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Monastic Colleges
Overview
[page 202] Yig cha are the required textbooks in the curriculum of Tibetan Buddhist monastic colleges (grwa tshang). They
may be called "debate manuals" because they are often structured around a series of debates which provide rich fodder
for the oral debates characteristic of Tibetan monastic education. The word yig cha literally means "record" or "notes."
Debate manuals have value both as explicit doctrinal records of the evolution of Buddhist thought and as implicit social
records of attitudes among educated monks toward faith, reason, education, and tradition. The genre can be traced back
almost a millennium, with new works still appearing in this century.
Often composed by distinguished scholars at the invitation of their colleges, many debate manuals are actually Tibetan
sub-sub-commentaries pertaining to Indian Buddhist treatises (stras) such as Dharmakrti's Pramavrttika, Maitreya's
Abhisamaylakra, and Candrakrti's Madhyamakvatra. Thus, while debate manuals are by definition pedagogical
works, intended to inform and to stimulate debate, the most noteworthy examples of the genre also involve elements of
creative exegesis, polemic, and/or philosophical synthesis. If we believe that earlier formulations of a religious view are
somehow more pure or more authenticand therefore more worthy of academic concernthen we may dismiss debate
manuals, along with Tibetan doxography (grub mtha') and [page 203] "grounds and paths" (sa lam) literature, as
derivative, synthetic, post-classical scholasticism. However, if our interest is the life of Buddhist philosophy across
generations of Tibetan scholars, and if we seek to know not just where tradition began but how it is remembered (and thus
reshaped), then we must give debate manuals their due.
In the monastic colleges of the dGe lugs school debate manuals have been the primary focus of intellectual life for the last
five or six centuries. This is certainly not to depreciate the enormous importance of Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa
(1357-1419) as the preeminent scholar and revered founder of the order, nor to imply a lack of reverence for kyamuni
and the authors of the Mahyna treatises. Tibetan scholars do rely upon debate manuals for exegetical guidance through
the "great books" of their tradition. The present Dalai Lama has reminded monks that they should not neglect to study
Tsong kha pa's own writings. Yet the issuance of such a reminder, unnecessary for the best scholars, is indicative of the
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typical student's tendency to acquire Tsong kha pa's system in a secondhand way, relying heavily on the convenient and
precise formulations of the debate manuals. Insofar as the colleges traditionally regard their manuals as ideal
reformulations of the essential points of the treatises and commentaries, the focus on the manuals has tended to displace
scholastic attention to the "great books."1
Monastic debate manuals bridge both historical and stylistic gaps by explicating the content of classical treatises in
language patterned after and readily (re)assimilated to the scholastic oral debate tradition. Debate manuals, or substantial
portions from them, are memorized by students and serve as the basis for (1) commentary by the teacher during class,
and (2) debate among the students in the monastery courtyard after class. Thus, these manuals link the philosophy of the
classical treatises to the living philosophy of courtyard debate, creating a shared universe for discourse among teachers
and students of the same college. In Tibetan monastic debate, arguments must be framed as syllogisms (prayoga, sbyor
ba) or consequences (prasaga, thal 'gyur), and the respondent must either challenge the sign (liga, rtags) (i.e., the minor
premise), or the pervasion (vypti, khyab pa) (i.e., the major premise), or else accept the opponent's point. The same rules
structure the debates in the manuals. Most manuals break down the [page 204] material into a series of topics, covering
each topic in a tripartite schema: (1) debates refuting opposing systems (dgag pa), (2) a presentation of the author's own
system (rang lugs bzhag pa) of definitions (mtshan nyid), etc., and (3) further debates dispelling objections (rtsod spong)
posed by actual or hypothetical critics. This format allows authors to sharpen their arguments while creating text that their
debate-trained readers find relatively easy to memorize for use in the courtyard. Conversely, debate manual authors must
have derived some of their written debates from oral debates current in their respective colleges and generations.
