Accesing Embodied Object Representations1

Psychological Bulletin
Accessing Embodied Object Representations From Vision:

A Review
Heath Matheson, Nicole White, and Patricia McMullen
Online First Publication, October 13, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/bul0000001
CITATION
Matheson, H., White, N., & McMullen, P. (2014, October 13). Accessing Embodied Object
Representations From Vision: A Review. Psychological Bulletin. Advance online publication.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/bul0000001
Psychological Bulletin
2014, Vol. 141, No. 1, 000
2014 American Psychological Association

0033-2909/14/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/bul0000001
Accessing Embodied Object Representations From Vision: A Review

Heath Matheson
Nicole White
Dalhousie University
University of Toronto
Patricia McMullen
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Dalhousie University
Theories of embodied cognition (EC) propose that object concepts are represented by reactivations of
sensorimotor experiences of different objects. Abundant research from linguistic paradigms provides
support for the notion that sensorimotor simulations are involved in cognitive tasks like comprehension.
However, it is unclear whether object concepts, as accessed from the visual presentation of objects, are
embodied. In the present article we review a large body of visual cognitive research that addresses 5 main
predictions of the theory of EC. First, EC accounts predict that visual presentation of manipulable objects,
but not nonmanipulable objects, should activate motor representations. Second, EC predicts that sensorimotor activity is necessary to perform visual cognitive tasks such as object naming. Third, EC posits
the existence of distinct neural ensembles that integrate information from action and vision. Fourth, EC
predicts that relationships between visual and motor activity change throughout development. Fifth, EC
predicts that the visual presentation of objects or actions should prime performance cross-modally. We
summarize findings from neuroimaging, neuropsychology, neurophysiology, development, and behavioral paradigms. We show that while much of the research published so far demonstrates that there is a
relationship between visual and motoric representations, there is no evidence supporting a strong form
of EC. We conclude that sensorimotor simulations may not be required to perform visual cognitive tasks
and highlight a number of directions for future research that could provide strong support for EC in visual
cognitive paradigms.
Keywords: visual object recognition, vision and action, theory of embodied cognition
out by the brain can be understood as algorithms that operate on

amodal representations. Therefore, the cognitive systems representations are stored as abstract symbols. This property allows
them to be implemented in any mediumincluding, of course, the
very thing from which they were inspired: computers.
However, these models tend to view the production of action as
the outcome of cognitive processes, not central to them. Recognition of the influence of action on cognition has led to dissatisfaction with amodal theories. Importantly, theories of embodied cognition (EC) provide a powerful alternative for understanding the
functional relationships between vision and action. Though there is
no single unified theory of embodied cognition, current proposals
assume that sensorimotor experiences constrain and shape cognitive processes (see Garbarini & Adenzato, 2004). As such, abstract
symbol manipulation in the brains computational centers does not
define cognition; rather, cognition depends on the human bodies
that constrain it, the brain that implements it, and the environment
in which it takes place. At their roots, theories of embodied
cognition argue that cognition is better understood as a biological
system constrained by experience.
Since the cognitive revolution of the 1960s, informationprocessing theories have dominated experimental psychology, providing models for understanding human cognition and shaping the
disciplines ideas about what constitutes mental processes. These
ideas have their roots in computational metaphors (e.g., the mind
as software executed in the brains hardware). Whether explicitly
or implicitly, most theories in cognitive psychology assume that
the brain is like a computer, processing sensory input with symbolic algorithms and producing a meaningful output (i.e., behavior). These ideas are perhaps most strongly reflected in the seminal
works of Fodor (1983) and Marr (2010). Classic applications of
this framework have resulted in models of cognitive processing
that are largely modular, with different processes specialized for
particular types of information and transforming it in particular
ways. An important feature of these theories is the notion that the
sensorimotor systems used to initially perceive the world are not
used to represent the world; that is, the cognitive processes carried
Heath Matheson, Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Dalhousie University; Nicole White, Department of Psychology, University of
Toronto; Patricia McMullen, Department of Psychology and Neuroscience,
Dalhousie University.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Heath
Matheson, Department of Psychology, Dalhousie University, Life Sciences
Center, Halifax, Nova Scotia, B3H 4J1. E-mail: heathmatheson@dal.ca
The Embodied Cognition Hypothesis

Many philosophers and experimental researchers have used the
term embodied cognition to frame their questions, though there is
great diversity in how this term is used. In a comprehensive review
of the concept, Shapiro (2011) defined three distinct categories of
1
MATHESON, WHITE, AND MCMULLEN
EC hypotheses.1 The category that we focus on here is the conceptualization hypothesis (Shapiro, 2011). According to researchers endorsing this hypothesis, cognitive processes are not only
constrained by the body and its modal sensory systems, but cognitionidentifying objects, reasoning about people and places,
solving emotional problems and planning for the futurealso
comprises reactivating the same sensory and motor regions involved in perception. According to this view of embodied cognition, to know that an object lying on the table is a hammer, we
must simulate (or reactivate) our experiences with a hammer
what it looks like, the sounds it makes, how to use it. Additionally,
in the future, when thinking about a hammer, we use these simulations as the basis of cognitive processing. Indeed, all of our
thoughts about hammers will rely on these modality-specific simulations in some way. By extension (and perhaps this is the most
radical consequence of the conceptualization hypothesis), even our
abstract thoughts rely on these simulationsthoughts about hammering our argument home or what it means to hammer away at
a task (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). It is the conceptualization
hypothesis that has attracted the most attention in experimental
cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience and underlies the
present review.
Why Theories of Embodied Cognition?

Before discussing models of EC, it is worth considering why
they hold such appeal for cognitive psychologists. There are at
least two advantages to the conceptualization hypothesis when
compared to more traditional, amodal hypotheses. First, EC is
neurologically constrained. Cognitive neuroscientific methods including functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), eventrelated potentials (ERPs), and single cell recordings have provided
evidence that brain activity is not strictly modular in a Fodorian
sense, and research has shown that many cognitive tasks activate
the entire brain, even in simple visual attention tasks (e.g.,
Gonzalez-Castillo et al., 2012). Most researchers argue that the
brain is best understood as a system of parallel networks (e.g.,
McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Sporns, 2011) or a dynamical
system (e.g., see Shapiro, 2011). Though it is certainly possible for
an amodal, neuroagnostic theory to be internally consistent,
highly predictive, and useful in generating new research questions,
by its very nature such a model is hardware-independent and thus
is not specific to the neuroarchitecture of the human brain. Hommel and colleagues (e.g., Hommel, Msseler, Aschersleben, &
Prinz, 2001) theory of event coding provides an excellent example
of such an neuroagnostic theory. However, we argue that, in the
end, the EC approach is a more neurologically plausible account of
human cognition because its predictions arise directly from knowledge of extant neural mechanisms.
The second advantage of the conceptualization hypothesis is
that it is robust against serious shortcomings of classical amodal
models. For instance, amodal theories essentially posit that concepts are duplicated in the brain, represented independently at
sensory and semantic levels. This redundancy is absent in EC,
which posits a single system for processing and representing
incoming information. More important, it has been argued that any
amodal account of cognition is inherently unfalsifiable (see Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003), as any result can be
explained by an additional module or algorithm. On the other
hand, the conceptualization hypothesis makes specific a priori

