A.M. No.

1625 February 12, 1990

ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent
Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and
violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against him,
respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court
to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite.
In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and
required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant
submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent
committed the following acts:
1.
Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro
Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the
Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty
percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation.
2.
Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case being terminated,
acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490;
3.
Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which
properties are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case
was still pending;
4.
Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract
with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of
the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming
that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the
Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a
public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and
registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;
5.
Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified documents
purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land Development Agreement
dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's Office of
Quezon City, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against
complainant designated as I.S. No. 7512936;
6.
Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his
client;
7.
Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis
before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City;
8.
Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office by
making false assertion of facts in his pleadings;
9.
Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally
tell a he, he does not tell the truth either."
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on
November 18, 1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply
to respondent's answer on December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent
filed a rejoinder.
In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as a witness and
submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent appeared both as witness and

counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties were required to submit their
respective memoranda.
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him,
claiming that the long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him
constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due process and speedy
disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General filed a comment
to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the
investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for postponement of
scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file
their respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p.
365]. Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor General's comment on October 26,
1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required the Solicitor General
to submit his report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the
recommendation that Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The
Solicitor General found that respondent committed the following acts of misconduct:
a.
transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the
pendency of the case where the properties were involved;
b.
concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land
development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the
execution of said agreement; and
c.
misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document
where two signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were
made to appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation of the
Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B
of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit
more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a
supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP, containing additional arguments
to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It
is respondent's contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Solicitor General was limited to the determination of whether or not there is
sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor
General still has to file an administrative complaint against him. Respondent claims
that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides
that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139
entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending
investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition
as provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been
substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to
respondent's claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not
mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707;
Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to

the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised
Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court
may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring
cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court
or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and recommendation of the
investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court
shall base its final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted
by the investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties during the
investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the
effectivity of Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of
the Solicitor General had been substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B
provides that only pending cases, the investigation of which has not been
substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be transferred to
the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated even
before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to
dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26,
1986, the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to
Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor
General already made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To
refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in
duplication of the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further
delay in the disposition of the present case which has lasted for more than thirteen
(13) years.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant
the referral of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by
the Solicitor General respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence,
his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely his own fault. There was
therefore no denial of procedural due process. The record shows that respondent
appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than eleven (11) documents
to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the complainant
who appeared as a witness against him.
II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent
committed the acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation
of the Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of
misconduct which warrant the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights"
which was signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to
respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907
sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the
document was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned properties
were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in
said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the
document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent
violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client's property or

interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his
profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a
lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional
ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go
Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics,
which states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject
matter of the litigation which he is conducting," does not appear anymore in the new
Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a purchase by
a lawyer of property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such
purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary action under the new Code of
Professional Responsibility.
This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal process" (Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of
the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended
or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of
these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The
transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act
which the Court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having
violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and
to society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the
Civil Code are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of
their existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring
by purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship
with such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed
that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature
and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity
to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence,
notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code,
the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art.
1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the
purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation constitutes a breach of
professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought against him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really
implemented, because the land development agreement on which the transfer
depended was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of
Rights that the assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent was
subject to the implementation of the land development agreement. The last
paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that:
... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES,
Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon
City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do transfer
and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and
assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in the abovedescribed property,
together with all the improvements found therein [Annex D of the Complaint,
Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied].

It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties
to respondent to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not
the land development agreement was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to
complainant, at the time the land development agreement was entered into, that
the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The
land development agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while the public
auction was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his
appearance for the complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a
certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the request of complainant and was understood to
be only provisional. Respondent claims that since complainant was not his client, he
had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the land involved in their land
development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was
duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as
constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale
was annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent
failed to inform the complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the
negotiations for the land development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to
live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a
premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant
was not a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to
inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of
their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development agreement,
respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a public
auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the
project they were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should
observe honesty and fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a
ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113,
February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified
documents purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land development
agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the
document filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the
signatories to the addendum to the land development agreement namely, Ramon A.
Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L.
Bautistawere made to appear as having signed the original document on
December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their names.
However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the
original and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado
and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and
Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them
on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copy attached to the letter and
to send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo,
pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado
had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true
copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's Supplemental Motion to
Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when
respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on May 23, 1973 as

Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
he knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed
by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard
of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the
truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22,
Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no
impropriety was committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract
with the Fortunados [Report and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court,
however, finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados,
which provides in part that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent
Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.
Alfaro T. Fortunado [signed]
Editha T. Fortunado [signed]
Nestor T. Fortunado [signed]
CONFORME
Ramon A. Gonzales [signed]
[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a
lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation.
[See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in
good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to
reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however,
does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by
him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to
enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324
(1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case,
the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration
of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion
Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts
violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the
former must incur administrative sanctions.
The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting
as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel
for the Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143.
The Court, after considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor General's findings
on the matter. The evidence presented by respondent shows that his acceptance of
Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and consent of the Fortunados. The
affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave
their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of
Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to
the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly
consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel
[Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional
Responsibility].

Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before
the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose
of harassing him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this
case, Civil Case No. Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City, while the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No.
5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and
lack of interest, respectively [Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp.
402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for holding that the complaints for
libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case
No. Q-18060, considering that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General
made no finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by respondent to
harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was
pending resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly
holds that there is no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing
the aforementioned cases was to harass complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since
the above discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining
grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent
violated the law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal
profession. Sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of
law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of
the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638,
647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature of the
offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case,
respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed
serious misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of
law for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let
copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country for their
information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3324
February 9, 2000
PASTOR EDWIN VILLARIN, PACIANO DE VEYRA, SR., and BARTOLOME
EVAROLO,
SR., complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RESTITUTO SABATE, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
BUENA, J.:
Complainants Pastor Edwin Villarin, Paciano de Veyra, Sr. and Bartolome Evarolo, Sr.
prays that administrative sanctions be imposed on respondent Atty. Restituto
Sabate, Jr. for not having observed honesty and utmost care in the performance of
his duties as notary public.
In their Affidavit-Complaint,1 complainants alleged that through their counsel Atty.
Eduardo D. Estores, they filed a complaint against Paterno Diaz, et al. under SEC
Case No. DV091, Region XI Davao Extension Office, Davao City.

Respondents in the SEC Case filed their "Motion to Dismiss With Answer To
Villarin's Et. Al., Complaint To The Securities and Exchange Commission"2 prepared
and notarized by Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. The verification of the said pleading
reads:
V E R I F I C AT I O N
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES)
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY) S.S.
WE, REV. PASTORS PATERNO M. DIAZ, MANUEL DONATO, ULYSSES CAMAGAY, LEVI
PAGUNSAN, ALEJANDRO BOFETIADO, All of legal ages after having been sworn in
accordance with law depose and say:
1. That we were the one who caused the above writings to be written;
2. That we have read and understood all statements therein and believed that all are
true and correct to the best of our knowledge and belief.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF hereunto affixed our signatures on the 6th day of February,
1989 at the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines.
By: (Sgd.) Lilian C. Diaz
(Sgd.) Camagay
(Sgd.) M Donato
By: (Sgd.) Atty. Restituto B. Sabate
(Sgd.) Dr. Levi Pagunsan
(Sgd.) Pastor A. Bofetiado
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before the above-named affiants on the 6th day of
February, 1989 at the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines.
(Sgd.)
RESTITUTO
B.
SABATE,
JR.
Notary Public3
Complainants alleged that the signature of Paterno Diaz was not his, but that of a
certain Lilian Diaz; that with regard to the signatures of Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro
Bofetiado, it was Atty. Sabate, Jr. who signed for them; and that herein respondent
Sabate, Jr. made it appear that said persons participated in the said act when in fact
they did not do so. Complainants averred that respondent's act undermined the
public's confidence for which reason administrative sanctions should be imposed
against him.
In his Answer,4 respondent alleged that Paterno Diaz, Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro
Bofetiado swore to the correctness of the allegations in the motion to
dismiss/pleading for the SEC through their authorized representatives known by
their names as Lilian C. Diaz, wife of Paterno Diaz, and Atty. Restituto B. Sabate, Jr.
manifested by the word "By" which preceded every signature of said
representatives. Respondent allegedly signed for and in the interest of his client
backed-up by their authorization5; and Lilian Diaz was authorized to sign for and in
behalf of her husband as evidenced by a written authority.6 Respondent alleged that
on the strength of the said authorizations he notarized the said document.
Respondent also alleged that in signing for and in behalf of his client Pagunsan and
Bofetiado, his signature was preceded by the word "By" which suggests that he did
not in any manner make it appear that those persons signed in his presence; aside
from the fact that his clients authorized him to sign for and in their behalf,
considering the distance of their place of residence to that of the respondent and
the reglementary period in filing said pleadings he had to reckon with. Respondent
further alleged that the complaint is malicious and anchored only on evil motives
and not a sensible way to vindicate complainants' court losses, for respondent is
only a lawyer defending a client and prayed that the case be dismissed with further
award for damages to vindicate his honor and mental anguish as a consequence
thereof.
The designated Investigating Commissioner of Integrated Bar of the Philippines
recommended that respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. be suspended from his
Commission as Notary Public for a period of six (6) months. The Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted the said recommendation and
resolved to suspend the respondent's Commission for six (6) months for failure to
exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public.
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr.
notarized the Motion to Dismiss With Answer prepared by him which pleading he

signed for and in behalf of Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado (while Lilian Diaz
signed for her husband Pastor Diaz), three of the respondents in the SEC case, with
the word "By" before their signatures, because he was their counsel in said case and
also because he was an officer of the religious sect and corporation represented by
the respondents-Pastors.
But while it would appear that in doing so, he acted in good faith, the fact remains
that the same cannot be condoned. He failed to state in the preliminary statements
of said motion/answer that the three respondents were represented by their
designated attorneys-in-fact. Besides, having signed the Verification of the pleading,
he cannot swear that he appeared before himself as Notary Public.1wphi1.nt
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangements.7 That function would be defeated if the notary public were
one of the signatories to the instrument. For then, he would be interested in
sustaining the validity thereof as it directly involves himself and the validity of his
own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position, and the very purpose of the
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted.8
Sec. 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgment of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking
the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made
under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state.9
A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before said notary public to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein. The acts of affiants cannot be delegated to
anyone for what are stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and
swore to the same personally and not through any representative. Otherwise, their
representative's names should appear in the said documents as the ones who
executed the same and that is only the time they can affix their signatures and
personally appear before the notary public for notarization of said document.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to
the sacred duties pertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy
impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal
solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such
responsibility is incumbent upon and failing therein, he must now accept the
commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion.10
That respondent acted the way he did because he was confronted with an alleged
urgent situation is no excuse at all. As an individual, and even more so as a member
of the legal profession, he is required to obey the laws of the land at all times.11 For
notarizing the Verification of the Motion to Dismiss With Answer when three of the
affiants thereof were not before him and for notarizing the same instrument of which
he was one of the signatories, he failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his
duty as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial Law, respondent
Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. is SUSPENDED from his Commission as Notary Public for a
period of one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt
A.C. No. 6968
August 9, 2006
ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO, Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------x

ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of University of the Philippines (UP)
graduating student Dennis Venturina, the chairperson of the UP College of Public
Administration Student Council, drew the then Chancellor of UP Diliman Roger
Posadas to seek the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Acting on the request of Chancellor Posadas, Atty. Orlando Dizon, then Chief of the
Special Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI, together with his men, repaired to the
Office of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of the UP Security Force on December 12, 1994.
As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag,
were at the time in the office of Col. Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested to take them into
his custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino, Legal Counsel of UP Diliman, who repaired to the
Office of Col. Bentain, advised against Atty. Dizons move, however, he not being
armed with a warrant for their arrest.
Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor for students Rosario Torres-Yu, who also
repaired to the office of the colonel, joined Atty. Lambino in opposing the turn-over
of the suspects to Atty. Dizon, despite the latters claim that under its Charter the
NBI was authorized to make warrantless arrests.
The suspects lawyer, one Atty. Villamor, later also showed up at the office of Col.
Bentain and after what appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty. Dizon and
the UP officials, the students were allowed to go back to their dormitories, with Atty.
Villamor undertaking to accompany them to the NBI the following morning.
The two student-suspects were eventually indicted in court.
Hence, spawned the filing of a complaint by Atty. Dizon against Atty. Lambino before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.1 to 1.3
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, docketed as CBD Case No. 346.
Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a criminal complaint also against Atty. Lambino, together
with Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and Col. Bentain, before the
Ombudsman, for violation of P.D. 1829 which makes it unlawful for anyone to
obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenses.
Atty. Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6,
Rules 6.01 and 6.02; and Canon 8, Rule 8.01, docketed as CBD Case No. 373.
The administrative cases were, on motion of Atty. Lambino, consolidated. Before the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), the issues were defined as follows:
1. Whether the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected students
to the group of Atty. Dizon constitutes violation of Code of Professional
Responsibility.
2. Whether the act of Atty. Dizon in trying to arrest the student-suspects constitutes
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

By Report and Recommendation submitted to the Board of Governors of the IBP on

June 20, 2005, CBD Investigating Commissioner Siegfrid B. Mison recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against Atty. Lambino in light of a finding that she "acted
within her official duties as she safeguarded the rights of the students in accordance
with the schools substitute parental authority" and "within the bounds of the law as
the NBI agents had no warrants of arrest."
With respect to the complaint against Atty. Dizon, the Commissioner recommended
to reprimand him for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility in "recklessly
tr[ying] to arrest" the suspects without warrant.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students without a warrant, Atty.
Dizon violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
xxxx

The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution of October 22, 2005, adopted and
approved the Commissioners Report. The IBP thereupon transferred to this Court its
Notice of Resolution, together with the records of the cases which this Court noted
by Resolution of February 1, 2006.

Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system. (Emphasis supplied).

As earlier stated, the issue against Atty. Lambino is whether she violated the Canons
of Professional Ethics in "refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of
Atty. Dizon."

Atty. Orlando V. Dizon is, in CBD Case No. 373, found guilty of violation of Canon 1 of
Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is REPRIMANDED and
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more
severely.

When the complaint of Atty. Dizon before the Ombudsman against Chancellor
Posadas, Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and Atty. Lambino was elevated on Certiorari and
Prohibition, this Court addressing in the negative the two issues raised therein, to
wit:
(1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly
made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting
petitioner for violation of P.D. No. 1829. x x x,1
held that the objection of the said UP officials to the arrest of the students "cannot
be construed as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, Sec. 1 (c) without rendering it
unconstitutional,"2 they having "a right to prevent the arrest [of the students] at the
time because their attempted arrest was illegal."3
Indeed, Atty. Lambino was legally justified in advising against the turn over of the
suspects to Atty. Dizon, there being no basis for him to effect a warrantless arrest.
Atty. Dizons administrative complaint against her must then be dismissed.
Respecting the complaint against Atty. Dizon, this Court, also in Posadas v.
Ombudsman, held that "[f]or the failure of the NBI agents to comply with the
constitutional and procedural requirements, . . . their attempt to arrest [the two
student-suspects] without a warrant was illegal."4
In the main, Atty. Dizon invoked Section 1 (a) of Republic Act 157 (The NBI Charter)
which empowers the NBI "to undertake investigations of crimes and other offenses
against the laws of the Philippines, upon its own initiative and as public interest may
require"5 and to make arrests. The invocation does not impress. Said section does
not grant the NBI the power to make warrantless arrests. The NBI Charter clearly
qualifies the power to make arrests to be "in accordance with existing laws and
rules."
Members of the investigation staff of the Bureau of Investigation shall be peace
officers, and as such have the following powers:
(a) To make arrests, searches and seizures in accordance with existing laws and
rules.6

WHEREFORE, CBD Case No. 346 against Atty. Marichu C. Lambino is DISMISSED.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the National
Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Justice.
SO ORDERED.
Adm.
Case
No.
6490
September
29,
2004
(CBD 03-1054)
LILIA
TABANG
and
CONCEPCION
TABANG, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On February 3, 2003, complainants Lilia Tabang and her mother, Concepcion Tabang,
filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a verified complaint for
disbarment or suspension against respondent Atty. Glenn C. Gacott for gross
misconduct, deceit and gross dishonesty.
Complainants allege as follows:
Sometime between the years 1984 and 1985, Lilia sought the legal advice of then
incumbent Judge Eustaquio Gacott, father of herein respondent, regarding her desire
to buy a 30-hectare agricultural land in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, which consists of several parcels of land belonging to different owners.
Judge Gacott informed Lilia that under the agrarian reform program of the
government, she is prohibited from acquiring vast tracks of agricultural land, as she
already owns other parcels of land. Judge Gacott then advised her to put the title of
the lands in the names of fictitious persons and to keep the titles with her for easy
disposition. Following the advice of Judge Gacott, Lilia bought the parcels of land
using fictitious names. Eventually, Lilia was able to secure individual titles over
these parcels of land in the names of 7 fictitious persons to wit:
TCT No. 12790 Agnes Camilla
TCT No. 12794 Andes Estoy
TCT No. 12791 Leonor Petronio
TCT No. 12792 Wilfredo Gomez
TCT No. 12793 Elizabeth Dungan
TCT No. 12476 Wilfredo Ondoy
TCT No. 12475 Amelia Andes
Respondent knows this fact. Later on, Lilia and Concepcion decided to sell the
subject parcels of land because they needed money for their medication and other

necessary expenses. On the pretext that he is going to help them sell the subject
property to prospective buyers, respondent borrowed the seven land titles from
complainants. However, despite the lapse of one year from the time he borrowed
the titles, respondent still failed to negotiate the sale of the property. He informed
herein complainants that he lost all the seven land titles. Respondent then advised
complainants to file a petition in court for re-issuance of title. Following respondents
advice, Lilia Tabang, in the guise of acting as the "authorized agent-representative"
of the fictitious owners, filed a case for the re-issuance of title to the seven parcels
of land. However, in the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed
that the signatures of the alleged owners in the seven individual Special Power of
Attorney executed in favor of Lilia Tabang appear to have been signed by the same
person because of the similarities in their strokes. The public prosecutor informed
the trial court of this fact prompting the latter to summon the alleged principals. To
avoid embarrassment and possible sanctions from the court because the alleged
principals are in fact fictitious, Lilia withdrew the case without prejudice to the refiling of the same. Subsequently, Lilia filed a new set of cases for re-issuance of title,
changing the signatures of the fictitious owners. Upon knowledge that a new set of
cases was filed, respondent executed or caused to be executed several documents,
among which were Revocation of Special Power of Attorney and Affidavits of
Recovery purportedly signed by the principals of Lilia Tabang. Respondent caused
the annotation of these documents in the land titles covering the subject properties.
Thereafter, respondent caused the publication of a notice representing himself as
the owner of the subject parcels of land and indicating therein his desire to sell the
said properties. Eventually, respondent was able to sell the seven parcels of land to
seven individuals. However, only three of these buyers were legitimate, while the
remaining four are dummies of respondent. As a result of selling the three parcels of
land, respondent was able to receive P3,773,675.00. None of the proceeds of the
sale was remitted to complainants.
Complainants contend that in executing the various Revocation of Special Power of
Attorney and Affidavit of Recovery, affixing thereon the signatures of the fictitious
registered owners of the disputed parcels of land, and in arrogating the ownership
over the said lands upon himself, respondent committed gross misconduct,
dishonesty and deceit. Complainants likewise allege that this is not the only case
wherein respondent sold properties of his clients to third persons without his clients
knowledge and consent.1
Respondent filed his Answer to the Complaint denying the material allegations of the
complainants. He claims that the seven land titles covering the subject properties
are valid and duly executed; and denies complainants allegations that the alleged
owners are fictitious. Respondent further claims that the registered owners
voluntarily sold the seven parcels of land to different individuals and his only
participation in the said sale is that he was authorized by the registered owners to
collect from the buyers the full payment of the lands sold. He further denies that
complainant Lilia Tabang is the real owner and that she merely acted as a broker
who was trying to promote the sale of the properties; that when she came to know
that the properties were sold by their registered owners, she called up the law office
of respondent and demanded that she be given her share or "balato" in the sale of
the properties equivalent to 20% of the gross sales because of her alleged efforts
exerted in promoting the sale of the subject parcels of land; that when respondent
turned her down, Lilia threatened to put him in bad light and seek his disbarment.
Respondent further denies complainants allegation that he sold real properties of
some of his clients to third persons claiming that in all these cases his role was
merely to notarize the documents of sale executed voluntarily by his clients and the
buyers of their properties.2
The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1054, was assigned by the IBP to
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro for report and recommendation. Commissioner
Navarro conducted a mandatory conference on November 25, 2003 after which she
required the parties to submit their respective position papers, together with all the

necessary documents and duly verified affidavits of their witnesses, if any. In a

report dated March 4, 2004, Commissioner Navarro found respondent guilty of gross
misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.3 Accordingly she recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for six months.4
On April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution adopting
the report of Commissioner Navarro. However, the Board modified the
recommended penalty and imposed the supreme punishment of disbarment.5
We do not agree with the IBP Resolution. The case should be remanded for further
proceedings.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent
disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among
the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to the practice of law, willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are
broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or
commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be
wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his
entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued
membership therein.6
Nonetheless, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.
For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent
must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Indeed, considering
the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar,
the Supreme Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.7
Moreover, in complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory
requirement which may not be dispensed with except for valid and compelling
reasons.8 Rule 139-B provides for the procedure of investigation in disbarment and
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys before the IBP, thus:
Sec. 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to
answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation
of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on
his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice,
the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the
date of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of
Governors upon prior application.
Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the
Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding
charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which
shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice.
The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in
accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the
Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen
(15) days from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall
within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings
and recommendations, which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court
for final action and if warranted, the imposition of penalty. (Emphasis ours)
In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner initiated the formal
investigation by conducting a mandatory conference between the complainants and
the respondent after both parties have filed their complaint and answer,
respectively. The mandatory conference was supposedly held for the purpose of

defining the issues and enabling the parties to stipulate facts. However, no definitive
result was reached during the conference as respondent continued to deny all the
allegations of the complainants. After the mandatory conference was held, no
further hearings were conducted. Instead, the Investigating Commissioner merely
required the parties to submit their respective position papers, including all the
necessary documents and duly verified affidavits of witnesses, if any. On the sole
basis of the pleadings filed by both parties and of the documents attached thereto,
the Investigating Commissioner submitted her Report and Recommendation to the
IBP Board of Governors.
Considering the gravity of the charges imputed against the respondent and the
imposition of the penalty of disbarment being prayed for by complainants, the
Investigating Commissioner should not have simply relied on the parties position
papers and the pieces of documentary evidence submitted by them. She should
have proceeded with the investigation by conducting formal hearings and calling
upon the parties to present additional evidence to support their respective
contentions. In the case of the complainants, the Investigating Commissioner should
have required the presentation of the persons who allegedly executed the affidavits
presented in evidence to prove the veracity of the allegations contained in said
affidavits, at the same time affording respondent the opportunity to cross- examine
the supposed affiants. The failure of the complainants to move for the presentation
of the persons alleged to have executed the subject affidavits does not render the
IBP powerless to conduct further investigation, considering its power to issue
subpoena under the Rule.
In the same manner, the Investigating Commissioner should have compelled the
persons named by the respondent as the original owners as well as the buyers of
the subject properties to appear before her. The appearance of these witnesses
could have easily been facilitated considering that the residence and office
addresses of the three of the supposed buyers are all located in Makati while the
residence of three of the original owners are located within Manila and the remaining
four are residing in the province of Cavite which is very near Metro Manila. To repeat,
under the above-quoted Rule, the Investigating Commissioner is authorized to issue
subpoena to compel the appearance of persons and witnesses before it.
It bears to point out that majority of the pieces of evidence presented by
complainants and respondent consists of affidavits and photocopies of documents.
Not one of the persons who executed these affidavits and instruments was
presented or subpoenaed by the Commissioner to identify their affidavits and give
the adverse party opportunity to confront the witnesses in a formal hearing.
Consequently, no judgment could be rendered fairly and squarely on the issues
raised in the subject administrative matter.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is hereby REMANDED to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995
WELLINGTON
REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant
City Fiscal of manila, with malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an attorney.
I
On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent,
an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed
by complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had given respondent
P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said

