Note to workshop participants:

Prof. Yarhi-Milo asked to pass on her apologies "for the

length of the ms and that the footnotes are not very well
organized. Any and all comments would be much
appreciated."

DRAFT: Please do not cite without the authors explicit permission --

In the Eye of the Beholder: Leaders, Intelligence, and the Adversarys Intentions

Keren Yarhi-Milo

How do leaders predict the future behavior of their adversaries? Debates concerning threat assessments
often hinge on arguments about whether decision-makers should focus on the military inventory of the
adversary, or his intentions. Throughout the Cold War, disputes among American professionals, such as
intelligence and military officers, and analysts in the punditocracy, over alleged Soviet military capabilities
dominated the commentary on the Soviet threat. But to what extent calculations of military balances and
force levels reflected, or shaped, how the politicos inferred the intentions of the Soviet Union? What
indicators did American presidents and and their closest advisors use to infer the foreign policy goals of the
Soviet Union?
These questions have broader policy significance. Current assessments of how threatening a rising
China, a resurgent Russia, or a possibly nuclear armed Iran are to American interests largely depend on the
indicators observers focus on to derive predictions about the intentions of these countries. States ability to
reduce uncertainty about others intentions, and the factors governing how these intentions should be
inferred has been one key issue at the heart of the debate between four major schools of thought in
international relations: Offensive realists, Defensive realists, Neo Liberal Institutionalisms, Constructivists,
and Rationalists, have all advanced propositions, implicit or explicit, about the sources and effects of
assessments about intentions. While these theories all provide some important insights in offering different
views as to what types of actions states should rely on in estimating intentions, they are inadequate in that
they have yet to offer solid empirical studies about how observers select signals, and the meanings they
typically attribute to them.

Page1of63

Indeed, to what extent do these theories reflect how statesmen actually read intentions? This article
begins to address this gap in the literature by developing and testing two explanations of perceived
intentions: the capabilities thesis and the behavioral-signals thesis. Each of these postulates a causal
relationship between two different sets of indicators and the perceptions of that adversarys long term
intentions by senior civilian decision-makers and intelligence agencies. These sets of indicators seem
intuitively likely to be most relevant to the process of inferring an adversarys intentions; furthermore,
international relations scholars have identified them as especially important in the context of the three
historical episodes examined below.
Using extensive archival research, newly-declassified documents, and interviews with former decisionmakers and intelligence analysts in the United States, this article tests the two theses about perceptions
using three cases: 1) American assessments of Soviet intentions under the administration of President
Jimmy Carter; 2) American assessments of Soviet intentions in the years leading to the end of the Cold War
under the second administration of President Ronald Reagan; 3) In addition, I argue that the findings in
these cases are robust by demonstrating how the same patterns of inferring intentions were used by British
observers to gauge the intentions of Hitlers Germany in the period leading to WWII.
The Argument in Brief
The historical records from these episodes suggest three intriguing findings. First, US and British
intelligence communities and civilian decision-makers used different analytic lenses to assess intentions.
British decision-makers during the interwar period and American decision-makers in two very different
administrations all gave greatest weight to indicators associated with the recent behavior of their
adversaries, rather than their capabilities, when assessing, respectively, German and Soviet policy
intentions. Perceptions of intentions did not change to the same degree among all decision-makers. Yet,
even those decision-makers who did not consistently update their beliefs in light of new evidence used
the adversarys recent behavior to support assessments about their intentions.

Page2of63

Second, American and British decision-makers were similar insofar as they did not use certain
indicators to infer intentions. Changes in the adversarys military capabilities per-se did not fundamentally
alter American or British decision-makers perceptions of their adversaries intentions.
empirical support for the capabilities thesis is weak:

Indeed, the

in private discussions and writings about the

adversary, decision-makers only rarely linked their assessments of the adversarys capabilities to their
interpretations of his foreign policy goals, even in cases when employing such evidence would have
bolstered the their argument. Nevertheless, changes in the adversarys capabilities were significant for
decision-makers in several ways. Changes in the adversarys capabilities often led decision-makers to raise
questions about its political objectives and military intentions. Further, concerns about the extent of
changes in the adversarys military capabilities were critical in shaping the ways countries responded in
their foreign policy and defense planning.
Finally, capabilities were the most significant indicators upon which the British and American
intelligence communities based their perceptions of intentions. The records of the available intelligence
estimates, is all three cases, are riddled with assumptions about the causal relations between Soviet
capabilities and their likely foreign policy behavior in the future. The National Intelligence Estimates of the
1970s and 1980s, for example, repeated the claim that Soviet decisions about how, where, and when to
expand would be driven by Soviet assessments of the correlation of forces between the two superpowers.
Notwithstanding this myopic reading of the Soviet Union, and perhaps as a result of it, intelligence
assessments of the adversarys political intentions had only marginal effect on the perceptions of civilian
decision-maker, who reached conclusions about Soviet policy for themselves, independent of intelligence
estimates. In the interwar period, the record shows, British intelligence significantly shaped Chamberlains
assessments about how and when to challenge Germany, but it did not play any real role in the evolution of
his views about the political intentions of Hitler.
The systematic differences between the indicators the decision-makers on the one hand, and the
intelligence communities on the other, relied upon, was a finding that I didnt expect to find, and one that

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requires a theoretical explanation. Using the method of hypothesis-generating cases, I use the empirical
findings to derive three concrete causal mechanisms that shed light on problem of selective attention to
information primarily, why decision-makers tend to selectively rely on behavioral indicators to assess the
adversarys political intentions; as well as how and when these causal mechanisms should be tested against
additional case studies. Drawing on insights from the literature on information processing, I suggest two
mechanisms that render the adversarys behavior a particular informative signal of intention for decisionmakers: the Subjective Credibility hypothesis refers to aspects in the adversarys behavior as perceived as
especially costly and irreversible, and is therefore attended to by decision-makers; the Vividness hypothesis
discusses aspects in particular kinds of adversarys behavior that generate affective responses from
decision-makers, and consequently, renders this information especially salient in the memory of the
decision-maker. Finally, I contend that one of the reasons that decision-makers selectively attend to
information about behavior to infer intentions, whereas intelligence communities selectively attend to
information about capabilities has to do with the perceived expertise of each set of actors.
The remainder of this article is presented in six sections. The first describes the dependent variable this
article examines -- perceived political intentions -- and it develops the two theses to be tested: the
capabilities and behavioral-signals variants. The second and third sections test the theses using evidence
from the two Cold War episodes. The articles fourth section discusses the findings in the context of the
British-German interaction. Section five raises the problem of selective attention to information in the cases
and uses the findings to generate hypotheses that specifies more concretely the causal linkage between
particular indicators and assessments of intentions among these two sets of perceivers. The final section
summarizes the discussion.
TWO THESES ABOUT INTENTIONS

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The article tests hypotheses that attempt to explain the sources of leaders perceptions of the political
intentions of their adversaries.1

The term political intentions refers to beliefs about the foreign policy

goals of the adversary in the long run (that is, a time horizon that is longer than a week or two into the
future) because these are most likely to affect a states own foreign policy and strategic choice. To simplify,
I divide assessments of political intentions into three crude categories: expansionist, opportunistic, and
status quo.2 The first is associated with the belief that a country wants to expand its power and influence
beyond its territorial boundaries. Expansionist intentions can range from a plan to achieve a hegemonic
international position to a desire for less moderate but still significant changes in the distribution of power
in the international system. A perception that the adversarys intentions are opportunistic means the
adversary would like to induce a change in the intentional distribution of power, but is not actively pressing
for it. Rather, the enemy is viewed as having contingent plans to change the status quo and will seize
opportunities to act on this purpose whenever possible. Such an adversary is more risk averse and prone to
opportunism only when it believes that it would not be punished. Finally, status quo intentions are defined
as a desire to simply maintain the relative power position the state already enjoys in the intentional system.
THE CAPABILITIES THESIS: The capabilities thesis posits that decision-makers infer intentions of the
adversary from different indexes of its military power. This thesis draws on several realist theories; common
to all is the idea that a countrys intentions are revealed from, or shaped and constrained by, its military
capabilities. Here I mention two pathways that link military power and perceived intentions. First, according
to Mearsheimers theory of offensive realism, decision-makers in an anarchic international system simply
assume the worst about adversaries intentions. An implicit assumption in offensive realist theory is that
decision-makers should anticipate not only that another state would maximize its power, but also that this

This study is concerned with the perceptions that go beyond a crisis context. Also, I look only at assessments of
adversary intentions. Finally, I am not concerned with whether perceivers correctly identify the intentions of their
adversaries.

For a similar typology, see Keith L. Shimko, Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan
Administration (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).

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power would be utilized in its entirety to support aggressive designs. Thus, from the perspective of the
perceiver, how aggressive a state can (or will) be is essentially a function of how powerful it is, or it can be. A
second pathway relies on the logic of costly actions, according to which the size of the incremental increase or
decrease in military capabilities can serve as a credible signal of aggressive or benign intentions,
respectively.3 Drawing on these insights, I generate the Numerical Preponderance Hypothesis, which posits
that under conditions of uncertainty, a countrys decision to increasingly devote resources to building up its
military capabilities, especially offensive ones, can be interpreted by its adversary as a signal of hostile
intentions. This is because the adversary will be more powerful and thus more dangerous according to the
logic of offensive realists, and because his actions are costly and thus reveal his type according to the costly
signaling logic. Conversely, a decrease in the adversarys military capabilities should, all else equal, be
associated with a change towards a more benign perceptions of its intentions.
THE BEHAVIORAL-SIGNALS THESIS: The behavioral-signals thesis posits that certain kinds of actions
are particularly useful in revealing information about the objectives of the adversary. The thesis is rooted in
various strands of work in international relations--democratic peace theory, neoliberal institutionalism,
social constructivism, and the rationalist literature on signaling. Here I evaluate the potential causal role of
three types of actions that have been identified in the literature as particularly significant in shaping others
assessments of intentions:
First, neoliberal institutionalists have long argued that the decision to join international institutions can
reveal information about intentions.4 Institutions are believed to have a unique ability to impose costs upon
states, and thus are instrumental in allowing states to separate those with benign intentions from those who

On changes in capabilities as a costly signal, see Andrew Kydds theory of Bayesian realism. Kydd, Trust and
Mistrust in International Relations.
4

See See Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, International Security, Vol.
20, No. 1 (1995), pp. 39-51; Philip Tetlock et al., eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989); Weinberger, Institutional Signaling; Celeste A. Wallander, Mortal Friends, Best Enemies:
German-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Stephen D. Krasner,
International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Kydd, Sheep in Sheeps Clothing.

Page6of63

are aggressive. Moreover, the decision to withdraw from binding institutions, according to the theory, is
essentially an alarming signal that indicates a change in a states intentions.5 In addition to international
institutions, changes in the nature of a countrys domestic institutions are considered to be another form of
signal that is expected to affect perceived intentions. The structural version of the democratic peace, for
instance, posits that the creation of democratic domestic institutions because of their constraining effects,
transparency, and ability to generate audience costs -- should lead others to more easily recognize the
benign intentions of democracies.6
Second, foreign interventions in weaker states are another important behavioral signal.7 A states
decision to spill treasure and perhaps even blood in order to change the status quo in a weaker state is likely
to be viewed as a costly, hence credible, signal of hostile intentions. While interventions through nonmilitary means like political subversion and economic assistance may worry perceivers, especially of
concern are those actions that attempt to change the distribution of power by intervening in a country that is
currently outside ones sphere of influence through the use of military force. Conversely, the signaling
literature tells us that a states decision to withdraw unilaterally from an ongoing intervention can be a
useful reassuring signal of more benign intentions.
A third type of behavioral signal I consider is arms control agreements. Scholars have pointed out that
when offense and defense are distinguishable, arms control agreements especially those that limit
offensive deployment and contain adequate verification agreements --provide an important reassuring signal

The usefulness of international institutions in revealing information about intentions depends on institutional
characteristics such as the nature of enforcement, the effects of veto points on state decision making, and its ability to
affect member states domestic political institutions.

For a summary of how domestic institutions can be a signal of intentions, see Mark L. Haas, The United States and
the End of the Cold War: Reactions to Shifts in Soviet Power, Policies, or Domestic Politics? International
Organization, Vol. 61, No. 1 (2007), p.152.

I define a military intervention as the deployment of troops across international boundaries to influence outcomes in
another state, but not to incorporate conquered territory into the aggressors own state. Elizabeth Nathan Saunders,
Wars of Choice: Leadership, Threat Perception, and Military Interventions, Ph. D. dissertation (New Haven: Yale
University, 2007), p.16. (Cite Book)

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of benign intentions.8 Alternatively, cheating or reneging on arms control agreements should lead others to
question the intentions of that state. It is important to differentiate the signing of arms control agreements as
a behavioral signal of intentions from indicators associated with the capabilities thesis. Indeed, both
ultimately deal with the relationship between a states military policy and others assessments of its
intentions. However, I argue that there is a qualitative difference between these two types of signals. First,
not all arms control agreements involve a significant change in military capabilities. SALT I and SALT II,
for instance, were freezes that essentially ratified the status quo. Thus, if the capabilities thesis is correct,
the signing of such agreements should not lead to a change in perceived intentions. On the other hand, the
behavioral-signals thesis predicts that the signing of such an agreement constraining future actions would be
perceived as a signal of changing intentions. Second, the two theses would also have different predictions
about both the time perceived intentions should change and the reasoning policy-makers would provide for
explaining the change. If the capabilities thesis is correct, a change in perceived intentions should occur
only when the implementation for the agreement results in an actual decrease in the adversarys capabilities.
If the behavioral-signals thesis is correct, perceived intentions should shift when the arms control agreement
is signed.9 Further, if the capabilities thesis is correct, policy-makers should refer to the actual change in
capabilities as the impetus for a change in their perceptions of the adversarys intentions. However, if the
behavioral-signals thesis is correct, policy makers would refer to the action of signing the agreement as a
critical factor.
In addition to the above-mentioned categories of behavioral-signals that reveal information about
intentions, the literatures about reputation and the use of analogical reasoning suggest that assessments of

Charles L. Glaser, The Security Dilemma Revisited, World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1997), pp. 171-201; Charles L.
Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
9

Evidence indicating that changes in assessments of intentions occurred at the time of the signing of a treaty due to
expectations of future shifts in capabilities is coded as confirming both theses.

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current intentions may be influenced by the adversarys past actions.10 Thus, an adversarys reputation for
aggressive behaviors based on past actions, it is argued, leads a state to infer that such an adversarys
intentions are currently more hostile, while a reputation for peaceful/status quo behavior leads it to infer
more benign intentions. Alternatively, as the political psychology literature suggests, decision-makers may
learn lessons of the past and rely on historical analogies to form current judgments about intentions. 11
To evaluate this proposition, I generate from the behavioral-signals thesis two hypotheses. The first,
termed the Current Actions hypothesis posits that current decision-makers focus most closely on the
actions taken by an adversary under its current leadership. The second, termed the Past Actions
hypothesis posits that leaders focus on actions an adversary took at an earlier time when different leaders
may have been in charge in both countries.In the cases, this implies that any actions by Soviet leaders
before Carter (in case #1) or Reagan (in case #2) had taken power, and all of Hitlers actions before 1934
(in case #3) will be considered as past actions in this study.
RESEARCH METHOD
To evaluate the two theses,12 I look at two sets of perceivers: first, I look at the perceptions of the key
decision-makers, referring to the Prime Minister or the President of the country, and his closest senior
advisors on issues of foreign policy towards that particular adversary; Second, I look at the perceptions of
the intelligence community as they are portrayed in collective reports and estimates. Given that intelligence

10

For example, see Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for DecisionMakers (New York: Free Press, 1986); Ernest R. May, Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in
American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Jack S. Levy, Learning and Foreign Policy:
Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield, International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1994), pp. 279-312; Yuen Foong
Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1992); and Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics.
11

Important work for and against reputation in security studies include, Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory
and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Jonathan
Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Daryl G. Press, Calculating
Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); and Paul Huth, Reputation
and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment, Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1997), pp. 72-99.
12

The theses are not mutually exclusive, and I am open to the possibility that they are both correct.

