DEFRA PROJECT FO0108

RESILIENCE OF THE FOOD SUPPLY TO

PORT DISRUPTION
FINAL REPORT
September 2012

Peter Baker (PRB Associates Limited)

and
Andrew Morgan (Global 78 Limited)

CONTENTS

Section
1.
2.
3.

4.

SubSection

2.1
2.2
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
4.1
4.2

5.

4.3
4.4

Title

Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
UK Food Security Assessment
Resilience of the food supply to port disruption
APPROACHES AND METHODS
Approach and work plan
Overview of case studies
Methodology
Experience
Possible next steps
RESULTS
Causes, extent, speed and duration of
transmission of port disruption
Features of domestic and international transport
infrastructure and food supply chains
Resilience of overseas port infrastructure
Behavioural aspects
DISCUSSION

1
6
9

13

27

6.

CONCLUSIONS

31

7.

RECOMMENDATIONS

33

Table
3.1
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4

Foreign Imports via Selected Port Groups

Possible Causes and Impacts of Port Disruption
Factors Affecting Decisions on Vessel Routing Scenarios
UK Food Supply in 2010
Dover and Felixstowe in Market Perspective

11
14
15
18
21

Figure
4.1
4.2

International Food Supply Chain Schematic

Selected Port Groups Map

19
20

Appendix
I
II

Decision-Making for Vessel and Freight Diversion

Scenarios
Selected Commodities Import Volumes

Annex
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Title
UK Food and Drink Import Data
UK Food and Drink Supply Chains
Import Corridor: Dover and Channel Tunnel
Import Corridor: Felixstowe and Southampton
Import Corridor: Thames and Medway
Import Corridor: Humber
Meat and Fish Imports
Citrus Fruit Imports
Sugar Imports
Palm Oil Imports

i
vi

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Report presents the principal findings, conclusions and recommendations arising from the Defrafunded research project FO0108 Resilience of the Food Supply to Port Disruption. It was undertaken
by Peter Baker (PRB Associates), a ports and shipping specialist, and Andrew Morgan (Global 78), an
international food supply chain specialist.
The research, which commenced in September 2011, was prompted in part by the outcomes of the
UK Food Security Assessment (published in August 2009 and updated in January 2010) and the
follow-up report from PRB Associates Background to Defras Assessment of UK Food Security,
published in September 2009 (see paragraph 2.1 below).
The aim of the research and consultation undertaken in this project is to address particular evidence
gaps in trade, port, shipping and supply chain information and practice, relevant to food imports that
have been identified in the earlier research. The Food Security Assessment concluded that in the
context of ports, food security is stronger where:
a. There is a range and diversity of entry points
b. Supplies can easily switch between ports in the event of port disruption, and
c.

Ports are dispersed geographically

However, while these features were recognised as the ideal for food security, questions remained
unanswered (evidence gaps) about the realities of UK port capacity, flexibility, diversity and
configuration in the event of possible port disruption scenarios. Furthermore it was identified that there
is a lack of commodity-based information, by port of entry, for EU imports and a lack of understanding
of UK food supply chains, particularly import dependencies and risks.
The main objective for the study was therefore to identify the likely causes, extent, speed and duration
of transmission of ports disruption into interruption of food imports arriving in the UK as containerised,
RoRo and bulk traffic.
The three secondary objectives were specified as follows:

Determine the extent to which particular features of domestic and international transport
infrastructure and food supply chains are likely to ameliorate / exacerbate the impact of UK port
disruption on the supply of food imports into the UK

Determine the extent to which UK food (import) security is contingent upon the resilience of
overseas port infrastructure (both within and without EU waters, and now and in the future)

Explore the behaviour, over the short to medium run (up to six months), of individual port
operators, shipping companies and land-based logistics and food supply chain agents in the
event of port disruption.

Approach
The study involved an assessment of possible port disruptions, their potential impact on UK food
supply and the options for remedial action in the short to medium term. The approach taken was to
conduct detailed Case Studies to examine four groups of leading ports (i.e. Dover corridor; Felixstowe
and Southampton; Thames and Medway; and Humber) and four imported food commodity groups (i.e.
meat and fish; citrus fruit; sugar; and palm oil). This approach was informed by engagement and
consultation with over 150 stakeholders, drawn from port authorities; terminal operators; shipping
lines; importers; logistics service providers; food manufacturers and processors; wholesale
distributors; and retailers.
Tonnage data and other information from 2010 were used to complement the interview evidence.
Although there are still some gaps and areas for further research, the compiled evidence base is
substantial and a good understanding has been obtained about many of the underlying issues.

The UKs dependency on food imports became evident in the analysis of some food commodity
import volumes compared to overall consumption. For example, 1.7 million tonnes of meat; 1.9 million
tonnes of fresh vegetables; and 3.2 million tonnes of fresh fruit were imported in 2010 and these
import flows represented 37%, 42% and 91% respectively of total supply / consumption in that year
(see Table 4.3).
14% of all UK foreign imports are food commodities carried in either trailers (RoRo mode) or
containers (unit load), or as dry bulk or liquid bulk. Out of a total of nearly 35 million tonnes of food
imports in 2010, approximately 21 million tonnes (61%) came from EU country origins (see Table 3.1
and Annex 1).
In view of the UKs dependency on food imports, the research gathered intelligence about specific
food commodity flows that would suggest the location of the pinch points, the consequent risk to the
food supply and the alternative supply options. At the same time, it looked at current port scenarios, in
particular at Felixstowe and Southampton for deep-sea LoLo container traffic, and the Dover corridor
terminals (Port of Dover and the Channel Tunnel) for short-sea accompanied RoRo ferry traffic, in
order to understand the operational issues and parameters, and also to evaluate capacity provision
and utilisation.

Felixstowe and Southampton handle over 3m containers per annum = 60% of the UKs foreign
container trade, comprising approximately 9% of the UKs total food imports

The Dover corridor handles over 3m trailers per annum = 48% of the UKs foreign RoRo freight
traffic, comprising approximately 17% of the UKs total food imports

Initial research confirmed that sugar (c. 1.9 to 2.0 million import tonnes per year) is a critical input
commodity across food and drink manufacturing and furthermore the port of London and the Tate &
Lyle Sugars facility on the Thames in particular handle 91% of all sugar imports from non-EU sources.
Palm oil (in some form) is also used widely as a food ingredient. The study confirmed that 98% of the
UKs edible oil imports from non-EU countries, accounting for 82% of total UK edible oil imports, are
channelled through just three ports; Hull, London and Liverpool.
Results and Findings
In summary, for the food commodities under review and the shipping modes most conspicuous in the
Case Studies (i.e. trailers and containers), the research indicates that there is a concentration of
import flow and shipping capacity on a relatively small number of ports (i.e. a lack of range and
diversity of appropriate port capacity). Furthermore, due to the dominant size and capacity of some
port routes and the specialist import handling facilities at other ports it is not so easy for supplies to
switch between ports in the event of port disruption at major entry points. Finally, while it is true to say
that ports around the UK are dispersed geographically it is also evident that the key ports, serving the
busiest international shipping routes and the largest concentration of population are concentrated in
the South East of England.
The key findings regarding the UKs food supply chain resilience to port disruption drawn from the
research, in terms of research results, conclusions and recommendations are summarised below and
expanded upon in the following sections of the report.
The likely causes, extent, speed and duration of transmission of ports disruption are summarised in
Table 4.1 and their relative impact on the food supply chain are considered to depend on a number of
factors, namely:

Nature and location(s) of the port disruption (incl. UK and / or overseas)

Characteristics of the interrupted commodity flows (e.g. volume, handling requirements)
Modal appearance(s) of the interrupted flows (i.e. RoRo, LoLo, bulk)
Service type(s) and frequency (deep sea / infrequent; short sea / high frequency; etc.)
Competition for alternative capacity from other interrupted (food and non-food) traffic
System flexibility (incl. availability of suitable alternative routes and port facilities)

Examination of the material conveys the message that one size does not fit all and maintenance of
food traffic flows requires attention to the specific requirements of each flow.
Port operators, shipping lines and associated private and public sector agencies have a good record
of overcoming port disruptions and putting contingencies in place to work around repeat incidents.
Such disruptions lie within the control of the port operators to overcome and plan for, just as they do
for major incidents like vessel collisions and channel blockages. It is for the unforeseen events (such
as tidal surges) that ports require regional and national government support and Regional Resilience
Groups are providing a base for such planning.
Probably the most significant feature of domestic and international transport infrastructure and food
supply chains likely to exacerbate the impact of UK port disruption (at Dover and the Channel Tunnel,
or Felixstowe and Tilbury for deep sea traffic) on the supply of food imports into the UK is the practice
of minimising stocks and organising Just-in-Time deliveries in order to keep working capital costs as
low as possible. Such a practice is made possible by the reliability of traffic flows from the European
Continent using the accompanied trailer mode on the Dover Ferries and the Eurotunnel Freight
Shuttles. Even long distance deep sea container services retain a reliability of service for Just-in-Time
supply chains. The findings in the report demonstrate both the security and interdependence of the
dual Channel freight channels and the over dependence on the route as a whole.
Calais and Dunkerque (and the Channel Tunnel facility at Coquelles) are undoubtedly crucial
overseas ports for the maintenance of UK supply via the short Channel crossings and, as in the UK,
their RoRo ramps are specifically designed to match the high capacity ferries on the routes. 75% of
accompanied trailers serving the UK market use these routes (over 3m units / 17% of UK food
imports). Ferries from other North Sea and Channel services could not berth at these ramps and,
conversely, the Dover ferries could not discharge and load at other UK ports without major bow and
stern access modifications.
The response behaviour to port disruption is encapsulated in some of the contingency plans already
in place among ports operators, such as Operation Stack for the Channel Tunnel routes, Vehicle
Booking Systems to overcome peak congestion at the main container ports and the development of
Port Community Systems to integrate commercial operations and the requirements of regulatory
authorities to reduce delays and duplication of effort.
Regional Resilience Groups have also embraced the ports, recognising the importance of maintaining
road and rail access during periods of bad weather and the Department for Transports Deep Port
model is a computerised information and contingency assessment model specifically developed to
hold port capacity and infrastructure information in order to be able to assess alternative options in the
event of disruption.
Conclusions
The Conclusions drawn from the study, expanded in Section 6, relate to the Results (see Section 4
and respective Annex reports) derived from the research in meeting the four project objectives and
dealing with the recognised challenges. Some of the key conclusions are:
a. Different levels of port disruption have been experienced in the past and have been dealt with and
incorporated into future continuity planning and there is an awareness of the potential for more
serious disruption (i.e. tidal surges, rising sea levels etc.) but less sign of any planning, other than
within newly formed Regional Resilience Groups.
b. The Department for Transports Deep Port Contingency Planning model has been built around a
range of relevant port infrastructure, shipping and trade data and incorporates road congestion
assessment, shipping movements, weather forecasting and tidal surge simulation. However, it is
recognised that more sophisticated modelling is required in order to be able to carry out
extensive, scenario-based, simulations of the impact and resolution of port disruption
c.

The UKs foodservice suppliers and grocery retail industry place a high level of reliance on the
Dover / Channel Tunnel import channels and on the accompanied trailer mode to satisfy the Justin-Time, minimum stock level supply chain philosophy for raw material and finished goods. A

policy that undermines resilience because there is no spare storage capacity in the system
(unless there are agricultural cycle and seasonal demands)
As an illustration of the pressures, stock levels of Spanish citrus fruit in import warehouses typically
provide c.1.5 days cover, with only transit stock downstream between warehouse and retail store. As
one interviewed importer (from a different food sector) commented if the Channel is disrupted for 24
hours we worry, and if for 48 hours we panic. However, it became evident that overall the food
industry either lacks awareness of the potential for problems or prefers to concentrate on the
immediate task at hand.
d. The Dover ferry routes and the Channel Tunnel Freight Shuttle services can provide significant
back-up for each other if one channel is disrupted. However, the same back-up scale of capacity
is not readily available on other short sea ferry routes to the UK, to ports that do not have the
RoRo berths capable of handling the Dover type ferries
e. The need for growing economies of scale in the deep sea container shipping sector is placing
increasing demands on the UKs few deep sea container ports (concentrated in the south east of
England) to develop deeper access channels and berths and to install larger container gantry
cranes in order to handle ever larger vessels. This is placing an increasing dependency on
Felixstowe, Southampton, and the new London Gateway development for deep sea imports
f.

There is a growing concentration of commodity consolidation, processing, storage and distribution

hubs located on the Continent and built around the deep sea hub ports (Rotterdam, Antwerp,
Zeebrugge, Le Havre, Hamburg), serving the Continent of Europe (by road, rail and barge) as
well as the UK (by short sea RoRo ferry and container services). UK deep sea container ports are
gateways to the UK market and not consolidation / distribution hubs for other markets. The
London Gateway development could incorporate commodity consolidation, processing and
European distribution activities adjacent to the port that could provide the UK with extra supply
chain security