that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office at
the City Hall.
An entrapment was set up by the NBI.
Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for
marking. The paper bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI
and subsequently returned to complainant for the use in the entrapment.
When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter would not
return until around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the NBI agents went back at
around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business with respondent,
complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to see
respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant
answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang umaga." To which respondent replied "Oo,
kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant then handed to respondent the marked
money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended
respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for
examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow florescent
powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to
the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he was
photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined to give a
sworn statement to explain his side of the case, invoking his right against selfincrimination.
On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation
of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.
On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of
administrative charges and the institution of disbarment proceedings against him.
On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office pending
investigation and disposition of his administrative case (Case No. 74).
Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two other cases
were earlier filed against respondent: namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave
Misconduct filed by one Angel Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was
found guilty as charged and was recommended for suspension; and Administrative
Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was
pending resolution.
In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant
surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and
consent.
He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI
at the instance of complainant was still pending preliminary investigation by the City
Fiscal of Manila. In connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he
had filed a criminal complaint for incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted
corruption of a public official against complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila.
In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against
respondent were motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill will. He said that the
investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by
respondent against him.
In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment
case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court., the case
was transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition.
On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that
respondent be disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its resolution dated March 26, 1994.
II
We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of
receiving the marked money from complainant during the entrapment conducted by

the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent filing of
administrative and criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent merely
denied the charge of extortion and retorted that the marked money was planted by
complainant.
It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative
testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]). When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against
him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm,
Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that he still maintains that
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him (Bayasen v.
Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA
393 [1978]).
Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as
to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be
disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176
SCRA 634 [1989]).
The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official,
which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised
Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]),
imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The
lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67
[1983]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from
the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 2033 May 9, 1990
E.
CONRAD
and
VIRGINIA
BEWLEY
GEESLIN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.
A.C. No. 2148 May 9, 1990
ATTY.
FRANCISCO
ORTIGAS,
JR.
and
ATTY.
EULOGIO
R.
RODRIGUEZ, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pea & Marcos for complainants in AC No.
2033.
Felipe C. Navarro for and in his own behalf.
PER CURIAM:
We write this finale to the dispiriting charges filed by complainants Francisco
Ortigas, Jr. and Eulogio R. Rodriguez in Administrative Case No. 2148 1 and by
spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Bewley Geeslin in Administrative Case No.
2033 2 seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for malpractice
and gross misconduct.
In our resolution dated May 5, 1980, issued consequent to the Report and
Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General submitted to this Court on
April 21, 1980, we ordered the suspension of respondent Navarro from the practice
of law during the pendency of these cases. 3
The investigative phase was conducted by said office pursuant to our resolutions of
February
14,
1975
and
September
13,
1976
in
G.R.
Nos.
L- 39386 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of
Appeals, et al." With commendable thoroughness and attention to detail, two reports
were submitted which, in order to vividly portray the scope and magnitude of
respondent's operations and how he was able to perpetrate the anomalous

transactions complained of, we quote extensively from said reports which are
sustained by the evidence of record.
I. The antecedent facts on which Administrative Case No. 2148 is premised are
reported by then Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, as follows:
PREPATORY STATEMENT
This unnumbered administrative case against respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro
(hereinafter called respondent NAVARRO, for short) originally stemmed from the
letter of a certain Angelito B. Cayanan to the Honorable Supreme Court dated
January 25, 1975 which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
I wish to respectfully inform your good office that I bought a few lots on installment
basis from Atty. Felipe C. Navarro of Ruby Hills Subdivision as evidenced by the
attached OR Nos. 0512 and 0519 and a "Contract of Sale".
Atty. Navarro, some officials and representative of the said company claim that
although there is a pending case No. L-39386 under Decree No. 1425 on the
property being sold, the case is almost won in their favor and are just waiting for
your final decision within a couple of months or even less.
In this connection, I am respectfully writing you this letter in order to bring to your
attention this transaction and to protect my rights in the event that any unfavorable
circumstances may arise in the future.
xxx xxx xxx
Acting on the aforesaid letter, the Supreme Court, per Resolution dated February 14,
1975, referred the copy of Mr. Cayanan's letter to the Solicitor General for
"investigation of the existence of sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution
of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District,
Quezon City) for suspension or removal from the office of attorney and for
appropriate action." The resolution reads as follows:
L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.) The court NOTED the letter dated January 25, 1975 of Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan
with its attachments (copy thereof has been furnished Atty. Felipe C. Navarro,
counsel for respondents) and RESOLVED to instruct the Clerk of Court to inform him
of the status of the cases at bar.
It appearing from said letter that Atty. Felipe C. Navarro has been selling the lots in
litigation herein on installment basis to the public (among them, Mr. Cayanan) as
"absolute owner by virtue of this contract of legal services in Civil Case No. 8321,
etc. of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig" (see Ruby Hills Subdivision Contract
of Sale), which lots are titled in the name of herein petitioner and not in Atty.
Navarro's name and that the unwarranted claim is made on his behalf that 'the case
is almost won in their favor' (see Mr. Cayanan's letter), the Court RESOLVED
FURTHER to refer copy of Mr. Cayanan's said letter with its attachments to the
Solicitor General under Rule 139, Sections 1, 3, 4 and 5 for investigation of the
existence of sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City) for
suspension or removal from the office of attorney and for appropriate action.
Aside from Mr. Cayanan, the Solicitor General is directed to communicate in the
premises with Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez of the law firm of Ortigas & Ortigas (with
address at 10th Floor, Ortigas Bldg. Ortigas Ave., Pasig, Rizal), who under letter of
June 10, 1974 on file in Administrative Case No. 1154 has offered to make available
documents in their possession showing other sales made by Atty. Navarro of
properties titled in the name of other persons, involving a total selling price of P75
million and down payments of almost P 0.6 million.
On April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General (now Justice of the Court of Appeals)
Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. wrote Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan asking him to submit his
affidavit embodying the circumstances surrounding the matters contained in his
letter dated January 25, 1975, especially the second paragraph thereof. The letter
was sent to Mr. Cayanan by registered mail but the same was returned unserved for
the reason that the addressee had moved to another address.

On the same date, April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General Gutierrez, Jr. also wrote
to Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez requesting him for copies of the documents evidencing
the sales made by respondent Navarro.
On February 13, 1976, this Honorable Court issued a Resolution in L-39386 and L39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) referring
the letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 "for investigation of
the existence of sufficient grounds for the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for
suspension or removal from office and for appropriate action" and directing "Mr.
Ortigas, Jr., to furnish the Office of the Solicitor General for the purpose with a copy
of said letter and all its pertinent attachments."
The aforementioned letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 reads
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Dear Justice Teehankee,
This is to apprise your Office of the latest activities of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro who has
previously been reported to the Supreme Court as selling properties titled in the
name of this Company.
We have just secured a new "subdivision plan" of Atty. Navarro showing that the lots
he is now selling to the public include those titled in the names of the heirs of the
late Don Vicente Madrigal and this Company in Quezon City. Atty. Navarro has thus
expanded his activities despite recent detention by the Military. As could be seen
from the attached "plan", Navarro claims to be the owner of that huge property
(actually titled in the name of the Madrigals and this Company) bounded by Ortigas
Avenue, E. delos Santos Avenue, White Plains Road and R. Rodriguez Avenue,
comprising approximately of 260 hectares.
As reported in our previous letters to the Court, Navarro claims to be the owner of
some 4,000 hectares of land in the Greater Manila Area in virtue of his handling the
case of some squatters on a 1.2-hectare lot in Mandaluyong, Rizal owned by Dona
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. He contends that whereas his squatters-clients
occupy only about a hectare, he has become, in virtue of his contract of legal
services' with them, the owner of thousands of hectares of land as these are
allegedly0 covered by void titles. Navarro thus started to openly sell these
properties.
Navarro's Ruby Hills and Bluehills Subdivisions, for instance, cover properties already
with buildings and other improvements. He has nevertheless been quite successful
in selling portions thereof, as when he sold lots within the De La Salle College, WackWack Golf & Country Club, ABM Sison Hospital, etc. His modus operandi is described
in this Company's letter complaint dated April 8, 1974 to Gen. Prospero Olivas, copy
of which is attached hereto for ready reference.
Navarro continues to defy the authorities, for only after a brief lull he is now again
openly selling titled properties of other persons. We have provided more than
sufficient documentary evidence to the Court and the Solicitor General and we hope
that formal administrative charges can now be filed against Navarro to prevent him
from further perpetrating a large scale fraud upon the public.
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, hearings were conducted on various dates.
COMPLAINANTS' EVIDENCE
The evidence for the complainants consist mainly of documents, most of which were
presented in Criminal Cases Nos. 3158 and 3159 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal and in the various civil cases before the said court involving Florentina Nuguid
Vda. de Haberer. Complainants' sole witness, Reynaldo Morallos, merely identified
the various documentary exhibits presented by the complainants.
From the evidence adduced by the complainants, it appears that a certain Florentina
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer (hereinafter called HABERER, for short) filed in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal twenty-two (22) cases for recovery of possession of her 1.2
hectare property in Mandaluyong, Rizal titled in her name, and to eject the twentytwo (22) families squatting thereat. Eleven (11) of these cases were raffled to Judge

Emilio Salas, while the other eleven (11) cases were assigned to Judge Pedro
Navarro. All the twenty-two (22) defendants-squatters were represented by
respondent NAVARRO. On behalf of his clients, respondent NAVARRO interposed as
principal defense, the alleged nullity of the HABERER'S title, claiming that the
mother title from which it emanated actually originated from Decree No. 1425 issued
in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which he claims to be non-existent.
The two sets of cases were decided differently. In the first set of eleven (11) cases,
Judge Salas rendered a decision on August 31, 1970 sustaining the validity of the
HABERER'S title and ordering the eviction of the defendants-squatters clients of
respondent NAVARRO (Exhibit W). In finding for the plaintiff, Judge Salas stated as
follows:
After due consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court finds
that most of the documentary evidence submitted by defendants are irrelevant to
the case since they pertain to defendants claim of ownership over 10,000 hectares
of land when the area of the property subject matter of the complaint is only 12,700
square meters. This Court also believes that the above-mentioned claims of
defendants are untenable.
Plaintiffs ownership over the property in question is evidenced by the issuance in her
name, since 1929, of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043. It is a settled rule in this
jurisdiction that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of
the one-year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is
based, it becomes incontrovertible (see case of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil.
558; Reyes & Nadres vs. Borbon & Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 791; Manuel Sy Juco, et
al. vs. Luis Francisco, 53 O.G., p. 2186, April 15,1957; Brizuela et al. vs. Ciriaco Vda.
de Vargas, 53 O.G., p. 2822, May 15, 1957).
Defendants' claim that they became owners of the land in question by adverse
possession is without merit considering that title to land becomes non-prescriptible
Sec. 42 of Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation to that
of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession
(Corporation de Pp. Agustines vs. Crisostomo, 42 Phil. 427). A title once registered
cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession. Registered
title under the Torrens System cannot be defeated by prescription. The title, once
registered, is notice to the World. All persons must take notice. No one can plead
ignorance of registration (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 3 Phil. 590, 595).
Further, defendants recognized plaintiffs ownership over the property in question
when they filed a petition with the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation wherein
they sought the latter's intervention for the acquisition of the property and for the
subdividing thereof into small lots to be sold to them at nominal cost. In said petition
defendants not only named the plaintiff as the owner of the property in question but
they also indicated therein her title to the land as Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. We quote hereunder the pertinent
facts and data concerning the property in question in defendants' petition submitted
to the General Manager of the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1) Location of land: Barrio Burol, Mandaluyong, Rizal
2) Name of registered owner: Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
3) Address of owner: 1288 Burgos St., Paco, Manila, or c/o Bausa, Ampil, & Suarez
Law Offices, Madrigal Bldg., Manila
4) Certificate of Title No. (attach photostatic copy): 15043
5) Area of land, Lot & Block & Survey Nos. 12,700 square meters(Exh G).
As regards defendants' claim that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued since
1929 in the name of plaintiff is null and void, this Court is of the opinion that
defendants cannot assail the validity of said title in this proceeding, which is for
recovery of possession. Any attack on the decree of registration of title must be
direct and not by collateral proceeding. The title which may be issued in pursuance
of said decree cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished in a

collateral proceeding (Legarda, et al. vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590). In the case of
Director of Land vs. Gan Tan, G.R. No. L-2664, May 30, 1951, our Supreme Court, in
reversing the decision of the trial court where the registered owner was considered
disqualified to acquire land under the Constitution and consequently was denied the
right to constitute his title, said: "That the disqualification raised by the Court is
untenable in the light of the theory that a Torrens title cannot be collateraly
attacked. That issue can only be raised in an action instituted expressly for that
purpose". (See also Ramon Chua Yu Sun vs. The Hon. Ceferino de los Santos, et al.,
G.R. No. 4347, November 23,1951; James (sic) G.R. No. L-4013, Dec. 29,1951;
Samonte, et al. vs. Descallar et al., No. L-12964, Feb. 29,1960).
In view of the above-mentioned ruling of the Supreme Court, it is our opinion that
there is no need to discuss the merits of the reasons claimed by defendants why
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in the name of plaintiff is null and void. (Exh.
W) Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8322, 8323, 8327, 8370, 8375, 8374, 8382, 8691,
8693, 8696 & 8699, at pages 6-7; 9-10).
In the second set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Pedro Navarro decided in favor of the
defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO. In his decision dated May 26,
1971, dismissing the complaints, Judge Navarro stated as follows:
Plaintiff claims to be the registered owner of a parcel of land containing an area of
12,000 square meters situated at the corner of A. Luna, Harapin Ang Bukas and J.C.
Zuluete Streets, Mandaluyong, Rizal, which is covered by, and more particularly
described in, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal
and indicated in the sketch plan attached to the complaint as Annex A.
xxx xxx xxx
It likewise appears that ejectment proceedings have been filed in the Municipal
Court of Pasig, Rizal, and in the City Court of Quezon City against several persons
occupying other parcels by Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, where
decisions have been rendered in favor of said Partnership. In order to forestall
executions of these decisions defendants in said ejectment cases filed class suit
before this Court by the occupants of the land which was heard and tried before
Branch XV in which the Director of Lands was impleaded as a party-defendant. The
decision of Branch XV in said class suit is made part of the evidence of these
defendants in the herein eleven cases for whatever the same may be worth as aid in
the determination of the merits of the issues raised herein.
As may be gleaned from said decision of Branch XV plaintiff therein assailed the
validity of Decree No. 1425 as null and void and or fictitious and the proceedings in
GLRO Rec. No. 917 upon which the decree was based as also null and void. The
Court sustained the herein plaintiffs claim and rendered judgment declaring (1) the
proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917 null and void; (2) the Decree No. 1425 null and
void; (3) all original certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant to the
judgment in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 utter nullities; (4) all transfer
certificates of title derived from the original certificates of title declared void under
No. 3 above, particularly but not exclusively, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 77652
and 77653 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its derivative
Transfer Certificate of 'title No. 135879 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, null and
void; (5) that the rightful owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the herein plaintiffs .
. . and so forth.
The Court has read copy of this decision of our Branch XV and observed findings of
facts too ponderous to be ignored.
That case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the proceedings leading to
the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 and, as an inevitable corollary, the nullity
of Decree No. 1425 issue by virtue of such void proceedings as well as the original
certificates of title issued as consequence thereof.
In said proceeding before Branch XV the Court, among other things, found that while
the decision in GLRO 917 was supposedly rendered on April 25, 1905, the survey of
the property subject matter of therein application was not made until June 16 to

August 16, 1906, or some one year after the decision. It found no proof of initial
hearing of the application for registration being published as required by law without
which the Land Registration Court could not have acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Said decision also made inference that since the survey of the property was not
made until a year after the rendition of the judgment the technical descriptions
appearing in the original certificates of title issued under GLRO Rec. No. 917 Decree
No. 1425, could not have been those appearing in the notice of initial hearing, if any.
Publication of accurate technical description being an essential jurisdictional
requirement which cannot be dispensed with and non-compliance with this
requirement renders the proceedings and the decision and decree and titles issued
arising therefrom null and void.
The same decision of Branch XV also made its findings that James Ross who was
said to have penned the decision in GLRO Rec. No. 917, never was a judge of the
Court of Land Registration at the time the decision was supposedly rendered
because the Gaceta Official for the year 1905 does not show that James Ross was
listed as Judge of the Land Registration Court or that he was ever appointed in that
capacity. Furthermore, the Court found that while J.C. Welson was the Clerk of Court
on April 26, 1905, one A.K. Jones issued the decree and he signed it as Clerk of
Court. The Court even found the supposed decision in that proceedings missing and
made its conclusion that since the decree which was supposedly issued by a person
who was not the Clerk of Court at the time and which decree did not contain the
description of the property ordered in the decision to be rendered because the
survey of the property was only made some one year later and that said decree
cannot now even be found, the decision rendered therein is void for lack of
jurisdiction.
Now, as we have said, the foregoing findings of facts are too ponderous to be
ignored. It is indeed a truism that a void original certificate of title cannot be the
source of a valid transfer certificate of title and a void judgment is, in the eyes of the
law, inexistent and cannot give source to any legal right.
The evidence now shows that the plaintiffs in said Civil Case No. 7-M(10339) before
Branch XV of this Court are also the defendants in the herein eleven cases in which
their properties are also involved. Since the case before Branch XV directly assails
the nullity of the proceedings by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 and the alleged
title of the plaintiff over the parcels of land occupied by the herein eleven
defendants is a derivative from such decree, it is the considered opinion of this Court
that until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this Court is reversed or set aside
by final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven defendants in these
eleven cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy and on which their respective
houses are built has become premature. It goes without saying that if said decision
of Branch XV will be finally affirmed, or that the same becomes final and executory,
all the claims of rights to ownership and possession of properties embraced in the
decision in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 shall become absolute nullities.
Possessions by actual occupants of all these properties had better be maintained
until after final decision in Civil Case No. 7-M(10339) shall have been rendered. (Exh.
R, Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, 8379, 8383, 8385, 8386,
8387 and 8700, at pp. 2, 5-9).
On June 21, 1971, Judge Navarro, acting on the motion filed by respondent
NAVARRO, issued an order cancelling HABERER's title over her property in question
and directing the issuance of a new title in lieu thereof in favor of respondent's
clients Thus
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
complaints in the above-entitled cases (Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8329, 8376, 8379,
8383, 8386, 8685, 8687 and 8700) all with costs against the plaintiff and hereby
ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in favor of the plaintiff Florentina
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer and in view thereof issue new certificates of title in favor of
the defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of Attorney Felipe

Navarro in accordance with the terms of the "Kasunduan Hinggil sa Serbisyo ng

Abogado" which is quoted in hisex-parte motion for clarification and/or modification
of the decision.
As so modified the decision stands in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit S, pp. 4-5).
On July 23, 1971, HABERER filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order,
and on September 15, 1972, Judge Navarro issued the following order:
In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate that its decision
in this case was mainly predicated on the decision of Branch XV of this Court that
the certificate of title emanating from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were
null and void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The Court opined that
until said decision is reversed the actual occupants had better be maintained in their
possessions of the land.
Pursuant to the same order the motion for reconsideration and new trial was set only
for reception of alleged newly discovered evidence.
The Court now understands that the decision of Branch XV is now under review by
order of our Appellate Court.
It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of June 21, 1971,
sought to be reconsidered insofar as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the
interests of other persons and entities like the Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, which is not a party herein, because the certificate of title of the plaintiff
is also a derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas and
Company, Limited Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas
& Company, Limited Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders or
decisions are made in this case cannot be made to affect the said company.
Decisions and orders can only affect parties to the case.
The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June 21, 1971,
must be reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is now
being the subject of further proceedings and (2) because it has the effect of
adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is
not even a party herein.
WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the
decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present
occupants of the land as stated in the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit T, at pp. 2-3).
HABERER appealed from the decision of Judge Navarro while the defendants-clients
of respondent NAVARRO appealed from the decision of Judge Salas. The Navarro
order of June 21, 1971 was not appealed by respondent NAVARRO's clients.
After the rendition of the Navarro decision which made reference to the decision
rendered by Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV,
respondent NAVARRO published in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971 the following:
LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED:
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF LAW AS INTERPRETED BY OUR SUPREME COURT
RESPECTING A VAST TRACT OF LAND LATIFUNDIO COVERING MANDALUYONG, SAN
JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY, THE DECISION DATED MAY 26, 1971
REITERATING AND REPEATING THE DECLARATION AND ORDER THAT ALL ORIGINAL
AND TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO RENDERED BY THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL IN
FAVOR OF THE MYRIAD CLIENTS OF THE UNDERSIGNED HAS AUTOMATICALLY BY
MERE LAPSE OF THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD) BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
But to every possessor in good faith there comes a time when he is considered a
possessor in bad faith. When the owner or possessor with a better right comes
along, when he becomes aware that what he had taken for granted is at least
doubtful, and when he learns the grounds in support of the adverse contention, good

faith ceases. The possessor may still believe that his right is more secure, because
we resign ourselves with difficulty to the sight of our vanishing hopes, but when the
final judgment of the court deprives him of the possession, all illusion necessarily
disappears. (Tacas vs. Robon, 53 Phil. 356, 361-362 citing Manresa and Articles 528,
545, and 1123 of our present Civil Code).
He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown without right to indemnity (Art 449, Civil Code)
HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE DESIRE OF THE UNDERSIGNED PREVAILING PARTY AND
SUCCESSOR BY TITLE ACQUIRED AFTER THE ACTIONS WERE BEGUN BY VIRTUE OF
HIS CONTRACT OF LEGAL SERVICES TO DEMAND FOR THE DEMOLITION OR REMOVAL
OF THE IMPROVEMENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH FOR:
The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored principles of the law of property. One
of those is the principle of accession whereby the owner of property acquires not
only that which it produces but that which it united to it either naturally or artificially.
Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or
repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land. Where however, the planter,
builder or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the
owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without
causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating
what Manresa calls a state of "forced co-ownership" (Vol. 3, 4th ed., p. 213), the law
has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option
to acquire the improvements after the payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige
the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. It is
the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older
and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing." Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 66 Phil. 598, 602; see also Filipinas
Colleges, Inc. vs. Garcia Timbang, et al., 106 Phil. 247, 254).
So caveat emptor (buyers beware) of possesors in bad faith as we are ready to ask
for the execution of the decision pursuant to law and avoid a scire facias Ordinary
prudence requires that those involved may please make some kind of arrangements
with the undersigned before execution by calling through the following telephones:
xxx xxx xxx
BY THE WAY, YOU ARE ALL INVITED TO JOIN THEMOTORCADE OF OUR PEOPLE'S
VICTORY WHICH WILL PASS THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL STREETS OF MANDALUYONG,
SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY FROM 9 A.M. TO 12 NOON TODAY,
SUNDAY, JULY 4, 1971, THE MOTORCADE WILL BEGIN FROM NO. 61 AMADO T. REYES
STREET, BARRIO BUROL, MANDALUYONG, RIZAL RETURNING TO THE SAME PLACE AT
NOON FOR LUNCH CELEBRATING TILL MIDNIGHT.
(Sgd.) FELIPE C. NAVARRO
Counsel for the Defense
60 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City
(Exhibit D, at pages 6-8).
Thereafter, respondent NAVARRO claimed ownership of properties originally covered
by Decree 1425 including the parcels of land owned by Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership (hereinafter called ORTIGAS, for short), and started selling them.
In view of the aforementioned publication, panic ensued among the lot buyers of
ORTIGAS and among the property owners whose titles were derived from Decree No.
1425. As a counter measure to allay the fears of the panicky lot buyers and owners,
ORTIGAS caused the publication in the Manila Times on July 19 and 17, 1971 the
following:
WARNING
SO THE PUBLIC MAY KNOW
In reply to numerous inquiries received by Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership
with reference to an advertisement published in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971
supposedly affecting the validity of all original certificates of title and transfer
certificates of title derived from Decree No. 1425, Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership wishes to announce that it is not a party to ANY case allegedly decided

on May 26, 1971 by the Supreme Court or any other court and therefore ALL ITS
TITLES DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NOT IN ANY WAY AFFECTED BY SAID
DECISION.
The public is hereby requested to be wary of any person selling lands and/or rights
to lands belonging to and in the name of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership.
The public is also warned to be wary of MISLEADING adverstisements and/or persons
basing their rights to lands of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership on such
"decision" of May 26, 1971 which is claimed to be "final and executory."
ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
(Exhibit D, at pages 4-5).
After the publication of the foregoing notices, respondent NAVARRO filed with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII, two (2) complaints for libel against the
officers of ORTIGAS and the officials of the defunct Manila 'times. Respondent
NAVARRO sought to recover in said cases damages allegedly sustained by him on
account of his failure to consummate thousands of sales by reason of the publication
of the above notice. In support of his allegation, respondent NAVARRO presented
169 deeds of sale over lots in his various subdivisions, the locations of which overlap
the properties owned by ORTIGAS (marked as Exhibit F, F-1 to F-168 in the instant
proceedings).
On December 13, 1971, Judge Benjamin H. Aquino dismissed these two cases for
libel for lack of merit (Exhibit D).
Apart from the documents pertaining to the HABERER cases and the libel cases, the
complainants also presented documents relating to Civil Case No. 7-M(10339), Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, et al." and Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro."
In Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), the plaintiffs therein sought to enjoin ORTIGAS from
ejecting them. Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz decided in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that
(1) there was no publication for the Notice of Initial Hearing set in 1905; (2) there
was no survey of the property sought to be registered; (3) the judge presiding over
the defunct Court of Land Registration was fake; and (4) the Clerk of Court of the
said Court was also fake. The dispositive portion of the Ruiz decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares and/or
orders:
1. That the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917 are null and void;
2. That Decree No. 1425 is null and void and/or fictitious;
3. That all the original certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant to the
judgments in G.L.R.0 Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 were utter nullities;
4. That all transfer certificates of title derived from the original certificates of title
declared void under No. (3) above, particularly but not exclusively, Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 77652 and 77653 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
and 126575 and its derivative Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135879 of the Register
of Deeds of Rizal, were and are null and void;
5. That the rightfully (sic) owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the herein plaintiffs,
the portions owned by them being as indicated in Exhibit P;
6. That the defendant Partnership cease and desist from molesting the plaintiffs in
the enjoyment and peaceful possession of their respective landholdings;
7. That the Hon. Andres Siochi, as Presiding Judge, Municipal Court, Pasig, Rizal, and
Hon. Ricardo Tensuan, as Presiding Judge, Branch II, City Court of Quezon City, and
the defendant Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, their agents,
representatives and any and all persons acting in their behalves, refrain and desist
absolute (sic) and perpetually from proceeding with or taking any action on Civil
Cases Nos. 1134, II 13865, II-13869, II-13877, II-13913, and II-13921 filed by the
herein defendant Partnership against some of the herein plaintiffs;

