PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,!vs.!

PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL,

MACARIO ASTELLERO, and JANUARIO DOSDOS, accused- appellants.
Accused-appellants were charged of murder and illegal possession of firearms at the RTC
of Cebu City for killing one Alexander Flores aka Alex. Among the witnesses
presented by the prosecution were Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., a radio news reporter then
aboard his jeep who heard a couple of gunshots; PO3 Celso Seville, Jr., a homicide
investigator of Police Station No. 3 who found four (4) .45 caliber shells some four (4)
feet away from the victim's body, and two (2) deformed slugs where the victim had lain;
Dr. Ladislao Diola, Jr., Chief of the PNP Region 7 Crime Laboratory who had autopsied
the victim's body; andSPO4 Lemuel Caser, a ballistician of the PNP Crime Laboratory,
who reported the following:
1. Fired cartridge cases marked "JA-1" to "JA-3" possesses similar individual
characteristics markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .45 with SN:
PGO13506;
2. Fired cartridge cases marked "JA-4" and "E-69-6" possesses similar individual
characteristics markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .45 pistol with SN:
52469;
3. Fired bullet metal jacket marked "JA-5" possesses similar individual characteristics
markings with test bullets fired from cal .45 pistol with SN: PGO13506;
4. Fired cartridge cases marked "E-45-1 " to "E-45-6" possesses similar individual
characteristics markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .38 Rev. SN: P8445;
5. Fired bullets marked as "JA-6" and "LD" possesses similar individual characteristic
markings with the test bullets fired from cal .38 Rev. SN: P8445.15
Accused appellant Abriol also testified that he surrendered his service firearm to the
BBRC Administrative Officer when he was served a warrant of arrest for murder in
Criminal Case No. CBU-28843. However, the handgun was defective and it was returned
to him for repair by Armscor, He presented a Memorandum Receipt authorizing him to
carry the government-issued .38 revolver. The defense also presented Dr. Jesus P. Cerna,
medico-legal officer of the Cebu City PNP Command, to testify on the caliber of the
firearms which might have caused the gunshot wounds of the victim. Relying on the
Necropsy Report prepared by Dr. Diola, Dr. Cerna declared that wound nos. 1 and 2,
which each measured 0.6 cm. by 0.6 cm., may have been caused by a .38 caliber firearm.
As to wound nos. 3 and 4, which each measured 0.5 cm. by 0.5 cm., it was possible that a
.38 handgun was used, or one with a smaller bore. Dr. Cerna opined that a .45 pistol
could not have inflicted all the foregoing wounds, as the entry points were too small for a
.45 caliber bullet. With respect to the grazing wounds found on the victim's body, Dr.
Cerna testified that it was impossible to determine the caliber of the firearm used.
The trial court found appellants' version of the incident neither convincing and credible
and, as earlier stated, it believed the prosecution's version. Petitioners' were convicted of

the offenses charged.

Hence, this appeal. The defense stated that the lower court erred in convicting the
accused- appellants for the crime of murder and illegal possession of firearms when they
received in evidence the testimony of Dr. Diola and P/Inspector Lemuel Caser. They
contend that both findings were ambiguous and have no basis. On the other hand,
appellants allege that the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel Caser, the prosecution's
ballistics expert, clearly shows that: (1) He is ignorant about such ballistics instruments
such as the micrometer, goniometer, and pressure barrel. (2) He is not conversant with
"the required references concerning ballistics," particularly books on the subject by
foreign authorities.(3) He could not "scientifically determine the caliber of a bullet."
Since P/Inspector Caser lacked adequate training and expertise in ballistics, they claim
that his opinion that the test bullets and cartridges matched the slugs and cartridges
recovered from the scene of the crime was not reliable. Appellants also assail Caser's
failure to take the necessary photographs to support his findings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the expert opinion of both the medical doctor and ballistic expert should
be stricken down.
HELD:
No. The Office of the Solicitor General points out that Dr. Diola's testimony is supported
by Dr. Pedro P. Solis, a medical expert, in his book entitled Legal Medicine. The factors
which could make the wound of entrance bigger than the caliber include: (1) shooting in
contact or near fire; (2) deformity of the bullet which entered; (3) a bullet which might
have entered the skin sidewise; and (4) an acute angular approach of the bullet. However,
where the wound of entrance is smaller than the firearm's caliber, the same may be
attributed to the fragmentation of the bullet before entering the skin or to a contraction of
the elastic tissues of the skin (stress supplied). Dr. Diola testified that a .45 caliber pistol
could have caused the grazing wounds on the victim's head and extremities.33 Dr. Cerna
corroborated Dr. Diola's findings in this regard. Such expert opinions disprove appellants'
theory that the .45 caliber handguns confiscated from them could not have been used in
killing the victim.
An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject
matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which
he proposes to express an opinion." There is no definite standard of determining the
degree of skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It
is sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training and education; (2)
particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and (3) presentation of
authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based. The question of whether a
witness is properly qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics rests with the
discretion of the trial court.
In giving credence to Caser's expert testimony, the trial court explained:

The defense downgraded the capability of Caser in forensics ballistics and identifying
firearms. Much stress is given to the absence of photographs of his examination.
Nonetheless, the Court is satisfied (with) Caser's examination, findings and conclusions
with the use of a microscope. Caser's conclusion based on his examination deserves
credit. He found the impressions on the primer of the fired cartridges that were test-fired
to have the same characteristics with those recovered at the scene of the crime. Whenever
a triggerman pumps a bullet (into) the body of his victim, he releases a chunk of concrete
evidence that binds him inseparably to his act. Every gun barrel deeply imprints on every
bullet its characteristic marking peculiar to that gun and that gun alone. These marking
might be microscopic but they are terribly vocal in announcing their origin. And they are
as infallible for purposes of identification, as the print left by the human finger.41
We agree with the trial court that P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert. He is a
licensed criminologist, trained at the Ballistics Command and Laboratory Center in Fort
Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, and in the National Bureau of
Investigation. He had previously testified as an expert witness in at least twenty-seven
(27) murder and homicide cases all over the country. An expert witness need not present
comparative microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to support his findings.
Examination under a comparison microscope showing that the test bullet and the
evidence bullet both came from the same gun is sufficient. Moreover, the ballistician
conclusively found similar characteristic markings in the evidence, test cartridges and
slugs.

People vs. Dy (super sorry super late :( )

Facts: Accused is the owner of Bennys Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with
murder before the trial court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused
contends the court erred in admitting the presentation of the prosecution of evidence that
he came to a police officer and made a confession on the crime and informed said officer
where to find the gun he used, a statement the accused denied to have done. They assail
its admissibility to the court on the grounds that such statement was not made in writing
and is in violation of the due process required in custodial investigation.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant
guilt of the accused.
Held: In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its credibility
before the court. An oral confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him
the gun is in his bar which he wants to surrender can be held admissible in court as
evidence against him. This is because such confession was made unsolicited by the police
officer and the accused was not under investigation when he made the oral confession.
Therefore there is no need to invoke compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial
investigation at the case at bar. The rule on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness
who heard the confession is competent to satisfy the substance of what he heard if he
heard and understood it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a
case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral confession made by the accused outside
the ambit of custodial investigation can be admissible in court and was given due
credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of the crime.

PEOPLE v. DURANAN (2001)

Doctrine: It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or
mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to
observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question.
Facts:
- Appeal from the decision of the RTC finding Emiliano Duranan, a.k.a. Kalbo, guilty
of two counts of rape against AAA, a feebleminded girl. He pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment.
- Complainant AAA, who was 25 years old when she was raped, is considered to be
retarded and finished up to the sixth grade only. She is unemployed and simply does
household chores for her family. Accused- appellant lived with the complainants family
in the same apartment in where he rented a room.
o The first incident: AAA was standing by the door of her grandfathers house when
accused- appellant suddenly placed his arm on her neck and dragged her inside the
common bathroom. Duranan kissed her and then removed her shorts and underwear as he
held her hands with his other hand. She did not cry for help because accused- appellant
threatened her that he would get angry if she did.
o The second incident: AAA was cleaning the family residence when Duranan took her to
his room. Duranan threatened her, laid her on the floor and raped her. After the incident,
Duranan sent her letters professing love for her and telling her how beautiful she was.
o Third incident: He attempted but stopped when he heard someone coming. After the
attempted rape, BBB testified that she noticed that her daughters lower lip was bruised.
The latter revealed for the first time what had happened to her.
- Apart from claiming that he wasnt in the house during the first incident and that he
couldnt have raped her in his room because there were six other people in his room
during the second incident, on appeal, Duranan claimed that the court erred in holding
that AAA is deprived of reason because there was no testimony by a competent
medical expert to that effect, especially since her own mother described AAA as quite
intelligent. He contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victims mental
age was not proven (Remember, her actual age is 25).
o He argues that under Art. 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential element for
the prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the
complainants mental age to determine if her mental age is under twelve. He further
claims that only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical
deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived.
Issue: WON the court erred in holding that AAA is deprived of reason because there
was no testimony by a competent medical expert to that effect