predictions about the relationship between neural and cognitive
processes. For these reasons, the conceptualization hypothesis
provides a strong framework to understand the relationship between brain and behavior.
Models of Embodiment
Though there is no single agreed-upon neuropsychological
model of EC, there are at least two that provide a strong theoretical
foundation.2 Fundamentally, both of these models share the assumption that Hebbian processes of association (see Hebb, 1949,
p. 62) underlie the functional organization of the brain. That is, the
particular collections of neurons activated by the experience of a
particular event (e.g., the visual, tactile, and auditory experiences
of hammering) become functionally connected by virtue of being
active at the same time and are thus more likely to be activated
together at a later time (see also Wennekers, Garagnani, & Pulvermller, 2006). There is now compelling neuroscientific evidence for such associative processes. Research in molecular neuroscience supports the notion that neural connections change
dynamically as a result of functional coactivation with other neuronal populations (see Seung, 2012, for a discussion).
Meyer and Damasio (2009) developed one model they call the
convergence divergence zone (CDZ) framework. This model is
organized into functional hierarchies. At the lowest level are neural
ensembles that process basic sensory information in the different
modalities. For instance, distinct neural ensembles have evolved to
1
The first is what Shapiro (2011) calls the replacement hypothesis. For
researchers endorsing this hypothesis, mental representations (i.e., amodal
symbol manipulation) are not needed for cognitive processes; consequently, cognition is not modeled as symbolic and algorithmic. For instance, robots that have an embodied neural architecture, in which
cognition is modeled as a dynamic, online interaction with the environment
without any explicit representational system, can navigate complex environments much more effectively than robots based on traditional information processing architectures (see Brooks, 1991). The second hypothesis
described by Shapiro is the constitution hypothesis. Here, researchers
believe that while mental representations exist and are necessary, cognitive
processes carried out on representations comprise both the body and the
environment; thus the body and environment are both critical components
of knowledge (e.g., Clark & Chalmers, 1998). For instance, when a person
uses a grocery list to remember which items to pick up on the way home,
the constitution hypothesis would argue that the grocery list is a form of the
cognitive process. Although these two embodied cognitive hypotheses are
intriguing, and they have obvious consequences for understanding cognitive science in the broader sense, they have had relatively little impact on
experimental cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience; such lines
of thought are more concerned with artificial intelligence and basic questions about the ontology of the concept of cognition.
2
Within cognitive psychology, ideas about embodiment have appeared
throughout its history. Allport (1985), was one of the first cognitive
psychologists to posit that the same neural elements that are involved in
coding the sensory attributes of a (possibly unknown) object presented to
eye or hand or ear also make up the elements of the auto-associated
activity-patterns that represent familiar object-concepts in semantic memory (p. 53). Further, Gibsons (1986) affordance hypothesis is often
described as an early form of embodiment. Indeed, ideas of embodiment
can be traced to James (1890), who suggested that never is the body felt
all alone, but always together with other things (Chapter 10, para. 16) and
also speculated about the role of the body in generating emotional reactions. Finally, Hommel, Msseler, Aschersleben, & Prinzs (2001) theory
of event coding shares some strong conceptual similarities to the models
discussed here, though it is neuroagnostic and not modality-specific.
A REVIEW OF EMBODIED OBJECTS
detect edges of different orientations in the visual system and

different pitches in the auditory system. These are best viewed as
feature maps, as they explicitly map the features of the environment by signaling the presence of various stimulus configurations.
These sensory ensembles then converge on other neural networks
beyond primary cortices (i.e., higher association cortices). These
networks converge on other secondary networks, and so on (up and
up to what are typically considered the most evolved structures
within the anterior cortices, including the prefrontal cortex and
temporal poles). By definition, convergence zones process information from multiple sources; given this pattern of connectivity,
convergence zones receive information about the relative timing of
activations in different modalities. In this way, higher order convergence zones hold records of different collections of sensorimotor experiences. According to Damasio (Meyer & Damasio, 2009;
see also Damasio, 2012), these highest order zones are best
thought of as dispositional ensembles; they are disposed to reactivate the modality specific cortices that were active during experience. The critical feature of this model is that these zones
themselves cannot be said to possess any knowledge per se (e.g.,
they are not the locus of semantic memory); rather, they possess
instructions for reactivating components of experience. That is,
each convergence zone sends divergent back-projections toward
the neural ensembles they receive information from, allowing them
to retroactivate different modality-specific ensembles in a simulation of a previous experience.
Proponents of this model argue that these simulations form the
basis of all cognitive processes, including object recognition. Sensorimotor systems map stimulus-specific sensory information of
objects (e.g., the feeling of the hammers handle, the sound it
makes on wood, the sight of its motion, its shape). These feature
maps are constantly updated as experience unfolds. By virtue of
the functional relationships between sensorimotor regions and
association cortices, experiences are stored as dispositions in
higher level zones and can be reactivated during recognition. For
instance, the visual presentation of objects will activate objectrelated experiences in other modalities. Importantly, while the
representation of both a nonmanipulable object like a bear and a
manipulable object like a hammer will rely on retroactivations of
visual and auditory experience, only the hammer should retroactivate motor experiences (assuming that one has little experience
manually manipulating bears). In cognitive tasks, the specificity of
these retroactivations (i.e., what types of experiences are retroactivated) will form the basis of naming or categorizing the stimulus.
A second model of embodiment extends Damasios CDZ framework. Barsalou et al. (2003) have developed the perceptual symbols systems theory. As in the CDZ framework, concepts are
represented through retroactivations of modality-specific information. However, Barsalou et al. (2003) extends the CDZ framework
by suggesting that attentional processes are important in shaping
simulations of sensorimotor activity. Attentional processes prioritize components of experience, increasing the chance that those
components will become part of the objects representation. In this
way, the representation of different stimuli may be weighted
toward different types of information. That is, simulations become
situated; the activation of the hammer simulation might not comprise all possible combinations of sensorimotor components but
will depend on the goal and experiences of the observer.
Together, the CDZ (Meyer & Damasio, 2009) and perceptualsymbol-systems (Barsalou et al., 2003) models serve as a general
framework for understanding how the brain might represent a
concept like hammer. They are useful in generating specific predictions stemming from the conceptualization hypothesis and
guide much of the review of evidence presented here.
The Present Review

In general, much evidence has accumulated in favor of an EC
perspective from tasks involving action production and understanding, memory, social cognition, problem solving and reasoning, and child development (see Barsalou, 2008, for a review of
studies in these areas; see also M. Wilson, 2002).3 The most
compelling support for EC comes from linguistic paradigms, from
which there are abundant behavioral and neuroscientific findings
supportive of motor activity in embodied object representations
(see Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Kiefer & Pulvermller, 2012; Pulvermller, 2005; Pulvermller & Fadiga, 2010).4 In contrast, there
is little discussion about whether object concepts, as accessed from
the visual presentation of the objects themselves, are embodied.
Research has yet to address the question of whether visually
encountering an object induces embodied simulations of activity in
modal regions associated with knowledge about the object. This is
important because it is unclear whether embodied simulations are
more important in certain modalities (e.g., language vs. vision vs.
audition, etc.) than others. To address this, we review research
relevant to the question of whether the visual presentation of
objects activates embodied object concepts.
In this review, we consider the broad visual-cognitive literature
relevant to examining an EC account of object representation. We
focus on five main predictions, each addressed by a different
domain of psychology and cognitive neuroscience. First, EC accounts predict that visual presentation of manipulable objects, but
not nonmanipulable objects, should activate motor representations,
since experience with manipulable objects should result in associated motoric representations. Neuroimaging studies are well
suited to address the prediction that there is a relationship between
visual representations (visual-specific activity) and action representations (motor-specific activity) for objects that we can manipulate, but not for nonmanipulable objects. Second, EC predicts that
sensorimotor activity is necessary to perform visual-cognitive
tasks such as object naming. Neuropsychological studies of patients with selective lesions to visual or motor regions provide an
ideal means of addressing this question, since damage to motor
regions (and therefore damage to essential simulation machinery)
3
However, embodied theories are not undisputed. As discussed later,
Caramazza and Mahon (2003) provide an introduction to specific, alternative accounts of conceptual organization (see also Capitani, Laiacona,
Mahon, & Caramazza, 2003; Dove, 2011). According to this line of
thought, although there is much evidence consistent with the theory of EC
in this literature, the interpretation of it is disputable. Indeed, Mahon and
Caramazza (2008) suggested that most of these studies show, at best, that
concepts in semantic memory are enriched by (rather than constituted by)
retroactivations of sensorimotor activity.
4
Discussion of the psycholinguistic literature and the relationship between embodied studies of language and embodied studies of visual
cognition are beyond the scope of the present review. Because there is
abundant discussion of embodiment in language, we restrict our discussion
to visual paradigms here.
should impair object naming of manipulable objects. Third, EC

