Liberation of Difference: Toward a Theory of Antiliterature

Author(s): Mark D. Seem

Source: New Literary History, Vol. 5, No. 1, What Is Literature? (Autumn, 1973), pp. 119-133
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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Liberationof Difference:
Toward a TheoryofAntiliterature
MarkD. Seem
I. Discursive
Constraints
andRepresentation
CCW

HAT IS 'WRITING'

(that of 'writers')if not a ... formof

subjection,perhaps taking ratherdifferentforms,but

whose main stressesare nonethelessanalogous,"' asks
Michel Foucault in L'Ordre du discours ("The Order of Discourse,"
translatedas "The Discourseon Language"). The "orderof discourse"
is our startingpoint,then. Is therea "machine de guerre,"2 a literary
an antidiscoursewhich mighthave the status of a counterdiscourse,
is
this
new
about
literature?If such be the case, what exactly different
type of discursiveactivity;what are the conditionsand nature of this
difference?I shall firstattemptto explain these theoreticalproblems,
activityof Michel Foucault
relyingespeciallyon the critical/theoretical
and Gilles Deleuze.3 Next, I shall analyze brieflya few passages from
Proust'sRemembranceof ThingsPast, as an example of such a counterdiscourse.
In "The Discourse on Language," Foucault definesdiscursiveconstraintsand examines the whole interplayof limitation,rarefaction,
and appropriationof discourse. First,he delineatesthose constraints
imposed fromwithout: excluded and forbiddenspeech, the division
I The Discourse on Language (L'Ordre du Discours), tr. Rupert Swyer,in Social
Science Information (April 1971), pp. 7-30, and included as an appendix to the
English translation of L'archdologie du Savoir (The Archeology of Knowledge)
(New York, 1972). This paper was originally presented by Foucault as his inaugural lecture at the College de France.
2 "Machine de guerre" means literally"war machine," and is an expression used
by Deleuze and Guattari in Capitalisme et schizophrenie: L'Anti-Oedipe (Paris,
1972).
3 ParticularlyFoucault's theoreticalworks: Madness and Civilization, The Order
of Things, The Archeologyof Knowledge, and The Discourse on Language. Deleuze's
major works are unfortunatelynot yet translated, except for the book on Proust,
and are: Nietzsche et la philosophie, La logique du sens, Difdrence et rdpitition,
Proust and Signs, culminating in his most recent work with F6lix Guattari,
Capitalisme et schizophrdnie.

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120

NEW LITERARY HISTORY

betweenreasonand madness,4and the volontgde ve'rit6(will to truth).

Here, as Foucault emphasizes,it is mainlya matterof collectivepower
and singular desire: that power which marks discoursewith taboos
and prohibitions(sexual taboos and political prohibitions,for example), which imposes silence on certain discourses (in the case of
"madness"), and which forbids"lies." Discoursewould, therefore,
say
only what is permitted,or what Reason permitsto tell the Truth of
the world. This last constraint,that will to truthwhich is always the
resultof an interplayof power and authority,governsthe othertwo.
Speaking of literatureFoucault says: "All thosewho, at one moment
or anotherin our history,have attemptedto mould this will to truth
and to turn it against truth,at that very point where truthundertakes to justifythe taboo and to define madness; all those, from
Nietzsche to Artaud and Bataille, must now stand as (probably
haughty) signpostsfor all our futurework."5
Foucault then focuseson the internalprocedures,where discourse
itselfexercisesits own control. Here it is no longera questionof desire
and power, but rather of events and chance as they establish the
boundariesof discourse. First,thereis criticalcommentary-thatactivitydestinedto restatewhat was alreadysaid or writtenin the primary
of the commentary.
text,which servesas a basis forthe meta-identity
Critical commentarymerelyengages in a repetitiveact of mimesis,
the funcforginga deceptivecopy of the primarytext. Furthermore,
tion of the author also limits the contingencyof discourse and its
statusas event. It is, in fact,alwaysthe positionof the authorvis-a-vis
his textwhichplaces his discourse.Foucault suggests,forexample,that
the anonymityof scientificdiscourse,where one is concerned only
witha "truth"accessibleto everyone,is opposed to both the singularity
(and responsibility)of the author in the literatureof the eighteenth
centuryand to the disappearingauthor of the contemporaryliterary
stage such as Beckett and other anonymous,or quasi-anonymous,
figures. Where it was once asked (and certain literarycriticismdemands) that the author guarantee the unityof his work and subtly
demonstratethe hidden meaning runningthroughit, it would now
appear that thesedemands are no longervalid in relationto thisantiliterarydiscourse. Chance and discursiveevent are therebylimitedby
an identityin the formof the individualityand the I of the author
(even though this I may hide behind the fradulentvoice of a third
4 See Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason
(New York, 1965) for an in depth discussion of this division.
5 The Discourse on Language. Reference to subsequent quotes from this book
will be given as page numbers in parentheses in the text.