Held: No, the trial court was correct. RTC decision affirmed.
- Rule 130, 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: Opinion of Ordinary
witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in
evidence regarding - -- (a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate
knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the mental
sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
- The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she
knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is
suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.
- It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or
mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to
observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question.
o Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he
bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. (conversations or dealings which
he has had with such person, etc.)
- The statement that complainant is quite intelligent must be read in the context of
BBBs previous statement that complainant thinks like a child but from her narration or
statement we can see that her declaration are (sic) true or believable. Thus, what
complainants mother meant was that complainant, although she thought like a child,
nevertheless could tell others what happened to her.
- Accused-appellant cites the medico-legal report which describes complainant as
coherent and contends that this is an evaluation of the mental state of complainantNO!
The medico legal reports purpose is limited to determining whether the complainant
had been sexually abused.

G.R. No. 158015 August 11, 2004!LAURA and ERIBERTO BAUTISTA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FERNANDO MORELOS, respondents. FACTS:
1. The dispute involves a parcel of land situated along Maceda Street, Sampaloc, Manila,
which was previously owned and registered in the name of the late Cesar Morelos.
2. During his lifetime, Cesar sold and conveyed the above-mentioned parcel of land in
favor of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista.
3. Respondent Fernando Morelos, claiming to be the illegitimate child of Cesar instituted
a complaint for the declaration of nullity of sale and title with damages.
4. At the trial, he presented testimonies of expert witnesses who claimed that the
signature of Cesar Morelos on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the fingerprint appearing on
his Residence Certificate were not his.
5. Petitioners countered that the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid. The witness to the
Deed, Carmelita Marcelino, testified that she saw Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura
Bautista sign the same.
6. RTC: Deed of Sale is valid and dismissed Morelos claim for insufficient evidence the
claims and counterclaims for damages of the parties.
7. CA: reversed the decision. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonies of expert witnesses are conclusive to be a strong basis to
nullify a duly executed and notarized deed of absolute sale.
HELD: YES.
1. Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may
be proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party, against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to
the satisfaction of the judge.
It is well-settled that a duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of
authenticity and due execution as well as the full faith and credence attached to a
public instrument. To overturn this legal presumption, evidence must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant to establish that there was forgery that
gave rise to a spurious contract.
3. In the case at bar, the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations
of forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness

who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal
knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or
circumstantial evidence at best. Carmelita Marcelino, the witness to the Deed of Absolute
Sale, confirmed the genuineness, authenticity and due execution thereof. Having been
physically present to see the decedent Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista affix
their signatures on the document, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of
petitioners.
4. Witness Francisco Cruz, Jr. failed to establish the fact that the signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale was not that of Cesar Morelos. He merely concluded that the document
was a forgery without citing any factual basis for arriving at that conclusion. Cruz did not
point out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine
and false specimens of writing, which would ordinarily escape detection by an ordinary
lay person.
Besides, a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner
therein expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity. The authenticity and
due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale must therefore be upheld.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NOEL LEE, accused-appellant.
D EC I S I O N!PUNO, J.:
facts:
On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch
127 in Criminal Case No. C-54012 (98), which sentenced accused-appellant Noel Lee to
death for the murder of Joseph Marquez.
Appellant is a well-known figure in their neighborhood and has several criminal cases
pending against him in Caloocan City. He was charged with frustrated homicide in 1984
and attempted murder in 1989.[9]
Accused-appellant had known the victim since childhood and their houses are only two
blocks apart. Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug addict.
Six days before his death, on September 23, 1996, accused-appellant caught Joseph
inside his car trying to steal his car stereo.
The accused-appellant likewise explained the two criminal cases filed against him in
1984 and 1989. The information for attempted murder was dismissed as a result of the
victims desistance while in the frustrated homicide case, the real assailant appeared and
admitted his crime.[12]
In a decision dated June 22, 1999, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty and
sentenced him to the penalty of death.
Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, viz:

Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:-(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait
involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to
establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
x x x x x x x x x.
issue:!w/n the proof of bad moral character of the victim is relevant to determine the
probability or improbability of his killing?
held:
no, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the
probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the
victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no
connection between the deceaseds drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in
the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the claim
that because of the victims bad character he could have been killed by any one ofthose
from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victims bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder
committed with treachery and premeditation. the proof of such character may only be
allowed in homicide cases to show that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent
danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive
action was necessary
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision dated June 22, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court,
Caloocan City, Branch 127 in Criminal Case No. C-54012 (98) is affirmed insofar as
accused-appellant Noel Lee is found guilty of murder for the death of Joseph Marquez.
The death sentence imposed by the trial court is however reduced to reclusion perpetua,
there having been no aggravating circumstance in the commission of said crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAFAEL DIOPITA y
GUZMAN, accused-appellant.
Facts: ( Crime of Robbery with Rape)!-Dominga Pikit-pikit, 24 years old (victim)!accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y Guzman,a "Ministerial Servant" in the congregation
of Jehovahs Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible
family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God!-Diopita dragged her
through the banana plantation towards the cornfields And sat on her(Pikit's) thighs and

proceeded to divest her of her belongings - ladies watch, bracelet, ring with russian
diamonds, wedding ring and P1,000.00 cash.As he was sexually assaulting her, Dominga
made desperate struggles and frantic calls for help but her efforts proved futile until he
finally satiated his lust.
Issue/Held:!1. W/N Diopita is entitled to acquittal because of his good moral character and
exemplary conduct? NO.
The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies
the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the
position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion
and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good
conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape.
An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral
character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be
resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving
his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant
case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of accusedappellant is unavailing.
2. Credence to the testimonies of the defense witnesses. He argues that these are
Jehovahs Witnesses, and as such, they are God-fearing people who would never lie as to
his whereabouts at the time in question.
This argument is as puerile as the first.The precision with which the witnesses for the
defense, who are his co-members in the Jehovahs Witnesses, quoted the respective hours
when the participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at best, selfserving and deserves scant consideration because of the facility with which it may be
concocted and fabricated.
The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is best and most
competently performed by the trial court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,!vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE

a.k.a. ROBERTO SAN MIGUEL,accused-appellant.
Facts:
Held:
Roberto Padrigone a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel, Michael San Antonio, Jocel Ibaneta and
Abelardo Triumpante were charged with rape. Roberto Padrigone and the other accused
broke into the house of Rowena Contridas, then 16 years old, situated in San Benito,
Salvacion, Buhi, Camarines Sur. Appellant Roberto Padrigone and accused Jocel Ibaneta

poked a knife at Rowena and her fourteen year-old sister, Nimfa, and threatened to kill
them if they reported the incident to others. Then, appellant undressed Rowena, and
sexually violated her while his co-accused watched with glee. After appellant satisfied his
lust on Rowena, the other accused took their turns.
Appellant assails the procedural irregularities committed by the prosecution and by the
trial court. He claims that the prosecution suppressed evidence by not presenting Rowena,
the victim, when the latter should have had her sane moments. As a consequence, the!trial
court deprived appellant of the opportunity to cross-examine her when she allegedly
declared before the Chief of Police of Buhi that it was only appellant who raped her!which
declaration became the basis for the latters conviction.
The basis of his conviction was not Rowenas declaration before the Chief of Police but
rather Nimfas testimony before the trial court that it was him who raped Rowena, among
others.
The non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as
suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply if (a) the
evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is
merely corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the
opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a!witness.
Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness stand. Second, Rowena was certified
to be suffering from Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition and thus cannot stand
judicial proceedings yet.The non-presentation, therefore, of Rowena was not willful.
Third, in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact
witnessed the violation committed on her sister.
8. [G.R. No. 122899. June 8, 2000] METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and G.T.P. DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
affirming the trial court's judgment ordering herein petitioner Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company (hereafter, METROBANK) to release/cancel the real estate mortgage
constituted over the subject property, and the respondent court's resolution dated 04
December 1995 denying petitioner METROBANK's motion for reconsideration.
The subject property is a parcel of land in Diliman, Quezon City consisting of six
hundred ninety (690) square meters originally owned by businessman Tomas Chia under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-16753 (106901) of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon
City. Saddled with debts and business reverses, Mr. Chia offered the subject property for
sale to private respondent G.T.P. Development Corporation (hereafter, GTP), with
assumption of the mortgage indebtedness in favor of petitioner METROBANK secured
by the subject property. GTP paid the said indebtedness for which Metrobank issued a

