Page 1 of 39

I.
I.

QUASI-DELICT (ARTS. 2176-2194, NCC)

Quasi-Delict
a. Introductory concepts
a.1 Nature, Scope and Coverage

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
*DOLO VS. CULPA

In Article 3, you find 2 ways of committing a crime under the RPC:

1.

Dolo something that is done with intent

2.

Culpa or Fault done through negligence

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
* When we say quasi-delict based on fault or negligence, is it something that is done intentionally?

Atty says, because precisely otherwise, it could have been dolo, but its really culpa.

*So if its not intentional, can you say its voluntary?

YES, Except that they are unintentional because they are not based on intent, but on fault, negligence, lack of foresight, lack
of skill.

*What did SC say about quasi-delict vs. torts?

Quasi-delict, as defined by Article 2176, is homologous but not identical to torts.

*Why is it homologous but not identical?

Like quasi-delict, torts can embrace the concept of negligence. You can as well file an action based on
negligence and say its torts. It can cover even intentional acts like battery, deceit and false imprisonment.
*Why is torts broader than quasi-delict?

Torts broader than quasi-delict because it is based on common law. Torts has been a matter of bread and
butter for common law jurisdictions like the US, you just read their McDonalds Case, or Philip Morris Case,
or the Oil Spill Case before. You have a judge who can award millions of punitive damages based on tort
because it can be any case that the court says it is. Whereas, the concept of quasi-delict being civil law in
character, is limited by what the law says. Precisely why SC said that tort would have to be broader than
quasi-delict.
*When we say therefore torts, as compared not just to quasi-delict but to our laws on reparation, which one would be
broader? Our civil law on wrongs. This takes us back to the case of Baksh, what did SC say there?

Our concept on reparation for civil wrongs is broader than torts. Because for instance, Baksh would take us
to Article 19, 20, 21 of the Civil Code which would otherwise not have found as in equivalent in common law
jurisdictions.
*What would be the importance of our laws on quasi-delict?

Because you have a law on quasi-delict you are able to get reparation. So provisions of quasi-delict allow us
to have a civil redress.
*What do you think does this law achieve?
1. Reparation or civil redress because of the law on quasi-delict, you are able to get reparation or civil
redress.
2. Corrective justice case of Baksh
3. Optimal deterrence - (attitude of Iranians after reading the case of Baksh)
4. Loss distribution example you have an employee committing an act or omission causing damage to
another, that you can as well hold liable the employer. And what is very good atleast for the victims
because they can sue not just the one who is at fault and who generally doesnt have the money, but
also the one who hired the one at fault and who generally has the money.
5. Civil law concept when you announce in the cases what should be the proper conduct to follow, the
courts can shape social norms or may be obtain social redress.
*Is Fault and Negligence the same?
NO. When we say fault, it is the performance of an act. Negligence, is the non-performance of the act. If you look at Article 3 of RPC,
Fault is there whenever there is negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, lack of skill. Precisely why in your Criminal Law you have this
crime known as culpa criminal. If it is based on fault, the crime is known culpa criminal.
Torts
Quasi-delict
Common Law
Civil Law
May be intentional
Unintentional (may or may not be voluntary)
May be criminal
May be criminal (such as criminal negligence)
No pre-existing contractual obligation
No pre-existing contractual obligation
Common Law
Customs and usages (broader)
Elcano vs. Hill

Civil Law
Enacted by Congress

Page 2 of 39
-

Held: Article 2176, when it refers to fault or negligence covers not only acts punishable by law but also acts in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. The acquittal of Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence not a bar to the instant action. Furthermore, in a civil action, only preponderance of
evidence to make the defendant pay in damages is needed.
The sons emancipation by marriage cannot free the father from responsibility. Under Article 397, by marriage of the minor
is not really full or absolute. (Under the Family Code, it is stated in Article 236 that nothing in this Code shall be construed
to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below 21 years of age
mentioned in the 2nd and 3rd paragraph of Article 2180.)
o Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in
the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA
Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or
common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but
international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
-

Difference between Quasi-delict (Article 2176) and Torts:

Article 2176: QUASI DELICT

It is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent.

known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept

TORTS

an Anglo-American or common law concept

much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal
acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.

Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Vs. CA

Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa aquiliana,
culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) is homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, which includes not
only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
a.2 Requisites
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Requisites:
1. A civil wrong
2. Arising from an act or omission
3. Amounting to fault or negligence
4. Where there is no pre-existing contractual obligation (since quasi-delict is essentially extra-contractual in nature.
See however the case of Air France vs. Carrascoso)
Child Learning v. Tagorio
-

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence:
(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.

b.

Difference between fault and negligence:

o FAULT

voluntary act or omission which causes damage to the right of another giving rise to an obligation on the
part of the actor to repair such damage.

requires the execution of a positive act which causes damage to another

o NEGLIGENCE

failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand.

Consists of the omission to do acts which result in damage to another.

Quasi-delict distinguished from

b.1 culpa criminal
As to interest
As to purpose

Culpa criminal
Public
Punitive / Corrective

Culpa aquiliana
Private
Reparation through indemnification

Page 3 of 39
As to basis of liability

There must be a law which punishes

the act or omission

Include all acts in which any kind of

fault or negligence intervenes

Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario ( DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CULPA-CONTRACTUAL AND CULPA-AQUILIANA)

Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil
Code are:

(1) That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
(2)That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
(3) That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes."

Joseph vs. Bautista

The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence the judgment on the
compromise agreement under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for breach of
contract of carriage, is untenable.

The trial court was correct in holding that there was only one cause of action involved although the bases of recovery
invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were not necessarily identical since the respondents were not
identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the
other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission
which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.

Rafael Reyes Trucking Corp vs. People

In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between:

(1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and
(2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover
damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery.

In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability
ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability."

Page 4 of 39
-

In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioner as employer
of the accused, based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Private respondents sued
petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault or
negligence of the latter. Under the law, this vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions
of law.
o

Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow an action predicated on quasi-delict to
be instituted by the injured party against the employer for an act or omission of the employee and would
necessitate only a preponderance of evidence to prevail.

Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a
felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his duty.

Spouses Santos vs. Pizardo

-

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e.,
(1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those
(a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law
under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the
caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery.

Manliclic vs. Calaunan

-

A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that
he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.

In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the
author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second
instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a
civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.

As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on
ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a
quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

b.2. culpa contractual (ARTS. 1172-1173, NCC)

As to liability
As to cause of action
As to diligence required
As to defense of due diligence in
the selection and supervision of
employees

Culpa contractual
Incidental
Must prove:
1. Existence of contract
2. Breach of contract
Extraordinary diligence (in case of
common carriers)
Not available

Culpa aquiliana
Direct
Negligence
Ordinary diligence
Available

Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such
liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. (1103)
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a
good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)

Page 5 of 39

Guiterrez v. Guiterrez, 56 PHIL 177

In case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the bus driver on which he was riding and of the driver of another
vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.
Philippine School of Business Administration, et. al. v. CA
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the
rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known
as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France vs.
Carrascoso, the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner
airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a
contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act
that breaks the contract may be also a tort.
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco vs.
Manila Railroad, Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it
does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is
to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extracontractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would
have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the
parties.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and
Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.
Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes
material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine
qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract
Air France v. Carrascoso
The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will;
he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way
to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has
assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."
The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. For the
willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10),
Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. And this, because
of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of
the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect
or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Thus, "Where a steamship company had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of
action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat
of ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." And this, because, although the relation of
passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a
tort".
Regino v. Pangasinan
In Non v. Dames II, the Court modified the "termination of contract theory" in Alcuaz by holding that the contractual relationship
between the school and the student is not only semestral in duration, but for the entire period the latter are expected to complete it."
Except for the variance in the period during which the contractual relationship is considered to subsist, both Alcuaz and Non were
unanimous in characterizing the school-student relationship as contractual in nature.
In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private respondents "inhumanly punish students x x x by reason only of their
poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon [petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness;" as a
result of such punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any of her subjects for the second semester of that school year and had
to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and
"demoralization of unimaginable proportions" in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. Generally, liability for tort arises
only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it
has an existing contract with its students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort.

Page 6 of 39
Manila Railroad Co. v. La Compania Trasantiantica
It is desirable, however, in this connection, to bring out somewhat more fully the distinction between negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation (culpa contractual) and neligence considered as an independent source of obligation between parties not
previously bound (culpa aquiliana).
This distinction is well established in legal jurisprudence and is fully recognized in the provisions of the Civil Code. As
illustrative of this, we quote the following passage from the opinion of this Court in the well-known case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf &
Pacific Co., and in this quotation we reproduce the first paragraph of here presenting a more correct English version of said passage.
The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of preexisting duties of the parties
to one another. But where relations already formed give arise to duties, whether springing form contract or quasi-contract, then
breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code.
We see with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses, either as
culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between two person not formerly bound by
any other obligation; or as an incident in the performance of an obligation which already existed, and which increases the liability arising
from the already existing obligation.

Calalas v. CA
The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the
tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action,
whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the
obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.

Construction Dev. Corp. of the Philippines v. Estrella, et. al.

Can one institute a civil action against different sets of defendants, one based on culpa contractual and the other based on culpa
aquilina?
Supreme Court held that the owner of the other vehicle which collided with a common carrier is solidarily liable to the injured
passenger of the same. We held, thus:
The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of the bus on which plaintiff was riding
concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver of another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v.
Buo, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and
severally held liable to the injured passenger or the latter's heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability was explained in
Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus:
Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs from contract while that of
respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez
vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was
riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable
for damages.
II. ACT OR OMISSION
ART. 1173, NCC
The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions
of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required.
TEST TO DETERMINE EXISTENCE OF NEGLIGENCE:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligence act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person
would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE:
Slight Negligence- the failure to exercise great or extraordinary care.
Ordinary Negligence- the want of ordinary care and diligence, that is, such care and diligence as an ordinarily prudent person
would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.

Page 7 of 39
Gross Negligence- materially greater than ordinary negligence, and consists of an entire absence of care or an absence of
even slight diligence; it implies a thoughtless disregard for consequences or an indifference to the rights and welfare of others.
ART. 3, REVISED PENAL CODE
Definitions. Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
ACCIDENT
An occurrence by chance, and not as expected. (Ballentines Law dictionary)
An unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; sometime that does not occur in the usual course of events or could be
reasonably anticipated. (Blacks law dictionary)
An act of God has been defined as an accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention,
which by no amount of foresight, pains or care, reasonably to have been expected, could have been prevented. (Nakpil & Sons v. CA)
GAID v. PEOPLE
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act which material damage results by
reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.
DYTEBAN v. CHING
The test of negligence is objective. We measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with that of an ordinary reasonable
person in the same situation.
It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime mover on the national highway posed a serious risk to oncoming
motorists. It was incumbent upon Limbaga to take some measures to prevent that risk, or atleast minimize it.
DAYWALT v. CORPORACIO DE PP. AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS
Whether a person who is not a party to a contract for the sale of land makes himself liable for damages to the vendee, beyond
the value of the use and occupation, by colluding with the vendor and maintaining him in the efforts to resist an action for specific
performance.
The right which was here recognized had its origins in a rule, long familiar to the courts of common law, to the effect that any
person who entices a servant from his employment is liable in damages to the master (illegal to interfere with any relation of personal
service).
The right of action for maliciously procuring a breach of contract is not confined to contracts for personal services, but extends
to contracts in general. Whether his motive is to benefit himself or gratify his spite by working mischief to the employer is immaterial.
Malice in the sense of ill-will or spite is not essential.
Upon the question of legal justification, if a party enters into a contract to go for another upon a journey to a remote and
unhealthy climate, and a third person, with bona fide purpose of benefiting the one who is under contract to go, dissuades him from the
step, no action will lie. But if the advice is not disinterested and the persuasion is used for the indirect purpose of benefiting the
defendant at the expense of the plaintiff, the intermeddler is liable if his advice is taken and the contract is broken.
PICART v. SMITH
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot be
here of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before
them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care
only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was
the duty of the actor to take precautions to guarantee against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion borne of this provision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.
UMALI V. BACANI
The series of negligence on the part of the defendants employee resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution, to wit: the
defendant did not cut down the banana plants which are taller than the electric posts to eliminate that source of danger to the electric
line; that after the storm they did not cut off the flow of electricity from the lines pending inspection of the wires to see if they have been
cut; and lastly, in not taking precautions to prevent anybody from approaching the live wires. Cause was negligence of employee and
not fortuitous event of storm.
The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the employer is supposed to
exercise supervision over the work of the employee. The liability of the employer is primary and direct.