Page9of63

agencies are responsible for collecting and interpreting information about threats, and that their primary
goal is to inform and support policy-makers in myriad ways, it is quite surprising that existing work has yet
to examine how relevant the work of intelligence actually is in influencing the decision-makers perceptions
about the intentions of major adversaries.13
The cases were selected because, first, they exhibit variation on the key explanatory variables,
capabilities and behavior. Specifically, both the initial level of the capabilities relative to those of the
observer, and the magnitude of change in the adversarys capabilities during the period of interaction vary
across the cases. Thus, both Cold War cases assume relatively equality in military capabilities between the
superpower and a moderate increase (Collapse of Detente case) or decrease (End of Cold War case) in
Soviet capabilities during the interaction period; while the analysis in the Interwar period starts with a
German military that is far inferior to the British one, followed by an unprecedented increase in German
military capabilities that ultimately shifted the balance of power in Germanys favor. Similarly, the cases
provide variation on both the types of actions the adversary was undertaking, as well as the direction in
which they should have influenced perceived intentions.
Second, the cases also address potential alternative variables that might also affect assessments of
intentions. One such variable is the political ideology of the adversary, which received much attention in the
international relations literature on threat perceptions.14 This study is not designed to systematically test the
independent causal role of political ideology in affecting assessments of intentions. However, the cases do

13

The possibility of politicization of intelligence by the civilians decision-makers could present a significant
methodological challenge: namely, by examining the coordinated assessments produced by the intelligence community
we would not be capturing the intelligence communitys inference process, but rather a reflection of the executives
beliefs and policy agenda. I deal with this issue in the broader project, but I can report that I did not find any significant
evidence that would lead me to conclude that intelligence was politicized in any of the three episodes.
14

For example, see Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 19461986, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (1993), pp. 624-638 and Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the
Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, 2nd edn. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
Michael N. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1998); Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). In addition, ideology
has been mentioned as an important signal of intentions in Kydd, Sheep in Sheeps Clothing and Edelstein,
Managing Uncertainty.

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exhibit variation in the adversarys political ideology. Thus, the adversarys ideology changes in both the
Interwar and the end of the Cold War cases, while Soviet ideology remains unchanged during the
interaction I capture in the Collapse of Dtente case. Further, the adversarys political ideology varies in
terms of the expected value it should have on assessments of intentions. However, as the empirical sections
of the book indicate, assessments of intentions fluctuate significantly in all three cases, including in the
Collapse of Dtente case a finding that should undermine our confidence in the causal effect of political
ideology in affecting others perceptions of intentions.
Third, to test the proposition that decision-makers tend to select only those signals that confirm their
pre-existing beliefs, and are therefore resistant to revising their assessments of intentions, I look at three
cases where the primary decision-makers (Chamberlain, Carter, and Reagan) differed not only with regards
to the kind of initial enemy image they had held, but also with regards to how institutionalized these beliefs
were. For example, while Reagan had had strong convictions about the aggressive intentions of the Soviet
Union in 1985; Carter had held quite dovish views of Soviet intentions in 1977 that were much less
entrenched than those of Reagan. I show that regardless of the differences in base-line and nature of their
beliefs about the adversary, all three decision-makers underwent a significant change in their assessments of
the adversarys intentions during a relatively short period of interaction; and more significantly, that they
did not cherry-pick the indicators that best suited their pre-existing beliefs or political agenda. Finally, the
direction of change in perceived intentions varies as well, while both the interwar and dtente cases exhibit
change towards more malign intentions, the end of the cold war points to a change towards more benign
interpretation of the adversarys intentions.15
I subject each of the three cases to two probes: First, I use the congruence procedure where I look for
covariance between the independent variables cited in each thesis and the dependent variable of perceptions

15

One potential criticism is that all cases entail assessments of Western democracies about the intentions of their nondemocratic adversaries. This is primarily due to the fact that the quantity and quality of available data from nondemocracies is not rich enough to permit us to have a reasonable grasp of what decision makers and intelligence
analysts in these countries discussed and thought when they inferred the intentions of their adversaries.

Page11of63

of intentions, especially as the variables changed over the course of interactions. For example, according to
the capabilities thesis, when the adversarys capabilities increase/decrease, observers should perceive its
intentions as more/less malign. If there is no correlation between the predictions of a thesis and the time or
direction in which perceptions of intentions change, we have evidence against that thesis; In the second
stage, I rely on a method of processing tracing to examine whether leaders and intelligence reports
explicitly cited the adversarys capabilities or his behavior as relevant evidence in their assessments of his
intentions. This latter component is important as it provides a further check against mistaking correlation
for causation. For empirical source, I primarily relied on declassified documents and intelligence reports,
secondary literature, the record of these leaders public statements. In the larger project, I code the archival
documents and the intelligence estimates using a standardized set of questions that probe to whether, to
what extent, and why assessment of intentions changes. 16 Below is a summary of the evidence.

The Collapse of Dtente: 1977-1980

President Carter began his tenure with great optimism about the Soviet Union. During his presidency,
however, Carters image of the Soviet Union appears to have changed. His policies vacillated for the first
three years, and became clearly more hawkish following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During his last
year in office, he did not meet with Soviet leaders, increased the defense budget, withdrew the SALT II
Treaty from the Senate consideration, and articulated the Carter Doctrine. How did Carter and his two main
foreign policy advisors -- Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and the National Security Adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski17-- perceive Soviet intentions? Did the US intelligence community rely on similar indicators to
estimate the objectives of the Soviet Union during that period?
PERCEIVED SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND BEHAVIOR (1977-1980)

16

See Authors Dissertation, Chapter I. After coding the documents according to the standardized questions, I randomly
selected 10% of the available documents and recoded them. There were no inconsistencies in the results.
17

On the relationship between the three decision-makers, see Jerel A. Rosati, The Carter Administration's Quest for
Global Community: Beliefs and their Impact on Behavior (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), p. 183.

Page12of63

The common consensus during this period was that the Soviets were building up and modernizing their
capabilities and that the military balance of power increasingly favored the Soviet Union.18

In the

conventional realm the Soviets were expanding their already large ground and theater air forces and to be
introducing modern systems that were equal or superior to those of NATO.19 Especially of concern were the
deployment of Soviet IRBMs (SS-20) in Europe, which, against the backdrop of central strategic parity,
produced a growing awareness of the possibilities that Soviet continental strategic superiority could
provide.20 While maintaining asymmetric equivalence with the Soviet Union,21 the defense establishment
was especially worried that Soviet counterforce capability was increasing rapidly. Furthermore, it was
feared that the Soviets were steadily improving the survivability and flexibility of their strategic forces,
which had reached the potential capability to destroy some four-fifths of the US Minuteman silos by 198081.22 Soviet damage-limitation capabilities, however, were still judged to be poor despite large and
continuing Soviet investment.23
As for Soviet behavioral signals, two particular sets of actions were significant from the perspective of US
observers. The first was the signing of the SALT II Treaty in June 1979 which assumed real reductions in

18

Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978, p.8. Report by Secretary of Defense on the FY 1979 Budget, January 23,
1978. pp.65-66.
19

The Development of Soviet Military Power: Trends Since 1965 and Prospects for the 1980s, (SR 81-10035X) p.xiiixv.

20

NIE 11-6-78, pp.2-3.

21

NSC meeting, June 4, 1979. Quoted in Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security
Advisor, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983), p.334-336. As for the perceived military balance in
Europe, it was estimated to favor the Warsaw Pact forces, which were generally superior quantitatively and were
making significant qualitative improvements. The Balance of Nuclear Forces in Central Europe, SR 78-10004; and
1978 Comprehensive Net Assessment.

22

NIE 11-3/8-79, pp. 2, 4. Later, the community modified this estimate. It claimed that the Soviets were then able to
destroy 60% of US ICBMs, and about 90% by 1985. However it was believed that US deployment of MX missiles in
multiple protective shelters in the late 1980s would make the accomplishment of the Soviet counterforce mission a much
more expensive proposition. NIE 11-3/8-80, p. B-12.
23

NIE 11-3/8-78, pp. 5-6, 11; see also, Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, on the FY 1979 Budget, January
23, 1978. pp.65-66; and Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, January 25, 1979, p.70.

Page13of63

strategic forces to 2,250 of all categories of delivery vehicles on both sides.24 The second, and most
significant from the perspective of US policymakers, was Soviet interventions in crises around the world.
This was the single most cited type of Soviet action that appeared in the correspondence between the key
decision-makers at the time, as well as the only one that was systematically addressed in the context of
perceived intentions. According to the International Conflict Behavior Dataset, the Soviets intervened in 26
conflicts between 1975 and 1980,25 out of which 2 involved direct military force: Ethiopia in early 1978 and
Afghanistan in December 1979. In addition, intelligence revealed in 1979 that the Soviets had placed a
combat brigade in Cuba. This episode created much panic in Washington that was quickly defused when
American decision-makers realized that the brigade had been in Cube since 1962. 26
American decision-makers did not weight all Soviet interventions equally. Starting in 1978, Soviet actions
were perceived as increasing in quantity, and at the same time, they were judged to be undergoing a
qualitative change both in terms of the means the Soviets employed in these interventions and the countries
where they chose to intervene. The concerns were twofold: unlike the events in Angola (1975) in which the
Soviets relied almost entirely on Cuban forces as proxies, the Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa (1978)
was more direct; later, in Afghanistan (late-1979 to 1980), the full-scale direct military force used by the
Soviet Union transformed it into a crisis actor. The second concern was that the observed pattern of Soviet
actions, known at the time as the arc of crises, which had been running from Africa to South-West Asia
would develop to include regions and countries that were more important to the interests of the United
States. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 significantly intensified this fear, especially in terms of

24

As a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter decided to table SALT II, believing that ratification of the
Treaty was dead in the Senate. NSC Repot #123.
25

The USSR exhibited low-level involvement in 11 crises; exhibited covert or semi-military activities in 13 crises; and
used direct military force in Ethiopia in 1978, and in Afghanistan in 1979. For a quick summary of these crises see ICB
dataset, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/.
26

On the disagreement between Brzezinski and Vance on the importance of the brigade crisis, see Vance, Hard
Choices, pp. 360-361; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 347; NSC reports, #98, #103, #104, and #109.

Page14of63

the implications it could have had on U.S. oil interests in the Middle East; in addition, it represented the first
direct use of force to restore a pro-Soviet regime outside of Warsaw Pact countries.
Table 1 summarizes the theses predictions. While Soviet capabilities and behavior essentially move in
the same direction, the case contains multiple points of observation that are tested against different type of
historical evidence. Thus, the two theses make somewhat different predictions about the time we should
expect assessments of intentions to change. But more importantly, they make substantially different
predictions about the kind of evidence observers should have used to support their assessments.
T ABLE 1: S UMMARY OF P REDICTIONS (1977-1980)
THESIS

THE CAPABILITIES
THESIS

HYPOTHESIS

The NumericalPreponderance
Hypothesis

The Recent Actions

Hypothesis
THE BEHAVIORALSIGNALS THESIS

STATED BELIEFS
ABOUT
INTENTIONS

Increasingly hostile

REASONING ABOUT
INTENTIONS
Observers should refer
to Soviet military
buildup, the correlations
of forces when
assessing Soviet
intentions

More hostile following

Soviet military
involvement in the horn
of Africa, and even
more hostile following
the invasion of
Afghanistan

Observers should refer

to Soviet interventions
in the Third World
when assessing Soviet
intentions

No predictions 27

No predictions

The Past Actions

Hypothesis

DECISION-MAKERS IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATIONS PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

27

The past actions hypothesis can only predict in this case that statements about current intentions be correlated with and
supported by assessments about the adversarys past actions. The thesis predictions cannot be further specified because
there was no one particular Soviet action before 1977 that appeared to be the focal point in discussions about the Soviet
Union during the period between 1977 and 1980.

Page15of63

To measure Carters, Brzezinskis and Vances perceptions, I rely on correspondence between Carter and
his senior advisors, such as the body of Brzezinskis weekly reports to President Carter,28 opinion reports,
an interview I conducted with Brzezinski, and the protocols of the Policy Review Committee and the
Special Coordination Committee. 29
During the first year of Carters presidency, he perceived Soviet intentions to be opportunistic but not
expansionist. Brzezinskis private weekly memoranda to Carter also reveal that even the more hawkish
members of the Carters administration viewed Soviet objectives, at least in the short term, as mostly
cooperative in nature.30 Throughout 1978, third world conflicts were growing in scope, intensity, and
importance. During this year Brzezinskis weekly reports to the President indicate a change in perceptions
of Soviet motivations, leading him to conclude by the end of that year that Soviet actions in Africa were a
part of a grand design to expand. But this change was a gradual one. In January 1978 he had still maintained
that either by design or simply as a response to an apparent opportunity, the Soviets have stepped up their
efforts to exploit African turbulence to their own advantage.31 A week later, he explained to Carter that the
Soviet leaders may be acting merely in response to an apparent opportunity, or the Soviet actions may be
part of a wider strategic design.32 On February 9, 1978, he provided Carter with an explicit (and rare)
account of not only what he thought about the intentions of the Soviets, in which he presented a table that
divides Soviets behavior into three kinds: Benign, Neutral, and Malignant.33 [See Table 2] Reviewing
Soviet actions, Brzezinski described Soviet objectives as seeking selective dtente.34 During February and

28

The latter provide an excellent source of information about the perceptions held by Brzezinski who wrote these reports
so frequently, that they can pinpoint changes in his attitudes with great accuracy; also, they include Carters handwritten
comments, thus revealing to some extent Carters own opinions about Brzezinskis perceptions and suggestions.
29

The NSC hardly met and during that period. Rosati, The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community.

30

Check Zbigs memo from Feb 26, 1977; NSC report #18.

31

NSC Report #42.

32

Memo for the President from Brzezinski, quoted in Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 181.

33

NSC Report #47.

34

Ibid.

Page16of63

March, the Ethiopians (backed by the Cuban and Soviet forces) continued their successful drive to push the
defeated Somali army out of Ethiopia. These events had led Brzezinski to seriously doubt whether Soviet
intentions were merely opportunistic, claiming instead that the USSR was in Ethiopia because it has a
larger design in mind.35 These conclusions were reiterated in subsequent reports to the president.36
While not dismissing Soviet actions in Africa as unimportant, Vance did not believe these were part of a
grand Soviet plan, but rather attempts to exploit targets of opportunity.37 From Vances point of view,
Soviet actions were within the bounds of acceptable competition.38 Alarmed by Carters growing
skepticism about Soviet motivations and objectives, Vance requested a formal review of U.S-Soviet
relations in May 1978.

In it, he explained to the President that many are asking whether this

Administration has decided to make a sharp shift in its foreign policy priorities and expressed his alarm
about Brzezinskis influence over the presidents image of the USSR.39 Indeed, during this period Carters
growing distrust of Soviet intentions, which was ignited by Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa,
became apparent. This was signaled by two shifts: first, a series of public statements were made by the
president, depicting the Soviets as less trustworthy and calling for the adoption of a harsher US stance
toward the Soviets; and, second, a growing understanding between him and Brzezinski regarding the Soviet
Union.40

35

Memo for the President from Brzezinski, The Soviet Union and Ethiopia: Implications for US Soviet Relations,
March 3, 1978.
36

NSC Report #55, #57.

