Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 130889

June 6, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NORBERTO LORENO, FELIX LEAL, SERAFIN RASCON, JOHN EDWARD LEYSA, and LARRY
MOQUERIO,accused.
JOHN EDWARD LEYSA, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision1 dated February 3, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch
38, in Criminal Case No. 35871, finding appellants John Edward Leysa and Norberto Loreno guilty of
murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of
Igmedio Larupay jointly and solidarily the amount of P48,100 as actual damages and P50,000 as
civil indemnity, and to pay the costs.
The Information filed against Norberto Loreno, Felix Leal, Serafin Rascon, John Edward Leysa and
Larry Moquerio reads as follows:
That on or about December 26, 1990, in the Municipality of Lambunao, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with guns of different make, with
treachery and evident premeditation and with a decided purpose to kill, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot one Igmedio Larupay with the weapons
they were then provided inflicting upon the latter gunshot wound on the vital part of his body
which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
During their arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Armando Castor, a CVO member; Dr. Eusebio Magbanua,
the Rural Health physician who conducted the necropsy on deceased Igmedio Larupay; Sgt. Isidro
Palma, who arrested the accused; Pat. Carlos Pagayon, who identified the police blotter entries; and
Marina Larupay, wife of the victim, who testified on the expenses and damages she incurred as a
result of her husbands death.
ARMANDO CASTOR, testified that he was a member of the Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO)
in charge of peace and order in Lambunao, Iloilo City. On December 25, 1990, he and several others
were sent by Sgt. Isidro Palma to patrol the area of Barangay San Gregorio where a dance was to
be held to celebrate the eve of the barangay fiesta. Sgt. Palma was the Philippine Army detachment
commander at Barangay Tranghawan, Lambunao, Iloilo City.3

At about 1:30 A.M. on December 26, 1990, while witness Armando Castor and his companions were
about half a kilometer away from the dance floor, he heard a shot coming from the direction of the
place where the dance was being held. He and his companions proceeded to the place and there
they were informed by one Boding Lesada that it was Serafin Rascon who fired the shot. When they
saw Serafin Rascon sitting near the entrance of the dance floor, they approached him. Castors
group leader, Igmedio Larupay confiscated Serafin Rascons firearm. On their way back to their
detachment at Barangay Tranghawan, Rascon prevailed over Igmedio Larupay to return to the
dance hall and to settle the matter among themselves. Rascon and Larupay walked abreast with
Castor behind them, about one arm length from Rascon. Upon reaching the dance hail, Castor saw
Norberto Loreno and John Edward Leysa. Behind the two were Felix Leal and Larry Moquerio.
Loreno was armed with a pistolized .12 gauge short firearm while Leal had a .20 caliber short
firearm. Leysa and Moquerio also had short firearms but Castor did not recognize their make.
According to Castor, he saw both Loreno and Leysa raise their firearms and shoot at them. Castor
dropped to the ground as the shots were fired. He fired back but did not hit anyone. He noticed
Igmedio Larupay lying dead on the ground with his face up. He then retrieved Larupays .22 caliber
magnum revolver and other personal belongings.
DR. EUSEBIO MAGBANUA testified that he conducted the necropsy on the body of the victim,
Igmedio Larupay, and found a single gunshot wound, left mid-infra clovecular, 1 1/4 inch by 1 1/4
inch in circumference. There was no exit wound. He described the cause of death of Igmedio
Larupay as cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to a gunshot wound. 4
The suspects were arrested by the local CVO and Sgt. Palma. 5
In their testimonies, accused NORBERTO LORENO,6 FELIX LEAL,7 SERAFIN RASCON,8 and
LARRY MOQUERIO9admitted they were in the dance hall when they heard a gunshot. They then
heard from the people around that Igmedio Larupay was shot. They denied they were together at the
dance, had firearms, and participated in the shooting.
Appellant JOHN EDWARD LEYSA in his testimony denied he was in the dance hall when the
incident happened. According to him, at around 5:00 P.M., December 25, 1990, he went to Barangay
Walang to attend the wake of his aunt. He was there until December 26, 1990. Barangay Walang is
about one kilometer away from Barangay San Gregorio.10
On February 3, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding Norberto Loreno and John Edward
Leysa guilty of murder. Its dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, Norberto Loreno and John Edward Leysa, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentence each of them to suffer a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Further, both accused, jointly and solidarily, are ordered to pay the heirs of Igmedio Larupay
the sum of P48,100.00 as actual damages and a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 by reason of
the death of Igmedio Larupay.
However, for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt, accused, Felix Leal, Larry
Moquerio and Serafin Rascon, are hereby acquitted for the crime charged.
In view of herein conviction, the property bond of accused, Norberto Loreno and John
Edward Leysa, are cancelled. No bail is available to both accused pending the finality of this
judgment. Both shall remain in detention.