corresponding receipt. However, Metrobank refused to release the real estate mortgage
on the subject property despite repeated requests from GTP thus the case for specific
performance was subsequently filed. The Trial Court ruled in favor of GTP but on appeal,
the CA reversed its decision but later on retracts and decided in favor of GTP .
ISSUE: Whether or not Metrobank is barred from refusing the discharge of the real
estate mortgage on the claim that the subject property still secures "other
unliquidated past due loans."
HELD: Petitioner METROBANK is estopped from refusing the discharge of the real
estate mortgage on the claim that the subject property still secures "other unliquidated
past due loans." In Maneclang vs. Baun,[14] this Court enumerated the requisites for
estoppel by conduct to operate, to wit:
"1.....there must have been a representation or concealment of material facts;!"2.....the
representation must have been with knowledge of the facts;!"3.....the party to whom it was
made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; and "4.....it must have been with
the intention that the other party would act upon it.
Petitioner METROBANK is thus barred from taking a stand inconsistent with its
representation upon which respondent GTP, as an innocent third person to the real
mortgage agreement, placed exclusive reliance. Respondent GTP had the reasonable right
to rely upon such representations as true, considering that it had no participation
whatsoever in the mortgage agreement and the preparation of the statement of account,
coupled with the expectation that a reputable banking institution such as petitioner
METROBANK do conduct their business concerns in the highest standards of efficiency
and professionalism. For an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against a person relying thereon.
A party may not go back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other
party who relied upon them. In the law of evidence, whenever a party has, by his own
declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular
thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
P. vs. Ong
Facts
1. Respondents Gabriel, Soledad and Francisca are children of respondent Faustino
Landingin and the late Agapita Ferrer.
2. Petitioner is the son of Agapita Ferrer by her first husband, Ludovico Cayabyab, while
respondent Amparo Francisco is __petitioner's niece, being the daughter of his sister,
Nieves Cayabyab.
3. Respondents asked for the annulment of the deeds of sale and the recovery of

possession of four parcels of land. Two of __the parcels of land (Lots [a] and [d]) are
situated in Dagupan City while the other two (Lots [b] and [c]) are situated in Sta.
__Barbara, Pangasinan.
4. Respondents alleged that petitioner was able to obtain the signatures of Agapita Ferrer
and respondent Faustino __Landingin in the deeds of sale through fraud, undue influence
and abuse of confidence. It was only in 1980, or three years thereafter, that they learned
of said sales after respondent Gabriel Landingin received from petitioner a demand to
vacate Lot (d) on which petitioner and private respondents all reside. According to
private respondents, these lots form part of their inheritance as the compulsory heirs of
Agapita Ferrer, to the exclusion of petitioner, who already received his share during
Ferrer's lifetime.
5. Petitioner did not claim Lot (a) but alleged that he acquired by purchase one-third
portion of Lots (b) and (c) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by respondent
Faustino Landingin and Agapita Ferrer on March 21, 1973; the remaining two-thirds
portion of Lots (b) and (c) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by respondent
Faustino Landingin and Agapita Ferrer on April 21, 1977; and Lot (d) by virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Sale executed by Agapita Ferrer with the marital consent of respondent
Faustino Landingin on April 21, 1977.
6. Trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint.
7. Intermediate Appellate Court rendered judgment reversing the questioned decision. It
ordered the annulment of the deeds __of sale over the subject lots and declared the heirs
of Agapita Ferrer and respondent Faustino Landingin the owners and rightful possessors
of the parcels of land in question.
Issue__Whether or not the respondents, who alleged that the petitioner committed fraud
in respect

to the transaction, have the burden of proving the same

Held
1. Petitioner claims that the sale of the subject lots to him is valid and binding as clearly
evidenced by the deeds of sale which __are public documents. According to him, private
respondents' allegation of fraud, deceit and undue influence have not been established
sufficiently and competently to rebut the presumption of regularity and due execution of
the deeds of sale.
2. Indeed, the general rule is that whosoever alleges fraud or mistake in any transaction
must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care for
his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and regular. This rule is
especially applied when fraud or mistake is alleged to annul notarial documents which
are clothed with the prima facie presumption of regularity and due execution (Revised

Rules on Evidence, Rule 132 [B], Sec. 30).