Conclusions regarding the behaviour over the short to medium term, of individual port operators,
shipping companies and land-based logistics and food supply chain agents in the event of port
disruption are clearly set out in Appendix I, Tables A to E, for the port operators and shipping lines
regarding RoRo, LoLo and bulk shipping modes. The tables summarise the order of decision-making,
among port operators, shipping lines and shippers that will take place in the event of port disruption.
Further downstream further clarity and insight is required with respect to any reference to the impact
of port disruption and the resilience of the supply chain in response to port disruption, in the
confidential Business Continuity Plans of food importers, manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers.
There is evidence of reactive behaviour (see Section 4.4) to prepare future plans following experience
of disruptive events, but more insight and support is required for proactive planning.
There is some evidence of importers using more than just one supply route to spread the risk but it is
unclear how dependent many importers, manufacturers and retailers may be on a single source of
supply utilising a single supply route into the UK.
Recommendations
In terms of port dependency (Dover / Channel Tunnel RoRo, Felixstowe LoLo), specialised bulk cargo
handling and processing facilities, Supply Chain practice, Information and Planning required and
Intervention, the following recommendations are proposed:
I. While the Dover / Channel Tunnel corridor and the port / rail terminal connections on both sides of
the Channel, is considered to be a crucial trade gateway more work is required to more accurately
estimate the ability to transfer freight and vessels to other routes should there be any disruption to
the UK ports RoRo network (see Annexes 3, 5 and 6)
II. Work should also be commissioned to look into the adaptability of RoRo ferries between Dover
operational mode and non-Dover mode. The economic development and installation of dual

purpose RoRo ramps could also be investigated, along with the scope to increase potential capacity
through the Channel Tunnel
III. A full analysis of UK Deep Sea container service and port capacity (allied to container feeder
service capacity and Continental port capacity), along similar lines to the UK Short Sea Freight
RoRo and LoLo Capacity Analysis and Report would help to clarify the flexibility and potential
transferability of vessels and containers from one port / service to another, should disruption occur.
It is currently not clear whether enough container feeder, short sea and Channel Tunnel train
capacity is available to feed containers back to the UK if a key UK container port is disrupted
IV. The potential benefits for UK food supply resilience generated by added value service
developments around the new London Gateway hub terminal should be assessed along with the
potential added resilience that transhipment hub developments at Scapa Flow, Hunterston or other
deep water facilities might generate
V. To improve the understanding of potential disruption and planning greater resilience scenario
analysis, planning needs to be carried out at an individual commodity flow level, just as it has been
for each of the food commodity Case Studies, particularly the sugar and palm oil Case Studies
where specialised refining, processing, storage and distribution are integral to the vessel and cargo
handling operations, adjacent to the berth
VI. Improved resilience planning and business continuity modelling can only benefit from greater
openness and transparency among stakeholders (ports, shipping lines, food and drink industry,
local and national government, government agencies, port community system providers).
Framework discussions centred on information sharing should be arranged for a stakeholder Forum
VII. Discussions with the developers and providers of the Port Community Systems in use at the UKs
major container ports; Marine Cargo Processing (MCP) and Community Network Services (CNS)
should explore the development of computer system based facilities that could assist the transfer of
container and RoRo ferry calls from one port to another in the event of port disruption (see further
reference to Port Community Systems in Annex 4)
VIII. The detailed inputs, outputs and scenario assessment capabilities of the DfTs Deep Port model
should be assessed in terms of its ability to model the impact and resolution options (vessel and
traffic diversion) in the event of port disruption. If it is not considered dynamic enough work should
be commissioned to develop and maintain such a live and interactive model
IX. Some evidence gaps can be filled by bespoke analysis of the DfTs Maritime Statistics database,
allied with support for Border Agency and Port Health Authority initiatives to identify food
consignments carried in trailers and containers arriving into the UK from EU countries. Provision to
identify food grade liquid bulk imports as part of the DfTs data collection process for the Maritime
Statistics would fill another gap
X. The location and volume of stock in the supply chain should be more transparent, to enable more
enlightened planning and government intervention, if felt necessary

2. INTRODUCTION
This Report presents the principal findings, recommendations and conclusions arising from the Defrafunded research project FO0108 Resilience of the Food Supply to Port Disruption. It was undertaken
by Peter Baker (PRB Associates), a ports and shipping specialist, and Andrew Morgan (Global 78), an
international food supply chain specialist.
The research, which commenced in September 2011, was prompted in part by the outcomes of the
UK Food Security Assessment (published in August 2009 and updated in January 2010) and the
follow-up report from PRB Associates Background to Defras Assessment of UK Food Security,
published in September 2009 (see paragraph 2.1. below).
The approach involved an assessment of possible port disruptions, their potential impact on UK food
supply and the options for remedial action in the short to medium term. Consequently the focus of this
study is on potential disruptions and resilience of food imports in general, rather than being limited to
the previously defined vulnerable commodities (see Food Security Assessment).
2.1 UK Food Security Assessment
The findings and conclusions of the UK Food Security Assessment were considered to be a logical
starting point for this research. Those that particularly affected the research were discussed under
Theme 3 of the Assessment: UK availability and access and related to:

Diversity and flexibility of entry ports into the UK

Evidence gaps in available information about UK food import flows

Diversity and flexibility of entry ports into the UK (Supporting indicator 3.6)
The Assessment noted that food supply, as well as feed and fertiliser inputs to domestic agriculture,
from overseas is enabled by the UKs international gateways. Focusing on seaports because 91%
of food imports arrive by ship, it concluded that in the context of ports, food security is stronger
where:
a) There is a range and diversity of entry points
b) Supplies can easily switch between ports in the event of port disruption
c) Ports are dispersed geographically
All of these would spread the risk of any disruption. Disruptions may temporarily restrict consumer
choice but would not result in panic buying or any other major consumer impact.
However, the question remained as to how these conclusions and the strength of food security related
to reality at the ports, an evidence gap that is addressed in this report.
Evidence gaps about UK food import flows (Supporting indicator 3.6)
Food import flows can come from either inside or outside the EU and this fact affects the data
available. The Department for Transports (DfT) Maritime Statistics is based on modes of appearance
rather than on individual commodity types. Also, while data for type and quantity of food imports into
the UK are collected by the HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) Chief system, data on UK port of
entry for food imports from the EU are not collected. UK government data for food imports, by port,
are therefore limited to:

The movement of bulk agricultural (food and feed) product traffic from the EU (DfT Maritime
Statistics) with UK port of entry

Data on port of entry for all food imports from non EU countries (HMRC system)

This study therefore assesses the UKs resilience to an over-reliance on the Dover / Channel Tunnel
and Felixstowe / Southampton supply routes, for instance not so much an assessment of
disruptions themselves, as more a case of assuming that there could be disruption and assessing the
UKs supply chain resilience.
The evidence gaps relevant to this study can therefore be summarised as:

Lack of commodity based UK RoRo and container port of entry data for EU imports

UK port capacity and configuration implications for possible import disruption scenarios

Information about UK food supply chains, including import dependencies and risks

2.2 Resilience of the Food Supply to Port Disruption

The project objectives were therefore shaped in order to begin to fill the above evidence gaps and to
confirm (or challenge) assumptions made and conclusions reached in the Food Security Assessment.
The headline objective was to identify the likely causes (for example, natural hazard or malice),
extent, speed and duration of transmission of ports disruption into interruption of food imports arriving
in the UK as containerised, RoRo and bulk traffic
The three secondary objectives were specified as follows:

Determine the extent to which particular features of domestic and international transport
infrastructure and food supply chains are likely to ameliorate / exacerbate the impact of UK port
disruption on the supply of food imports into the UK

Determine the extent to which UK food (import) security is contingent upon the resilience of
overseas port infrastructure (both within and without EU waters, and now and in the future)

Explore the behaviour, over the short to medium run (up to six months), of individual port
operators, shipping companies and land-based logistics and food supply chain agents in the
event of port disruption.

The principal challenges to effective execution were expected to be:

1. Determining the type, scale and mode of appearance of UK food import traffic from within the EU
(in the absence of adequate HMRC data)
2. Engaging with key stakeholders including commercial and non-commercial port operators,
shipping lines, land-based logistics agents, the Department for Transport and food supply chain,
food manufacturing and grocery distribution experts
Following Section 1: Executive Summary and Section 2: Introduction, the main body of the report
comprises the following sections:
Section 3: Approaches and Methods. This section gives the rationale for the use of Work Packages to
meet the project objectives. It sets out how and why the individual tasks were undertaken, explains
how the challenges were faced, and also reports on the consultants experience during the project.
Section 4: Results. Each Work Package included undertaking several detailed Case Studies, the
results of which are summarised in this section. This provides the reader with the main points and
related insights arising from the extensive evidence base collected during the research. Wherever
possible, evidence was gathered about attitudes towards stock holding and replenishment; and
behavioural aspects in the event of supply chain disruption.
Section 5: Discussion. Together with an overall assessment of the results against the objectives
described above, this section also describes the specific difficulties and risks associated with the
current systems in the event of port disruption.

Section 6: Conclusions. This section summarises the key findings of the research, including
identification of new opportunities and areas for improvement.
Section 7: Recommendations. The final section makes a number of important recommendations
about future research needs and the steps that should be taken by stakeholders in order to improve
the resilience of the food supply to port disruption.
The report concludes with a series of ten Annex Reports containing supporting material either about
a specific facet of the research or about one of the eight case studies.
The headline objective was to identify the likely causes (for example, natural hazard or malice),
extent, speed and duration of transmission of ports disruption into interruption to UK food imports by
modal appearance. The extent to which this was achieved is described in Sections 4 and 5.
The extent to which the three secondary objectives (as listed above) were realised varies by port
cluster and food commodity. A high-level commentary appears in Sections 4 and 5, while more detail
is provided in the individual Annex Reports.

3. APPROACHES AND METHODS

3.1 Approach and work plan
The research proposal, as agreed with Defra, called for a structured approach comprising seven
Work Packages together with eight targeted and detailed Case Studies. This approach was designed
to combine industry engagement with research, consultation, analysis, meetings, reporting and
development from the Case Studies to achieve the project objectives and meet the challenges.
The approach was shaped to provide both general and specific insights, as well as an understanding
of the potential disruptions, their impact, and their temporary and longer-term solutions.
The Work Packages and their associated Case Studies were focused as follows:

Work Package 1: Key stakeholder consultation, background studies and published

evidence

Work Package 2: UK food commodity trade and trade data

Work Package 3: UK food international supply chains

o Frozen meat, fish and crustacean imports
o Fruit and vegetable imports

Work Package 4: UK food processing and consumption

o Sugar imports and UK distribution
o Palm oil imports and UK distribution

Work Package 5: UK port infrastructure and associated shipping modes

o Disruption at the Port of Dover / Channel Tunnel
o Disruption at either Felixstowe or Southampton
o Disruption on the River Thames (including the Port of Tilbury) and Medway (including
Thamesport)
o Disruption at Humber ports

Work Package 6: Preparation of the Final Report

Work Package 7: Review Meetings and Final Report Presentation.

Work Package 1 was designed to underpin the subsequent research programme through a review of
the evidence base and consultation with certain key stakeholders. These were to include Defra and
DfT, together with selected port operators, shipping lines, inland transport operators, commodity
traders, importers, freight forwarders, refiners, food processors and manufacturers, wholesalers,
grocery retailers, caterers, logistics service providers (3PL and 4PL) and trade associations.
Work Package 2 was structured to develop an understanding of available data on imports, including
from Defra, DfT and HMRC, before undertaking work on the Case Studies. Although the project
timeline would extend into 2012, the decision was taken to use 2010 as the sample year, for both
initial data analysis and subsequent information-gathering during the Case Studies. (The DfTs
Maritime Statistics 2011 are not published until later in the year).
Work Packages 3 to 5 were planned around the eight Case Studies (see 3.2) which considered the
operational experiences, issues and concerns of stakeholders through focused research to fill
evidence gaps identified in the UK Food Security Assessment. It was planned also to undertake Work
Packages 3 to 5 concurrently, rather than sequentially, to encourage progressive cross-sector sharing
of knowledge and understanding.
Work Packages 6 and 7 respectively were designed to keep the project on track and then to prepare
and present a suitably robust evidence-based Final Report.

In addition Annex 1 was specified to report on the results of Work Package 2; Annex 2 was
designed to provide contextual information about UK food and drink import flows; and Annexes 3 to
10 were specified to describe the individual results of the eight Case Studies.
3.2 Case Studies
Preparation of a series of Case Studies was seen as the best way to address the headline objective
and three secondary objectives outlined in Defras Project Specification and to meet the challenges
identified.
The Case Studies were designed to highlight the potential causes and impact of port disruption and
explore the behaviour of the port and shipping communities and land-based logistics and food supply
chain agents in the event of port disruption, as well as examining the extent to which particular
features of domestic and international transport infrastructure and food supply chains are likely to
ameliorate / exacerbate the impact of disruption. Incidence of avoidance measures, preparedness,
resolution and recovery at the point of disruption were to be assessed along with the short to medium
term alternative solutions.
The rationale for each of the Case Studies, as key elements and examples of UK food supply, is as
follows:
Dover / Channel Tunnel (Annex 3): the importance of the Dover corridor for EU freight flows was
recognised in the UK Food Security Assessment. Dover has high-frequency RoRo ferry connections
with Calais and Dunkerque. The Channel Tunnel between Coquelles and Folkestone handles both
RoRo freight traffic on the Eurotunnel Shuttle services and unit load (container) traffic on throughfreight rail services. It is estimated that 26% of the UKs food imports from EU countries enters the
country through this corridor.
Felixstowe / Southampton (Annex 4): while geographically apart, these two leading container ports
are similar in terms of port configuration (deep water berths, quayside container gantry cranes, high
capacity landside container handling and storage facilities) and the mainline container services they
serve. As well as competing for food-related facilities (e.g. reefer plugs, port health inspections, etc.)
arriving food containers have also to compete with other (non-food) traffic for terminal handling and
onward transportation.
Thames / Medway (Annex 5): it was known that the Thames receives not only bulk traffic such as
sugar and edible oils but its RoRo (mostly unaccompanied) and Short Sea container traffic was
believed to include significant food flows from EU ports. Tilbury has also established itself as a key
port for temperature-controlled container flows from South Africa and the countries of South America.
Thamesport provides further deep sea container capacity and the London Gateway terminal promises
to add significantly to the UKs container handling capacity.
Humber ports (Annex 6): these ports were known to be important for non-EU imports (e.g. bulk crude
palm oil at Hull, fresh and frozen fish at Immingham) and EU imports including meat, fish, and fresh
produce. The EU imports arrive on either container services or RoRo ferries (mostly unaccompanied
trailers) from Continental ports such as Rotterdam and Zeebrugge.
Meat and fish (Annex 7): the UK is heavily dependent on meat and fish imports, some coming
directly from countries such as New Zealand (lamb), Brazil (poultry), or China (fish). High volumes
also come from the Netherlands, Germany or Denmark, either as raw material for final manufacture in
the UK, or as finished product for foodservice and retail, as fresh, chilled, or frozen shipments. Imports
of meat represent roughly 37% of UK consumption and Tilbury and Immingham are key ports for this
trade.
Citrus fruits (Annex 8): temperature-controlled perishable whole fruit imports from both Northern and
Southern hemispheres, as importers follow the sun, provide a good example of the complex, timecompressed inbound flows that are a major feature of UK grocery retail supply chains. Flows are
known to come from Spain and South Africa but little was known about how these supply chains
worked in practice, although Dover/Channel Tunnel and Tilbury are recognised as key ports of entry.