Monastic Colleges
Goldstein (21) estimates that twenty-six percent of traditional Tibet's male population were monks. Although Tibetans
generally regard monks as superior to laymen, this high percentage is one reason that the official charisma of the robes
was not potent enough to mark monks as an exclusive lite. In the dGe lugs, the dominant order of Tibetan Buddhism
since the seventeenth century, scholarly achievement has been one of the most important paths into the lite circles of
leadership. To understand this fact, we must reflect on the relationship between reason and liberation in Tsong kha pa's
philosophy.
Like other Buddhists, Tsong kha pa and his dGe lugs pa followers contend that liberation from beginningless cycles of
suffering is reached through non-dualistic (advaya, gnyis med) and trans-conceptual insight (nirvikalpajna, rtog med ye
shes) into reality (dharmat, chos nyid). However, for the dGe lugs pa this insight is not a spontaneous, naturally arising,
objectless intuition. Rather it is something that must be gradually and systematically cultivated, and it has a specific,
rationally comprehensible objectemptiness (nyat, stong pa nyid). Although emptiness is the very nature of the mind,
realization (rtogs pa) of this natural emptiness is a hard-won accomplishment. Realization of emptiness depends not only
upon prior training in ethics, but upon conceptual mastery of what "emptiness" is and how logic can be used to approach it.
This philosophical stance reinforced the religious and political authority of those who controlled educational institutions
equipped to provide the requisite training in logic and philosophy.2 Traditionally, much of dGe lugs education was
controlled by [page 205] large monasteries near Lhasa, especially 'Bras spungs, Se ra and dGa' ldan.3 Each major
monastic university comprised a number of colleges, each college having its own support personnel, its own temples, its
own debate manuals, its own faculty, and its own abbot (mkhan po). Some colleges focused on tantric studies, while
others existed only in theory or in vestigial forms; the major colleges that concern us here are sGo mang and Blo gsal gling
at 'Bras spungs, sMad and Byes at Se ra, and Shar rtse and Byang rtse at dGa' ldan. While education was a major
function of these institutions, at any given time most of the monks at the monastic universities were not students. Goldstein
(24) reports, for example, that at the middle of this century the monks at the sMad college of Se ra monastery numbered
2,800; of these only 800 were students. Few of these students could expect to complete the entire monastic curriculum;
most would find other vocations within the monastery. Thus, degree-holders were, and today remain, a small lite within
the monastic community.
An education at a big monastery is not presumed necessary for spiritual development, but there is an implication that study
at these monasteries represents a rare and invaluable spiritual opportunity for those who can withstand its rigors.
Advancement through the curriculum and academic hierarchy of these institutions is presumed to reflect the attainment of
(at least) the conceptual knowledge and analytical skills prerequisite to yogic realization. The colleges of 'Bras spungs, Se
ra and dGa' ldan monasteries give the title dge bshes to scholars passing exams at the end of twenty to twenty-five years
of study. The charismatic valence of this title is apparent when one considers that the Sanskrit equivalent of the title dge
bsheskalyamitra, usually translated "spiritual friend"is a standard epithet of a guru, i.e., a spiritual master.
Traditionally, considerable wealth and power accumulated in the hierarchies of these prestigious institutions; they played
important religious, political, economic, and even military roles in the history of Tibet. Far-flung networks of affiliated
monasteries not only provided a feeder system for promising students and appropriate sinecure for graduates, but also
offered channels for political intercourse. The abbots of the major colleges were among the most important figures in
Tibetan politics. Because the abbots were always selected from the ranks of the dge bshes, mastery of [page 206] the
monastic syllabusincluding expert knowledge of the debate manualswas an important path "out of the ranks" into
charismatic office and political power. While incarnate lamas (sprul sku) achieved their status otherwise, they were at least
in principle expected to pass through the same educational system.