posits the existence of distinct neural assemblies that integrate
information from action and vision and that activity in either
modality can activate these assemblies. The neurophysiological
literature exploring single cell responses allows us to assess this
claim. Fourth, EC predicts that relationships between visual and
motor association areas change throughout development, a question that can be addressed via research in child development.
Finally, the vast literature of behavioral paradigms examining
visual-cognitive abilities is well suited to address the EC prediction that the visual presentation of objects or actions should prime
performance in visual tasks and tasks of action generation.
To investigate these hypotheses, we began our literature search
using Google Scholar to search for the exact phrases embodied
cognition (which revealed 399,000 results) and grounded cognition (which revealed 184,000 results). This initial search was used
primarily to identify extant reviews on the topic. The search for
embodied cognition resulted in M. Wilson (2002), Mahon and
Caramazza (2008), and Shapiro (2011) as the top hits; the top hits
for grounded cognition were Barsalou (2008) and Barsalou (2010).
Problematically for the present review, most explicit discussion on
the embodied cognition hypothesis occurs within the domain of
linguistic processing, so a further keyword search was not useful in
identifying empirical articles pertinent to our review. Therefore,
using these extant reviews, we identified behavioral and fMRI
studies from the reference lists that pertain uniquely to the domain
of visual processing of objects. From there, we used the cited by
function of Google Scholar and, through author agreement, identified potential relevant neuroimaging, neuropsychological, neurophysiological, developmental, and behavioral studies. All studies
included in our review were published in English in established
empirical, peer-reviewed journals. Because most of the published
research was not explicitly discussed as a test of the theory of
embodied cognition, we selected studies on the basis of three
general criteria: The studies must (a) use exclusively (or primarily)
the visual presentation of objects as stimuli (either real objects like
tools or other visually presented shapes); (b) record a dependent
measure from explicit motor behavior (including verbal responding) or neural activity from motor systems (or their indices); and
(c) be (by author agreement) cited in the literature as evidence in
favor of some form of embodied hypothesis. Additionally, we
were particularly interested in studies that included a task that was
semantic in nature (e.g., object naming, picture word matching,
categorization), though this was not exclusively the case (e.g., we
review studies with passive viewing). With this approach we were
able to identify and review some of the main predictions of the
theory of embodied cognition; we do not intend to exhaustively
review research in sensorimotor vision and action. We include
studies from the modern period of psychological investigation only
(i.e., since 1900) and focus on studies that were published since the
introduction of functional neuroimaging; though there is a long
philosophical and potentially empirical tradition of thought that
could be considered embodied (see No, 2004), we sought to
review only those studies that were peer reviewed in the current
psychological tradition. We included studies from any age group
of participants (though, with the exception of the few developmental studies we discovered, most were conducted in young adults).
We excluded studies and reports that focused on computational
modeling, computer simulations, or robotics, as these areas are
beyond the scope of the review. Our literature search was conducted between October 2012 and March 2014. In the final review,
we discuss four studies from neuroimaging, six from neuropsychology, two from neurophysiology, two from development, and
three from behavioral studies (summarized in Table 1) and draw
on additional sources to highlight our main criticisms of the
interpretation of these studies.
On the basis of our review of the current evidence, we argue that
findings in diverse areas of psychology and cognitive neuroscience
do not provide evidence for a strong form of EC in visual object
processing. In the next section, we examine studies relevant to EC
and attempt to identify the main problems with interpreting their
results as evidence for embodied object representations. While this
review does not speak against the general utility of EC, it does
provide a comprehensive integration of research examining EC
and object representation and helps to constrain the development
of the theory of embodied cognition as a way of understanding the
mind and brain. We conclude by discussing the types of evidence
that will be needed to support an EC account of object concepts
from vision.
Neuroimaging
One of the most obvious predictions of the EC account of object
representations is that viewing manipulable objects should elicit
activity in both visual and motor cortices, while viewing nonmanipulable objects should elicit activity in visual cortices only. It is
well established that, after reaching primary visual cortex, visual
information is processed in separate streams; Information about
object shape and color is processed in the ventral stream, extending
from V1 into the inferior temporal lobes, while information about
an objects movement, its location in space, and the metrics needed
to grasp it are processed dorsally, in the posterior middle temporal
gyrus and regions of the anterior inferior parietal lobe (see Milner
& Goodale, 1995). Despite interactions between these two streams
during higher visual processes (Matheson & McMullen, 2010), the
notion that there are separate ventral and dorsal cortical streams is
generally taken as evidence that different object features are encoded in distributed neural networks (e.g., form vs. motion or
action; see Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999; see also ThompsonSchill, 2003). This claim was supported by PET research (Martin,
Wiggs, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1996) showing that although naming images of animals and tools activated overlapping ventral
visual cortical structures, there were category-specific activations
in the occipital lobe in response to animals and unique premotor
activations in response to tools. An EC account of object representation is consistent with this pattern of brain activity.
Additional research has shown that visual presentation of manipulable objects activates motor regions. PET studies have shown
activation in premotor cortex in response to tools during passive
viewing, naming, and describing a tools function, suggesting
motor involvement in representing objects (e.g., Grafton, Fadiga,
Arbib, & Rizzolatti, 1997). fMRI results have further revealed
frontoparietal activity during passive viewing of manipulable objects (e.g., Chao & Martin, 2000). Dorsal regions are activated
when participants imagine manipulating visually presented objects, including the inferior parietal cortex, the prefrontal cortex,
the motor cortex (in some cases), and the supplementary motor
area (see Grzes & Decety, 2001). Similar findings have been
Note.
EC embodied cognition.
Masson et al., 2011; see also Bub

& Masson, 2010; Bub et al.,
2008; Tipper, Paul, & Hayes,
2006; Tucker & Ellis, 1998;
Tucker & Ellis, 2001
Witt et al., 2010
Behavior
Craighero et al., 1996
Mounoud et al., 2007
Development
Kalnine & Bonthoux, 2008
Ferrari et al., 2005
Neurophysiology (nonhuman primate)