Page 8 of 39

CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION v. CA

Foreseeability of the harm is therefore an indispensable requirement. Thus, in a case where the SC found that the actor could
not have reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him, it was ruled that he was not guilty of negligence.
RAKES v. AG & P
Professional Risk. Employer-Employee Relation.
This contractual obligation, implied form the relation and perhaps so inherent in its nature to be invariable by the parties, binds
the employer to provide safe appliances for the use of the employee, thus closely corresponding to English and American Law. On
these principles it was the duty of the defendant to build and maintain its tracks in reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its
workingmen from unnecessary danger. IT is plain that in one respect or the other it failed in its duty, otherwise the accident could not
have occurred, consequently the negligence of the defendant is established.
Another contention of the defense is that the injury resulted to the plaintiff as a risk incident to his employment and, as such,
one assumed by him. It is evident that this can not be the case if the occurrence was due to the failure to repair the track or to duly
inspect it for the employee is not presumed to have stipulated that the employer might neglect his legal duty. Nor may it be excused
ground that the negligence leading to the accident was that of a fellow-servant of the injured man. It is not apparent to us that the
intervention of a 3rd person can relieve the defendant from the performance of its duty nor impose upon the plaintiff the consequences
of an act or omission not his own. Sua cuique culpa nocet. This doctrine, known as the fellow-servant rule, we are not disposed to
introduce into our jurisprudence. Adopted in England by Lord Abinger in 1837 it has been effectually abrogated by the Employers
Liability Act ad the Compensation Law. xxx
ASSOCIATED BANK v. TAN
Our SC has emphasized that the banking business is impressed with public interest. Consequently, the highest degree of
diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity and performance are even required of it. By the nature of its functions, a bank is
under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care.
S.D. MARTINEZ v. BUSKIRK
Acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or injurious and which have been generally acquiesced in by
society for so long a time as to have ripened into a custom, can not be held to be unreasonable or imprudence and that, under the
circumstances, the driver was not guilty of negligence in so leaving his team while assisting in unloading his wagon.
PACIS v. MORALES
A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely
dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous
instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs or life
or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known never to
keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the
guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed
for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they
are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he
accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective
gun should have been stored in a vault. For failing to ensure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent.
YLARDE v. AQUINO
The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor
should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult , but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of
persons of his age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care
ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge, and experience under the same or similar
circumstances.
PHILHAWK CORP v. LEE
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a
way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a
general but definite class of risks.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the
employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees. To avoid
liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employees, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that
he exercised the case and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees.
REGALA v. CARIN
Respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the injuries he sustained were the proximate effect of
petitioners act or omission. It thus becomes necessary to instead look into the manner by which petitioner carried out his renovations to
determine whether this was directly responsible for any distress respondent may have suffered since the law requires that a wrongful or
illegal act or omission must have preceded the damages sustained by the claimant.

Page 9 of 39
It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the lawful exercise of his property rights to introduce renovations to his abode.
While he initially did not have a building permit and may have misrepresented his real intent when he initially sought respondents
consent, the lack of permit was inconsequential since it only rendered petitioner liable to administrative sanctions or penalties.
FRANCISCO v. CHEMICAL BULK CARRIERS
One who is physically disabled (blind) is required to use the same degree of care that a reasonably careful person who has
the same physical disability would use. Physical handicaps and infirmities, such as blindness or deafness, are treated as part of the
circumstances under which a reasonable person must act. Thus, the standard of conduct for blind person becomes that of a reasonable
person who is blind.
VAUGHAN v. MENLOVE
The standard of care under negligence is not based on the judgment of each individual.
A landowner is under a general duty of care to use his land without negligently causing injury to others. The standards of
negligence is that of a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances.
The court held that even though D did not light the fire, he was as much responsible for it as if he had put the candle to the rick
himself, and noted that it was a well known fact that hay will ferment and take fire if nor carefully stacked.
There was gross negligence because S had been warned repeatedly of the risk and chose to ignore that risk.
HAZING AS NEGLIGENCE: VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE
In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the
result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. Here a person performs an initial lawful deed, however, due to negligence,
imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act. Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is
a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an immediate personal harm,
injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.
In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an
act done with grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the
threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position
of the person to whom negligence in attributed foresee the harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure
to do so constitutes negligence.
For a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree
of the danger involved. If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual
who choses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury. It is
thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, from a transitory glance
of care to the most vigilant effort. The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of
each particular case.
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Villa, the cardiac failure was caused by blood clots all over the body of the
accused as a result of the paddling and blows. And evidence shows that some accused fraternity members were drinking during the
initiation rites.
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death
of Villa culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the
process. With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI
medico-legal officer found that the victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all
those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
IV.
CAUSAL RELATION BETWEEN ACT OR OMISSION AND DAMAGE
a Doctrine of Proximate Cause
PROXIMATE CAUSE that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each
case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. (American Express International Inc. v. Cordero, G.R.
No. 138550, Oct. 14, 2005)
Q: When may a person be held liable for his negligent act?
A: A person may be held liable for his negligent act if such is the proximate cause of the injury, even though it is merely one of many
concurring efficient causes.
TISON ET AL. VS. SPS. POMASIN GR NO. 173180, AUGUST 24, 2011
FACTS:
Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay
last 12 August 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-trailer, driven
by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the opposite lane going towards Naga City.
The jitney on the opposite lane, going downhill, was falling off the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag manner
and heading towards the direction of the truck. To avoid collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a
tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left fender of the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few meters away. The
tractor-trailer was likewise damaged.
Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted.
The appellate court noted that the restriction in Jabon's driver's license was violated, thus, giving rise to the presumption that he was
negligent at the time of the accident.
ISSUE:
Who is the negligent party or the party at fault?
RULING:
We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction
imposed on his driver's license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3. As a matter of fact, Jabon even asked the Land Transportation Office to
reinstate his articulated license containing restriction code 8 which would allow him to drive a tractor-trailer. The Court of Appeals
concluded therefrom that Jabon was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the collision.

Page 10 of 39
Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of
negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It
must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed
thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is
a contributing cause of the injury. Likewise controlling is our ruling in Aonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that negligence
per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages. In said
case, Aonuevo, who was driving a car, did not attempt "to establish a causal connection between the safety violations imputed to the
injured cyclist, and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that these violations in themselves sufficiently
established negligence appreciable against the cyclist. Since the onus on Aonuevo is to conclusively prove the link between the
violations and the accident, we can deem him as having failed to discharge his necessary burden of proving the cyclist' s own liability."
30We took the occasion to state that:
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the
mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to
impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not
be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury
sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is
remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the
conduct of other.
In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-trailer driver's restrictions on his license to the vehicular
collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation Office merely erred in not including restriction
code 8 in his license.
OCEAN BUILDERS v. SPS. CUBACUB, GR NO. 150898, APRIL 13, 2011
FACTS:
Bladimir Cubacub (Bladimir) was employed as maintenance man by petitioner company Ocean Builders Construction Corp. at its office
in Caloocan City.
On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus advised by petitioner Dennis Hao (Hao), the company's general
manager, to rest for three days which he did at the company's "barracks" where he lives free of charge.
Three days later or on April 12, 1995, Bladimir went about his usual chores of manning the gate of the company premises and even
cleaned the company vehicles. Later in the afternoon, however, he asked a co-worker, Ignacio Silangga (Silangga), to accompany him
to his house in Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by Silangga of Bladimir's intention, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered
Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.
Along with co-workers Narding and Tito Vergado, Silangga thus brought Bladimir to the Caybiga Community Hospital (Caybiga
Hospital), a primary-care hospital around one kilometer away from the office of the company then transferred to Quezon City General
Hospital (QCGH). However, he died.
The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimir's immediate cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest and the
antecedent cause as pneumonia. On the other hand, the death certificate issued by Dr. Frias recorded the causes of death as cardiac
arrest, multiple organ system failure, septicemia and chicken pox.
Bladimir's parents-herein respondents later filed on August 17, 1995 before the Tarlac Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Capas a complaint
for damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of negligence which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimir's condition
leading to his death.
ISSUE:
WON the employer is liable/negligent
RULING:
At the onset, the Court notes that the present case is one for damages based on torts, the employer-employee relationship being
merely incidental. To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must be present, viz.: (1) duty (2) breach (3)
injury and proximate causation. The assailed decision of the appellate court held that it was the duty of petitioners to provide adequate
medical assistance to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, failing which a breach is committed.
As found by the trial court and borne by the records, petitioner Hao's advice for Bladimir to, as he did, take a 3-day rest and to later
have him brought to the nearest hospital constituted "adequate and immediate medical" attendance that he is mandated, under Art.
161, to provide to a sick employee in an emergency.
Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical background. He may not be thus expected to have known that
Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better facilities than the Caybiga Hospital, contrary to appellate court's ruling.
AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir. Proximate
cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without
which, the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears
from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or
damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.
IN FINE, petitioner company and its co-petitioner manager Dennis Hao are not guilty of negligence.
FERNANDO V. CA, 208 SCRA 714
FACTS:
On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of
Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio
Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. On November 26, 1975
Bascon was notified and he signed the purchase order. However, before such date, specifically on November 22, 1975, bidder
Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernandoand Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found
dead inside the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. One body, that of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle,
Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there. The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned
that the five victim sentered the septic tank without clearance neither from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market
master. In fact, the septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones who did the reemptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and in his reports, put the cause of death of all five victims
as "asphyxia" caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below normal conditions. The lungs of the five victims
burst, swelled in hemmorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case, was sulfide gas produced
from the waste matter inside the septic tank. Petitioners, children of the deceased, file a complaint for damages. TC: Dismissed. CA:
In favor of petitioners, based on social justice. CA on MR: Reversed, in favor of Davao City.
ISSUE:
W/N Davao City is liable.
HELD:
No. We find no compelling reason to grant the petition. We affirm.
While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence
was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public

Page 11 of 39
toilet in Agdao Public Market, the public respondent immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. Thereafter,
it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon. The public respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial
measures to meet the situation. It is likewise an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic
tank since 1956, people in the market have been using the public toilet for their personal necessities but have remained unscathed.
In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen
unless one removes its covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from
the public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has
not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no
exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His
failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.
DYTEBAN V. JOSE CHING, supra.
ISSUE:
W/N prime mover driver Limbagas negligence was the proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.
HELD:
SC held that the skewed parking of the prime mover (negligence of the driver) was the proximate cause of the collision.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. More comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that
an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense,
policy and precedent. Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link
must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of the
act or omission.
Here, We agree with the RTC that the damage caused to the Nissan van was a natural and probable result of the improper parking of
the prime mover with trailer. As discussed, the skewed parking of the prime mover posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Limbaga
failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The skewed parking of the prime mover triggered the series of events that led to the collision,
particularly the swerving of the passenger bus and the Nissan van. The skewed parking is the proximate cause of the damage to the
Nissan van.
BATACLAN V. MEDINA, 102 PHIL 181
FACTS:
The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of Medina Transportation, driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by
Mariano Medina. On its way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires burst and the vehicle fell into a canal. Some passengers were able to
escape by themselves or with some help, while there were 4, including Bataclan, who could not get out. Their cries were heard in the
neighbourhood. Then there came about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch. As they approached the bus, it caught fire and the
passengers died. The fire was due to gasoline leak and the torch. Salud Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in her name and on behalf of her
5 minor children, sought to claim damages from the bus company. The CFI favored the plaintiff, and the CA forwarded the case to the
SC due to the amount involved.
ISSUE:
What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan and the other passengers?
HELD:
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having
undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree that there was negligence on the part of the
defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. At the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the
passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point
where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters.
The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus
must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. A satisfactory
definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their
brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
In the present case, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when
the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but
most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 am), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural
than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other
words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of
some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road
walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was,
gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that
gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said
negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759
and 1763.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO V. REMOQUILLO, 99 PHIL 117

Page 12 of 39
FACTS:
Efren Magno went to repair a media agua of the house of his brother-in-law on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila. While making the
repair, a galvanized iron roofing which he was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung
parallel to the edge of the media agua and 2-1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. The electric wire was
already in the premises at the time the house was built. This distance of 2-1/2 feet of the media agua from the electric wire was not in
accordance with city regulations which required a distance of 3 feet but somehow or other the owner of the building was able to have
the construction approved. In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against the Manila Electric Co. the CA awarded
damages holding that although the owner of the house in constructing the media agua exceeded the limits fixed in the permit, still
after making that finally approved because he was given a final permit to occupy the house and that the company was at fault and guilty
of negligence because although the electric wire had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric company did
not exercise due diligence nor take other precautionary measures as may be warranted. Said decision was appealed to the SC.
HELD:
SC held that the real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself.
When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his
age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So,
he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant case, his
training and experience failed him, and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms
length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the
motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution.
But even assuming for a moment that the defendant electric company could be considered negligent in installing its electric wires so
close to the house and mediaagua in question, and in failing to properly insulate those wires (although according to the unrefuted
claim of said company it was impossible to make the insulation of that kind of wire), nevertheless to hold the defendant liable in
damages for the death of Magno, such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the
accident, because if the act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the proximate and
principal cause of the electrocution, then his heirs may not recover.
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather
the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such
as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the latters length of 6 feet. For a
better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause with respect to injuries, we find the following citation helpful:
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If not danger
existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of prior
defection condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.
TAYLOR V. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT CO., 16 PHIL 8
FACTS:
The defendant left some twenty or thirty fulminating caps used for blasting charges of dynamite scattered in the premises behind its
power plant. The plaintiff, a boy 15 years of age, in company with another boy 12 years of age, entered the premises of the defendant,
saw the fulminating caps and carried them away. Upon reaching home they made a series of experiments with the caps. They thrust
the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. They
then opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and the plaintiff held
the cap while the other boy applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed causing injuries to the boys. This action was
brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for the injuries which he suffered.
ISSUE:
W/N Manila Electric is liable for damages to the petitioners
HELD:
No. The immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to
the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot
recover."
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not
have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were
attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which
therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that
plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the
resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than
the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days
after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself.
The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive
character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an
explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use
of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by
the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any
reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9
years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the
ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that
a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the
explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as
might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him
under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature
and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the

Page 13 of 39
commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the
question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their
consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their
consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying
nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him.
SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY V. CA, 300 SCRA 20
FACTS:
This case involves a collision between a truck owned by petitioner and a cimarron which caused the death of three persons and injuries
to several others. Petitioners truck crashed the cimarron when the driver stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and this
caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. RTC found Petitioners driver to be responsible
for the accident and awarded damages in favor of Private respondents. Petitioner contends that the driver of the cimarron was guilty of
contributory negligence since it was guilty of violation of traffic rules and regulations (overloading, had only one headlight on) at the time
of mishap. He also argued that sudden swerving of a vehicle caused by its driver stepping on the brakes is not negligence per se. He
further argued that the driver should be exonerated based on the doctrine of last clear chance, which states that the person who has
the last clear chance of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident. He petitioner claimed that the cimarron had the last opportunity of avoiding an accident.
ISSUE:
1

W/N the cimmaron was guilty of contributory negligence due to violation of traffic rules and regulation which added to the proximate
cause of the accident or such was based solely on the negligence of the panel truck driver.