8. That the case be dismissed as against defendant Director of Lands;

9. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as and
for attorney's fees;
10. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the costs of the suit; and
Defendant Partnership's counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit EE at pages 5-6).
ORTIGAS appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals. On November 21,
1971, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting aside the decision of Judge
Ruiz and ordering a new trial to enable the petitioner to introduce newly discovered
evidence. The case was then remanded to the lower Court. On November 3, 1973,
Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who took the place of Judge Ruiz who was separated
from the service by the President of the Philippines, rendered a decision the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant, Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, as against the plaintiffs:
1. Dismissing the amended complaint;
2. Confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, issued in Expediente 917 and all titles
emanating therefrom;
3. Directing each of the plaintiffs to individually pay the defendant Company:
(a) P30.00 per month as rental of the premises occupied by them from the time of
the filing of the complaint on October 20, 1967, with legal rate of interest, until they
surrender the possession thereof to defendant Company;
(b) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
(4) Ordering plaintiff and their successors-in-interest, agents or any person or
persons acting in their behalf, who are found to be in possession of defendant
company's land to vacate the same and remove and demolish their improvements
thereon at plaintiffs expenses;
(5) Ordering Atty. Emilio D. Castellanes to return the attorney's fees in the amount of
P 1,030.00 he prematurely collected from defendant company, with interest; and
(6) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit DD at pages 44-45).
The aforesaid decision was appealed. During the pendency of the approval of the
record on appeal, ORTIGAS filed a motion for immediate execution of judgment. After
exchange of pleadings by the parties, the trial court presided by Judge Alcantara
granted the motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of
Ortigas upon filing a bond in the amount of P250,000.00. Del Rosario, et al. filed a
motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order. Despite opposition by Ortigas,
Judge Florellana Castro-Bartolome, who was appointed to Branch XV vice Judge
Alcantara, granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside the order of Judge
Alcantara. Ortigas contested the order of Judge Bartolome through a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP04060.
On September 1, 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in the aforesaid
case, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The order of the respondent Judge
dated February 25, 1975, is hereby annulled and set aside and the order of Judge
Arsenio Alcantara, granting immediate execution, is hereby revived, with
instructions to the respondent judge to fully implement the latter order, including
the approval of the petitioner's bond and the issuance of the necessary writ or writs
of execution. The restraining order issued at the inception of this action is hereby
(sic) permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit EE at pages 50-51).

This decision was the subject of a petition for review filed by respondents Del
Rosario, et al., but the same was denied. So also with the motion for reconsideration
filed with the Supreme Court (Annex "A" of Exhibit FF)
In order to stop respondent NAVARRO from selling its titled properties, ORTIGAS also
filed Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVI,
entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro.
On December 16, 1972, Judge Sergio A.F. Apostol rendered a decision in favor of
Ortigas as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It having been found that defendant was guilty of bad faith and fraud in claiming
and selling plaintiff's land, plaintiff is entitled to attomey's fees. This court finds the
amount of attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 to be fair and reasonable
considering the extent and value of the property involved and the nature of the
case.
Defendant, in his answer and motion to dismiss, alleged that as a result of the
issuance of the restraining order, he suffered damages in the amount of
Pl,000,000.00 daily.
Firstly, the same was not raised as a counterclaim. Therefore, this court can only
treat it as an affirmative defense.
Secondly, no evidence was submitted to prove this claim of damages. Under the
same authorities cited in support of the denial of plaintiffs claim for damages,
therefore, he has failed to establish what damages he had suffered.
Lastly, the court has found that plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for. It
follows, therefore, that the issuance of the restraining order was proper and, hence,
can not be the basis for a claim for damages.
This court cannot help but end this decision with a note of admonition and hope. The
people who will ultimately suffer the most from defendant's acts in question are his
buyers, who in all probability are middle class people who themselves wanted to
make money out of the apparent sad predicament that defendant had brought upon
the plaintiff. It is the fervent hope of this court, therefore, that with the advent of the
NEW SOCIETY defendant will turn a new page and make a fresh start in life.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Upholding the validity and indefeasibility of plaintiffs Transfer Certificates of Title
over the land in question;
2. As a consequence thereof, forever enjoining and barring the defendant, his
successors-in-interest, assigns, agents or any person or persons acting for or in his
behalf, from selling and advertising, verbally, or in writing, the sale of the lands in
question and from asserting any claim or dominion or possession whatsoever on or
over the said property, directly or indirectly, adverse to the plaintiff; and
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 plus cost
of suit.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit II-I-a, at pages 409-411 of Exhibit II).
The afore-quoted decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CAG.R. No. L-53125-R.
On December 13, 1978, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in the
aforesaid case affirming the decision of Judge Apostol.
Respondent NAVARRO elevated the case to this Honorable Tribunal (G.R. No. L50156). Again, his petition was denied for lack of merit. His subsequent motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Consequently, the issue brought forth in the sala of
Judge Apostol has now been laid to rest.
EVIDENCE FOR THE RESPONDENT
Respondent NAVARRO presented both testimonial and documentary evidence. His
testimonial evidence consist of his testimony and those of Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez,
one of the complainants; and Arsenio de Guzman, Chief of Section of the Bureau of
Lands. His documentary evidence consist of Exhibits 1 to 13, inclusive.

On direct examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that the present charges are
the same as the charges in administrative Case No. 1154, entitled, "In Re: Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro, respondent", which was referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation. He further declared that this Honorable Court deferred
action on the said administrative case until such time that G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709,
the heirs of the late Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al. is
terminated. Respondent's direct testimony dwelt only on these two matters and on
the identification of his Exhibits 1 to 9.
On cross-examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that he is the counsel for the
defendants in the twenty-two (22) cases before Judge Pedro Navarro and Judge
Emilio Salas of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that he became the owner of the
lands not occupied by his clients by virtue of his contract of legal services signed by
them (pp. 76-78, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; pp. 7-10, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). Said contract for
legal services, which appears on pages 224-232 of Exhibit "1", reads as follows:
KASUNDUAN HINGGIL SA SERBISYO NG ABOGADO SA MGA KINAUUKULAN NA ANG
MGA BAGAY NA ITO AY MALAMAN AT MAKARATING
Itong kasulatan na ito ay nagpapatibay at nagbibigay-bisa hinggil sa serbisyo ni Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro tungkol sa aming karapatan sa lupaing nasasakop ng diumanoy
Kautusan-Blg. 1425 (Decree No. 1425) sa diumanoy Usapin Blg. 699, 875, 917, aip
(Cases Nos. 699, 875, 917, etc.) sa dating Hukuman ng Pagpapatala ng Lupain
defunct Court of Land Registration) na ang nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425
na siyang pinagbatayan ng ipinapatalang gawagawang dalawanput anim (26) ng
mga Original Certificates of Title ng Register of Deeds ng Pasig at nagbunga ito ng
maraming Transfer Certificates of Title na sa kasalukuyan iginigiit ng mga mayhawak
ngunit yan ay wala namang bisa at katuturan (Viz., City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil.
324, 340) dahil sa kapaltosan ng nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 na sa
mula't sapul magpahanggang ngayon sa kasalukuyan ay iginigiit sa mga nakalagda
sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito kasama na rin ang mga dati at ibang mga kliyente ni
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ngayon ay siyang nararapat maging kalahok sa
animnapung usapin na sa kasalukuyang hawak ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (Civil Cases
Nos. 8322, etc. of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branches I, II, and VI contesting
the genuineness and due execution of Decree No. 1425 of the defunct Court of Land
Registration) upang mabigyan ang mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng mga kanikaniyang
katibayan o kung sila man ay mayhawak ng titulo na sakup ng diumano'y Kautusan
Blg. 1425 ay babagohin iyan o mapapalitan ng maybisa galing sa Hukuman upang
matahimik at mapayapa ang dahilan paninirahan kanilang mula't sapul ay kanila
nang pinamamayanan sa buong kaalaman ng sambayanan at walang paglilihim ng
kanilang mapayapang pagmamay-ari ng mga lupain na sa mula't sapul ay
pinaninirahan ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito at ng kanilang ninuno
o nagpamana (predecessors-in-interest) na siyang mga pangyayari ay sapat na
upang maigawad ang mabisang titulo sapagkat ang nasabing lupain kailanmay di
naging pambayan kungdi pribado o di kaya'y sariling pag-aari ng nakalagdang mayari sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito, dahil sa mga nabanggit ng mga pangyayari na
'natamo sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay-bisa ng batas di lamang ng karapatan sa
pag-aangkin ng lupain kungdi maging ang karapatang ipinagkaloob sa kanila ng
pamahalaan ay nagsasaad na ang aktuwal na pagkakaloob sa kanila ng pamahalaan
ng titulo ay di na kinakailangan upang ang nasabing karapatan ay di kilanlin o
pagtibayin ng Hukuman (Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 242; Director
of Lands vs. Abaldonado CA-G.R. No. 177-R, Jan. 12, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz 2188). Ngunit
sa dahilang mayroon huwad na titulo ang mga nag-aangkin ng mga lupain at
nararapat iharap sa Hukuman ang bagay na ito upang ang Hukuman magpatibay at
magbigay-bisa ng mga titulo sa mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito ayon sa
Section 10 ng Rule 39 ng Rules of Court. Sapagkat ang pamumusisyon sa isang
bagay ang batayang di mapagtatalunan hinggil sa kalaunan ng pagmamay-ari nito
ng makalipas ang mahabang panahong takda ng batas, maging ito man ay walang
karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin ay nagpapahina at sumisira sa saklaw-bisa
at halaga ng pinakamahusay na titulo na maaring nasa bagay na iyon na

pinanghahawakan ng taong hindi nagmamay-ari. Bunga nito, ang pamumusisyon ng

mahigit sa tatlumpung (30) taon na tinatamasa ng isang tao bilang may-ari kahit na
walang karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin ay gumaganap ng sapat na titulo
upang makuha ang pag-aari ng lupaing tangan sapagkat ang lampas-bisa o ang
panahong itinakda ng batas sa pamamagitan ng pamumusisyon ng mahigit na
tatlumpung (30) taon ay tiyakang hadlang na maging ang pinakamahusay na titulo
na kinikilala ng batas ay hindi makatitinag o makapangingibabaw (Kincaid vs.
Cabututan, 35 Phil. 383).' Hindi maaring sabihin o ipagmalakdan ng mga
nangamkam na sa pamamagitan ng kanilang huwad na titulo ay naangkin na nila
ang lupain o di kayay gawing batayan ang kanilang huwad na titulo upang masabing
sila ay nagmamay-ari ng lupa. Hindi ito maaring maganap sapagkat ang krimen at
panlilinlang ay hindi maaring maging batayan ng panimula ng ay isang tunay at
mabisang titulo kahit na ipinagbili at nabili sa isang mabuti ang hangarin ng bumili
ng karampatang halaga ng lupain (Levin vs. Bass, 91 Phil. 419, 439). Dahil sa
itinuring ng batas na sila ay 'constructive trustees, lamang kaya hindi maganap ang
lampas-bisa (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, 49 Phil. 244-249).
Subali't dahilan sa ilang katiwalian ng katotohanan na di nabatid ng mga nakalagda
sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito na di-umano'y siyang naganap na pangyayari ngunit
ang tunay na katotohanan ay di naman ito naganap at naliligaw sa paniniwalang
nararapat silang nagbayad ng rentas o alkila at ang ilan ay binili ang lupain gayong
ang katotohanan ay sila ang nararapat at tunay na may-ari sa di-umano'y Kautusan
Blg. 1425 (Decree No. 1425) ng defunct Court of Land Registration na nagbunga ng
gawa-gawang titulo na sumasakop sa buong kalawakan ng humigit kumulang ng
4,000 hectares na samakatuwid ay apatnapung (40) milyong metro kuwadrado ng
lupaing ngayon ay matatagpuan sa buong bayan ng Mandaluyong, ang buong bayan
ng San Juan sapagkat sakop ito noon ng bayan San Felipe Neri ayon sa Act No. 942,
ang bahagi ng Punta sa Maynila sapagkat sakop ito noon ng Mandaluyong na
ngayon, kalahati ng bayan ng Pasig, kalahati ng bayang Mariquina, at kalahati ng
Lungsod ng Quezon sapagka't pinilas lamang ito buhat sa bayan ng Mariquina,
Pasig, San Juan at Mandaluyong sa pamamagitan ng Commonwealth Act No. 502 na
pinagtibay noong Oktubre 12, 1939 at sang-ayon sa mga paglalarawan ng diumano'y pagsusukat o survey nagsimula sa Maytunas creek patungong ilog ng San
Juan patungong dakong ibaba ng agos ng ilog ng San Juan hanggang sa bahaging
matatagpuan ang ilog ng Pasig sa Punta, Maynila at lumilisya sa patungong itaas ng
agos ng ilog Pasig na nababanggit ang sapa ng Buayang Bato sa Namayan,
Mandaluyong pagkatapos ay pabalik sa ilog Pasig sa dakong pataas ng agos ng ilog
hanggang sa ilog ng Mariquina at pagsunod sa dakong pataas ng agos ng ilog ng
Mariquina hanggang sa sapa ng Pinagpatayang Buaya at lumalakdaw hanggang sa
pinagmulan ng sapa ng Diliman na umaagos ng pababa patungong ilog ng San Juan
at pabalik sa sapa ng Maytunas na ang nasabing baybay-sukat o survey sa abot
makakaya ng sino mang may sapat ng kakayahang agrimensor (surveyor) ay di
makabuo ng ni isa man lamang maramihang-gilid na hugis o anyo (polygon).
Dahilan sa mga nabanggit na pangyayari, ang mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng
Kasunduang ito ay sumasang-ayon na kasunduin ang paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro ng No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City upang gumawa ng
karampatang hakbang sa Hukuman ng Unang Dulungan ng Rizal pati Quezon City
hanggang sa Corte Suprema kung kinakailangan at gawin ang anumang paraang
isinasaisip niyang tumpak at nararapat gawin sang-ayon sa batas upang matamo ng
mga makalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito ang kani-kaniyang titulo ayon sa
paraang minamarapat ng batas at kaming mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang
ito ay nagkakaloob ng buong kapangyarihan kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ilagay sa
kanyang pangalan at kung sa kanino man niya naising ipagkaloob ang ibang bahagi
ng lupain na aming minana o pinagsundan (predecessors-in-interest) nguni't
ipinaubaya na namin kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro bilang bahagi ng buong kabayaran
ng kanyang serbisyo at karapatang maangkin niya sangayon sa mga inilalahad ng
kasunduang ito maliban na lamang doon sa bahagi ng lupaing nais naming
mapatituluhan sa ilalim ng aming kani-kaniyang pangalan at sumasangayon kami sa

pagbabayad ng karampatang halaga sa paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro nang

naayon sa isinasaad ng kasunduang ito. Na sa bawa't kilos na magaganap sa
pagpapatitulo ng aming mga ariarian ang mamamahala sa mga gastos o kabayaran
ay si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang ibig sabihin na mula sa pagpapasukat (survey)
ng mga ari-arian hanggang sa pagbibigay ng mga plano ng mga sukat upang
mapagtibay ito ng Kagawaran ng Lupain (Bureau of Lands), paghahanda at
pagnonotaryo ng mga affidavit' ng pagmay-ari, pagkuha ng mga katibayan ng
pagkamayari, bayad sa pagpasok sa husgado (filing fees), pagpapatala
(registration), paggawa ng mga kasulatan (documentation), pagsalin ng mga rekord
(transcripts), pagpapatunay (certifications) at iba pang mga kinakailangang bayaran
at pagkagastuhan ay nasa kalayaan na ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na pagpasiyahan
ng naaayon sa kaniyang sariling kagustuhan na ang nilalayon sa bandang huli at
ang tunay na hangarin ay ang mapatituluhan ng ayon sa batas ang aming kanikaniyang mga lupain sa aming kani-kaniyang pangalan na sa pamamagitan ng mga
tungkuling iniatang namin kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa pamamagitan ng
kasunduang ito, sumasang-ayon kami at natatalian o nabibigkisan ng kasunduang
ito na magbayad ng halagang Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00) sa bawat metro
kuwadrado ng lupaing matitituluhan sa aming pangalan bilang kabayaran sa
serbisyo o paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro; ang halagang Sampung Piso
(P10.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ay aming magiging paunang-bayad upang ang
proyektong ito ay mapanimulan kaagad sa lalong madaling panahon at ang
matitirang dapat bayarang halaga na Labing-limang Piso (P15.00) bawa't metro
kuwadrado ay aming babayaran kapag naipagkaloob na ang titulo ng lupa sa amin
sa kasunduang kapag buhat sa isang taon mula sa petsang ipinagkaloob ang titulo
ng lupa ay hindi kami nakababayad ng buo sa halagang natitira o balanse na Labinglimang Piso (P15.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado, ang titulo ng lupain ay mapupunta
sa pangalan ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro nguni't ang kasunduang ito na isang taong
pagbibigay-palugit ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang siya ay mabigyan ng kabuuang
kabayaran sa kanyang mga paglilingkod sa usaping ito at sumasang-ayon si Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro na kami ay pahintulutang isangla ang aming mga ari-ariang may
karampatang titulo na di huwad at pinagtibay ng batas sa alinmang bangko upang
ito ang magsilbing bayad sa mga paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa usaping
ito at iyon lamang ang natatanging sandali o panahong kami ay mawawalan na ng
obligasyon o tungkuling bayaran ang Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00) sa bawat
metro kuwadrado ng lupaing ikinasundo namin ang serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro upang matituluhan nang naayon sa batas. Sumasang-ayon din si Atty. Felipe
C. Navarro na ang sinuman sa aming nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito na hindi
kayang magbayad ng paunang-halaga na Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa bawa't metro
kuwadrado ay bibigyan ng karampatang magbayad ng makahalintulad na halaga sa
bawa't buwan sa loob ng sampu (10) o dalawampung (20) taon sang-ayon sa mga
hinihingi ng pangyayari, ang titulo ng lupain ay ipagkakaloob lamang sa nagnanais
umangkin nito kung mababayaran na ang kabuuan ng paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro kasama na ang "legal interest" at ang amortization nito ngunit
kinakailangan magbigay sila ng paunang bayad na Limangpung Piso (P50.00) upang
panimulan ang pagbabayad buwan-buwan (monthly installment condition) at
magiging mabisa lamang ito kung matutupad ng buong katapatan ang pagbabayad
ng hulugang buwan-buwan (monthly installment) na maaring magbuhat sa halagang
Limang Piso (P5.00) hanggang Limangpung Piso (P50.00) sa bawat buwan nang
naayon sa laki o kalawakan ng lupaing nararapat na mapasa-amin ayon sa batas. Sa
dahilang ang buhay ng tao ay walang katiyakang magtatagal na habang panahon ay
isinasalin namin ang aming mga karapatan at tungkulin sa aming tagapagmana
lamang at gayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na maaring manahin ang kanyang
karapatan sa kasunduang ito sa mga tagapagmana lamang niya upang itaguyod nila
ang paglilingkod sa anumang paraan ayon sa batas.
SA KATUNAYAN AT KATIBAYAN NG LAHAT NG NABANGGIT NA KASUNDUANG ITO
ay lumalagda kami sa kasunduang ito na aming tutuparin ang lahat ng isinasaad sa
kasunduang ito na sinasang-ayunan din ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na kanyang tuparin

ang kanyang tungkulin bilang manananggol na tutulong sa amin upang kami ay

mapagkalooban ng Hukuman ng titulo sa aming kani-kaniyang lupain ng naayon sa
batas at siyang isinasaad din ng kasunduang ito at kasama ng paglagda ng aming
mga pangalan na siyang nais naming pangalang lumitaw sa titulo, ang aming kanikaniyang tirahan, kalawakan ng lupain, paraang pagbabayad at petsa na kami'y
lumagda sa kasunduang ito bilang pagpapatunay sa aming taos-pusong pagsangayon at hangarin tumupad sa lahat ng napapaloob sa KASULATANG ITO.
In the course of the proceedings, respondent NAVARRO admitted that he has sold,
and is still selling, properties covered by Torrens titles in the names of ORTIGAS &
CO., Madrigal, and others, but he claims that the titles of said parties are null and
void because they emanated from Decree No. 1425; that he has no title over the
properties sold by him except the contract of legal services which his clients
allegedly signed; that he has no approved plans for the various subdivisions
allegedly owned by him; that he has not obtained any certificate of registration or
license to sell from the National Housing Authority; that he has not declared for
taxation purposes the thousands of hectares of prime lands in Mandaluyong, San
Juan, Pasig, Quezon City and Marikina, allegedly owned by him; and that he has not
filed any case directly attacking the title of ORTIGAS and others (pp. 7-33, t.s.n.,
Sept. 9, 1977; Exhibit J).
Respondent NAVARRO also admits that he is the defendant in the "25-Billion-pesocase" before Judge Sergio Apostol, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled
"Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro's Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City"; that said case covers lands in
Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Marikina and Quezon City including those involved in
the present case (pp. 8-21, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; Exhibits F, F-I to F-168).
Despite the decision of Judge Apostol upholding the validity of the Ortigas Transfer
Certificate of Title and enjoining respondent NAVARRO from selling lots covered by
said title, NAVARRO still continued selling properties covered by the injunction
claiming that the said decision is ineffectual because the same has been appealed.
(pp. 33-34, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). 4
On the basis of the foregoing report, the Solicitor General filed a complaint with
Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as complainant, praying that respondent Navarro be disbarred,
that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys, and that his certificate of
admission to the bar be recalled.
On May 23, 1980, respondent Navarro filed his answer with prayer to lift the order of
suspension. 5 Complainant Ortigas, Jr. filed an opposition to said motion to lift
suspension . 6 Respondent Navarro reiterated his plea in his manifestation dated
August 8, 1980. 7 In a resolution dated September 2, 1980, this Court denied the
motion to lift the order of suspension. 8
On October 29, 1980, respondent Navarro filed an urgent ex parte motion praying
for the lifting of the order of suspension 9 which was denied by this Court on
November 13, 1980. 10 He reiterated his prayer in another motion filed on January
5, 1981 11 but the same was likewise denied in our resolution of January 22,
1981. 12
II. Administrative Case No. 2033 arose from a letter-complaint, dated March 13,
1979, filed by the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Geeslin with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, charging respondent Navarro with deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct in office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath. Said letter was
thereafter referred to this Court by Integrated Bar of the Philippines President (now
Chief Justice) Marcelo B. Fernan for appropriate action. 13
Pursuant to our resolution of June 4, 1979, 14 respondent Navarro filed his answer
with
motion
to
dismiss
on
June
29,
1979. 15 The
corresponding
reply 16 and rejoinder 17 were subsequently filed. In a resolution of this Court dated
October 1, 1985, the case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. 18
On August 28, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its report, with the
following findings and recommendation:

CHARGES
In their Complaint dated March 13, 1979, complainants charged respondent with
deceit, malpractice and gross conduct in office, and blatant violation of the
Attorney's Oath, for having deliberately misrepresented the facts and the law while
acting as counsel for the defendants in the following civil cases:
a. His insistence that our clients are no longer owners of the land subject of the
cases mentioned above; he falsely alleged that to his personal knowledge the title to
the land is in the name of one Leopoldo Cojuangco. This false allegation was made
despite the final decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVII, in Civil
Case No. Q-18221 entitled "E Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin vs. Leopoldo Cojuangco,
et al." (1) declaring the transfer of the lot to Leopoldo Cojuangco was fraudulent and
had been effected thru falsification; and, (2) ordering the cancellation of the title
issued to Cojuangco and the reversion of the title to our clients. Copies of the
Complaint and the Decision in said case are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C",
respectively.
b. Mr. Navarro persisted and still persists in representing that our clients' title was
rendered null and void by virtue of the expiration of the Parity Amendment and the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Quasha vs. Republic, 46 SCRA 160. Our
clients' title to the aforesaid property was acquired by hereditary succession from
the late Dr. Luther Bewley who acquired said land in 1925. The ownership therefore
of our clients is protected both under the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. Any lawyer,
even a law student, knows that the Parity Amendment and the decision in the
Quasha case,supra, covers cases where property was acquired by virtue of the Parity
Amendment. Mr. Navarro is either guilty of abysmal ignorance of the law or of
complete and unabashed contempt for facts, the law of the land and for the Courts.
c. Mr. Navarro persists in misrepresenting to the Court that the title covering the
land subject of the above cases had been declared null and void in the "final and
executory" decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II. He deliberately
omits to give the title of the case and its docket number for the obvious and
malicious reason that the case he relies upon (Heirs of Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 42699-42709) is still pending resolution before the Supreme Court and
hence cannot be "final and executory."
d. He misrepresents to the Court that the land subject of the cases heretofore
enumerated is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the Quezon City Court and
hence the court has no jurisdiction. Further, that title thereto having described the
land to be part of the Municipality of San Juan del Monte, is void. He cannot disclaim
knowledge however of the fact that the area in the vicinity of Santolan Road in
Quezon City was originally part of the Municipality of San Juan del Monte territory of
Quezon City when the latter was created on 14 June 1950. In the light of this fact,
Mr. Navarro's representation is false and malicious.
e. Mr. Navarro has shown a complete and total disregard for basic norms of honesty
and decency in that having prejudiced the interest of his clients because of his gross
neglect to appeal in a timely manner from the decision of the court and having
adopted the wrong remedy, in complete ignorance of the law, he had influenced his
clients into commencing a case before the Tanod Bayan against the Presiding Judge
of the City Court of Quezon City, Branch 1, and Hon. Minerva Genovea The case is
obviously calculated to harrass and coerce the Honorable Presiding Judge. Mr.
Navarro's conduct speaks ill of his respect for the law and the courts.
f. The penchant of Mr. Navarro to misrepresent and deceive did not stop before the
City Court of Quezon City. He continues to do so in the petition he filed before the
Honorable Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. S.P. 08928 entitled "Adolfo
Corpus, et al. 'vs. Hon. Minerva Genovea et al." Copies of the Petition and the
undersigned attorney's Comments thereto are hereto attached as Annexes "D" and
"E", respectively. (pp. 2-4, Record)
RESPONDENTS ANSWER
In his Answer dated June 29, 1979, respondent averred:

1. From the face of the Resolution itself showing that the undersigned respondent
was never furnished with a copy of the complaint, it can be gathered therefrom that
the complaint is clearly intended to prevent the undersigned respondent to proceed
in defending his clients' cause in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 (Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs.
Hon. Minerva C. Genovea, the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley
Geeslin, et al.) still pending at this writing before the Court of Appeals. To allow
complainants to harass respondent while the case (is) still pending in our courts of
justice is an act in contempt of court for which complainants and their counsel is
(sic) liable.
2. Undersigned respondent as counsel for the defendants Adolfo Corpuz, et al. gave
his entire devotion to the interest of his clients, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of their rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end
that nothing be taken or be withheld from his clients, save by the rules of law,
legally applied; for his clients are entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy
and defense that is authorized by law as was done by the undersigned respondent in
the ejectment case filed by the complainants Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B.
Geeslin against the several clients of the undersigned. (pp. 42-43, Record)
After complainants filed a Reply dated July 17, 1979 pointing out that respondent's
Answer does not deny any of the six (6) counts of charges specified in the
Complaint, respondent filed a Rejoinder dated September 7, 1979, wherein he
averred:
1. The complainants alien spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin who are
citizens of the United States of America held TCT No. 153657 which was cancelled
on December 31, 1970 by TCT No. 180231 issued in the name of Leopoldo A.
Cojuangco both of which TCTs are described to be located at Santolan Road,
Municipality of San Juan, Province of Rizal, (now part of Metro-Manila) filed ejectment
proceedings before the City Court of Quezon City against my clients Victorino
Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and twenty others in Civil Case Nos. I-29872 to I-29931
which later were elevated to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928
entitled Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon.Minerva C. Genovea the Spouses Conrad
E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.
2. Undersigned respondent being retained as counsel for the defendants Victorino
Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and the twenty (20) other defendants did his bounden
duty in defense of their rights and exerted his utmost learning and ability within
what the law allows that at this stage, the controversy is still under litigation before
the courts as stated above.
3. Under the foregoing circumstances, the administrative action must have been
resorted to by the complainants at the instigation of their counsel who failed in
wanting to defeat the defendants of their God-given rights to the land in litigation
that there can be no other conclusion left but that the administrative complaint
against the respondent is 'pure' harassment. (pp. 53-54, Record)
FINDINGS
When the case was set for hearing by the Office of the Solicitor General, the parties
agreed that there is no dispute as to the fact of the case. Hence, they were granted
a period of thirty (30) days within which to file their respective memoranda, if they
so desire, after which the case will be considered submitted for resolution.
Since respondent did not deny the allegations of the Complaint, and in fact admitted
during the hearing of the case set by the Office of the Solicitor General that there is
no dispute as to the facts of this case, it follows that the specifications of the
charges against him, which are duly supported by documents, are deemed
sufficiently proven.
The only justification invoked by respondent is that he "gave his entire devotion to
the interest of his clients" and that he "did his bounden duty in defense of their
rights and exerted his utmost learning and ability.
Consequently, respondent is deemed to have committed the misrepresentations
specified by complainants, as quoted above.
RECOMMENDATION

Respondent was also charged in Administrative Case No. 2148 entitled Ortigas vs.
Navarro and has been suspended from the practice of law since May 5, 1980. His
suspension is still in effect.
The acts complained of in the present case also warrant the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro
be likewise suspended from the practice of law.
Makati, for Manila, August 17, 1989. 19
No justiciable issue was raised in Administrative Case No. 2033 as respondent
Navarro failed to deny the material allegations in the complaint of the spouses E.
Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin.
The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in Administrative Case No. 2148
are:
1. Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the names of other
persons without the consent of the latter; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute sufficient grounds for
suspension or disbarment.
Respondent reiterated in his answer that the transfer certificates of title of Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer were declared
null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XV, in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs.
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, et al.," and in the order dated June 21, 1971 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369,
8376, 8379, 8383, 8685, 8686 and 8700 entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
vs. Federico Martinez, et al." Respondent likewise reiterated his claim of ownership
over all parcels of land (including those of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership
and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer) covered by Decree No. 1425, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 917, which was declared null and void in the decision dated March 31,
1970 of Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 20 Furthermore, he asserts
ownership over the subject properties as payment for his legal services rendered in
the ejectment cases filed against his clients in Branches I and II of the former Court
of First Instance of Rizal.
1. To clarify, Civil Case No. 7-M(10339)filed before Branch XV of the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal directly assailed the nullity of the proceedings in G.L.R.O.
Record No. 917 by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 was issued, as well as the
original certificates of title issued as a consequence thereof. These original
certificates of title include the properties belonging to Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. On March 31, 1970, Judge
Vivencio M. Ruiz then presiding over said Branch XV rendered a decision declaring
Decree No. 1425, as well as the original certificates of title issued pursuant thereto,
null and void. Ortigas appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals which set
the same aside and remanded the case to Branch XV for new trial. On November 3,
1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who replaced Judge Ruiz, rendered a decision
confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles emanating therefrom. The
said decision was pending appeal with the Court of Appeals when the investigation
of respondent by the Solicitor General was conducted.
We take judicial notice of the fact that on December 29, 1983, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision affirmingin toto the November 3, 1973 decision of Judge
Alcantara, which became final and executory on May 25, 1984 insofar as plaintiffsappellants Pascual Santos, et al. are concerned. The plaintiffs-appellants Pedro del
Rosario, et al. appealed to the Supreme Court in a petition for review
on certiorari which was, however, denied on February 18, 1985. The denial became
final and executory on April 10, 1985. Thereafter, the records of the case were
remanded to Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal for execution.
The records further show that the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV in Civil Case
No. 7-M (10339) became the basis of the decision rendered by Judge Pedro Navarro
of Branch II on May 21, 1971 which dismissed the complaint for ejectment filed by

Haberer against the clients of respondent Navarro. However, Judge Navarro in his
decision categorically stated that "it is the considered opinion of this court that until
and unless the decision of Branch XV of this court is reversed or set aside by final
judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven defendants in these eleven
cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy and on which their respective houses
are built has become premature." This condition was reiterated in Judge Navarro's
order of September 15, 1972 wherein he stated that:
In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate that its decision
in this case was mainly predicated on the decision of Branch XV of this Court that
the certificate of title emanating from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were
null and void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The Court opined that
until said decision is reversed the actual occupants had better be maintained in their
possessions of the land. 21
However, to repeat, the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV was set aside by the
Court of Appeals which remanded the case for new trial and another one was
rendered, this time by a different judge on November 3, 1973 upholding the validity
of Decree No. 1425 and all titles issued as a consequence thereof. Respondent
cannot feign ignorance of the November 3, 1973 decision, which superseded the
March 31, 1970 decision, for the simple reason that it was his clients who appealed
the former decision to the Court of Appeals. In spite thereof and indicative of his bad
faith, he stubbornly continues to invoke the decision of March 31, 1970 as the
source of his alleged ownership rights over the Ortigas properties.
2. In the order of June 21, 1971, Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II ordered the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued in the name of Haberer
and the issuance of new titles in the name of the defendants, subject to the lien for
attorney's fees in favor of respondent pursuant to the terms of the contract for his
legal services. However, the same judge issued an amendatory order dated
September 15, 1972, which provides in part that:
It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of June 21, 1971,
sought to be reconsidered insofar as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the
interests of other persons and entities like the Ortigas and Company, Limited
Partnership, which is not a party herein, because the certificate of title of the plaintiff
is also a derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas
& Company, Limited Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders of
decisions are made in this case cannot be made to affect the said company.
Decisions and orders can only affect parties to the case.
The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June 21, 1971,
must be reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is now
being the subject of further proceedings and (2) because it has the effect of
adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is
not even a party herein.
WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the
decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present
occupants of the land as stated in the decision stands. (Emphasis supplied) 22
It is apparent, therefore, that since the order of June 21, 1971, was set aside, the
inescapable conclusion is that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 stands and
remains in the name of Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. Consequently, the
defendants therein never acquired title to the property covered by the title of
Haberer. And, since respondent Navarro merely derives his supposed title to the
properties as a mere transferee, with more reason can he not validly become the
owner of the above properties.
3. Respondent intransigently relies on his contract for legal services executed with
his clients, the defendants in the Haberer case, as another basis of his claim of
ownership over the entire property covered by Decree No. 1425. It must be noted
that the said contract was executed pursuant to the ejectment cases filed against

respondent Navarro's clients which involve only the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 containing an aggregate area of 12,700 square meters,
more or less. It appears that the defendants assigned rights to respondent Navarro
over properties which they did not actually occupy and which virtually extended to
all the properties covered by titles issued under Decree No. 1425. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, said defendants have not presented any
document evidencing their ownership of the parcels of land they assigned to their
lawyer.
From the foregoing considerations, it is incontrovertible that respondent's pretended
ownership rights over the parcels of land covered by Decree No. 1425 have no bases
whatsoever, either in fact or in law, and it is an assault on credulity to assume that
he was not aware of the vacuity of his pretensions and misrepresentations.
In resolving this disbarment case, we must perforce initially focus on the degree of
integrity and respectability required and expected of the law profession. There is no
denying that membership in the legal profession is achieved only after a long and
laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability the attorney acquires a fixed
means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that the
emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social
prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same
by reason of the fact that everyone is deemed an officer of the court. 23
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been judiciously
stated by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in this wise:
On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and
the prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought
not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely
desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its
harmony with the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling
power, some discretion, ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment,
but it must be exercised. 24
In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose
of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of
livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the public from the
misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the proper administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence. 25 Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly
with his client and to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has
proven him unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney. 26
As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges until the contrary is proved, and that, as an officer of the court, he has
performed his duty in accordance with his oath. 27 Therefore, in disbarment
proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant 28, and for the court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. 29
We have painstakingly scrutinized and evaluated the records of these two
administrative cases and we cannot but find that strong and unassailable evidence
exist to render it our irremissible duty to impose the ultimate sanction of disbarment
on respondent.
Respondent's defense is anchored primarily on the contract for legal services,
executed by his clients whom he represented in the twenty-two ejectment cases
filed before Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, and
quoted in full in the earlier part of this discussion.
It is extremely relevant to note that both of the aforesaid two branches of the trial
court made no finding as to the validity of the claim of ownership favorable to the
defendants therein. On the contrary, Judge Salas of Branch I found for the plaintiff
and ordered the defendants, clients of respondent, to vacate the premises.

In the case before Judge Navarro of Branch II, the complaint was dismissed merely
on the ground that "since the evidence is uncontroverted that the defendants in all
these eleven cases have been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of their
respective parcels dating back since their predecessors in interest, their possession
must be maintained and respected. 30
Thereafter, on June 21, 1971, the aforesaid judgment of dismissal dated May 26,
1971 was modified, and the Register of Deeds was thereafter ordered to cancel the
transfer certificate of title issued in favor of plaintiff and to issue new titles in the
name of defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of herein
respondent in accordance with the contract for legal services hereinbefore
discussed.
Eventually, however, this subsequent order was reconsidered and set aside in the
order of September 15, 1972, "because it has the effect of adversely affecting the
interest of Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, which is not even a party herein," but it
reinstated the decision of May 26, 1971 insofar as it denied the ejectment of the
present occupants.
As earlier noted, there is nothing in the records to show that the defendants in the
ejectment cases were declared the true owners of the land subject of said cases.
Only the fact of possession was ruled upon, and what the courts recognized was
merely the defendants' right of possession. They, therefore, never become the
owners of the subject lots in any sense of the word in the absence of any declaration
to that effect, by reason of which they could not have legally transmitted any
ownership rights or interests to herein respondent. Furthermore, we have seen that
any further claim of ownership on their part was finally settled by the order of
September 15, 1972, setting aside the order of June 21, 1971, wherein the trial court
correctly held that the earlier order unjustifiedly affected adversely the rights of
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership. In addition, said court specifically excluded
the title of said partnership from the effects of its decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal services, the defendants-clients
agreed to convey to respondent whatever properties may be adjudicated in their
favor in the event of their failure to pay the attorney's fees agreed upon. As
hereinbefore stated, there was nothing awarded to the said defendants except the
right to possess for the nonce the lots they were occupying, nothing more. That
respondent acquired no better right than the defendants from whom he supposedly
derived his claim is further confirmed in the order of Judge Navarro, dated June 21,
1971, denying the issuance of new certificates of title to herein respondent who, to
further stress the obvious, was not even a party but only a lawyer of the defendants
therein. It follows that his act of selling the Ortigas properties is patently and
indisputably illegal.
Respondent admits that he has no Torrens title but insists on the puerile theory that
his title is his contract of legal services. 31 Considering that the effectivity of the
provisions of that contract is squarely premised on the award of said properties to
the therein defendants, and since there was no such adjudication, respondent's
pretense is unmasked as an unmitigated deception. Furthermore, it will be recalled
that the land involved in the two ejectment cases consists of only 1.2 hectares
whereas respondent is claiming ownership over thousands of hectares of land, the
sheer absurdity of which he could not be unaware.
Respondent further admits that he has been and is continuously selling, up to the
present, the entirety of the land covered by Decree No. 1425 32 pursuant to the
decision of Branch XV of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, dated March 31,
1970, declaring the said decree null and void as well as the titles derived therefrom.
It must nonetheless be remembered that the decision of Judge Navarro recognizing
the defendants' right of possession is subject to the final outcome of the March 31,
1970 decision of Branch XV which nullified Decree No. 1425. The latter decision, at
the time the decision of Judge Navarro was rendered, was pending appeal. This is
precisely the reason why Judge Navarro had to amend his decision a third time by
setting aside the order of registration of the land in the name of the defendants. He

could not properly rule on the ownership rights of defendants therein pending a final
determination of the validity of said decree, which thus prompted him to find merely
on the fact of possession. Besides, a mere declaration of nullity cannot, per se justify
the performance of any act of ownership over lands titled in the name of other
persons pursuant to said decree. To cap it all, as earlier discussed, that decision
dated March 31, 1970 has been reversed and set aside, and a new one entered
confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, which latter decision has long become
final and executory.
In Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership vs. Navarro,"
herein respondent was enjoined from selling, offering for sale and advertising
properties of the plaintiff therein. We have seen that a decision was subsequently
rendered therein on December 16, 1972 by Branch XVI of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal upholding the validity of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name
of Ortigas and Co., Limited Partnership which became final and executory after
respondent's petition for review was denied by this Court. However, respondent
continued to sell properties belonging to Ortigas in blatant disregard of said
decision. This was categorically admitted by respondent himself during the
investigation
conducted
by
the
Solicitor
General. 33
Respondent avers that the said decision cannot be enforced during the pendency of
the appeal therefrom. Even if this were true, the fact that respondent was enjoined
by the court from selling portions of the Ortigas properties is compelling reason
enough for him to desist from continuing with his illegal transactions.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General:
Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge Vivencio Ruiz declaring as null
and void certificates of titles emanating from Decree No. 1425 was reversed and set
aside. He knew that Judge Pedro Navarro of the Rizal Court of First Instance
exempted Ortigas & Company from the effects of his decision. He also knew that
Judge Sergio Apostol of the Rizal Court of First Instance in Quezon City had upheld
the validity of the certificates of title of Ortigas & Company. Despite all these
pronouncements and his awareness thereof, respondent NAVARRO still continued to
sell properties titled in the name of Ortigas & Company and the Madrigals. 34
Lastly, the motion to dismiss filed by respondent should be, as it is hereby, denied
for lack of merit. Respondent inexplicably posits that the charges against him should
be dismissed on the ground that his suspension was automatically lifted by virtue of
our resolution, dated June 30, 1980, which merely reads:
The manifestation of counsel for respondent stating among other things that the
complaint against respondent could not prosper if respondent's manifestation dated
March 3, 1980 in G.R. No. L-42699-42709 and his request for certification by the
Chief Justice to the effect that the petition in G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709 is deemed
dismissed pursuant to Sec. 11(2) of Art. X of the Constitution are granted, are
NOTED.
There is absolutely nothing in the resolution to support respondent's typical
distortion of facts. On the contrary, our resolutions dated September 2, 1980,
November 8, 1980, and January 22, 1981 repeatedly denied respondent's motions
for the lifting of his suspension.
It further bears mention at this juncture that despite the suspension of respondent
Navarro from the practice of law, he continues to do so in clear violation and open
defiance of the original resolution of suspension and the aforestated resolutions
reiterating and maintaining the same. Thus, the records of this Court disclose that in
G.R. No. L-78103, entitled "Jose de Leon, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," a Second
Division case filed on April 25, 1987, counsel for private respondents therein
questioned herein respondent Navarro's personality to intervene in the case since he
was under suspension, to which respondent Navarro rejoined by insisting that his
suspension had allegedly been lifted already. In G.R. No. 85973, entitled "Hilario
Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the petition wherein was filed on December 2,
1988 and assigned to the First Division, respondent Navarro also appeared as

counsel for therein petitioner. Said petition was denied since the same was
prepared, signed and verified by respondent Navarro, a suspended member of the
Philippine Bar. Over his expostulation that his suspension had already been lifted,
the Court directed the Bar Confidant to take appropriate action to enforce the same.
Again, in G.R. No. 90873, entitled "Matilde Cabugwang et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.," the Second Division, in a resolution dated January 31, 1990, imposed a fine of
P1,000.00 upon said respondent for appearing therein as counsel for petitioner
which fine he paid on February 5, 1990.
In at least three (3) other cases in the Second Division, respondent Navarro
appeared before the Court as counsel for petitioners therein, viz: (1) G.R. No. L74792 (Lorenzo Valdez, et al., vs Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.), filed on June
11,
1986
and
decided
on
December
7,
1986;
(2)
G.R.
No.
L-76589 (Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), filed on
November 28, 1986 and decided on May 4,1987; and (3) G.R. No. 81482 (Ricardo
Rasalan vs. Flaviano Pascua, et al.), filed on January 30, 1988 and decided on
February 15, 1988. The rollos in said cases show that he also appeared as counsel
for the petitioners in the Court of Appeals, but since the lower courts' original
records were not forwarded to this Court, said rollos do not reflect whether he also
appeared before the different courts a quo.
Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to lawful orders of
constituted authority and illustrate his incorrigible despiciency for an attorney's duty
to society. Verily, respondent has proven himself unworthy of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by law and by this Court, through his deliberate rejection
of his oath as an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be
furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread
on the personal records of respondent. This resolution is immediately executory.
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda,
a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the
practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17
October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several
pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission
basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and
return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in
February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which
then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated
16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984
also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the
amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after
their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders
Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of
dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring
of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms.
Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358;
and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases
Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court
rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:

(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and

(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and
sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in
Criminal Case No. 8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 8538360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 8538361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the
practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the
conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar,
and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is
hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her
profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections
27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must be
forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED. 1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted
respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to
the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent
filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action
respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17
October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of the period for filing
a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the
Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she
posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review
on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the
reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty
aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's
action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been
motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of
the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not
violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she
issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to
complainant Ms. Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of
Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the
offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects
public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez, 2 the Court explained the
nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its

deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by the law. The
law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against
public order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest. 3 (Italics supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had
been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance.
The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from
practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the
Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit
and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it
certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of
such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of
good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an
admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law. 5
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders
from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant
and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent.
G.R. No. L-47431
December 19, 1940
In the matter of the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis, deceased.
CONCORDIA CUEVAS ( alias CONCORDIA ABESAMIS), executrix-appellant,
vs.PEDRO ABESAMIS, 2. o ET AL., oppositors-appellees.
Villasan,
Valenton
and
Santiago
for
appellant.
Angel Cecilio for appellees.
LAUREL, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dated
May 27, 1937, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, the court sustains the opposition to the approval of the amended project
of partition presented by the executrix and hereby orders the latter to present
another inventory and another project of partition which shall include only the

property adjudicated to the defendants in the final decision of this court in case No.
4816, consisting of only one-eight (1/8) of the three parcels of land described in the
will of the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis.
On February 11, 1928, Crescenciano Cuevas submitted for probate in the court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija the last will and testament of her deceased natural
father, Crescenciano Abesamis, which bequeathed three parcels of land, one share
of stock in the "Gallera de Pearanda" of a par value of P100, and two carabaos
worth P100 to Concordia Cuevas ( alias Concordia Abesamis), Francisco Abesamis,
Perpetua Abesamis, Isaias Abesamis and Pedro Abesamis in the manner and under
the conditions stated therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
On March 15, 1928, however, Pedro Abesamis and twenty-five others entered their
opposition to the distribution of the properties described in the will, for the reason
that "a que dichos bienes son de propiedad pro indiviso entre los aqui opositores y la
testamentaria," and simultaneously informed the court that they had commenced an
action for the partition of said properties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
On May 14, 1928, the will was admitted to probate and Concordia Cuevas was
appointed executrix with a bond of P1,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
On May 13, 1928, Pedro Abesamis and the other oppositors did institute civil case
No. 4816 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against the estate of
Crescenciano Abesamis, Concordia Nuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias Abesamis
for the partition, alleging that said properties belonged, in the first instance, to
Anacleto Mercado, their common causante, who entrusted them to Crescenciano
Abesamis with the understanding that they were not to be subdivided as long as the
minor children of her other deceased son, Teodorico Abesamis, were living with the
Crescenciano. A demurrer interposed by the defendants on the ground that there
was another pending action involving the same subject matter was sustained after
which the plaintiffs were required to amend their complaint, the amendment
consisting simply in eliminating therefrom the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis and
leaving as party defendants Concordia Cuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias
Abesamis. As these defendants failed to answer the amended complaint, they were
declared in default and , on July 3, 1930, judgment was rendered adjudicating seveneights (7/8) of the properties in favor of the plaintiffs and the other one-eight (1/8)
for the defendants. On February 7, 1931, the court ordered the commissioners of
partition to declare as sole heiress Concordia Cuevas to the exclusion of Francisco
and Isaias Abesamis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On March 3, 1931, the partition commissioners submitted their report, upon which
the court declared that "no hay lugar a aprobar por ahora el informe de los
comisionados partidores hasta que se haya verificado la particion en dicha
testamentaria en la cual pueden las partes de esta causa hacer valer los derechos
que pudieran tener sobre los terrenos en cuestion." A motion for reconsideration
having been denied on September 15, 1932, plaintiffs, on February 14, 1934, moved
for the approval of the project of partition filed by the commissioners . On February
26, 1934, the court ordered the suspension of the approval of the partition of the
properties
until
the
termination
of
the
testamentary
proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On January 9, 1937, Concordia Cuevas presented to the probate court a partition
plan adjudicating the three lots and the two carabaos in favor of the legatees
mentioned in the will. This was rejected by the court for the reason that it was not in
conformity with the inventory of the estate and the decision in civil case No. 4816.
On January 26, 1937, the executrix submitted an amended inventory and later
another project of partition distributing the properties of the estate in accordance
with the terms of the will, which were objected by the defendants, because these
included their legitimate shares under the decision in civil case No. 4816. The
opposition was upheld by the court in kits decision of May 27, 1937, the dispositive

part
of
which
is
quoted
in
the
beginning
of
this
opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The executrix-appellant assigns the following errors:
1. The court erred in not holding that the decision in civil case No. 4816 of the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, declaring that the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis
is entitled only to one-eight (1/8) of the property described in the will, is a nullity and
can
not
bind
the
estate
of
Crescenciano
Abesamis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2. The court erred in not approving the amended project of partition presented by
the executrix on February 8, 1937, and in not distributing the estate of the deceased
Crescenciano
Abesamis
according
to
the
provision
of
the
will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
3. The court erred in not finding that it has no jurisdiction as a probate court to
decide the question of ownership of the property involved in these proceedings part
of which is claimed by the oppositors to be their property not by virtue of any right
of inheritance from the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis but by title adverse to that
of the deceased and his estate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
4. The court erred in not holding that the oppositors have no personality to object to
the project of partition presented by the executrix on February 8, 1937, which was
drafted in accordance with the provision of the will of the deceased Crescenciano
Abesamis.
Under the first assignment of error, appellant impugns the validity of the decision of
the lower court in civil case No. 4816 declaring that the legatees here, defendants in
that action, are entitled only to one-eight of the property on the ground that the
estate of Crescenciano Abesamis was not a party in said proceeding. It should be
noted that all the coheirs, except Perpetua Abesamis, were defendants therein, and
that by order of the court, in its instructions to the partition commissioners dated
February 7, 1931, the herein executrix-appellant was pronounced by the sole heiress
of the deceased. As said defendants were declared in default and are, to be sure,
bound by the decision in that case, we are of the opinion that the appellant cannot
now be permitted to assail its virtuality not to regard it as totally ineffectual against
the testate estate. The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the
moment of death(article 657, Civil Code), and where, as in this case the heir is of
legal age and the estate is not burdened with any debts, said heir immediately
succeeds, by force of law, to the dominio n, ownership and possession of the
properties of his predecessor, and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the
latter. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Dais vs. Court of First Instance of
Capiz, 51 Phil., 396.) In the absence of a special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate, there is no necessity of a previous declaration of status and the heir or heirs
can sue and be sued in that capacity (Arsenio de Vera et al. vs. Cleotilde Galauran,
37 Off. Gaz., 1821). This disposes likewise of the second assignment of
error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
With reference to the third assignment of error, it should be observed that the
oppositors instituted a separate action (civil case No. 4816) for the partition of the
properties described in the will of Crescenciano Abesamis. No question of ownership,
therefore, was in fact determined in the testamentary proceedings (civil case No.
4797) by the probate court. It results that when, on February 8, 1937, the court
disapproved the project partition filed by the executrix, it did not decide adverse
claims of proprietorship but only lent force and effect to the decision rendered in
civil case No. 4816.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under the fourth and last assignment of errors, it is vigorously contended that only
heirs or legatees may present an opposition, and that only inasmuch as the
oppositors-appellees are not heirs or legatees, they have no legal personality to
object to the approval of the project of partition. By virtue of the judgment in civil
case No. 4816 adjudicating seven-eights of the property in their favor, the herein
oppositors had the right to oppose any project of partition which, in effect, would

divest them of their right of ownership. To conclude otherwise would be to permit

the
executrix
to
enrich
herself
at
the
expense
of
the
oppositors.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
A.C. No. 190
September 26, 1964
MARCOS
MEDINA,
complainant,
vs.
LORETO U. BAUTISTA, Respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:chanrobles virtual law library
In a complaint filed on September 15, 1954, Marcos Medina charged
respondent Atty. Loreto U. Bautista with the commission of certain acts constituting
malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. To this complaint
respondent filed an answer on October 19, 1954. The case was referred to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. This official in turn
referred the case to the provincial fiscal of Cagayan for investigation and report.
Later after the reception of the corresponding evidence, the Solicitor General
submitted his report to this Court finding respondent guilty of the acts of malpractice
complained of and recommending his disbarment. Together with this report he
submitted a complaint formally charging respondent with acts constituting the
alleged malpractice as found in his investigation with the prayer that the name of
respondent
be
stricken
off
from
the
roll
of
attorneys.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A copy of this formal complaint was served on respondent so that he may
answer it if he so desires in accordance with the rules. Thereupon, he answered the
complaint denying the material allegations thereof and praying that it be dismissed.
He, however, also prayed that he be allowed to introduce additional evidence. This
was allowed and the case was set for hearing. The first hearing was set on May 4,
1964, which, by agreement of the parties was postponed to June 22, 1964. On this
last date, however, no hearing was held, and so it was again postponed to July 22,
1964. And having neither respondent nor his counsel appeared on the last date set,
complainant and his counsel submitted additional evidence consisting of several
decisions of the Court of Appeals showing that respondent was found guilty of
estafa.
Thereafter,
the
case
was
submitted
for
decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It appears that sometime in 1953, Maria Ragsac Cabel filed a complaint for
reconveyance of a parcel of land before the Court of First Instance of Cagayan
against complainant Marcos Medina. In the early of January, 1954, complainant
Medina approached the plaintiff seeking a compromise of the case. Plaintiff told him
to see her lawyer Loreto Bautista, respondent herein, whereupon he went to see the
latter in his office at Aparri, Cagayan. Respondent demanded P500.00 as a
consideration for the amicable settlement, and as complainant had no ready cash
then, he asked to be allowed to pay the same in small installments paying on that
occasion the sum of P35.00. Respondent agreed and thereupon prepared a motion
for an extension of time to file his answer in the case. Complainant returned to his
hometown.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
One month later, complainant received an order declaring him in default and
so he went to respondent to ask him why in spite of their agreement he was
declared in default. Respondent assured him that he had nothing to worry about,
and on that occasion respondent again asked for P50.00 which then and there
complainant gave. Before complainant left respondent told him to look for more
money.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It turned out that respondent opposed his own motion for an extension of time
to file an answer for, in lieu thereof, he filed a motion to declare complainant in
default. Consequently, a decision was rendered detrimental to complainant since the

court allowed plaintiff to repurchase the property in litigation for the sum of
P1,200.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On March 2, 1954, complainant again went to the office of respondent in Luna,
Mt. Province apparently with the purpose of having the papers for the amicable
settlement of the case prepared, but on this occasion respondent prepared two
documents, Exhibits C and D, wherein, on one hand, it was made to appear that
Maria Ragsac Cabel sold the property to complainant in consideration of the sum of
P8,000.00 and, on the other, the latter reconveyed the same property to the former
for the sum of P1,200.00. Both documents were witnessed by respondent. Both
documents were also found to be fictitious in the sense that the considerations
mentioned therein were never received. Maria Ragsac Cabel was asked by
respondent to sign Exhibit C without knowing its contents upon the assurance that it
was
necessary
in
order
that
she
could
recover
the
land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Sometime later, complainant received a letter from Atty. Bienvenido Jimenez,
co-counsel of respondent in the civil case, requesting him to bring the title of the
property pursuant to the decision of the court, and complying with this request
complainant went to see Atty. Jimenez but instead of bringing the title he showed
him the document which he was made to sign purporting to be a deed of sale by
Maria Ragsac Cabel in his favor of the property for the consideration of P8,000.00.
Atty. Jimenez asked Mrs. Cabel if she received the amount mentioned therein, which
she denied. Instead Mrs. Cabel told Atty. Jimenez that she had given P800.00 to
respondent to be deposited in court with the understanding that said respondent
would raise the additional P400.00 to complete the sum of P1,200.00 which was
fixed by the court as the consideration of the reconveyance of the property. After
inquiry, Atty. Jimenez found that there was no such amount deposited in court, and
in order to correct the wrong generated by the two fictitious documents, Atty.
Jimenez prepared another document embodying the terms of the amicable
settlement which they agreed would be submitted in the civil case. This settlement
having been carried out, it put an end to the controversy. According to complainant,
he
paid
all
in
all
to
respondent
the
sum
of
P500.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
From the foregoing narration, the following facts are deemed to have been
established: (1) respondent after agreeing with complainant to settle the case
amicably prepared a motion for extension of time to file an answer, but instead he
filed a motion to declare the latter in default; (2) being fully aware of the decision
rendered in the civil case, respondent prepared two fictitious deeds of sale in the
sense that the consideration in either was never in fact received; (3) pretending to
arrange an amicable settlement of the case, respondent received on different
occasions from complainant several sums totalling P500.00. (4) respondent, taking
advantage of the ignorance of his client Maria Ragsac Cabel, ask her to sign a
document wherein it was made to appear that she received P8,000.00 when in truth
and in fact she did not receive said amount; and (5) respondent received from his
client Mrs. Cabel the amount of P800.00 with the understanding that the amount
was to be deposited in court for the repurchase of the property, but instead of
depositing it he misappropriated the money. These facts constitute malpractice and
conduct unbecoming a member of the bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
In addition, the record shows that in CA-G.R. No. 18560-R, respondent was
convicted of estafa and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 4
months ofarresto mayor to 1 year and 1 day of prision correccional, with the
accessories of the law, and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P800.00,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. And in CA-G.R. No. 21796-R, the
Court of Appeals made the following derogatory comment against respondent:
A lengthy discourse of the relationship of attorney and client need not be
indulged in. Suffice it to say that a lawyer should be scrupulously careful in handling
money entrusted to him in his professional capacity. A high degree of fidelity and

good faith on his part is exacted. (Alindogan v. Gerona Adm. Case No. 221, May 21,
1958). Here, appellee (herein respondent Bautista) violated the trust. He was bound
to deposit the P800.00 in court. But he did not; he converted it to his own use and
benefit to the damage of appellant. Indeed, he was convicted of estafa. Not only
that. The confidence reposed in him by appellant was once again infringed when he
lent his signature to Exhibits 2 and 3 which he knew to be spurious. Upon these
documents, appellant - for nothing - lost the land already won in court. She had to
compromise with the defeated suitor. But she got the very short end of the bargain.
And yet, appellee had the temerity to come to court for attorney's fees. Good morals
and sound public policy bar the portals of justice to him. Guilty of fraud on one count
and bad faith on another, he has forfeited all legal claims for services in procuring
the judgment in Case No. 634-A of the Cagayan Court (6 C.J. 725; C.J.S. 1025; 5 Am.
Jur. 363; Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2nd Ed. [1961], p. 99).
There is no question that the crime of estafa is one which involves moral
turpitude within the purview of Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, respondent Loreto U. Bautista is hereby disbarred and, as a
consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys.
A.C. No. 350
August 7, 1959
In re: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Emerito M. Salva for the
Government.
Dalmacio de los Angeles and Luis F. Gabinete for respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a
final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals and was sentenced to two (2) years,
four (40 months, and one (1) day of destierro, and to pay a fine of P2,300, with
subsidiary destierro in case of insolvency (CA-G.R. No. 11411-R), and under section
1, Rule 128, of the Rules of Court, he was required to show cause why he should not
be disbarred from the practice of his profession.
In his written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of this Court
considering that he has six children to support the eldest being 16 years old and the
youngest 4 years who will bear the stigma of dishonor if disciplinary action be taken
against him. He made manifest to this Court that if he ever committed what is
attributed to him, it was merely due to an error of judgment which he honestly and
sincerely deplores.
Under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed from his office as
attorney if he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude the reason behind
this rule being that the continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite
condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in the practice of law with the
result that the loss of such qualification justifies his disbarment (Mortel vs. Aspiras
100 Phil., 586; 53 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 628). And since bribery is admittedly a felony
involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it
sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment
as ordained by section 25 of Rule 127.
It is therefore ordered that respondent be removed from his office as attorney and
that his name be stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered.
A.M. No. 689-MJ April 13, 1978
FELIX
vs.
MUNICIPAL
JUDGE
PEDRO
Quezon, respondent.
A.M. No. 809-MJ April 13, 1978
BENJAMIN
H.
vs.

LEYNES, complainant,
D.

VELOSO

of

General

Nakar,

VIRREY, complainant,

MUNICIPAL
JUDGE
Quezon, respondent.

PEDRO

D.

VELOSO

of

General

Nakar,

AQUINO, J:
For having illicit relations with a concubine under scandalous circumstances in a
house located at the poblacion of General Nakar, Quezon, Pedro D. Veloso, the
municipal judge of that town, was charged by Atty. Benjamin H. Virrey with
immorality in public office (Complaint dated October 23, 1974, p. 10, Rollo of
Administrative Matter No. 809- MJ).
Judge Veloso, who is now sixty-eight years old and who was admitted to the bar in
1938, started his judicial career in 1946 as a justice of the peace of Infanta, Quezon.
Since 1950, he has been functioning as the incumbent judge of General Nakar.
The respondent contracted marriage with Ligaya Veluz at the parish church of
Infanta on October 24, 1955. Curiously enough, that was the date (one day after his
46th birthday) when he suffered serious injuries in a vehicular accident at Infanta
and when he was brought by plane to Manila and admitted to the V. Luna General
Hospital at six- thirty in the evening.
Apparently, Judge Veloso married Ligaya Veluz when he had already begotten three
children. (In his personal reference sheet of September 10, 1947, he indicated that
he was married with two children named Linda and Nonong but he did not mention
his wife's name. In his information sheet for GSIS insurance dated November 9, 1960
he named his children as Ulpiano, Evangelina and Asuncion, twelve, ten and six
years old, respectively. Again, he did not state his wife's name. See pages 7 and 58
of his personal record).
The respondent admits that the thirty-seven-year old Gloria Tropicales (his alleged
housemaid) is his mistress. Out of their union, two children, named Juana and Paulo,
were born in 1970 and 1972 when the respondent was already a sex-agenarian. *
Respondent Judge, invoking "the interest of justice" and article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code, prays for the dismissal of the immorality charge on the ground that his
wife, Rosario V. Veluz (she is named Ligaya in the marriage certificate), condoned his
acts of concubinage, as shown in her affidavit of November 21, 1974. In that
affidavit, she unabashedly stated that, because her husband's thighbone was broken
in a vehicular accident in 1955, she chose Gloria Tropicales to serve her husband,
like a real wife ("upang paglingkuran ang aking asawa na ang gagawin niyang
paglilingkod ay parang tunay na asawa"). She gave the assurance that she would
not prosecute their offspring.
The respondent also presented to the Investigating Judge the affidavit dated March
5, 1976 of complainant Virrey wherein the latter withdrew his complaint for
immorality (on the condition that he would not incur any liability) because he was
convinced that Mrs. Veloso hired her husband's mistress to take care of him (Exh. A).
Respondent's counsel in his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument scheduled
before the Court en banc on December 9, 1976 made the preposterous contention
that the respondent should be exonerated because there was no evidence presented
against him since the complainant did not appear at the hearing.
Respondent and his counsel should know that since he had admitted the commission
of concubinage, that charge is conclusively established and it does not have to be
proven anymore. His admission is a confession (Sec. 2, Rule 129 and secs. 22 and
29, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
We hold that Judge Veloso should be dismissed by reason of his immoral conduct.
His moral delinquency renders him unfit for the office of municipal judge and
warrants his removal from office (Sec. 97, Judiciary Law).
A lawyer, of course, should have good moral character. He may be disbarred for
grossly immoral conduct or when he is convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude such as concubinage (Secs. 2 and 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court; In re Isada,
60 Phil. 915).
If good moral character is required of a lawyer, with more reason that requirement
should be exacted of a member of the judiciary who at all times is expected to

observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public decency (Canon
3 of Judicial Ethics, Administrative Order No. 162 of the Secretary of Justice, August
1, 1946. 42 O.G. 1803).
Judge Veloso, in relying on his wife's condonation of his immorality, erroneously
confounded or equated the extinction of his criminal liability with his moral fitness to
occupy the position of town magistrate. While the moral stigma connected with
concubinage may be tolerated in a private person by those who are not fastifious, it
is intolerable when the concubinage is committed by a judge and even if the spouse
of the judge allegedly condones the offense. (See marital disqualification rule in
section 20, Rule 130, Rules of Court; Ordoo vs. Daquigan, L-39012, January 31,
1975,
62
SCRA
270,
272-3).
A judge suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality in public
office when he labors under the delusion that he can be a judge and at the same
time have a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the
community. The absence of criminal liability does not preclude disciplinary action by
reason of his highly unconventional and censurable behavior.
Nor does the withdrawal by complainant Virrey of his charge render the
administrative case moot. This Court maymotu proprio investigate a judge for his
continuing, grossly immoral conduct.
Felix Leynes, who complained against Judge Veloso for acquitting Ricardo Pujeda and
Esperidion Pujeda of the charge of having assaulted his son, Juancho Leynes
(Criminal Case No. 872), adopted the charge of immorality withdrawn by Virrey.
According to Leynes's counsel, the respondent lives with his concubine in a house
just across the municipal hall and plaza. Leynes posed a rhetorical question: how
can the inhabitants of a town have confidence in the administration of justice by an
immoral judge who himself violates the law? (p. 326, Rollo of Administrative Matter
No. 489- MJ).
In view of the result arrived at in this case, it becomes unnecessary to make any
adjudication on the charge of Leynes that Judge Veloso was guilty of partiality in the
disposition of Criminal Case No. 872 and the other charges of Virrey imputing to the
respondent malicious delay in the administration of justice, misconduct in office,
neglect of duty and failure to hear, try and decide Election Case No. 8.
WHEREFORE, respondent Veloso is removed from the office as municipal judge. His
application for disability retirement is disapproved.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 407
August 15, 1967
IN RE ATTORNEY JOSE AVANCEA, respondent.
J.
Gonzales
and
Orense
for
respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General for complainant.
ANGELES, J.:
On January 12, 1951, the Supreme Court entered a resolution as follows:
In Administrative Case No. 407, In re Atty. Jose Avancea, it appearing that
respondent was convicted in criminal case No. 10220 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Jose Avancea, of the crime of
falsification of public document under Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and that
in the decision rendered to that effect the Court has found that said respondent has
taken advantage of the law profession in committing said crime to defraud his
clients, the Court ordered that respondent be, as he is hereby, provisionally
suspended from the practice of law, pending final termination of the criminal case
No. 10220, now pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.
Jose Avancea, a member of the Bar, was charged with falsification of public
document before the Court of First Instance of Manila, in criminal case No. 10220.
After trial, he was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two years to six years of prision correccional, to pay a fine
of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the

costs. The trial court also found that he took advantage of the law profession in
committing the crime of falsification of public document to defraud his clients. A
copy of the decision was sent to the Supreme Court for whatever the action it may
deem appropriate to take in the premises. Conformably thereto, the Supreme Court
adopted the resolution hereinabove quoted.
From the decision of the lower court, Jose Avancea appealed to the Court of
Appeals. On February 28, 1962, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court.
On a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme
Court, the latter Court, on June 13, 1962, dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
On January 21, 1963, Jose Avancea was committed to prison at the National
Penitentiary.1wph1.t
On September 25, 1963, the President of the Philippines extended conditional
pardon to Jose Avancea.
On October 1, 1963, Jose Avancea was discharged from confinement.
In the decision of the trial court, the following is said:
The evidence on record conclusively establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt as the author of the falsification of the Power of Attorney (Exhibit
A), with grave abuse of confidence. The accused is a lawyer and has taken
advantage of the law profession in committing the crime of falsification of a public
document to defraud his clients. A lawyer of the type of the accused is a disgrace to
the law profession and should be disbarred.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals said:
A la vista de los datos expuestos el Juzgado cree y asi concluye que el apelante no
ha explicado satisfactoriamente como Ilego a su posesion el poder especial Exhibito
A; la presuncion es concluyente que aquel es el autor de la falsification de las firmas
de los hermanos Joa que aparecen en el poder especial Exhibito A. (People vs.
Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338).
La conclusion es, pues, que el apelante fue quien preparo el exhibito A; fue quien
falsifico las firmas de los hermanos Jao que aparecen en dicho document; y, fue
quien Ilevo dicho documento a la oficina del notario Tumblos para su ratificacion.
EN SU VIRTUD, habiendose probado fuera de toda duda racional la culpabilidad del
apelante, y la decision apelada estando de conformidad con las pruebas y la ley, la
misma se confirmation in toto, con las costas contra el apelante.
There can, therefore, be no doubt, that Jose Avancea has committed the crime of
falsification of public document against his clients with grave abuse of confidence,
having been found guilty thereof by final judgment of competent jurisdiction. His
acts amount to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office as an attorney, which
constitute grounds for removal from office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, not to mention conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral
turpitude.
The fact that the respondent was extended conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive is of no moment. Such conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of
the penal consequences of his act, but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment,
especially so when he is being disbarred on the ground of professional misconduct
for which he had been convicted by final judgment. (Cf. In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.)
Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered declaring Jose Avancea disbarred from the
practice of law, and striking his name from the roll of attorneys.
December 7, 1928
In re FELIPE DEL ROSARIO
Felipe
del
Rosario
City Fiscal Guevara for the Government.

in

his

own

behalf.