10

Sugar (Annex 9): raw cane sugar from tropical countries, which is included in the list of vulnerable
commodities in the UK Food Security Assessment, arrives in dry bulk form on the River Thames (Tate
& Lyle Sugars riverside facility at Silvertown handles almost all non-EU cane sugar imports), with far
smaller quantities reported as non-EU container traffic at Felixstowe or Tilbury. In addition to an
assessment of these (and other sugar) import flows, the research needed to uncover how things were
still changing after the EU sugar reforms of 2005.
Palm oil (Annex 10): UK food manufacturing uses palm oil and its fractions for a wide range of food
products, from bakery to desserts to confectionery. As with sugar supply, serious port disruption at
particular ports would therefore impact on food manufacturing with availability consequences for the
foodservice and retail sectors. Imports were understood to include non-EU crude palm oil in bulk and
processed oils from the EU.
The following table illustrates the significance of the selected port groups:
Table 3.1 Foreign Imports via Selected Port Groups
Total foreign
Port Group
import volume % share
2010 (k tonnes)
Dover / Channel Tunnel
22,083
9%
Felixstowe / Southampton
33,583
13%
Thames & Medway
41,718
17%
Humber
50,915
21%
Case Studies sub-total
148,299
60%
UK Major Ports total

246,007

100%

Estimated food
import volume
(k tonnes)
5,832
3,115
4,726
3,713
17,386
34,861

% share
17%
9%
13%
11%
50%
100%

Source: DEFRA analysis via HMRC data feed with EU food imports by port derived from Border Agency sampling
analysis (see Annex 1, Section 6)
Note: Other important UK ports for non-EU and EU food imports are identified in Annex 1, Tables 5.5 and 5.6

3.3 Methodology
The research steps required to balance time and resources, between the specifics of the Case
Studies and the general deliverables of the Work Packages, led to the formulation of the following
work programme:

Preliminary discussion with industry specialists (ports, shippers, DfT, trade associations) and a
search of limited relevant literature (port handbooks, web sites, food sector publications)

Review of HMRC / Defra contextual import data

Identification of possible stakeholders willing to participate in the research

Work with these stakeholders to compile an accurate description of their as-is import scenarios
(in terms of product origins, modal formats, volumes, services used and frequencies, utilisation of
port and shipping capacity etc.)

Understanding the stakeholders approach to ensuring consistent supply and review strategies
already in place (or planned) to mitigate likely possible effects of port disruption

Report on findings to Defra and provide feedback to the stakeholders.

3.4 Project limitations

In terms of the identified project challenges defined in Section 2.2 the following outcomes emerged:
It proved possible to gather enough information from stakeholders and DfT to build a robust
evidence base for many of the selected food commodity import flows. However, in several
instances, this compilation had to be done under the constraints of confidentiality, requiring a

11

forensic approach which proved highly time-consuming. More could be done, as will be described
in Section 6 Conclusions and Section 7 Recommendations.
Altogether, some 150 organisations across the stakeholder spectrum were invited to support the
research. In nearly all cases engagement was possible, following adequate assurances about
maintenance of (commercial) confidentiality. Completion of formal Non-Disclosure Agreements
was also required in four instances.
As a rule commercial enterprises participated positively and most would probably be willing to
share in ongoing dialogue with Defra. The quality of most inputs ranged from good to excellent.
Importantly, most commercial participants expect to receive project feedback that they could
incorporate into their business continuity planning.
3.5 Possible next steps
The way in which the approach of using Work Packages, with supporting Case Study research, can
be employed as a template for further research is developed in Section 7 Recommendations.

12

4. RESULTS
In this Section the evidence-based findings from each of the eight Case Studies, as described in more
detail in the Annex Reports, are summarised under the four project objective headings, namely:

Causes, extent, speed and duration of transmission of port disruption

Features of domestic and international transport infrastructure and food supply chains

Resilience of overseas port infrastructure

Behavioural aspects

Following this summary of results, Section 5 contains a discussion of the principal issues that were
identified during the research; Section 6 presents the important conclusions; and finally Section 7 the
recommendations.
4.1 Causes, extent, speed and duration of transmission of port disruption
The extent of any port disruption and then the speed and duration of transmission of port disruption
into the supply chain depends on a number of factors. These include:

Nature and location(s) of the port disruption (incl. UK and / or overseas)

Characteristics of the interrupted commodity flows (e.g. volume, handling requirements)

Modal appearance(s) of the interrupted flows (i.e. RoRo, LoLo, bulk)

Service type(s) and frequency (deep sea / infrequent; short sea / high frequency; etc.)

Competition for alternative capacity from other interrupted (food and non-food) traffic

System flexibility (incl. availability of suitable alternative routes and port facilities)

Looking first at the potential nature and location of port disruption, feedback from interviews
identified a number of possible causes. These are shown (ranked in ascending order of probable
scale and severity) in Table 4.1 overleaf, together with the likely duration; the impact level; and the
intervention level required to address the problem and resume port operations.
The duration of the disruption (i.e. the speed with which it can be overcome) will largely depend on its
nature (type, scale, time, location, etc.), and on who has the remit and the resources to remedy
matters. For example, the scale could range from a simple mechanical breakdown at a single berth to
a tidal surge that could shut down a range of ports along the UK East Coast and on the Continent for
an indeterminate period. Evidently, while solutions to some forms of disruption may rest with the port
operator, others will not, such as with strike actions at overseas ports.
The duration may be just the time it takes to repair physical or mechanical infrastructure, something
that is within the control of the port operator. Similarly, there may be local alternatives such as when
single berths are closed, or an in-dock facility is incapacitated by the temporary closure of a lock gate,
alternative berths may be available at the same, or at a nearby port. To illustrate, when its in-dock
facilities are not accessible at Immingham, DFDS Seaways makes use of its river berths at the same
port (see Annex 6 for more details).
Looking next at characteristics of food commodity flows, the research demonstrated that types
and consequent handling parameters vary significantly. One issue is volume, either in terms of the
numbers of shipments or tonnage per individual shipment. Another is shipment type, whether unit
load (e.g. container or road trailer, with meat, fish, or fresh produce); liquid bulk (e.g. palm oil); or dry
bulk (e.g. raw cane sugar). In addition, temperature regimes (i.e. heated, ambient, fresh, chilled, deep
chilled or frozen) vary. All such factors put requirements and constraints on port / terminal handling

13

capabilities and capacities that can limit the range of available ports. It is also important to address
the need for suitable border inspection and port health arrangements and expertise at other ports.
Table 4.1: Possible Causes and Impacts of Port Disruption
Cause
Duration
Impact level
1. Mechanical failures (bulk discharge
equipment, cranes, RoRo ramps, etc.)
2. Peak time arrival traffic congestion or
temporary control system (technical)
failures
3. Bad or extreme weather (high winds,
snow, etc.)
4. Power failures (leading to control
system and equipment downtime)

Intervention level

SHORT

PORT

PORT

SHORT

PORT

PORT

SHORT /
MEDIUM

REGIONAL

SHORT

REGIONAL

5. Industrial action (port workers,

government agency employees, road
haulage drivers, rail workers, etc.)

SHORT?

PORT / NATIONAL

6. Lock gate failure

SHORT /
MEDIUM

PORT

7. Vessel breakdown, grounding,

collision, sinking (at berths or in access
channels), including ongoing
environmental impact of fuel spillage

SHORT /
MEDIUM /
LONG

PORT / RANGE
OF PORTS (with
single access
channel)

MEDIUM

PORT / REGIONAL
/ NATIONAL

MEDIUM

TUNNEL

TUNNEL

MEDIUM?

REGIONAL

GOVERNMENT

LONG

NATIONAL

INTERNATIONAL

LONG

INTERNATIONAL

GOVERNMENT

LONG

INTERNATIONAL

GOVERNMENT

8. Road and rail transport problems

(fuel prices, accidents causing
blockages, shortage of drivers, etc.)
9. Fire and / or disruption in the
Channel Tunnel
10. Terrorist activity (bombs, hi-jacking)
11. Earthquake, tsunami, flooding,
volcano eruptions at foreign ports
12. Tidal surge (will impact Continental
ports as well)
13. Climate change / rising sea levels
(longer term likelihood and planning?)

PORT / REGIONAL
GOVERNMENT
PORT / REGIONAL
UTILITIES
PORT / TRANSPORT
INDUSTRY /
REGIONAL AND
NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT
PORT
SHIPPING LINES /
PORTS / MARINE
AUTHORITIES /
REPAIR AND
SALVAGE
TRANSPORT
INDUSTRY /
GOVERNMENT

The modal appearance of the interrupted flows is closely-related to the aspect of commodity flow
characteristics. Combined they dictate the type (and capacity) of terminal facilities and equipment
required at the arrival port. These include such things as vehicle ramps and marshalling areas for
RoRo traffic; container cranes / carriers (of various types) with suitable container yards (and reefer
plugs) for LoLo (temperature-controlled) applications; pumps, pipelines and (heated) food-grade
storage tanks for liquid bulk traffic; and grab cranes, conveyors (often), and either storage sheds or
silos for dry bulk commodities.
More general information about commodity types and their modal appearance is provided in Annex 2
while information by food commodity (meat and fish; citrus fruit; sugar; and palm oil) is contained in
Annexes 7 to 10. Examination of this material will convey the message that one size does not fit all
and maintenance of food traffic flows requires attention to the specific requirements of each flow.
Service type(s) and frequency must also be taken into account. For example, while the Dover
corridor RoRo ferry services are designed to handle driver-accompanied freight traffic, the RoRo
services arriving from Rotterdam or Zeebrugge at Purfleet are set up for unaccompanied traffic. This
latter traffic includes not only unaccompanied road trailers but also containers (double-stacked on
low-height MAFI trailers). The Purfleet terminal therefore has the specialist tractor units needed to
unload the ship (pull trailers on and off ship), together with the requisite mobile cranes and adequate
secure yard space for trailer parking and container stacking.
Frequencies also vary significantly: RoRo services might be high-frequency as on the Calais to Dover
route where two ferries arrive every hour; others such as from Zeebrugge to Tilbury less frequent. A
short-sea LoLo service from Spain such as that from Bilbao to Tilbury may call two or three times a

14

week, while a chartered deep-sea dry bulk vessel with raw cane sugar from the tropics may arrive at
the Tate and Lyle Sugars jetty at Silvertown at intervals of only once a month, with four vessels
providing a weekly service. The point is that 1) individual ports and terminals are configured for
specific service types and frequencies and 2) that this is a significant limitation when seeking
alternatives in the event of port disruption.
In the event of port disruption, competition for alternative capacity from other interrupted traffics
(including from non-food flows) would be a significant factor, especially if disruption was predicted to
be anything other than short-term. This would be expected to affect RoRo (e.g. Dover corridor)
services almost immediately. Depending on circumstances, the impact on LoLo services could be
slower; while in the case of bulk food commodities the competition could be expected to be for
suitable port facilities for displaced vessels rather than for shipping services as well.
System flexibility is the final factor affecting the speed and duration of transmission of port disruption
into the supply chain. Even a brief consideration of the factors described above brings the realisation
that food import flows (especially those using RoRo services) are inherently complex and rely on the
right combination of services and equipment. Failure of one part of the system requires rapid
identification of, and communication about, alternative resources with suitable technical
characteristics (e.g. cargo handling capabilities).
However, the following researched example illustrates the flexibility challenge. Refrigerated meats
from all over northern Europe are consolidated into refrigerated (reefer) trailer loads at a depot in the
Netherlands. The loaded trailers are then taken by Dutch tractor units to the Hook of Holland ferry
terminal, before being shipped as unaccompanied trailer traffic on an overnight service to Harwich.
Locally-based tractor units collect the trailers from the port for delivery to food processors across the
UK and subsequent (reloaded) return to Harwich. The whole system works like a conveyor belt it is
highly-efficient and tightly-timed.
Serious disruption at either port would compromise the integrity of the system. Assuming that the ferry
could be diverted, there is no guarantee that the new despatching / receiving port would have the
terminal tractors, space, or reefer plugs required to handle unaccompanied reefer trailers, or that it
would have enough capacity. Although re-routing of vessel and the connecting road vehicles could
possibly be arranged, they and the loads would be in the wrong place at the wrong time, with a
knock-on adverse effect throughout the network.
Bearing the above example in mind as an illustration, the over-riding consideration in modern food
supply chains is customer satisfaction, with each player in the chain being viewed as the customer of
the preceding player. Customer requirements are generally formalised to include contractuallyenforceable service level agreements (SLAs), often with financial penalties for service failure.
This situation is a powerful driver for intelligent decision-making about alternative vessel routing in the
event of port disruption. The following table lists the key factors involved, be it unit load or bulk
shipping mode:
Table 4.2: Factors Affecting Decisions on Vessel Routing Scenarios
1 Vessel size
5 Available cargo handling capacity
2 Vessel configuration
6 Storage and processing capacity
3 Schedule
7 Information transfer and control
4 Available berths
8 Inland transport resources
Appendix I contains a series of tables that describe the related issues to be addressed when
attempting diversion of vessels (and freight) flows involving 1) RoRo; 2) LoLo; or Bulk traffic.
The research and consultation has therefore identified the following as key factors influencing
the impact of port disruption on food supply: the nature and location(s) of the disruption; the
characteristics of the interrupted commodity flows; the modal appearance(s) of the flows;
shipping service type(s) and frequency; competition for alternative available capacity; and
adequate system flexibility.

15

Examples of disruption
As was shown in Table 4.1 above, port disruption can have a wide range of possible causes.
Similarly, the scale and extent of potential port disruption could be relatively minor, such as from the
temporary failure of the hydraulics on a RoRo linkspan (such as at Dover) or an electrical fault on an
individual container gantry crane, or it could be a major event such as a severe tidal surge along the
UKs East Coast.
Industrial action, particularly at a Continental port, is another possible cause of disruption.
Interestingly, one recognised outcome of the national dock strike in the 1980s was the emergence of
Felixstowe as the UKs premier deep sea container port due to it being outside of the constraints of
the National Dock Labour Scheme at the time and therefore free of strike action, while Southampton
was deeply embroiled in the dispute.
As an example of technical problems causing disruption, the Port of Southampton had to close for
several days when its big bang approach to the upgrade of the ports terminal control system failed
and the port was left with only a manual back-up system.
Weather conditions pose a particular risk for ports that are in exposed situations. For instance the
Port of Dover has to close when wind speeds exceed 50 knots per hour. Strong winds can also affect
operations at the Port of Felixstowe and in extreme circumstances the port is forced to close for
reasons of health and safety.
Shipping lines have responded to disruption at Southampton or Felixstowe by discharging UK-bound
containers at Continental ports, from where they have been transhipped back to the UK on feeder
vessels. Or they have rescheduled the UK port call until later in the vessels circuit around hub ports in
North West Europe, coinciding with the reopening of the UK port. Alternatively, Felixstowe has the
current luxury of being able to transfer a limited number of vessels to its less heavily utilised sister
terminal at Thamesport.
In addition, when a port closes, the flow of containers being delivered to the port does not switch off.
Felixstowe, for example, has contingency plans in place to temporarily hold arriving vehicles in a
separate parking area off the A14 approach road, several miles before reaching the port over the 12
months to the end of April 2012 this happened 7 times.
Similarly, the Dover corridor has Operation Stack for parking on the M20 to provide a pressure valve
to overcome peak arrival times in the event of disruption on the Channel or in the Tunnel this went
into operation 5 times in 2010, the most severe occasion being a 49-hour implementation at the
beginning of December because of congestion at Euro Tunnel.
Accidents such as the two container gantry crane collapses at Southampton and the Channel Tunnel
fire in 2008 can have longer-term effects. The train fire in the Channel Tunnel closed the link
altogether for several days and then led to limited operations through the one remaining tunnel for
several months.
Although a major import channel for freight from Europe, for specific reasons this closure of the tunnel
and subsequent partial closure did not cause discernible disruption to the UK food supply. Much of
the overflow traffic was absorbed onto the Dover ferry services from Calais and Dunkerque where
utilisation levels at the time were relatively low; ferry capacity was abundant (SeaFrance was still fully
operational); and additional, suitable vessels laid-up elsewhere happened to be available and ready
for use alongside the existing fleets. Future resilience, in many respects, will depend on the available
capacity and utilisation of the ferry services in operation at the time of any future disruption in the
Tunnel.
In 2010 Defras Food Security Assessment indicated the need for a greater understanding of the
potential impact of port disruption. In addition the transport problems caused by heavy snow around
Christmas 2010 / 2011 led to the formation of resilience groups, such as the Kent Resilience Group
and the recognition of the need for the closer involvement of the local ports (e.g. Dover, Medway,
Port of London) in these organisations.