W/N petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.

HELD:
1. It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Petitioner
has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed
thereto. Petitioner says that "driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during night time certainly increases the
risk of accident," that because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there was "decreased visibility," and that the fact that the vehicle
was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded "decreased [its] maneuver ability." We are convinced that no maneuvering which the
Cimarron driver could have done would have avoided a collision with the panel truck, given the suddenness of the events. Clearly, the
overcrowding in the front seat was immaterial.
All these point to the fact that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioners driver. As the trial court noted, the
swerving of petitioners panel truck to the opposite lane could mean not only that petitioners driver was running the vehicle at a very
high speed but that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney ahead of it as well.
2. With respect to the requirement of passing psychological and physical tests prior to his employment, although no law requires it,
such circumstance would certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of due diligence. As the trial court said:
. . . No tests of skill, physical as well as mental and emotional, were conducted on their would-be employees. No on-the-job
training and seminars reminding employees, especially drivers, of road courtesies and road rules and regulations were done.
There were no instructions given to defendants drivers as to how to react in cases of emergency nor what to do after an
emergency occurs. All these could only mean failure on the part of defendant to exercise the diligence required of it of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Indeed, driving exacts a more than usual toll on the sense.
Accordingly, it behooves employers to exert extra care in the selection and supervision of their employees. They must go beyond
the minimum requirements fixed by law. But petitioner did not show in what manner drivers were supervised to ensure that they
drove their vehicles in a safe way.
MERCURY DRUG V. BAKING, GR NO. 156037, MAY 25, 2007
FACTS:
Sebastian M. Baking, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. Respondent was given two medical prescriptions
Diamicron for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his triglyceride. Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug
Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for
Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet. On the third day of taking the medicine, respondent figured in a vehicular accident. The car he was
driving collided with the car of one Josie Peralta due to falling asleep while driving. He could not remember anything about the collision
nor felt its impact. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical and mental state at the time of the collision,
respondent returned to Dr. Sys clinic. Dr. Sy was shocked to find that what was sold to respondent was Dormicum, instead of the
prescribed Diamicron. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent and this was affirmed by the CA in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the proximate cause of respondents accident.
HELD:
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Requisites under Art. 2176:
(a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and,
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.

Page 14 of 39
Petitioners employee was grossly negligent in selling to respondent Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a
fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very cautious in dispensing
medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The
care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of
the business which the law demands.
Proximate Cause
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case,
upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioners employee been careful in reading Dr. Sys prescription. Without the
potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a
collision. Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the same Code.The employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages
caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of the law that
there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him, after such
selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Thus, petitioner's failure to prove that it
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee will make it solidarily liable for
damages caused by the latter.
BPI V. SUAREZ, GR NO. 167750, MAR 15, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Reynald R. Suarez (Suarez) is a lawyer who used to maintain both savings and current accounts with petitioner Bank of
the Philippine Islands (BPI). Suarez had a client who planned to purchase several parcels of land in Tagaytay City, but preferred not to
deal directly with the land owners. They agreed that the client would deposit the money in Suarezs BPI account as payment for the
Tagaytay properties and then, Suarez would issue checks to the sellers. An RCBC check was then deposited to Suarezs current
account in BPI. Suarez instructed his secretary, Garaygay, to confirm from BPI whether the face value of the RCBC check was already
credited to his account that same day it was deposited. It was alleged that BPI confirmed the same-day crediting of the RCBC check.
With this, Suarez issued on the same day five checks for the purchase of the Tagaytay properties. Days after while in the U.S. for
vacation, he was informed by Garaygay that the checks issued were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds with penalties despite an
assurance from RCBC that it has already been debited in his account and fully funded. Claiming that BPI mishandled his account
through negligence, Suarez filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages. The TC rendered judgment in favor of
respondent which was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE:
W/N the erroneous marking of DAIF (drawn against insufficient funds), instead of DAUD (drawn against uncollected deposit)on the
checks,is the proximate cause of respondents injury.
HELD:
In the present case, Suarez failed to establish that his claimed injury was proximately caused by the erroneous marking of DAIF on the
checks. Proximate Cause has been defined as any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred. There is nothing in Suarezs
testimony which convincingly shows that the erroneous marking of DAIF on the checks proximately caused his alleged psychological or
social injuries. Suarez merely testified that he suffered humiliation and that the prospective consolidation of the titles to Tagaytay
properties did not materialize due to the dishonor of his checks, not due to the erroneous marking of DAIF on his checks. Hence,
Suarez had only himself to blame for his hurt feelings and the unsuccessful transaction with his client as these were directly caused by
the justified dishonor of the checks. In short, Suarez cannot recover compensatory damages for his own negligence.
RAMOS V. C.O.L. REALTY, GR NO. 184905, AUG. 28, 2009
FACTS:
A vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan, owned by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino
Larin ("Aquilino"), and a Ford Expedition, owned by Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo ("Rodel"). (C.O.L. Realty)
averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car at a speed of five to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda
Street and has just crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when (Ramos) Ford Espedition violently rammed against the cars
right rear door and fender. With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees towards the direction where it came from. A
passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat ("Estela") sustained injuries. Ramos denied liability for damages insisting that it was the
negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realtys) driver, which was the proximate cause of the accident. Ramos maintained that the sedan car
crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through
the intersection.
Petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela.
The demand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City. MeTC rendered the decision exculpating Ramos from liability. RTC affirmed the
decision of the MeTC. The CA affirmed the view that Aquilino was negligent in crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street
since, as per Certification of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA).
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner could be held solidarily liable with his driver, Rodel Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty for damages
suffered in a vehicular collision.
HELD:
Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz:
Article 2179.When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack
of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Article 2185.Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or
agent, the latters negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superiors action against the third person, assuming of
course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made.
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilinos act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes
negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for
any damages suffered by respondent from the accident.Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And

Page 15 of 39
more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have
happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person
who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a
natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature
of the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of
Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. It is unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodels
contributory negligence, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilinos recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the
accident.
VALLACAR TRANSIT v. CATUBIG, GR NO 175512, MAY 30, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of transportation and the franchise owner of a Ceres Bulilit bus with Plate No. T-0604-1348.
Quirino C. Cabanilla (Cabanilla) is employed as a regular bus driver of petitioner.
On January 27, 1994, respondent's husband, Quintin Catubig, Jr. (Catubig), was on his way home from Dumaguete City riding in
tandem on a motorcycle with his employee, Teddy Emperado (Emperado). Catubig was the one driving the motorcycle. While
approaching a curve at kilometers 59 and 60, Catubig tried to overtake a slow moving ten-wheeler cargo truck by crossing-over to the
opposite lane, which was then being traversed by the Ceres Bulilit bus driven by Cabanilla, headed for the opposite direction. When the
two vehicles collided, Catubig and Emperado were thrown from the motorcycle. Catubig died on the spot where he was thrown, while
Emperado died while being rushed to the hospital.
The Court of Appeals adjudged that both Catubig and petitioner were negligent. The appellate court held that both Catubig and
Cabanilla were negligent in driving their respective vehicles. Catubig, on one hand, failed to use reasonable care for his own safety and
ignored the hazard when he tried to overtake a truck at a curve. Cabanilla, on the other hand, was running his vehicle at a high speed
of 100 kilometers per hour.
ISSUE:
Who is liable?
RULING:
The proximate cause of the collision of the bus and motorcycle is attributable solely to the negligence of the driver of the motorcycle,
Catubig.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
The RTC concisely articulated and aptly concluded that Catubig's overtaking of a slow-moving truck ahead of him, while approaching a
curve on the highway, was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision which led to his own death, to wit:
Based on the evidence on record, it is crystal clear that the immediate and proximate cause of the collision is the reckless and negligent
act of Quintin Catubig, Jr. and not because the Ceres Bus was running very fast. Even if the Ceres Bus is running very fast on its lane,
it could not have caused the collision if not for the fact that Quintin Catubig, Jr. tried to overtake a cargo truck and encroached on the
lane traversed by the Ceres Bus while approaching a curve. As the driver of the motorcycle, Quintin Catubig, Jr. has not observed
reasonable care and caution in driving his motorcycle which an ordinary prudent driver would have done under the circumstances.
Recklessness on the part of Quintin Catubig, Jr. is evident when he tried to overtake a cargo truck while approaching a curve in
Barangay Donggo-an, Bolisong, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental. Overtaking is not allowed while approaching a curve in the highway
(Section 41(b), Republic Act [No.] 4136, as amended). Passing another vehicle proceeding on the same direction should only be
resorted to by a driver if the highway is free from incoming vehicle to permit such overtaking to be made in safety (Section 41(a),
Republic Act [No.] 4136). The collision happened because of the recklessness and carelessness of [herein respondent's] husband who
was overtaking a cargo truck while approaching a curve. Overtaking another vehicle while approaching a curve constitute reckless
driving penalized not only under Section 48 of Republic Act [No.] 4136 but also under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
b. Doctrine of Imputed Negligence
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by
the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty
or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession
of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business.
Burden of Proof:
Q: Who has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent?
A: As a general rule, the person alleging negligence has the burden of proving the same. But there are two notable exceptions to the
rule: (1) where the law itself provides for instances where negligence is presumed; and (2) when the thing speaks for itself (res ipsa
loquitor).
Exceptions:
- Presumption of Negligence (Art 2184 & Art 2185)
- Res Ipsa Loquitor
- Vicarious Liability
TISON ET AL. VS. SPS. POMASIN GR NO. 173180, AUGUST 24, 2011

Page 16 of 39
FACTS:
Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, 1 figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay
last 12 August 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-trailer, driven
by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the opposite lane going towards Naga City.
(refer above)
RULING:
Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of
negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 27 we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It
must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed
thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is
a contributing cause of the injury. 28 Likewise controlling is our ruling in Aonuevo v. Court of Appeals 29 where we reiterated that
negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages.
In said case, Aonuevo, who was driving a car, did not attempt "to establish a causal connection between the safety violations imputed
to the injured cyclist, and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that these violations in themselves sufficiently
established negligence appreciable against the cyclist. Since the onus on Aonuevo is to conclusively prove the link between the
violations and the accident, we can deem him as having failed to discharge his necessary burden of proving the cyclist' s own liability."
CAEDO V. YU KHE THAI, 26 SCRA 381
FACTS:
Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 along E. de los Santos Ave., in the vicinity of
San Lorenzo Village bound for the airport. Several members of his family were in the car. Coming from the opposite direction was the
Cadillac car of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his driver Rafael Bernardo. The two cars were traveling at a moderate speed with their
headlights on. Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela (rig). Defendants driver did not notice it until he was about eight (8) meters away.
Instead of slowing down behind the caretela defendants driver veered to the left with the intention of passing by the caretela but in
doing so its rear bumper caught the ream of the caretelas left wheel wrenching it off. Defendants car skidded obliquely to the other end
and collided with the on-coming vehicle of the plaintiff. The plaintiff on his part, slackened his speed and tried to avoid the collision by
veering to the right but the collision occurred just the same injuring the plaintiff and members of his family. Plaintiff brought an action for
damages against both the driver and owner of the Cadillac car.
ISSUE:
W/N Bernardo is liable? If Yes, W/N Yu Khe Thai is solidarily liable with Bernardo?
HELD:
YES. Bernardo is liable, because facts reveal that the collision was directly traceable to his negligence. BUT, owner, Yu Khe Thai is
not solidarily liable with his driver.
Art 2184 is indeed the basis of a masters liability in a vehicular accident.Note however that the 2nd sentence of Art 2184 qualifies
before the owner can be made solidarity liable with the negligent driver. This is because the basis of the masters liability is not
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR but rather the relationship of PATERFAMILIAS. The theory is that, the negligence of the servant, is
known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects the masters negligence if he fails to correct it order to
prevent injury or damage.Test of imputed negligence in Art 2184 is necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held in a uniform and
inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure
of skill or proficiency either in mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he can own a motor vehicle. The test
of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he
should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver
that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to
require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have
real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had
been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During that time he had no record of violation of
traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master.
Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his
failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon
it.
We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The
road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of
alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car
was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel.
And even when he did see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left
side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such that there was no
reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind,
he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a
thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.
KAPALARAN BUS LINE V. CORONADO, GR NO. 85331, AUG 25, 1989
FACTS:
The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera has reached the intersection where there is a traffic sign 'yield,' it stopped and cautiously treated
the intersection as a "Thru Stop' street, which it is not. The KBL bus was on its way from Sta. Cruz, Laguna, driven by its regular driver
Virgilio Llamoso, on its way towards Manila. The regular itinerary of the KBL bus is through the town proper of Pila, Laguna, but at times
it avoids this if a bus is already fully loaded with passengers and can no longer accommodate additional passengers. As the KBL bus
neared the intersection, Virgilio Llamoso inquired from his conductor if they could still accommodate passengers and learning that they
were already full, he decided to bypass Pila and instead, to proceed along the national highway. Virgilio Llamoso admitted that there
was another motor vehicle ahead of him. The general rule is that the vehicle on the national highway has the right-of-way as against a
feeder road.
Judging from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad, the sequence of events shows that the first vehicle to arrive at the intersection
was the jeepney. Seeing that the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped at the intersection began to move forward, and for his
part, Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the intersection to give way to the jeepney. At about this time, the KBL bus was approaching the
intersection and its driver was engaged in determining from his conductor if they would still pass through the town proper of Pila. Upon
learning that they were already full, he turned his attention to the road and found the stopped vehicles at the intersection with the
jeepney trying to cross the intersection. The KBL bus had no more room within which to stop without slamming into the rear of the
vehicle behind the car of Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver chose to gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the jeepney driven by
Grajera, which had the right-of-way, was about to cross the center of the highway and was directly on the path of the KBL bus. The
gamble made by Llamoso did not pay off. The impact indicates that the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of speed because, after the