Murata et al., 1997
Grasping was faster when primes handle was congruent

with the produced action, suggesting that object
perception facilitates congruent actions.
Performing a concurrent motor task impairs naming of

manipulable but not nonmanipulable objects.
Object naming
Grasping was faster when prime was congruent with the

produced action, suggesting that object perception
facilitates congruent actions.
Compatible action pantomimes prime recognition as

young as 5 years old.
5-year-olds detect thematic relationships (screwdriver

screw) faster for manipulable objects than
nonmanipulable objects.
Single neurons that are active when reaching for object

are also active during the visual presentation of the
object.
Single neuron responds to the observation of tool use
(but not same action without tool) and to performing
the same action.
Patient with impaired object use but intact identification

Patient with impaired object use but intact tool use
identification
Patient with apraxic deficts did not show worse
performance with manipulable vs. nonmanipulable
objects
Patients with frontoparietal lesions spontaneously reached
for and used visually presented objects
Patients showed deficits in object naming but preserved

object use; other patients showed the opposite pattern.
Unique occipital activation to animals; unique premotor

activation to tools
Tool presentation and describing tool use activated
frontoparietal regions.
Tool presentation activated frontoparietal regions.
Tool presentation activated frontoparietal regions.
Main finding
Reaching and grasping (primed by

pictures of handled objects)
Reaching and grasping to bars (primed

by pictures of oriented bars)
Object naming and categorization

(primed by action pantomimes)
Object relationship categorization
Tool use observation and goal directed

reaching
Object reaching and grasping
Object naming; picture-word matching
Rosci et al. 2003
Lhermitte, 1983
Object naming; Picture-word matching

Describing function
Object naming; demonstrating object

use
Passive viewing, naming, describing

function
Passive viewing
Orientation judgment
Object naming
Main task of interest
Cubelli et al., 2000

Halsband et al., 2001
Neuropsychology
Negri et al., 2007; Papeo et al.,
2010
Chao & Martin, 2000

Grzes & Decety, 2002
Grafton et al., 1997
Neuroimaging
Martin et al., 1996
Study
Table 1
Summary of Studies of Interest Relevant to the Main Predictions of EC Reviewed
This suggests that motor simulations

are causally related to object
naming.
Suggests that the presentation of a

visual object automatically activates
action representations, facilitating
manual actions.
Suggests that the presentation of a
visual object automatically activates
action representations, facilitating
specific manual actions.
Action experience affects object

categorization as young as 5 years.
May reflect activity of higher order

convergence zone integrating visual
and motor activity.
Suggests tight coupling of visual and

motor processes.
EC predicts object use and naming

(i.e. semantic information) should
be impaired together.
The visual presentation of manipulable

objects elicits premotor activity.
Relevance to EC
However, this main finding did not

replicate with other object set;
additionally, little evidence for
motor interference effects from
working memory.
Mounting evidence suggests that

these types of facilitation effects
have their locus in attentional
biases.
Unclear whether these results are
casually related to cognitive task
or reflect more generally reaching
and grasping.
Unclear whether visionaction

relationships should increase or
decrease with age; unclear
whether action experience is
causally necessary in object
recognition.
Unclear whether these neurons are

used in cognitive tasks.
Does not show that motor processes

are necessary for cognitive tasks.
Strong form of embodiment cannot

be maintained.
Suggests a correlational relationship,

but not a causal one.
Conclusion
reported in an upright/inverted orientation judgment task of manipulable objects (Grzes & Decety, 2002; see also Devlin et al.,
2002, for a relevant meta-analysis). Overall, these neuroimaging
studies are consistent with the theory of ECs prediction of motor
involvement for manipulable objects but not nonmanipulable objects.
However, the neuroimaging findings are subject to an important
limitation in that they are strictly correlational. Findings of motor
activation during the visual presentation of manipulable objects
cannot be used to argue that such activity is necessary for object
perception; activity in motor regions may be inconsequential for
performing cognitive tasks like object naming (see also Mahon &
Caramazza, 2008). Alternatively, observed frontoparietal activity
might simply reflect a covert, automatic preparation for action on
an object (e.g., grasping) that has nothing to do with the cognitive
task (i.e., object naming). Thus, the neuroimaging evidence does
not allow us to make strong claims about the role of motor activity
in cognitive tasks and provides only correlational evidence.
Neuropsychology
Results from studies of the cognitive performance of braindamaged individuals are relevant to the predictions of embodied
object representations. Specifically, damage to modality specific
cortices used during simulations should impair cognitive performance (e.g., object naming). It is well documented that lesions to
different regions of the cortex can result in category-specific
deficits in object recognition. Warrington and Shallice (1984), for
example, described patients who had deficits in identifying animals but relatively intact identification of tools. The reverse pattern has also been shown (e.g., Gonnerman, Andersen, Devlin,
Kempler, & Seidenberg, 1997; see also Hillis & Caramazza, 1991,
for a double dissociation between manipulable objects and nonmanipulable objects; see Capitani, Laiacona, Mahon, & Caramazza, 2003, for a discussion of the interpretation of these dissociations). A double dissociation can suggest that object
representations are distributed over different cortical regions and
provides evidence that different experiences with manipulable and
nonmanipulable objects result in distinct neural representations
(see also Masullo et al., 2012). However, given the nature and
extent of the lesions reported in these studies (i.e., clearly defined
lesions to motor regions are not always present), double dissociations do not provide strong support for the notion that motor
regions are necessary for processing manipulable objects.
The importance of sensorimotor activity in processing manipulable objects is more comprehensively addressed in studies of
patients with visual apraxia. Apraxia is a multifaceted disorder
resulting in impaired object use (i.e., a deficit in action production)
after lesions to different cortical regions (see Petreska, Adriani,
Blanke, & Billard, 2007, for a detailed review; see De Renzi,
Faglioni, & Sorgato, 1982). Importantly, the EC account of object
representation makes a clear prediction about the effects of apraxic
lesions on object processing. Specifically, if motor simulations
play a role in representing knowledge about an object, then apraxic
patients unable to use intact simulations due to cortical damageshould show deficits in visual cognitive tasks (e.g., naming,
categorizing, etc.) pertaining to manipulable objects. This prediction has been supported by Negri et al. (2007), who reported four
patients who showed deficits in a simple object-naming task while
retaining the ability to demonstrate the objects use; however,

these authors also report four patients who showed the opposite
pattern, with impaired object use but retained object naming (see
also Papeo, Negri, Zadini, & Ida Rumiati, 2010). Additionally,
Cubelli, Marchetti, Boscolo, and Della Sala (2000) described an
apraxic patient with intact picture naming and pictureword
matching, while Halsband et al. (2001) reported a small number of
apraxic patients who could still provide verbal semantic information about tool functions. Finally, using a standard set of pictures,
Rosci, Chiesa, Laiacona, and Capitani (2003) reported that apraxic
patients did not show worse naming performance of manipulable
vs. nonmanipulable objects.
Overall, it is clear that the neuropsychological dissociation
within apraxia is at odds with a strong form of the EC account of
object representations; patients can perform visual cognitive tasks
(e.g., naming, describing functional knowledge) despite impaired
motor execution or planning (due to parietal or frontal damage).5
This is evidence that the strong form of EC cannot be maintained.
There are other neuropsychological conditions that are important to the EC account of object representations. For instance, in a
well-cited report, Lhermitte (1983) described what he calls utilization behavior, in which neuropsychological patients spontaneously act upon objects (i.e., reaching for them, grasping them, and
sometimes putting the objects to use) upon the visual presentation
of the object. A full description is useful:
While seated, the patient took a glass, gave it to the examiner and then
picked up a jug. He poured water into the glass and, having put down
the jug, took the glass from the hand of the examiner and drank the
water. Taking a pack of cigarettes, he hesitated a moment, then
opened it and drew out a cigarette. He looked puzzled at it, being a
nonsmoker. A few seconds later, he held it to the mouth of the
examiner who accepted it and taking the lighter which was in the
examiners hand, near his knees, the patient lit the cigarette. Questioned on this behaviour, he simply said You held out objects to me;
I thought I had to use them. (Lhermitte, 1983, pp. 245246)
An important feature of this behavior is that the examiner does