Since accused, Felix Leal, Larry Moquerio and Serafin Rascon, are acquitted of the crime
charged, their respective property bonds are automatically cancelled. The Clerk of Court is
ordered to return the property bonds to their bondsmen duly receipted.
Cost against the accused, Norberto Loreno and John Edward Leysa.
SO ORDERED.11
Both Loreno and Leysa appealed their convictions. However, Norberto Loreno died on July 24, 1997.
Hence, this appeal now concerns only appellant Leysa.
In his Brief, appellant alleges the following errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE LONE TESTIMONY OF
ARMANDO CASTOR.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT JOHN
EDWARD LEYSA.
Simply, the issues concern is the credibility of the witness for the prosecution and the sufficiency of
the evidence to convict appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant argues that the testimony of Armando Castor, the lone eyewitness, should not be given
credence since he did not actually see who shot the victim. He also assails Armandos credibility
because he did not report the crime to authorities promptly. Appellant points out that the victim
suffered only one gunshot wound and that the other witnesses testified that they only heard one
shot. But witness Armando Castor claimed that both Norberto Loreno and appellant fired their guns
at the victim. Further, appellant asserts that Norberto Loreno admitted sole responsibility for the
crime and exonerated appellant of any liability in a statement executed on March 25, 1997.12
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the lone eyewitness was
credible and his testimony should be accorded full faith and credit. The OSG also claims that the
affidavit executed by Norberto Loreno that became the basis for a motion for new trial filed on May
27, 1997,13 was not admissible in favor of appellant.
The well-settled rule is that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the appellate court will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court 14 since the latter is in a better position to decide this
issue.15 However, this rule is not absolute. It is subject to exceptions. One concerns a situation where
the judge who penned the decision did not personally hear the evidence for the prosecution. 16 In the
present case, Judge David Alfeche, Jr., the ponente,only inherited this case from Judge Amelita K.
Del Rosario who conducted the trial and heard the witnesses testify.
Another exception to the general rule is where substantial facts and circumstances have been
overlooked which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion or alter the result of the
case.17 In this case, we find that based on the evidence on record, the trial court misapprehended
certain facts and failed to consider significant portions of the testimony of the witnesses.
We shall now detail these misapprehended or neglected facts adduced during the trial that are, in
our view, favorable to appellants cause. First, the trial court failed to consider Armando Castors
testimony that he did not actually see who shot the victim. According to Armando:

Q:

You did not actually see them fire?