16

Resilience to some disruptions can be managed and planned. Some possible causes of disruption
may seem unlikely to some (e.g. tidal surges, effects of global warming) but that is no reason not to
understand the current probabilities of such events and the potential implications and plan resilience
measures, from government level to port level.
4.2 Features of domestic and international transport infrastructure and food supply chains
The particular features of domestic and international transport infrastructure and food supply chains
which are likely to ameliorate/exacerbate the impact of port disruption on food import flows into the UK
are described under the following headings, with supporting features specific to port infrastructure and
shipping detailed in Appendix 1:

UK Food Supply in 2010

International Food Supply Chains
Selected (Case Study) Port Groups
Selected (Case Study) Commodities

UK Food Supply in 2010

The complexity of UK food supply can be inferred from the Defra report Agriculture in the UK 2010, as
summarised in Table 4.3 overleaf. This overview lists volumes by agricultural commodity,
measured in millions of tonnes, showing UK production (value and volume), plus imports (highlighted
in green), less exports, to give a (new) total food supply volume. It does not include other food and
drink imports such as ambient manufactured products, only those for the listed commodities.
However, the table clearly indicates how UK food supply depends on domestic production and
imports; and the research revealed how these flows have interdependent supply chains through
processing, manufacturing, and distribution all the way to the consumer.
While not within the scope of the study, it should be noted that even domestic agricultural production
is dependent on imported inputs of fuel, fertiliser and feeds. This was reinforced by the findings about
molasses imports during the sugar commodity research: in 2010 535,000 tonnes of molasses was
imported and c. 80% of this is used by animal feed compounders
Table 4.3 shows that there were significant imported volumes of: meats of various types (1.7 million
tonnes); fresh vegetables (1.9 million tonnes); and fresh fruit (3.2 million tonnes). The table also notes
imports of plants and flowers which, although falling outside its scope, were found by the research to
include significant RoRo traffic flows from the Netherlands. Because these use the same resources as
do imports of vegetables and other temperature-controlled products, this competition for capacity
could exacerbate the effects of port disruption.
In addition, summary information about imports of the selected Case Study commodities is provided in
Appendix II Selected Commodities Import Volumes. This presents the Defra data for 2010 by (4
digit) commodity import code, further analysed into Non-EU and EU tonnages. For the non-EU traffic
the breakdown by UK port is also shown. The figures are totals for the year, although seasonality
within the year is not shown.
The data about fish imports required considerable interpretation because it includes data about fresh
and frozen fish caught in North Atlantic and other fisheries and then landed at UK ports such as
Peterhead. The research therefore concentrated on identifying those import flows on which UK fish
product manufacturing and processing depend. From this it has been possible to obtain a good
understanding of the important flows, including those coming as containerised traffic directly from
China, as well as those from North America which are first brought into cold storage in continental
Europe and then delivered to the UK by road trailer.
Looking briefly at the data on bulk commodity imports, it should be noted that a broad cross-section of
UK food and drink manufacturing is dependent on imported sugars and syrups, some of which appear
as bulk raw sugar for refining in the UK (nearly all on the Thames at Silvertown). Similarly, many food
manufacturers are dependent on palm oil, its fractions and derivatives; crude palm oil is imported as
liquid bulk for UK refining and fractionating; refined oils also appear as bulk or unit load traffic.

17

Table 4.3: UK Food Supply in 2010

Category
Commodity

Arable

Other

Horticulture

Livestock

Dairy

Wheat
Barley
Oats
Rye, corn, triticale, maize
Oilseed rape
Linseed
Potatoes
Sugar beet (not for feed)
Peas for stock feed
Beans for stock feed
Total arable
Sugar (refined basis)
Total other
Fresh vegetables (inc.
Channel Islands)
Fresh fruit
Plants and flowers
Total horticultural
Beef and veal
Pigmeat
Mutton and lamb
Poultrymeat
Total meat
Milk (litres)
Eggs for human
consumption (dozens)
Total dairy

Prod.
Value
m
1,683
510
63
4
702
23
780
198
12
91
4,066
----1,257
574
1,831
2,191
984
970
1,799
5,944
3,325
561

Gross
14.8
5.3
0.7
0.1
2.2
0.1
6.0
6.5
0.1
0.6
36.4
1.0
1.0
2.7

Volume
million tonnes
Plus Less
Imp.
Exp.
1.1
3.3
0.1
1.0
<0.1
<0.1
0.9
<0.1
0.2
0.3
<0.1
<0.1
1.6
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.1
5.4
1.3
0.5
1.3
0.5
1.9
0.1

0.4
3.2
Not included
3.1
5.1
0.9
0.3
0.7
0.8
0.3
0.1
1.6
0.5
3.5
1.7
13.5
0.1
0.8
0.2

New
12.7
4.3
0.6
1.0
2.1
<0.1
7.1
6.5
0.1
0.6
35.1
1.8
1.8
4.5

0.1

3.5

0.2
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.7
0.4
<0.1

8.0
1.1
1.4
0.3
1.8
4.6
13.2
1.0

3,886

More information about UK food and drink supply is provided in Annex 2. This includes a description
of how consumer demand is met through the grocery retail and foodservice channels; as well as a
review of UK agriculture; processing and manufacturing; wholesale distribution; and import activity.
The Annex then discusses key aspects of UK supply chains.
When considering how port disruption could affect UK food and drink supply, there are some aspects
that apply equally to domestic and imported supply flows within the UK, while others relate specifically
to international supply flows. Looking at the first group, highlights include:

There is continual consumer demand for a wider range of food and drink products. This includes
demand for fresh and chilled products, i.e. with short shelf life.

Every food and drink category has unique characteristics such as technology, materials,
temperature regime, shelf life, rate of sale, promotional practices, and market channel mix.
Therefore every supply chain will have its specific configuration at global, regional or local level in
response to the economic drivers.

Sophisticated UK distribution networks have taken advantage of revolutions in transport,

materials handling, storage, information and communications technologies. Centralisation and
outsourcing have been key themes. Slower moving stock is held in national centres; faster
moving items are held regionally, near the consumer. Retail outlets have only limited ambient,
fresh, chilled, and frozen stock capacity.

Networks have been designed around rapid flows of products and information. In line with
this, inventory has been moved upstream, closer to the manufacturer or supplier, and pulled

18

downstream only when needed to meet consumer demand. Time compression is a key element.
Fresh and chilled lines might have less than 2 days stock cover in a distribution network; ambient
lines possibly 1 to 2 weeks cover; and frozen from 2 to 3 weeks cover. The whole system
depends on fast, accurate replenishment of retail stock.

Technical requirements which have implications for packaging, storage, handling, and transport
also come into play. Temperature-controlled logistics enables frozen, deep-chilled, chilled, fresh
and heated regimes. Atmosphere control is also available. These are all important for
maintenance of quality and food safety.

Manufacturers (and importers) have similar supply chains with logistics operations that connect
seamlessly to those in grocery retail and foodservice. The supply chain can therefore work with a
series of interdependent and integrated end-to-end processes.

Importantly, these modern food and drink supply chains do not differentiate between domestic and
imported supply. Wherever the source, product and information flows are expected to conform to the
above ways of thinking and working.
International Food Supply Chains
Looking specifically at international supply flows, the following diagram provides a simplified view of
the end-to-end food chain, from production to consumption. For simplicity, transport networks are
implied but not shown. Also the retail segment includes not only grocery retailers but also caterers
(foodservice).

2012 Global 78 Limited

Fig. 4.1 International Food Supply Chain Schematic

The complexity of food supply chains is increased when part of the process is located overseas,
either in the EU or further afield. Global sourcing brings into play a whole range of new factors
including culture, ways of working, language, legal structures, exchange rates, longer transit
distances and times, and the number of hand-offs across the supply chain.
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the location of the port interfaces (i.e. land transit / port / sea transit /
port / land transit) can occur at different stages in the international food and drink supply chain. Also,
this location can vary. Sometimes only the agricultural production is overseas; at others primary and /
or secondary processing is overseas as well. Situations can vary by season or according to market
conditions.
The degree of food processing at the time of import must also be taken into account. Defras
Agriculture in the UK 2010, reported UK imports under the three headings of Unprocessed; Lightly
processed; and Highly processed. For some commodity flows (but not all) this will broadly
correspond with the modal appearance of the particular traffic e.g. raw material for refining will often
appear as either dry bulk or liquid bulk.
In the light of the above information about supply chains, factors that could ameliorate the effects
of port disruption include: modern supply chains in the UK are well organised; they are managed by

19

pro-active management teams with an end-to-end view of the supply chain; these teams are
supported by effective information and communications technologies; and that there is good
communication between stakeholders, even when located overseas.
On the other hand, factors that could exacerbate the effects of port disruption include: that the
interdependencies of highly sophisticated supply chain networks are not properly appreciated or
understood; there is over reliance on the reliability and availability of transport infrastructure;
everything is tightly timed and run on minimal stock levels wherever possible; and insufficient attention
has been given to inter-organisation disaster planning scenarios.
However each supply chain is different and has its own characteristics. For example, while there are
many different disruption possibilities, 24 hours of port disruption could create difficulty for the Dover
Corridor import flows, but 48 hours could be disastrous under certain circumstances.
Selected (Case Study) Port Groups
The geographical dimensions are illustrated by the Selected (Case Study) Port Groups map below.
This helps make the point that location is another critical element affecting supply chain performance.

Port Groups

Humber

Felixstowe + Southampton

Thames

Dover
corridor

Fig. 4.2 Selected (Case Study) Ports Groups Map

Closer examination of the meat and fish, and citrus fruit supply chains (see Annex 7 and 8),
alongside the Case Study examination of the Felixstowe and Southampton, Dover / Channel
Tunnel and Thames (Tilbury) port complexes highlights the dependency on these import
corridors, the concentration of flows for a range of food commodities and the difficulties created in
the supply chain if there is any port disruption.

Exacerbating factors are the bespoke design of the Dover ferries to match the port loading and
discharge infrastructure and the difficulties that causes for handling those vessels at other port
(see Annex 3), the scale of the Felixstowe container terminals and the shortage of sufficient
alternative UK capacity (see Annex 4) and the specialisation at the London Container Terminal
(Tilbury) in the handling of reefer containers arriving on vessels from South America and South
Africa (see Annex 5).

The importance of Dover and Felixstowe and an indication of the impact on the supply chain if
there is prolonged disruption at either of these ports is highlighted in Table 4.4

20

Table 4.4: Dover and Felixstowe in market perspective

Dover
Felixstowe
Unit throughput
2.068m trailers
2.074m containers
(2010)
UK Market share
31% of UK RoRo freight
42% of all containers
including tunnel ex trade
handled through UK ports
cars
RoRo berths /
container cranes
UK Market share
Vessel calls/sailings
(2010)
UK Market share

8 purpose built berths

34 container cranes

5%

29%

365 ferry sailings per week

1,713 container vessel calls

in year
45% of all UK container
vessel calls

35% of UK ferry sailings

Hinterland transport connections by road, rail, maritime feeder service, or to a lesser extent
barge, are all important features in maintaining the flow of freight traffic to and from the ports. If
there is disruption on the M20 motorway it will impact on the flow of freight to and from the
Channel Tunnel and Dover port.

Similarly the rail connections to both Felixstowe and Southampton (and Tilbury and Thamesport)
have become crucial lifelines for the flow of containers to and from the ports, including import
flows of ambient manufactured food and drink products. Disruption to rail services would soon
cause congestion and disruption to port operations.

Selected (Case Study) Commodities

Geographical dimensions also apply to the selected Case Study commodity flows. Key features
include:

The demographics of the UK population continue to drive grocery retail and foodservice outlet
locations. As a generalisation this means significant demand profiles spread across London and
the South East and the Midlands; and a more clustered approach in areas such as the North
West, North East, central Scotland, and so on.

The retailer RDC networks have been set up accordingly and suppliers have to take this into
account when designing their own response to customer demand. In many cases they will be
required to deliver product to consolidation centres working on behalf of the retailers. This is also
true for overseas suppliers of finished food products.

Consolidation centres tend to specialise in certain products and / or temperature regimes. They
might be central (e.g. the stockheld Reed Boardall cold store at Boroughbridge) or at multiple
regional cross-dock locations (e.g. NFT and Culina Logistics have chilled distribution networks
across the UK). Collections from suppliers and deliveries into the retailer networks are tightlytimed, so inter-location road distances are important.

Cold store locations are also used to stockpile seasonal imports to enable overseas producers to
maintain steady production runs from a finite amount of raw material in any given period. There
will therefore be a steady reefer container flow from major deep sea ports such as Felixstowe,
Tilbury, Thamesport and Southampton.

Moving upstream, meat and fish processors often located along the M62 corridor in the North of
England could receive raw material (or finished product) from Denmark, Germany or the
Netherlands in reefer trailer loads, arriving as either accompanied or unaccompanied RoRo traffic.
Incidentally, both UK and Continental meat and fish processors will also be receiving raw material
directly from South America or Asia as LoLo container traffic, typically via Felixstowe or Tilbury
into the UK; or via Rotterdam or Hamburg onto the Continent.

21

Deep-sea inbound supply might not always be frozen and this brings additional time constraints
where even short port disruption can become a critical issue. A domestic producer could source
vacuum-packed deep-chilled lamb from New Zealand. The shelf-life is adequate for normal
circumstances, allowing it to be put on the shelf at the retailer store within the time limitations.
However, if Felixstowe is closed because of high winds, the consignment then arrives via
Rotterdam several days late, with a consequent risk of insufficient remaining shelf-life.