not instruct the patient to do anything, nor does the patient report
intending to act on it. In fact, patients often observe their own
behavior with confusion. One patient was shown different pairs of
sunglasses during examination and was wearing all three simultaneously by the end of the session. In these patients, neurological
damage was restricted to the frontal lobes, leading Lhermitte
(1983) to suggest that utilization behavior reflected a lack of
inhibition of automatically activated motor behaviors toward objects. In other words, it is possible that utilization behavior reflects
the involuntary nature of motor activation in response to a visual
object; this would suggest that motor activations simply reflect the
association between action and vision, but does not allow us to
make strong claims about the necessity of motor activity in cognitive tasks as put forth by the theory of EC.
5
Note that a number of apraxic patients do show deficits in both naming
and using objects, demonstrating that the deficits may commonly co-occur.
Again, however, this only suggests that these two functions are correlated
in some patients (see Buxbaum, Kyle, & Menon, 2005 for a similar
reasoning with regard to the relationship between action production and
action understanding).
Taken together, neuropsychological results certainly suggest a

relationship between the visual presentation of objects and the
activation of motor representations, but again fail to show that the
intact sensorimotor retroactivations are necessary for cognitive
tasks. The double dissociation technique has been criticized because simulations have shown that double dissociations can arise
with distributed damage to a single network in addition to focal
damage to a small number of unique networks (Devlin, Gonnerman, Andersen, & Seidenberg, 1998). For the theory of EC, this
may limit the interpretation of any neuropsychological result.6
However, over and above this limitation, there are a number of
additional caveats to the conclusion that the neuropsychological
literature does not favor EC, which is likely why the neuropsychological literature has not limited the development of EC. First,
research has shown that substantial alterations to brain organization and function may occur after brain damage (i.e., plasticity;
e.g., Chollet et al., 1991) and/or patients may develop compensatory strategies that make it seem as if certain abilities are intact
when instead the patient has learned to perform a task in a new
way. Indeed, some models of EC (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2003)
predict a differential weighting of information in each modality
depending on the goals of the observer. It is possible that after
brain damage to motor regions, representations become more
heavily weighted to other intact modalities (auditory and visual) as
a way of dealing with unavailable simulations in the damaged
modality. Second, few studies have attempted to identify more
subtle consequences of sensorimotor system damage, for instance
by investigating reaction times or three-dimensional movement
trajectories (e.g., Till, Masson, Bub, & Driessen, 2014). Such
measurements may reveal specific deficits that are overlooked
when looking at overall performance accuracy. Regardless, the
review presented here shows that the strongest form of EC, in
which sensorimotor simulations in modality specific cortices are
absolutely necessary for cognitive performance, cannot be maintained (see also Mahon & Caramazza, 2008) and suggests that at
the very least the predictions made by EC must be qualified.
Neurophysiology
The discovery of mirror neurons in the monkey frontal lobe (i.e.,
neurons that respond during both the performance and observation
of action) has prompted much speculation about the brains capacity to simulate other peoples actions, and it is often argued that
mirror neurons are the basis of action understanding (see Rizzolatti
& Craighero, 2004). Indeed, mirror neurons appear to validate
many assumptions made by EC and serve as a neurophysiological
basis for simulation-based models such as CDZ and perceptual
symbols systems (see Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011).
However, the role of mirror neurons in representing object
concepts (rather than action concepts) is unclear. There is a subclass of visuomotor neurons called canonical neurons in area F5 of
the macaque frontal lobe. These neurons preferentially respond to
the presentation of objects or the performance of specific actions
on those objects (see Murata et al., 1997). For instance, cells that
fire when the animal performs precision grip movements also fire
during the visual presentation of small objects that afford precision
grips; similarly, those that fire during power grasps also respond
preferentially to the visual presentation of larger objects. These
findings suggest that canonical neurons code movements for in-
teracting with specific objects (Rizzolatti et al., 1988) and reflect

the activation of motor simulations during the visual presentation
of an object (see Garbarini & Adenzato, 2004). Similarly, Ferrari,
Rozzi, and Fogassi (2005) discovered a unique class of mirror
neurons that respond preferentially when a monkey observes another using a tool, but not to the same action without the tool or to
the presentation of the tool alone. Together, the different types of
mirror neurons may be a neurophysiological basis of a higher order
CDZ convergence zone that can initiate retroactivations across
multiple modalities (i.e., vision and sensorimotor). However,
whether these neurons play a role in cognitive tasks remains
unknown. Given the lack of language in nonhuman primates,
empirically investigating the direct role of mirror neurons, canonical neurons, or tool-responding mirror neurons during cognitive
tasks remains a challenge. However, this does not rule out the
possibility of their involvement and remains an opportunity for
functional imaging work to be done during human performance.
Development
One prediction of the EC is that experience with manipulable
and nonmanipulable objects shapes embodied representations over
a lifetime. According to one group, as a child accumulates experience with objects, reliance on multiple modalities for representation may actually decrease as more specific representations form
(see Mounoud, Duscherer, Moy, & Perraudin, 2007). Lexical
research has shown that manipulability is important in conceptual
processing throughout development (e.g., Borghi & Caramelli,
2003), and research with physical objects shows that children as
young as 4 years prefer to categorize novel objects on the basis of
function rather than visual similarity (e.g., Kemler Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris, & Blair, 2000). However, very little developmental research has explored the nature of visual object representations
over time. Kalnine and Bonthoux (2008) have shown that children as young as 5 years old are able to detect that a picture of a
screwdriver matches with a picture of a screw (i.e., thematic
relationships) faster for manipulable objects than for nonmanipulable objects (e.g., castle matches with knight), a finding they
suggest reflects differential contributions of action experience to
concept representation. Mounoud et al. (2007) showed that in
children as young as 5 years old the presentation of an action can
prime object categorization (e.g., the presentation of a person
sawing results in faster categorization of a saw as a tool), but this
priming decreases as children age. According to Mounoud et al.,
this suggests that the role of experience in grounding conceptual
representations of objects is actually greater in early development,
when interactions with the world dominate experience (see also
Perraudin & Mounoud, 2009).
The developmental literature indirectly supports the notion that
action and object representations are associated early in development. However, given the dearth of research in this area, the exact
developmental trajectory of purported embodied object representations remains unknown. Further, we argue that the assumption of
stronger embodiment in early development is flawed. That is, as
one accumulates experience and correlated sensorimotor activity
occurs more frequently for manipulable objects (i.e., correlations
between actions and visual presentation of objects), models based
6
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
on Hebbian cell assemblies should predict stronger relationships