Intercollegiate solidarity within the large monasteries tends to be weak. Each functioning college has its own chapel ('du
khang), staff, and debate manuals. As Goldstein (26-29) notes, when monks at Se ra Byes revolted against the central
government in 1947, Se ra sMad did not help them; when 'Bras spungs Blo gsal gling quarrelled with the Dalai Lama in
1921, 'Bras spungs sGo mang did not take their side. A monk's strongest loyalties are to his college and his regional
house (khang tshan), a sub-collegiate unit with membership traditionally based on natal province. Some colleges have
traditional regional affiliations based on the provinces represented by their constituent houses; thus, rivalries between
colleges within a monastery may have a regional flavor. Each college maintains the hagiographical tradition of its most
important author and, to a certain extent, takes his assertions as orthodoxy. Rivalries still rage between contiguous
colleges using different textbooks. At 'Bras spungs, doctrinal disputes between Blo gsal gling and sGo mang turn on
differences so thin that one hesitates to call them "philosophical." Yet analytical debate of such differences plays an
enormous role in the manuals and the lives of those who use them. In debate with other colleges (during the winter
session and at sMon lam) each monk is expected to uphold, insofar as possible, the assertions of his college's manuals.
Outside the context of debate with other colleges, dGe lugs monks differ greatly in their attitudes toward "debate manual
orthodoxy." Many regard their teachers and manuals as sources of unassailable truth, using their definitions as absolute
reference points. On the other hand, there are always those who "consider the knowledge imparted to them as a
tool...accepted provisionally in order to advance" on a quest that is at once philosophical and spiritual (Dreyfus: 10-12).
Geshe Sopa (41-42) reports that the curriculum at the Byes college of Se ra includes three years for the first phase, five
years for the second, and four years for each of the other three phases. At the sGo mang college of 'Bras spungs, six
years are dedicated to the first phase and six or seven years to the second phase (Hopkins: 15; Klein: 220). Once a day
classes meet with a teacher for about two hours of text-study; twice daily they meet in the courtyard for sessions of oral
debate among students. Five or six weeks out of every year are set aside for an inter-monastic session of debate and
study of Dharmakrti's Pramavarttika and related texts. Those who complete the five phases of the curriculum normally
spend additional years reviewing and sharpening their debate skills before undergoing examination for the dge bshes
degree at the Prayer Festival (sMon lam) celebrated during the first three weeks of the new year.
In this limited space we will mention some of the debate manuals used in the third (dbu ma) phase of this curriculum.
mtshan (1469-1546), author for the Byes college of Se ra and the Byang rtse College of dGa' ldan;5 sGom sde shar pa
Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan (1532-1592), a student of rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan and an author for the Byes College of
Se ra as well as the Byang rtse College of dGa' ldan; Khyung phrug Byams pa bkra shis (sixteenth century), another
student of rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan and an author for the Byang rtse College of dGa' ldan; Pa chen bSod nams
grags pa (1478-1554), author for the Blo gsal gling College of 'Bras spungs and the Shar rtse College of dGa' ldan; and
'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa Ngag dbang brtson 'grus (1648-1721), author of the texts of the sGo mang College of 'Bras
spungs as well as the bKra shis 'kyil Monastery, which he founded.6
Pa chen bSod nams grags pa, rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, and 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa are the best known and
most influential of the Mdhyamika debate manual authors. In their textbooks on Madhyamaka, these writers share two
main goals: (1) to provide a basis for instruction in the fundamentals of Madhyamaka philosophy, and (2) to confirm the
fundamental coherence of Tsong kha pa's system by refuting contrary interpretations and rebutting critics. Born in the
same century during which Tsong kha pa and his immediate disciples died, and flourishing prior to the sect's attainment of