Page 17 of 39
collision, it did not stop; it travelled for another 50 meters and stopped only when it hit an electric post. After trial, the trial court rendered
a judgment in favor of private respondents which was affirmed by the CA but modified the award of damages.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable for the accident.
HELD:
Kapalarans driver had become aware that some vehicles ahead of the bus and traveling in the same direction had already stopped at
the intersection obviously to give way either to pedestrians or to another vehicle about to enter the intersection. The bus driver, who
was driving at a speed too high to be safe and proper at or near an intersection on the highway, and in any case too high to be able to
slow down and stop behind the cars which had preceded it and which had stopped at the intersection, chose to swerve to the left lane
and overtake such preceding vehicles, entered the intersection and directly smashed into the jeepney within the intersection.
Immediately before the collision, the bus driver was actually violating the following traffic rules and regulations, among others, in the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as amended. Thus, a legal presumption arose that the bus driver was
negligent, a presumption that Kapalaran was unable to overthrow.
Application of Article 2180:
The patent and gross negligence on the part of the petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as
employer was guilty of negligence either in the selection or in the supervision of its bus driver. Where the employer is held liable for
damages, it has of course a right of recourse against its own negligent employee. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the
insolvency of such employee. So far as the record shows, petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the presumption of negligence on
its own part.
MENDOZA V. SORIANO, ET.AL, GR NO. 164012, JUNE 8, 2007
FACTS:
Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth Avenue, was hit by a speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. He was thrown
five meters away, while the vehicle only stopped some 25 meters from the point of impact. One of Sorianos companions,
asked Macasasa to bring Soriano to the hospital, but after checking out the scene of the incident, Macasasa returned to the FX, only to
flee. A school bus brought him to the hospital where he later died.
After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint against petitioner. It found Soriano negligent for crossing Commonwealth Avenue by
using a small gap in the islands fencing rather than the pedestrian overpass and that petitioner was not negligent in the selection and
supervision of Macasasa. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable and W/N respondent is guilty of contributory negligence.
HELD:
Application of Article 2185
Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating traffic
regulations. The records show that Macasasa violated two traffic rules under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. First, he failed to
maintain a safe speed to avoid endangering lives. Both the trial and the appellate courts found Macasasa overspeeding. The records
show also that Soriano was thrown five meters away after he was hit. Moreover, the vehicle stopped only some 25 meters from the
point of impact.Both circumstances support the conclusion that the FX vehicle driven by Macasasa was overspeeding. Second, Macasasa,
the vehicle driver, did not aid Soriano, the accident victim, in violation of Section 55, Article V of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
While Macasasa at first agreed to bring Soriano to the hospital, he fled the scene in a hurry. What remains undisputed is that he did not
report the accident to a police officer, nor did he summon a doctor.
Application of Article 2180
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks. The liability arises due to the presumed negligence of the employers in supervising their employees unless they prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.While respondents could recover damages from
Macasasa in a criminal case and petitioner could become subsidiarily liable, still petitioner, as owner and employer, is directly and
separately civilly liable for her failure to exercise due diligence in supervising Macasasa. We must emphasize that this damage suit is
for the quasi-delict of petitioner, as owner and employer, and not for the delict of Macasasa, as driver and employee.
In this case, we hold petitioner primarily and solidarily liable for the damages caused by Macasasa. Respondents could recover directly
from petitioner since the latter failed to prove that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in supervising Macasasa.
Contributory Negligence
We agree that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Soriano was guilty of contributory negligence for not using the pedestrian
overpass while crossing Commonwealth Avenue. We even note that the respondents now admit this point, and concede that the appellate
court had properly reduced by 20% the amount of damages it awarded. Hence, we affirm the reduction of the amount earlier awarded,
based on Article 2179 of the Civil Code which reads:
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
ANONUEVO V. CA, ET. AL., GR NO. 130003, OCT. 20, 2004
FACTS:
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Aonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with
owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Aonuevos brother, Jonathan. Aonuevo was in the course of making a left turn
towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result. As testified by eyewitness Alfredo
Sorsano, Aonuevo was umaarangkada, or speeding as he made the left turn into Libertad and that Aonuevo failed to exercise the
ordinary precaution, care and diligence required of him in order that the accident could have been avoided.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Aonuevo before the RTC. The RTC rendered
judgment against Procter and Gamble and Aonuevo while the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles and whether Villagracias own fault and
negligence serves to absolve the Aonuevo of any liability for damages.
HELD:
The applicability of Art. 2185 is expressly qualified to motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to presume that the law intended a
broader coverage.

Page 18 of 39
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the
time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.
As distinguished, motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a
direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion
is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in
inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or collision.
Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. If such were indeed the evil sought
to be remedied or guarded against, then the framers of the Code would have expanded the provision to include non-motorized vehicles
or for that matter, pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a motorized
vehicle within the dynamics of road travel. The fact that there has long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed on
motorized vehicles, arising from the special nature of motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the qualification under
Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher standard. Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal
footing with other types of vehicles. Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized vehicles, even
if by analogy.
NEGLIGENCE PER SE:
The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or negligence
per se. The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was the proximate cause of the
injury complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that
violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the
mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to
impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not
be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury
sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is
remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the
conduct of others.
WHEN THERE IS AN ORDINANCE:
But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver causes an accident by exceeding the speed limit, for example, we
do not inquire whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous. It is enough that it was prohibited. Violation of an ordinance
intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating the hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the harm
which the ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm.
The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention
of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or
ordinance was intended to prevent.
Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia, resulting from his violation of an ordinance?
It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be equipped with headlights or horns is to promote road safety
and to minimize the occurrence of road accidents involving bicycles. At face value, Villagracias mishap was precisely the danger
sought to be guarded against by the ordinance he violated. However, there is the fact which we consider as proven, that Aonuevo
was speeding as he made the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. This reckless behavior would
have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the path of Aonuevos car as it turned into the intersection, whether they are fellow
motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. We are hard put to conclude that Villagracia would have avoided injury had his bicycle been up to
par with safety regulations, especially considering that Aonuevo was already speeding as he made the turn, or before he had seen
Villagracia. Even assuming that Aonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such
lapse on the cyclists part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn. The failure
of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to
negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is established between such failure and the injury sustained. The principle
likewise finds affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the proximate
cause of the injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto. Aonuevo had the burden of clearly proving that the alleged negligence
of Villagracia was the proximate or contributory cause of the latters injury.
FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER v. DE LOS SANTOS, GR NO. 152033, MARCH 16, 2011
FACTS:
On the night of September 30, 1984, Teresa Elena Legarda-de los Santos (Teresa Elena), the wife of respondent Wilfredo de los
Santos (Wilfredo), performed at the Rizal Theater in Makati City, Metro Manila as a member of the cast for the musical play, Woman of
the Year.
On that same night, at the request of Wilfredo, his brother Armando de los Santos (Armando), husband of respondent Carmina Vda. de
los Santos, went to the Rizal Theater to fetch Teresa Elena after the latter's performance. He drove a 1980 Mitsubishi Galant Sigma
(Galant Sigma) with Plate No. NSL 559, a company car assigned to Wilfredo.
Two other members of the cast of Woman of the Year, namely, Annabel Vilches (Annabel) and Jerome Macuja, joined Teresa Elena in
the Galant Sigma.
Around 11:30 p.m., while travelling along the Katipunan Road (White Plains), the Galant Sigma collided with the shuttle bus owned by
petitioner and driven by Alfredo S. Mejia (Mejia), an employee of petitioner. The Galant Sigma was dragged about 12 meters from the
point of impact, across the White Plains Road landing near the perimeter fence of Camp Aguinaldo, where the Galant Sigma burst into
flames and burned to death beyond recognition all four occupants of the car.
ISSUE:
WON Mejia was negligent
RULING:

Page 19 of 39
It was well established that Mejia was driving at a speed beyond the rate of speed required by law, specifically Section 35 of Republic
Act No. (RA) 4136. Given the circumstances, the allowed rate of speed for Mejia's vehicle was 50 kilometers per hour, while the records
show that he was driving at the speed of 70 kilometers per hour. Under the New Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Apparently, in the present case, Mejia's violation of the traffic rules does not erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the
time of the collision. Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care
and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the condition's encountered which will enable him to keep the vehicle
under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway.
The excessive speed employed by Mejia was the proximate cause of the collision that led to the sudden death of Teresa Elena and
Armando.
d. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Translation: The thing speaks for itself.
The doctrine: Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

Not a rule of substantive law but a mere procedural convenience.

o Rationale: Res ipsa loquitur has no legal basis.

Applicable only when there is no direct proof of negligence available.

o Meaning: Due to the nature of the incident, it is impossible to find direct evidence of negligence.
Requisites:
1 Event does not ordinarily occur
o NOTE: The test is not based on rarity but that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence.
2 Exclusive control of defendant
3 No other cause
4 No fault on party injured
Res ipsa loquitur in culpa
aquiliana
Must eliminate all other causes

Res ipsa loquitur in

culpa contractual
Negligence is presumed
by the fact of breach

Negligence and proximate cause are QUESTIONS OF FACT.

o Effect: Cannot be reviewed by the SC. (General Rule)
Elements:

arises when no direct evidence is available

applicable to pure (non-contractual) torts

CAVEAT: no contributory negligence in the one invoking

Inferences:

instrumentality is within the management and exclusive control of the defendant

the injury would have happened in the ordinary course of things if the defendant was not negligent
Q: When there is no direct proof of negligence, does res ipsa loquitur automatically apply?
A: No, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not automatically apply. The party invoking the doctrine must first establish that there is no
direct proof of negligence AVAILABLE. Only after establishing that may he rely upon the inferences under res ipsa loquitur.
Q: Why is the doctrine inapplicable in culpa contractual?
A: Because in culpa contractual, the breach of the contract is already an act of presumed negligence. The contract governs the
conduct of the parties so that if there is a breach, all that the plaintiff needs to prove is the existence of the contract and the breach
thereof.
MAAO CENTRAL CO. V. CA, GR NO. 83491, AUG. 27, 1990
FACTS:
Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the caboose or "carbonera" of Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the petitioner, when the
locomotive was suddenly derailed. He and his companion jumped off to escape injury, but the train fell on its side, caught his legs by
its wheels and pinned him down. He was declared dead on the spot. The claims for death and other benefits having been denied by
the petitioner, the herein private respondent filed suit in the RTC of Bago City. Judge Hobilla-Alinio ruled in her favor but deducted
from the total damages awarded 25% thereof for the decedent's contributory negligence and the total pension of P41,367.60 private
respondent and her children would be receiving from the SSS for the next five years. The widow appealed, claiming that the
deductions were illegal. So did the petitioner, but on the ground that it was not negligent and therefore not liable at all. In its own
decision, the CA sustained the rulings of the trial court except as to the contributory negligence of the deceased and disallowed the
deductions protested by the private respondent.
ISSUE:
W/N the respondent court is at fault for finding the petitioner guilty of negligence notwithstanding its defense of due diligence under Art
2176 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
Petitioner is guilty of negligence and cannot claim defense under Art 2176.
DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF EMPLOYEES; NOT EXERCISED IN THE CASE AT BAR.
The petitioner also disclaims liability on the ground of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, contending it has exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees. The Court cannot agree. The record shows it was in fact lax in requiring them to exercise
the necessary vigilance in maintaining the rails in good condition to prevent the derailments that sometimes happened "every hour."
Obviously, merely ordering the brakemen and conductors to fill out prescribed forms reporting derailments which reports have not
been acted upon as shown by the hourly derailments is not the kind of supervision envisioned by the Civil Code.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
We also do not see how the decedent can be held guilty of contributory negligence from the mere fact that he was not at his assigned
station when the train was derailed. That might have been a violation of company rules but could not have directly contributed to his
injury, as the petitioner suggests. It is pure speculation to suppose that he would not have been injured if he had stayed in the front car
rather than at the back and that he had been killed because he chose to ride in the caboose. Contributory negligence has been defined
as "the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant's
negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury." It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be
shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and
body." There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay
there despite warnings or signs of impending danger.
RES IPSA LOQUITOR