37

Vance, Hard Choices, p. 84.

Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 101-103, adding, [The Soviets] felt our human rights efforts were aimed at overthrowing
their system; they saw our behavior as unpredictable; and they were growing uncertain as to whether we still wanted a
SALT Treaty. Ibid
39
Memo from Vance to Carter, May, 29, 1978. Document released to author under FOIA, July 2007. Case #:200604709.
38

40

See also, Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 188-189 and Richard C. Thornton, The Carter Years: Toward a New
Global Order (New York: Paragon House, 1991), p. 185.

Page17of63

By mid-1978, Vance and Brzezinski placed themselves in opposite camps. Carters own views were still
incoherent and vacillating. Describing two distinct views on Soviet intentions, Brzezinski wrote to
Carter:
One view, was that the Soviets have stomped all over the code of dtente. They continue to
pursue a selective dtente. Their action reflects growing assertiveness in Soviet foreign policy
generally Another View was that the record of Soviet action is much more mixed and has to be
considered case-by-case. The Soviets are acting on traditional lines and essentially reacting to
U.S. steps. 41

By early 1979 Brzezinski had already been confident about his assessment that the Soviets were pursuing
an expansionist grand design, and continued to press Carter to act more assertively. He wrote to Carter
that recent Soviet involvement in Cambodia coupled with Soviet recent actions in Africa revealed a
revisionist pattern.42 Carter was very concerned about recent Soviet involvement in those crises; but for now
he decided to reject Brzezinskis calls to deliberately toughen both the tone and the substance of our
foreign policy.43 The issue of Soviet intentions resurfaced as a source of debate in the administration
during the crisis over the Soviet brigade in Cuba. Brzezinski perceived this episode as further confirming
his thesis that the Soviet side was becoming more assertive and the U.S. more acquiescent. Carter was
concerned, but like Vance he also wished to defuse the crisis and to prevent the political death of SALT II.44
During the summer of 1979, Carters skepticism about Soviet intentions continued to grow. These views
changed further following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which signified a major turning point for
Carter. His statements, actions, and policies during and following the invasion clearly indicate that his
perception of Soviet intentions changed most dramatically, leading him to declare that the action of the
Soviets had made a more dramatic change in my opinion of what the Soviets ultimate goals are than

41

NSC Report #65.

42

NSC Report #84.

43

NSC Report #109.

44

Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 347-351.

Page18of63

anything theyve done in the previous time that Ive been in office. 45 Carter no longer perceived the Soviet
leadership as opportunistic, but rather as pursuing well-planned expansionist goals. Others in the
administration, especially the NSC headed by Brzezinski similarly regarded the invasion as symptomatic
of Soviet behavior, believing that the Soviet Union was currently in an assertive phase of its history.
Summarizing his thoughts, Brzezinski explained,
Soviet behavior is still prudent, but it does involve a gradual shift from political encouragement of often
geographically remote ideological sympathizers, to more direct support of them through the use of Cuban
proxies in the mid-1970s, to even more direct projection of Soviet military power itself currently.46

Meanwhile, Vances special advisor on Soviet affairs, Marshall Shulman disagreed viewed the invasion as
an aberration from Soviet behavior

47

that reflected largely as an expedient reaction to opportunities

rather than as a manifestation of a more sustained trend.48

In sum, the timing and direction of change in Brzezinskis and Carters perceptions of Soviet
intentions match most closely the expectations of the behavioral-signals thesis. Nonetheless, this thesis
cannot account for Vances reluctance to change his views following the intervention in the Horn and the
invasion of Afghanistan.

45

Jimmy Carter, interview, Meet the Press, NBC, January 20, 1980. Also, see Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 480; Message
for Brezhnev from Carter Regarding Afghanistan, December 28, 1979; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 429.
46

NSC Report #134.

47

NSC Report #134; for a similar logic, see Memorandum for Warren Christopher from Marshall Shulman, Notes on
SU/Afghanistan, January 22, 1980; Vance, Hard Choices, p. 388.
48

Vances own perceptions of Soviet political intentions appear to have remained unchanged even after the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. In public, Vance tried to downplay the relevance of analyzing Soviet intention. Garthoff,
Dtente and Confrontation, p. 1070. Finally, on December, 1981, when asked how do you perceive the intentions of
the Soviet Union in international politics, Vance replied that in order to spread Marxism, the Soviets will seek targets
of opportunity wherever they may arise. However, when asked, Do you believe the Soviet Union is pursuing a
strategy to dominate the world? he replied: No, I believe they are realistic enough to recognize that they cannot
dominate the world. I do believe, however, that they are going to take advantage of opportunities, wherever they may be
found, which will advance their basic ideology or theology, whatever you want to call it. (Emphasis Added). When
Shulman was asked whether Vance perceived the Soviets as sort of bent on world domination, he replied: I think he
would put it differently, my impression is that he feels that the Soviets Union would take advantage of opportunities to
expand its influence wherever it thought it could do so, safely, and then with acceptable cost. The interview was
conducted by Melchoire Joseph Laucella for a Ph. D. dissertation entitled Cyrus Vance's Worldview: The Relevance of
the Motivated Perspective (The Union Institute, 1996).

Page19of63

The two alternative theses about perceived intentions indicate quite different processes through which
decision-makers justify and reason their assessments of an adversarys intentions. Out of roughly 7,000
primary documents I read, the reasoning evidence provides overwhelming support for the behavioralsignals thesis and only weak support for the capabilities thesis. Soviet interventions constituted the most
significant indicator from which intentions were inferred. Second, although not all senior decision-makers
changed their perceptions of Soviet intentions at the same time or to the same extent, all of them explicitly
and frequently utilized Soviet international behavior to support their conclusions. Their disagreement was
thus not about whether intentions could or should be inferred from these actions but was instead about two
different issues: how Soviet interventionism should be interpreted, and to what extent Soviet
interventionism indicated intentions.49 The rest of this section provides some empirical examples.
In his second weekly report to the president, Brzezinski explained that his assessments about Soviet
intentions seem to emerge from Soviet behavior and statements since the election.50 The table he
presented to Carter in February 1978 [See Table 2] is illuminating not simply because it reveals how
Brzezinski analyzed Soviet intentions but also because of what it does not include, or more accurately, by
what Brzezinski chose not to include in it. Thus, we see no mention of indices of capabilities, but only those
pertaining to recent Soviet behavior; the latter, however, are not confined to Soviet interventionism.51
During the Cuban brigade affair Brzezinski evaluated the Soviet intentions by looking at its past actions in
Cuba in order to determine whether and to what extent their current behavior was different from the
pattern established from the mid-1960s until recently. 52 With additional clues from Soviet international

49

Brzezinskis nicely illustrates the differences in interpretations in Memo for the President from Brzezinski, The Soviet
Union and Ethiopia: Implications for US Soviet Relations, March 3, 1978.

50

NSC Report #2.

51

Others in the NSC invoked similar reasoning, for example see, Memo for Brzezinski from Paul Henze Fundamentals
in the Horn of Africa Situation, January 16, 1978. For a similar reasoning see, Telegram for Cyrus Vance from US
Ambassador in Moscow, Prospects for US-Soviet Cooperation on Horn, February, 1978.
52

NSC Report #95.

Page20of63

behavior, particularly in relationship to the various troubled spots,53 Brzezinski concluded that the
deployment of a Soviet brigade in Cuba was another manifestation of Soviet expansionist designs.54
Soviet actions in Afghanistan were used by Brzezinski to further bolster his assessments of Soviet
intentions. Publicly, Brzezinski maintained the position that Soviet motives for the Afghan invasion could
not be known.55 Yet, his private writings clearly reveal his conviction that Soviet actions in Afghanistan
represented a qualitative shift in the behavior of the Soviet Union specifically, due to the level and type of
force employed by Soviets -which indicated that the USSR was currently entering in an assertive phase
of its history.56 This was especially worrying given that Afghanistan was the seventh state since 1975 in
which communist parties had come to power with Soviet guns, tanks, and assistance (Vietnam, Angola,
Laos, South Yemen, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and now probably Afghanistan).57
What is especially striking about Brzezinskis reasoning is how rarely he referred to Soviet capabilities in
this context, even though evidence of recent Soviet military buildup would have bolstered the hawks case. I
could only find five statements in which Brzezinski invoked the Soviet military buildup as indicative of
Soviet intentions. For example, in one of his weekly reports to Carter, Brzezinski writes:
There is also a further point to be registered: Soviet defense programs are going beyond the needs of
legitimate deterrence and are increasingly pointing towards the acquisition of something which might
approximate a war-fighting capability. While we do not know why the Soviets are doing this
(intentions?), we do know that their increased capabilities have consequences for our national security.58
(Emphasis Added).

53

NSC Report #109.

54

Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 349.

55

Brzezinski, Power and Principle p. 430.

56

NSC Report #134.

57

Memo for the President from Brzezinski, Strategic reaction to the Afghanistan problem, January 3, 1980.

58

NSC Report #75. Part of the reason, Brzezinski explains in an interview, was that Soviet capabilities were not a good
indicator of what the Soviets would necessarily do in the future; and second, because Carter himself did not believe that
the Soviet military buildup was quite worrisome. In his memoirs, Brzezinski writes that Carter expressed his belief that
Soviet superiority was a perception created by members of the NSC. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p.336.

Page21of63

This statement, I argue, does not lend support to the capabilities thesis. Although Brzezinski does sound
concerned about the recent trend in Soviet military buildup, he explicitly says that he cannot infer from
these indicators what the Soviets intentions are. Instead, he claims that the recent increases in Soviet
capabilities have an effect on the overall assessment of threat but not necessarily on the assessment of
intentions.59
As with Brzezinski, recent Soviet actions in the Third World weighed heavily in Vances assessment of
Soviet intentions, lending significant support to the behavioral-signals thesis. The difference between
Brzezinski and Vance lay, then, not in the categories of information each prioritized, but instead in the
manner in which each interpreted similar information. While Brzezinski focused on trends in Soviet
behavior, Vance analyzed the merits of each individual Soviet action. Thus, while viewing the invasion of
Afghanistan as representing a somewhat qualitative shift in Soviet behavior, it did not necessarily indicate a
change in overall intentions.60

Like Brzezinski, Vance did not discount altogether previous Soviet

interventions, noting that, Afghanistan is the manifestation of a larger problem, evident also in Ethiopia,
South Yemen, Southeast Asia and elsewhere.61 Yet he interpreted Afghanistan as an aberration from past
Soviet actions and as something therefore not necessarily indicative of its future behavior.62 Finally, the
reasoning used by the doves to explain their assessment of Soviet intentions lends nearly no support at all to
the capabilities thesis. This does not necessarily refute this thesis, but it is striking in comparison to the
overwhelming support I was able to find in favor of the behavioral-signals thesis.
Reasoning evidence about Carters assessment, although more limited in its scope, also lends strongest
support to the behavioral-signals thesis. Whenever Carter did discuss Soviet intentions, he used Soviet

59

Brzezinski also addressed capabilities in other reports, but he did not link them implicitly or explicitly -- to assessment
of Soviet political intentions. NSC Report #33 and #108.
60

Meeting the Challenge in Southwest Asia, February 1, 1980, State Department Bulletin, Vol. 80 (March 1980), p.35.

61

Cyrus Vance, statement of U.S foreign policy before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 27, 1980, quoted
in Vance, Hard Choices, p. 502.
62

NSC Report #134. Marshall Shulman employed a similar reasoning; see Memorandum for Warren Christopher from
Marshall Shulman, Notes on SU/Afghanistan, January 22, 1980.

Page22of63

international behavior as the main explanation. Before Afghanistan, Carter was uncertain as to the nature of
Soviet intentions, but their aggressive behavior led him to adopt a tougher stance. Thus, on February 9,
1979, he handed a memo to Brown, explaining that with or without a grand plan, determined Soviet efforts
as evidenced in the Horn of Africa, the PDRY, and Afghanistan, now abetted by turmoil in Iran, could lead
to general disorder or the imposition of dominant Soviet influence, which the U.S. and its friends cannot
tolerate.63 The invasion of Afghanistan no longer left doubts in Carters mind as to the expansionist nature
of Soviet objectives. Thus, for example, in a telegram to Chancellor Schmidt in February 1980, Carter
explained that In light of other Soviet activities in the region especially in Ethiopia and Yemen we
would have to regard a prolonged Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as part of a calculated strategic thrust
against the Wests vital interests.64
In conclusion, the historical evidence indicates that both the timing and direction in changed perceptions
are most consistent with the predictions of the behavioral-signals thesis. Brzezinskis reports clearly show
that a significant shift in his perceptions occurred during the latter half of 1978, as a result of Soviet actions
in the Horn. Carters views shifted somewhat following the Soviet intervention in the Horn, but it was the
invasion of Afghanistan that radically changed his perceptions about the Soviet political and military
objectives. Finally, Vance continued to view Soviet political intentions as opportunistic following the
invasion of Afghanistan. Evidence in the form of reasoning lends overwhelming support for the behavioralsignals thesis. In addition, it is surprising that despite the growing Soviet military buildup at the time,
which according to some hawks was reminiscent of Nazi Germanys rearmament in the 1930s,65 decision-

63

Memo from the President to Brown, February 8, 1979. Obtained through DDRS.

64

Letter from President Carter to Chancellor Schmidt, February 9, 1980. Obtained through DDRS.

65

Charles Tyroler, Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger (Washington: PergamonBrasseys, 1984), p. 10. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff similarly stated that not since Germanys
rearmament in the 1930s has the world witnessed such a single-minded emphasis on military expansion by a major
power. Gen. David Jones, as quoted in Les Aspin, What Are the Russians Up To? International Security, Vol. 3, No.
1 (1978), p. 30.

Page23of63

makers at the Carter administration only rarely invoked such indicators to support their assessments of
Soviet intentions.
US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: 1977- 1980
As opposed to the above discussion, the conclusions the intelligence community drew about Soviet
intentions reveal that neither the capabilities nor the behavioral-signals thesis can account for the exact time
which estimates about Soviet intentions fluctuated.66 However, the reasoning the NIEs used to support
intelligence assessments of Soviet intentions provides overwhelming support for the capabilities thesis and
only weak support for the behavioral-signals thesis.
During 1977 the NIEs portrayed Soviet intentions as seeking to exploit dtente.67 The estimates during
the following year were more alarming a change that is consistent with the predictions of both the
capabilities and the behavioral-signals thesis. Portraying the Soviets as relentless in their efforts to change
the correlation of forces in their favor, the intelligence community concluded that the Soviets would more
aggressively pursue opportunities to expand in the Third World. Nevertheless, an important 1978 NIE
concluded,
On the whole, such a prognosis, while projecting some increase in the assertiveness of the Soviet Union
external behavior, represents a fairly natural evolution of the USSRs foreign policyIt is therefore a
prognosis of continuity, taking into account, however, the greatly enhanced military capabilities and more
insistent claims to a global role associated with the USSRs emergence as a superpower.68

Unlike the civilian decision-makers, and contrary to the predictions of the behavioral-signals thesis, the
invasion of Afghanistan did not produce a change in the NIEs estimates about the Soviet intentions. In fact,
two NIEs that were released a few months following the invasion are striking because they describe the

66

Yet NIEs from this period described a more hostile USSR than the ones published in the first half of the 1970s, partly
as a result of Team Bs criticism of the CIAs Soviet estimates in 1976. For a detailed discussion on this episodes and
its effects of the NIEs estimates see authors dissertation, and Anne H. Cahn, Killing Dtente: The Right Attacks the
CIA (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1998).
67

NIE 11-4/77, 11-3/8-77.