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LIBERATION

OF DIFFERENCE

12I

person). And, finally,thereis the systemof "disciplines"where there

are anonymousand distinctdiscursiveareas subject to the rules of a
"discursivepolice force": "Disciplines constitutea systemof control
in the productionof discourse,fixingitslimitsthroughthe action of an
identity,taking the form of a permanentreactivationof the rules"

(p.220).

There is a thirdgroup of constraints.These are no longerconcerned

withthe externalplay of desireand power to decide what has the right
to be said in the name of a giventruth,nor are theyconcernedwiththe
questionof the limitationof the role of chance and the appearance of
discourseas event. This time, it is a matterof access to discourse:
"Rarefaction . . . among speaking subjects: none may enter into
discourseon a specificsubject unlesshe has satisfiedcertainconditions
or if he is not,fromthe outset,qualifiedto do so" (p. 225). Here we
are dealing with rituals,sociedtesde discours ("fellowships" of discourse) where one mustundergoan apprenticeshipor an initiationin
orderto be qualifiedas an "homme de lettres,"withpolitical,religious,
and philosophicaldoctrinesand with the social appropriationof discourses. One becomes qualified in rituals, provided one knows the
proper speech, gestures,and behavior. In a particular "fellowship"
of discourse,the person is qualified if he knows the secrets and the
hidden laws (magic, alchemy, literature). In the case of what is
termed"writing,"it is a question of the qualificationsof the writer/
scribe as the one who can and ought to say the truthwith words; the
one who, havingthe given power,representsthingsof the world in all
their"truth"solelyby the use of language. In the case of a doctrine,
thereis a double subjugation: first,the memberof a group is qualified
onlyif he knowsthe discoursesof the group to which he belongs; second, thesediscoursesmustbe kept withinthe confinesof the group by
the exclusionof all otherdiscourses- "adherenceto a class,to a social
or racial status,to a nationalityor an interest,to a struggle,a revolt
or an acceptance" (p. 226).
Across this whole last group of constraintsoperatesthe mechanism
of access to, and the social appropriationof,discourse. It is a question
here of the entire educational machine, where the appropriationof
discoursesis maintained and/or modifiedpoliticallyand involvesthe
whole interplayof knowledgeand power implicitin it: "What is an
educational system,afterall, if not a ritualizationof the word; if not
a qualificationof some fixingof roles forspeakers; if not the constitution of a (diffuse) doctrinalgroup; if not a distributionand an appropriationof discoursewithall itslearningand its powers?" (p. 227).
What, then,is writing? What is this discoursetermed "literature"

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NEW LITERARY HISTORY

I22

if not a similarsystemof qualificationof the writer/author

as precisely
the one who "represents"the truth;if not a representation
destinedto
a closed circle of readers; if not, finally,the privilegedpropertyof a
group of people who have it in theirpower to say what will fall into
thiscategoryof "literary"discourse-that is to say, thisominouscircle
of universityliterarycriticismwhich fixes,by itself,the role of the
author and the status of this discourse?
Accordingto Foucault, thereare a certainnumberof philosophical
themeswhich respondto theselimitationsand constraintsand, at the
same time, reinforcethem. First, philosophy proposes an "ideal
truth"and an "immanentrationality"as, respectively,
the law of discourse and the principleof its ordering. Next, philosophyreinforces
the power and breadth of these limitationsby negating the specific
realityof discourse. It performsthis in three ways: first,the consubjects are seen
cept of the "foundingsubject": Writing/speaking
as carriersof meaning,ratherthan as those who practice discoursea prodigiousignoranceof the realityof discourse! Second thereis the
notion of the "originatingexperience,"which presupposesa primary
complicitywiththe world-a worldthatwould open itselfto a reading
in orderto disengagethe immanentmeaning. Such a view revealsthe
world as made of meanings and ideas, and analysisneed only focus
its glance on this "meaning-full"surfaceto decipherthe world-Book.
Last of all, thereis the forbiddingthemeof mediation,of the universal
mediation of discourse. Here it is simplya matterof retrievingthe
movement of a logos so as to permit consciousness to ". . . deploy all

the rationalityin the world" (p. 228). This is a subtle denial of the
realityof discoursesince,insteadof puttingdiscourseitselfin the center
of analyticalactivity,one findstherelogos, as a discoursealready,and
forever,pronounced: "Discourse is no longer more than the shimmeringof a truthabout to be bornin itsown eyes.. ." (p. 228).
in each case philosophydoes
As Foucault himselfstressesrigorously,
nothingbut suppressthe realityof discourseby means of a gamea game of signs: "Discourse thus nullifiesitself,in reality,
specifically,
in placing itselfat the disposalof the signifier"(p. 228). He adds that
at the presenttime thereis not only a simple venerationof discourse
which pretendsto liberateit but also a logophilia. But, as he hastensto
add, underneaththis apparentlogophilia a sortof fear hides furtively,
a veryreal logophobia! Specifically,it is a fear of ". .. everything
that could possibly be violent, discontinuous,querelous, disordered
even and perilousin it,of theincessant,disorderly
buzzingof discourse"
(p. 229).