Fruit and vegetable importers and packhouses are generally located in the traditional growing
areas of Kent, Lincolnshire, the Vale of Evesham, or in Lancashire. As most produce imports for
these locations from the EU (especially from the Netherlands or Spain) arrive as accompanied
RoRo traffic via East Coast ports or the Dover corridor (the majority) there is a heavy demand for
accompanied ferry services.

Looking specifically at citrus fruits, importers follow the sun to provide their customers with a year
round service from whichever growing region is in season for a particular fruit or variety. And the
importers have each developed their own network of growers in the various producing countries.
There is also a broad demarcation in sourcing patterns between the Northern and Southern
hemispheres, with Spain and South Africa respectively as the leading producers.

Logistics flows therefore vary by season. Spanish season fruit often packed at source will
travel in reefer trailers to reach the UK via an eastern Channel port or Eurotunnel. During the
South African season containers will generally arrive (at Tilbury) as LoLo traffic for onward
movement by road to storage and packing. Stock cover is usually only c1.5 days for Northern
Hemisphere citrus and between 7 to 10 days cover for Southern Hemisphere product, to allow
flexibility in deep-sea arrivals.

The research also examined bulk supply flows of sugar and of palm oil. Highlights of the findings
included:

Raw cane sugar arrives for refining in dry bulk vessels on the River Thames. These vessels can
be from c.5,000 to c. 30,000 tonnes capacity and in 2010 some 50 vessels arrived at Tate & Lyle
Sugars jetty at Silvertown. The shipments can come from any one of a number of cane-growing
countries in tropical and sub-tropical regions of the world, with Brazil the worlds leading producer.
The concentration of imports (see Annex 9) through Silvertown and the location of specialised
processing and storage facilities at the berth are an exacerbating feature of raw cane sugar
supply in the face of port disruption.

Other sugars arrive mainly as containerised traffic often via Felixstowe or Tilbury from
producers in Australasia, Africa, or the Caribbean. In addition to imports sugar is also produced
from domestic sugar beet processing. Approximately 80% of the UKs total sugar demand (c.1.9
to 2.0 million tonnes per year) is from food and drink manufacturers. Even though sugar may be a
small component in many recipes it is a critical ingredient.

Crude palm oil arrives in liquid bulk at several ports in the UK, notably at Hull, on the Thames, or
at Liverpool. Indonesia and Malaysia are the worlds leading producers. Discharge requires both
0
the vessel and the receiving terminal to be able to heat the crude to at least 40 C. Storage also
requires food grade tanks, from which the product can be pumped to an adjacent refinery.
Appropriate UK third-party storage is usually dedicated to molasses.

4.3 Resilience of overseas port infrastructure

UK food import security is contingent upon the resilience of overseas port infrastructure, both EU and
non-EU. Looking at each of these in turn, disruption could be at port level (e.g. Rotterdam as a whole)
or else at terminal level (e.g. a specific palm oil refinery). So it is important to have enough knowledge
and understanding of matters at commodity flow / terminal level to assess resilience adequately.

22

EU ports
It should be noted however, that it is often difficult to unravel just how much EU import into the UK is
actually first an import into the Continent from outside of the EU that has been customs cleared,
possibly as part of a larger consignment; or subsequently stored, refined / processed before being
shipped to the UK. Reported examples include poultrymeat from South America via Rotterdam, or
molasses from the tropics via Amsterdam.
As regards deep-sea services, if ports in north-west Europe on the deep-sea service rotations, such
as Rotterdam or Antwerp, were put out of action it might not directly impact upon the UK because
alternative EU ports (Le Havre, Zeebrugge, Amsterdam, Bremerhaven, Hamburg) would most likely
be used in the first instance to handle the disrupted import traffic for the Continent. However, more
research on port capacities, service rotations and feeder capacity is required in order to confirm this
proposition.
Ferry service capacity between Dover and the Continent is split 70% via the Port of Calais / 30% via
Dunkerque (see UK Short Sea Freight RoRo and LoLo Capacity Analysis and Report 2010 and
Annex 1 page 4). The short Channel crossing attracts traffic to Calais and Dunkerque from
Continental origins just as Dover attracts UK traffic and there are also signs of a growing development
of consolidation and distribution facilities in Belgium and northern France which are becoming UK
supply hubs.
There are risks. Strike action and blockades in Calais have been a common cause of disruption in the
past. Spare capacity at both Calais and Dunkerque is limited and alternative suitable capacity at other
Continental ports is restricted due to the scarcity of shore ramp configurations that match those at
Dover. Also Channel Tunnel Freight Shuttle services depend entirely upon loading and discharge
platforms at the shuttle terminal at Cocquelles, not far from Calais.
Similarly, 71% of short-sea RoRo and container service capacity calling into the Thames is connecting
with either Rotterdam or Zeebrugge (= 0.85 million trailer / forty-foot container equivalent units); and
for the Humber ports the equivalent share is 59% (1.2 million units).
The UK therefore has a major dependence on both RoRo and LoLo food imports via EU ports such as
Rotterdam, Zeebrugge, Dunkerque and Calais. More details are provided in Annexes 3, 5 and 6.
Importantly, further work is required to establish the precise levels of spare berth/port capacity
available, suitable for Dover/Calais type ferries, in the UK and on the Continent.
Assessment of EU port resilience also requires an evaluation of transhipment activities on the
Continent. Major ports like Rotterdam and Antwerp have de-consolidation facilities where liquid bulk
products discharged from large single and multi-product tankers will be transhipped, via storage, to
smaller tankers for distribution around European port facilities, including in the UK.
Other traffics transhipped in Rotterdam include high volumes of frozen fish in containers from
worldwide sources that are then feedered to Immingham for the processing plants in Grimsby (also
supplied with large volumes of containerised fish from Reykjavik, Iceland).
Container feeder vessels link the EU with UK ports closer to the cargo destination and away from the
UKs main deep sea ports in the South East of England. Examples include Hull, Immingham,
Teesport, the Port of Tyne, and Grangemouth, which all depend on this deep-sea transhipment traffic
for their growing container operations and port-based storage and distribution operations for particular
import traffics.
Continental ports such as Rotterdam are consequently very important for UK food supply: handling of
imports from all over the world and hosting subsequent short-sea distribution. Disruption at an EU
port, such as Rotterdam, could therefore seriously upset UK food supply, as is quantified above for
UK Short Sea RoRo and container (including feeder) traffic. Further work would be required to
establish the full range of dry bulk and liquid bulk reception, storage, refining and processing facilities
around the port of Rotterdam that ultimately feed the UK market. The London Gateway development
promises to redress some of the balance if added value activities are developed at the port, although

23

this still leaves bulk product handling exposed (subject to further analysis) to Continental storage and
processing before transfer to the UK market.
Non EU ports
At high-level, with 13 million tonnes of food being landed at UK ports from non-EU origins (nearly 40%
of all UK food import volume) there is generally a spread of risk across a range of ports serving a wide
region or continent.
LoLo services calling at Felixstowe would have loaded at a range of ports in the Far East or North
America, for instance. No single overseas port is therefore considered critical, although Hong Kong
and Singapore are major consolidation hub and transhipment ports for the Far East and Australasian
region.
A similar scenario would apply to South American ports. For example in Brazil, when Itaja was
severely disrupted by major flooding late in 2008, containerised food export traffic was able to
relocate to other ports such as Rio Grande, Paranagua, or Santos.
As regards bulk traffic, raw cane sugar comes from a diverse range of countries (as discovered in
Annex 9) so there are likely to be alternative sources in the event of port disruption. However, there
can be landside transport disruption, such as that which more recently affected Queenslands sugar
exports.
Crude palm oil from Indonesia is shipped from a variety of ports including Teluk Bayur in West
Sumatra. Malaysia has a number of ports and the worlds largest palm oil storage facility in its Johor
Free Trade Zone, next to Singapore. In the above cases delivery to the port is by small vessel and by
road.
Also, particular overseas supply markets and loading ports may become more important for UK
supply in the future as the growing Chinese and Indian consumer markets draw in more and more
food imports from producers that have traditionally supplied the UK and European markets, so
reducing the range of supply ports serving the UK.
More work would be required to assess any dependence on particular overseas ports for other food
commodities shipped in bulk, especially for bulk imports from the EU, where the UK port of entry is not
formally recorded. More detailed analysis of import trade and traffic (agricultural products) through UK
ports, by country of origin (from DfT Maritime Statistics) linked with EU trade data giving the detail of
food commodity imports by EU country of origin would throw some light on particular overseas ports if
any over-dependence existed.
4.4 Behavioural aspects
As noted in Section 2 of this Report, a research objective was to explore the behaviour, over the short
to medium term, of individual port operators, shipping companies, and land-based logistics and food
supply chain agents in the event of port disruption. Exploration was mostly successful with the only
limitation coming from the bulk food commodity sector where some players were not prepared to
share information about preparedness with the authors, taking the view that such details fell within
their Business Continuity Planning and was therefore highly sensitive and strictly confidential.
Nonetheless, public limited companies do publish their annual risk management assessment, as
illustrated by the Associated British Foods plc Annual Report and Accounts 2011, pages 46 through
48. This company is a diversified international food, ingredients and retail group with British Sugar, a
major player in the UK sugar market, in its portfolio. The closest the risk management assessment
comes to issues such as port disruption is under the heading of People where it has the following
information:
Issue
Input costs, suppliers
and supply chain
reliability

Risk
Disruption to raw material supplies and
production caused by problems with suppliers,
natural disasters and other incidents

24

Mitigation
Business continuity and
disaster recovery planning
regularly reviewed

Beyond that there is no published information, either at plc or individual company level. However, from
general discussion with interviewed stakeholders and an understanding of current industrial practice,
the Consultants are able to make the following observations about a range of behavioural issues:

Ports, shipping lines, importers, others involved in the supply chain and public sector agencies
prepare and respond differently, depending on whether any port disruption is short, medium or
long term. A range of responses to port disruption from ports, shipping lines, shippers and various
public sector agencies are presented in logical order in Table 4.1 and Appendix I, for RoRo,
LoLo and bulk modes

Short term disruption is generally dealt with by the private sector operators, through their own
devices under their control. Medium term disruption often also involves public sector agencies, in
concert with the private sector, in dealing with and overcoming the consequences of disruption.
The evolution of Resilience Groups and the coordinated implementation of Operation Stack
are good examples of this kind of behaviour

There is good evidence of preparedness and Business Continuity Planning among port
operators, shipping lines, importers and processors for situations involving known types of
disruption that has probably been experienced before; a kind of reactive planning. One good
example is the implementation of Vehicle Booking Systems (VBS) at Felixstowe and
Southampton container terminals to control the flow of vehicle arrivals at the port gates and to
spread the flow of arrivals away from peak times that previously caused major disruption during
the daytime cycle

It is left to the overseeing Port Authorities and Local and National Government to prepare
contingency plans for the unexpected, often major, types of disruption, such as river channel
blockages, pollution control, flooding and other types of disaster

Indications from the Port of London Authority (PLA) would suggest that they are able to simulate
incidents such as river blockages on computer models and assess the impact on vessel access,
as an example of proactive planning

The DfTs Deep Port model is, on balance, a reactive planning tool because it cannot easily
answer a range of what if scenario questions without significant manual input. It contains many
facts and details about port infrastructure and facilities, shipping services and trade and traffic
(freight and passenger). It proved very useful when the Icelandic volcanic ash cloud disrupted air
travel activities by informing government (and consequently the public) of the range of passenger
ferries available as an alternative mode of transport

However, its use as a sophisticated planning tool to simulate and assess the impact of port
disruption in advance and answer the range of what if questions that arise is questionable and
should be reviewed

It should also be noted that market developments and behaviour patterns in the supply chain
have shaped the use of different transport modes and supply routes into the UK and in some cases
led to a greater dependency on particular modes and routes. As illustrated below, there are new
dependencies that could be interpreted as reducing resilience:

Reliance on supply chains that have low stock levels but high ability to respond quickly to
customer demand (e.g. Just-in-time models), even when stock is held remotely (e.g. food
consolidation centres in northern France), has created a false sense of security so that the need
for disruption recovery scenarios have not been anticipated

Against this trend, some suppliers and logistics service providers have been taking the lead to
introduce stock into the supply chain, supported by PortCentric logistics developments where
stock is held at or near a UK port. How well this would work for perishable items such as produce
would have to be evaluated

Time based logistics tend to require greater use of the accompanied transport mode and the
short, high frequency Dover Corridor crossings. This is counter to attempts to reduce road miles
25

and transfer freight to longer ferry routes (that when well utilised will lower overall CO 2 emissions).
In any case, North Sea ferry routes have been built around the unaccompanied mode and cannot
therefore easily absorb any increase in accompanied traffic

Ferry berths and vessels have been specially designed to allow rapid discharge and loading and
minimum port time in Dover (bow and stern access to match port infrastructure) but this renders
vessels unable to use other UK ferry ports. Conversely there is greater scope to flex capacity on
the Dover ferry routes and Freight Shuttle services. Even more so if surplus vessel and freight
shuttle capacity is available

An increasing dependency on the container mode of transport (for deep sea and short sea) with
larger and larger vessels providing increased economies of scale is leading to greater
concentrations of freight traffic through Felixstowe (for UK) and Rotterdam (for Continent and UK)

The scale of service provision and range of commodities handled in Rotterdam and other key EU
ports is leading to higher levels of UK supply of non EU food commodities via the Continent. The
London Gateway development may help to reverse this trend

Increasing use of refrigerated containers for the movement of fresh produce, meat and fish is
leading to a decline in the size of the break-bulk reefer vessel fleet and the loss of specialised port
handling and storage facilities, e.g. Sheerness

The continued concentration of packhouses for the fresh produce sector in Kent and south
Lincolnshire, to supply the whole UK market only serve to draw further traffic through the short
Channel routes

The poor state of the economy in Spain is leading to some haulage companies going out of
business and exposing the fresh produce trade to a shortage of transport and rising freight rates.
Western Channel ferry and container services and schedules may not meet the exacting timebased demands of the fresh produce carriers from Spain

Elements of Dutch, Belgian and German freight traffic will naturally use the longer North Sea ferry
routes without adverse impact on service but long haul traffic from more distant parts of Europe
needs the security of a turn-up-and-go service, as supplied through Calais and the Channel
Tunnel

Channel Tunnel capacity is available for extra freight shuttle (trailer) and through train (container)
services. Fresh produce could be transported from Spain by train but reliability and frequency
issues need to be dealt with.