Page 20 of 39
The absence of the fish plates whatever the cause or reason is by itself alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner. Res ipsa
loquitur. The doctrine was described recently in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court. (167 SCRA 376) thus: Where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
FF CRUZ & CO. V. CA, GR NO. 52732, AUG 29, 1988
FACTS:
The furniture manufacturing shop of F.F. Cruz in Caloocan City was situatedadjacent to the residence of the Mables.Sometime in
August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be
constructed between the shop and Mables residence. The request was repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears.In the early
morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in Cruzs shop.Cruzs employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the
fire, buttheir efforts proved futile. The fire spread to the Mables house. Both the shopand the house were razed to the ground.The
Mables collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and thecontents thereof.The Mables filed an action for damages
against the Cruzs.The TC ruled in favor of the Mables. CA affirmed but reduced the award ofdamages.
ISSUE:
W/N the doctrine of r e s i p s a l o q u i t o r is applicable to the case.
HELD:
YES. The doctrine of r e s i p s a l o q u i t o r is applicable to the case. The CA, therefore, had basis to find Cruz liable for the loss
sustained by the Mables.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, may be stated as follows:
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want
of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.),Inc., G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.]
The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine, considering that in the normal course of operations of a
furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for
machinery may be found thereon.
It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of petitioneror its employees was not merely presumed.Cruz failed
to construct a firewall between its shop and the residenceof the Mables as required by a city ordinance:
that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a litcigarette
that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop; and
that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop
Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Cruz's failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would
suffice to support a finding of negligence.Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for
another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the
flames from leaping over it. Defendant's negligence,therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect
tothe spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall
between its property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to
comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence [Teague v.
Fernandez, G.R. No. L-29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA 181.]
US V. CRAME, 30 PHIL 2
FACTS:
Mariano Crame, chauffeur of a motor vehicle, while driving along Calle Herran in the city of Manila, knocked down, dragged, and ran
over the body of George E. Coombs, a private in the US army, who was then crossing the road, causing him injuries, wounds, and
bruises. Moreover, such injuries damaged his mental faculties and incapacitated him from further performance of his duties as a
soldier. Crame alleges that he was only going at about 10 miles per hour, and that since Coombs suddenly appeared in front of the
car, he tried but failed to change the course of the automobile so as to avoid hitting him. The trial court convicted Crame of serious
physical injuries by imprudencia temeraria, on the ground that: 1) he did not reduce his speed sufficiently, nor did he attempt to stop
to avoid an accident; 2) he did not sound his horn or whistle or use his voice to call the attention of Coombs to notify him that he
should stop and avoid being struck by the car; and 3) Crame was driving in the center, or a little to the right of the center of the
street instead of on the left side thereof.
ISSUE:
W/N Crame is criminally liable for the damages caused to Coombs.
HELD:
THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE MORE THAN SUSTAINED.
The fact that Crame did not see Coombs until the car was very close to him is strong evidence of inattention to duty, especially since
the street was wide and unobstructed, with no buildings on either side from which a person can dart out so suddenly. Moreover, the
street was also well-lighted, so there is no reason why Crame did not see Coombs long before he had reached the position in the
street where he was struck down.
The presence of the carromata was not corroborated by any of the witnesses. Moreover, it would have obscured his vision only for a
moment. Besides, it is the duty of automobile drivers in meeting a moving vehicle on public streets and highways to use due care
and diligence to see to it that persons who may be crossing behind the moving vehicle are not run down by them.
It is clearly established that Crame was driving along the right-hand side of the streetwhen the accident happened. According to the
law of the road and the custom ofthe country, he should have been on the left-hand side of the street. According towitnesses there
was abundant room for him to drive on such side.
There is no evidence which shows negligence on the part of Coombs. At the time he was struck, he had a right to be where the law
fully protected him from vehicles traveling in the direction in which the accused was driving at the time of injury. There is no evidence
to show that the soldier was drunk at the time of the accident. And even if he were, mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does it
establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. If
ones conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE; PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF.
Where, in a criminal prosecution against the driver of an automobile for running down and injuring a pedestrian crossing a street, it
appeared that at the time the injury was produced, the injured person was where he had a right to be, that the automobile was being
driven on the wrong side of the street, and no warning was given of its approach, it was properly held that there was a presumption of
negligence on the part of the driver and that the burden of proof was on him to establish that the accident occurred through other
causes than his negligence.
AFRICA V. CALTEX [PHIL], GR NO.L-12986, MAR. 31, 1966
FACTS:
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the
underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving truck where the nozzle of the hose was inserted . The fire then spread to
and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them.The owners of the houses, among

Page 21 of 39
them petitioners here, sued Caltex and Boquiren (agent in charge of operation) .Trial court and CA found that petitioners failed to
prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their
employees. Both courts refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsaloquitur on the grounds that as to its applicability xxx in the
Philippines, there seemsto be nothing definite, and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption inappropriate cases, in the case
at bar, however, we find no practical use for such doctrine.
ISSUE:
W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r should apply as to presume negligence
on the part of the appellees.
HELD:
DOCTRINE OF R E S I P S A L O Q U I T U R APPLIES. CALTEX IS LIABLE.
Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that where the thing which caused the injurycomplained of is shown to be under the
management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation of defendant, that the
incident happened because of want of care.
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein
and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The person who knew or could have known how the fire started were the
appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is fair and reasonable inference that the incident
happened because of want of care.
The report by the police officer regarding the fire, as well as the statement of the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who was
transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke out, strengthen the presumption of negligence.
Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy district and pedestrians often pass through or mill around the premises; (2) the area is used
as a car barn for around 10taxicabs owned by Boquiren; (3) a store where people hang out and possibly smoke cigarettes is located
one meter from the hole of the underground tank; and (4) the concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only 2 meters high at
most and cannot prevent the flames from leaping over it in case of fire.
LAYUGAN V. IAC, 167 SCRA 363
FACTS:
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the
Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway ; that
defendant's truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized.
Serrano bumped the truck being repaired by Pedro Layugan, while the same was at a stop position. From the evidence presented, it
has been established clearly that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver, Daniel Serrano. The police
report confirmed the allegation of the plaintiff and admitted by Daniel Serrano on cross-examination. The collision dislodged the jack
from the parked truck and pinned the plaintiff to the ground. As a result thereof, plaintiff sustained injuries on his left forearm and left
foot. The left leg of the plaintiff from below the knee was later on amputated when gangrene had set in, thereby rendering him
incapacitated for work depriving him of his income.The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff, however, the Intermediate
Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the IAC acted correctly in applying the doctrine or res ipsa loquitur with proper jurisprudential basis and if not, who is
negligent?
HELD:
Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the right side of the road would be of no moment taking
into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed three or four meters from the back of the truck. But
despite this warning which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the private respondent, still
bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his left
forearm and left foot.
It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and
convincing evidence. It follows that in stamping its imprimatur upon the invocation by respondent Isidro of the doctrine of Res ipsa
loquitur to escape liability for the negligence of his employee, the respondent court committed reversible error.
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR:
Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of any explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
AS DEFINED UNDER BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY:
Res ipsa loquitur.The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon
proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendants exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not
happen in the absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred
from mere fact that accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in
absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and
control of alleged wrongdoer.
RULE OF EVIDENCE:
The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence
may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of
substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima
facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can only be
invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.Hence, it has
generally been held that the presumption of inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff has
knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or
where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence
clearly appear. Finally, once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant,
no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely elucidated
that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence, as in this case.

Page 22 of 39
PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. V. SPS.SARANGAYA, GR NO. 147746, OCT. 25, 2005
FACTS:
In 1986, spouses Sarangaya erected a building known as Super A Building and was subdivided into three doors, each of which
was leased out. The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second and third doors of the building. In 1988,
petitioner Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., through its branch manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a
contract of lease of the first door of the Super A Building. Perla Compania renovated its rented space and divided it into two. The
left side wasconverted into an office while the right was used by Pascual as a garage for a 1981model 4-door Ford Cortina.
On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not bring the car with him.Three days later, he returned, and
decided to warm up the car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched on the ignition key, the engine made an odd sound
and did not start. He again stepped on the accelerator and started the car but petitioner again heard an unusual sound. He then saw
a small flame coming out of the engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted from the vehicle and started to push it out of the garage
when suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed the whole garage.Pascual was trapped inside and suffered
burns on his face, legs and arms.Meanwhile, respondents were busy watching television when they heard two loud explosions. In no
time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their belongings, furniture and appliances .The city fire marshall c submitted a
report to the provincial fire marshall and concluded that the fire was accidental. The report also disclosed that petitionercorporation had no fire permit as required by law.Based on the same report, a criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Damage in Property was filed against petitioner Pascual. On the other hand, Perla Compania was asked to pay the
amount of P7,992,350, inclusive of the value of the commercial building. At the prosecutors office, petitioner Pascual moved for the
withdrawal of the complaint, which was granted.
Respondents (spouses Sarangaya) later on filed a civil complaint based on quasi-delict against petitioners for a sum of money and
damages, alleging that Pascual acted with gross negligence while petitioner-corporation lacked the required diligence in the
selection and supervision of Pascual as its employee.
ISSUES:
W/N Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine and W/N Perla Compania liable under tort
HELD:
a.) YES, Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. It relates to the fact of an
injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiffs prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inference
and not on presumption.The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial
evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking. The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to
allege negligence in general terms. In such instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish
negligence. The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to
explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of. Thus, it is the defendants responsibility to show that there was
no negligence on his part.
To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must concur:
1) theaccident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
3) theinjury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not ordinarily occur unless there is negligence. A flame spewing out
of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engine
is revved. Hence, in this case, without any direct evidence as to the cause of the accident, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes
into play and, from it, we draw the inference that based on the evidence at hand, someone was in fact negligent and responsible for
the accident.
Under the second requisite, the instrumentality or agency that triggered the occurrence must be one that falls under the exclusive
control of the person in charge thereof. In this case, the car where the fire originated was under the control of Pascual. Being its
caretaker, he alone had the responsibility to maintain it and ensure its proper functioning. Where the circumstances which caused
the accident are shown to have been under the management or control of a certain person and, in the normal course of events, the
incident would not have happened had that person used proper care, the inference is that it occurred because of lack of such care.
The burden of evidence is thus shifted to defendant to establish that he observed all that was necessary to prevent the accident
from happening. In this aspect, Pascual utterly failed.
Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show that respondents contributed to the incident. They had no access
to the car and had no responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it was parked in a building they owned.
TEST TO DETERMINE NEGLIGENCE:
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: did the defendant in
committing the alleged negligent act, use reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person in the same
situation would have employed? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the
car, failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically checked (as its year-model and condition required) revealed his
negligence. A prudent man should have known thata14-year-old car, constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely
prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the
necessary inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the car.
b.) YES, COMPANIA LIABLE UNDER TORT
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service
records. While the petitioner-corporation does not appear to have erred in considering Pascual for his position, its lack of
supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable for the fire.In the supervision of employees, the employer must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach
thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence that they
complied with everything that was incumbent on them.
CARMEN, JR. v. BACOY, GR NO 173870, APRIL 25, 2012
FACTS:
At dawn on New Year's Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud (Emilia), along with her spouse Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and their
daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on their way home from a Christmas party they attended in Poblacion, Sominot, Zamboanga Del Sur.
Upon reaching Purok Paglaom in Sominot, they were run over by a Fuso passenger jeep bearing plate number UV-PEK-600 that was
being driven by Allan Maglasang (Allan). The jeep was registered in the name of petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used
as a public utility vehicle plying the Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur and vice versa route.
Oscar was held civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity. Oscar Jr.'s core defense to release him from responsibility for the death of the
Monsaluds is that his jeep was stolen. He highlights that the unauthorized taking of the jeep from the parking area was indeed carried
out by the clandestine and concerted efforts of Allan and his five companions, notwithstanding the obstacles surrounding the parking
area and the weight of the jeep. Oscar Jr. alleges that the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (literally, the
thing speaks for itself) should not have been applied because he was vigilant in securing his vehicle. He claims that the jeep was
parked in a well secured area not remote to the watchful senses of its driver Rodrigo.

Page 23 of 39
ISSUE:
WON Oscar is subsidiarily liable.
RULING:
Notably, the carnapping case filed against Allan and his group was already dismissed by the RTC for insufficiency of evidence. But even
in this civil case and as correctly concluded by the CA, the evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence required was likewise not
met to support Oscar Jr.'s claim that his jeep was unlawfully taken.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, "[w]here the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of
the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had management or
control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by
defendant that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care." Res ipsa loquitur is "merely evidentiary, a
mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a
specific proof of negligence." It "recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the
principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the accident, enough of the
attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant
the burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part." The doctrine is based partly on "the theory that the defendant in charge
of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while
the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms."
The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as follows:
1)the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2)the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just walking along the road would suddenly be sideswiped and run
over by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one in charge of the said vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep which caused the
injury was under the exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power
to instruct him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeep's use, including who or who may not drive it. As he is aware that the
jeep may run without the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to park it safely and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to
observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the victims was due to any voluntary action or contribution
on their part.
The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a presumption of negligence against Oscar Jr. which he could have
overcome by evidence that he exercised due care and diligence in preventing strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately, he failed to
do so.
V.
DEFENSES
a. Complete Defenses
a.1 Plaintiffs own negligence
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if
his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)
FE CAYAO-LASAM v. RAMOLETE, G.R. No. 159132, December 18, 2008
the Court notes the findings of the Board of Medicine that petitioner advised her to return on August 4, 1994 or four (4) days after the
D&C. However, complainant failed to do so. This being the case, the chain of continuity as required in order that the doctrine of
proximate cause can be validly invoked was interrupted. Had she returned, the respondent could have examined her thoroughly.
Editha omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which could have avoided the injury. The omission in not returning for a
follow-up evaluation played a substantial part in bringing about Edithas own injury.
Based on the evidence presented in the present case under review, in which no negligence can be attributed to the petitioner, the
immediate cause of the accident resulting in Edithas injury was her own omission when she did not return for a follow-up check up, in
defiance of petitioners orders. The immediate cause of Edithas injury was her own act; thus, she cannot recover damages from the
injury.
Exception: Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance
TAYLOR v. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT CO., supra.
The doctrine of implied invitation is applicable. In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license
might sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where
they would be likely to gather for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if one were to
throw away upon his premises things tempting to children, the same implication should arise.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not
have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, we are of opinion that
under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the
proximate cause of the injury, and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and
putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that
the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
The doctrine of implied invitation does not apply where the said youth has not been free from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut
open the detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents, knowing that his action would result in an explosion.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the
average boy of his age; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. True, he
may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the
contents of the cap, but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully,
recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion.