68

NIE 11-4-78, x.

Page24of63

Soviet objectives to be more moderate, and their behavior as more prudent, than those of any of the
estimates discussed thus far. For instance, NIE 11-3/8-79 (released in March 1980) written in large part
by DCI Turner himself -- claimed that the important aims underlying the Soviets programs were to
strengthen USSRs deterrent.69 Further, the NIE portrayed the Soviets as highly concerned by future
adverse trends in the correlation of forces, as a result of recent U.S. and NATO initiatives to modernize and
deploy new weapons systems.70
The fact that Soviet actions in Afghanistan did not lead the intelligence community to describe Soviet
intentions as more hostile is inconsistent with the predictions of the behavioral-signals analysis. We may
never know why DCI Turner and the community in large chose to characterize Soviet intentions as such,
although it seems as though calculations of future quantitative and qualitative trends in the balance of power
affected the communitys assessments. Both NIEs 11-3/8-79 and 11-3/8-80 (released in December 1980)
included (for the first time) explicit net assessments of US and Soviet capabilities, taking into
considerations not only the anticipated US military buildup under Carter, but also calculations of what the
US and Soviet forces could actually accomplish in the event of nuclear exchange. This had the effect of
diminishing the significance of Soviet growing military capabilities and increasing the confidence
intelligence analysts believed Soviet military derived from those capabilities. Consequently a less assertive
Soviet foreign policy was envisioned.71

69

NIE 11-3/8-79, p. 4.

70

The DIA and the military intelligence agencies disassociated themselves from the estimate, describing Soviet aims as
less prudent . It estimated that the Soviets belief in its increasing superiority during the next three to five years would
probably lead it to attempt to secure maximum political advantages from its military arsenal in anticipation of US
force modernization programs; and that "the Soviet leadership is now confident that the strategic military balance has
shifted in the Kremlin's favor and that the aggressiveness of its foreign policy will continue to increase as the Soviet
advantage grows." Ibid, p. 4 and B17-B18.
71

DIA and all the military intelligence chiefs argued that the use of comparative force analysis drives and distorts the
Estimates judgments. NIE 11-3/8-79, p. 3. Turner did acknowledge the importance of past actions, saying "during the
early-to-middle 1980s, when the Soviets' strategic capabilities relative to those of the United States would be greatest, we
would expect them--as in the past--to probe and challenge the United States . . . " Yet, the bulk of the assessments of
Soviet future behavior by Turner and the rest of the community relied most heavily on current and projected estimates of
Soviet capabilities. Ibid, p.B17-B18.

Page25of63

Throughout the period, calculations of Soviet material capabilities, the current and projected strategic
balance, and the types of weapons the Soviets were amassing all appear to have driven assessments of
Soviet intentions. Inter-agency disagreements about how the Soviets perceived their own military strength
and the evolving correlation of forces led to significant differences in the conclusions they reached about
Soviet intentions. Those agencies that perceived the Soviets as highly confident in their power were also the
ones predicting that Soviet foreign policy would become more aggressive. Alternatively, those agencies
who perceived Soviet capabilities to be weaker also saw Soviet intentions as less aggressive and their
objectives as more moderate. To be sure, interpretations of Soviet capabilities and intentions were often
tainted by clear bureaucratic interests. Whatever the parochial motives of analysts from different agencies,
the key point to which I am drawing attention is that, despite their disagreements about Soviet intentions, all
grounded their estimates of intentions in Soviet capabilities.
Finally, in stark contrast to the way members of the Carter administration assessed Soviet intentions, the
intelligence community rarely made references to past and current Soviet actions to support inferences
about future intentions.72 Soviet actions in the Third World were discussed almost entirely in the context of
how confident the Soviets had become in their military power.

The End of the Cold War: 1985-1988

PERCEIVED SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND BEHAVIOR (1985-1988)
Realist accounts of the end of the Cold War point to the decline in Soviet relative power during the late
1980s.73 Yet, the archival documents show that during the second Reagan administration, the US

72

NIE 11-4-78 made some references to current Soviet actions with respect to SALT and dtente. This line of reasoning
however was rarely invoked. NIE 4-1-78, pp. ix, x, and 17.
73

Wohlforth, William, 1994/5. Realism and the End of the Cold War. International Security, 19;(3): 91-129.

Page26of63

intelligence community estimated that Soviet military power were growing74 and that Soviet strategic-force
modernization efforts were comprehensive.75 As for the conventional military balance between the two
superpowers, declassified reports pointed to a strong advantage in favor of the Warsaw Pact over NATO in
almost all categories of forces resulting from the continuing pace of Warsaw Pact weapons production. 76 In
addition, the theater nuclear balance of power was perceived as extremely threatening prior to the signing of
the INF Treaty due to vigorous modernization and initial deployment of the Soviet SS-20 missiles in
Europe.
The INF Treaty became effective in June 1988. While the Treaty signaled Soviet willingness to accept
highly disproportionate cuts and intrusive on-site inspections, from a capabilities standpoint while the
Treaty substantially affected Soviet MRBM and IRBM forces, it did not diminish Soviet ability to waging a
nuclear war in the view of the intelligence community.77 Finally, in December 1988, Gorbachev announced
a unilateral and meaningful reduction in Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe. The US intelligence
community paid close attention to these developments, but a change in the perceived balance of capabilities
resulting from these reductions only occurred in late 1989 following the initial phase of the unilateral force
reductions. Thus, for the period in question, Soviet capabilities were not perceived as diminishing in either
size or quality.78

74

Noel E. Firth, Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates, 1950-1990 (College Station, Texas A&M
University Press, 1998), pp. 98-11. Starting in 1983, the CIA acknowledged that Soviet weapons procurement growth
had been flat since 1975, and that the rate of growth in overall defense spending since 1975 had actually dropped, and
in weapons procurement the rate was almost flat. F. D. Holzman, Politics and Guesswork: CIA and DIA Estimates of
Soviet Military Spending, International Security, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1989), pp. 101-131; Noel E. Firth, Soviet Defense
Spending, pp. 98-11.
75
For example see NIE 11-3/8-86, NIE 11-3/8-87, NIE 11-3/8-88.
76

Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress, 1989, p. 29.

77

NIE 11-3/8-88, p.5; DoD reflected reached a similar conclusion. Soviet Military Power, 1989, p. 7; 1990, pp. 54-55.

78

NIC M 89-10003, Status of Soviet Unilateral Withdrawals, October 1989.

Page27of63

As for changes in Soviet behavior, Gorbachevs attempts to signal a change in Soviet behavior
during 1985 and 1986 did not receive serious attention.79 Soviet behavior during 1987-1988 offered
additional and significant reassurances to the United States. Especially important were the public
announcements of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan;80 Soviet pursuit of multilateral negotiations on
several other regional conflicts including Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua; and Gorbachevs actions to
restructure the political system in the Soviet Union.81 To be sure, some decision-makers in the United States
did recognize Gorbachevs efforts to institute glasnost within the Soviet Union during 1987 as significant.
But it was only from mid-1988 that his actions were perceived as sincerely aimed at fundamental
institutional change.82
T ABLE 3: S UMMARY OF P REDICTIONS (1985-1988)

THESIS

THE CAPABILITIES
THESIS

HYPOTHESIS

The NumericalPreponderance
Hypothesis

STATED BELIEFS
ABOUT
INTENTIONS

Increasingly hostile

Less hostile following

the signing of the INF

REASONING ABOUT
INTENTIONS
Observers should refer
to Soviet military
buildup, the correlations
of forces when
assessing Soviet
intentions
Observers should refer
to Soviet reassuring

79

Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, pp. 275-276 and Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet
Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 334.
80

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told Shultz on the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan in September
1987. Gorbachev publicly confirmed this decision in February 1988.
81

On the importance of the Nineteenth Party Conference of June 1988 see, Mark L. Haas, The United States and the
End of the Cold War: Reactions to Shifts in Soviet Power, Policies, or Domestic Politics? International Organization,
Vol. 61, No. 1 (2007), pp. 145-179.

82

As late as the end of 1987, both Shultz and Matlock argued that Gorbachevs actions had not yet signified fundamental
reforms. George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribners Sons,
1993), p. 1081; Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, pp. 295-296; In mid-1988, Reagan praised Gorbachev for initiating a
true democratic reform. He added that these reforms were cause for shaking the head in wonder, leading him to view
Gorbachev as a serious man seeking serious reform. State Department Bulletin, 1988, vol. 2137, pp. 37-38.

Page28of63

The Recent Actions

Hypothesis

THE BEHAVIORALSIGNALS THESIS

Treaty; and increasingly

benign following the
Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan and
domestic institutional
changes

The Past Actions

Hypothesis

Hostile

actions under
Gorbachev when
assessing Soviet
intentions

Observers should refer

to Soviet actions in the
Third World in late
1970s when assessing
Soviet intentions

PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS AND THE SECOND REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

The Reagan administration came into power with long-standing and well-established beliefs about the
expansionist nature of the Soviet Union. Following the Moscow summit in May 1988, Reagan asserted that
his speech five years earlier, in which he had referred to the Soviet Union as an evil empire, was no
longer relevant, and he claimed that his comment belonged to another time, another era.83 What caused
the change in how Soviet intentions were perceived?
An evaluation of the available documents indicates that, similarly to members of the Carter
administration, Soviet behavior was the most decisive indicator from which Reagan and his closest foreign
policy advisor, George Shultz, inferred Soviet intentions.84 Reagan and Shultz perceived Soviet intentions
to be expansionist until mid-1987. They did take note early on that, unlike previous Soviet leaders,

83

Quoted in Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 352.

In addition to declassified materials, I reviewed all relevant public statements made by these decision-makers for
which printed transcripts can be obtained. In all cases, I regard as relevant only statements that were delivered by these
officials (i.e., they have to say what is attributed to them). Finally, I rely on interviews that I conducted with
Ambassador Jack Matlock, and Secretary George Shultz. I do not examine the views of Casper Weinberger because
first, he resigns in 1987 for personal reasons; second, most of his public statements do not contain explicit references to
Soviet intentions; third, his private papers are still declassified. Weinbergers 1990 memoirs clearly indicate however
that neither changes in Soviet capabilities nor in Gorbachevs behavior led him to reexamine his views about the
expansionist intentions of the Soviet Union. Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: 7 Critical Years in the
Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), pp. 348-349.
84

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Gorbachev did not express support for the Brezhnev Doctrine. Yet, even after the first summit meeting with
Gorbachev in December 1985, Reagan stated both in public and in private that Gorbachev was still
dedicated to traditional Soviet goals and that he had yet to see a break from past Soviet behavior.85 During
the following year, Reagan and Shultz certainly began to view Gorbachevs policies as signaling a positive
change, but only in attitude. The briefing books circulated to the President prior to the Reykjavik summit
meeting in October 1986 did not anticipate Gorbachevs concessions on strategic and intermediate-range
missiles, space, defense and nuclear testing. Yet, following that summit Reagan again asserted that he had
no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions.86 He further stated that he continued to believe
that Gorbachev was totally dedicated to their system.87
Consistent with the predictions of the behavioral-signals thesis, Reagan and Shultz underwent a gradual
reevaluation of Gorbachevs intentions during 1987. Gorbachevs acceptance of the American proposal on
INF was a major contributing factor, which led Reagan for the first time to reflect on his previous
characterization of the Soviet Union. He said:
with regard to the evil empire. I meant it when I said it, because under previous leaders they have
made it evident that they were based or that their program was based on expansionism, on going
forward toward the Marxist philosophy of the one-world Communist state. All of those things were
true And it was true that there was a philosophy then, under the previous leaders, that there was no
immorality in anything that furthered the cause of socialism, therefore permitting themselves to violate
trust, to lie, and so forth. There seems to be an entirely different relationship. [Emphasis added]88

Yet, at that time neither Reagan nor Shultz were convinced that Gorbachev was willing and capable to take
a series of actions that would signal a genuine change in Soviet foreign policy objectives. As Reagan notes,
in the spring of 1987 we were still facing a lot of uncertainty regarding the Soviets it was evident

85

For example, see US Department of State Bulletin, November 1985, p. 11; Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Hereafter, Presidential Papers),1985, p. 415.
86
Presidential Papers, 1986, p. 1369.
87

Ibid, p. 1377.

88

Presidential Papers, 1987, pp. 1508-1509.

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something was up in the Soviet Union, but we still didnt know what it was.89A more significant turning
point in the revelation of Soviet intentions occurred only in the spring of 1988, which eventually led Reagan
and Shultz to conclude that the intentions of the Soviet leadership could no longer be described as
expansionist. While corresponding to the predictions of both theses, the timing and reasoning provided for
the change in rhetoric regarding the political intentions of the Soviets is most consistent with that of the
behavioral-signals thesis.
The shifts in Reagans and Shultzs statements occurred especially following two events. The first was
the initial phase of the Soviet withdrawal of Afghanistan in April, which symbolized to both that that the
expansionist Brezhnev Doctrine was dead. In his memoir, Shultz explains that the dominant perception in
the administration was that if the Soviets left Afghanistan, the Brezhnev Doctrine would be breached, and
the principle of never letting go would be violated. Similarly, in a private conversation with Gorbachev,
Reagan noted that the withdrawal from Afghanistan was a tangible step in the right direction, and he took
note of Gorbachevs statement that the settlement could serve as a model for ending other regional
conflict.90 A second important event around the time of the Moscow summit was the presentation of
Gorbachevs proposals for the 19th Communist Party Conference. These signaled to many in the
administration that Gorbachevs domestic reforms would move the Soviet Union in a revolutionary
direction and make it difficult for future Soviet leaders to reverse course if they wished to do so. Reviewing
these proposals, Matlock described them as nothing short of revolutionary in the Soviet context, adding
that they provided evidence that Gorbachev was finally prepared to cross the Rubicon and discard the
Marxist ideology that had defined and justified the Communist Party dictatorship in the Soviet Union.91

89

Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), p.683.
Transcripts of the Washington Summit, June 1, 1988, 10:05-11:20, A.M. Similarly, in public Reagan treated this move
as an historic triumph that opened the possibility of resolving additional regional conflicts involving the Soviets.
Presidential Papers, 1988, pp. 632, 726.
90

91

Jack F. Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, pp. 295-296.