A:
No, sir. I did not actually see as to who of them hit the victim because I was already
on the ground face down.18
This at once creates an ambiguity and causes a doubt as to who really killed the victim. This doubt is
exacerbated by the physical evidence19 showing that the victim suffered only one gunshot wound.
This physical evidence reveals that only one shot resulted in the death of Igmedio Larupay. This
evidence contradicts the testimony of Armando Castor to the effect that both Loreno and Leysa fired
their guns. Moreover, the prosecution failed to show that spent bullets were found near the crime
scene that would indicate that more than one shot were fired at the victim. It follows that only one
gun and one gunman firing at the victim killed him with one bullet. Who this gunman is - whether it is
appellant Leysa or his co-accused Norberto Loreno - has not been ascertained. Nor could it now be
determined, beyond a shadow of a doubt.
Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence, the physical
evidence, being paramount, prevails.20 We are unable to give credence to the testimony of Armando
Castor that he saw both Loreno and Leysa fire their respective weapons when he himself said he
was already face down on the ground when the two were about to fire. Patently, we are persuaded
that he did not really see who shot the victim.
As the evidence now stands, we are left to surmise whether Norberto Loreno or appellant Leysa
fired the bullet that caused the death of the victim, Igmedio Larupay. Unfortunately, nothing on record
could help us ascertain who of the two is legally responsible for Larupays death. For while in theory,
conspiracy could tie both men to the crime, we find that the trial courts finding of conspiracy is not
supported by the evidence on record. Conspiracy must be proved. It cannot be surmised that
conspiracy existed just because Norberto Loreno and appellant Leysa were both seen raising their
arms and aiming at the victim. Conspiracy as a basis for conviction of appellant should be proved in
the same manner as the criminal act.21 Althought direct proof is not essential,22 conspiracy must be
shown to exist as clearly as the commission of the offense itself. It is a fundamental rule that a
charge of conspiracy must be proven, just like any other criminal accusation, "independently and
beyond reasonable doubt."23 Mere simultaneous aiming by appellant and his co-accused at the
victim with their firearms does not by itself demonstrate concurrence of will or unity of action or
purpose that could be a basis for their collective responsibility.24
The evidence of the prosecution only proves with certainty that appellant Leysa was present when
the victim was killed. It does not prove beyond doubt who killed him. There is paucity of evidence
that indicate, beyond a scintilla of a doubt, that appellant and Norberto Loreno shared a common
design and a unity of purpose in killing Igmedio so as to make both responsible by reason of a
conspiracy. There is even doubt whether both did fire at the victim. For the victim was hit only once;
he suffered only one bullet wound. Accordingly, acquittal of John Edward Leysa is in order. His
responsibility for the death of Igmedio Larupay has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 38, in Criminal
Case No. 35871, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant JOHN EDWARD LEYSA
is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Director of Prisons is ordered to release appellant JOHN EDWARD LEYSA, unless there are
other lawful reasons for his confinement, and to furnish the Court, within 10 days from notice, proof
of compliance with this order.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo*, Mendoza, De Leon, Jr., and Corona, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 146635 December 14, 2005
MARCELO MACALINAO, Substituted by ESPERANZA MACALINAO and ANTONIO
MACALINAO, Petitioners,
vs.
EDDIE MEDECIELO ONG and GENOVEVO SEBASTIAN, Respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals dated 31 May 2000 and 7 September 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
52963. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the complaint for
damages filed by Marcelo Macalinao (Macalinao) against Eddie Medecielo Ong (Ong) and
Genovevo Sebastian (Sebastian) for insufficiency of evidence.
The antecedent facts follow.
Macalinao and Ong were employed as utility man and driver, respectively, at the Genetron
International Marketing (Genetron), a single proprietorship owned and operated by Sebastian. On 25
April 1992, Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and two truck helpers to deliver a heavy piece of
machinerya reactor/motor for mixing chemicals, to Sebastians manufacturing plant in Angat,
Bulacan. While in the process of complying with the order, the vehicle driven by Ong, Genetrons
Isuzu Elf truck with plate no. PMP-106 hit and bumped the front portion of a private jeepney with
plate no. DAF-922 along Caypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan at around 11:20 in the morning. 3
Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the passengers sustained physical injuries as a
consequence of the collision.4 Macalinao incurred the most serious injuries
among the passengers of the truck. He was initially brought to the Sta. Maria District Hospital for first
aid treatment but in view of the severity of his condition, he was transferred to the Philippine
Orthopedic Center at the instance of Sebastian. He was again moved to the Capitol Medical Center
by his parents, petitioners herein, for medical reasons and later to the Philippine General Hospital for
financial considerations.5
Macalinaos body was paralyzed and immobilized from the neck down as a result of the accident and
per doctors advice, his foot was amputated. He also suffered from bed sores and infection. His
immedicable condition, coupled with the doctors recommendation, led his family to bring him home
where he died on 7 November 1992.6