between them. Thus, it is conceivable that embodied effects should
grow stronger in development, not weaker; this has yet to be tested
in any paradigm. Finally, as with the research reviewed in preceding sections, there is little evidence that action simulations are a
necessary component of manipulable object processing in early
development. Future developmental research should explore the
strength of the vision-action relationship through infancy.
Behavioral Paradigms
Increasingly, EC is influencing behavioral investigations of
visual cognition. It is now well established that the visual presentation of an object can affect both action production (e.g., grasping) and object recognition (e.g., naming). For instance, Craighero,
Fadiga, Umilta`, & Rizzolatti (1996) had participants grasp bars
that were oriented 45 from upright. On some of the trials, a visual
prime of a bar oriented in the same way (i.e., a congruent visual
prime) was shown before the grasp, and on others a visual prime
of a bar oriented in the opposite way (i.e., an incongruent visual
prime) was shown. The authors reported that grasping was faster
on congruent trials and interpreted this as evidence that the visual
presentation of a graspable object automatically primes related
motor actions. This type of result is consistent with a body of
research that suggests a direct coupling between object perception
and action. In a more specific demonstration of the coupling
between object perception and action, Masson, Bub, and Breuer
(2011) showed that manual actions toward objects are facilitated
by the presentation of visual objects whose handles are orientated
congruently with the targets. For example, visually presenting a
picture of a beer mug with its handle oriented vertically facilitated
vertical grasps to a grasping apparatus. These results suggest
further that the presentation of a visual object automatically activates action representations (see also Bub & Masson, 2010; Bub,
Masson, & Cree, 2008; Tipper, Paul, & Hayes, 2006; Tucker &
Ellis, 1998; Tucker & Ellis, 2001).
The behavioral literature suggests that the visual presentation of
an object can automatically activate actions, influencing motor
responses in cognitive tasks. These findings are consistent with EC
and support one of its main predictions: namely, that visual presentation of an object will activate motor activity associated with
that object. However, a growing body of behavioral research
suggests that an EC interpretation of these results may not be
correct. Specifically, stimulusresponse compatibility effects (e.g.,
facilitated responding with the hand that is compatible with the
orientation of an objects handle) may be better explained by the
location of visual attention. For instance, Matheson, White, and
McMullen (2014a) had participants make upright/inverted or category judgments about left- and right-oriented tools and animals.
They showed that participants were faster at responding with the
hand that was compatible with the orientation of the tools handle
in the upright/inverted judgment task. However, responses were
also faster with the hand that was compatible with the animal
heads. Facilitated responses to animal heads or tails are not predicted by EC (because humans do not often manipulate large
animals) and suggest a more domain-general mechanism.
Importantly, in some tasks, motor facilitation effects are not
restricted to the manipulable part of the object. For instance,
Anderson, Yamagishi, and Karavia (2002) presented participants
with pictures of scissors or clocks while they made orientation

judgments, and observed faster responding when the response
hand was compatible with the orientation of the scissors handles
and the orientation of the clocks hands (see also Phillips & Ward,
2002). If motor associations underlie these effects, then facilitation
should have been found only with the scissors and not the clock
(see also Vainio, Ellis, & Tucker, 2007, Experiment 2; Cho &
Proctor, 2013; Cho & Proctor 2010; Cho & Proctor, 2011; Pellicano, Iani, Borghi, Rubichi, & Nicoletti, 2010). Together, these
results suggest that facilitation effects that have been previously
interpreted as embodied effects may instead reflect a more general,
task-dependent, stimulusresponse compatibility that is driven by
the locus of attention. Such an account suggests that some features
of objects grab attention, and recent electrophysiological investigations of this interpretation provide support for the notion that, in
general, object handles do attract visual attention (Matheson, Newman, Satel, & McMullen, 2014). This conclusion was also reached
by Proctor and Miles (2014) who suggested that these stimulus
response compatibility effects are best understood as arising from
domain-general spatial biases and argue that these results should
no longer be invoked as support of the automatic activation of
motor representations to manipulable objects.
Spatial attentional biases may best account for the results of
studies using simple button presses as responses. Importantly, Bub
and Masson (2010) directly compared button press responses to
reaching and grasping. These authors showed that liftoff times for
reaching toward a grasping apparatus were faster when visually
presented objects were aligned compatibly with the reach. This
suggests that some aspects of motor simulation may be invoked by
the visual presentation of the object, just not more general simulations that potentiate key-presses. A more specific effect was also
reported by Tucker and Ellis (2001), who had participants categorize objects by making precision or power grips on a grasping
apparatus. They reported that participants were faster at responding when a visually presented object afforded a compatible action.
Additionally, measuring three-dimensional movement trajectories,
Till et al. (2014) have reported that a visually presented manipulable objects affect the online trajectories of reaching and grasping,
biasing them in ways that are compatible with the presented object.
Unlike the paradigms using button presses, these types of results
do provide support for the notion the visual presentation of a
manipulable object invokes sensorimotor simulations (see also
Masson et al., 2011). While measuring specific grasp apertures and
movement trajectories has promise for supporting more nuanced
predictions of EC, and while these measures a not likely explained
by spatial attentional biases, they still suffer from many of the
criticisms of other research in EC. Specifically, at best they show
that visually presented objects activate motor simulations, but they
still do not provide evidence that motor simulations are a part of
the representation of visual objects, or that they are used to
perform cognitive tasks. Further, it is unclear whether similar
effects are observed for nonmanipulable objects.
To provide support for the causal role of sensorimotor simulations in cognition, it is necessary to show that disrupting simulations impairs cognitive performance (e.g., naming or categorization) for manipulable objects but not nonmanipulable objects. This
question has been recently investigated by a number of researchers
using motor interference paradigms. For instance, Witt, Kemmerer, Linkenauger, and Culham (2010) had participants name
pictures of tools and animals while they squeezed a sponge. They

reasoned that if motor simulations are necessary for efficient
semantic processing, then squeezing a sponge will slow naming of
manipulable objects but not nonmanipulable objects. This is indeed what they showed, in the first study to provide such strong
evidence in favor of EC. However, this interference effect was not
replicated using a different set of objects; indeed, manipulating the
picture-plane orientation of the images reversed the effect (Matheson, White, & McMullen, 2014b), suggesting again a more general, attentional locus of the effect. Other researchers have explored the effects of concurrent motor tasks in other cognitive
domains. For instance, Pecher (2013) showed that a concurrent
motor task did not specifically impair working memory performance (holding information about the object in working memory
over a short delay) for manipulable objects versus nonmanipulable
objects. She concluded that motor simulations are not necessary
for working memory performance. Using a similar logic, Postle,
Ashton, McFarland, and de Zubicaray (2013) showed that reading
hand-related words did not affect performance of a hand action any
more than reading other effector-related words (e.g., feet). Together then, with the exception of one study, the results from motor
interference paradigms do not support EC. While there are a
number of methodological reasons that this may be the case (e.g.,
the timing of the motor interference, the specificity of the effectors
and actions involved, etc.), and while motor interference paradigms should be used to test EC predictions more specifically, the
current available results do not provide evidence for EC.
Overall, behavioral research has shown some evidence consistent with activation of motor associations to visually presented
manipulable objects. However, a growing body of literature suggests that such findings may be more consistent with general
attentional effects and subsequent stimulusresponse compatibility
that are not a consequence of visual-motor simulations, and thus,
not supportive of a strong form EC in visual object perception.
Additionally, interference effects are not prevalent. Though refined behavioral paradigms that measure more specific consequences of motor simulations may useful in future research (e.g.,
Till et al., 2014), the current behavioral evidence in favor of EC is
not compelling.
the neuropsychological literature shows us that, though deficits in