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Unfortunately, the available documents do not allow us to identify the relative importance of
Gorbachevs domestic reforms in comparison to Soviet behavior internationally in changing Reagans
perceptions. There is evidence in support of both types of variables; and therefore studies that downplay the
significance of either domestic institutional variables or of Soviet foreign policy ignore important pieces of
information. In addition to these objective behavioral changes, Reagans personal impression of
Gorbachev was another contributing factor that enhanced the level of trust between the two leaders,
especially in light of Reagans belief that he had played some role in convincing the Soviet leader to take
certain actions during their private conversations. It thus seems that those actions that Reagan believed to
have stemmed from his own urging such as the release of dissidents and the peaceful conclusion of
regional conflicts were no less important in changing Reagans attitudes. 92
What is clear is that as a result of Gorbachevs actions, Reagan left office with different views about the
Soviet Union and its intentions. Towards the end of his tenure as president, when asked whether he
considered Gorbachev as a real friend, Reagan responded, Well, I can't help but say yes to that
Further, when asked if he could declare the Cold War over, the president responded, I think right now, of
course.93
The reasoning Reagan and his advisors employed in private and in public to justify their assessments of
Soviet intentions provides overwhelming support for the behavioral-signals thesis, and rather weak support
for the capabilities thesis. During 1985 and 1986, Reagan and his advisors had focused mainly on past
Soviet actions, especially interventions in the Third World during the 1970s under Brezhnev, and treated
this as significant evidence that Soviet intentions had remained expansionist. These actions continued to

92

For example, Reagan notes that by late 1987 there were tentative indications that quiet diplomacy was working
with Gorbachev: Although neither he nor I discussed it publicly, some of the people whose names were on the lists Id
given him of people who we knew wanted to leave the Soviet Union began receiving exit permits. Impressed by these
gestures, Reagan says, Although Soviet troops were still fighting in Afghanistan and the Soviets were still supporting
guerillas in Central America and elsewhere, we were at least seeing real deeds from Moscow. Reagan, 686-687. Later,
during the Washington summit, Reagan was satisfied that Gorbachev promised him in private that he would end the
shipment of Soviet military weapons to Nicaragua. Reagan, An American Life, p.701.
93
Presidential Papers, 1988, pp. 708-709; on his reaction to the announcement of a unilateral withdrawal of conventional
forces, see Ibid, pp. 1592-3

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dominate discussion of Soviet intentions in 1987. However, following the INF treaty and throughout 1988,
Reagan and his advisors increasingly referred to Gorbachevs behavior to support their assessments that
Soviet objectives under this leadership were slowly changing.
In addition, beginning in 1987 Reagan became very clear in stating what concrete actions he expected
Gorbachev to take in order to clearly signal a change in Soviet political intentions. This employment of
what could be called a litmus test is interesting to the extent that Reagan did not demand that Gorbachev
reduce Soviet military capabilities. Instead, Reagan concentrated on domestic and international changes in
Soviet behavior. These included, for example, a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, changes in
Soviet policies on immigration and freedom of religion, and institutionalization of more transparency on
issues pertaining to Soviet security policy.94 On nearly every occasion when the president discussed USSoviet relations, Soviet behavior was mentioned as the main indicator from which a change in Soviet
objectives could be inferred. For example, in November, 1987, referring to reports on reforms in the Soviet
Union, Reagan said,
Glasnost we are told, is ushering in a new eraGood sense, however, dictates that we look for tangible
change in behavior for actions, not words in deciding what is real or illusionary.95
Once Gorbachev appeared to be complying with these public demands, and when he seems to have been
responsive to Reagans private requests, Reagan and Shultz were significantly more willing to acknowledge
that a genuine change in the Soviet Union was in fact taking place, and in their statements they tied these
behavioral changes to his reassessments of Soviet objectives.
To be sure, Reagan and Shultz both saw a connection between Soviet capabilities, their actions, and
their intentions. In their eyes, Soviet expansionist conduct during the 1970s occurred at a time when the

94

For example, in October 1987, Reagan noted, It is in regional conflicts where Soviet performance has been most
disturbing. Anyone searching for evidence that the Soviets remain expansionist, indeed imperialist, need look no farther
than Nicaragua or Afghanistan. Presidential Papers, 1987, p.1239.
95

Presidential Papers, 1987, p.1271.

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United States had lost its superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weapons.96 However, they
made it clear that it was Soviet behavior during that period, rather than its military buildup, that ultimately
provided the decisive evidence of Soviet aggressive intentions. In fact, one of Reagans favorite quotes,
which he and his advisors reiterated many times in public and in private meetings with Gorbachev and other
foreign leaders, was that nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed
because they mistrust each other.97 Reagan similarly acknowledged that the adversarys capabilities by
themselves are not good indicators of their intentions, but are instead a byproduct of how they perceive the
others intentions. For instance, in October 1985 he stated that it was important to remember that arms,
whether nuclear or conventional do not come to exist for no reason. They exist because nations have very
real differences among themselves and suspicions about each others intentions.98
Finally, scholars have emphasized the importance of ideological changes within the Soviet Union in
affecting Reagans perceptions of Soviet intentions.99 While the causal impact of this indicator could
theoretically be tested independently of other factors, I argue that it is hard, if not impossible, to disentangle
changes in Soviet ideology from changes in Soviet domestic institutions during this period. The two not
only occurred simultaneously, but the record also shows that references to Soviet ideology almost always
included references to the observable implications of these ideological changes which included changes in
Soviet domestic institutions. At the same time, while I did find substantial evidence in support of the
changes in domestic institutions, I did not find similar evidence where Reagan refers to changes in Soviet

96

In Europe, Reagan continued, the effect of this loss was not quickly perceptible, but seen globally, Soviet conduct
changed markedly and dangerously. First in Angola in 1975, then when the West failed to respond, in Ethiopia, in South
Yemen, in Kampuchea, and ultimately in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union began courting more risks and expanding its
influence through the direct and indirect application of military power. Today we see similar Soviet efforts to profit and
stimulate regional conflicts in Central America. Presidential Papers, 1985, pp. 1287-1288. In May 1985 Reagan
reiterated this line of reasoning. See, Presidential Papers, 1985, p. 650.
97

For example see Reagans speech at Moscow State University on May 31, 1988. US Department of State Bulletin,
August, 1988.
98
99

Presidential Papers, 1985, p. 1275.

For a good summary, see Mark L. Haas, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Reactions to Shifts in
Soviet Power, Policies, or Domestic Politics? International Organization, Vol. 61, No. 1 (2007)

Page34of63

ideology per-se as forming the basis for his changing perceptions. If anything, the quote by Reagan
mentioned above about the irrelevance of Glasnost in the absence of tangible changes is a case in point.
Mark Haas, who examined the role these two factors played in changing Reagans beliefs, reaches similar
conclusions, stating, Gorbachev needed to propose major democratic institutional changes before most
U.S. leaders believed his commitment to liberalism was genuine. Greater tolerance and respect for basic
human rights were insufficient to arrive at this conclusion.100

US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: 1985-1988101

An analysis of the intelligence communitys assessments of Gorbachevs intentions in the years leading
to the end of the Cold War reinforces the findings from the previous case.102 Once again, the intelligence
community gave greatest weight to Soviet capabilities in judging political objectives. Nevertheless, despite
a sense by some CIA analysts that senior intelligence officials were politicizing the intelligence estimates,
the latter did not play any meaningful role in shaping Reagans or Shultzs reading of Soviet intentions
during that period.
During the first half of the 1980s, Soviet intentions were perceived as hostile. The hawkish perspective
of the Soviet Union held by DCI William Casey and by DDCI Robert Gates certainly played an important

100

Ibid, p.175

101

In addition to reviewing all available NIEs, I also examined available INR and CIA reports on the Soviet Union,
although they are not the subject of analysis here. Finally, I rely on interviews this author conducted with William
Odom, who was the head of the NSA at the time, as well as Douglass MacEachin, Melvin Goodman, Raymond
Garthoff, and Fritz Ermarth who are former CIA analysts of the Soviet Union.

102

On the intelligence assessments during this period, see John Diamond, The CIA and the Culture of Failure: US
Intelligence from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq, (Stanford University Press, 2008). Gerald K. Haines
and Robert E. Leggett, eds., Watching the Bear: Essays on CIAs Analysis of the Soviet Union (Washington: Center for
the Study of Intelligence Publications, 2003); Kirsten Lundberg, CIA and the Fall of the Soviet Empire: The Politics of
Getting it Right. Case Study: C16-94-1251.0 for the Intelligence and Policy Project, John F. Kennedy School of
Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1994); At Cold Wars End: U.S. Intelligence on the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, 1989-1991, History Staff, (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central
Intelligence Agency, 1999); and Douglas MacEachin, CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Record Versus the
Charges, Center for the Study of Intelligence, (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1996).

Page35of63

role in shaping the intelligence reports. But the alarming estimates of the early 1980s were also partly a
reaction to criticism from conservative circles that the CIA had been too soft in judging the Soviet
objectives in the late 1970s.103

The pre-existing division within the community between those who

perceived Soviet intentions as especially hostile and expansionist and those who perceived them as more
benign and opportunistic was further accentuated during Gorbachevs tenure. The community then, as Gates
puts it, was more than a little schizophrenic.104 Yet, these internal divisions did not present themselves in
the sections of the NIEs dealing with Gorbachevs foreign policy goals, which were especially skeptical of
any change in Soviet intentions.
The estimates between 1985 and 1987 concluded that Gorbachev was seeking dtente with the West not
in order to suspend the competition, but instead to reduce US challenges to Soviet interests, decrease US
defense efforts, and thus help in the long-term to preserve and advance the USSRs international influence
and its relative military power.105 A careful reading of the reasoning the NIEs employed to support
conclusions about Soviet intentions lends strong support to the capabilities thesis. Soviet recognition that
the correlation of forces would soon shift against the Soviet Union coupled with a relative decline in Soviet
economic power were presented as the leading explanations for Gorbachevs initiatives.

106

Soviet

behavioral signals such as repeated calls for US ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the
Peaceful Nuclear Explosive Treaty, for resumption of negotiations toward a comprehensive test ban treaty,
and for a chemical weapons ban - were consequently dismissed as political propaganda aimed at bolstering

103

See the testimony of the then Director of SOVA, Douglas MacEachin, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 520-521.

104

Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insiders Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 330-333. Disagreements over certain issues pertaining to Gorbachev tactics
and the state of the Soviet economy did exist. But at no point during this period was an alternative assessment about
Soviet policy objectives present in the coordinated NIEs.

105

SNIE 11-9-86, p.4; NIE 11-18-87, pp. 3-4. Numerous INR assessments during 1987, like the one titled What Does
Gorbachev Want? show that the State Department shared these skeptical conclusions about Soviet intentions.

106

NIE 11-3/8-86, NIE 11-8-87, SNIE 11-16-88, and NIE 11-3/8-88. Until the spring of 1986, the community was not in
agreement over the relative importance of Soviet economic difficulties in hindering the Soviet Unions ability to remain a
superpower.

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Gorbachevs campaign of deception, and they were not treated as indicators of intentions.107 As in the
intelligence estimates of Soviet intentions during the previous decade, the military dimension of the Soviet
threat continued to loom over all other aspects of the analysis of the Soviet Union. Overestimation of Soviet
strategic forces and defense spending during the 1980s was an important contributing factor to the
communitys tendency to overstate the Soviet propensity to rely on military power, and thus, to continue to
assess Soviet intentions as hostile.108
By mid-1988, Reagans and Shultzs assessments of Soviet intentions had already undergone a
fundamental change. The record of the available NIEs indicates, however, that the US intelligence
community had revised its estimates of Soviet objectives only in mid-1989.109 Throughout 1988, the
community continued to hold that Gorbachevs foreign policy initiatives were merely tactical in scope and
insincere in nature, and that no significant discontinuity in Soviet traditional goals and expectations was to
be anticipated.110 In explaining this position, the community primarily relied on indicators associated with
the capabilities thesis. Specifically, Soviet modernization efforts of what the community considered to be
war-fighting capabilities, coupled with calculations as to how economic difficulties would affect the
strategic balance of power, provided the greatest clues about Soviet objectives.111
The predictions of the behavioral-signals thesis are least consistent with the US intelligence analysis of
Soviet intentions during this period. Not only was the community reluctant to acknowledge the significance

107

See for instance NIE 11-16-85, p.13; and SNIE 11-8-86, pp. 15-17.

108

CIAs SOVA was growing increasingly concerned that the estimates of projected Soviet strategic weapons systems
were inflated. MacEachin, sought, unsuccessfully, to record a dissent, claiming that the aggregate projections for new
Soviet strategic weapons given in NIE 11-3/8-86 were exaggerated. Memorandum to Deputy Director for Intelligence
from MacEachin, Force Projections, NIE 11-3/8, April 22, 1986.

109

Yet, in an estimate published five days after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the community still viewed Warsaw Pacts
intentions as hostile, and cautioned against the possibility of an unprovoked attack on Western Europe. NIE 11-14-89,
p.iii.

110

Whither Gorbachev: Soviet Policy and Politics in the 1990s (NIE 11-18-87 which was published in November
1987) ; SNIE Soviet Policy During the Next Phase of Arms Control in Europe; Memorandum by Robert Gates,
Gorbachevs Gameplan: The Long View, November 24, 1987; NIE 11-3-8-88

111

NIE 11-3/8-88.

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of Gorbachevs initiatives, it also very rarely used Soviet behavior to draw inferences about Soviet foreign
policy goals. Gorbachevs policies on arms limitations, for example, were seen as stemming from the need
to increase Soviet relative economic capabilities, a task that could be accomplished only by reducing
pressure to allocate more resources to defense. Engaging NATO in arms control agreements more generally
was perceived as intended to undercut support in the West for NATOs weapons modernization efforts.112
The communitys reluctance to revise its estimates of Soviet intentions led to repeated clashes between
Gates and Shultz, the latter admitting later that he lost confidence in the intelligence reports on the Soviet
Union. Shultz writes:
When Gorbachev first appeared at the helm, the CIA said he was just talk, just another Soviet attempt to
deceive us. As that line became increasingly untenable, the CIA changed its tune: Gorbachev was serious
about change, but the Soviet Union had a powerfully entrenched and largely successful system that was
incapable of being changed, so Gorbachev would fail in his attempt to change it.113

The transcripts of the confirmation hearings of Gates as DCI in 1991 indicate that members of the CIA were
displeased by his resistance to include more benign interpretations of development in the Soviet Union in
the NIEs. Gates himself testified that the CIAs resources at the time did not allow him the luxury of sort
of just idly speculating on what a different kind of Soviet Union might look like.114

The Interwar Period: 1934-1939

PERCEIVED GERMAN CAPABILITIES AND BEHAVIOR (1933-1939)

112

NIE 11-18-88. On the INF Treaty, see NIE 11-3/8-88, p.6. The CIA did not foresee Gorbachevs announcements of
unilateral cuts in conventional forces, as well as the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Gates, From the Shadows, pp.
428-433; Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 520-521. Some NIEs did refer to Soviet recent behavior to questions about specific actions
like Gorbachevs behavior in the ongoing arms control negotiations. Yet, they did not use these indicators to reach
conclusions about his larger foreign policy goals.
113
114

Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 864

Hearings, Volume II, p.481.

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The review of perceived trends in Nazi Germanys military capabilities leads to two main
conclusions:115 First, from 1933 until 1935 Germanys military buildup was seen as defensive in nature and
moderate in pace. The German army was initially viewed as built to fight a limited war against a single
central or eastern European foe; the Luftwaffe was being expanded, but only to achieve parity with the
French air force. Second, during these two years, the military balance of power was expected to show
comfortable margins of superiority for the Allies in all three dimensions of all warfareair, land, and sea.
Taken together, the capabilities thesis expects that Britain would have perceived Germanys intentions as
somewhat hostile, but that there would have been no significant change in perceived hostility between 1933
and 1935.
In the fall of 1936, however, with the accumulation of information from what were regarded as reliable
sources and following the German announcement in March that there would be compulsory military
conscription in Nazi Germany and that the army would be increased to 36 divisions, British intelligence and
military establishments revised their assessments. The threat of German military hegemony led to
significant pessimism and worst-case predictions, which lasted until early 1939.

116

Then, according to

Wesley Wark, British intelligence became more optimistic despite clear reports of an unlimited expansion
of German capabilities. Further, both the numerical balance of military capabilities and the deployment of

115

For example, see, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, Foreign Armament, January 22, 1937, CAB 56/2; Chiefs of
Staff Committee, Comparison of the Strength of Great Britain with that of Certain Other Nations as at of May 1937,
February 9, 1937, CAB 24/41; Chiefs of Staff Committee, Comparison of the Strength of Great Britain with that of
Certain Other Nations as at of January 1938, November 12, 1937, CAB 24/296; Ministerial Sub-Committee, Report
of the Ministerial Sub-Committee on German Re-armament, November 23, 1934, CAB 24/268; Minutes of the 283rd
meeting of the CID, October 29, 1936CAB 2/6, p. 176; Estimated Scale of Air Attack on England in the Event of
War with Germany, Committee of Imperial Defence Memo; Chiefs of Staff Committee, The German Army Its
Present Strength and Possible Rate of Expansion in Peace and War, April 28, 1938, CAB 24/276; Chiefs of Staff
Committee, Appreciation of the Situation in the event of War against Germany in 1939 by the Joint Planning SubCommittee, October 26, 1936, CAB 53/29.