In orderto analyze, and perhaps mitigate,thisfear in all its condi-

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LIBERATION

OF DIFFERENCE

123

tions, one must make, according to Foucault, three methodological

decisions: ". . . to questionour will to truth;to restoreto discourseits
characteras an event; to abolish the sovereigntyof the signifier"(p.
229). This formof analysisproposedby Foucault is, clearly,opposed
pointby pointto the traditionalconstraintsoperatingon discourseand
to a structuralapproach: "... the analysisof discoursethus understood, does not reveal the universalityof a meaning, but brings to
lightthe actionofimposedrarity,witha fundamentalpowerof affirmation. Rarityand affirmation;
rarity,in the last resort,of affirmationcertainlynot any continuousoutpouringof meaning,and certainlynot
any monarchyof the signifier"(p. 234, my italics). It is therefore
necessaryto detach oneselffromeverynotion of a primaryidentity;
liberate oneself from any idea of an original logos as founder of
meaning and from the constraintsof representationby divorcing
oneself, finally and most importantly,from the Hegelian system
and its concept of totality. In short, one must change the point
of attack, the position of analysis,and become situated at the level
of the game, or betteryet, in the entire theaterof difference.One
should no longerspeak of a repetitionof identitiesand resemblances;
one shouldliberatediscourse,give back to it the realityof its practiceas a real event. This can be accomplished by becoming aware of
differences,
byseeingin discursiveactivitynotjust a game of representation,but rathera repetitionof difference.We muststudythat which
fromall others,and it is essentialthatwe
makes any discoursedifferent
show what constitutesthe differenceof differentdiscursivepractices
in orderto measuretheirpowerof affirmation.It is therefore
necessary
to engage in an analyticalpracticewhich is totallyopposed to any and
all analyses of representation,
by taking part in a very real struggle
In
order
to studythe "conditionsof possibility"
such
analyses.
against
of discourse,we must have an anticriticaldiscourse. The discourse
of Foucault, as well as that of Deleuze, seemsto me to be exactlythat:
a counterdiscoursewhich liberates difference.
It is essentialto definebrieflywhat theymean by difference,
repetition, multiplicity,and intensiveseries. Then we might be able to
analyze anotherformof counterdiscourse:a literarydiscourseopposed
at everylevel to the identityof an author,to the repetitionof the same,
and to representation-an antiliteraturewhich destroysat everymomentall conceptsof totality,a literarydiscoursewhich extends,at least
in the French novel, fromProust (the originatorof this "machine"?)
to Beckett (who is indeed the one who goes the farthest,the one who
neverstopsgoing as far as possiblein that impossibledirection). Foldiscourse
lowing Nietzsche's philosophicaldiscourse,this anti-literary

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NEW LITERARY HISTORY

124

also sets itselfagainst the original and universal logos-to become

ANTI-LOGOS.6

II. Liberation of Difference: A Tool of Affirmation

As Deleuze statesin L'Anti-Oedipe, it was Maurice Blanchot who
posed the problemat the level of the literary"machine."7 How does
which are joined by a relationof differentiation
one conceivefragments
an originaltotality? Obviously,an idea of
reference
to
withoutany
is
an
affirmative
thoughtirreducibleto a unity.
multiplicity needed,
in
mind
what Foucault perceived as a
In otherwords (and keeping
of
fearof the reality discourse),what exactlyare theforceswhichmove
under the repetitionof the same? Accordingto Deleuze, "the art of
the contemporarynovel revolvesaround differenceand repetition."8
But what exactlydoes Deleuze mean by repetitionand difference?
He states his position on repetitionat the outset of Differenceet
repe'tition:

Repetitionis a behavior,but in termsof something

unique and singular,
whichhas neitherlikenessnor equivalence. And perhapsthis repetition
as externalconduct echoes in turn a more secretvibration,an inner
evenmoreprofoundin itsgenerating
Festivalshave
repetition
singularity.
no other apparent paradox: to repeat an event which is "irricommen able" (un-beginnable). It is not a matterof adding a second and
a thirdtimeto the first,but ratherof raisingthe firsttimeto the "nth"
power.9
The point of departureis thereforesingularityitself,in oppositionto
discourse. Strictly
the notionof "primaryidentity"in representational
of
is
a
repetition-a repetitionof the
type
speaking, representation
of
likeness.
same, of identity,
Repetitioncan always be represented.
But "pure" repetitionis practiced against all law, it is transgression.
It was the man of duty and honor who inventedthe ordeal of the
repetitionof the same (and of good), and it is againstthese concepts
of good and the same, and also against generality(habit and representation) that repetitionfunctions. In opposing repetitionto gen6 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs, tr. Richard Howard (New York, 1972); see
the chapter "Anti-Logos."
L'Anti-Oedipe, p. 50.
Diffdrenceet rdpetition,"Introduction," my translation.
9 Diffe'renceet rdpitition,p. 8. My translations-further referenceswill appear
in the text as page indications.
7
8

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LIBERATION

OF DIFFERENCE

125

erality,in settingup repetitionagainst habit and the peculiaritiesof

memory,one sees thatforgetting(L'OUBLI) becomes a positiveforce
-in fact, one forgetsbecause one repeats. When we speak of representation,we are also speaking of mediation: repetitionoperates in
orderto break throughthis obstruction: "it is a matterof producing
... a movementcapable of excitingthe mindbeyondall representation;
of inventingvibrationsand intensities"(p. Io). Hegel's dialectics,says
Deleuze, depends on "bare" repetition,a repetitionof surfacesand the
whichblocksdifference.There are, then,
same: hence a representation
at least two typesof repetition: bare repetition,of the same (where
it is a matterof the identityof concepts-a staticand negativerepetition), and "dressed" repetition(where it is a question of masks and
and dysimulacrums),a repetitionof differencewhich is affirmative
namic.
of the negaWhen Hegel speaks of the resolutionof contradictions,
in orderto rise above them,he is at the same time
tion of differences
to the religiousconcept of union: "Here is union, in which
referring
the differences
of thesecharacteristics
are done away with .... ." Who
can deny the fundamentallyreligious (faithful) nature of Hegel's
dialectics? For him, resolutionof contradictions(differences)seems
to be achieved in a religious way, through worship (mediation).
Essentially,then, is it not indeed possible that the whole notion of
resolvingcontradictions(those annoying differences!) in order to
reach a synthesis-above differences-and to reach the totalityof the
ALL is, in its most profoundregions,nothingless than the nihilistic
of the Christianmovementof the negationof differences
representation
status of the Son,
in
the
(as
Trinity,and especiallythe contradictory
cannot
union
God
who
achieve
a
with
Christ,
exceptby his own negaa
negation brought about by the totalizing
tion-through death!),
action of faith? The ruse of Christianity,
which is also Hegel's ruse,
takes the form of a mathematical "miracle": make ONE out of
THREE, riseabove DIFFERENCES to UNITY! If such be the case,
is it not also possiblethat all dialectics,by theirvery form,bear the
weightof thisreligiousstamp-the stamp of FAITH in a totalityabove
multiplicity,singularities,and differences?To combat this nihilistic
and multiplicity,
a thoughtwhich,
faith,one needsa thoughtofintensity
instead of lookingfor a common denominatorunder or above differences, thinksdifference"differentially."
Referringto Deleuze's own discourse,Foucault writesin "Theatrum
Philosophicum"(Critique [Nov. 1971]) : "Let us pervertgood sense,
and make thoughtplay outsidethe orderedcategoryof resemblances,"
and he adds, "One must thinkthoughtas intensiveirregularity-dis-

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I26

NEW LITERARY HISTORY

integrationof the subject."'1 It is not a question here of the "true"