Before he died, Macalinao was able to file an action for damages against both Ong and Sebastian
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81. 7 After his death, Macalinao was
substituted by his parents in the action.8 A criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting to serious physical injuries9 had also been instituted earlier against Ong but for reasons
which do not appear in the records of this case, trial thereon did not ensue. 10
After trial in the civil action, the RTC held that based on the evidence, Ong drove the Isuzu truck in a
reckless and imprudent manner thereby causing the same to hit the private jeepney. It observed that
while respondents claimed that Ong was driving cautiously and prudently at the time of the mishap,
no evidence was presented to substantiate the claim. 11 It declared Ong negligent and at the same
time, it held that Sebastian failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of Ong. Consequently, the trial court pronounced the two of them jointly liable to pay
actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as civil indemnity for Macalinaos death. The trial
court subsequently increased the monetary award12 upon petitioners motion for reconsideration
thereof.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court. It held that the evidence
presented by petitioners was woefully scant to support a verdict of negligence against Ong. And
since respondents liability hinged squarely on proof of Ongs negligence, neither of them could be
held liable for damages to petitioners.13
Aggrieved at the ruling, petitioners elevated the case to this Court. They herein contend that contrary
to the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals, the evidence conclusively establish fault or
negligence on the part of Ong and justify the award of damages in their favor.
The petition is meritorious.
The issue of negligence is factual and, in quasi-delicts, crucial in the award of damages. 14 In the
case at bar, the crux of the controversy is the sufficiency of the evidence presented to support a
finding of negligence against Ong. Given the contradictory conclusions of the trial court and the
appellate court on this issue, this Court is impelled to ascertain for itself which court made the
correct determination.
While as a rule factual findings of the Court of Appeals are deemed conclusive in cases brought to
us on appeal, we have also consistently pronounced that we may review its findings of fact in the
following instances, among others:
(i) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts; (ii) when
the factual findings are conflicting; (iii) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (iv) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth
by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. 15
Said exceptions obtain in this case thus, a departure from the application of the general rule is
warranted.
In reversing the trial court and absolving respondents from liability, the appellate court made the
following pronouncement:

The evidence presented is woefully scant. The pictures of the collision afford no basis for concluding
that it was the fault of the defendant driver, or that he was driving recklessly. The police report
contains no findings as to the road conditions, estimates of the relative speed of the vehicles, or their
exact position at the time of the accident. And even so, entries in the police blotter should not be
given significance or probative value as they do not constitute conclusive proof of the truth thereof.
Nor were eyewitnesses presented, not even affidavits or statements to give any indication as to what
actually happened. The police investigators findings are sketchy at best, with only the phrase "Isuzu
lost control" as his opinion, with no explanation how he reached it. Civil cases require evidence of a
lesser degree than criminal cases, but one sentence by one who did not even witness an event, is
not conclusive proof.
...
There was only the fact of the collision before the trial court. The attendant circumstances were not
established, and no fault could be determined using the evidence, both testimonial and documentary
presented.16
Contrary to the above conclusion of the appellate court, the evidence on record coupled with the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur sufficiently establishes Ongs negligence.
We focus first on the evidence presented before the trial court.
The photographs of the accident which the appellate court cavalierly brushed aside as insignificant
deserve substantial cogitation. In Jose v. Court of Appeals,17 we upheld the trial courts reliance on
photographs of the accident as opposed to a partys obviously biased testimony. In so doing, we
stated:
In criminal cases such as murder or rape where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty,
this Court has, in many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth.
In People v. Vasquez,18where the physical evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we ruled that the physical evidence should prevail. 19
Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth which ranks high in our hierarchy
of trustworthy evidence.20
In this case, while there is a dearth of testimonial evidence to enlighten us about what actually
happened, photographs21 depicting the relative positions of the vehicles immediately after the
accident took place do exist. It is well established that photographs, when duly verified and shown by
extrinsic evidence to be faithful representations of the subject as of the time in question, are, in the
discretion of the trial court, admissible in evidence as aids in arriving at an understanding of the
evidence, the situation or condition of objects or premises or the circumstances of an accident. 22
According to American courts, photographs are admissible in evidence in motor vehicle accident
cases when they appear to have been accurately taken and are proved to be a faithful and clear
representation of the subject, which cannot itself be produced, and are of such nature as to throw
light upon a disputed point.23 Before a photograph may be admitted in evidence, however, its
accuracy or correctness must be proved, and it must be authenticated or verified 24 first. In the case
at bar, the photographer testified in open court and properly identified the pictures as the ones he
took at the scene of the accident.25