3. Nevertheless, the general rule admits of exceptions, one of which is Article 1332 of the
Civil Code which provides: When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is
in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person
enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the
former.
4. Under the foregoing provision, where a party to a contract is illiterate, or can not read
nor understand the language in which the contract is written, the burden is on the party
interested in enforcing the contract to prove that the terms thereof are fully explained to
the former in a language understood by him
5. In the case at bench, both respondent Faustino Landingin and Agapita Ferrer were
illiterate. The latter, in fact, could only thumbmark her signature on all the deeds of sale;
and although respondent Faustino Landingin may have affixed his signature to the deeds
of sale, he could neither read nor write and actually lost the use of his right arm to
paralysis in 1971. To make matters worse, all the deeds were written in English while the
spouses could speak and understand only the Pangasinense and Ilocano dialects.
6. Since fraud and undue influence in the execution of the subject deeds are alleged by
respondents, the burden, under the circumstances, shifted to petitioner to prove that the
contents thereof had been adequately explained to the vendors and that the latter fully
understood the same.
7. As very well found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to discharge this burden.
8. The testimonies of Bartolome Ceralde and Dr. Alfredo Cerezo are not sufficient and
credible enough to tip the scale in __favor of petitioner.
9. First, Ceralde is a "compadre" of petitioner. The fact that the respondent Faustino
Landingin and Agapita Ferrer sold a
parcel of land to him in 1973, does not necessarily make the sale of the lots to petitioner
valid and binding. Dr. Cerezo, on
the other hand, has been the spouses' physician since 1955 and his testimony that he
never knew of Agapita Ferrer's eye
operation and hospital confinement in Manila raises serious doubts about his credibility.
10.

Second, when the two contracts were executed and witnessed by Dr. Cerezo in
1977, Agapita Ferrer and respondent __Faustino Landingin were 81 years old. In
fact, barely six months later, Agapita actually died of senility, as stated in her
__death certificate.

11.

Third, both Dr. Cerezo and Ceralde testified that Atty. Tandoc, the lawyer who
allegedly drew up the deeds of sale in __1977, read and explained in

Pangasinense the contents of said deeds to the spouses. Ceralde, however, was not
present when Atty. Tandoc allegedly performed the said act. Surprisingly too,
Atty. Tandoc allegedly performed the said a witness. Even Attys. Caguioa and
Siapno, who notarized respectively the same deeds of sale, as well as the 1973
contract, were never called to testify. No explanation whatsoever was given as to
the failure of petitioners to present these two notaries public who notarized the
deeds of sale in question.
12.

The weight of the testimony of Dr. Cerezo is therefore undermined by this lapse
on the part of petitioner. Only the two notaries public could be examined and
cross-examined on the accuracy of their translation of the contents of the
documents written in English into the dialect known to and understood by the
vendors.

13.

Fourth, the couple was not assisted by any of their children in the execution of the
subject contracts. This circumstance is strange and highly suspicious. Magdalena,
respondent Faustino Landingin's daughter by his first marriage, and Soledad
Landingin were then living with their parents. Like Amparo Francisco, their stepniece, they actually assisted the couple in their correspondences and transactions.
However, neither of the sisters nor Amparo was invited to act as an instrumental
witness, much less informed of the execution of the contracts at petitioner's house
which is merely one meter away from their house.

14.

Fifth, there is no satisfactory showing that the consideration for the sale of the lots
was ever paid to Agapita Ferrer and respondent Faustino Landingin. Where it is
claimed that the signature and thumbmark of the vendors were procured by the
vendees through fraud, undue influence and abuse of confidence, a showing that
valuable consideration passed hands and that the vendors benefitted therefrom,
may help erase any thought that such sinister designs attended the transaction.

15.

Indeed, all these facts and circumstances lend credence to the claim that the sale
of the subject lots and the execution of the deeds of sale were done surreptitiously
and in fraud of the couple and their heirs.

16.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the

petition is

DENIED.