Page 24 of 39
We are satisfied that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which
inflicted the injury.
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. v. BALANDAN, 91 Phil 488
The doctrine of attractive nuisance may be stated, as: One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of
a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.
The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some
unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against
this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property
creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, (he) is not liable
because of having created an "attractive nuisance.
a.2. Assumption of Risk
AFILIADA v. HISOLE and HISOLE, 85 Phil 67
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause,
although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the
fault of the person who has suffered damage.
the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for "any damages which it may cause," and this for the
obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent
it from causing damage.
In the present case, the animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as
such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including
himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
ILOCOS NORTE CO., v. CA, GR No. 53401, Nov. 6, 1989
In order to escape liability, petitioner ventures into the theory that the deceased was electrocuted when she tried to open her steel gate,
which was electrically charged by an electric wire she herself caused to install to serve as a burglar deterrent. Petitioner suggests that
the switch to said burglar alarm was left on. But this is mere speculation, not backed up with evidence.
While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said
eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. In
times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in
constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that defendant did
that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its office.
The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely
due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission"
Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the
surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. A person is
excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an
emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's
property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident
occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her
merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by
petitioner's negligence.
CALALAS v. CA, supra.
Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, the Civil Code requires extraordinary diligence from common carriers with regard to the
safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers.
Petitioner breached the contract of carriage on two scores. First, as found by the CA, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal
angle. This is a violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of
32(a) of the same law.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were
exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained
by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated
merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN, ET. AL., v. REYES, GR No. 154259, FEB. 28, 2005
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury") refers to self-inflicted injury or to the
consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even
if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar
because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New
Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower courts findings of fact.
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly
unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein
being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief
and is indeed incredible.

Page 25 of 39
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lims
exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
a.3. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; Doctrine of Supervening Negligence; Doctrine of Discovered Peril; or the
Humanitarian Doctrine
--presupposes that there are two negligent acts however the negligence of one is antecedent to the negligence of the other
PICART vs. SMITH, supra.
As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side;
but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment
have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of
situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the
plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the
defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to
take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
Plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But
as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
PANTRANCO v. BAESA, GR No. 79050, Nov. 14, 1989
The doctrine of the last clear chance was defined by this Court in the case of Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in
this wise:
The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery
for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding
the prior negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People's Lumber and Hardware, et al. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de Calibo, et al., G.R. No. 70493, May 18, 1989]. The subsequent negligence of the defendant in
failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes
between the accident and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff [Picart v.
Smith, supra].
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages.
GLAN PEOPLES LUMBER v. IAC, GR No. 70493, May 18, 1989
The finding that "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep when the collision occurred" is, based on nothing
more than the showing that at the time of the accident, the truck driven by Zacarias had edged over the painted center line of the road
into the opposite lane by a width of twenty-five (25) centimeters. It ignores the fact that by the uncontradicted evidence, the actual
center line of the road was not that indicated by the painted stripe, that although it was not disputed that the truck overrode the painted
stripe by twenty-five (25) centimeters, it was still at least eleven (11) centimeters away from its side of the true center line of the road
and well inside its own lane when the accident occurred. By this same reckoning, since it was unquestionably the jeep that rammed into
the stopped truck, it may also be deduced that the jeep was at the time travelling beyond its own lane and intruding into the lane of the
truck by at least the same 11-centimeter width of space.
Nor was the IAC correct in finding that Zacarias had acted negligently in applying his brakes instead of getting back inside his lane upon
spying the approaching jeep. Being well within his own lane, he had no duty to swerve out of the jeep's way. And even supposing that
he was in fact partly inside the opposite lane, coming to a full stop with the jeep still thirty (30) meters away cannot be considered an
unsafe or imprudent action, there also being uncontradicted evidence that the jeep was "zigzagging and hence no way of telling in
which direction it would go as it approached the truck.
It was rather Engr. Calibos negligence which was the proximate cause of the accident. Evidence and testimonies show that the jeep
had been zigzagging or was driven erratically at that time and that its driver had been on a drinking spree on the occasion prior.
Even, however, ignoring the of negligence on the part of Calibo, and assuming some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias in
failing to keep within his designated lane, incorrectly demarcated as it was, the physical facts, would still absolve the latter of any
actionable responsibility for the accident under the rule of the last clear chance.
Both drivers had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. It is also admitted that the truck was
already at a full stop while the jeep was still 30 meters away when thereafter, the latter plowed into the truck. From these facts the
logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, by stopping in his turn or swerving
his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity
of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect, as the Appellate Court would have it, the truck to swerve and leave him a
clear path.
DE ROY vs. CA, January 29, 1988
Court finds that the CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under
Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from
its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only
they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the
doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
PLDT vs. CA, GR No. 57079, Sept. 29, 1989
HELD:
Private respondents jeep were running along the inside lane of Lacson street when it suddenly swerved (as shown through the
tiremarks) from the left and thereafter hit the accident mound. Petitioner company cannot be held liable to the private respondents. The
accident had not occurred due to the absence of warning signals but rather the abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane.
Secondly, the jeep was not running at 25kph when the accident occurred, otherwise it would not have hit the accident mound since at
that speed, it could easily apply its brakes on time.
From the above findings, the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory but rather the very cause of the
occurrence of the accident and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The only purpose of warning signs was to inform and
warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations.
It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care

Page 26 of 39
was the cause thereof. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident,
notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday
and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to
danger; hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
ONG vs. MCWD, 104 Phil 397
Although the proprietor of a natatorium is liable for injuries to a patron, resulting from lack of ordinary care in providing for his safety,
without the fault of the patron, he is not in any sense deemed to be the insurer of the safety of patrons. And the death of a patron within
his premises does not cast upon him the burden of excusing himself from any presumption of negligence. Thus in Bertalot vs. Kinnare,
supra, it was held that there could be no recovery for the death by drowning of a fifteen-year boy in defendant's natatorium, where it
appeared merely that he was lastly seen alive in water at the shallow end of the pool, and some ten or fifteen minutes later was
discovered unconscious, and perhaps lifeless, at the bottom of the pool, all efforts to resuscitate him being without avail.
Appellee has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their
death.
Appellant posits that even if it be assumed that the deceased is partly to be blamed for the unfortunate incident, still appellee may be
held liable under the doctrine of "last clear chance" for the reason that, having the last opportunity to save the victim, it failed to do so.
We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming
pool. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence
of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences
to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. Or, "As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity
of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person which is imputed to his
opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident."
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion
in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Abao responded to the
call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had
been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by
appellants to impute liability to appellee..
ACHEVARA vs. RAMOS, GR No. 175172, Sept. 29, 2009
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that
an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but
definite class of risks.
Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner as it travelled on the opposite side of the highway,
Benigno Valdez was made aware of the danger ahead if he met the owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by
immediately veering to the rightmost portion of the road or by stopping the passenger jeep at the right shoulder of the road and letting
the owner-type jeep pass before proceeding southward; hence, the collision occurred. The CA correctly held that Benigno Valdez was
guilty of inexcusable negligence by neglecting to take such precaution, which a reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily have
done under the circumstances and which proximately caused injury to another.
On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo Ramos guilty of gross negligence for knowingly driving a defective jeep on the highway.
The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez were contemporaneous when Ramos continued to drive a wiggling
vehicle on the highway despite knowledge of its mechanical defect, while Valdez did not immediately veer to the rightmost side of the
road upon seeing the wiggling vehicle of Ramos. However, when the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep,
Valdez realized the peril at hand and steered the passenger jeep toward the western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision. It was at
this point that it was perceivable that Ramos must have lost control of his vehicle, and that it was Valdez who had the last opportunity to
avoid the collision by swerving the passenger jeep towards the right shoulder of the road.
The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, but the defendant
who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is made liable for all the consequences of the
accident, notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff. However, the doctrine does not apply where the party charged is required
to act instantaneously, and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered.
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case, because even if it can be said that it was Valdez who had the last
chance to avoid the mishap when the owner-type jeep encroached on the western lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the
opportunity to avoid the collision.
a.4. Emergency Rule
VALENZUELA vs. CA, 253 SCRA 303
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the
standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation.

Page 27 of 39
Under the "emergency rule", an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time
to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.
A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both
convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a
parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop
and assess the emergency because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists.
ORIX METRO LEASING VS MANGALINAO
We are not convinced that the Isuzu is without fault. As correctly found by the CA, the smashed front of the Isuzu strongly indicates the
strong impact of the ramming of the rear of the Pathfinder that pinned its passengers. Furthermore, Antonio admitted that despite
stepping on the brakes, the Isuzu still suddenly smashed into the rear of the Pathfinder causing extensive damage to it, as well as
hitting the right side of the Fuso. These militate against Antonio's claim that he was driving at a safe speed, that he had slowed down,
and that he was three cars away. Clearly, the Isuzu was not within the safe stopping distance to avoid the Pathfinder in case of
emergency. Thus, the 'Emergency Rule' invoked by petitioners will not apply. Such principle states:
[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he
finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. 46 AaEDcS
Considering the wet and slippery condition of the road that night, Antonio should have been prudent to reduce his speed and increase
his distance from the Pathfinder. Had he done so, it would be improbable for him to have hit the vehicle in front of him or if he really
could not avoid hitting it, prevent such extensive wreck to the vehicle in front. With the glaring evidence, he obviously failed to exercise
proper care in his driving.

a.5. Prescription
Art. 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be
counted from the day they may be brought.
CAPUNO vs. PEPSI, GR No. L-19331, Apr. 30, 1965
The present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article
1146, Civil Code). Appellants' intervention in the original action was disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order. And
when they commenced the present civil action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still pending, showing that appellants then
chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code
In filing the civil action, appellants considered it as entirely independent of the criminal action, pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil
Code.
In other words, the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent,
Capuno and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. But the
complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or after the lapse of more than five years.
The contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi
is incorrect notwithstanding that appellants had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such
reservation was not necessary; as without having made it they could still file as in fact they did a separate civil action even during
the pendency of the criminal case; and consequently, the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the
institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict.
b. Incomplete/Partial Defense
b.1. Doctrine of Contributory Negligence
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But
if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
PHIL. NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. TUPANG, GR No. 55347, Oct. 4, 1985
The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so.
Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its
obligation under the contract of carriage.
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears that the deceased was chargeable with
contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and
tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such contributory
negligence, while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral damages.
By the same token, the award of exemplary damages must be set aside.
RAKES vs. ATLANTIC GULF, supra. (See under ACT OR OMISSION)
TAYLOR vs. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT CO.. supra.(See under DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE)
BANAL & ENVERSO vs. TACLOBAN ELECTRIC & HOUSE PLANT, 54 Phil 327
The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious
procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one
could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.
The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could
only result in reduction of the damages.
JARCO MARKETING CORP. vs. CA, 321 SCRA 377
We apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence.
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that
account, exempt from criminal liability. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of
liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence.

Page 28 of 39
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have
occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not
have caused the counter to collapse.
CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the
latter's hand. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. It was reasonable
and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child.
NAPOCOR vs. CASIONAN, GR No. 165969, Nov. 27, 2008
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. There is contributory negligence when the partys act
showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger.
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community. There were no warning signs to
inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only
viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in
the area.
CADIENTE vs. MACAS, GR No. 161846, Nov. 14, 2008
In this case, records show that when the accident happened, the victim was standing on the shoulder, which was the uncemented
portion of the highway. As noted by the trial court, the shoulder was intended for pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as
those loading or unloading passengers may use the shoulder. Running vehicles are not supposed to pass through the said uncemented
portion of the highway. However, the Ford Fiera in this case, without so much as slowing down, took off from the cemented part of the
highway, inexplicably swerved to the shoulder, and recklessly bumped and ran over an innocent victim.
The respondent cannot be expected to have foreseen that the Ford Fiera, erstwhile speeding along the cemented part of the highway
would suddenly swerve to the shoulder, then bump and run him over. Thus, we are unable to accept the petitioner's contention that the
respondent was negligent.
VI. LIABILITY - TORTS (Laws, cases, discussion)
Art. 2180, NCC
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official
to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
A. By Tortfeasor
Tortfeasor is the one to be held liable. Art. 2176
If there are several tortfeasors: shall be held liable solidarily. For instance, ralph, brendale, johnbee all tortfeasors. Athena is able to
obtainn judgement against them. What is the legal implication of their liability? In ObliCon, athena can choose any one of them, lets say
the liability is P90K, she can ask everything from brendale alone since liaibility is solidary. If brendale pays the P90K, he can ask for
reimbursement from johnbee (P30K) and ralph (P30K).
LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC., vs. GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION
and R&B INSURANCE
CORPORATION,
Both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of
the New Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Loadmasters claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as
subrogee, is not a valid defense. It may not have a direct contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the provisions
of Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum
that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of
its employees.[20] To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee.[21] In this regard, Loadmasters failed.
Each wrongdoer is liable for the total damage suffered by R&B Insurance. Where there are several causes for the resulting
damages, a party is not relieved from liability, even partially. It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient cause without
which the damage would not have resulted. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would not have
resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. As stated in the case of
Far Eastern Shipping v. Court of Appeals,[24]
X x x. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the
injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against
any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was
more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be
a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the
total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where
their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily
liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. [Emphasis supplied]
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Page 29 of 39
- consider the possiblity of someone being liable for somebody elses act or omission - dctrine of vicarious liability.
- In socratic method, students learn vicariously. Through the agony and pain of one person, the rest of the class learns :)
- you would have 2 persons there, 2 personalities. One who committed act or omission that causes damage to another, the other who is
being made responsible for it.
- it is not a violation of the fundamental principle that in imputing liability he is liable for his own act or omission because the basis of the
liability under vicarous liability is his own negligence.
- his negligence is premised from the fact that somebody for whom he is liable had committed the act or omission. Had he properly
supervised and selected that person, that person would not have committed the act or omission. It is his own negligence that is made
the basis of liability.
- In fact, in 1918 the reason why liability is imputed is becaus of his having failed to exericse the due care that is expected of him as
evident from the fact taht why else did that person under his superivsion committed the act or omission, if he had properly supervised
him.
- and because it is his own negligence, the liability is direct. It is his own negligence after all is the vasis of liability. It is as well primary.
- direct and primary, premised on the persons failure to negligence, you dont evn have to bring in the very person who comiited the act
or omission coz it is not his negligence that is the subject matter of hte doctrine of the vicarious liabiltiy. It is the liability of the person
who is tasked to supervise him.
- as early as in 2004 Cerezo case: an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employer's liability
based on a delict is merely subsidiary.43 The words "primary and direct," as contrasted with "subsidiary," refer to the remedy provided
by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation. 44 Although liability under Article 2180
originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes
damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage.
This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee's criminal
negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in
selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the employers liability is solely subsidiary is wrong.
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without including the author of the act. The action
against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not
subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to
the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action. 46
Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. The trial courts acquisition of jurisdiction over
Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to dispose of the present case on the merits.
- it does not mean that because you dont need to bring him in you dont have to prove hte act or omission, you will still have to establish
that he committed act or omission causeing amagge, under superivions of the person held vicariously liable.
- The scenario: A, the erring person causing damage to another. B, Somebody with supervision over him
- both be brought to court, ideal. But if that erring person is dead or nowhere to be found then the case can proceed against B alone,
his liability is the basis of the action but you still have to prove that A caused damage to another and B had duty to supervise.
- different from subsidiary ability under RPC.
B.1. By parents
Art. 221. Family Code. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law.
Republic Act No. 6809, Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of
eighteen years."
Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards
below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
Art. 2180, NCC
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
- father is responsible for damages caused by minors who lived under their company.
- equality before the law. Family Code, Art. 221. = parents.
- they have to be minors living under the your company for you to be vicariously held liable for their acts and omissions causing
damage to another.
- Scenario: Minor A, killing someone. If he lives in your company, the victim, the heirs can hold you vicariously liable. First you got to be
minor.
Who is a minor? Below 18. But there was a time a minor was below 21 then RA 6809 lowering the age from 21 to 18. When this was
lowered, majority commences at the age of 18 but theres a provision under the said law:
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards
below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
- what is the implication?
- means that minor is BELOW 21. (that was also a bar question :) )
- the very reason why they are liable is because of the parental duty to supervise them that comes along parental authority.
- if age 21 exactly, still living with parents, the latter are not liable.
Theres emancipation from parental authority but their responsibility subsists until age 21 of the child under this law.
> Minor children up for adoption. Tamargo case: We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been
retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do
not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing
at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be
given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of
the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so