thoughtor of the "true" analyticalmethod: ratherit is a matterof a
thought,now possibleand unavoidable, which is intensive,and of an
analysiswhich liberatesdifferences.In short,as Deleuze never stops
THEATER
repeatingafterNietzsche,we must constructa different
forthis new formof thought. We need different
masks and gestures.
We mustdevelop a thoughtwhich goes beyondcontradictions,
beyond
good and evil. Foucault putsit well:
To liberatedifference,
we need a thoughtwithoutcontradictions,
without
dialectics,withoutnegation: a thoughtwhichsaysyes to divergence;an
affirmative
is disjunction;a thoughtof the
thoughtwhose instrument
and
nomadic
whichno constraints
of
multiple-of dispersed
multiplicity
the Same can limitor regroup. . . thatis to say [applicable]to a multiplicityof discerniblepointswhichbecome displacedas one distinguishes
theirconditions,and whichinsistsand subsistsin an interplayof repetitions. ("TheatrumPhilosophicum,"
p. 899)
To speak of differencein termsof contradictionsis to undertakea
which is "contradictory,"
in
violentnegationof one of the differences
orderto reach a resolution.In so doing,one negatesthe entirenature
of differentiation
by stayingwithinboth a concept of totalityand the
limitsof representation.You do not resolvedifferences;you analyze
theirconditionsand affirm
theirreality.
When dealing with this firstrepetition(of the Same), where differenceis staticand subjectedto identities,we are in a theaterwhose
movementis horizontaland negative. But in the case of this second
it is a question of a theaterof intensity
repetition,that of difference,
and dynamics. Here, the strengthof repetitionlies in displacementand
disguise (displacement of sites and points of view, disguise of the
withmasksand simulacrums),and the power of difcharacters/actors
ferencerestsin divergenceand displacement,where the centerforthe
repetitiveact shiftsconstantly.
Deleuze states,at the end of Differenceet repetition,that thereis,
however,a third repetition,a repetitionthat is endless and beyond
cycles-the straightline of the "empty form of time": beyond the
the death instinct.Beyondbare repeticycleof memoryand forgetting,
dressed
tion and
repetition,beyond that which subjugates difference
and that which recognizesit, there is a repetitionwhich makes the
and whose power is destructionand selection. The highest
difference,
formof art, then,says Deleuze, would be that one which plays all of
Io

"Theatrum Philosophicum," Critique,p. 898, my translation.

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LIBERATION

OF DIFFERENCE

127

these repetitionssimultaneously: repetitionsof habit, repetitionsof

memory,and the ultimaterepetitionsof death. Foucault explains the
event/deathbrillantly: "In an exemplaryway, death is the event of
all events,meaning at its pure state: it takes place in the anonymous
billowingof discourse; it is that which is spoken about, has already
happened and remains indefinitelyfuture,reaching everywherethe
extremesof singularity.The meaning/eventis neutral as is death"
("Theatrum Philosophicum,"p. 891). This thirdrepetitionis "pure,"
since what is repeated is repetitionitself.
Deleuze brings about a complete reversal of representation: the
conceptsof likenessand identityexist,but not as primaryfoundations.
To the contrary,these concepts are "secondary powers," always reeverything
volvingaround differences.In the theaterof representation,
rotatesaround the same, around primaryidentity,necessity-that of
the unconditionedand of death-and totality. But in the theater
of eternalrecurrenceit is always a question of the famed Nietzschean
throw-of-the-dice:the Dionysian contemplationof all possibilitiesof
of the returnof the dice, which
Chance in one throw,the affirmation
carrieswith it necessity(the necessityof that particularcombination),
of the identityof that combinationand, finally,the
the affirmation
of the same (as the act of recurrenceitself), where the
affirmation
returnis containedin the contemplation,where necessityis contained
in chance,whereidentityand the one and all are containedin the multiplicityof all possibilities.Where,lastly,totalityexistsalong with the
otherparts and multiplefragmentsof this machine in the formof a
dice tumbler. This thoughtof eternal recurrenceis clearly opposed
radically to representation: we no longer have necessity,sameness,
likeness,and totalityas primarypowers,but ratherchance, difference,
eternal recurand multiplicity.Beneath representation,
dissimilarity,
rence prepares its return: beneath the same, differencetrembles;
of fragmentsare ready to explode; bebeneath totality,a multiplicity
neath the intellectand Logos, desireand Pathos rumblenow and forever-AND NOT THE CONTRARY!
Startingwith de Sade, and
his violation,his rape of representation,
somethinglike violence,desire,
or passionstretchesitselfout under all discursivepractice,as the condition of possibilityand necessityof its event.11To liberate discursive
than de Sade, no longerjust representwe mustgo even further
activity,
of
the torrentsthat Deleuze and Guatalso
all
but
letting
ing "desire,"
tariterm"machines-disirantes"(desiring-machines)flowfreely,allowing desire to play and rejoice in all of its interplaysof repetitionby
See chapters on representation,
i
The Order of Things (New York, 197i).
and the limits of representation (the discussions of Don Quixote and de Sade).