116

Wark, The Ultimate Enemy, p. 231.

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these capabilitiesthe dimensions of power most relevant for deriving predictions from the capabilities
thesiswere reported to have worsened from the perspective of British policy-makers, notwithstanding
quantitative and qualitative developments in British military capabilities. The roots of this optimism within
the intelligence resulted primarily from perception about the economic potential of Germany to sustain this
massive buildup in the event of war, as well as from a decrease in the morale of the German soldiers. These
are not considerations relevant to the narrow perspective of the capabilities thesis as laid out in this study.
According to this thesis, Britains analysts should have continued to see Germany as rather hostile, and
should have remained pessimistic throughout the period from 1936 to 1939.
Hitlers actions during this period cannot be reviewed here at length. Suffice is to note that from the
perspective of British decision-makers most of Germanys actions starting with the withdrawal of
Germany from the League of Nations and from the Disarmament Conferencewere a source of significant
concern. Germanys actions in the following yearsspecifically, its militarization of the Rhineland, the
Anschluss with Austria, and its threats to use force in the crisis over the Sudeten territoriescontributed to
the perception that Germany had embarked on a dangerous path. But other German actions at the same
time-- repeated assurances that it sought only limited revisions of the status quo by peaceful means, its
signing of a Naval Treaty with Britain in 1935, and its willingness to sign several nonaggression treaties
with its neighbors-- led British decision-makers to think that the future behavior of Germany could not be
predicted with any degree of confidence. The behavioral-signals hypothesis would expect Germanys
invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, explicitly reneging on the agreement reached in
Munich, was action conveying a clearer message about German expansionist intentions. British decisionmakers perceptions of Germanys intentions, according to this thesis, should have become significantly
more hostile. Germanys renunciation of the Naval Treaty, the annexation of Memel, and the invasion of
Poland a few months later should have reinforced these perceptions.
T ABLE 4: S UMMARY OF P REDICTIONS (1934-1939)
STATED BELIEFS
ABOUT

REASONING ABOUT

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THESIS

THE CAPABILITIES
THESIS

THE BEHAVIORALSIGNALS THESIS

HYPOTHESIS

The NumericalPreponderance
Hypothesis

The Recent Actions

Hypothesis

INTENTIONS

INTENTIONS

Somewhat hostile
from 1934, and
significantly more
hostile from fall 1936.

Observers should refer

to German military
buildup, and the balance
of power when
assessing Germanys
intentions

More hostile from 1934,

and significantly more
hostile following the
invasion of
Czechoslovakia.

Observers should refer

to Germanys hostile
and reassuring actions
when assessing its
intentions

The Past Actions

Hypothesis

Hostile

Observers should refer

to German actions in the
years leading to, and
during, the First World
War when assessing its
current intentions

BRITISH DECISION-MAKERS PERCEPTIONS OF NAZI GERMANYS INTENTIONS

Relying mostly on over 10,000 primary documents that I collected from the British National Archives,
and on a significant collection of documents from the Foreign Office published in the series Documents on
British Foreign Policy, 19191939, I contend that during 1934 and 1935, British decision-makers believed
that Germanys intentions included territorial adjustments in Eastern and Central Europe, possibly also the
return of Germanys colonial empire.117

However, they also believed that Germany sought peaceful

relations with Britain, and that the Naval Agreement was an important sign of such intentions.118 The
majority view was that Germanys intentions were no doubt revisionists, but still somewhat opportunistic to

117

Minutes of the 7th DRC Meeting, January 25, 1934, pp. 3-4, CAB 16/109, minutes of the 9th DRC Meeting,
January 30, 1934, pp. 11-12, CAB 16/109. For a similar belief in expansive German interests, see Comments by
Laurence Collier, November 22, 1935. DBFP II, XV. Appendix I; Committee of Imperial Defense, Defense
Requirement Sub-Committee Report, February 28, 1934, CAB 16/109; Memo by Vansittart, The Future of Germany,
April 7, 1934, CAB 24/247; Memo by Simon, Austria, January 22, 1934, CAB 24/247; Ministerial Committee
Meeting, May 15, 1934. CAB 16/110.
118
For example, see Letter from Henderson to Eden, July 1, 1937, DBFP II, XIX, No. 10

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the extent that it could be dissuaded from pursuing its aggressive plans in Europe in return for territories in
Africa. Further, the Prime Minister and his advisors accepted at face value Hitlers assurances that he had
no territorial ambitions in the west, with the exception of the Rhineland, and that Germany would only
resort to war if her demands were not met by peaceful means.119
To be sure, the documents indicate that during 1934-35, Germanys increasing capabilities were a source
of concern among British decision-makers, but by themselves they were not sufficient to indicate what
Germanys intentions were. Rather, it was Germanys actions, specifically the illegality of the military
buildup, the withdrawal from international commitments in order to maintain a certain level of military
capabilities, and the militarization of its society that were seen as critical indicators that Germany intended
to change the status quo. The importance of behavior was reflected in the statements of Prime Minister
McDonald, for example, who claimed Evidence was accumulating from many quarters showing the
German Government were training their people to march; that they were producing the physical means
which would enable them to take offensive action against their neighbors, and that, hard though it was for
us to say so, Germany had become war-minded again.120 Similarly, Secretary Simon stated in the Cabinet
that it was not Germanys current capabilities that constituted the threat, but rather Hitlers methods of
appealing to his own people that might easily result in a menacing situation.121 They were also quite
explicit about what they expected Germany to do in order to demonstrate its benign intentions. The gist of
this litmus test was that Germany had to take certain actions, consistent with the behavioral-signals thesis:
(1) Germanys return to the League of Nations and to the Disarmament Conference; (2) its accession to an
Eastern Pact; (3) a declaration that it respected Austrian integrity and independence.

119

An exception was Under Secretary of State Vansittart. Memo by Vansittart, Britain, France and Germany,
February 3, 1936, CAB 24/260.

120

Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the Foreign Policy Committee, November 22, 1934, CAB 27/572.

121

Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, March 19, 1934, CAB 23/78.

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Shortly before the Rhineland crisis in spring 1936, Secretary Eden concluded that the form and direction
of [German] expansion is the one still doubtful factor in Germanys plans for the future.122 But subsequent
German actions appear to have convinced British decision-makers that Germany was willing to pursue its
revisionist aims in Eastern Europe with greater intensity than previously assumed. The crisis, in which the
German army unilaterally reoccupied the Rhineland in contravention of the terms of the Versailles Treaty,
marked the beginning of the expansion of territory directly under German military control. Following this
episode, and combined with Germanys decision to withdraw from the Locarno Treaty, British decisionmakers concluded that Germany could no longer be trusted to respect its international commitments and
grew much more concerned about Germanys determination to pursue aggressive objectives in Central and
Eastern Europe.123 On that, Eden commented, Herr Hitlers action is alarming because of the fresh
confirmation which it affords of the scant respect paid by German Governments to the sanctity of treaties.
As a result, Eden concluded, The myth is now exploded that Herr Hitler only repudiates treaties imposed
on Germany by force. We must be prepared for him to repudiate any treaty even if freely negotiated (a)
when it becomes inconvenient; and (b) when Germany is sufficiently strong and the circumstances are
otherwise favorable for doing so.124 However, the British cabinets insistence to negotiate with Germany
over its other territorial ambitions in Eastern and Central Europe still reflected the belief that German
intentions might still be considered as opportunistic, as a quid pro quo with Germany was seen as possible
and worth-pursuing. To that end, however, the Cabinet suggested that Hitler could take other concrete
actions to show his benign intentions in the aftermath of the crisis. As Eden put it,
What he would ask Hitler to say would be that, having stated that he wanted to negotiate a series of new
pacts as a basis for peace in Europe, he would, as a proof of his intentions, withdraw all his forces from
the Rhineland over and above the troops necessary for a symbolic occupation.125

122

Memo By Eden, The German Threat. January 17, 1936. CAB 27/599

123

Memo by Eden, Germany and the Locarno Treaty, March 8, 1936. CAB 24/261; Minutes by Vanssitart, March
17, 1936, DBFP II, XVI, No. 121.
124
Memo from Eden, Germany and the Locarno Treaty, March 8, 1936, CAB 24/261.
125

Cabinet Minutes, March 11, 1936, CAB 23/83.

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Yet, there was an increasing sense among some key members of the Foreign Office and Cabinet, like
Eden, that there were important indicatorssuch as past German military actions and declarations, the
dominance of the Nazi Party over the military, Hitlers refusal to show visible signs of a definite change
of political orientation in Germany, and his refusal to return to the League of Nations -- that Germany was
now determined to carry out their Eastern expansion programme in spite of all comers.126
To be sure, when Chamberlain took office in 1937, he believed, albeit with some degree of uncertainty,
that Hitler wished to revise the status quo in Austria, the Sudetenland, and to dominate Eastern Europe.127
Yet, he also assumed that Germany would neither use force nor commit an act of aggression in
Czechoslovakia, and that Germanys intentions were still opportunistic or at best limited expansionist in the
sense that an attempt to reach a comprehensive peace treaty with it was a real possibility.128 Halifax, the
newly appointed Foreign Minister, likewise predicted that the Germans would continue with its beaverlike persistence in pressing their aims in Central Europe, but not in a form to give others causeor
probably occasionto interfere.129
German actions in Austria in March 1938 reinforced the perceptions that German immediate intentions
were merely to bring German nationals into the Reich. But at the same time, some other aspects in
Germanys behavior during the Austrian Anschluss led Chamberlain to conclude that Germany did not wish
to antagonize Britain per se, especially given the care that Hitler was taking to avoid direct provocations
and the consideration that the Germans had shown on a variety of smaller issues.130 Overall, Both

126

Memo by Eden, Germany, July 20, 1936. CAB 24/263. See also Memo from Phipps to Eden, March 11, 1936.
DBFP II, XVI, No. 65. Memo by Eden Anglo-German Relations with Particular Reference to the Colonial Question,
March 15, 1937. CAB 27/626.

127

Letter from Chamberlain to Sister, November 1937, DBFP II, XIX, No.295.

128

Cabinet Meeting, November 24, 1937, CAB 23/90; Minutes of Anglo-French Conversations, November 29 and 30,
1937, CAB 27/626.

129

Cabinet Meeting, November 24, 1937, CAB 23/90.

130

Minutes of the Committee on Foreign Policy, March 18, 1938. CAB 27/623

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Chamberlain and Halifax concluded in March that Hitlers aim were limited as he wished to include all
Germans in the Reich but not to include other nationalities an objective that if not achieved through
peaceful means would drive Germany to use force against Czechoslovakia itself. He reasoned that Hitlers
recent public speeches, together with the solemn assurances recently given by Gring to the
Czechoslovakian Minister in Berlin, and the private interviews given to Henderson by German officials, all
suggested that an agreement between Germany and Czechoslovakia was attainable.131
With this in mind, and against a crisis over the Sudenten territories in Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain flew
to meet with Hitler in September 1938. As the Cabinet discussed how to respond to Hitlers demands, two
lines of interpretation existed about Hitlers intentions. The first, advanced by Chamberlain, was that
Hitlers aggression would end with the return of the Sudeten Germans into the Reich. Chamberlain relied on
two sources to support this assessment of Hitlers intentions: first, and most importantly, he believed that he
had established an influence over Hitler and he now felt that he could trust his personal assurances. In this
regard, Chamberlain disregarded past German actions, and instead relied on his personal interaction with
Hitler and the assurances he had given to him in private. Second, Chamberlain was satisfied that if Hitler
made these assurances public, that would be sufficient evidence that his assurances were sincere. 132 The
second interpretation of Hitlers intentions that existed in the Cabinetnamely, that Hitlers intentions were
unlimited in scope was based on Hitlers past actions and the record of his past declarations. Further,
believing that Hitlers statements were basically cheap talk and therefore unreliable, some ministers wanted
Hitler to exhibit peaceful behavior. Thus, for example, the Secretary of the Board of Trade wrote a personal
letter to Chamberlain, expressing his doubts as to the Prime Ministers interpretation of Hitlers intentions.

131

Draft Memo for the French Government, Situation in Central Europe: Czechoslovakia, March 21, 1938, CAB
27/627.

132

Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, September 17, 1938. CAB 23/95. Chamberlain made a similar comment a week
later after his second meeting with Hitler. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, September 24, 1938. CAB 23/95.; Self 2005,
347-348. On the role of Chamberlains personal impressions as credible evidence of his sincerity see Keren Yarhi-Milo
and Todd Hall, The Personal Touch: Leaders Impressions, Costly Actions, and Assessments of Sincerity.
(Unpublished Ms.)

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He noted, I am afraid that I remain profoundly skeptical of Nazi promises and shall do so until I see
peaceful words accompanied by peaceful deeds. 133
In the winter of 1938-39, however, British assessments about Germanys intentions shifted in response to
several intelligence reports about likely Germanys plans to attack in the West, that were in line with
changes in Germanys domestic and diplomatic activities at the time. In anticipation of these actions,
Germanys aims were believed to be nothing less than world domination, and that Hitler desired a war with
the western powers.

134

Yet, it was the German invasion and occupation of rum Czechoslovakia that left

little doubt in the minds of Chamberlain and his advisors that Germanys intentions were unlimited in
scope, and as a result decided to shift British policy from one of appeasement to one of confrontation. In
Cabinet discussions, both Halifax and Chamberlainthe architects of appeasementnoted that Germanys
actions demonstrated that Germanys aims and methods were extremely hostile, requiring England to take
steps to stop her by attacking on two fronts.135 Halifax likewise argued that the real issue was Germanys
attempt to obtain world domination, and that it was in the interest of all countries to resist. . . otherwise
we might see one country after another absorbed by Germany.136 This line of reasoning was also invoked
quite explicitly, for example, in a Foreign Office memo dated March 29, 1939:
The absorption of Czecho-Slovakia has clearly revealed Germanys intentions. It marks the first
departure from the Nazi racial theory, under which the reason to suppose that the treatment applied to
Czecho-Slovakia will be extended to other countries in Europe, notably Roumania and Poland.137

133

Letter from Secretary of the Board of Trade to Chamberlain, October 3, 1938, PREM 1/266A.

134

Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, February 1, 1939, CAB 27/97; Germany: Factors, Aims, Methods, etc., December
20, 1938, FO 1093/86; Memo by Halifax to Mr. Mallet, DBFP III, IV, No. 5. Yet, Henderson questioned the reliability
of these sources, claiming that these were produced by elements opposed to the Nazi Regime. See, for example, Memo
by Henderson to Halifax, February 28, 1939, DBFP II, XV, No. 162.

135
136
137

Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, March 20, 1939, CAB 23/98

Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, March 18, 1939, CAB 23/98.

Foreign Office Memo on the Situation after the Absorption of Czecho-Slovakia, and on the Policy of his Majestys
Government, March 29, 1939, DBFP III, IV, Appendix IV.