visual cognitive tasks sometimes co-occur with apraxic disorders,
many apraxic patients retain the ability to name manipulable
objects, providing support for the conclusion that motor simulations are not necessary to perform visual cognitive tasks. Third,
though the neurophysiological literature has identified neural assemblies that integrate information about action and vision, the
functional role of these assemblies in object processing is still
largely unknown. Fourth, research in child development shows
that relationships between visual and motor activity may become
weaker throughout development but, as with the neuroimaging
data reviewed here, there is no evidence that motor simulations are
necessary for object processing. Finally, the behavioral literature
using visual cognitive paradigms shows motor-priming effects in
visual tasks, but these effects are likely best accounted for by
domain-general attentional biases. In sum, there is presently little
evidence supporting the predictions of a strong form of the theory
of embodied cognition in the representation of object concepts in
visual cognitive tasks.
Instead, we conclude that visual object perception (i.e., recognition, identification) does not require activity in motor regions
and can often be carried out on the basis of visual information
alone. This is not to suggest that motor activity is independent of
visual processing, but rather that the paradigm and/or the stimulus
itself constrains the involvement of motor systems in visual processing. For example, when one views a hammer, the visual
stimulus is rich enough to specify information about the hammer
without the need to invoke embodied processes (i.e., simulations of
auditory, motoric, and additional sensory experiences). It seems
likely that much of the motor activity recorded in imaging tasks
during object perception is more about specifying potential action
than specifying the object concept. Similarly, some of the behavioral evidence suggests that attention is directed to object parts that
are the likely targets of action. Again, this type of activity does not
reflect a retroactive simulation used for completing visual cognitive tasks (e.g., object naming) but rather simply reflects the need
to isolate manipulable object features for the purpose of acting
upon them. Overall, then, the interpretation of the results reviewed
here puts constraint on EC with respect to visual object representations in these cognitive tasks.
Discussion
Summary and Conclusion
What Evidence Is Needed to Support

the Theory of EC?
We have reviewed a large body of research from neuroimaging,

neurophysiological, neuropsychological, developmental, and behavioral studies that are relevant to the EC account of object
representations. On the basis of the above review, we argue that
the literature does not support a strong form of EC in visual object
perception and is instead better accounted for by known relationships between vision, action, and domain-general processes such
as visual attention. On the basis of careful consideration of research relevant to the main predictions of EC, we conclude that
sensorimotor simulations are not engaged for, or at least not
evidenced by, the types of visual cognitive tasks reviewed here
(e.g., picture or object naming).
First, neuroimaging studies show only correlational relationships between visual and motor representations for manipulable
objects and do not support a causal link between the two. Second,
These conclusions raise a number of questions about the kind of

evidence that would be needed to support the theory of EC in
visual cognitive paradigms. There are at least three questions that
future research must explore. First, because neuroplastic reorganization or compensatory strategies might allow apraxic patients to
successfully perform visual cognitive tasks, future research should
manipulate motor cortex directly by altering motor activity in the
healthy brain. In the psycholinguistics literature, paradigms using
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) have shown that stimulating arm representations in primary motor cortex facilitates processing of arm-related verbs (e.g., throw) but not leg-related verbs
(Pulvermller et al., 2005). Further, stimulating the motor cortex
increases muscle potentials in the response hand that is compatible
with the orientation of a visually presented mug handle (Buccino,
Sato, Cattaneo, Roda`, & Riggio, 2009; see also Cardellicchio,
10
Sinigaglia, & Constantini, 2011). Future research should explore

whether TMS applied to motor regions responsible for hand movement specifically increases the amplitude of motor-evoked potentials elicited during perception of manipulable objects compared to
nonmanipulable objects; the theory of EC predicts that this would
be the case. Further, such a paradigm is useful for determining the
relationship between motor-evoked potentials and visual cognitive
performance.
A second type of evidence needed to strongly support EC
accounts of object representation can be gleaned from behavioral
interference paradigms. As discussed above, a large behavioral
literature suggests that viewing a manipulable object facilitates
motor responses. Interfering with these motor responses (and
therefore disrupting the normal processes that occur during a
simulation) should disrupt visual cognitive performance (e.g., Witt
et al., 2010). We argue that though the results have not been
promising, methodological considerations may be more fruitful in
finding support for EC by, for instance, manipulating the specificity of the motor involvement (see Till et al., 2014) or the timing
of interference (see Bub & Masson, 2010). Future research should
continue to explore the extent to which concurrent motor tasks are
capable of interfering with visual cognitive performance in tasks
that more tightly control the timing and extent of motor interference.
The third piece of evidence necessary to support the EC account
of object representations relates to the timing of embodied simulations, which can be studied via temporally sensitive methods
such as electro- or magneto-encephalography (EEG and MEG,
respectively). Critically, if activity associated with the motor system reflects functional simulation of an object concept, then it
should occur early in object processing; conversely, if this activity
is merely correlational (e.g., as a consequence of postsemantic
imagery), then it should occur later (see van Elk, van Schie,
Zwaan, & Bekkering, 2010; Hauk, Shtyrov, & Pulvermller, 2008
for discussions of this issue in linguistic research). Using a task in
which participants were shown manipulable and nonmanipulable
objects, at least one EEG study has shown that manipulable objects
are differentiated from nonmanipulable objects by about 270 ms
poststimulus and has localized this difference to motor regions
(Proverbio, Adorni, & DAniello, 2011). However, because participants were engaged in a task detecting the appearance of
oddball stimuli (i.e., plants) and not explicitly processing the
manipulable objects, it is still unclear whether such activity is
related to cognitive performance such as naming or categorization.
Future research should explore whether manipulable objects are
differentiated from nonmanipulable objects at stages that precede
known cognitive effects (e.g., P3 or N400) during tasks that
involve conceptual processing.
Constraining Theories of Embodied Cognition

In general, there are a number of criticisms of EC (e.g., Dove,
2011). Some of these issues are not specific to the visual domain
and have been raised in the linguistic literature as well (e.g.,
Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Kiefer & Pulvermller, 2012). For instance, many authors maintain that modality-specific activity is
insufficient to represent all semantic information (e.g., Shelton &
Caramazza, 1999). In the literature, widespread semantic impairments are easily explained by amodal accounts (e.g., Hillis, Rapp,
Romani, & Caramazza, 1990), for instance, by hypothesizing