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NEW LITERARY HISTORY

I28

realizingthat thisis, precisely,desire'sdifference.In orderto perform

a radical analysis,an analysisof "war" againstthe conceptof a primary
Logos, we need an analyticalinstrumentpowerfulenough to incorporate withinitselfall actionsof Pathos (and see theseactions as "pathologies"); we need a "symptomology"-a "schizo-analyse."12The
name forsuch a methodis not important. But if one wants to really
an
enjoy modem literaryactivityin its status as a counterdiscourse,
an
to
then
Proust
Beckett
in
antiliterature, antilogos (from
France),
one needs a radical mode of thoughtdifferent
fromthosewhich clutter
currentcriticaldiscourseswherethe criticneverstopstalkingof totality,
and signified-La (Sainte) Ecriture!13
meaning,signifier,
In speakingof Deleuze, Foucault saysthatthereis a mode of thought
and selective. Foucault himwhich is genital,aggressive,affirmative,
role
in the developmentof this
of
fundamental
a
self, course, plays
"new" thought. As Foucault says,thissortof analyticalthoughtof the
strugglesof Pathos against "logophobia" must take into account the
symptomsof these "pathologies," and is thus a sort of diagnosis:
"Diagnosis understoodthisway does not establishthe affadavitof our
identityby a game of distinctions.It establishesthe fact that we are
that our reason is the differenceof discourses,our history
difference,
the differenceof times,our selfthe differenceof masks. It establishes
that difference,
far frombeing the forgottenand recoveredorigin,is
the scatteringthat we are and that we produce" (my italics).14
On the basis of the analyticalargumentpresentedin the preceding
pages, we mightnow be able to leave the purelytheoreticalperspective
and apply this approach to literarytext. We shall attemptto analyze
a few scenes of Proust'sRemembranceof Things Past, in an effortto
ratherthan list the static
grasp the fleetingproductionof differences,
of
the
same.
representation
III.

Antiliterature: Kaleidoscopic Difference

intensive
In orderto examinetheseelementsof chance, multiplicity,
series,difference,and repetition,I have chosen a scene fromProust
which seemsto me centralto the whole Proustiandiscourse: the scene
of the group of younggirlsat Balbec-beach.15
I2 L'Anti-Oedipe, p. 325-"Introduction & la schize-analyse."
13 For a discussion of this concept of "6criture," see the works of Jacques
Derrida, especially Ecriture et la difference,ed. de Seuil (Paris, 1972).
14 Foucault, L'Archdologie du savoir (Paris, I969), pp. 172-73, my translation.
All quotations from Proust will be from the Scott Moncriefftranslation,ReI5
membrance of Things Past (New York, I934), I. All furtherreferenceswill indicate page within parentheses in the text.

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LIBERATION

OF DIFFERENCE

129

Amongall thesepeople ... [were]the girlswhom I noticed,with that

masteryover theirlimbswhichcomesfromperfectbodilyconditionand
a sincerecontemptfortherestof humanity... advancingstraightahead,
which
withouthesitationor stiffness,
exactlythosemovements
performing
each
of
their
in
full
wished
to
members
perform,
they
independenceof
therest,thegreaterpartof theirbodiespreserving
whichis
thatimmobility
so noticeablein a good waltzer..... Althougheach was of a typetotally
fromthe others,theyall had beauty; but to tell the truth,I
different
had seen themforsuch a shorttime,and withoutventuringto look them
straightin the face, that I had not yetindividualisedany of them....
(accordingto the orderin whichtheirseriesmet the eye,marvellousbeAnd
cause the mostdifferent
aspectscame nextone another. . .) ....
this want, in my vision,of the demarcationswhich I should presently
establishbetweenthemsentfloodingover the groupa wave of harmony,
of a beautyfluid,collectiveand mobile.[my
the continuoustransfusion
italics]16
One mightbe temptedto see in thisscene the veryproofof a Proustian
concept of totality,of "la belle totalit6."7 But such an interpretation
would be nothingless than negligence,willed withouta doubt: a failure to note such sentencesas, "Although each was of a type totally
different
fromthe others" or "marvellousbecause the most different
aspects came next one another." A disregard,finally,of the essence
and
of such Proustianscenes: the essenceof fundamentaldifferences
to
order
of
and
intensiveseriesunderlyingall illusions totality
unity-in
movement
a
spread the illusionthat Proustwould speak of totalizing
unifyingall!
As Deleuze shows so well in his chapter on series and groups in
Proust and Signs, the whole mechanismof intensiveseries is already
of the
presentin thisscene. A nebulous beginning,nondifferentiation
in
of
the
the
contains
a
essence
each
others),
way
girl
group (where
where the colors and shapes of the girls intermingle,but where the
unifiedcollectivity
subtlygivesway, always,to an individualization,to
a chance selectioncomprisingthe necessityof this choice, a selective
and differentiating
process that startsfrom a singularity,forminga
new series. To talk of Proustin termsof a totalityis to stop short (as
Swann always did). It is to see Proust solely on the level of groups
(which always representthe surface for Proust), instead of going
I6 Withina Budding Grove, pp. 596-97.
17 Girard writesof this scene in an unpublished text,"La violence et le sacr6 dans
A la recherche du temps perdu." Due to a decidedly Hegelian point of departure,
Girard's reading seems to deny Proustian discontinuity,forcing Proust into totality
and identity-"A contresens" I think- "Derriere l'illusion de la differenceabsolue,
regne l'identit " (p. 13).