Page 30 of 39
as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they
were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such
a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
Libi vs. IAC
* The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the
instruction and supervision of the child.
* We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is
primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the
persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are
solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that
"(t) he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damages."
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary.
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"ARTICLE 101.Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.
xxx xxx xxx
First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by . . . a person under
nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall
devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no
fault or negligence on their part." (Emphases supplied.) 21
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes
committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their
part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in
both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of
insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that "(i)f the minor
causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a
guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such
person be insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from
execution, in accordance with civil law."
Cuadra vs. Monfort
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there being
no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible, the
latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in the different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the mother
under the circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence,
which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may
therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states
"that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is the
exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child,
especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated
measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it implies a
consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the
damage could have been prevented.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the
observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or
the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the
right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it
was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to
anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would
reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
B.2. By guardians
ARTICLE 217. Family Code. In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated,
parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions
duly
accredited
by
the
proper
government
agency.
B.3. By owners and managers of establishment
Sps. Viloria
Rabbit
Castilex
B.4. By employers
3 points or angles of attack:
1. Under 2180, quasi-delict concept
2. Common carriers
3. Revised penal code, Art. 103, subsidiarily liable.
- defense for one cannot be used for another. Different defenses, extent and level of liability.
Art. 2180, NCC
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
xxxx

Page 31 of 39
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
- employer is engaged in business.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
- need not be engaged in the business for ER to be held vicariously liable as employer. Such as in the case of househelpers and others
employees of employers not engaged in business are contemplated under par. 5
The common thread in 4 and 5 is that
-- the act that caused damage to another was done in the occasion of their functions (for the ones employed in business) or (even if not
employed in business)in the performance within the scope of their assigned task.
Differs greatly in the concept of common carrier.
ER cannot insist that EE violated the instructions. ER cannot say exercised diligence of GFF.
ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION (Formerly CONSOLIDATED ORIX LEASING AND FINANCE
CORPORATION), petitioner, vs. MINORS: DENNIS, MYLENE, MELANIE and MARIKRIS, all surnamed MANGALINAO y DIZON,
MANUEL M. ONG, LORETO LUCILO, SONNY LI, AND ANTONIO DE LOS SANTOS G.R. No. 174089. January 25, 2012
Orix as the operator on record of the Fuso truck is liable to the heirs of the victims of the mishap
Orix cannot point fingers at the alleged real owner to exculpate itself from vicarious liability under Article 2180 47 of the Civil Code.
Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the Fuso by reason of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable
for the damages or injury the truck registered under it have caused. It has already been explained:
Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it
would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to
an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or
injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the
person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the
Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would
become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership. . . .
48
Besides, the registered owners have a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that they may be required to
pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff, 49 which Orix rightfully acknowledged by filing a third-party complaint against the
owner of the Fuso, Manuel.
-In contemplation of Art. 2180 and in culpa contractual.
When can it be said that that EE was acting in the performance of their function or within the scope of assigned task?
Issued company vehicle, what if you used that vehicle from home to office? In taking your lunch? Are you acting in the scope of your
assigned task? In the occasion of function so as to hold ER vicarously liable?
Is that the benefit to the ER contemplated of by law?
Coz surely it has benefited ER. Sure to get to the office on time.
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS'
HOSPITAL, INC.
The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an
employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle:
I.Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals
It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in
returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special
business benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to
reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an employee is acting within the
scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. 13
II.Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to or from Work
In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of
his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the
services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses
his employer's motor vehicle.
The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employer's
vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his actual
duties. Where the employee's duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work, or to go to and from
his home to various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have frequently
applied what has been called the "special errand" or "roving commission" rule, under which it can be found that the employee continues
in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope
of his employment in going to or from work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of
the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
III.Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not
liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates
that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some
incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he
has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment,
and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip.
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not on
the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in
American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in
ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer's business or within the scope of his assigned task.
- acting within the scope of assigned task if and only if there is a special business benefit to the employer. Is my going on office on
time a special business benefit? No. EE is expected to be present on time.
>> RPC. ARTICLE 103.Subsidiary Civil Liability of Other Persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

Page 32 of 39
- when does the subsidiary liability of ER arise? How to enforce subsidiary liability?
-- ex. Gorio, Guard of automotive shop shot a person and a criminal case was filed against him. Judgment was rendered: Gorio liable
for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. liable for P500,000 for civil damages. The sheriff served the writ of
execution but was returned unsatisfied coz Gorio is insolvent, from there what to do?
Private complainant can go after the Yasmien, the ER. How? What steps can you take as a lawyer in going after the ER? File a motion
to enforce subsidiary liability with a notice of hearing. File that and serve that with the ER and with EE-accused. It is in that hearing that
the ER will be heard so he cannot even say that he was denied due process because there was hearing. It is enforced not in a separate
case but through a motion in the same case. So you are notified.
Now the ER knows that his EE is a judgment debtor. As a lawyer, what is your defense?
- not his EE
- not engaged in trade or business
- offense was committed not discharged in his duties
- EE is not insolvent
>> what else are the other defenses?
- cannot say exercised due diligence as this defense is under Art. 2180 (vicarious) not for delict. Its not provided for in RPC
- RPC: only defense is that one, some or all of the elements are not present.
DIONISIO CARPIO vs. HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC Branch IV, Zamboanga City) and EDWIN RAMIREZ Y
WEE, [G.R. No. 84516. December 5, 1989.]
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1)
that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and
(3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only
after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable
upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency.
* If the elements are present, no other defense.
* Civil liability under Art. 2180, NCC. Vicarious liability, defense: exercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision over the EE
(2 burdens)
* Due diligence in the selection: ER must have considered the qualification (NBI clearance), experience and service records. It
established by documents and testimonies.
The employer must not merely present testimonial evidence to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee, but he must also support such testimonial evidence with concrete or documentary evidence.
The reason for this is to obviate the biased nature of the employer's testimony or that of his witnesses. (Syki case)
Due diligence in supervision: ER must show evidence such as manuals on policies, seminars, evaluation, documentary evidence.ER
must monitor implementation in fact to the point imposing sanctions for and whenever there is a breach. Not just issuing verbal
reprimand or warning.
You cannot just use testimony, youve got to present documents.
In a situation where ER is held subsidiarily liable, it usually arises towards the end where there is judgment of conviction all throughout
the trial of criminal case agianst EE, ER not knowing or even knowing has not participated in the trial coz he is not a party to the case.
And yet the very real possibility is the he will be held liable for the civil aspect of the case. Contrast that with vicarious liability under Art.
2180. Direct and primary liability. Can participate right away but a defense difficult to prove.
Burden of proof in vicarious liability is preponderance of evidence while in criminal liability is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
What can dissipate the difficulty in establishing proof beyond reasonable doubt is that the court can award civil damages pursuant to
the civil liability implied in the criminal liability.
In a case of plaintiff vs. ER, ER has the capacity to engage a better lawyer and consistent in supplying evidence.
In contrast with the one who is probably not thinking of properly defending himself because he was not a party in the case. In fact, this
is one of the matters that you should warn your ER-clients about. That when there is a criminal case filed against the EE in the
discharge of its function, you cannot stand idly by because what if your EE might be held civilly liable and is insolvent. So these are the
things you must lay out. In Subsidiary liability, all throughout out the proceedings, EE is involved while ER might be complacent. While
in vicarious liability, engaging the ER at the outset, he may properly prepare his evidence. Many things you should consider. Practical
considerations.
Another line of Attack
For ER engaged in the business of contract of carriage.
NCC, Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the
former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of
the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employees.
- cannot set up the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision. Required to exercise extraordinary diligence.
- In contrast to the Defense for subsidiary liability and vicarious liability: EE not acting within the scope.
- Different angles of attack, different defense.
In the selection of EE
** In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service
records. With respect to the supervision of employees, employers must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including
documentary evidence (Victory Liner case)
** Case law teaches that for an employer to have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, he should not be satisfied with the
applicant's mere possession of a professional driver's license; he must also carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, his experience and record of service. Petitioner failed to present convincing proof that she went to this extent of verifying
Venturina's qualifications, safety record, and driving history. The presumption juris tantum that there was negligence in the selection of
her bus driver, thus, remains unrebutted.
(Yambao vs. Zuniga)
Supervision of EE
** with respect to the supervision of employees, employers should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of
vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence. (Metro Manila Transit Corp. Vs. CA)
Evidence Needed:

Page 33 of 39
The employer must not merely present testimonial evidence to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee, but he must also support such testimonial evidence with concrete or documentary evidence.
The reason for this is to obviate the biased nature of the employer's testimony or that of his witnesses. (Syki case)
Distinguish from defense fo employer in culpa contractual:
ARTICLE 1759.Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts
of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Other Cases:
Mamaril vs. BSP
Vicarious liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case. It is uncontested that Pea and
Gaddi were assigned as security guards by AIB to BSP pursuant to the Guard Service Contract. Clearly, therefore, no employeremployee relationship existed between BSP and the security guards assigned in its premises. Consequently, the latter's negligence
cannot be imputed against BSP but should be attributed to AIB, the true employer of Pea and Gaddi.
Baliwag Transit vs. CA
Article 2180, in relation to Art. 2176, of the Civil Code provides that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages
caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee there instantly arises a presumption of the law that
there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such
selection. The presumption however may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it had exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Hence, to escape solidary liability for quasidelictcommitted by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care. Petitioner's failure to
prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver Juanito Fidel will make
it solidarily liable with the latter for damages caused by him.
St. Francis High School vs. CA
Under Article 2180, par. 4 , it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission
which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not
within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private
affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School
were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this
picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity. As earlier pointed out by the trial court,
mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in
any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and
neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the findings of respondent Court on this score, employers will forever
be exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such act
or omission he committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.
Filamer Christian Institute vs. CA
The legal issue in this appeal is whether or not the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is applicable to petitioner Filamer with
reference to Funtecha.
In disclaiming liability, petitioner Filamer has invoked the provisions of the Labor Code, 7 specifically Section 14, Rule X of Book III
which reads:
"Sec. 14.Working scholars. There is no employer-employee relationship between students on the one hand, and
schools, colleges or universities on the other, where students work for the latter in exchange for the privilege to
study free of charge; provided the students are given real opportunity, including such facilities as may be
reasonable, necessary to finish their chosen courses under such arrangement." (Emphasis supplied).
It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law, petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha's employer. Funtecha
belongs to that special category of students who render service to the school in exchange for free tuition. Funtecha worked for
petitioner for two hours daily for five days a week. He was assigned to clean the school passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. with
sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m. classes. As admitted by Agustin Masa in open court, Funtecha was not included in the
company payroll. 8
The wording of Section 14 is clear and explicit and leaves no room for equivocation. To dismiss the implementing rule as one which
governs only the "personal relationship" between the school and its students and not where there is already a third person involved, as
espoused by private respondents, is to read into the law something that was not legislated there in the first place. The provision of
Section 14 is obviously intended to eliminate an erstwhile gray area in labor relations and seeks to define in categorical terms the
precise status of working scholars in relation to the learning institutions in which they work for the privilege of a free education.
But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the primary responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot
be imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at the time of the accident, it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was
not acting within the scope of his supposed employment. His duty was to sweep the school passages for two hours every morning
before his regular classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving the
vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. In
other words, at the time of the injury, Funtecha was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which he was employed,
but for some purpose of his own. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his tortious negligence. Petitioner
Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he had caused.
Aguila vs. Baldovizo
it is not necessary to amend the original decision holding the petitioners, Marlun Lisbos, and the insurance company solidarily liable. In
an action based on quasi-delict, the liability of the employer is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee. 14 Thus, even if the driver was included albeit not served with summons, petitioners are directly and
primarily liable. Thus, petitioners Aguila and Reyes as employer and registered owner or possessor-operator of the van, respectively,
are solidarily liable in accordance with Article 2180 15 in relation to Articles 2184 16 and 2194 17 of the Civil Code.
Jayme vs. Apostol
No negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the person may have the right to control the manner of the
vehicle's operation. 26 In the absence of an employer-employee relationship establishing vicarious liability, the driver's negligence
should not be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle. 27 Whatever right of control the
occupant may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the doctrine of vicarious liability.