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In sum, the time (and direction) of change in British decision-makers perceptions of German intentions
most closely matches the predictions of the behavioral-signals thesis, and much less so those of the
capabilities thesis. Specifically, Germanys non-capability based behavior prior to 1936 such as the
withdrawal from the League of Nations and the renunciation of the Versailles treaty were the indicators that
led British decision-makers to treat Germanys as the ultimate threat to Britain. This early assessment that
Germany had significant revisionist, albeit limited, intentions cannot be explained by the capabilities thesis
since at the time German capabilities did not increase by much, and were considered largely benign in
nature. Later on, German actions in Rhineland, Austria, and the Sudetenland led to another, although
moderate, adjustment of perceptions of German intentions. This pattern can be seen as consistent with the
capabilities thesis as well as German military power significantly grew during this time period. Yet, as the
analysis has shown, the exact pattern of evolution in how these individuals changed their estimates and the
reasoning they provided during this period are traced back to features in German behavior in these crises,
together with perceived changes in domestic trends within German, and the balance of power between
radicals and more moderate forces within the Nazi Party; but not to patterns in its military buildup.
To be sure, evolving perceptions of the numerical balance of power as well as British perception of
inferiority in terms of its ability to effectively challenge Germany in Europe, shaped to a large extent its
dual policy of rearmament and diplomacy that more or less guided its strategic behavior in several
important crises during that period. However, this policy was consistent with, and motivated by, the
dominant British perceptions of Hitlers intentions at the time, according to which (1) Hitlers limited
objectives of conquering certain regions in Eastern and Central Europe were reasonable, if not morally
right; and (2) Germanys expansionism, to some extent at least, stemmed from economic need. Thus, it was
argued, a return of some of Germanys previously owned colonies might convince Hitler to give up his
territorial ambitions in Eastern and Central Europe.138 A significant turning point in British policy occurred

138

Different decision-makers advanced different rationales for appeasement. Some believed that appeasement was
needed to buy time to rearm; others viewed it as a justifiable policy on moral grounds, claiming that Germany was right
to claim these territories. Others more pragmatically did not believe that these territories were vital to British interests

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in 1939 following Germanys invasion of Czechoslovakia. The shift to a harder-line stance towards
Germany coincided with, and indeed stemmed from, a reassessment of the ultimate objectives of Germany.
The link between a revised assessment of Germanys intentions following its actions in Czechoslovakia and
the adoption of a harder-line policy is nicely illustrated in Chamberlains statement at a Cabinet meeting on
March 18:
The Prime Minister said that up till a week ago we had proceeded on the assumption that we
should be able to continue our policy of getting on to better terms with the Dictator Powers, and
that although those powers had aims, those aims were limited. We had all along had at the back of
our minds the reservation that this might not prove to be the case, but we had felt that it was right
to try out the possibilities of that course.
On the previous Wednesday, German actions in Czechoslovakia had only just taken place. He
[Chamberlain] had now come definitely to the conclusion that Herr Hitlers attitude made it
impossible to continue to negotiate on the old basis with the Nazi regime. This did not mean that
negotiations with the German people were impossible. No reliance could be placed on any of the
assurances given by the Nazi leaders.139

As for the role of German Nazi ideology, the documents indicate that some decision-makers saw it as the
root cause of German expansionism, while other saw it as a symptom of growing economic difficulties.140
The former reflected mainly the opinion of the Foreign Office, but the latter interpretation certainly guided
the policies Chamberlain and his advisors had pursued. Yet, even for that group of decision-makers, both
the regions Hitler had chosen to target and the political ideology he advocated served as indicators from
which they inferred Germanys limited revisionist intentions up until March 1939 - specifically, the idea

and therefore were willing to allow Germany to peacefully penetrate these regions. Moreover, the Foreign Office under
Secretary Eden was angered by Chamberlains policy of limited reliability and his essential abandonment of alliance
diplomacy. The Foreign Office grew increasingly disillusioned about the prospects of achieving a peace settlement in
Europe, which explains their growing uneasiness with Chamberlains initiatives after becoming Prime Minister in May
1937. Chamberlain began to regard Eden as an obstacle to agreement with Germany, but with the appointment of Sir
Neville Henderson as the British Ambassador to Berlin in April 1937, and with Halifax taking over for Eden in early
1938, Chamberlain was able to bring the Foreign Office into line with his approach.
139
140

Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, March 18, 1939, CAB 23/98.

On the division within the Foreign Office on this issue, see Memo by Messrs. Ashton-Gwatkin and Jebb respecting
German expansion, January 31, 1936, DBFP II, XV, Appendix IV

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that Hitler was merely interested in bringing all Germans into the Reich. Ambassador Henderson, for
example, invoked this line of reasoning in early March when explaining why he did not think that Hitler
was contemplating further expansion in the West:
It must not be forgotten that a principle of Nazism in its present form is purity of race. Austria
and the Sudeten lands, where all were pure Germans, and where, even in the former case, the
majority of the inhabitants were, in principle, in favour of Greater Germany, is one thing, and
countries in which such a majority is non-existent quite another. One is too apt to believe that,
because the one happened, the other must equally be contemplated.141

More significantly than German nationalist rhetoric, however, were the observable implications of
nationalist trends as they were manifested in domestic changes within Germany; specifically, the efforts to
militarize the German society and their effects on the balance between moderate and extremists within the
Nazi Party all of which are consistent with the behavioral-signal thesis. These were advanced s diagnostic
evidence by many in the Cabinet and the Foreign Office such as Eden for example, who observed for
example German youth were being imbued with the idea of expansion both east and west, and as a result
Britain should not be under any illusion as to the aims that underlie German policy. The Germany of today (and, I fear, to-morrow, in view of the forces of miseducation which are perverting her youth) has no
intention of respecting the integrity of her smaller neighbours, no matter what paper she may sign. There
will always be the mental reservation that national interests override treaty obligation.142

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND PERCEPTIONS OF GERMAN INTENTIONS

A review of the evolution in the British intelligence communitys assessments -- as they were reflected
in the coordinated reports by the three military service intelligence agencies, specially, the COS Annual

141
142

Memo by Henderson to Halifax, March 9, 1939, DBFP III, IV, No. 195.

Memo by Eden on Germany, April 25, 1936, CAB 24/262. For similar comments, see Memo by Phipps to Hoare,
November 13, 1935, DBFP II, XV, No. 213

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Reviews, Strategic Reviews, and Strategic Appreciations can be summarized as follows: First, these
reports rarely discussed the issue of German political intentions. However, similarly to the civilian decisionmakers, the intelligence community believed that German intentions were revisionist but limited in scope.
Yet, contrary to their civilian counterparts, both the timing and direction of change in perceived intentions
by the military intelligence agencies match the expectation of the capabilities thesis. As for the predictions
of the behavioral-signals thesis, the evidence is inconclusive. The available documents do not provide clear
evidence whether and to what extent Germanys annexation of Czechoslovakia shifted perceived intentions.
In part, this is because the Foreign Office was by then responsible for writing the sections in the COS
reports dealing with assessments about Germanys political intentions.143 Moreover, after the Munich crisis
British intelligence shifted its focus away from predictions about Germanys long-term aspirations, toward
more immediate questions about Germanys wartime objectives and military readiness.
Further, the evidence indicates that the British intelligence communitys estimates about Germanys
political intentions as well as its plans to wage war (i.e. military intentions) were inferred primarily from
calculations about the rate of its military rearmament and from the estimates about the military balance in
Europe. As long as Germany was perceived to be militarily weaker than Britain, the mere buildup of
German capabilities did not lead the intelligence community to infer aggressive intentions, although the
buildup did indicate a desire on part of Germany to eventually change the status quo in eastern Europe,
hopefully by non-military means. Accordingly, between 1934 and 1936, the intelligence community
ascribed to Germany limited revisionist aims with a low propensity to use military force to achieve its
objectives as long as the military balance was not in its favor.
From the fall of 1936, however, assessments of Germanys capabilities and intentions changed. The
change resulted primarily from the growing recognition that the German buildup was aimed not at
achieving parity, but rather superiority. Once again, calculations of relative capabilities were perceived as

143

To be sure, political intelligence throughout this period came not from the COS, but rather from the Foreign Office
through its representatives overseas.

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the single most significant factor that would determine the scope and timing of German expansion.
Accordingly, the report concluded,
While the spirit which at present actuates German policy continues, the danger that German ambition for
expansion will cause war in Europe will endure. As Germanys rearmament progresses and she becomes
more ready for war, the danger of conflict increases. Germany may well start by seeking to regain that
portion of Czechoslovakia which is inhabited by three and a half million Teutons, by recapturing Memel
from Lithuania, or by a war against Soviet Russia aiming at the obliteration of the Polish corridor and
obtaining a quid pro quo for the Poles in the Ukraine. These are all items which German policy aims to
achieve as and when the European situation offers her a favourable opportunity. The recovery of
colonies is a further item which is definitely included in German policy and holds the possibility of
friction with the British Empire.144

In May 1937 the COS again because it was not yet ready to do so militarily. Indeed, the report explicitly
used indicators associated with the capabilities thesis to support its conclusion.
Apart from the actual comparison of strength in 1937 and its bearing on German prospects of success,
Germany, in judging the advisability of risking war in May 1937, will be influenced by the way in which
the comparison of strength is likely to alter within the next few years.

The report also indicated that Germany would not be able to mobilize more divisions than France by 1939,
but would have air superiority as early as 1937. Britains naval superiority gave London the ability to apply
economic pressure on Germany and thus dissuade it from embarking on war. Finally, with respect to
industrial output for armament, the report claimed that Germany might anticipate that in 1937 its industrial
strength relative to its potential enemies would be greater than in subsequent years. Taking all of these
factors into account, the report concluded, Germany is unlikely to plan to go to war in 1937.145

144

Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Strategic Review, July 3, 1936, CAB 53/28. The
task of assessing Germanys future plans was further complicated by the perception that the German General Staff and
the Nazi Party did not see eye to eye on Hitlers foreign policy objectives and his plans to use force. Yet, these
documents did not conclude that the Army opposed Hitlers expansionist designs. Rather, it was thought that the Army
merely disagreed with Hitlers views about when and how to achieve these objectives. See, Memo regarding the aims of
the German General Staff, April 9, 1936, DBFP II, No. 228

145

Chiefs of Staff Committee, Comparison of the Strength of Great Britain with that of certain other Nations as at May
1937, February 9, 1937, CAB 56/3.

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Calculations about the rate of further expansion of the German army and air force, and Germanys
economic capacity to sustain such intensive rearmament efforts, dominated the discussions about whether
and when Germany would decide to fight during 1938. In April 1938, the COS estimated that it was
Germanys aim to be able to mobilize on the outbreak of war the largest Army which the economy and
man power of the nation are capable of sustaining. With this in mind, and given a steady rate of expansion,
the COS assessed that Germany would not be prepared for war before January 1942.146To be sure, it was
not merely calculations about the numerical balance of power that drove assessments about intentions.
Rather, qualitative factors such as efficiency, morale, confidence, and economic capacity to sustain war,
were factored into the assessment of German intentions. Especially important was the intimate link between
assessments of the Germanys general economic conditionsits manpower, food supplies, and raw material
and fuel resourcesand Germanys ability to sustain its military strength in war. The latter not only
informed the British intelligence communitys conclusions about the likelihood that Germany would use its
military forces in pursuit of revisionist goals, but also contributed to a cautious optimism among the
intelligence community in 1939 about the balance of forces in the longer-term, and consequently the ability
of Britain to effectively deter or defend against German aggression.
The link between assessments of capabilities and perceptions of intentions was identified by A.J.P.
Talyor, who argued that the British intelligence community assumed that once Germany had rearmed, war
would more or less follow on itself.147 Wark, however, argued that Taylors depiction of the COS
analytical process was not quite accurate: Numerical reporting of German power did not lend itself to the
assessment of German intentions, and the overt intelligence authorities seem to have deliberately eschewed
making such linkages. My analysis accepts Warks contention that numerical indicators of the balance of
forces were not the sole piece of evidence that drove assessments about capabilities. I also agree with Wark

146

Chiefs of Staff Committee, The German Army: Its Present Strength and Possible Rate of Expansion in Peace and
War, April 22, 1938, CAB 24/276.

147

A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 376, quoted in Wark, The
Ultimate Enemy, p. 238.

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that until the fall of 1936 the British intelligence community predicted a peaceful future with Germany. But
Wark ignores the fact that it was precisely at the moment when assessments of the balance of power shifted
in Germanys favor (Fall 1936) that the intelligence community stopped imagining a peaceful future in
Europe.
THE PROBLEM OF SELECTIVE ATTENTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
This article has shown that despite the intelligence communitys reliance on the adversarys
capabilities, decision makers chose to independently form judgments about the adversarys political
intentions on the basis of the adversarys recent behavior. At the same time, psychological factors and
organizational interests contributed to differences in the interpretations, but not the selection, of these
signals. Further, actors did not seem to have cherry-picked the indicators that best suited their political
agenda. For example, military intelligence agencies could have easily pointed to Soviet military
interventions in the late 1970s to make the case that they have malign intentions; but they did not. Likewise,
decision-makers who could have benefited rhetorically from raising Soviet capabilities as a powerful
evidence of Soviet aggressive intentions did not do so. Yet, Brzezinskis weekly memoranda to Carter
contain nearly no references to the Soviet military buildup as an indication of intentions. Yet, Brzezinski
relentlessly tried to persuade Carter that the Soviets had a grand design to expand. Similarly Reagan, who
often had to publicly defend his skepticism of Gorbachevs benign intentions during 1985 and 1986 almost
never invoked Soviet offensive capabilities or modernization efforts as evidence of malign intentions.
Still, consistent differences between the civilian decision-makers and the intelligence community across
the three cases was a pattern that I did not expect to find when starting this project and one that demands a
theoretical explanation: specifically, why decision-makers attended to information about the adversarys
behavior to a much larger extent than to changes in the adversarys military capabilities? And, why did the
intelligence communities in the United States and Britain exhibited a markedly different inference process?

Page53of63

Using the Cold War case studies I have generated concrete hypotheses that are intended to generalize
beyond the original data, and specifically, offer more specified causal mechanisms that can explain the
selective selection of particular indicators on intentions that we see in the empirical cases. It is important to
note that using this inductive process of theory development I could not use the same empirical cases that
helped constructed the theory in the first place. Following the advice of George and Bennett, I tested these
hypotheses in the broader project against additional evidence from the two Cold War cases that was not
used to derive these hypotheses, as well as against the case study detailing British perceptions of German
intentions that was conducted after I had noticed a pattern in the first two Cold War cases I investigated.148
I claim that the pattern we see stems primarily from what is called the selective attention to information,
which scholars have recognized as one of the most important cognitive limitations that influence political
choice. Cognitive processing capacities are constrained by bottleneck of short-term memory that allows
those who attempt to interpret others intentions, for instance, to attend to only limited elements of the
environment at any given time. This leads to disproportionate information processing that has numerous
implications on the types of signals perceivers will focus on as they assess the intentions of their
adversaries. For the politicians, two main factors the credibility and vividness of information -- appear to
have jointly contributed to a biased inference process among civilian decision-makers. Further, I argue that
Intelligence analysts operate in a formal, professional, and institutionalized organization that is part of a
bureaucracy.149 As I result, particular bureau-organizational information processes and organizational
missions of intelligence communities shape the selection and evaluation of information pertaining to the
adversarys intentions that then lead them to heavily rely on indicators of adversarys capabilities at the
expense of other indicators. I call this the expertise hypothesis. In the reminder of this section I elaborate on
the three hypotheses and explain their relevance in the cases.