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NEW LITERARY HISTORY

130

further,as far as possible, and plunging to the depths of intensive

series-where totalityis laughed at and destroyed.
Followingthisscene, thereis the verycuriousscene of profanation,
repeatingagain the action of spittingon the father. This new transgressiveact is the violencewhich forcesMarcel to select,recognizedifferences,and measurethe distancesbetweenthe girls. It is preciselya
question of theirindependentmovement: "They could not set eyes
on an obstacle withoutamusing themselvesby crossingit" (p. 597)man waiting,alone, for his wife to return,
Seeing an eighty-year-old
one of the membersof the group jumps over him, knockinghim over
"... to the greatdelightof the othergirls,especiallyof a pair of green
eyesin a 'dashing'face,which expressed,forthatbold act, an admirain whichI seemedto discerna traceof timidity,
a
tion and a merriment
shamefacedand blusteringtimiditywhich did not existin the others"
(p. 599). This is exactlythesame sortof timidityand joy (the timidity
and joy of the child/artistat play) which can be found in Vinteuil
and his daughter-a timiditytowards rules and laws, and the joy of
transgression.These younggirls,thisexotictribeof "Sapphists,"mock
authorityby jumping over it and knockingit down. This repeated
is centralto the entireProustiandiscourse,a disact of transgression
course directed against laws, a repetitivepractice of differentiation
whichis a pure act of transgression.The violenceof thistransgression,
as elsewhere,forcesthe narratorto performan act of mental transgression,to go beyond illusorysurfaces,in order to thinkin termsof
difference.Many criticshave been trappedin the myriadof Proustian
themselvesand, like Swann (the
surfaces,never riskingtransgression
of thisdiscourse,
artistemanqu6), also neverarrivingat the difference
and
its nature of antilaw,antitotality,
anticontinuity, anti-thesamea
veritable
as
Deleuze
or,
Anti-Logos:18 theyhave failed to see
says,
in the developmentof the novel
a continuity
that farfromrepresenting
Proust
must be seen as a break with a
(and literaturein general),
whole tradition,a discontinuitycontemporarywith a new mode of
thoughtand renderingantiliterature
possible.
of thesegirlsafterthisviolent
Forced to establishthe real differences
reversalof totalityand authority,Marcel selectsa singularpointwhich
will place him in relationshipto the group,startinga new series: the
singularityof those "two green eyes." "By this time their charming
featureshad ceased to be indistinctand impersonal. I had dealt them
like cards into so many heaps to compose . .. the big one who had
jumped over the old banker" (p. 598). Afterthis firstdifferentia18

Ibid., "Anti-Logos."

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LIBERATION

OF DIFFERENCE

131

tion, he focuseson those green eyes, and says of the girl whose eyes
are so green: "I knew that I should never possess this young
cyclistif I did not possess also what there was in her eyes" (p.
6oo). This selection,this choice, is the pure chance, but the difference of this new series is, at the same time, a necessity. Real
thought,Proustnevertiresof tellingus, is notthecalm,voluntarymovementof rationality,
but ratheralwaysa resultof a violencewhichforces
us to think-a thoughtwhich graspsthe true movementof repetition
and the displacementof differences.The girl with the green eyes
is Albertine,and the seriesAlbertine/Marcel,therefore,grows out of
thisoverthrowof totalitarianauthority.
thisviolence,thistransgression,
As Deleuze shows,each seriesis vertical,extratemporal,and intensive.
Such is obviouslythe case in this serieswhich explodes in the worlds
of Sodom and Gomorrah and the mysteryof transexuality.From
the singularityof Albertineand the secret behind these green eyes,
which remainsinaccessiblethroughout,we travelthroughotherseries,
but notin a transcendental
way directedultimatelytowardsunification,
synthesis,or totalization,but rather,as Deleuze shows in Proust and
from one series to another,without
Signs: we travel transversally,
is
them:
evertotalizing
"Jealously the transversalof love's multiplicity;
of places; sleep,the transversal
travel,the transversalof the multiplicity
of
moments."
of the multiplicity
19
moveWe travel (if we accept to followProust's own transgressive
onto
of
an
illusion
than
rather
it) transversally,
totality
imposing
ment,
fromthe seriesof Albertineto all the otherlove-series(joined together
by the bond of jealousy), to the seriesof the sonata, and, finally,to the
seriesof profanationat Montjouvain.
Tired of Albertineand convincedof the need to break up withher,
Marcel is terriblybored with her duringa train ride back to Balbec.
To pass the time,he speaksof music,deliberatelyscornfulof Albertine's
musical tastes. She inadvertentlyasks him the name of the piece in
question, and he respondsmockingly,"Vinteuil's sonata." Suddenly
everythingchanges. All the Proustianelementsare forcedback into
motionwhen she says that not only does she know the sonata, but she
knows Mlle. Vinteuil somewhat,and knows Lea very well-the one
Vinteuil'smusic. Immediately,the visions
responsibleforrediscovering
of that nightat Montjouvain (where L6a and Mlle. Vinteuil sexually
transgressedthe "law of the father") reappear in his mind, and the
images of the act of profanationhaunt him again. Thus, Albertine
stumbles,totallyby chance, into this otherseries (of profanationand
19