26

5. DISCUSSION
This study is intended to provide greater insight into the UKs food import supply chain, particularly in
terms of the port and shipping interchange, the availability of meaningful supporting information and
the preparedness of ports, shipping lines, transport service providers, food importers and local and
national Government Departments (Defra, DfT) in planning for and dealing with port disruption.
There are facts presented about food import volumes, port and shipping capacities and importers
supply chains; and there are also issues raised that require exposure to further discussion and joint
resolution if possible.
Key areas for discussion and resolution, to lead into Section 6: Conclusions and Section 7:
Recommendations are presented below, grouped under the following headings:

Port dependency Dover (and Short Sea RoRo ferry market in general)

Port dependency Felixstowe (and Deep Sea container market in general)

Specialised bulk cargo handling

Supply chain practice

Further information and planning required; and Intervention:

5.1 Port dependency Dover (and Short Sea RoRo ferry market in general)
In general, if one port is closed it is not just a simple solution to move ships to another port. Alternative
ports that extend voyage times will interfere with fixed schedules and in any case they might not have
an available free berth. Different commodities, shipping modes (RoRo, container, dry bulk, liquid bulk)
and ship sizes require the appropriate port capacity, infrastructure, cargo discharge and loading
equipment, storage and inland transport capacity. The analysis in Annexes 3 and 4 indicates the
shortage of suitable port and shipping capacity serving the UK should Dover or Felixstowe be forced
to close.
However, Dovers ferry services and the Channel Tunnel Freight Shuttle services provide
complementary back-up capacity and the flexibility in both routes to increase and decrease
capacity at relatively short notice should be kept under review. The Channel Tunnel is the best
alternative option in the event of any closure at Dover and vice versa. Spare capacity is available in
the Dover / Tunnel system and could be enhanced if required.
When disruption prevents the movement of freight through a port for an extended period, shipping
lines require alternative port options, but such alternatives only exist if sufficient and suitable
berthing and handling infrastructure is available at other ports. Even then, there has to be sufficient
manpower and storage available (open, under cover, specialised tanks) and the means and capacity
to transport the freight from the port to its ultimate inland destination.
To suggest that the solution, if one port is closed, would be to send vessels to the next available port
with suitable available berths is far too simplistic. If Dover is forced to close, it would take eight
specialised berths out of action, with shore-based ramp equipment that is designed specifically for the
ferries employed on the routes from Calais and Dunkerque.
The vast majority of RoRo ferry berths at other UK south and east coast ports could not handle the
Dover ferries (without major modification) and the longer sea crossing involved substantially reduces
overall capacity potential in any case. If the ferries cannot be handled the traffic would have to find
alternative ferry routes, but such alternative ferry services do not have sufficient driver
accommodation and a change to an unaccompanied movement would require planning for suitable
road haulage to be available at each end of the ferry route (something that could be developed as a
contingency plan).

27

Similarly other conventional RoRo ferries require major modification to bow and stern access
ramps and doors before they could be used on the Dover / Calais route, should increased capacity be
required, following disruption elsewhere.
The notion that freight movements could be transferred from the road trailer to the container mode
makes the unsafe assumption that there are sufficient containers and skeletal trailers available to
carry the containers behind a tractor unit on the road. In any case many shippers and receivers are
not equipped to handle the loading and unloading of fixed side containers with a single set of rear
doors, being geared up to load and discharge from both sides of a curtain sided trailer with forklift
trucks.
There is information available on UK Short Sea Freight RoRo and LoLo Capacity, allowing some
assessment and estimate of capacity utilisation and spare capacity in the UK supply system (see
Section 5 in Annexes 3, 4, 5 and 6), but there is a shortage of such information for deep sea
container capacity and associated feeder service capacity. There is also a shortage of information on
specific port and vessel capacity availability for bulk food commodity flows, such as for sugar and
palm oil.
All such information would provide valuable input into Business Continuity Planning models as
companies, organisations and government are not necessarily aware of the shortage of available
routing alternatives.
The Dover Harbour Board has promoted plans to develop additional RoRo berths in the Western
Docks to expand capacity but for resilience and security purposes there should be some further
investigation into the commercial viability of a private sector development of an alternative to Dover.
Failing that, there should be some further research into the development and installation of dual
purpose RoRo berths that can accommodate Dover type ferries as well as conventional ferries with
inbuilt ramps at other ports in order to accommodate ferries diverted from Dover.
5.2 Port dependency Felixstowe (and Deep Sea container market in general)
Similarly, Felixstowe is a critical entry point for the UKs deep sea container imports (see Annex 4
and Table 3.1). The opening and future expansion of the London Gateway Terminal on the Thames
will provide much needed, suitable alternative deep water capacity in the system because current
alternative UK deep sea container ports could not handle the overflow. Alternatively the organisation,
equipment and short sea shipping capacity required to repatriate UK bound containers having to be
discharged at deep sea ports on the Continent would most likely not be sufficient. (This scenario
requires detailed assessment and modelling in order to properly understand the availability of
alternative shipping and transport modes and capacity, as does the Dover closure scenario).
The London Gateway development, a venture that is commercially justified by its promoters, is going
to create added supply chain security in the system, although the development has been a private
sector initiative.
In undertaking the project the importance of the extra deep sea shipping capacity and land-side
logistics development at London Gateway became evident from the perspective of food supply
resilience. The concept of deep sea transhipment hubs could also be reviewed if supply chain security
gives extra weight to development potential.
The Thames and Humber Case Studies (Annexes 5 and 6) have served to illustrate the range of
alternative RoRo ferry and container handling options available should Dover and/or the Channel
Tunnel or Felixstowe and/or Southampton face disruption. These estuaries, like other major port
estuaries in the UK (i.e. Tees, Tyne, Forth, Clyde, Mersey, and Severn) have a range of
infrastructures and services that are in themselves their own back-up, although their combined scale
for RoRo and container operations are still deficient when it comes to providing alternative capacity in
the event of disruption at Dover / Channel Tunnel (RoRo) or Felixstowe (LoLo).

28

5.3 Specialised bulk cargo handling

As examples of bulk import locations, the Tate & Lyle Sugars plant on the Thames and the AAK palm
oil refinery at Hull, are key food import facilities that are not replicated elsewhere in the Thames or
Humber, respectively. The respective Sugar and Palm Oil Case Studies (Annexes 9 and 10) have
highlighted the significance of these facilities and identified alternative import channels and UK stock
holding points.
If alternative UK import facilities, processing plants and supplies cannot bridge the gap, the supply of
processed product could possibly be sourced from continental Europe, transported either in road
trailers or containers. Such a scenario for these two products and a range of others throws more
emphasis on the need for short sea freight RoRo and container service capacity and connections in
the UK.
Further work would be required in order to raise the understanding of individual bulk food
commodity supply chains in order to enable government to assess the food supply chain
mechanisms and the impact of supply disruption upon UK manufacturing and processing viability, as
well as general food shortages.
5.4 Supply chain practice
The Just-in-Time supply chain philosophy, aiming to minimise stock levels in part to reduce
working capital exposure, requires an adherence to time-based transit and delivery performance that
depends on short, high frequency transport services across the English Channel particularly for fresh
and chilled imports. As noted in Annex 2 it is questionable whether the practice leaves enough stock
in the system for resilience. There is also the issue of who would carry the stock burden of any
increased buffer stocks.
Given the importance of stock held in the supply chain to protect resilience there is an evident lack of
transparency in that while importers and transport operators might know their individual supply
chains well, there needs to be a better grasp of matters across and between sectors. Improved
knowledge of stock locations, volumes and routes would aid food supply resilience planning. However
the research carried out for this project identified clear concerns about commercial confidentiality and
competition issues.
There is a growing UK dependency on Continental refining and processing of non EU sourced raw
materials, being driven by companys global decision making and a centralisation of food
manufacturing (driven by cost reduction). For the UK this means a growing dependency on short sea
shipping services and Continental ports such as Rotterdam. Port and shipping dependency should be
a part of multi-national companys Europe-wide planning.
5.5 Further information and planning required
Intensive use of the unit load transport mode (trailers and containers) to move food products has a
major dependence on IT systems to maintain control and visibility along the whole supply chain.
This is both a strength and a weakness in securing the resilience of UK food supply.
IT systems such as the Port Community Systems in operation at many ports and a particular feature
at the key container ports, can help facilitate the smooth transfer of vessels and freight from one port
that is disrupted to another unaffected port. Such systems could also prove to be a central tool in
identifying and analysing EU food imports. On the negative side, the growing dependence on IT
systems leaves the supply chain vulnerable to system failures, power supply interruptions, and even
cyber crime.
There is almost certainly a need for an improved Contingency Planning Model for Government and
more openness between ports and government, and between government departments, in developing
and improving the robustness of Business Continuity Planning. The DfT is aware of the issue and
is liaising with ports and local authorities. However, is there a lack of inclination in the market to
develop contingency plans for what are seen as highly unlikely events?

29

After verifying the utility of the present Deep Port contingency planning model in providing a dynamic
response to potential what if questions, it may be necessary to commission the design and
development of a more dynamic and pro-active model. Without such a dynamic model, containing up
to date port, shipping, supply chain, trade and traffic information it is difficult to develop any thoughtthrough back-up plans.
There are important questions to be asked. Is the current level of food import trade and traffic
information adequate for informed planning? Non EU trade information is available in detail from the
HMRCs Chief database, providing detailed commodity information by UK port of entry and country of
origin (although without shipping mode).
Similar information for EU food trade is only available for the UK as a whole, with details of country of
origin (imports) and destination (exports), but no indication of UK port of entry. There is some
supporting information from the Department for Transports Maritime Statistics that does fill some of
the EU trade evidence gap, but how necessary is it to identify all EU food imports, by UK port (and
tunnel), specific food commodity and mode of shipment?
5.6 Intervention
Other questions relate to intervention. If sufficient suitable alternative port or shipping service capacity
is not available, is it possible to prioritise freight and/or food freight on ferries and container
services if required? What commodities could be held back to allow food traffic to move and what
would be the impact on UK industry?
Does the UKs Border Control and Port Health network need a review to assess the response to the
change of routing of food imports in order to make sure that food security is not diminished and speed
of transit is not compromised through lack of appropriate resources?
If there is an identified shortage of spare / alternative port and shipping capacity to secure UK food
supply, should government encourage and finance the provision of extra capacity? EU
initiatives, such as Marco Polo, have encouraged development of port infrastructure and longer ferry
routes to replace long road journeys, with an environmental imperative, with limited success for UK
supply. Related issues are:

Should Channel Tunnel through train services be encouraged?

Should the development and installation of dual use (Dover type and non-Dover type) RoRo
berths be encouraged?

Would the benefit to UK supply resilience be outweighed by the cost of a Dover 2 development?

In general, market imperatives prevail and there is likely to be a continuing trend towards the use and
development of short Channel crossings (ferries and Tunnel). Why should there be any spare
capacity in system? It is only when there are periods of depressed economic activity that ports and
shipping lines have the luxury of spare capacity that could absorb the impact of disruption elsewhere,
but during such cycles operators will tend to close down or mothball excess capacity in any case.

30

6. CONCLUSIONS
The Conclusions drawn from the study relate to the Results (see Section 4 and respective Annex
reports) derived from the research in meeting the four project objectives and dealing with the
recognised challenges and these are summarised below:
The headline objective was to identify the likely causes, extent, speed and duration of transmission
of ports disruption into interruption of food imports arriving in the UK as containerised, RoRo and bulk
traffic. In summary the extent of any port disruption and then the speed and duration of transmission
of port disruption into the supply chain depends on a number of factors. These include:

Nature and location(s) of the port disruption (incl. UK and / or overseas)

Characteristics of the interrupted commodity flows (e.g. volume, handling requirements)
Modal appearance(s) of the interrupted flows (i.e. RoRo, LoLo, bulk)
Service type(s) and frequency (deep sea / infrequent; short sea / high frequency; etc.)
Competition for alternative capacity from other interrupted (food and non-food) traffic
System flexibility (incl. availability of suitable alternative routes and port facilities)

The details in Table 4.1 provide a clear summary of possible causes of disruption (in order of
magnitude), their likely duration and the impact and intervention levels. There are clearly some
disruptions that can be, and are, dealt with at the local level and others that require regional and
national government intervention. Furthermore:
i. Different levels of port disruption have been experienced in the past and have been dealt with and
incorporated into future continuity planning and there is an awareness of the potential for more
serious disruption (i.e. tidal surges, rising sea levels etc.) but less sign of any planning, other than
within newly formed Regional Resilience Groups.
ii. Widespread disruption is predicted if there is a tidal surge but there appears to be little planning in
place to improve resilience (the real effects of global warming and rising sea levels are being
prepared for in Indonesia for instance by raising the height of quay structures)
iii. The Department for Transports Deep Port Contingency Planning model has been built around a
range of relevant port infrastructure, shipping and trade data and incorporates road congestion
assessment, shipping movements, weather forecasting and tidal surge simulation. However, it is
recognised that more sophisticated modelling is required in order to be able to carry out extensive,
scenario-based, simulations of the impact and resolution of port disruption
As for the evidence base required to enhance any modelling of port disruption scenarios:
iv. More detailed UK trade and traffic type information is available from the DfT if required, providing
country of origin (shipment), cargo type and UK port of entry linkages. This could be combined with
appropriate inputs from industry players
v. Useful information that can enhance general resilience planning is not always transparent. Private
company, trade federation and government information is retained within closed networks for fear of
contravening commercial confidentiality and data protection laws. The governments Food Stock
Survey results were not made available, for instance, and their use was not clarified. Similarly while
some trade federations were able to help, others were unable to assist for reasons of data
protection compliance. There needs to be a better understanding of the existence of useful
information in the event that it can be used in an actual emergency
In determining the extent to which particular features of domestic and international transport
infrastructure and food supply chains are likely to ameliorate / exacerbate the impact of UK port
disruption on the supply of food imports into the UK, the following conclusions emerged:
vi. The UKs foodservice suppliers and grocery retail industry place a high level of reliance on the
Dover / Channel Tunnel import channels and on the accompanied trailer mode to satisfy the Justin-Time, minimum stock level, supply chain philosophy for raw material and finished goods. This