An examination of said photographs clearly shows that the road where the mishap occurred is
marked by a line at the center separating the right from the left lane. Based on the motorists right of
way rule, the Isuzu truck which was headed towards Norzagaray, Bulacan26 should have been
occupying the left lane while the private jeepney which was traversing the road to the town proper of
Sta. Maria, Bulacan27 should have been in the right lane. Exhibits "L" and "L-4" among the
photographs, however, reveal that in the aftermath of the collision, the Isuzu truck usurped the
opposite lane to such an extent that only its right rear wheel remained in the left lane, a few inches
from the demarcation line. Its two front wheels and left rear wheel were planted squarely on the
private jeepneys lane and the Isuzu truck had rotated such that its front no longer pointed towards
Norzagaray but partially faced the town proper of Sta. Maria instead.
While ending up at the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile collisions, the
position of the two vehicles gives rise to the conclusion that it was the Isuzu truck which hit the
private jeepney rather than the other way around. The smashed front of the Isuzu truck is pressed
against the private jeepneys left front portion near the drivers side. The private jeepney is
positioned diagonally in the right lane; its front at the rightmost corner of the road while its rear
remained a few feet from the demarcation line. Based on the angle at which it stopped, the private
jeepney obviously swerved to the right in an unsuccessful effort to avoid the Isuzu truck. This would
support the statement of the police investigator that the Isuzu truck lost control 28 and hit the left front
portion of the private jeepney.29 It would also explain why the driver of the private jeepney died
immediately after being brought to the hospital,30 since in such a scenario, the brunt of the collision
logically bore down on him.
Moreover, the unequal size and weight of the two vehicles would make it improbable for the
relatively lighter private jeepney to have stricken the heavier truck with such force as to push the
latter to the formers side of the road. Had that been the case, the two vehicles would have ended up
crushed together at the center of the road or at the Isuzu trucks lane instead of rolling to a stop at
the private jeepneys lane.
Another piece of evidence which supports a finding of negligence against Ong is the police report of
the incident denoted as Entry No. 04-229 of the Sta. Maria Police Station. The report states that the
Isuzu truck was the one which hit the left front portion of the private jeepney.31 This piece of evidence
was disregarded by the Court of Appeals on the ground that entries in police blotters should not be
given significance or probative value as they do not constitute conclusive proof of the truth thereof.
While true in most instances, it must still be remembered that although police blotters are of little
probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent
evidence to refute the facts stated therein.32 Entries in police records made by a police officer in the
performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein
stated,33 and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent
evidence.34
In this case, the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence and the person who
made the entries thereon was likewise presented in court. On the other hand, aside from a blanket
allegation that the driver of the other vehicle was the one at fault, respondents did not present any
evidence to back up their charge and show that the conclusion of the police investigator was false.
Given the paucity of details in the report, the investigators observation could have been easily
refuted and overturned by respondents through the simple expedient of supplying the missing facts
and showing to the satisfaction of the
court that the Isuzu truck was blameless in the incident. Ong was driving the truck while the two
other truck helpers also survived the accident. Any or all of them could have given their testimony to

shed light on what actually transpired, yet not one of them was presented to substantiate the claim
that Ong was not negligent.
Since respondents failed to refute the contents of the police blotter, the statement therein that the
Isuzu truck hit the private jeepney and not the other way around is deemed established. The prima
facie nature of the police report ensures that if it remains unexplained or uncontradicted, it will be
sufficient to establish the facts posited therein.35
While not constituting direct proof of Ongs negligence, the foregoing pieces of evidence justify the
application of res ipsa loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself."36
Res ipsa loquitur recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof,
thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. 37 It permits the plaintiff to
present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the
doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the
burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part. 38
The doctrine can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available.39 This is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to
allege negligence in general terms and rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order
to establish negligence.40 The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the
chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the
defendant but inaccessible to the injured person. 41
In this case, Macalinao could no longer testify as to the cause of the accident since he is dead.
Petitioners, while substituting their son as plaintiff, have no actual knowledge
about the event since they were not present at the crucial moment. The driver of the private jeepney
who could have shed light on the circumstances is likewise dead. The only ones left with knowledge
about the cause of the mishap are the two truck helpers who survived, both employees of Sebastian,
and Ong, who is not only Sebastians previous employee but his co-respondent in this case as well.
In the circumstances, evidence as to the true cause of the accident is, for all intents and purposes,
accessible to respondents but not to petitioners. The witnesses left are unlikely to divulge to
petitioners what they knew about the cause of the accident if the same militates against the interest
of their employer. This justifies the invocation of the doctrine.
Under local jurisprudence, the following are the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur:
(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones
negligence;
(2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
(3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. 42
We are convinced that all the above requisites are present in the case at bar.