Ibid., p. I37-

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132

NEWLITERARY
HISTORY

transgression)of whichshe is alreadyand forevera part, and Marcel's

jealously returnsintensified.He decides to make her his prisoner,in
order to deny the unknownAlbertine(the lesbian) and the secretof
her eyes,so as to annihilateher difference.But this is impossible,as
Marcel will learn, and his failure,as well as Albertine'svictory,reestablishesdifferenceforever. This is the last step in Marcel's "apprenticeship,"leading him to art: but the artist,forProust,is the one
can neverbe subjugated,
who realizes,as Marcel must,that difference
made "prisoner,"or possessedby a totalizingact of Logos, and must,
of Albertine'seyeswill
instead,be revealedand affirmed.The mystery
neverbe solved,just as the mysteryof Proust (the real man, entering
into the realm of death throughhis writing) remainsintact-a pure
difference.
Understoodin thismanner,the Proustianworldis a theaterof multiand repetitions.Everythingbegins
plicity,intensiveseries,differences,
whichleads to theintensivedevelopmentof the essence
withsingularity,
of differentiation
workingunderneaththe surfaceof things. Proust's
thoughtoperatesexactlylike a kaleidoscope-Remembrance of Things
of formsand colors in constant
Past is a kaleidoscope: a multiplicity
combinationswhich, at that
movement,incessantlyrepeatingdifferent
the
one
fixes
when
moment
image to isolate a single series,
precise
seemsto be whole. But thistotalityis merelyone among many (each
seriesformingits own totality). It is onlyone of the pieces in thisvast
machine which juggles essencesand substances-it is nothingbut one
elementamong others,neverunifiedin one last movement.The failure
of so many criticsto see thisdeeper side of Proustis perhaps due to a
prejudice,and a fear-the prejudice of Hegelian totalityand the fear
of all thatis discontinuous.To denythe profoundlydiscontinuous,differentiatingnature of Proustian discoursewould be to annihilateits
difference,
therebyforcingit into a continuum,and onto a shelf,where
it does not fit. But likeNietzsche's,Proust'sthoughtis radicallyaffirmative and selective,rigorouslydirectedagainstthe concept of a primary
disjunction,
logos, and he sees Time (history) in termsof difference,
and death: "the meaning of the word: defunctus,"as
discontinuity,
Beckettconcludesin his Proust. Proustianthoughtis affirmative,
and
hisdiscourseis in oppositionto all laws oftotalityand moralrestriction:
an antiliterature.
it is a counterdiscourse,
to
By restoring this literarydiscourseits status as an event and a
practice,one instantlyconstructsa powerful"machine de guerre" to
oppose the notion of continuity,totality,and representation-tofight
againstall thatdeniesthe realityof discourse.

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LIBERATION

OF DIFFERENCE

133

In so doing, we allow the series to flow from the voice of the

Unnamable20 (that shapelessverbal egg) and, by settinginto motion
of
thiskaleidoscopicmachinewithits perpetualreturnof a multiplicity
now
and
we
abandon
different
and
ourselves,
forms,colors,
intensities,
forever,to the chancesof the dice: the riskof chance in all itsmultiple
possibilities;the riskof the necessityof differenceof all that returns;
the risk,finally,of Death and its silent,endlessrepetition.In analyzing
literarydiscoursethisway, we restorerealityto what I have termedan
antiliterature:the realityof life and of death, the realityof a real discursivepractice-historicallydifferent-whichis no longersubjectedto
the ominous "monarchyof the signifier"but, instead, freed as a nomadic anarchyof a productionwhich is, in its last instance,difference.
STATE UNIVERSITY
BUFFALO

OF NEW YORK,

20 For a fascinating description of what Beckett might be saying in L'Innommable, see L'Anti-Oedipe where Deleuze and Guattari referto the notion of "corps
sans organes" as the voice-egg,and production.

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