31

policy undermines resilience because there is no spare storage capacity in the system (unless there
are agricultural cycle and seasonal demands)
vii. The Dover ferry routes and the Channel Tunnel Freight Shuttle services can provide significant
back-up for each other if one channel is disrupted. However, the same back-up scale of capacity is
not readily available on other short sea ferry routes to the UK, to ports that do not have the RoRo
berths capable of handling the Dover type ferries
viii. The need for growing economies of scale in the deep sea container shipping sector is placing
increasing demands on the UKs few deep sea container ports (concentrated in the south east of
England) to develop deeper access channels and berths and to install larger container gantry
cranes in order to handle ever larger vessels. This is placing an increasing dependency on
Felixstowe, Southampton and the new London Gateway development for deep sea imports
The extent to which UK food (import) security is contingent upon the resilience of overseas port
infrastructure was identified in the following key areas:
ix. A growing dependency on Continental supply would be clarified by a more thorough understanding
of EU trade in food commodities from the Continent (over 21m tonnes) in order to establish what is
truly EU traffic and what is via EU traffic. However, it is already apparent that there are major
dependencies on food imports from Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, using either RoRo ferry
services or LoLo container services
x. There is a growing concentration of commodity consolidation, processing, storage and distribution
hubs located on the Continent and built around the deep sea hub ports (Rotterdam, Antwerp,
Zeebrugge, Le Havre, Hamburg), serving the Continent of Europe (by road, rail and barge) as well
as the UK (by short sea RoRo ferry and container services). UK deep sea container ports are
Gateways to the UK market and not consolidation / distribution hubs for other markets. The London
Gateway development could incorporate commodity consolidation, processing and European
distribution activities adjacent to the port that could provide the UK with extra supply chain security
xi. Further economy drives and rationalisation could lead to further concentration of processing and
refining of bulk imports on the Continent (e.g. sugar, palm oil examples) at the expense of UK
refining and processing capacity. As such the resilience of the supply of sugar (cane sugar) and
palm oil to port disruption (high dependency on Silvertown and Hull respectively) has to be viewed
as a threat to the UK processing and refining industry as a whole and not just a threat to current
supply
Conclusions regarding the behaviour over the short to medium term, of individual port operators,
shipping companies and land-based logistics and food supply chain agents in the event of port
disruption are clearly set out in Appendix I, Tables A to E, for the port operators and shipping lines
regarding RoRo, LoLo and bulk shipping modes. The tables summarise the order of decision making,
among port operators, shipping lines and shippers that will take place in the event of port disruption.
Further downstream further clarity and insight is required with respect to any reference to the impact
of port disruption and the resilience of the supply chain in response to port disruption, in the
confidential Business Continuity Plans of food importers, manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers.
There is evidence of reactive behaviour (see Section 4.4) to prepare future plans following experience
of disruptive events, but more insight and support is required for proactive planning.
There is some evidence of importers using more than just one supply route to spread the risk but it is
unclear how dependent many importers, manufacturers and retailers may be on a single source of
supply utilising a single supply route into the UK.

32

7. RECOMMENDATIONS
The report recommendations follow the themes put forward in the Discussion section (Section 5),
guided by the research Results (Section 4) and Conclusions (Section 6) that have emerged in
meeting the four project objectives. In terms of port dependency (Dover / Channel Tunnel RoRo,
Felixstowe LoLo), specialised bulk cargo handling and processing facilities, Supply Chain practice,
Information and Planning required and Intervention, the following recommendations are proposed:
I. While the Dover / Channel Tunnel corridor and the port / rail terminal connections on both sides of
the Channel, is considered to be a crucial trade gateway more work is required to more accurately
estimate the ability to transfer freight and vessels to other routes should there be any disruption to
the UK ports RoRo network (see Annex 3, 5 and 6 for preliminary analysis)
II. Work should also be commissioned to look into the adaptability of RoRo ferries between Dover
operational mode and non-Dover mode. The economic development and installation of dual
purpose RoRo ramps could also be investigated, along with the scope to increase potential capacity
through the Channel Tunnel
III. A full analysis of UK Deep Sea container service and port capacity (allied to container feeder
service capacity and Continental port capacity), along similar lines to the UK Short Sea Freight
RoRo and LoLo Capacity Analysis and Report would help to clarify the flexibility and potential
transferability of vessels and containers from one port / service to another, should disruption occur.
It is currently not clear whether enough container feeder, short sea and Channel Tunnel train
capacity is available to feed containers back to the UK if a key UK container port is disrupted
IV. The potential benefits for UK food supply resilience generated by added value service
developments around the new London Gateway hub terminal should be assessed along with the
potential added resilience that transhipment hub developments at Scapa Flow, Hunterston or other
deep water facilities might generate
V. To improve the understanding of potential disruption and planning greater resilience scenario
analysis, planning needs to be carried out at an individual flow level, just as it has been for each of
the food commodity Case Studies, particularly the sugar and palm oil Case Studies where
specialised refining, processing, storage and distribution are integral to the vessel and cargo
handling operations, adjacent to the berth
VI. Improved resilience planning and business continuity modelling can only benefit from greater
openness and transparency among stakeholders (ports, shipping lines, food and drink industry,
local and national government, government agencies, port community system providers).
Framework discussions centred on information sharing should be arranged for a stakeholder Forum
VII. Discussions with the developers and providers of the Port Community Systems in use at the UKs
major container ports; Marine Cargo Processing (MCP) and Community Network Services (CNS)
should explore the development of computer system based facilities that could assist the transfer of
container and RoRo ferry calls from one port to another in the event of port disruption (see further
reference to Port Community Systems in Annex 4)
VIII. The detailed inputs, outputs and scenario assessment capabilities of the DfTs Deep Port model
should be assessed in terms of its ability to model the impact and resolution options (vessel and
traffic diversion) in the event of port disruption. If it is not considered dynamic enough work should
be commissioned to develop and maintain such a live and interactive model
IX. Some evidence gaps can be filled by bespoke analysis of the DfTs Maritime Statistics database,
allied with support for Border Agency and Port Health Authority initiatives to identify food
consignments carried in trailers and containers arriving into the UK from EU countries. Provision to
identify food grade liquid bulk imports as part of the DfTs data collection process for the Maritime
Statistics would fill another gap
X. The location and volume of stock in the supply chain should be more transparent, to enable more
enlightened planning and government intervention, if felt necessary

33

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34

APPENDIX I: Decision-Making for Vessel and Freight Diversion Scenarios

A: Vessel diversion to alternative port (RoRo mode)
Issues
Criteria to Satisfy
Customer requirements

1. Vessel size
2. Vessel configuration

Does an alternative port and

schedule satisfy customer
requirements in terms of delivery
lead time and scheduled deliveries?
Draft, length and beam (width) of
vessel must fit at alternative port
Stern and bow doors and ramps on
ship must fit alternative berths

3. Schedule

Can the daily or twice daily (maybe

even more frequent) schedule of the
disrupted service be maintained?

4. Available berths

Vessel fits and has right

configuration but is there a spare
berth? See Annex 3, 5 and 6;
Section 5 for capacity appraisal
Does the alternative port have
sufficient labour, specialist
equipment and terminal areas to
handle the additional trailers,
wheeled ships gear and mobile units
being discharged and loaded?
Terminal operator / stevedore
requires pre-advice on cargo being
discharged and units arriving for
shipment in order to control terminal
inventories and properly identify
units for collection and dispatch
Unless new traffic is mainly
accompanied trailers the excess
unaccompanied freight will require
traction to move between the port
and inland destination

5. Available cargo
handling capacity

6. Information transfer
and control

7. Inland transport
resource and
destinations to serve
(imports and exports)

Comments / Compromises

Shippers and receivers will need to be

flexible in allowing for extended delivery
lead time and out of hours deliveries
First decision is whether ship will fit at
another UK port
The width of the vessel, the positioning
of doors and ramps and whether the
ship has its own hinged ramps or not
are all factors to consider
Existing schedule on a different route
will be compromised if longer voyage
time involved and required berth slot is
not available, unless port time reduced.
Overall shipping capacity reduced
Existing services at alternative port may
be able to condense the time that they
are on the berth
Ports and terminals will generally have
manning and equipment for existing
requirements only. Additional labour
and equipment may be required
Electronic data interchange more
advanced now but system and software
compatibility may be an issue.
Established Port Community Systems,
used across groups of ports will aid
transfer
Road haulage capacity can be moved,
temporarily, from one port to another
and some haulage companies have
depots at several ports. (Rail capacity
not an issue for RoRo)

Note: For further information port flexibility and vessel diversion refer to Section 5 in Annexes 3, 5 and 6

APPENDIX I: Decision-Making for Vessel and Freight Diversion Scenarios

B: Freight diversion to alternative route (RoRo mode)
Issues
Criteria to Satisfy
Customer requirements

A. Route

B. Mode

C. Capacity available

Apart from minimal port

displacement and maintenance of
mode the customer may have
refrigerated or heated equipment.
Alternative service and port needs
sufficient electrical connection points
to maintain power to the units
Alternative route (service) needs to
be as close as possible to disrupted
service route in terms of ports of call
and voyage distance
Alternative service has to have
suitable available capacity for
accompanied trailer,
unaccompanied trailer, or shipment
on ships gear
Is there available capacity on
suitable alternative routes? See
Annex 3, 5 and 6; Section 5 for
Capacity appraisal

D. Agreements in place
/ space allocations

Does shipper have existing

agreements in place with other
shipping lines?

E. Inland transportation

Road haulage provision for

unaccompanied traffic is required at
alternative port

Comments / Compromises

No compromise here, temperature

control is vital for certain commodities

May require change to Continental port

of loading as well as moving away from
disrupted UK port
Change of route and service may
require a change from accompanied to
unaccompanied trailer mode
May be spare capacity at certain times
of day when demand is normally weak.
Other shipping lines may be able to
increase capacity by increasing
schedule intensity and / or introducing
additional vessels
Existing agreements and unfulfilled
space allocations makes transfer
easier. Otherwise freight rates may be
punitive
Existing road haulage contractor may or
may not be able to work with alternate
port

Note: For further information port flexibility and traffic diversion refer to Section 5 in Annexes 3, 5 and 6 and Annex 7 and 8

ii

APPENDIX I: Decision-Making for Vessel and Freight Diversion Scenarios

C: Vessel diversion to alternative port (LoLo mode)
Issues
Criteria to Satisfy
Customer requirements

Does an alternative port and

schedule satisfy customer
requirements in terms of delivery
lead time and scheduled deliveries?

1. Schedule

Can schedules be maintained and

containers delivered and collected
without calling at the disrupted port?

2. Vessel size

Draft, length and beam (width) of

vessel must fit at alternative port

3. Vessel configuration

Will ship fit under cranes and will

crane reach to far side of ship?

4. Available berths

Vessel fits and has right

configuration but is there a spare
berth? See Annex 4, 5 and 6;
Section 5 for Capacity appraisal

5. Available cargo
handling capacity

Does the alternative port have

sufficient labour, specialist
equipment and terminal areas to
handle the additional containers
being discharged and loaded?

6. Information transfer
and control

Terminal operator / stevedore

requires pre-advice on cargo being
discharged and units arriving for
shipment in order to control terminal
inventories and properly identify
units for collection and dispatch
The transfer of large volumes of
containers from one port to another,
or others, will require a substantial
uplift in available inland transport
resource

7. Inland transport
resource and
destinations to serve
(imports and exports)

Comments / Compromises

Differing requirements for short sea and

deep sea customers but shippers and
receivers will need to be flexible in
allowing for possible extended delivery
lead time and out of hours deliveries.
For deep sea customers Just-in-Time
delivery is usually not such an issue
For short sea port-to-port services
scheduling issues are similar to short
sea RoRo. For deep sea and short sea
feeder (multi-port) services a rescheduling of North West Europe port
calls could allow time for disruption to
clear. Containers can be fed back to
the UK from other Continental ports but
it would require a step change in feeder
service capacity, road haulage capacity
and Channel Tunnel through train
capacity. Feeder services could drop
containers at other scheduled UK ports
of call
Use an alternative UK port if it fits and
for some deep sea vessels calling at
Felixstowe there is a very limited range
of UK alternatives
Container vessels are a standard box
shape but the number of rows of
containers stowed across the ship and
the height of the containers above the
water level need to correspond with the
maximum dimensions of the shore
cranes. Short sea container handling
facilities will not be able to handle deep
sea vessels
There may be spare berths but maybe
not at the right time to allow the deep
sea vessel to maintain its overall
schedule. In the longer terms schedules
can be adjusted
Ports and terminals will generally have
manning (suitably trained), equipment
and terminal areas for existing
requirements only. Additional labour,
equipment and possibly land area may
be required
Established Port Community Systems,
used across groups of ports will aid
transfer and such system use is more
widespread in the container handling
sector
Road haulage capacity can be moved,
temporarily, from one port to another
and some haulage companies have
depots at several ports. Rail freight
capacity is constrained by available
train paths and in any case it is difficult
to schedule new services at short
notice

Note: For further information on port flexibility and vessel diversion refer to Section 5 in Annexes 4, 5 and 6

iii

APPENDIX I: Decision-Making for Vessel and Freight Diversion Scenarios

D: Freight diversion to alternative route (Deep Sea LoLo mode)
Issues
Criteria to Satisfy
Comments / Compromises
Customer requirements

A. Route

Apart from minimal port

displacement and maintenance of
mode the customer may have
refrigerated or heated equipment.
Alternative service and port needs
sufficient electrical connection
points to maintain power to the
units
Are there alternative routes and
services to the UK market and
how easy is it to switch?

B. Mode

The only alternative deep sea

services will be container services
so change of mode not possible /
necessary

C. Capacity available

Is there available capacity on

suitable alternative routes? See
Annex 4, 5 and 6; Section 5 for
Capacity appraisal

D. Agreements in place /
space allocations

Does shipper have existing

agreements in place with other
shipping lines?

E. Inland transportation

Road haulage and rail transport

provision and possibly maritime
feeder services for containers is
required at alternative port

No compromise here, temperature

control is vital for certain commodities

There are some shipping line

conferences that now provide daily a
daily service between N.W.Europe and
the Far East, for example. There are
alternatives but there is a delayed
reaction with vessels being on 70-day
round trips
Growth in container trade has, in part,
been driven by the conversion of bulk
and break bulk cargoes to
containerisation. A reversion to bulk
shipment may be possible in some
instances
The availability of alternative capacity
will depend on the point in the shipping
cycle ranging from huge over-capacity
following periods of economic growth
and shipbuilding activity leading into an
economic downturn, or huge under
capacity at the point before new
tonnage is delivered in response to
economic growth
Existing agreements and unfulfilled
space allocations makes transfer
easier. Otherwise freight rates may be
punitive
Existing road haulage, rail service and
maritime feeder service contractor may
or may not be able to work with
alternate port

Note: For further information on port flexibility and traffic diversion refer to Section 5 in Annexes 4, 5, 6 and Annex 7 and 8. For
short sea container operations the principles of diversion are very similar to those for RoRo traffic diversion and containers can
also be carried on RoRo ferries, although the reverse is not true, i.e. trailers cannot be shipped in container vessels

iv

APPENDIX I: Decision-Making for Vessel and Freight Diversion Scenarios

E: Vessel diversion to alternative port (Bulk mode)
Issues
Criteria to Satisfy
Customer requirements

Customers will either have an ondock handling, storage and

processing presence or bulk
product will be transported by
road or rail to the customers
inland site. Does the customer
have an alternative port facility or
can product be transported from
another port?