MALCOLM, J.:
The supplementary report on bar examination irregularities of the fiscal of the City
of Manila, dealing with the case of Felipe del Rosario, has been laid before the court

for consideration and action. It is recommended by the city fiscal that Felipe del
Rosario be ordered to surrender his certificate of attorney and that he be forever
prohibited from taking the bar examination. An answer to the report has been
permitted to be made, in which the court is asked to disapprove the report and to
direct the setting aside of the suspension to practice law by the respondent,
heretofore ordered by the court.
Felipe del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who failed for the second
time in 1925. He presented himself for the succeeding bar examination in 1926 and
again was unable to obtain the required rating. Then on March 29, 1927, he
authorized the filing of a motion for the revision of his papers for 1925 based on an
alleged mistake in the computation of his grades. The court, acting in good faith,
granted this motion, and admitted Felipe del Rosario to the bar, but with justices
dissenting. Subsequently, during the general investigation of bar examination
matters being conducted by the city fiscal, this case was taken up, with the result
that a criminal charge was lodged in the Court of First Instance of Manila against
Juan Villaflor, a former employee of the court and Felipe del Rosario. Villaflor pleaded
guilty to the information and was sentenced accordingly. Del Rosario pleaded not
guilty, and at the conclusion of the trial was acquitted for lack of evidence.
The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these
proceedings. The court is now acting in an entirely different capacity from that which
courts assume in trying criminal cases. It is asking a great deal of the members of
the court to have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the
illegal machinations culminating in the falsification of public documents, of which he
was the sole beneficiary. Indeed, the conviction of Juan Villaflor in itself
demonstrates that Felipe del Rosario has no legal right to his attorney's certificate.
While to admit Felipe del Rosario again to the bar examination would be tantamount
to a declaration of professional purity which we are totally unable to pronounce. The
practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it,
but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion.
The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely
enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the
Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to
clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold
himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar. (In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266;
People ex rel. Colorado Bar Association vs. Thomas [1906], 36 Colo., 126; 10 Ann.
Cas., 886 and note; People vs. Macauley [1907], 230 Ill., 208; Ex parte Wall [1882],
107 U. S., 265.)1awphi1.net
The recommendation contained in the special report pertaining to Felipe del Rosario
is approved, and within a period of ten days from receipt of notice, the respondent
shall surrender his attorney's certificate to the clerk of this court.
December 7, 1920
In re CARLOS S. BASA
Pedro
Guevara
for
respondent.
Attorney-General Feria for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment of Attorney Carlos
S. Basa.
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of
California and the Philippine Islands. Recently he was charged in the Court of Fist
Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found
guilt in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. del Rosario, Judge of First
Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven
months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was
affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court. 1
The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of

his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude . . ." The sole question presented,
therefore, is whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article
446 of the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude.
"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by
numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found which has decided the exact
question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral
turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and
the accepted rule of right conduct. (In reHopkins [1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard vs.
Lyon [1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)
When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be
taken by the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the
violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed
over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the
uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.
It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be
discharged from prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer for one year. So
ordered.lawphi1.net
A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981
MAGDALENA
T.
ARCIGA complainant,
vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.
AQUINO, J.:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment
of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of
grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her.
Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child,
Michael Dino Maniwang.
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City.
Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine
while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. They became
sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel
in January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month.
They renewed their relationship. After they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and
finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other
boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked
Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with
him, she jokingly said that she was in love with another man and that she had a
child with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he
did not mind because he loved her very much.
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his
acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued
his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters
and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and
Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that
they were married although they were not really so. Segundino convinced
Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed
the bar examinations. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a
marriage license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love
and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again
that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. He was not present

when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu
Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his
child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25,
1975. Several days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena also attended, he
stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was something amiss,
Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her that
they could not get married for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan.
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who
was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that their
marriage could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25,
1975. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she
had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the
commander of the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a
hospital (Exh. I and J).
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is
the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry
Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of Magdalena's shady past.
She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an
illegitimate child before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion,
respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of
marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is
required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character
and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court.
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the
continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining
membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when
a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have
moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
"grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies
that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be
the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became
pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six
children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified
(In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons
of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his
misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is
in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of
immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his
wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral
conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances.
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still
prevailed, observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the
ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not well

cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he
feels himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A
fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint" has become
general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following
cases:
(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia
C. Almirez, under promise of marriage, which he refused to fulfill, although they had
already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in consequence of their
sexual intercourse; he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy,
Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to
convince her to have an abortion to which she did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez,
Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs.
Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were
married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake
marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin,
106 Phil. 256).
(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with
another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to
disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil.
313).
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living
on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal
necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another
girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while
continuing to demand money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her and
persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his
perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs.
Simbol, 123 Phil. 450).
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer
Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside a
hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because, anyway,
they were going to get married. She used to give Puno money upon his request.
After she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her.
(Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was
single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina and his own son
Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in
this world. I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through
thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will
always be the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil.
586).
(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for
fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman separated from her husband,
seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a child.
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is
similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio
V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission
to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in
1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels.
On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar
nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that, because
of the close intimacy between the complainant and the respondent, she felt no
restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity.

According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long
intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against
Villanueva.
This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so
corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado,
Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs. Wong,
Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114
Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93
SCRA 91).
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for
disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 376
April 30, 1963
JOSEFINA
ROYONG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant
Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the
Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner described
therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all
the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3,
1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the
recommendation that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office
lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the
report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her
foster mother, left her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the
pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second
floor of the house the respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back.
Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand dragged her
to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the floor. She did
not shout for help because he threatened her and her family with death. He next
undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he
removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue
her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her
foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She
resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she
joined her foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual
intercourse she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8,
21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the
neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made
by the respondent; that she still frequented the respondent's house after August 5,
1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and
received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick
of influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles
left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3,
t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he
went to the Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as technical
assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the
administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of
March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).

The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant
from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered
by the complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction,
according to him, he limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her
tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual
intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second one
week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in
December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her
house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity. He intended
to marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster parents'
intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to
marry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.'
After the discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he
confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something
she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25,
1960).
xxx
xxx
xxx
FINDINGS AND COMMENT
There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the
complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him under circumstances
of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual
intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her
behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have been more a
sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in
conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia
Angeles to live maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted, and it
is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because of him. His own
evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous
relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could
not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in
her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was
accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage
which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook
her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of
his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an
uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a
sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not
difficult to see why she could not resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn
petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character"
(Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar
examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the
Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to
be. From 1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with
Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married
woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him
from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the Supreme Court in
1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year or
thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently
disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous
relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should be
sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double
standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for
disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
xxx
xxx
xxx

RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing,
respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer
and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent
did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the
Solicitor General formulated another complaint which he appended to his report,
charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for
admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living
adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with
the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of
public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and
praying that this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the
respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the
roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that
"the complaint does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said
complaint are different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and
that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of
the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for
additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the
additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties
were duly notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a
memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed,
alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no
act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or
fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his petition
for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a
member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1wph1.t
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife,
Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on
December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia AngelesRoyong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already
married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga,
Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24)
as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him she was
'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's
house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was married
and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she
was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were already living together as
'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when
they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2
months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she and
respondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later,
she left Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because
respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for
her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband
(Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 2829). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with
respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n.

35); in fact, she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court
Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date,
which request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the
respondent averring, among others, the following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant,
because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse
with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18 years of age;
that he had been living with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20
years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her
love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted
Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on
February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her sister,
Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date
(February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as commonlaw husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him,
but she confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was
still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a
stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter
had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to return
to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his expectations,
Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live
with him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was
ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed
not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman;
that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his
petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest
intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married
woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his petition, because he
did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be
stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good
moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he
was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he
filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court
Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1)
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit
relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts on
her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross
immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became
a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his
moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then
immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles,
a married woman. The investigators also recommended that the respondent be
disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent,
through his counsel of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April
30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument.
This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations
with the complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on
June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an
adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina
Royong the and the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are
sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment.

It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding

his illicit relations with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia
Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of
rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the
disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25,
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has
already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the
courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a
necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised
without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively
prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give
the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco,
Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well
settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making
power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the
accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar
instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general
powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be
removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where
from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of a fair private
and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the
rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its
loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that
as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be
disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or non-professional
activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this Court has been
toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from
office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as
to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44
Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most
apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth
birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur
criminal liability, as he himself declared and that he limited himself merely to
kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind,
which together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid
purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was
the niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her
who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took
advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis
(Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly
because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was
17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is
not difficult to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission
of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a person
who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done
without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid
of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute
sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the
ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with approval the
following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of
Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client,
as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the
qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good

moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege

to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during
the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an
attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession,
but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which
shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license
and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing
on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the
privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be
as the Solicitor General puts it recognizing "a double standard of morality, one
for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of
the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his
simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him
from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring
moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on
tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the
members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he
admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not
controlling. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency,
certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the
noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he
continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in
some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christian
charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost
13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means
he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the predicament he
found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with
her makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another
immoral act. The noblest means he could have employed was to have married the
complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous
relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous
relations with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned.
Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of
the legal profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of
an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to
possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority
in filing the present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it
charges an offense or offenses different from those originally charged in the
complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the evidence adduced at the
hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the
respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of
fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court
orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. If the
Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall
file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in
his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the
clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the
same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules
requires the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in

the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law
provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed against
the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by the
evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty
to file any case against the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced
during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself
at that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention is clearly
erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character.
Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective
reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people
think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to
practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of
him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known.
As has been said, ante the standard of personal and professional integrity which
should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such
conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v.
Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley,
82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the
time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia
Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his
status, did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that
his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a
member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent,
Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.
A.M. No. RTJ-92-904 December 7, 1993
DR.
NORBERT
L.
ALFONSO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MODESTO C. JUANSON, Branch 30, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, respondent.
Nicanor B. Padilla and Roberto A. Demigillo for complainant.
S.N. Barlongay and W.B. Lachica for respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On 15 September 1992, the complainant, a doctor of medicine by profession, filed
with this Court a sworn complaint charging the respondent with immorality and
violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. He accuses the respondent of maintaining
illicit sexual relations with his wife, Sol Dinglasan Alfonso. The complainant and his
wife were married on 10 December 1988 and their union bore them three children,
all boys, ages 3 years old, 2 years old, and 4 months old, respectively. He alleges
that their married life was peaceful and happy until the discovery of the sordid affair,
which came about in this manner:
Sometime in February 1991, the complainant received a phone call from the wife of
the respondent who informed him that Sol and her husband (respondent) have been
carrying on an affair and that she has in her possession the love letters of Sol which
she wants to show to the complainant. Although he did not believe the information
and even berated Mrs. Juanson for trying to ruin his family, he, nevertheless, told Sol
about it. Sol assured him of her love and concern for the family and claimed that the
respondent
was
just
a
client
of
her former office, the Banco Filipino (EDSA Cubao Branch). Two weeks later, Mrs.
Juanson called him again to inquire if he had received the photocopies of Sol's love
letters to the respondent. He again scolded Mrs. Juanson and told her not to call him

up anymore. On 12 June 1992, he and Sol left for the United States of America (USA)
for a vacation. He stayed there up to 19 July 1992; however, Sol returned ahead of
him on 10 July 1992. During his absence, specifically on 17 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson
called up his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso, and divulged to the latter the illicit affair
between the respondent and Sol. On 20 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson sent to Atty. Alfonso
photocopies of Sol's love letters to the respondent. During their pre-arranged
meeting on 25 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson delivered the original copies of Sol's alleged
letters
to
Atty. Alfonso who was accompanied by the complainant's sister, Celestine A. Barreto.
When Sol arrived in the Philippines on 10 July 1992, Atty. Alfonso decided to hire a
private investigating agency to undertake an inquiry on the alleged illicit affair
between Sol and the respondent. Through surveillance conducted by its private
investigators, the agency found that Sol had met with the respondent on 11 and 17
July 1992 at Unit 412-A of Citihomes at 130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, and that they stayed inside the unit for two to three hours.
Complainant further alleges that on 25 July 1992, five days after his arrival from the
USA, his sister Celestine told him about the illicit relationship between Sol and the
respondent. Celestine showed him the pictures taken by the private investigators
and the alleged love letters of Sol. In the evening of the said date, in the presence of
their respective parents, the complainant confronted Sol and showed her the proofs;
Sol still denied the affair and insisted that she was just discussing some business
with the respondent. Later, however, at about 1:30 a.m. in their house, Sol finally
admitted to having an illicit affair with the respondent since late 1983 when she was
an employee of Banco Filipino (EDSA Cubao Branch) and that before they left for the
USA, she met with the respondent at Unit 412-A Citihomes.
As a result of this revelation, the complainant sent his wife out of the house. He and
Sol have been living separately since 26 July 1992. He also subsequently discovered
from the statement of the billing from Pacific Bell for overseas calls which he and Sol
made while they were in the USA that on 17 and 25 June 1992 Sol had made calls to
the respondent's office at the Manila Regional Trial Court.
Complainant submits that the respondent is undeserving of the noble office of the
judiciary and prays that he be meted the appropriate administrative sanction for
immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.
In compliance with this Court's Resolution of 22 October 1992, the respondent filed
his Comment on 21 December 1992. He admits that he knows Sol and that "they
have been communicating with each other casually and innocently," but denies that
they are lovers and were having an illicit affair, that Sol has been sending love
letters to him, and that, except for the 11 and 17 July 1992 meetings, he and Sol had
been going to the apartment situated at 130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, and staying there for hours. He asserts that he came to know Sol sometime
in 1987 when she engaged his professional services in connection with five criminal
cases filed by her in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal and the in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig. In the course of their attorney-client relationship, Sol
sought legal advice from him and during those occasions they usually talked over
the phone and not in the office. In June 1992, he received an overseas call from Sol
who was then in the USA. Sol asked for advice concerning her problem with her
employer, the Security Bank and Trust Co. (Dau Central Branch). They agreed that
Sol would see him upon her return to the Philippines. On 11 July 1992, shortly after
her arrival from the USA, he ad Sol met at the aforementioned apartment, which was
leased not by the respondent but by Celestino Esteban. After discussing her
problem, with Celestino and two other persons present, he and Sol left the
apartment and took a late lunch at Fastfood, Robinson. He reassures the
complainant "that his wife has always been faithful to him and that he would do
nothing as would tarnish their warm relationship, much less destroy the
complainant's family."

On 4 May 1993, the Court referred the case to Associate Justice

Lourdes T. Jaguros of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Justice Jaguros conducted a full-blown investigation. At the hearings on 17, 18, 21
and 29 of June 1993 and 6, 8, 9 and 12 of July 1993, the parties submitted
testimonial and documentary evidence. On 4 October 1993, she submitted her
Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 1993. Pertinent portions of her
findings of facts read as follows:
As culled from the evidence of this case, Complainant Dr. Norbert L. Alfonso and Sol
Dinglasan were married at Sta. Ana Catholic Church on December 10, 1988 as
evidenced by a marriage contract (Exh. "N"). Three children were born of this
marriage, John Jason, three (3) years old, Jan Norbert, two (2) years old, and the
youngest Jan Joseph, four (4) months old. Complainant and his family lived a happy
and normal life with their Sundays spent on outings after the Sunday mass. (p. 9,
tsn, June 29, 1993).
In February, 1991, Complainant received phone calls from a woman introducing
herself as a concerned friend telling that complainant's wife is having an illicit affair
with her said woman caller's husband. Said caller did not identify herself but only
said she was in possession of love letters of complainant's wife Sol to said caller's
husband. After two weeks, said "concerned friend" called up the Complainant again
to ask him if he had received said caller's registered mail. Complainant after both
calls asked his wife Sol about her having an affair with another man, and in both
instances, Sol assured him of her love. Then the calls stopped for the rest of the year
1991 and early part of 1992 although Complainant noticed that his wife Sol used to
go out alone every Saturday.
On June 12, 1992, Complainant and his wife Sol went to the U.S.A. for a vacation but
the latter decided to return to Manila ahead of the former on July 10, 1992 (Exh.
"O"). Complainant followed in returning home only on July 19, 1992 (Exh. "O-1").
On July 25, 1992, Complainant was invited by his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso to his
sister Celestine Barreto's house, and there his father showed him five (5) love letters
written by Complainant's wife Sol with envelopes addressed to Atty. Modesto C.
Juanson (Exhs. "A" to "E" and submarking), and pictures taken by private
investigators of Complainant's wife and respondent Judge in company of each other
(Exhs. "F-5" to "F-22", "G-2" to "G-14"). Complainant recognized the handwriting of
his wife Sol in said love letters, specifically the GAIN memo pad paper used by Sol in
her love letter (Exh. "D") which is a prescription pad of Complainant to his patients.
Likewise, in the pictures, Complainant recognized his wife Sol holding a "Payless"
bag (Exh. "F-6") with the Respondent Judge holding the same bag later on (Exh. "F14"). In practically all the pictures, Complainant identified his wife Sol and the
respondent Judge. The Respondent Judge was no stranger to Complainant as the
latter knows said Judge personally. Said Judge is one of the best friends of
Complainant's parents-in-law and was even a sponsor in the wedding of
Complainant's sister-in-law. Both Complainant and Respondent Judge had met thrice
and talked with each other.
The five love letters, including a picture of the Respondent Judge (Exh. "K") were
handed to Complainant's father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso by a lady who introduced
herself, as Mrs. Ceferina Juanson in the presence of Complainant's sister, Celestine
Barreto. The three met at the front entrance of the Sto. Domingo Church, Quezon
Boulevard, Quezon City and proceeded to the City Diners Restaurant in the same
city where the three had a talk and where Mrs. Juanson handed to Atty. Alfonso the
five love letters with a picture, at about 10:30 to 11:30 a.m. in late June 1992. Prior
to said meeting on June 17, 1992, at about 11:00 a.m. a "concerned woman" had
called up Atty. Alfonso at his home and in the vernacular had said "Tinataihan ang
ulo ng anak mo ng babaeng iyan" referring to Complainant's wife. To clear Atty.
Alfonso's doubt, the woman promised to send proofs which Atty. Alfonso received by
LBC in a parcel containing the xerox copies of Complainant's wife's love letters to
Atty. Modesto C. Juanson.

After
the
meeting
with
the
lady
who
identified
herself
as
Mrs. Ceferina Juanson, Atty. Alfonso got an overseas call from Complainant that his
wife Sol was coming home to Manila earlier so that Atty. Alfonso engaged the
services of a private investigating agency, Truth Verifier System, Inc., to conduct
surveillance of the activities of Complainant's wife, Sol upon her arrival from the
U.S.A. Sol Alfonso did arrive on July 10, 1992, and on July 11 and 17, 1992, the Truth
Verifier System, Inc. through Marjorie Juinio and Edgardo Tamayo, licensed private
detectives conducted surveillance operation on Mrs. Sol Dinglasan and respondent
Judge Modesto Juanson. On said date of July 17, 1992, said private detectives
together with Raymond Tabangcura and Edgar Naquilla, saw, Sol Dinglasan Alfonso
go out of her house carrying a bag, take a tricycle and alight at Lamayan St., walk
towards Sta. Ana Church then board a taxicab. Following said taxicab, the taxi
stopped at City Homes, San Francisco Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Sol went
inside Unit 412-A Citihomes, and stayed inside for about three hours. Respondent
Judge Modesto Juanson came out first of said unit, wearing blue walking shorts and
light colored polo and carrying the plastic bag which Sol was seen carrying earlier,
and then followed by Sol. At around 1:00 p.m., the Respondent Judge and Sol were
inside said Respondent's Wrangler jeep on their way to Robinson Galeria at EDSA.
The two ate at Mongolian Restaurant and at Gusto Unico, then they proceeded to
Robinson's Supermarket. Inside the supermarket, Marjorie Juinio saw the Respondent
Judge put his arm on the shoulder of Sol, and they were also seen holding hands (pp.
23-26, tsn, June 21, 1993). Then the two, Respondent Judge and Sol boarded the
Wrangler jeep. At about 3:45 p.m., Sol alighted at the corner of Suter and Roxas
Streets and then boarded a tricycle while the jeep left. The formal report of the Truth
and
Verifier
System,
Inc.
has
been offered by Complainant as Exhibit "F-1" to "F-4" while the many pictures taken
of Respondent Judge and Sol were marked and offered as Exhibits "F-5" to "F-22".
The other team of the Truth Verifier System, Inc. led by Edgardo Tamayo practically
corroborated the findings of the Marjorie Juinio team. A formal report marked and
offered as Exhibit "G" to "G-1", and pictures taken of Respondent Judge and
Complainant's wife Sol marked and offered as Exhibits "G-2" to "G-14" were
presented before the Investigator.
Five days after the arrival of Complainant Dr. Norbert L. Alfonso, he was invited by
his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso to Norbert's sister's house in San Juan, Metro
Manila. In the house of Celestine Alfonso Barreto, Atty. Alfonso showed his son,
Norbert the love letters written by his wife Sol to Respondent Judge (Exhs. "A" to
"E"). Complainants recognized the handwritings of his wife Sol and even the GAIN
memo stationery which complainant was using as his prescription pad for his
patients (Exh. "D"). He recognized his wife Sol and Respondent Judge in the pictures
taken by the private detectives. On said day, Complainant Norbert Alfonso
experienced the greatest shock of his life and wondered what happened to his life.
His father, Atty. Alfonso, however, advised him not to hurt his wife Sol. In that same
party, Complainant showed Sol the pictures and the love letters which made Sol turn
pale and stammer when talking. Sol's own parents were embarrassed and walked
out of the party.
On
the
same
night
at
about
10
in
the
evening,
Complainant
Dr. Norbert Alfonso confronted his wife Sol as to the truth of her relationship with
Respondent Judge. Before the Investigator said Complainant made the following
testimony on direct examination:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. DEMIGILLO:
Q What else did your wife tell you during that confrontation, her exact words ?
xxx xxx xxx
A She took a deep breath again and told me, "Sweetheart, I am very, very, very
sorry, I made a mistake." I asked, "What mistake is that ?" She replied, "I had sexual
intercourse with the Judge."
xxx xxx xxx

Q What else, if any, happened during that confrontation?