different stores of semantic information or differences in how
these stores are accessed. This raises the important question as to
whether an embodied perspective is even necessary. Shapiro
(2011) points out succinctly that in some cases it is not clear
whether embodied hypotheses and amodal information processing
hypotheses are mutually exclusive (indeed, they may not even be
asking the same types of questions). For instance, some results
might be best explained with embodied theories (e.g., behavioral
motor-interference effects), while others might be best suited to
amodal accounts (e.g., the naming abilities of apraxic individuals),
much as light can be described in terms of waves and in terms of
particles. If these theories are not mutually exclusive, then elucidating object representations from both perspectives will provide a
more complete understanding of the nature of object representation.
At the very least, recent reviews highlight the futility in examining the embodied hypothesis as a binary question, concluding
instead that future research must investigate when and how sensorimotor activity is recruited in cognitive tasks (Willems &
Francken, 2012). Some authors suggest that a spectrum of amodal
(or multimodal) and modality-specific processes (embodied and
disembodied processes) contribute to the full range of concrete and
abstract semantic processing (Pulvermller, 2013). This conclusion is echoed by Zwaan (2014), who, in a discussion of embodied
language, has suggested adopting a pluralist perspective: Embodied cognition is needed to explain how we build representations of
the world, while amodal accounts are needed to address the most
abstract aspects of cognition (e.g., metaphor; though see Lakoff &
Johnson, 1999). Zwaan (2014) posits five levels of embodiment (in
psycholinguistics) that differ in the degree to which comprehension relies on embodied versus amodal representations. Indeed, a
continuum of amodal and modality-specific or embodied representation may better account for the available data and places
emphasis on the need for disembodied cognition in tasks that
happen quickly and effortlessly (e.g., in following the speech of
another person; see Binder & Desai, 2011). Some philosophical
authors maintain that extreme embodiment can be rejected because
certain cognitive processes (e.g., motor control) cannot be understood without recourse to sensorimotor representation and abstract,
creative thought, requires the combination of sensorimotor representational content (e.g., Thagard, 2012). This line of thought is
reflected in the neuroimaging literature investigating how combinations of sensorimotor features are selected and represented (e.g.,
Coutanche & Thompson-Schill, 2014). Similarly, in a review of
the empirical literature on linguistic processing, Meteyard,
Cuadrado, Bahrami, and Vigliocco (2010) have suggested that
purely amodal, symbolic theories and strong forms of embodiment
can both be rejected; what remains is determining which aspects of
the evidence for embodiment constitute representational content
and which aspects are merely correlated with that content or as
Zwaan (2014) suggests, When do we need which and how do they
interact? (p. 230).
The current review challenges the EC account of object representation when representations are accessed from vision. However,
this conclusion only constrains EC, helps develop it further, and
does not provide evidence against the general principles of the
approach or models like the CDZ (Meyer & Damasio, 2009).
Indeed, evidence for embodied representations is robust, especially
in linguistic paradigms and studies of action understanding (Barsalou, 2008). Given the discrepancies between these literatures and
the literature of embodied visual object processing, we suggest that
the theory of embodied cognition and the simulation processes it
posits might not apply equally across all cognitive domains. Indeed, it appears that embodied effects may apply differentially to
different domains, with a strong embodiment in linguistic domain,
weaker in action understanding, and weakest still in visual cognitive tasks (see also Meteyard et al., 2012, for ideas concerning
embodiment and the depth of processing). We suggest that the
relative reliance on sensorimotor simulations changes depending
on how far removed the stimulus is from direct experience. With
visual objects, simulations are less important because much of the
visual information is available in view; in contrast, with words,
much more elaborate simulations are required to fully make sense
of the stimulus and make use of it in cognitive tasks. Overall, this
hypothesis suggests that simulation/retroactivation processes may
be more useful for some cognitive tasks than others. This conclusion is reached by Zwaan (2014), who suggests that embodied
simulations may be more important for recognizing a word that
refers to a tool, rather than identifying a tool that is in view.
Though this is speculative, this proposal suggests that future research will need to explore the ways in which embodied effects are
manifested in different cognitive domains and opens the possibility
of domain-specific embodiment.
Embodiment and Beyond

Though information processing theories of object processing
and other cognitive functions continue to dominate the psychological literature, research that takes an embodied perspective (or at
least claim to take an embodied perspective) is increasingly challenging these approaches. The excitement the embodied approach
has generated promises to offer new insights into not only how
objects in the world are processed, but how cognition unfolds in
the environment more generally. Importantly, the predictions of
embodiment are applicable beyond object processing and have
been used in an attempt to understand a wide variety of psychological domains, including language use (e.g., Pulvermller,
2013), human emotions and empathy (e.g., Niedenthal, 2007), the
understanding of developmental disorders such as autism spectrum
disorder (e.g., Eigsti, 2013) and other neuropsychiatric conditions
(e.g., Parkinsons; Kemmerer, Miller, MacPherson, Huber, &
Tranel, 2013), in addition to child development (Byrge, Sporns, &
Smith, 2014) and applied areas such as educational psychology
(Ionescu & Vasc, 2014). Indeed, one attractive feature of the
embodied approach is that it may offer a way of unifying the
diverse areas within psychology and neuroscience (Matheson &
White, 2011; see also Glenberg, 2010, for a discussion of the
unifying potential of the concept of embodiment within psychology). However, while researchers are discovering clever ways of
investigating the predictions of EC within these various domains
of psychology, our review here points to the importance of tempering excitement about findings that are merely consistent with
embodied predictions and suggests the need for a critical assessment of whether experimental findings in these areas do in fact
offer evidence in favor of embodied accounts. Indeed, at this stage
in the literature, our review shows that excitement about supporting the theory may lead to overinterpretations that are just not
11
justified based on the data, or may blind researchers from seeking

alternative, simpler, more domain general (or amodal) explanations for the data. Indeed, we hope to show that it is not sufficient,
based on the conceptualization hypothesis, to show that the body
interacts with some form of psychological processes (e.g., body
balance influencing political attributions; see Dijkstra, Eerland,
Zijlmans, & Post, 2012) and that it is important to fully describe
the assumptions of the embodied theory we are adopting and what
the predictions for brain and behavior will be (see also A. D.
Wilson & Golonka, 2013). In the present review, we have provided
a case study in the domain of visual cognition. We feel that to
develop this theory to its full explanatory power will require
critically examining the existing evidence, determining which
questions need addressed, and identifying the methods and dependent measures that are best suited to doing so in all domains of
psychology and neuroscience.
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Received March 27, 2014

Revision received July 30, 2014
Accepted August 1, 2014

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Psychological Bulletin

Accessing Embodied Object Representations From Vision:

2014 American Psychological Association

Accessing Embodied Object Representations From Vision: A Review

out by the brain can be understood as algorithms that operate on

The Embodied Cognition Hypothesis

MATHESON, WHITE, AND MCMULLEN

Why Theories of Embodied Cognition?

hand, the conceptualization hypothesis makes specific a priori

A REVIEW OF EMBODIED OBJECTS

detect edges of different orientations in the visual system and

The Present Review

MATHESON, WHITE, AND MCMULLEN

should impair object naming of manipulable objects. Third, EC

Masson et al., 2011; see also Bub

Mounoud et al., 2007

Ferrari et al., 2005

Neurophysiology (nonhuman primate)

Grasping was faster when primes handle was congruent

Performing a concurrent motor task impairs naming of

Grasping was faster when prime was congruent with the

Compatible action pantomimes prime recognition as

5-year-olds detect thematic relationships (screwdriver

Single neurons that are active when reaching for object

Patient with impaired object use but intact identification

Patients showed deficits in object naming but preserved

Unique occipital activation to animals; unique premotor

Reaching and grasping (primed by

Reaching and grasping to bars (primed

Object naming and categorization

Object relationship categorization

Tool use observation and goal directed

Object reaching and grasping

Object naming; picture-word matching

Rosci et al. 2003

Object naming; Picture-word matching

Object naming; demonstrating object

Passive viewing, naming, describing

Main task of interest

Cubelli et al., 2000

Chao & Martin, 2000

Grafton et al., 1997

This suggests that motor simulations

Suggests that the presentation of a

Action experience affects object

May reflect activity of higher order

Suggests tight coupling of visual and

EC predicts object use and naming

The visual presentation of manipulable

However, this main finding did not

Mounting evidence suggests that

Unclear whether visionaction

Unclear whether these neurons are

Does not show that motor processes

Strong form of embodiment cannot

Suggests a correlational relationship,

A REVIEW OF EMBODIED OBJECTS

MATHESON, WHITE, AND MCMULLEN

retaining the ability to demonstrate the objects use; however,

An important feature of this behavior is that the examiner does

A REVIEW OF EMBODIED OBJECTS

Taken together, neuropsychological results certainly suggest a

teracting with specific objects (Rizzolatti et al., 1988) and reflect

We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.