No two motor vehicles traversing opposite lanes will collide as a matter of course unless someone is
negligent, thus, the first requisite for the application of the doctrine is present. Ong was driving the
Isuzu truck which, from the evidence adduced, appears to have precipitated the collision with the
private jeepney. Driving the Isuzu truck gave Ong exclusive management and control over it, a fact
which shows that the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence could be attributed
to Macalinao relative to the happening of the accident since he was merely a passenger in the Isuzu
truck. Respondents allegation that Macalinao was guilty of contributory negligence for failing to take
the necessary precautions to ensure his safety while onboard the truck 43 is too specious for belief
particularly as respondents did not even present any evidence to prove such allegation. The last
requisite is, therefore, likewise present.
There exists a fourth requisite under American jurisprudence, that is, that the defendant fails to offer
any explanation tending to show that the injury was caused by his or her want of due care. 44 In this
case, while respondents claimed that Ong drove cautiously and prudently during the time in
question, no evidence was proffered to substantiate the same. In fact, Ong did not bother to testify to
explain his actuations and to show that he exercised due care when the accident happened, so even
this requisite is fulfilled.
All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable
presumption or inference of Ongs negligence arises. In consonance with the effect of the doctrine,
the burden of proving due care at the time in question shifts to respondents. Unfortunately, as
previously discussed, aside from blanket allegations that Ong exercised prudence and due care
while driving on the day of the accident, respondents proffered no other proof. As a consequence,
the prima facie finding of negligence against Ong, remaining unexplained and/or uncontradicted, is
deemed established. This in turn warrants a finding that Ong is liable for damages to petitioners.
Such liability of Ong is solidary with Sebastian pursuant to Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is
obliged to pay for the damage done . . . .
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
...
Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
...
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees.45 To avoid liability
for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by

presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his employee.46
In an attempt to exculpate himself from liability, Sebastian claimed that he exercised due care in
selecting Ong as a driver. Before he hired Ong, he allegedly required him to produce police and NBI
clearances and he took into account the recommendations of Ongs previous employer and
friends.47 Sebastian also stressed that he instructed Ong to drive slowly and carefully and to take
necessary precautions.48 He likewise admonished Ong to be careful after the latter had some minor
accidents in the parking area.49
However, Sebastians statements are not sufficient to prove that he exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection of Ong. His testimony is self-serving and devoid of corroboration as
he did not bother to support the same with document evidence. Moreover, Sebastian could not even
remember whether the recommendation from Ongs previous employer was made verbally or in
writing.50
On the other hand, due diligence in supervision requires the formulation of rules and regulations for
the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation
and monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules. 51 Admonitions to drive carefully without the
corresponding guidelines and monitoring of the employee do not satisfy the due diligence required
by law either.
In short, Sebastians claims fall short of what is required by law to overcome the presumption of
negligence in the selection and supervision of his employee. The trial court therefore correctly held
him solidarily liable with Ong to petitioners.
In an obvious ploy to relieve himself from liability should the appellate courts decision be reversed,
Sebastian averred that Macalinao is not entitled to damages. He anchored his claim on the novel
argument that the provisions of Art. 2180 apply only when the injured party is a third person but it
has no application to an employee like Macalinao.52 He likewise postulated that recovery from the
Social Security System, State Insurance Fund, Employees Compensation Commission, and the
Philippine Medical Care Act, the government agencies with which petitioners filed a claim in view of
Macalinaos injury and subsequent death, preclude pursuing alternate recourse or recovering from
other sources until the former claims have been rejected.53
Sebastian is grasping at straws. Art. 2180 makes no distinction whatsoever whether the claimant is
an employee or a third person relative to the employer. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.54
Moreover, petitioners claim against Sebastian is not based upon the fact of Macalinaos previous
employment with him but on the solidary liability of the latter for the negligent act of one of his
employees. Such is not precluded by prior claims with the government agencies enumerated. One is
based on compulsory coverage of government benefits while the other is based on a cause of action
provided by law.
Additionally, respondents postulated that since it was Macalinao who sustained physical injuries and
died, he was the one who suffered pain, not petitioners so moral damages are not recoverable in this
case.55
The relatives of the victim who incurred physical injuries in a quasi-delict are not proscribed from
recovering moral damages in meritorious cases. To hold otherwise would give rise to the ridiculous
scenario where a defendant may be compelled to pay moral damages in a quasi-delict causing