A I asked my wife "How many times did you have sexual intercourse with the
Judge"?
Q Was there any response?
A She answered five times and then right away I said, "Putangina mo, five times
lang.Alam mo ba kung ilan beses kitang naganyan? Tarantado ka." With my voice
not so loud because the door and the windows were opened. If I shout the neighbors
will hear and then the yayas will go down right away.
Q What was your wife doing at that time?
A My wife was crying and saying, "Sweetheart, I am very, very sorry. Forgive me."
She was kneeling before me and begging forgiveness. "Forgive me, sweetheart, I
love you."
I told my wife, "you do not love me, you love your stupid Judge."
Q Is there anything else that you discussed during that confrontation aside from the
admission?
A After that admittance of my wife having sexual relationship with the Judge,
reminiscing the past events when we were together I told my wife, "That's why pala
every Saturday umaalis ka dito. Sinong pinupuntahan mo?" And definitely, she
admitted to me, "To the Judge." (pp. 35-41, tsn, June 29, 1993)
The confrontation between Complainant and his wife Sol ended at about 5:00 a.m. of
the following day, July 16, 1992 with Complainant asking Sol to leave the house.
Sol also admitted to the Complainant that when she went to Hongkong on December
26, 1989 up to December 29, 1989 she was with Respondent Judge, and records of
the Commission on Immigration for said dates show that both Sol Alfonso and
Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson departed for Hongkong via Cathay Pacific plane
on December 26, 1989 and returned to Manila on December 29, 1989 (Exhs. "P" and
"P-1").
Also, Complainant received from his sister in California, U.S.A., a Pacific Bell
Statement of Telephone Calls reflecting two calls made by his wife Sol to Manila, at
numbers 632 476120. Number 632 is the country code while number 476120 is the
phone number of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, where Respondent Judge is the
Presiding Judge.
As of now, Complainant Dr. Norbert Alfonso and his wife Sol live separately, and
their three children are alternately in the custody of Complainant or Sol for certain
number of days.
Upon the other hand, Respondent Judge main defense is denial as he advances the
position that Sol Dinglasan Alfonso was a former client when Respondent Judge was
still a practicing lawyer, and that from time to time Sol would consult him regarding
her cases. As to the Hongkong trip, Respondent Judge simply accompanied a former
client who was looking for a house to buy in Hongkong and as to the visit in the
Citihomes unit, Respondent Judge claimed that he was only visiting his godson
George Zari who spent a vacation in the Philippines for a month.
Some elaboration of the respondent's version is necessary. He is now 56 years old.
(TSN, 8 July 1993, 31). He and his wife, Ceferina, were married in 1961 and have two
sons. Ceferina is eight years his senior. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 4-5). From 1967 to 1969,
he was the Chief Legal Officer in the Office of the City Mayor of Quezon City and
from 1969 to 1982 he was the Second Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City. After that
and until November 1990, when he was appointed Judge of the Regional Trial Court
at Urdaneta Pangasinan, he was in private practice of law. In April 1992, he was
assigned to Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. (TSN, 8 July 1993, 32).
He first came to know Sol when she hired his services as her counsel in six criminal
cases involving dishonored checks she filed against Santiago Maramag and
Evangeline Maramag. (Id., 33-39). In 1989, he saw Sol at the wedding of her sister
Jennifer to Romeo Dizon; he stood as sponsor for the groom then. In June 1992,
Romeo saw him at his office at the City Hall in Manila and sought advice regarding
the letter Sol had received from the Security Bank requiring her to explain why she
should not be declared absent without leave (AWOL) for leaving her work without an

approved leave of absence. He told Romeo that he would not be able to give any
advice unless he saw the letter and talked with Sol. A few days later, he received an
overseas call from Sol who said that she left the Philippines sometime after 10 June
1992. He told her that he could not give any written or oral advice until he read the
letter and talked with her. This overseas call might have been the 17 June 1992 call
referred to in the Pacific Bell Statement. (Exhibit "Q"). He was not able to talk to her
in the second overseas call referred to in Exhibit "Q." Two or three weeks alter, he
received local call from Sol who told him that she was back and that she has the
letter. Sol begged to see him at his office. He, however, told her that he was busy;
besides, it was already late in the afternoon. She got frantic and so he told her that
they could meet the following day at Unit 412-A, Citihomes, at 130 San Francisco St.,
Mandaluyong, since he was to meet his godson, George Zari, in the said place. They
did meet there at 11:00 o'clock in the morning the following day
11 July 1992, a Saturday. Sol gave him the letter from the Security Bank and after
interviewing her he promised to prepare a draft of a "reply." Present at that time
were Celestino Esteban, lessee of the unit who is his friend, George Zari, and his
live-in partner, Marissa. Forty-five minutes later, he decided to go home. Sol
requested for a ride in his vehicle in order to alight at the place of her employer
along EDSA and Shaw Boulevard to which he obliged. While on their way, Sol invited
him for lunch and they went to the Mongolian Restaurant at Robinson's where they
had lunch. They had coffee nearby and then parted ways. Thereafter, on separate
days, Sol called him by phone to ask about the draft of the reply. On the second call,
he told her that since he would meet George Zari on the 17th of July at Unit 412-A
Citihomes, she might just as well meet him there. She acceded and on that date he
left his office at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning and arrived at Unit 412-A thirty
minutes later. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 25). Sometime after Sol arrived, he gave to her
the draft of the reply and instructed her to type the letter, date and sign it, and then
send it to her employer. He also referred her to Atty. Lachica to whom she should
henceforth communicate because he, respondent, is busy at his office. When he was
about to leave, Sol asked if she might ride in his vehicle in order to alight at EDSAShaw Boulevard to which he agreed. After that he did not meet Sol again. (TSN, 9
July 1993, 3-15).
Respondent denies having gone to Hongkong with Sol on 26 December 1989 and
having seen her in Hongkong. According to him, his traveling companion was Cua
Sen. (Id., 16-23). Cua Sen corroborated him on this point. (TSN, 6 July 1993, 5-10).
When confronted about the charge of immorality and unethical conduct for having
illicit relations with Sol, he answered: "I deny it very strongly, your Honor." (Id., 32).
Respondent further suggests that it was impossible for him to have sexual
intercourse with Sol because he was suffering from two debilitating diseases
diabetes mellitus, for which he has been "taking insulin" since 1987, and prostatitis
which have seriously affected his sexual potency. In his own words, he "could
hardly
make
it,"
and
that
he
has
"no
erection
whatsoever."
(Id., 29-32; Exhibits "11" and "12").
Justice Jaguros gives full faith and credit to the complainant's version for she finds no
reason not to believe the complainant. According to her, "[n]o man in his correct
mind would come forward and claim that his honor and good name have been
stained by an adulterous wife, doubt the paternity of his children, and in the process
destroy his family and home." She ruled that the testimonies of the witnesses for the
respondent Cua Sen, Celestino Esteban and former Judge Zari do not inspire
belief.
Justice Jaguros then concludes that the immoral conduct of the respondent has
ruined two families his own and that of the complainant. Respondent "cannot
escape from the blame and sin of what he has caused Complainant's once happy
family." More pertinently she adds:
But beyond the domestic confines of these two families, Respondent Judge is no
ordinary mortal who can live the life he pleases having two women at the same time
his wife and worst [sic], another man's wife. He is a Judge who symbolizes the law

and the highest degree of morality in the community. The citizens look up to him as
the embodiment of justice and decency, as he decides cases brought to his court.
He can be no less.
And invoking our decision in Leynes vs. Veloso (82 SCRA 325 [1978] ) and Castillo
vs. Calanog (199 SCRA 75 [1991] ) as precedent and moral compass, she asserts
that she has no other alternative but to find respondent "GUILTY as charged of
Immorality and Violation of Judicial Conduct" and to recommend his "DISMISSAL . . .
from office."
In the light of the conclusions of the Investigating Justice and her recommendation
for the imposition upon the respondent of the severest administrative penalty
dismissal from the service it is all the more imperative to conduct as assiduous
examination and evaluation of the records and the evidence.
There is no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship existed between the
respondent and the complainant's wife. For one, there are the cards or notes, which
the complainant and the Investigating Justice described as love letters. These five
"love letters" are marked as Exhibits "A." "B," "C," "D," and "E," and dated 3 July
1987, 23 May 1988, 15 February 1988, 11 January 1989, and 7 March 1989,
respectively. For another, if we were to give full credit to the complainant's
testimony that during their confrontation Sol had admitted having sexual intercourse
with the respondent on five occasions (TSN, 29 June 1993, 39-40), it would appear
that the relationship had developed into an extra-marital liaison. It was furthermore
established that both Sol and the respondent took the same flights of Cathay Pacific
aircraft to Hongkong on 26 December 1989 and back to the Philippines on 29
December 1989. There is, however, no evidence that they stayed together in the
same hotel in Hongkong. On the other hand, there is the unrebutted testimony of Mr.
Cua Sen that he, a client of the respondent, was the latter's travelling companion.
From the foregoing, it is clear that their affair began before Sol and the complainant
were married on 10 December 1988 and might have blossomed from the attorneyclient relationship between respondent and Sol. Her marriage to the complainant did
not diminish Sol's love for the respondent, for even after she committed herself to
the complainant alone and made a vow of fidelity to him till death at the solemn
ceremony of marriage, she still sneaked out her love notes to the respondent.
It must, however, be stressed that the respondent is not charged with immorality or
misconduct committed before he was appointed to the judiciary. As to the postappointment period, we find the evidence for the complainant insufficient to prove
that the respondent and Sol continued their extramarital affair. No love notes written
by her after November 1990 were presented in evidence. If she did, they could have
been kept with Exhibits "A" to "E" in some secret place which was not, however,
unknown anymore to the respondent's wife. Sol's admission or confession to the
complainant that she had carnal knowledge of the respondent on five occasions
made no reference to specific dates and is hearsay. In his direct examination, the
complainant's counsel exerted no further effort to obtain clarifications as to the
dates thereof. He perhaps realized its futility because the narration by the
complainant of the information clearly indicated that the complainant did not ask Sol
to elaborate on the five illicit sexual acts. On cross-examination, counsel for the
respondent carefully avoided any entanglement with the details of the admission not
only because it might have provided an occasion for the complainant to elaborate
thereon, but because it would have operated as a waiver of his objection to the
testimony as hearsay. The transcripts of the stenographic notes discloses that the
counsel for the respondent objected and entered a continuing objection to questions
directed to elicit or which tended to elicit statements or admissions supposedly
made or given by Sol on the grounds that any such statements or admissions would
be hearsay or otherwise barred by the res inter alios acta rule. Justice Jaguros
recognized the merit of the objection; hence, she allowed the answers to be taken
merely as part of the narration nut not as evidence of the truth thereof. Thus:
ATTY. DEMIGILLO:
Q. What was her response to your exhortation?

A. After a few minutes she took a deep breath and said, "Sweetheart, patawarin mo
ako,nagkaroon ako ng kasalanan sa iyo."
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
At this juncture, Your Honor, we would like to register our objection as to the issue of
the truth of the statement as purported to be answered by her wife for two reasons:
One, it is hearsay. We have no opportunity to cross-examine the . . .
COURT:
As part of the narration.
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
Yes, as part of the narration, but just for the purposes of record we would like to
register our objection as to the truth of the statement itself. First, it is hearsay;
second . . .
COURT:
Precisely, admitted only as part of his narration.
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
That is alright. Second, it is . . . on the basis of the inter-alia [sic] rule, the admission
of a party should not prejudice the rights of another.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. DEMIGILLO:
Q. What was the exact statement of your wife?
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
Again,
subject
to
the
observation
of
this
Honorable
Court,
we
would register our objections on these two grounds: Hearsay and res inter-alia [sic]
rule.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
Excuse me, I have some manifestations . . .
COURT:
You have a continuing objection?
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
Yes, I am not going to do this at every turn. I just want to say that our objection is a
continuing one. (TSN, 29 June 1993, 36-39).
If they were then allowed by the Investigating Justice as merely "part of the
narration," they should only be considered as independently relevant
statements, i.e., proof that Sol made statements or admissions, but not as proof of
the truth of facts revealed in the said statements or admissions. Elsewise stated, the
admission in evidence of the words spoken by Sol is not to be used in determining
the issue of their truth. (FRANCISCO, V.J.,The Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines, vol. VII, Part I, 1973 ed., 438). This being so, the acts of sexual
intercourse admitted by Sol cannot, insofar as the respondent is concerned, be
deemed proven by the said admission or confession. While it is true that technical
rules of evidence should not be applied in administrative cases, however, since the
Investigating Justice herself had specifically allowed the hearsay answers merely as
part of the narration, or more specifically as independently relevant statements, it
would be unfair and arbitrary to thereafter disregard the ruling. All told, there is in
this case no direct and competent evidence against the respondent that he had illicit
sex with Sol.
But even if the admission of Sol were to be taken as proof of the truth of the facts so
admitted, considering, however, that Sol's admission that she engaged in sexual
intercourse on five occasions made no reference to specific dates, that their affair
antedated Sol's marriage, that their last proven tryst was in Hongkong in 1989, and
that there is an absence of positive and competent evidence to show that any of the
five acts of sexual intercourse took place after the respondent's appointment to the
judiciary , it cannot be safely presumed that the respondent committed any of the
sexual indiscretions after he became a judge. Respondent is not charged for
immorality committed before his appointment. Accordingly, proof of prior immoral

conduct cannot be a basis for his administrative discipline in this case. The
respondent may have undergone moral reformation after his appointment, or his
appointment could have completely transformed him upon the solemn realization
that a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
(Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution). It would be unreasonable and unfair to
presume that since he had wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he could
never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond
reformation and redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of
a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a high price for that honor
his private and official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of
impropriety. (Jugueta vs. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27 [1974]). And the lawyer who is
thereafter appointed thereto must perforce be presumed to have solemnly bound
himself to a way of conduct free from any hint or suspicion of impropriety. The
imputation of illicit sexual acts upon the incumbent judge must be proven by
substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases.
This the complainant failed to do. The meetings of the respondent and Sol at Unit
412-A of Citihomes on 11 July and 17 July 1992 do not by themselves prove that
these were trysts for libidinal gratification. Evidence was offered by the respondent
to prove otherwise. However, considering their prior special relationship, the
respondent and Sol's meetings could reasonably incite suspicion of either its
continuance or revival and the concomitant intimacies expressive of such
relationship. In short, the respondent suddenly became indiscreet; he succumbed to
the sweet memories of the past and he was unable to disappoint Sol who asked for
his legal advice on a matter which involved her employment. Such indiscretions
indubitably cast upon his conduct an appearance of impropriety. He thus violated
Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates that "[a] judge's official
conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also
in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach," and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which provides that "[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities." It has been said that a magistrate of the
law must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as
the epitome of integrity and justice. (Dia-Aonuevo v. Bercacio, 68 SCRA 81 [1975] ).
The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the
preservation of the faith of the people in the judiciary. (Candia vs. Tagabucba, 79
SCRA 51 [1977] ).
It is to be noted that 17 July 1992 fell on a Friday. On that date, the respondent left
his office at the City Hall of Manila at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning and arrived
at Unit 412-A Citihomes thirty minutes later. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 25). Per report of
the private detectives (Exhibit "G"), the respondent and Sol left the unit as 1:30
o'clock in the afternoon on board a vehicle and that twenty-five minutes later, Sol
alighted near the crossing overpass at United Street. It is, therefore, clear that on 17
July 1992 the respondent had left his office during office hours and, considering the
distance between Mandaluyong and his office at the City Hall of Manila and the
usual traffic condition, it was impossible for him to have reached his office if at all
he did proceed to it in time for the commencement of the official session hours in
the
afternoon,
i.e., 2:00 p.m. (Paragraph 5, Interim and Transitional Rules and Guidelines Relative to
the Implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization of 1981). Thus, for purely
personal sessions, he violated the rule regarding the official sentence. Such violation
amounted to neglect of duty.
Finally, a word on the respondent's defense that he not have sexual congress with
Sol because he was suffering from diabetes mellitus and prostatitis. The claim is
both self-serving and irrelevant. No expert testimony was presented to prove the

stage, extent or degree of seriousness of the diseases and their effects on his
capacity to copulate. The physicians who purportedly issued the medical certificates
did not testify thereon. Besides, immorality for which the respondent is charged
is not based alone on illicit sexual intercourse. It is settled that:
immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and as an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. (Black's Law Dictionary,
Sixth ed., 1990, 751).
WHEREFORE, for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, and the rule on official time, respondent JUDGE MODESTO C. JUANSON is
hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) and, further,
sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED
Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984
PRECIOSA
R.
OBUSAN, complainant,
vs.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.
Roger Castuciano for complainant.
Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband
Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He
was admitted to the bar in 1968.
In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and
Housing Corporation, he became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who
represented to him that she was a widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with
her a son who was born on November 27, 1972. He was named John Obusan (Exh.
D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting
or undissolved.
Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married
Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony
held on December 30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1)
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for
more than one year. In the evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife was out of the
house, lawyer Obusan asked permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house
and take a vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he has
never returned to the conjugal abode.
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient
investigation and surveillance, she discovered that he was living and cohabiting with
Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City.
He had brought his car to that place.
The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated by
Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto
Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three
executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed by their
testimonies.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as the
head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at the head of the
barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to
know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where
respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing eyeglasses.
Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when
he married Preciosa. He admitted that from time to time he went to 85-A Felix

Manalo Street but only for the purpose of giving financial assistance to his son, JunJun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's
testimony.
He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He claims
that they were paid witnesses. He declared that he did not live with Natividad. He
resided with his sister at Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home
because he could not endure the nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels, her
absences from the conjugal home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San
Andres Street) and her interference with his professional obligations.
The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a complaint
for disbarment against the respondent. Obusan did not answer the complaint. He
waived the presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer did not file any
memorandum.
After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained the
burden of proof. She has proven his abandonment of her and his adulterous relations
with a married woman separated from her own husband.
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of
grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with
a former paramour, a married woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs.
Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).
Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with
another woman who had borne him a child. He failed to maintain the highest degree
of morality expected and required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117
Phil. 768).
WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10185
March 12, 2014
LICERIO
DIZON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
On May 14, 2004, complainant Licerio Dizon (complainant) filed a petition against
Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. (Atty. Cabucana), before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), praying for the disbarment of the latter for falsification of public
document.
In his petition, complainant alleged that he was one of the would-be-buyers of a
parcel of land owned by the heirs of the late Florentino Callangan, namely, Susana,
Jun and Angeleta, all surnamed Callangan who were parties in Civil Case No. 1-689
filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch I, Santiago City (MTCC); that on
November 6, 2003, a compromise agreement was executed by the parties in the
said case and notarized before Atty. Cabucana on the same date it was signed at the
MTCC; that at the hearing conducted on December 11, 2003 regarding the due
execution and the veracity of the compromise agreement, the signatories therein
testified that they signed the instrument in the court room of MTCC but not in the
presence of Atty. Cabucana as Notary Public; that because of the irregularity in the
due execution of the Compromise Agreement, there was undue delay in the
resolution/decision of Civil Case No. 1-689 which caused damage and injury to
complainant; that Atty. Cabucana violated the Notarial Law in notarizing the
document in the absence of most of the signatories/affiants; and that he should be
sanctioned in accordance with Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Code and Code of
Professional Responsibility. Complainant further alleged that Atty. Cabucana uttered

grave threats against him on July 20, 2004 after the hearing of the said case in
MTCC.
In his Answer, Atty. Cabucana averred that the complaint was intended to harass
him because he was the private prosecutor in a criminal case filed against
complainant before the MTCC; that complainant had no cause of action as his right
was not violated because he was just a "would be" buyer and not a party to the
compromise agreement; and that complainant would not suffer any damage by the
pendency of the case or by any defects obtaining in the notarization of the
compromise agreement.
In its Report and Recommendation,1 dated January 22, 2007, the Investigating
Commissioner found that Atty. Cabucana violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he notarized the compromise agreement without
the presence of all the parties, and recommended that he be suspended as Notary
Public for a period of two (2) years and from the practice of law for six (6) months.
In its Resolution,2 dated May 31, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
modification that Atty. Cabucana be suspended for only six (6) months for violation
of his obligation as Notary Public.
On motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors, in a
Resolution,3 modified its earlier resolution and suspended Atty. Cabucana from the
practice of law for one (1) month and disqualified him from re-appointment as notary
public for one (1) year.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors except as
to the penalty.
Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law states:
The acknowledgment shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by
law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it,
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made
under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state.
The requirement of affiant's personal appearance was further emphasized in Section
2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 which provides that:
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
As a notary public, Atty. Cabucana should not notarize a document unless the person
who signs it is the same person executing it and personally appearing before him to
attest to the truth of its contents. This is to enable him to verify the genuineness of
the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
party's free and voluntary act and deed.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. GUILTY of
violating
Rule
1.01,
Canon
l
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility.1wphi1 Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of
law for three (3) months, REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any, and
PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years,
effective immediately, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the
records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all
its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all cou1is
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 932

June 21, 1940
In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent,
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner-complainant.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the Solicitor-General
against the respondent Roque Santiago, charging the latter with malpractice and
praying that disciplinary action be taken against him.
It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife
Soledad Colares for some nine consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a
second marriage, sought the legal advice of the respondent, who was at the time a
practicing and notary public in the Province of Occidental Negros. The respondent,
after hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the latter that he could secure a
separation from his wife and marry again, and asked him to bring his wife on the
afternoon of the same day, May 29, 1939. This was done and the respondent right
then and there prepared the document Exhibit A in which it was stipulated, among
other things, that the contracting parties, who are husband and wife authorized each
other to marry again, at the same time renouncing or waiving whatever right of
action one might have against the party so marrying. After the execution and
acknowledgment of Exhibit A by the parties, the respondent asked the spouses to
shake hands and assured them that they were single and as such could contract
another and subsequent marriage. Baniquit then remarked, "Would there be no
trouble?" Upon hearing it the respondent stood up and, pointing to his diploma
hanging on the wall, said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be
valid." Relying on the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit, on June 11, 1939,
contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. There is also evidence to show
that the respondent tried to collect for this service the sum of P50, but as the
evidence on this point is not clear and the same is not material in the resolution of
the present case, we do not find it necessary to make any express finding as to
whether the full amount or any portion thereof was paid or, as contended by the
respondent, the service were rendered free of charge.
The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up the defense that he
had the idea that seven years separation of husband and wife would entitle either of
them to contract a second marriage and for that reason prepared Exhibit A, but
immediately after the execution of said document he realized that he had made a
mistake and for that reason immediately sent for the contracting parties who, on
June 30, 1939, came to his office and signed the deed of cancellation Exhibit A.
There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the spouses
Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and
prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is
contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The
advice given by the respondent, the preparation and acknowledgment by him of the
contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law.
The admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that
his continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred is dependent upon his remaining
a fit and safe person to society. When it appears that he, by recklessness or sheer
ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with the responsibilities and
obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of this professional
privilege should be declared terminated. In the present case, respondent was either
ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving the
complainant legal advice. Drastic action should lead to his disbarment and this is the
opinion of some members of the court. The majority, however, have inclined to
follow the recommendation of the investigator, the Honorable Sotero Rodas, in view
of the circumstances stated in the report of said investigator and the fact that
immediately after discovering his mistakes, respondent endeavored to correct it by
making the parties sign another document cancelling the previous one.

The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby

suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. So ordered.
May 15, 1903
G.R.
No.
1203
In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice
of law.
Solicitor-General
Araneta
for
Government.
W. A. Kincaid for defendant.
PER CURIAM:
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First
Instance, in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not
be suspended as a member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after
he had been notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading
the law then in force in said city; and,
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and
after its organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the
purpose of evading the law.
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made
answer to these charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto.
After reading testimony given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United
States vs. H. D. Terrell,1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after reading the
said affidavits in his behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court below found, and
decided as a fact, that the charges aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were
true, and thereupon made an order suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the
Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk of the court to transmit to this court a
certified copy of the order of suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts
upon which the same was based.
We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they
were such as to justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the
knowledge and acts of the accused in connection with the organization of the
"Centro Bellas Artes" Club were of such a nature and character as to warrant his
suspension from practice.
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of
violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part
of an attorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross
misconduct in his office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney
knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify
disbarment.
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the United
States, vs. Terrell was acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore,
been convicted of crime, and as the acts with which he is charged in this
proceeding, while unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in
their nature, we are of opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the
suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands
for the term of one year from the 7th day of February, 1903.
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended from the
practice of law for a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995
RODOLFO
MILLARE, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of

the Revised Rules of Court, this Court resolved to refer it to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a decision, finding
respondent guilty of malpractice and recommending that he be suspended from the
practice of law.
I
Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from
the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC) which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate
the premises subject of the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through
respondent as counsel, appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Bangued, Abra (RTC). She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid the rentals
adjudged by the MTC. The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for
failure to comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim
Rules and Guidelines (CA-G.R. CV No. 11404). According to the CA, Co should have
filed a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22).
The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 19, 1986.
On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by respondent as counsel
for Co in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404, arguing that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC
were null and void for being contrary to law, justice and equity for allowing the
lessor to increase by 300% the rentals for an old house. Respondent, admitting his
mistake in filing an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for review, prayed that he
be allowed to file an action for annulment.
On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to respondent's Manifestation and
Motion and let the records remain with it. However, on November 10, 1987, the said
court ordered the records in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 to be remanded to the court a
quo.
On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Decisions
and/or Reformation or Novation of Decisions of the MTC and the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No.
11690), insisting that the decisions were not in accordance with existing laws and
policies. On December 17, 1987, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment or
novation explaining that
. . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38),
there is no other means whereby the defeated party may procure final and
executory judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation,
unless (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law,
or (b) it has been obtained by fraud, . . . . There is no allegation in the present
complaint to the effect that the judgments in the former cases were secured through
fraud (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35; Emphasis supplied).
On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration for Oral Arguments of the CA decision. The
CA denied the motion. Again, respondent requested the CA to set his Motion For Oral
Arguments on April 14, 1988.
In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the Motion for Oral Argument
and in a resolution dated October 18, 1988, denied the motion for reconsideration of
the February 12 Resolution.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court (G.R. No.
86084) questioning the decisions of the MTC and the RTC in favor of petitioner's
mother. In a Resolution dated January 4, 1989, we denied the petition for having
been filed and paid late on December 12, 1988 and November 12, 1988,
respectively. A motion for reconsideration from such resolution was likewise denied
with finality.
Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or Restraining Order
(dated July 6, 1988) in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690.
On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Motion for Execution of the
judgment in Civil Case No. 844. Respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion for

Execution on the ground that the case was still pending review by the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 11690 and therefore the motion for execution was premature. On August 23,
1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The RTC affirmed the order for the
issuance of the writ of execution. Thus, a writ of execution was issued on October
18, 1988.
On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action (SP CV No. 624) with the
RTC, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary
injunction against the MTC, Provincial Sheriff and complainant's mother, seeking to
annul the writ of execution issued in MTC Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil Case No.
344. Respondent alleged that the order granting the writ of execution was issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a petition to
annul the decisions (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690) was still pending with the CA.
On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes, deferred the
implementation of the writ of execution until the petition filed in SP CV No. 624
for certiorari was resolved. The CA denied in SP CV No. 624 respondent's Urgent
Motion to Set Aside and Declare Null and Void the Writ of Execution.
From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV No. 624 denying the Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition,Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order,
respondent again filed an Appeal and/or Review byCertiorari, Etc. with the CA (CAG.R. SP No. 17040).
II
We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to
represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule
19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the
case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.
Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable
construction of the law or rules which is favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not
allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing
law. He cannot prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly
groundless actions (Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility 310 [1979]).
Professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary
restrictions and qualifications (Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 579-582 [1986]).
Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. Implementing said Canon are the following rules:
Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the
filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole
purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment (Edelstein, The
Ethics of Dilatory Motions Practice: Time for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069
[1976]; Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F. 2d 539, 543 [2d Cir. 1971]).
The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully
protected and her defenses were properly ventilated when he filed the appeal from
the MTC to the RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded
means to delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his
client. The said decision became executory even pending its appeal with the RTC
because of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly
rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the decisions of
the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and
dilatory. According to the CA, there was no allegation therein that the courts had no

jurisdiction, that his client was denied due process, or "that the judgments in the
former cases were secured through fraud."
As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530 (1993):
A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for
want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) that it has been obtained
by fraud. . . . (at p. 534).
Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded,
respondent knew very well that the decision of the MTC was already ripe for
execution.
This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 423
(1993), ruled:
. . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is remanded to the trial court for
execution, the function of the trial court is ministerial only; the trial court is merely
obliged with becoming modesty to enforce that judgment and has no jurisdiction
either to modify in any way or to reverse the same. . . . (at p. 430).
(See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993] and Garbo v. Court of
Appeals, 226 SCRA 250 [1993]).
Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the
execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:
(1) Civil Case No. 344 Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 844 of
the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, with the Regional Trial Court, Abra;
(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Abra;
(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 An Action For the Annulment of Decisions And/Or
Reformation or Novation of Decisions filed with the Court of Appeals;
(4) G.R. No. 86084 Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court;
(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 Appeal And/Or Review By Certiorari, Etc. filed also with
the Court of Appeals; and,
(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 Petition For Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with
Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
1, Bangued, Abra.
Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of
the same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping.
In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court explained that forum shopping
exists when, by reason of an adverse decision in one forum, defendant ventures to
another for a more favorable resolution of his case. In the case of Gabriel v. Court of
Appeals, 72 SCRA 272 (1976), this Court explained that:
Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's processes and
improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of
justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to add, the lawyer who
filed such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a
final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an
attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such actions
as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor (at p. 275).
By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a
favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of
a member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such
defenses as he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws (Garcia v. Francisco,
220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the Committee on Bar Discipline "in
filing a number of pleadings, actions and petitioner, respondent 'has made a
mockery of the judicial processes' and disregarded canons of professional ethics in
intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case
was rendered, thus, 'abused procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice'"
(Report and Recommendation, IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, p. 2).
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.