1. Vessel size

Draft, length and beam (width) of

vessel must fit at alternative port

2. Vessel configuration

Vessel may have its own ships

gear (cranes) for self-discharge
and loading, otherwise ship and
shore configurations generally
compatible for bulks
Bulk services not normally
operating in scheduled liner
service. Can bulk stock be
delivered to an alternative port
and can customers obtain
material from alternative port?
Berth or quay will not be a
problem but berth may require
specialised cargo handling
equipment (cranes, grabs,
conveyors etc.), under-cover or
tank storage and on dock
processing and refining facilities.
Such facilities may also need to
be owned and operated by the
same company as is based at the
disrupted port to maintain
commercial continuity
Port authorities and stevedores
will need to be informed

3. Schedule

4. Available berths and

cargo handling capacity

5. Information transfer and

control

6. Inland transport
resource and destinations
to serve (imports and
exports)

Is there sufficient inland transport

capacity available at alternative
port?

Comments / Compromises

If processing and refining customers

cannot receive raw material in the usual
way they may revert to buying ready
refined and processed material from
Continental suppliers and/or divert raw
material to their own Continental
processing sites. Other importers and
refiners could also pick up slack if they
have available capacity. Either way
there is a threat to the UK supply chain
and to the UKs own refining and
processing industry
First decision is whether ship will fit at
another UK port. It may be possible to
tranship product at a Continental port to
deliver in smaller quantities to an
alternative UK port (if smaller vessel is
available)
Liquid bulk tankers require specialised
discharge and loading infrastructure
and tank storage at any alternative port
/ berth
Bulk products (generally raw materials)
usually required to add to stock before
going into manufacturing process

Unless an appropriate alternative port /

berth with suitable storage and
processing facilities is available the
discharged material will need to be
transported by road or rail back to the
storage and processing plant at the
disrupted port, assuming the disruption
doesnt extend to the whole port
operation

Bulk products can be just a single

consignment and therefore the supply
and transfer of information and
subsequent stock control will be
relatively routine
Bulk food imports generally moved by
road. Extra trucks may be able to be
placed at alternative port to provide
temporary capacity

Note: For further information on port flexibility, bulk vessel and bulk traffic diversion refer to Section 5 in Annexes 5 and 6 and
Annex 9 and 10. For dry and liquid bulk movements the customer, the freight and the vessel are an integral package and
therefore vessel and freight diversion are inseparable

APPENDIX II: Selected Commodities Import Volumes

Meat and fish

Code
#0201
#0202
#0203
#0204
#0206
#0207
#0210

Description
Fresh or chilled beef
Frozen beef
Pigmeat
Mutton or lamb
Offal
Poultrymeat
Salted meat
Total tonnes k

Non EU tonnes % by port

Felix.
Soton.
3.3
1.6
2.6
44.0
23.2
5.8
2.2
0.5
0.1
0.7
58.5
25.5
29.5%

12.8%

T/port London Imming.

0.2
16.2
0.9
10.8
0.4
1.6
1.9
17.0
0.9
0.1
5.3
0.3
0.4
23.4
0.5
32.1
4.4
106.4
1.2
2.2%

53.6%

0.6%

L/pool Belfast
0.1

0.1

1.0
0.4
0.9

0.2

2.3

0.1%

1.2%

Non EU
EU
Total
tonnes tonnes tonnes
k
k
k
19.8
150.0
169.8
13.3
54.0
67.3
4.6
359.0
363.6
88.0
12.0
100.0
14.1
33.0
47.1
25.4
355.0
380.4
33.3
317.0
350.3
0.0
198.5 1,280.0 1,478.5

Other
ports

0.0% 100.0%

Non EU vs EU tonnes %

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Code
#0302
#0303
#0304
#0306
#0307

Description
Fresh or chilled fish
Frozen fish
Fish fillets, etc.
Crustaceans
Molluscs
Total tonnes k

Non EU tonnes % by port

Code
Description
#1511 Palm oil + fractions
#1513 Other oils
Total tonnes k
Non EU tonnes % by port

Felix.
Soton.
0.4
14.2
1.7
14.3
6.5
21.5
11.6
5.7
0.8
56.1
20.6
19.2%

7.1%

T/port
1.0
1.8
0.3
0.5
3.6
1.2%

London Imming.
39.5
2.2
4.2
0.8
82.0
2.8
1.8
0.8
0.4
6.6
127.9
2.3%

43.8%

L/pool

Belfast

0.3
0.8
0.1
1.0
2.2

0.7

0.8%

0.2%

0.7

Non EU
EU
Total
Other tonnes tonnes tonnes
ports
k
k
k
33.1
73.0
57.0
130.0
13.4
37.0
9.0
46.0
27.6
133.8
48.0
181.8
0.1
38.9
8.0
46.9
9.2
6.0
15.2
74.2
291.9
128.0
419.9
25.4% 100.0%

Code
Description
#1701 Cane or beet sugar
#1702 Other sugars
#1703 Molasses
Total tonnes k

69.5%

30.5% 100.0%

Ports
Felixstowe
Southampton
Thamesport
London
Immingham
Liverpool
Belfast
Other ports column includes reported UK fish landings at Scottish ports, e.g. Peterhead

Felix.
Soton.
0.7
0.1
0.7
0.1
0.2%

0.0%

T/port

London
78.6
20.9
0.0
99.5

0.0%

25.2%

Hull
206.1
17.5
223.6
56.7%

L/pool Belfast
62.8
4.1
2.0
1.6
64.8
5.7
16.4%

1.4%

Non EU
EU
Total
tonnes tonnes tonnes
k
k
k
352.3
64.0
416.3
42.1
22.0
64.1
0.0
394.4
86.0
480.4

Other
ports

0.0% 100.0%

Non EU vs EU tonnes %

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

86.6% 100.0%

Ports
Felixstowe
Southampton
Thamesport
London
Immingham
Liverpool
Belfast
Other ports: na

Non EU vs EU tonnes %

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

13.4%

82.1%

17.9% 100.0%

Ports
Felixstowe
Southampton
Thamesport
London
Hull
Liverpool
Belfast
Other ports

Felix.
Soton.
56.6
1.3
0.1
0.2
0.1
58.1
0.2

T/port London Imming.

0.1
918.4
19.2
vi
0.4
0.3
0.2
19.2
0.7
937.9
19.2

L/pool Belfast
10.5
1.9
189.2
28.1
201.6
28.1

Non EU
EU
Total
tonnes tonnes tonnes
k
k
k
1,004.8
418.0 1,422.8
4.0
453.0
457.0
168.2
405.2
130.0
535.2
168.2 1,414.0 1,001.0 2,415.0

Other
ports

APPENDIX II: Selected Commodities Import Volumes

Palm oil

Code
Description
#1511 Palm oil + fractions
#1513 Other oils
Total tonnes k
Non EU tonnes % by port

Felix.
Soton.
0.7
0.1
0.7
0.1
0.2%

0.0%

T/port

London
78.6
20.9
0.0
99.5

0.0%

25.2%

Hull
206.1
17.5
223.6

L/pool Belfast
62.8
4.1
2.0
1.6
64.8
5.7

56.7%

16.4%

1.4%

Non EU
EU
Total
tonnes tonnes tonnes
k
k
k
352.3
64.0
416.3
42.1
22.0
64.1
0.0
394.4
86.0
480.4

Other
ports

0.0% 100.0%

Non EU vs EU tonnes %

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

82.1%

17.9% 100.0%

Ports
Felixstowe
Southampton
Thamesport
London
Hull
Liverpool
Belfast
Other ports

Sugar

Code
Description
#1701 Cane or beet sugar
#1702 Other sugars
#1703 Molasses
Total tonnes k
Non EU tonnes % by port

Felix.
Soton.
56.6
1.3
0.1
0.2
0.1
58.1
0.2
4.1%

0.0%

T/port London Imming.

0.1
918.4
19.2
0.4
0.3
0.2
19.2
0.7
937.9
19.2
0.0%

66.3%

L/pool Belfast
10.5
1.9
189.2
28.1
201.6
28.1

1.4%

14.3%

2.0%

Non EU
EU
Total
tonnes tonnes tonnes
k
k
k
1,004.8
418.0 1,422.8
4.0
453.0
457.0
168.2
405.2
130.0
535.2
168.2 1,414.0 1,001.0 2,415.0

Other
ports

11.9% 100.0%

Non EU vs EU tonnes %
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Ports
Felixstowe
Southampton
Thamesport
London including Tilbury and Thames Refinery
Immingham
Liverpool
Belfast
Other ports (molasses) = Avonmouth, Hull, and Silloth

vii

58.6%

41.4% 100.0%

APPENDIX II: Selected Commodities Import Volumes

Vegetables and fruit

Code
#0701
#0702
#0703
#0704
#0705
#0706
#0707
#0708
#0709

Description
Felix. Soton. T/port London Imming. L/pool Belfast P/mouth
Potatoes
79.0
1.5
1.0
Tomatoes
0.4
0.1
6.8
Onions, etc.
45.7
1.4
1.4
18.3
1.5
Cabbage, etc
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.1
Lettuce, etc.
Carrots, etc
9.3
0.2
0.3
Cucumbers, etc
Peas,beans, etc.
1.3
0.1
0.9
Other vegetables
9.1
1.0
1.3
8.3
0.1
3.2
Total tonnes k 145.0
2.8
4.2
28.8
0.0
0.1
1.8
10.1

Non EU tonnes % by port 60.8%

1.2%

1.8%

12.1%

0.0%

0.0%

0.8%

Non EU EU
Total
Other tonnes tonnes tonnes
Dover ports
k
k
k
81.5 167.0
248.5
9.5
16.8 363.0
379.8
0.9
13.7
82.9 308.0
390.9
0.4
1.0 159.0
160.0
1.0
1.0 164.0
165.0
0.1
9.9
61.0
70.9
0.2
0.8
1.0 152.0
153.0
2.3
0.4
5.0
4.0
9.0
15.9
0.4
39.3 408.0
447.3
29.3
16.3
238.4 1,786.0 2,024.4

4.2% 12.3%

6.8% 100.0%

Non EU vs EU tonnes %

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Code
#0801
#0802
#0803
#0804
#0805
#0806
#0807
#0808
#0809
#0810

Description
Tba
Tba
Bananas
Dates, etc.
Citrus fruits
Grapes
Melons, etc.
Apples, etc.
Apricots, etc.
Berries, etc.
Total tonnes k

88.2% 100.0%

Ports
Felixstowe
Southampton
Thamesport
London
Immingham
Liverpool
Belfast
Portsmouth
Dover
Other ports, e.g. Harwich, Ipswich, Medway (Sheerness) and Ramsgate

Felix. Soton. T/port London Imming. L/pool Belfast P/mouth

26.8
21.7
109.6
114.8
5.3
66.5
8.7
4.2
357.6

0.1
0.1
0.8
1.8
0.1
0.7
0.1
0.6
4.3

2.2
0.8
7.6
19.2
5.8
14.5
0.7
1.2
52.0

139.8
61.5
198.8
80.8
66.2
122.4
17.1
9.7
696.3

Non EU tonnes % by port 16.8%

0.2%

2.4%

32.7%

0.1

0.1

0.1
0.1

7.1

2.1
0.5

0.2

9.2
0.1
0.6
17.1

0.0%

0.8%

0.1%

2.7

459.4
76.4
37.4
0.2
2.9

576.3

Non EU EU
Total
Other tonnes tonnes tonnes
Dover ports
k
k
k
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
206.3
69.7
904.3
85.0
989.3
41.8
2.0
204.5
35.0
239.5
8.0
29.6
391.9 276.0
667.9
9.3
32.6
268.0
79.0
347.0
7.5
0.1
87.9 110.0
197.9
0.3
5.2
219.3 372.0
591.3
2.5
1.3
30.5 104.0
134.5
6.2
0.2
22.7
94.0
116.7
281.9 140.7 2,129.1 1,155.0 3,284.1

27.1% 13.2%

6.6% 100.0%

Non EU vs EU tonnes %

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

11.8%

Ports
Felixstowe
Southampton
Thamesport
London
Immingham
Liverpool
Belfast
Portsmouth
Dover
Other ports, e.g. Harwich, Medway (Sheerness), Middlesbrough, Ramsgate

viii

64.8%

35.2% 100.0%

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Peter Baker, the founder and owner of PRB Associates, specialises in
operational, financial and market analysis in the ports and shipping sectors;
with working experience in the ports sector and in RoRo ferry operations.
In addition to a range of project commissions in the UK and internationally,
Peter has researched and produced the UK Short Sea Freight RoRo and
LoLo Capacity Analysis and Report every year since 2000 and for the first
time in 2009 produced an Irish equivalent. The report and database
information provide a detailed analysis and assessment of the capacity
provision and spread in the market, with comprehensive route, service,
vessel and port information contained in detailed appendices.
PRB Associates Limited specialises in providing shipping and transport consultancy and analysis
services for private and public sector organisations. Founded in 1998, PRB Associates has
successfully completed commissions for freight generators, freight transport service providers
(shipping lines and road transport operators), port operators and various public sector organisations.
Assignments have ranged from service analyses, feasibility studies, financial modelling and economic
impact studies, to market research and appraisal and national transport strategy formulation.
Andrew Morgan, the founder of Global 78, has extensive international
business and logistics experience gained in projects across many industrial
sectors, including food supply projects in Europe, Brazil and India. These
advisory and implementation projects have ranged in scope from agribusiness, through manufacturing and processing, to wholesale and retail
distribution in final consumer markets.
A Chartered Member of the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport
(UK), Andrew is the author of Making the Brazil Connection managing risk
in the international food supply chain and also co-author of the UKIBC
Report India Agri-Food Supply Chains: Overview and Opportunities.
Global 78 Limited is focused on helping commercial clients discover new perspectives for success in
local and international markets and for delivery of real bottom-line improvements. It also undertakes
research for public sector policy-making. Food supply chains are complex. Innovation, resilience and
sustainability are all vital elements for successful policy, strategy, and operations. The Global 78 team
therefore provides clients with quality research, specialist advice, and support for implementation.

CONTACT DETAILS
PRB Associates Limited
Royal Dock Chambers
Flour Square
Grimsby
NE Lincolnshire
DN31 3LW
United Kingdom

Global 78 Limited
1 Hayden Lane
Staverton
Cheltenham
Gloucestershire,
GL51 0SR
United Kingdom

t +44 (0)1472 353532

e peter.baker@prbassociates.co.uk
www.prbassociates.co.uk

t +44 (0)1242 681229

e amorgan@global78.co
www.global78.co

ix