148

See George and Bennett, pp. 111-112; and Levy, pp. 5-6

149

On the difference between organizations and small groups see Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds, pp. 192-193

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First, I argue that historical record shows that certain behavioral-signals by the adversary such as
embarking on foreign military interventions or dismantling domestic institutions were perceived by
decision-makers as costly and irreversible ( especially in comparison to changes in military capabilities perse) and consequently, they were viewed as especially credible indicators to the inference process of
intentions. Put more crudely, it appeared to decision-makers as easier to undo changes in military
expenditures rather than withdraw military forces from occupied territory and rebuild political institutions.
As a result, decision-makers understood that there was greater selectivity in engaging in those particular
activities; and accordingly were greatly influenced by such indicators, and in some cases even demanded
the adversary to explicitly undertake what they believed to be costly and irreversible actions to show his
benign intentions.150At the same time, variation in prior beliefs among the key decision-makers can account
for the variation in the time each changed its perceived intentions. Those decision-makers who held
relatively more hawkish views about the adversarys intentions changed their perceptions of his intentions
in response to costly and irreversible actions that were supposed to indicate benign intentions more slowly
than those decision-makers who hold more dovish views of the adversarys intentions. Further, contrary to
normative and rationalist theories, what costly and irreversible actions decision-makers chose to focus on
depended upon their theories about the links between the behavior and underlying characteristics.151
Another reason decision-makers tended to focus on the adversarys behavioral-signals was due to the
role of affect as information152. Recent work in political science has shown that our felt responses shape the
certainty of our beliefs, and preferences for certain choices, and dovetails with earlier work on the

150

Larson, 2000. Anatomy of mistrust: US-Soviet relations during the Cold War. Ithaca: Cornell Univ Pr.
Kydd, Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation, 326.

151

Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, 32-33; Jonathan Mercer, Emotional Beliefs,
International Organization 64-1 (2010): 1-31.

152

McDermott, Rose. 2004. The Feeling of Rationality. Perspectives on Politics 2 (4):691-706.

. 2004. Political Psychology in International Relations Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Mercer,
Jonathan. 2005. Rationality and Psychology in International Politics. International Organization 59:77-106

Page55of63

significance of information salience.153 As Borgida and Nisbett classically argued, there may be a kind of
eyewitness principle of the weighing of evidence, such that firsthand, sense-impression data is assigned
greater validity...154 Or in the words of Chaim Kaufmann, information that is highly salient (vivid,
concrete, immediate, emotionally interesting or exciting) will receive greater weight than its evidentiary
value warrants People pay more attention to, and are more influenced by, especially salient information
than less vivid information.155 What does vivid information specifically mean in the context of this study?
I argue that, first, decision-makers can and frequently do treat personal impressions garnered from the
behavior of their adversarys leadership in summit meetings or private conversations as highly salient
indicators of their sincerity; and consequently, they view these opportunities as providing important
evidence about the intentions their country.156 Consider for example the comments President Bush made in
reference to the intentions of the Russian leader Vladimir Putin following their meeting: I looked the man
in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able
to get a sense of his soul157 Notable figures such as Winston Churchill, Antony Eden, and Franklin
Roosevelt, for instance, arguably were also strongly influenced by their personal impressions of Stalin
(Groth 1964). Churchill even at one point stated, Poor Neville Chamberlain believed he could trust Hitler.
He was wrong. But I dont think that I am wrong about Stalin (Yergin 1977, 65).

153

Kaufmann, Chaim. 1994. Out of the Lab and into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of
Political Decision Making. International Studies Quarterly 38 (4), p. 563; Nisbett, Richard E., and Lee Ross. 1980.
Human Inference. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Pp. 59-61,123-127
.
154
Borgida, E, and RE Nisbett. 1977. The Differential Impact of Abstract vs. Concrete Information on Decisions.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 7 (3):258-271.
155

Kaufmann (1994, 563)

156

Check article on intelligence aspect of summit meetings (examples: Reagan Gorbachev personal interaction; Shultz
trips to Moscow; trips by Eden, Halifax, and Chamberlain to Germany, Chamberlains sense of betrayal by Hitler;
Carters sense of betrayal with Afghanistan)

157

U.S. President George W. Bush, Press Conference with Russian President Vladimir Putin, 16, June, 2001

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Decision-makers attentiveness and responsiveness to that kind of information has a certain justification
and confers occasional advantages. Interpersonal interaction provides a setting in which leaders not only
exchange information by the content of what they say, but also through myriad other channels. These
include facial expressions, attitude, body language, tone of voice, even unconscious movements or
reactions. As Jervis (1989 [1970], 32-33) states, When an actor is able to directly observe one of his
adversaries he will... scrutinize those presumably uncontrolled aspects of personal behavior that are indices
to the adversarys goals, estimate of the situation, and resolve. The adversarys emotional behavior in such
circumstances make them, according to Jervis, a single that is believed to inextricably linked to the
adversarys intentions (i.e. an indice). At the same time, however, impressions derived from private
meetings can be also misleading and potentially risky. Writing about the intelligence aspect of personal
diplomacy, Alexander Groth points out, most politicians tend to be overconfident in their ability to judge
others, and thus may be too tempted to use their personalized impressions as credible information of
intentions. This is most risky in instances where the adversary chooses to be deceitful and is skillful at it -
as the case of Chamberlains assessments of Hitlers intentions following their meeting in October 1938
illustrates.
It is extraordinarily difficult to forecast exactly what behavior leaders will pay attention to, and the
impressions they will take away from meetings with their counterparts; personal impressions by nature are
contingent on highly personal and contextual factors containing large degrees of variance and are hard to
independently assess. I hypothesize however that personal impressions of the adversarys behavior will
likely influence assessments of intentions under three conditions: First, all else equal, leaders institutionally
endowed with the power to make independent judgment calls will have more discretionary freedom to draw
upon their own personal impressions in making decisions. Conversely, should leaders perceive their
counterparts to be under strong institutional constraints and thus relatively powerless, personal impressions
may be given less weight. Second, specific situational factors can also play a role. Situations where
information is scarce, ambiguous, or contradictory can push leaders to rely on personal impressions for lack

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of other sources. Also, leaders may fall back on instinctual personal impressions in situations when they
experience reduced cognitive processing capacity, such as due to crisis-induced stress.158 Finally, attributes
characteristic to certain leaders may also play a role. Leaders highly confident in their personal judgment
and distrusting or dismissive of bureaucratically produced assessments will more likely draw upon personal
impressions. Alternatively, actors with strong preconceptions of or prejudices toward their opposite
numbers may be more gradual in adjusting their explicit evaluations in response to personal interactions.
In addition to personal impressions, decision-makers may perceive information about the adversarys
behavior as salient also because of the ego-centric bias, according to which decision-makers tend to
exaggerate the causal significance of their own actions and discount the importance of other factors,
thereby, overestimating the linkages between themselves and the behavior of others.159 The predilection of
decision-makers to see themselves as the central point of reference when they explain particular actions of
their adversaries can produce significant emotional response, rending these types of behavioral-signals
highly salient information of intentions from the perspective of the observing decision-maker. As the
empirical cases indicate, the three primary decision-makers I look at Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Prime
Minister Chamberlain have all been victims to this ego-centric bias, believing that certain positive or
negative actions by their adversaries were a direct response to their own actions. For example, Carters
believed that the United States was the target of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; while Reagan
saw changes in Gorbachevs practices of political liberalization at least partially stemming from his own
personal influence over the Soviet leader.
The presence of ego-centric bias might be especially salient in the process of inferring intentions when a
decision-maker believes he communicated to the adversary, through private channels or in public, what kind
of actions he would expect the adversary to undertake to reveal his intentions. An adversarys reluctance or

158
159

(McDermott 2004, 173-176)

On Ego centric bias see Stein building politics into psychology and Ross and Sicoly, 1979; Fiske and Taylor,
1984; Jervis, 1976: 343-355; an Lebow 1988

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refusal to subsequently comply with these litmus tests may have an especially personalized and negative
emotional effect on the observing decision-makers.160 Alternatively, the presence of the ego-centric bias
might work in the opposite direction: that is, an adversarys actions that are consistent with the with the list
of actions proposed in the litmus test could serve as a particularly salient reassuring signal from the
perspective of the observer as he will likely attribute the adversarys actions to his own prior actions even in
cases where the adversarys decision to undertake these actions was motivated by unrelated considerations.
A final insight that follows from the vividness hypothesis is that while decision-makers are keen
to rely on vivid information, they will likewise be reluctant to rely on evidence that is abstract, pallid, and
less concrete.161 As the empirical cases indicates, most intelligence reports that estimate the threat posed by
the adversary fit these criteria, and these were largely ignored by decision-makers to address issues
pertaining to the adversarys political intentions.
In addition to credibility stemming from costly actions and vividness of information, I argue that
one of the reasons that decision-makers selectively attend to information about behavior to infer intentions,
whereas intelligence communities selectively attend to information about capabilities has to do with the
perceived expertise of each set of actors. Decision-makers, as politicians who tend to spend much time and
efforts in trying to uncover the intentions of other actors within their own decision-making system, have a
particular skill-set that make them believe that can draw accurate inferences about intentions from the
adversarys behavior. At the same time, more often than not lack the nuanced experience or expertise that is
required to interpret complex information about the adversarys military capabilities and doctrine, and
certainly the inferences they should draw from these indicators about his political intentions.

160

For a nice illustration of the concept of litmus test to gauge intentions, see Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of
Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p.
34; and Edelsteins dissertation. In Game theory this is referred to as screening models See Eric Rasmusen, Games
and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory, 2nd Edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 259-65.

161

Chaim Kaufmann, Out of the Lab and into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of
Political Decision Making, 38-4 (1994): 563.

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On the other hand, the comparative advantage of the intelligence community appears to be in
collecting and analyzing trends in the adversarys military capabilities. Indeed, the bureau-organization
context in which intelligence analysts operate make them a different kind of perceivers in comparison to the
politicos. Organizational missions are known to channel attention and affect the selection of information as
well as the preference for interpretations. Intelligence organizations estimates about the adversary
intentions reflect the expertise these organizations develop in cultivation of the organizational goal. Since it
is often the case that the primary mission of intelligence is to forewarn of hostile action, it is also often the
case that these organizations tend to devote most time and energy to the collection, production, and analysis
of information about the military inventory of the adversary. Much of a potentially hostile states
capabilities can be known and easily tracked over time. As Mark Lowenthal writes, this is particularly true
of deployed conventional and strategic forces, which are difficult to conceal, as they tend to exist in
identifiable garrisons and must exercise from time to time. They also tend to be garrisoned or deployed in
large numbers, which makes hiding them or masking them impractical at best. The regularity and precision
that govern each nations military make it susceptible to intelligence collection.162 In other words, military
inventories tend to be a convenient target for collection. Further, military arsenals are tangible in the sense
that can be quantified and presented in a quasi-scientific way. Indeed, much of the intelligence that was
produced (not just collected) about the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany was statistical. The extensive
monitoring of the adversarys military inventory creates narrow-mindedness that characterizes the inference
process of experts, or to use Isaiah Berlins metaphor, hedgehogs. Hedgehogs know one big thing, upon
which they rely to form judgments about a variety of things. A recent study by Phillip Tetlock on the style
of reasoning of experts notes, the intellectually aggressive hedgehogs knew one big thing and sought,
under the banner of parsimony, to expand the explanatory power of that big thing to cover new case.163
Similarly, the intelligence communities in the United States and Britain appear to have relied on its

162

Lowenthal, pp. 234-235

163

Tetlock, pp. 20-21

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expertise about the adversarys capabilities to address questions pertaining to his political intentions. In
short, information about the adversarys capability was the most readily available, the easiest to gather and
defend when presented to the executives, the most amenable to analysis, and, thus, served as the most
parsimonious heuristic from which intelligence organization derived predictions about political intentions.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study also has several practical implications for foreign policy. First, and perhaps most
obviously, a states behavior is likely to have the greatest effect on how others will judge its intentions.
However, reassurance even through such behavior is difficult, and the historical record suggests
uncertainty about the extent to which these actions will have the desired effect. Cognitive biases,
preexisting beliefs, and organizational politics are likely to taint others interpretation of these signals.
While there is plenty of room for misinterpretation, policy-makers should nevertheless be aware that their
diplomatic and military actions are likely to be a more significant category of signals in shaping the
perceptions of the adversarys leadership than changes in material capabilities. Prudent decision-makers
should not, however, conclude that this means they need not worry about the consequences of a large
scale military buildup. The historical evidence indicates that armament efforts by the adversary did lead
observers to raise, though not answer, questions about the adversarys long-term objectives.
A second set of policy implications pertains to the quality of the intelligence analysis about the
adversarys political intentions and their impact on decision makers. This study has not been designed to
address whether the intelligence community got it right or not. The evidence I have presented, however,
does point to practices in imputing intentions that may have prevented the intelligence community from
reaching accurate conclusions about the adversarys foreign policy goals.
Specifically, the NIEs did not state the assumptions underlying the intelligence communitys estimates
of the adversarys political intentions. Thus, it is unclear whether the community was even aware that its
biased inference process was decisive in driving estimates about Soviet foreign policy intentions. Second,

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the premise that the perceived correlation of forces would determine Soviet foreign policy should have been
examined as to whether it relied on direct evidence or on assumptions. The intelligence community should
have asked what an alternative picture of Soviet intentions would look like if that premise were removed
from the equation. Yet, to be fair, even if the practice of inferring intentions had been conducted with more
rigor and imagination, there is no guarantee that the intelligence community would have produced more
accurate assessments Soviet intentions. Nor is there reason to believe that such improvements would have
led civilian decision-makers to pay more attention to the NIEs. Nonetheless, if no effort is made to
institutionalize practices designed to counteract the bias this study has identified, a bias that privileges
capabilities over behavior, then one should expect that it will continue to affect the intelligence
communitys assessments of adversaries intentions.
Finally, the NIEs analysis of Soviet political intentions had only a marginal effect on the perceptions of
civilian decision-makers. To a large extent, the latter preferred to make these general political judgments for
themselves. Indeed, Brzezinski and Shultz were all critical of the NIEs political analysis, believing that
they had better knowledge of the adversary and could therefore offer better insights.164 Further, the NIEs
relied on different indicators than those used by decision-makers, and therefore reached conclusions about
the adversarys foreign policy objectives that were not congruent with the opinions and assessments of key
civilian decision-makers at the time. 165

T ABLE 2: B RZEZINSKI ' S S UMMARY OF S OVIET I NTENTIONS (S OURCE : NSC R EPORT #47)

164
165

Authors Interview with Brzezinski.

These findings echo the conclusions of scholars who have examined the correlation between intelligence and foreign
policy in other cases. For example, Kahn David. United States Views of Germany and Japan in 1941, in May Ernest,
ed., 1984. Knowing One's Enemies : Intelligence assessment before the two world wars, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press. Similarly, interviews that I conducted with Ret. Major General Shlomo Gazit, the head of the Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) intelligence branch in the mid-1970s, suggest that Israeli decision-makers paid little attention to
the Israeli intelligence about Sadats political intentions in the period following the 1973 War.

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Benign

Neutral

Malignant

SALT (tough but serious)

Middle East (not helpful but not

overtly destructive)

Neutron Bomb (an intense

propaganda campaign against
the U.S.)

CTB (clearly seeking

accommodation)

Arms Transfers (restrained; not

actively cooperative and seeking to
retain Soviet freedom of action)

Human Rights (suppression at

home and some success in
toning down U.S criticism
abroad)

Indian Ocean (seeking

accommodation but rather onesided in its proposals)

CSCE (uncooperative and

obstructive)

Chemical Warfare (positiveexploratory)

Southern Africa
(uncooperative and
encouraging extremism)

Radiological Warfare (positiveexploratory)

African Horn (assertive

intrusion, with dangerous
demonstration-effects)

Nuclear Proliferation (positive

and cooperative)