physical injuries but will be relieved from doing so should those same injuries cause the victims
death.
In the case of Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon,56 we held that in quasi-delicts:
. . . . the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The
intensity of the pain experienced by therelatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of
affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the
offender.57 (Emphasis Supplied.)
The trial court awarded moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00 but since prevailing
jurisprudence has fixed the same at P50,000.00,58 there is a need to increase the award to reflect the
recent rulings.
Lastly, respondents claim that exemplary damages is not warranted in this case. Under the law,
exemplary damages may be granted in quasi-delicts if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.59 Gross negligence has been defined as negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons
may be affected.60
Ongs gross negligence in driving the Isuzu truck precipitated the accident. This is lucidly portrayed
in the photographs on record and it justifies the award of exemplary damages in petitioners favor.
However, the trial courts award of P10,000.00 is insufficient, thus the Court deems it proper to
increase the award to P25,000.00 under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May 2000,
as well as itsResolution dated 7 September 2000, are hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 dated 12 April 1996 as amended by the Order dated
23 May 1996 is hereby REINSTATED with the modifications that the award for moral damages is
increased to P50,000.00 to conform with prevailing jurisprudence and
the award for exemplary damages is increased to P25,000.00. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice

Footnotes
Penned by Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now the Court Administrator of the
Supreme Court), concurred in by Associate Justices Bernardo Ll. Salas and Edgardo P.
Cruz; Rollo, pp. 104-113.
1

Id. at 126-127.

RTC Records, pp. 333, 336.

Id. at 336.

Ibid.

Id. at 336-337.

Id. at 7-10.

Id. at 333.

Id. at 182.

10

TSN, 14 April 1993, pp. 15-17.

RTC Records, p. 338.

11

Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Eddie

Medecielo Ong and Genovevo Sebastian doing business under the name and style
Genetron International Marketing to jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the following
amounts:
12

1. The total amount of P109,354.33 for medical and hospitalization expenses;

2. The amount of P11,000.00 for funeral and burial expenses;
3. The amount of P91,200.00 for loss of earning capacity;
4. The amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for death;
5. The amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages; and
6. The sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
13

Rollo, pp. 110-112.

Pleyto and Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Lomboy, G.R. No. 148737, 16 June 2004, 432
SCRA 329.
14

Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 433 Phil. 258 (2003) citing Twin Towers Condominium Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123552, 27 February 2003.
15

16

Rollo, pp. 110-111.

17

379 Phil. 30 (2000).

18

280 SCRA 160 (1997).

19

Supra note 17.

See Aradillos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135619. 15 January 2004, 419 SCRA 514;
People v. Bonifacio, 426 Phil. 511 (2002); People v. Marquina, 426 Phil. 46 (2002); Tangan v.
Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 139 (2002); People v. Whisenhunt, 420 Phil. 677 (2001); People
v. Ubaldo, 419 Phil. 718 (2001); People v. Palijon, 397 Phil. 545 (2000); People v. Candare,
388 Phil. 1010 (2000); People v. Roche, 386 Phil. 287 (2000); People v. Arafiles, 282 Phil. 59
(2000); Jose v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17.
20

21

Exhibits "L" to "L-4", RTC Records, pp. 205-209.

Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. VII citing Aldanese
v. Salutillo, 47 Phil 548.
22

Andersen v. Bee Line, Inc. 1 N.Y. 2d 169, 151 N.Y. S. 2d 633, 134 N.E. 2d 457 (1956);
Hawes v. Atlantic Refining Co., 236 N.C. 643, 74 S.F. 2d 17 (1953), cited in 8 Am Jur 2d
1287.
23

24

8 Am Jur 2d 1287.

25

TSN, 16 July 1993, p. 4.

26

TSN, 19 May 1993, p. 3.