political supremacy, rJe btsun pa and Pa chen see the founder and his early followers in the light of a charisma slightly
less magnificent than that appreciated by later generations. Pa chen, in particular, boldly overthrows the assertions of
mKhas grub and rGyal tshab when they conflict with his own conclusions (see BZSG: 61a and BJGL: 47a-47b). The work
of rJe btsun pa and Pa chen seems quite terse when compared to 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's elaborate grappling with
myriad doctrinal complications. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's Mdhyamika manual is more [page 209] ambitious than others in
its attempts (1) to demonstrate the fidelity of Tsong kha pa to his Indian sources and (2) to reconcile apparent
contradictions among Tsong kha pa, mKhas grub, and rGyal tshab. Thriving in the heyday of dGe lugs power, 'Jam
dbyangs bzhad pa is also more deferential to Tsong kha pa's spiritual "sons" (sras)mKhas grub and rGyal tshab. When
he cannot reconcile a literal (tshig zin) reading of mKhas grub or rGyal tshab with his own understanding of Tsong kha pa,
he works to reconcile the intentions (dgongs pa) behind their words.7
(GTKN: 266). By citing Candrakrti's denial of non-worldly conventionalities in refutation of sTag tshang, 'Jam dbyangs
bzhad pa suggests that Candrakrti's initial denial is intended to rule out a special category [page 210] of non-worldly, yogic
conventionalities.
'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa then uses a hypothetical objection as an opportunity to reconcile his reading of the Prasannapad
with earlier comments on the Madhyamakvatra. Confident that in a few brief strokes he has unravelled a passage in the
Prasannapad, aligned it with the Madhyamakvatra, and refuted sTag tshang, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa cannot resist
concluding on a self-congratulatory note. He writes (BMC: 541-542):
Incorrect Position held by sTag tshang the Translator: [Candrakrti's] use of the word loka ["world"] in
the phrase lokasavti ('jig rten gyi kun rdzob) precludes Superiors having in their continuums
conventional valid cognitions (tha snyad pa'i tshad ma) that perceive conventional truths (savtisatya,
kun rdzob bden pa).8
Correct Response: It follows that this is incorrect because [Candrakirti's] statement of loka [in
"lokasavti"] is descriptive; it is not [made] for the sake of applying analyses such as [yours]. This is
because Candrakrti's Prasannapad (493) says:
Is there also a savti that is not worldly from which a worldly savti could be thus
distinguished? This [word "worldly"] describes how things are. That analysis [which
assumes that since savti is sometimes modified by "worldly," there must also be
an unworldly savti] does not apply here.
Incorrect Position with regard to this: It [absurdly] follows that worldly conventionalities (lokasavti, 'jig
rten gyi kun rdzob) are not divided into conventionalities that are real for the world ('jig rten gyi yang dag
pa'i kun rdzob) and conventionalities that are unreal for the world ('jig rten gyi log pa'i kun rdzob)
because [according to you] "world" (loka, 'jig rten) is stated [merely] for descriptive purposes [and not in
order to differentiate two types of conventionalities].9 If you accept the consequence, it follows that your
explanation that in Candrakrti's Madhyamakvatra (104) worldly conventionalities are of two types
those that are real from a worldly perspective and those that are unreal from a worldly perspectiveis
incorrect.
Correct Response: The original reason [that "world" is stated for descriptive purposes in the
Prasannapad] certainly does not entail the consequence [that worldly conventionalities are not
divided into conventionalities that are real for the world and conventionalities that are unreal for the
world] because, since the erroneousi.e., falseconsciousnesses of one whose sense powers have
been impaired by jaundice, etc., are not the world in relation to whose perspective something is posited
as [page 211] real, Candrakrti says "worldly conventional truth" (lokasavtisatya) in order to make
that point understood.10 This is because Candrakrti's Prasannapad (493.2-4) says:
Yet in one way there is [such a non-world]. Those who have erroneous vision
because their senses have been impaired by opthalmia, blue eye-film,11 jaundice,
etc. are not worlds. That which is a conventionality for them is not a worldly
conventional truth (lokasavtisatya).12 Therefore, a worldly conventional truth is
distinguished from that.