Page 34 of 39
Compare: subsidiary liability under art. 103, RPC
Franco vs. IAC
Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer under the Revised Penal Code and the employer's primary
liability under the Civil Code which is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. The first type of liability is governed by Articles 102 and 103
of the Revised Penal Code while the second kind is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from a delict committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor
and upon whose primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be based. Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be
proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby the employee's criminal negligence or delict and
corresponding liability therefor are proved. If no criminal action was instituted, the employer's liability would not be predicated under
Article 103. The conviction of the employee primarily liable is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. There can
be no automatic subsidiary liability of defendant employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code where his employee has not
been previously criminally convicted.
Under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability is based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious
acts of its employees subject, however, to the defense that the former exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employees.
Bermudez vs. Melencio-Herrera
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses
the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise
of the diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their
right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict. The
appellant precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil action in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111,
Rules of Court. In fact, even without such a reservation, we have allowed the injured party in the criminal case which resulted in the
acquittal of the accused to recover damages based on quasi-delict. In People vs. Ligon, G.R. No. 74041, we held: "However, it does not
follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution
must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages (Article 29,
Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Alvarez vs. CA
It is already a settled rule that the subsidiary liability of an employer automatically arises upon his employee's conviction, and
subsequent proof of inability to pay. In this light, the application of Pajarito is merely the enforcement of a procedural remedy designed
to ease the burden of litigation for recovery of indemnity by the victims of a judicially-declared criminally negligent act. As had been
aptly stated, "A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be
adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more
expedient than a time remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the
case. . . . These do not exist in this case. Considering more over the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review
stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed." (Emphasis supplied).
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-President and General Manager vs. HON. PHILADELFA B.
PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil
liability ex delicto; 12 and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony
(e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law; 13 the intentional torts; 14 and culpa aquiliana 15 ); or (b) where the injured
party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. 16 Either of these two possible liabilities may
be enforced against the offender.17
Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa
criminalunder Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the
Civil Code. If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its
employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. On the other hand, if the action
chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee. 18
Article 1161 19 of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to
the provision of Article 2177 20 and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this
Book, regulating damages. Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case the
obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who
makes known his cause of action in his initiatory pleading or complaint, 21 and not with the defendant who can not ask for the dismissal
of the plaintiff's cause of action or lack of it based on the defendant's perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against
the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. 22
Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's minor son was caused by the negligent act of the petitioners'
driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for failing "to exercise the necessary
diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of [their] employee, the driver, which diligence, if
exercised, would have prevented said accident."
Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, they would have alleged
that the guilt of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; that such accused driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary
liability of the defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their employee (driver) based on the principle that
every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. 23 Since there was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver, precisely
because death intervened prior to the termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses' recourse was, therefore, to sue the
petitioners for their direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict.
Recourse of ER held Vicariously Liability
Art. 2181, NCC.Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or
delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
- what if you were not able to prove due diligence in the selection and supervision and you were held liable. What you can do is avail of
Art. 2181.
- if for example the damage is P1M, ER paid P1M, he can ask for what he has paid. It is simplistically said. If he paid P1M, he can
demand P1M.
- consider specific scenario: ER who is an Owner of vehicle in the vehicle at the time of mishap
ARTICLE 2184.In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have,

Page 35 of 39
by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found
guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
- here is one who has a driver. Owner of the vehicle in the vehicle. Accident happened where the driver hit the pedestrian. Necessitating
hospitalization for 20 days. What is the defense there that the owner can raise? Defense must be specific that you cannot have by
due diligence prevented the misfortune from happening. You could not have prevented the misfortune from happening like it was
so sudden. Be careful with your defenses.
If you failed to adduce that defense, your liability is solidary with the driver. If the damage was P1M. How much can the employer can
recover from the driver not to the extent of P1M of full reimbursement because ER is also liable. Can ask for P500,000. Art. 2181 is
differently worded than Art. 2184. Solidary liability - you are liable somehow to some extent.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n)
B.5 owner of the vehicle
In the vehicle
Not in the vehicle
NCC, Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could
have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n)
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time
of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n)
Article 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper government office a bond executed by a government-controlled
corporation or office, to answer for damages to third persons. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the competent
public official. (n)
Duavit vs. CA
The Supreme Court ruled in Duquilleo v. Bayot (67 Phil. 131-133-134) [1939] that an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an
accident involving the said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him.
The Court cannot blindly apply absolute rules based on precedents whose facts do not jibe four square with pending cases. Every case
must be determined on its own peculiar factual circumstances. Where, as in this case, the records of the petition fail to indicate the
slightest indicia of an employer-employee relationship between the owner and the erring driver or any consent given by the owner for
the vehicle's use, we cannot hold the owner liable.
Juaniza vs. Jose
Only the registered owner of a public service is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation, or
may be caused to any of the passengers therein.
Anonuevo vs.CA
The applicability of Art. 2185 is expressly qualified to motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to presume that the law
intended a broader coverage.
At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of non-motorized vehicles ranging from human-powered
contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such as calesas and carromata. These modes of transport
were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they are today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code chose then
to exclude these alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with the use of the term motorized vehicles. If Aonuevo seriously
contends that the application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater interaction today of all types of vehicles, such argument
contradicts historical experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles, as it stood in 1950, was significantly
lower than as it stands today. This will be certainly affirmed by statistical data, assuming such has been compiled, much less confirmed
by persons over sixty. Aonuevos characterization of a vibrant intra-road dynamic between motorized and non-motorized vehicles is
more apropos to the past than to the present.
There is a fundamental flaw in Aonuevos analysis of Art. 2185, as applicable today. He premises that the need for the distinction
between motorized and non-motorized vehicles arises from the relative mass of number of these vehicles. The more pertinent basis for
the segregate classification is the difference in type of these vehicles. A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike
a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A motorized
vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles.
At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or collision.
This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and
greater combustability due to the fuels that they use.
FGU Insurance Co. vs. CA
The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made
responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from
causing damage. 7 Yet, as correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of the circumstances
mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the
owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent
FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an employer of the latter.
We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code which provides: " In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former , who was in the vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune . .
. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither
applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has
no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can
neither prosper.
Cadiente vs. Macas
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had already sold it to someone else, is primarily responsible to the public for whatever
damage or injury the vehicle may cause. The policy behind vehicle registration is the easy identification of the owner who can be held
responsible in case of accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle. This is so as not to inconvenience or prejudice a third party
injured by one whose identity cannot be secured. 21

Page 36 of 39
Therefore, since the Ford Fiera was still registered in the petitioner's name at the time when the misfortune took place, the
petitioner cannot escape liability for the permanent injury it caused the respondent, who had since stopped schooling and is now forced
to face life with nary but two remaining limbs.
B.6. By state
Republic vs. Palacio
The initial complaint against the Irrigation Service Unit was that it induced the Handong Irrigation Associations, Inc., to invade and
occupy the land of respondent Ortiz. This liability thus arose from tort and not from contract and it is a well-entrenched rule embodied in
art. 2180 of the Civil Code that the State is liable only for torts caused by its special agents specifically commissioned to carry out acts
complained of outside of such agent's regular duties. In the absence of proof that the tortious inducement was authorized, neither the
State nor its funds are liable therefor.
Meritt vs. GPI
"Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is
rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether
to pay the judgment or not, and execution can not issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a
seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such
judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof." (49 Am. Jur., sec. 104, pp. 312-320.)
"Judgment against a state, in cases where it has consented to be sued, generally operate merely to liquidate and establish
plaintiff's claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise they can not be enforced by processes of law; and it is for the
legislature to provide for their payment in such manner as it sees fit." (59 C.J. sec. 501, p. 331; 81 C.J.S., sec. 232, p. 1343.)
The Government of the Philippine Islands in only liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees when
they are acting as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil code, and a chauffeur of the
General Hospital is not such a special agent.

STATE
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official
to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
- special agent: one who performs governmental function but a function different from his official function. In that case, the state is
liable.
- cant file a case against the state for 3 reasons:
1. The constitutional provision that you cant sue the state unless it consents.
2. Philosophical justification
3. Practical consideration that to allow the state to be sued would be to divert its attention from the pressing demands of public
service.
Can the state be sued?
> When suit vs. State
- sued by its name
- unincorporated performing government functions
officials

performing

public

function

Consent to be sued
1. Express- only through law.
- General law: Art. 2180, NCC. Act 3023 - money claim arising from contract file a case against COA before going to court.
- Special law: Meritt case, Meritt asked a congressman for a bill to support him.
2. Implied
B.7. By teachers
Exconde vs. Capuno
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son
Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was
then living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident. And so, plaintiff
contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability.
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are
liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this provision only
applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953, Ed., Vol.
IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557). Here Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as
part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor.
And it was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it, the accident
occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable
for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law.
Palisoc vs. Brillantes
The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in
their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child" This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code. In the
law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of
the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students'
activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary
precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries
that some students themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.
The basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 (now 2180)is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc., are
supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority and where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the
teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the reason that
the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the
child is under instruction. The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers under the
same cited article.

Page 37 of 39
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article
2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or
the other defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the students) remain in
their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its head and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such
liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live an board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower
court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present
decision.
The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said defendants
but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their
students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve
themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision said defendants
failed to prove such exemption from liability.
Amadora vs. CA
The provision in Article 2180 of the Civil Code should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is
academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be
liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be
answerable. There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed
by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides: "Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody." Following the canon of reddendo singula
singulis, "teachers should apply to the words "pupils and student's and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices."
The provision in Article 2180 of the Civil Code should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is
academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be
liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be
answerable. There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed
by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides: "Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody." Following the canon of reddendo singula
singulis, "teachers should apply to the words "pupils and student's and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices."
The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its
premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school
premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues.
The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the
pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned.
It should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades and not on the school itself.
If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general
principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus
paterfamilias.
Such defense of bonus pater familias is also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer
for the tort committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the
injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180.
It should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the
offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable
by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student's age.
The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its
premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school
premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues.
The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the
pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned.
It should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades and not on the school itself.
If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the
general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a
bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense of bonus pater familias is also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer
for the tort committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the
injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180.
It should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the
offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable
by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student's age.
Salvosa vs. IAC
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for
"damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is
that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student]
and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 - 'so
long as (the students) remain in their custody' means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time.
In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is
embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the

Page 38 of 39
student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school
activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises
of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody" of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
We hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot
Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon
for damages resulting from his acts. Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident, Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit
Commandant, AFP, had instructed Jimmy B. Abon "not to leave the office and [to keep the armory] well guarded. Apart from negating a
finding that Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody of the school when he committed the act for which the petitioners are sought to be
held liable, this circumstance shows that Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his
superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
ARTICLE 218.The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall
have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. (349a)
ARTICLE 219.Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons
exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised
the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. cda
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts. (n)
St Marys Acadamy vs. Carpitanos
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in
child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of
the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils
and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally
and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction,
or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause
of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or
the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Further, there was no evidence that
petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva,
grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed
James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Mary's
Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting
from such accident. Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages in the amount of
P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. In this case, the proximate
cause of the accident was not attributable to petitioner. For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the
decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. Moreover, the
grant of attorney's fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the rule. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification. Thus, the grant of attorney's fees against the petitioner
is likewise deleted. aESICD
We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the
public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. Hence, with the
overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
TEACHERS
Art.
2180(7),
NCC
Lastly, TEACHERS or HEADS of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their PUPILS AND
STUDENTS OR APPRENTICES, so long as they remain in their custody.
Family
Code
ARTICLE 218.The SCHOOL, its ADMINISTRATORS and TEACHERS, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall
have special parental authority and responsibility over the MINOR child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
The liability of teachers reach beyond the minority of students - Art. 2180(7)
B.8. Defense: diligence of good father of family
C. Provinces, cities and municipalities
Jimenez vs. City of Manila
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach, that the defective public works
belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or
municipality has either "control or supervision" over the public building in question.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana Public Market, despite the Management and Operating Contract between
respondent City and Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under the control of the former.
City of Manila vs. Teotico

Page 39 of 39
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos avenue were, therefore, a
national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic
Act 409.
Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article
only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. In the case at bar, this control or
supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer

LGU
ARTICLE 2189.Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by
reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision?
- ex. Car is damaged due to potholes, can you file a case against LGU?
- no. The law is specific to death of or injury to persons not to property.
- control and supervision, not ownership.
D. Proprietors of buildings, engineer, architect, contractor
NCC, Article 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it
should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)
Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances
which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place.
(1908)
Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in
article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with
said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909)
De Roy v. Ca, supra
Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family
of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents
had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. RTC
found petitioners guilty. CA affirmed.
SC: CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the
Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.