27

Id. at 2.

28

Supra note 26.

29

RTC Records, p. 181.

30

Supra note 26 at 4.

31

Supra notes 26 and 28.

32

Lao v. Standard Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 140023, 14 August 2003, 409 SCRA 43.

33

Ibid. Sec. 44, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence.

Lao v. Standard Insurance Co. Inc., supra note 32 citing U.S. v. Que Ping, 40 Phil. 17, 19
(1919).
34

Cometa v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1187 (1999) citing People v. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703,
720 (1998).
35

36

Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1198 (1999).

Ludo and Luym Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125483 1 February 2001, 351
SCRA 35.
37

38

Ramos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 36.

Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-73998, 14 November 1988, 167 SCRA
376.
39

40

D.M. Consunji v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, 20 April 2001, 357 SCRA 249.

41

Ibid.

42

Ramos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 36.

43

Rollo, p. 193.

44

Supra note 23 at 8.

Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. C & A Construction, Inc. G.R. No. 156034, 1 October 2003,
412 SCRA 524.
45

LRTA v. Natividad, 445 Phil. 31 (2003); Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 435
Phil. 129 (2002) citing Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, G.R. No. 79050-51, 14
November 1989, 179 SCRA 384; Umali v. Bacani, G.R. No. L-40570, 30 January 1976, 69
SCRA 263.
46

47

TSN, 31 January 1995, pp. 5-6, 10-14.

48

Id at 6.

49

Id. at 14.

50

Id. at 10.

51

Fabre v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 774 (1996).

52

Rollo, pp. 193, 200-202.

53

Id. at 201-202.

54

Recana v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123850, 5 January 2001, 349 SCRA 24.

55

Rollo, pp. 202-203.

56

G.R. No. 160709, 23 February 2005, 452 SCRA 285.

57

Ibid citing Cesar Sangco, Torts and Damages, 1994 ed., p. 986.

Id. citing Pestao v. Sps. Sumayang, G.R. No. 139875, 4 December 2000, 346 SCRA 870,
879.
58

59

Art. 2231, Civil Code.

Fernando v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96183, 19 August 1992, 212 SCRA

680 citing Ballantines Law Dictionary 3rd ed. p. 537.
60

Footnotes
*

Acting Chief Justice. Chairman.

Records, pp. 184-193.

Records, pp. 1-2.

TSN, July 18, 1991, pp. 8-30; August 7, 1991, pp. 2-10.

TSN, July 17, 1991, pp. 5-6.

TSN, November 6, 1991, pp. 5-28.

TSN, October 25, 1991, pp. 3-16.

TSN, August 28, 1991, pp. 17-26.

TSN, September 19, 1991, pp. 18-35.

TSN, August 28, 1991, pp. 2-16.

10

Supra, note 8 at 3-17.

11

Records, pp. 192-193.

Rollo, p. 38. The statement was written in the Ilonggo dialect and was translated to English
in an affidavit dated April 10, 1997 (See Rollo, p. 39). It was not among the evidence
presented during the trial as it was executed only after Norberto Loreno and appellant John
Edward Leysa had already been convicted and started serving their prison sentence.
12

13

This was denied by this Court in an order dated September 1, 1997.

14

People vs. Balano, et al., G.R. No. 116721, 272 SCRA 782, 787 (1997).

15

People vs. Maalat, G.R. No. 109814, 275 SCRA 206, 214 (1997).

16

People vs. Llaguno, et al., G.R. No. 91262, 285 SCRA 124, 136 (1998).

People vs. Pacina, G.R. No. 123150, 338 SCRA 195, 207 (2000); People vs. Ortiz, G.R.
No. 111713, 266 SCRA 641, 653 (1997).
17

18

TSN, August 7, 1991, p. 3.

19

Records, p. 5.

20

People vs. Uycoque, G.R. No. 107495, 246 SCRA 769, 779 (1995).

21

People vs. Ferras, et al., G.R. No. 119495, 289 SCRA 94, 107 (1998).

22

People vs. Maluenda, et al., G.R. No. 115351, 288 SCRA 225, 251 (1998).

23

Dans, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 127073, 285 SCRA 504, 533 (1998).

24

People vs. Quitlong, et al., G.R. No. 121562, 292 SCRA 360, 381 (1998).