Since it seems that even many former scholars did not explain13 this, I have written a little clearly.
Conclusion
From a dGe lugs religious perspective, debate manuals engender analytical skills and lay the foundations of right view,
thus providing a solid conceptual basis from which yogic inquiry into the nature of reality can proceed. We may also
observe that (1) minor differences among the manuals are focal points for the intellectual expression of collegial solidarity
and intercollegiate tensions, while (2) their far broader commonalities in structure and content contribute to the
socialization of the monastic lite within a shared worldview.
References
Candrakrti
MAMadhyamakvatra. Tibetan translation: P no. 5261, vol. 98 in The Tibetan Tripiaka (see Suzuki).
PPMlamadhyamakavttiprasannapad. In Mlamadhaymakakriks de Ngrjuna avec la Prasannapad Commentaire
de Candrakrti. Ed. by Louis de la Valle Poussin. Bibliotheca Buddhica4. Osnabrck: Biblio Verlag, 1970. Tibetan: P
no. 5260, vol. 98 in The Tibetan Tripiaka (see Suzuki); and Jacques May, Prasannapad Madhyamakavtti, douze
chapitres traduits du sanscrit et du tibtain. Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1959.
Dharmakrti
PVPramavrttikakrika. In Pramavrttika of Acharya Dharmakrti. Ed. by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Varanasi:
Bauddha Bharati, 1968. Tibetan: P no. 5709, vol. 130 in The Tibetan Tripiaka (see Suzuki).
Dreyfus, Georges B. J.
1987Definition in Buddhism. M.A. thesis. Charlottesville: University of Virgina.[page 214]
Goldstein, Melvyn C.
1989A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Guaprabha
VSVinayastra. Tibetan translation: P no. 5619, vol. 123 in The Tibetan Tripitaka (see Suzuki).
Hopkins, Jeffrey
n.d.Reflections on Reality: The Nature of Phenomena in the Mind-Only School. Unpublished ms.
Klein, Anne
1986Knowledge and Liberation. Ithaca: Snow Lion.
Maitreya
AAAbhisamaylakra. In Abhisamaylakra-Prajpramit-Upadea-astra. Ed. by Th. Stcherbatsky and E.
Obermiller. Bibliotheca Buddhica22. Osnabrck: Biblio Verlag, 1970. Tibetan: P no. 5184, vol. 88 in The Tibetan
Tripiaka (see Suzuki).
Newland, Guy
1984Compassion: A Tibetan Analysis. London: Wisdom.
1992The Two Truths. Ithaca: Snow Lion.
Perdue, Daniel
1992Debate in Tibetan Buddhism. Ithaca: Snow Lion.
Notes
[1] This situation is not peculiar to dGe lugs. In the colleges of the Sa skya school (and in the Sa skya College now
located in Rajpur, India) the primary focus is on the work of Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge (1429-1489) rather than on
the work of Sa skya Paita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182-1251/2) and the other early luminaries of the order. The Sa
skya pa monks use the word yig cha to refer to the required texts by Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge.
[2] The following paragraphs describe the general situation in the monastic universities, considering both the traditional
context (pre-1959) and the contemporary context of the dGe lugs monasteries reestablished in exile near Mundgod and
Bylakuppe, India.
[3] Tsong kha pa established dGa' ldan in 1409; his student Byams chen chos rje founded 'Bras spungs in 1416 and Se
ra (spelled Se rwa by some authorities) in 1419. Each held several thousand monks. Other major dGe lugs monastic
universities include bKra shis lhun po, bKra shis 'kyil, and sKu 'bum. [page 212] Established in 1445 in gZhis ga rtse by
dGe 'dun grub pa (who was posthumously entitled "First Dalai Lama"), bKra shis lhun po became the seat of the Pa
chen Lama in the seventeenth century. bKra shis 'kyil was founded in eastern Tibet by the dGe lugs scholar 'Jam
dbyangs bzhad pa Ngag dbang brtson 'grus, and sKu 'bum was founded in the sixteenth century at Tsong kha pa's
birthplace.