G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975

VENANCIO
CASTANEDA
and
NICETAS
HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR
D.
AGO,
LOURDES
YU
AGO
and
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court
for more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit
against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain
machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago
appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castaeda, L-14066, affirmed
the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of
execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his
motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon
City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago
moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed.
On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed
the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house and
lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9,
1963 to the highest bidders, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson. Ago failed to
redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of
the vendees Castaeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance
of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his
co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case
Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago
upon which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal
obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential
house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be
reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that
wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered
and the writ of execution was issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife
Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture in the logging business which
failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal
partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of
Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the
respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from
carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus arose where what
the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On
November 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had
previously issued, and the Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the
respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. But
enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon City court
again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then re-restored.
On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order
was being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116,

praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the
writ of possession. This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a
minute resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The
respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same
preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The
respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140).1wph1.t We dismissed the
petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed
another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R.
39438-R). The said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary
injunction. After hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of
possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made permanent pending
decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to
proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the merits without unnecessary
delay. No pronouncement as to costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed the
present petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a
co-equal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila,
which issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its coequal court, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the
restraining order it had previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila
court's writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the
enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1 where the wife was a party in one case
and the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties
was upheld, the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the
replevin judgment against her husband for which their conjugal properties would be
answerable. The case invoked is not at par with the present case. In Comilang the
actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of the common interest of the
spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership
benefited from the husband's business venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ
of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the
property is adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu
Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course
obviously wrong, for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim
ignorance of his business that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got
embroiled, and of the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties.
Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue until
the claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that the writ of possession
being a complement of the writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the
latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval between the
judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third parties to
the property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the
present case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the properties
or of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the
time writ of possession was issued, and even up to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it
is much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part
of the property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that
(1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and
the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties
in question; (4) her husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties

were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a
preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; (7)
the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to
redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could be
levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent
execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the
complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in
the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the
logging business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every
opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but
did not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the
one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This halfshare is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy,
constituting neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only
upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the community. 3 The
decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect
a right not in esse and which may never arise. 4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its
enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5 which
is conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted
from the house, but the decision under review would prevent the ejectment of
Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor and which part
would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here; the decision
would actually separate husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in
effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution of
the conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the
sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners,
long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for,
the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal
remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the
assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist
execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5
times in the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use
them to subvert the very ends of justice. 6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as
an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation
instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause
must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot
countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's
position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies
and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to

acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must
resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to
litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his
client; its primacy is indisputable. 7
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other
than to seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the
case below which might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the
end, we have motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother
case of the present case). We find that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the
merits has not even started;
(b) after the defendants Castaedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the
plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new partiesdefendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to
admit an amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new
party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental
complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an
extension to the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental
complaint and amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons
hereunder stated. The Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal
properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was
personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered into, which
resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the
conjugal property is leviable, is the same issue that we have already resolved, as
barred by laches, in striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting
preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted.
This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the
Castaedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took
possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their
damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails
to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid
or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal
properties was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the
Castaeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which
they bought the properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there was
annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of
the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P141,750
despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of
P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and
because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require
payment of the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is
the judgment creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the
amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule
39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees
Castaedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is
of no moment to the Agoo.

Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount
of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is
moreover barred by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos
on account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth
cause of action derives its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown,
are baseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas aver that the action was
unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the
services of counsel for not less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a
preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the
properties to the Castaedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the
properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use being 20% annually of
their actual value; and that the filing of the unfounded action besmirched their
feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the
defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in
conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the
plaintiffs, caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause
more damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of
land in question; that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the
defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels
bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad
faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused
by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and
transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental
complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause damage
and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two
parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also
in bad faith, while Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two
other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in
bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending
litigation.
Discussion
on
The
Causes
of
Action
of
The
Supplemental
Complaint
And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of
the cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the
original complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of
ownership and possession of the properties by reason of the agreements
subsequently entered into by the Castaedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy
and sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid
on the ground that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the
transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have already indicated that
the issue in the first cause of action of the original complaint is barred by laches,
and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental
complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in
the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil
case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without
prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent
action. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu
Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this
decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the
Clerk of Court.
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON
DE
YSASI
III, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY,
and JON DE YSASI,respondents.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case,
notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would
indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private
respondent had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial
amity and with the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for
judicial intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit
with distaste, the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the
same reasoned detachment accorded any judicial proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein
private respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as
sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager
of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on
a fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone,
gasoline, medical and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily
activities and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting,
weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to
the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by
private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor
of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his
wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized
on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he
underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer.
During his recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr.
Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter,
for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his
medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in
April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary.
Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden
withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's
auditor and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands,
however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC,
for brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984,
docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment

of full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the
NLRC, 1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his
employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner
the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination
of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. 2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of
the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto. 3
His motion for reconsideration 4 of said decision having been denied for lack of
merit, 5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution:
(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is
entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other
benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these
issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private
respondent, such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm
administrator, the character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from
private respondent, that is, whether the same are in the nature of salaries or
pensions, and whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions
as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended
a modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings
and conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84, 6 for which
reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In
compliance with the Court's resolution of November 16, 1992, 7 NLRC filed its
comment on February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of
the findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter. 8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor
arbiter is worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of
the special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action involved, this case
could very well go down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its
kind. For this case is an action filed by an only son, his father's namesake, the only
child and therefore the only heir against his own father. 9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were noted that
may justify why this labor case deserves special considerations. First, most of the
complaints that petitioner and private respondent had with each other, were
personal matters affecting father and son relationship. And secondly, if any of the
complaints pertain to their work, they allow their personal relationship to come in
the way. 10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of
want of just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process.
He also charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings
of the executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings
thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of
his functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a
ground to terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that
it is wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor
arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this
Court. Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private
respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of
the transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d),
Rule
44
(should
be
Section
16[c]
and
[d],

Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of
page references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code
that technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling, and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively
ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities
of law or procedure in the interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be
rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who
conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the
judge who penned the decision does not impair the validity of the
judgment, 11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution with due care
and makes certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final
dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence submitted in the case. 12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T.
Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11,
1985, and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who
eventually decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering
that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's
functions, 13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the
application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due
process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must
be interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge
private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his
arguments. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural
niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no
worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and
after due process. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which
an
employer
may
validly
terminate
an
employment,
to
wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders
of his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual
neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of
the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d)
commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the
installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or
the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the
closing is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor
Code, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof, with due
entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates provided by law.15 Suffering
from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment of the employee is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also a
ground for termination of his services provided he receives the prescribed
separation pay. 16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by an
employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from
employment. 17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent
gravely erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that
petitioner abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such
employment.
For
want
of
substantial
bases,
in
fact
or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to
the factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent

NLRC, 18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by

law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve
acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to
December 1982, cannot be construed as abandonment of work because he has a
justifiable excuse. Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal
around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio Tan of
Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986
at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to
Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon
the instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only
administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not
really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances
involved and basic human experience, petitioner's illness and strained family
relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable reason for
petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to
December 1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant outright dismissal
without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as
follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2)
clear intention to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in
Labor and Social Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute abandonment.
In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for
abandonment to arise, there must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and
some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more
interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC(184
SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of
employment, there must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to
resume his employment. . . Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied
by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want
to work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment. First,
petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda
Manucao, is justified by his illness and strained family relations. Second he has some
medical certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to work, petitioner
wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention to assume
again his employment. Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for
illegal dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are
indications that petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment. 20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's
confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical
treatment. Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of
petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical
and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit
to work again. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so
serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation
is beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said illnesses, the details of
which were amply substantiated by the attending physician, 21 and as the records
are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was

justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate
and unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required
to constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment. 22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner
unmistakably may be classified as a managerial employee 23 to whom the law
grants an amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties. This is why when
petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I want to go," 24 he was simply
being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority. His duties as
farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the
office premises at all times, or to be subjected to specific control from his employer
in every aspect of his work. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as
efficiently and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may definitely not qualify
as a model employee, in this regard he proved to be quite successful, as there was
at least a showing of increased production during the time that petitioner was in
charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the
years 1983 to 1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was
recuperating from illness and on account of which his attendance and direct
involvement in farm operations were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision
and control exercisable by private respondent as employer was necessarily limited.
It goes without saying that the control contemplated refers only to matters relating
to his functions as farm administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal
affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm
administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was
no explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to
begin with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that
any transfer of residence would justify the termination of his employment. That
petitioner changed his residence should not be taken against him, as this is
undeniably among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per
se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his
son's intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept
petitioner on the payroll, reported him as an employee of thehacienda for social
security purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions
therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he
became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered
the latter to have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed him as
an employee. According to private respondent, whatever amount of money was
given
to
petitioner
from
that
time
until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles
from a father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were
made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely
stopped giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard
petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral
deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los
(p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive
of petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister
motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning
the job upon accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel
position that the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the
administration of the farm legally converts the initial abandonment to implied
voluntary resignation. 25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew
about petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The
assertion regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his

continued performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from
May to the last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant
and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued
since April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and
capability to resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September
14, 1984. 26 With these, petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly
pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or
without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as
farm administrator. 27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may
justly be made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear
intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as
the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such intent
we find dismally wanting in this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's
plans of returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982,
prolonged though it may have been, was not without valid causes of which private
respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that
petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor
substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as
even after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced"
that petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform
services directly required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and
correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm
machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc., 28 claiming and paying for
additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to
Bacolod through Zip Forwarders, 29 getting the payment of the additional cash
advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities,
Inc., 30 and
remitting
to
private
respondent
through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to
the normal activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to
request or even command his child to run errands for him. In the present case,
however, considering the nature of these transactions, as well as the property
values and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that private respondent would
leave the matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by
someone who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is
familiar with the terms, specifications and other details relative thereto, such as an
employee. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have
done so by private respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect
or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him
with respect to what would then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard
to imagine what further authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee
so as to compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney 32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda. Manucao,
hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill
District, and a duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA
PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA representing
payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such plantermember;

That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents

I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-INFACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my name,
place and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being
herein given the power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place and
stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks. PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but
to turn the same over to me for my proper disposition.
That
I
HEREBY
RATIFY
AND
CONFIRM
the
acts
of
my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been
terminated by reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests
for an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, 33 the
issuance of withholding tax reports, 34 as well as correspondence reporting his full
recovery and readiness to go back to work, 35 and, specifically, his filing of the
complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his
work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for
private respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the
latter's intention to abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of
such deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of
private respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel,
thereby
foreclosing
his
opportunity
to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof
on the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by
Administrative Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said office. 36 Fair play dictates that
at such an important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of
testimony, both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and crossexamine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as
salary, pension, allowance orex gratia handout, there is no question as to
petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his
capacity as farm administrator. The change in description of said amounts contained
in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed
to be determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar
circumstances above set out. Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of
allowances given by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare, it is rather
unusual that receipts therefor 37 should be necessary and required as if they were
ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged
abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the
father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we
have determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums
received by petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for services
rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a
character that can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and
solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly
converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive act on the part of the
employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. The very concept of
resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of his employment38 does
not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private
respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice

and hearing. 39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases
where the employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the
grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation
obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any
ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment. 40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are
set out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in
this wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall
furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the
grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be served at
the worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations as stated
against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such
notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in
writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. Any decision taken by the employer shall be
without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his
dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. The employer shall submit a monthly report to the
Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected
by him during the month, specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers,
the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination of
employment, the positions last held by them and such other information as may be
required by the Ministry for policy guidance and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that
petitioner was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice
about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be
heard. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory
twin requirements of procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect
admits that no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by
the certification issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI
of the Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of
petitioner was submitted thereto. 41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot
be denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be
dismissed, as the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules
explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of
substantial compliance. While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to
terminate an employee, especially when there is just cause therefor, the
requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not countenance
the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has the effect of
undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the
employee. 42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor
General rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense of implied
resignation and/or abandonment, records somehow showed that he failed to notify
the
Department
of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as
required by BP 130. And for this failure, the other requisite for a valid termination by

an employer was not complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate the
otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The validity of the cause of
dismissal must be upheld at all times provided however that sanctions must be
imposed on the respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process
requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 1112, Annex "C" Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69.
In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just
cause,
he
must
not
be
rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due
process. The public policy behind this is that, it may encourage the employee to do
even worse and render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed.
However, the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due process. In the
present case, however, not only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but
his dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment
because he has a justifiable excuse. 43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the
mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally
dismissed employee to reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the
imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due
process requirements. Private respondent, for his part, maintains that there was
error in imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit
the employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office, as
required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and
not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the
employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right
of every worker to security of tenure. 44 To give teeth to this constitutional and
statutory mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in
case of its denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall
not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to
his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from
him up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in
the absence of just cause for dismissal. 45 The Court, however, on numerous
occasions has tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code,
recognizing that in some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate
against the practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares
that where there are strained relations between the employer and the employee,
payment of back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of
reinstatement, 46 and more particularly when managerial employees are
concerned. 47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is therefore
appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what the
law accords him. 48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination,
to wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed
from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement.
(Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. vs. NLRC,
173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement,
differences should be made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The
Court concluded that a company which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate

freely in a competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC should know the difference
between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the
reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file
workers who had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not be
appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism between the parties
(Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of petitioner and
private respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and peaceful employeeemployer relationship is hardly possible. 49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his
dismissal from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted
oppression, or was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. He further
prays for exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust
dismissal by other employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to
compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, and social humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a
wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause
thereof. 50Exemplary damages, under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. They are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left
to the court to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. 51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing
recovery of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by
bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, 52 and of exemplary
damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent
manner. 53 We do not feel, however, that an award of the damages prayed for in
this petition would be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their
allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary
damages were awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and
were undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally
be faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this
controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate
claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism
and the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them
acted in good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against
the other. For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can
rightfully be awarded to petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following
recommendation of the Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified. There was
no voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse
for his absence, or such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice
and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal. He should be
ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding three years from date of
dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of six
months being considered as one (1) year in accordance with recent jurisprudence
(Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for damages should be dismissed,
for both parties are equally at fault. 54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records,
sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded
that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal 55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is

just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable
efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in
consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their
clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to
conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or
withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for
wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation. 56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a)
lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short
of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court.
The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward
effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and
protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they
may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case
has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that
a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor
dispute within his jurisdiction." 57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the
thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any
reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged
to make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family
leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful
and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced
that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sanssentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may
have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as
parties to this dispute, and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly
contribute to the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine,
neither of the parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest
hope, therefore, that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their
respective rights in this decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear to
an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for
a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, 58 and, in
lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of
service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-29543

November 29, 1969
GLORIA
PAJARES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUDGE ESTRELLA ABAD SANTOS, MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA and
UDHARAM BAZAR CO.,respondents-appellees.
Moises
C.
Nicomedes
for
petitioner-appellant.
Tomas Lopez Valencia for respondents-appellees.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
We dismiss as frivolous petitioner-appellant's appeal from the lower Court's Order of
dismissal of her petition for a writ of certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction

against respondent judge's order denying her motion for a bill of particulars as the
defendant in a simple collection case.
The origin of the case is narrated in the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated August
16, 1968 certifying the appeal to this Court as involving purely questions of law:
This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Gloria Pajares from the order dated July
21, 1962 issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction against respondent Judge Estrella Abad
Santos of the Municipal Court of Manila and respondent Udharam Bazar & Co.
There is no dispute that on April 25, 1962, the Udharam Bazar & Co. sued Gloria
Pajares before the Municipal Court of Manila for recovery of a certain sum of money.
The lawsuit was docketed in the inferior court as Civil Case No. 97309 and was
eventually assigned to the sala of the respondent Judge Abad Santos.
In its complaint the Udharam Bazar & Co. averred, among others, as follows:
"2. That defendant in 1961, ordered from the plaintiff quantities of ready made
goods and delivered to her in good condition and same were already sold, but did
not make the full payment up to the present time;
"3. That defendant is still indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P354.85,
representing the balance of her account as the value of the said goods, which is
already overdue and payable."
Instead of answering the complaint against her, Gloria Pajares, however, moved for
a bill of particulars praying the inferior court to require the Udharam Bazar & Co. to
itemize the kinds of goods which she supposedly purchased from the said company,
the respective dates they were taken and by whom they were received as well as
their purchase prices, alleging that without this bill she would not be able to meet
the issues raised in the complaint.
After due hearing, the inferior court denied the motion of Gloria Pajares for a bill of
particulars. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied too by the said court,
she then brought the incident on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Manila,
alleging in support of her petition that in denying her motion for a bill of particulars,
the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion.
But on July 19, 1962, herein respondent Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a motion to
dismiss the petition for a writ of certiorari, as well as the petition for a writ of
preliminary injunction, for the reasons: (1) that the allegations of the complaint filed
by the said company in the inferior court, particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof,
are clear, specific and sufficiently appraise the defendant, now herein petitioner
Gloria Pajares, of the nature of the cause of action against her so as to enable her to
prepare for her defenses; and (2) that things asked for in the motion for a bill of
particulars are evidentiary matters, which are beyond the pale of such bill.
Convinced that the said motion of the company is well founded, the lower court
accordingly dismissed the petition on April 21, 1962.
Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied by the court
below, Gloria Pajares undertook the present appeal to this Court, contending under
her lone assignment of error to maintain her such appeal that the lower court erred
in dismissing her petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, in its order dated
July 21, 1962, as amended by its order dated August 18, 1962.
The only genuine issues involved in the case at bar are: (1) whether the allegations
of the complaint sufficiently appraise Gloria Pajares of the nature of the cause of
action against her; and (2) whether the items asked for by the said Gloria Pajares in
her motion for a bill of particulars constitute evidentiary matters. To our mind these
are purely legal questions. A perusal of the brief of the parties has shown that no
genuine factual questions are at all involved in this appeal.
It is plain and clear that no error of law, much less any grave abuse of discretion,
was committed by respondent judge in denying appellant's motion for a bill of
particulars in the collection case instituted in the Municipal Court of Manila by
private respondent-appellee for the recovery of her indebtedness of P354.85
representing the overdue balance of her account for ready-made goods ordered by
and delivered to her in 1961. Appellee's complaint precisely and concisely informed

appellant of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the cause of action against
her, in accordance with the requirements of the Rules of Court.1
It was therefore improper for appellant, through her counsel, to insist on her motion
that appellee as plaintiff "submit a bill of particulars, specifying therein in detail the
goods represented by the alleged amount of P354.85, giving the dates and invoice
numbers on which they were delivered to the defendant, the amount due on each
such invoice and by whom they were received." These particulars sought all
concerned evidentiary matters and do not come within the scope of Rule 12, section
1 of the Rules of Court which permits a party "to move for a definite statement or for
a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularly to enable him to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial."
Since appellant admittedly was engaged in the business of buying and selling
merchandise at her stall at the Sta. Mesa Market, Quezon City, and appellee was one
of her creditors from whom she used to buy on credit ready made goods for resale,
appellant had no need of the evidentiary particulars sought by her to enable her to
prepare her answer to the complaint or to prepare for trial. These particulars were
just as much within her knowledge as appellee's. She could not logically pretend
ignorance as to the same, for all she had to do was to check and verify her own
records of her outstanding account with appellee and state in her answer whether
from her records the outstanding balance of her indebtedness was in the sum of
P354.85, as claimed by appellee, or in a lesser amount.
The record shows, furthermore, that a month before appellee filed its collection
case, it had written appellant a demand-letter for the payment of her outstanding
account in the said sum of P354.85 within one week. Appellant, through her counsel,
wrote appellee under date of March 23, 1962, acknowledging her said indebtedness
but stating that "Due to losses she has sustained in the operation of her stall, she
would not be able to meet your request for payment of the full amount of P354.85 at
once. I would therefore request you to be kind enough to allow her to continue
paying you P10.00 every 15th and end of the month as heretofore."
No error was therefore committed by the lower court in summarily dismissing
appellant's petition for certiorariagainst respondent judge's order denying her
motion for a bill of particulars, as pretended by appellant in her lone assignment of
error. Well may we apply to this appeal, the words of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in an
analogous case,2 that "the circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove
that appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation
unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves condemnation, wasting as it does, the time
that the courts could well devote to meritorious cases."
Here, this simple collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for over
seven years. Had appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess
judgment and ask from her creditor the reasonable time she needed to discharge
her lawful indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has incurred by way of
filing fees in the Court of First Instance, premiums for her appeal bond, appellate
court docket fees, printing of her appellant's brief, and attorney's fees would have
been much more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to appellee. Yet, here she
still remains saddled with the same debt, burdened by accumulated interests, after
having spent uselessly much more than the amount in litigation in this worthless
cause.
As we recently said in another case,3 the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys
is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases
may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the
Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is
not interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of
this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action."
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, and petitioner-appellant's counsel
shall pay treble costs in all instances. This decision shall be noted in the personal

record of the attorney for petitioner-appellant in this Court for future reference. So
ordered.