[4] There is also a class of Mdhyamika debate manuals based on Tsong kha pa's Legs bshad snying po. Many of the
Newland, 1984.
[6] No longer extant are Mdhyamika debate manuals by Blo gros rin chen seng ge (fifteenth century) and Shes rab
dbang po (fifteenth century?), both formerly used in the Byes College of Se ra. My translation of the satyadvaya section
from 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's Mdhyamika debate manual is forthcoming from Snow Lion.
[7] For examples, see BMC: 268b, 275b, and 290a. In the section dealing with the two truths, we find mKhas grub quoted
eight times in eighty-six sides. By comparison, Ngrjuna is also cited eight times; only Tsong kha pa, Candrakrti, and
stra are cited more often. rGyal tshab is cited four times.
[8]
The Sa skya scholar sTag tshang lo ts ba Shes rab rin chen criticizes the dGe lugs position on conventional valid
cognition (tha snyad pa'i tshad ma). He writes (GTKN: 269):
[T]he presentation of valid cognition that is well known in the world ... [may be] asserted in a way that
indulges the perspective of the world. However, a so-called "valid cognizer comprehending
conventionalities" is completely non-existent [not only in terms of the thorough analysis into
emptiness but even] in terms of the normal analysis of our own system.
Thus, even Superiors in states subsequent to meditative equipoise (prhalabdhajna) cannot have valid knowledge of
conventional phenomena. Nevertheless, their "yogic" mode of apprehension is distinct from the non-analytical
perspective of the world. sTag tshang (GTKN: 266) uses this distinction to make a twofold division of conventionalities:
In general, it is said that there are two types of conventionalities: worldly conventionalities and yogic
conventionalities.With regard to illustrations, coarse phenomena of a mistaken perspective that
does not investigate or analyze are worldly conventionalities. Subtle impermanencean object found
by a conventional awareness with normal analysisand the appearances in states subsequent to
meditative equipoise of Superiorsare yogic conventionalities.
[9] This incorrect position challenges a shift in 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's manner of reading the word "world." When the
phrase "of the world" ('jig rten gyi) is added to the phrase "real conventionality" (yang dag pa'i kun rdzob) or "unreal
conventionality" (log pa'i kun rdzob), 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa understands [page 213] this to mean conventionalities that
are real or unreal for the worldly perspective. (If the qualification "for the worldly perspective" were not added, then one
would have to say that all conventionalities are unreal.) However, when the phrase "of the world" ('jig rten gyi) is added
to "conventionality" (kun rdzob), 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa does not take this to mean "conventionality in the perspective of
the world." Such a reading might suggest a contrasting "conventionality in the perspective of yogis" as advocated by
sTag tshang. Or else, it might suggest that worldly conventionalities are phenomena that worldly beings can recognize
as conventionalities.
[10] Conventional truths (savtisatya), literally, are "truths-for-a-concealing ignorance," phenomena that are
misapprehended as truths by the subtlest ignorancea conception of inherent existenceof even ordinary, healthy
persons. A person with jaundice who sees a white piece of paper as yellow may have a coarse ignorant consciousness
that believes that the paper is actually yellow, just as it appears. That misconception conceals the white color of the
paper. However, such a misconception is not the concealing ignorance in terms of which that paper is a concealer-truth
because it is not a conception of inherent existence.
[11] "Blue eye-film" (ling thog sngon po) does not appear in the Sanskrit.
[12] Jacques May's Tibetan (432) reads: 'jig rten kun rdzob bden pa ma yin pas. La Valle Poussin's Sanskrit (493) reads
alokasavti.
[13] At 542, reading bshad for shod in accordance with the sGo mang edition, 300a.
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