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Record - MC-CBX-54-S1 (Plenarv Sefsion)

29

6 ,Tanuary 1982
SUM MAR Y__~R~P COR D
54TH MEP.TING OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEI'; IN 1981
Held on Thursday, 17 Derember 1981, at 1000 hours
in the Situation Centr~, (Presentation Room),
NATO Headouarter~, Brussels, Belqium
PR!:SENT

n.H.

Chairman:

Admiral

Aelqium:
Canafla:
Denmark:
Italy:
Luxemboura:
Nf'therlands:
Norwav:
Portuqal:
Turkey:
lInitefl Kingdom:
United States:

Li~ut~na~t General Y. Defleurwaerder

Lieutenant Ger~ral R. Gutknecht
Lieutenant General P.O.w. Thorsen
Lieut~nant Gen~ral E.D. Bernhard
Lieutenant Genf'ral P. Panaefstathiou
vice Admiral r. Fantonl
Colonel p. Beraem
Lieutenant General J.e. zoutenhier
Lieutena~t Colonel R. Aaby
G~neral I'.A.G. Cardoso
Vice Admiral f:. Prqin
I\dmiral Sir Ar,thonY Morton
Aflmiral G.~.R, Kinnear, II

Deputy Chairman:
Director, IMS:

Lieutenant General Sinclair L. MeIner

Lieutenant General T. Huitfeldt

German v :
Greece:

Falls

ALSO PRESJ:NT
F'rench Military
Mission:

G~neral rle Di"i5ion O. Le Taillandier

de Gaborv

i.~::~o

Ai r Comm, ,flore, RAF

Serretar", IMS

DIS'l'RIBPTION:
Record - MC-CBX-54-Al (Plenary Sessi0n)
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'rhis document consists of

a total of nine page~

IMS Control Nr: O82002313

NATO SECRET

l\ATO SECRIT

PART I

PLENARY SESSIOl\
C 0 N TEN T S

Item No.

Subject

BRIEFING ON CURRENT INTELJ.IGENCE BY THE

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, IMS eNU)

Record - MC-CBX-S4-81

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No.

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PART I

PLENARY SESSION
NATO SECRET

Item 1

BRIEFING ON CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BY TtlE

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, IMS (NU)

General Alkemade, Assistant Director Intelligence

Division, INS, provideJ a summary of the Polish situation
and a statement on the NATO Indications and Warning SysteJn.
A supplemen t a ry br ie fi ng was provided by
Rostgard on Soviet naval aviation ships(l).

CaptaiJ~

The Italian ~Iember expressed his appreciation to

the DIS IntellIgence Division for their outstanding performance.
He pointed out the difficulty, citinl~ Poland as an example, of
processing and presenting clear and lip to date information on
events in the world on the basis of insufficient and fragmentary
information.
The United Kingdom ~lember ;,150 complimented the HIS
Intelligence DIVISIon for thClr work.
He made the point that
recent events in Poland reinforced the fact that it was possible
to obtain an elenJent of warning on r(,adiness in terms of
capability but when a high state of readiness was reached, it was
much more difficlJlt to forecast a change of intent.
tie s~id the
judgement of intent wa~ beyond the duties of the Intelligence Division.
lie pointed out that the militan' authorities in Poland had been
in a state 0 C r0"diness but chaJlged 1heir intentions with few
signals and had achiev.:d s11rIHi!'e.
The United States Memher praised the work of the
Intelligence Division, IMS for keepillg the ~1ilitary Committee
~ell informed on capability and agre('d with the United Kingdom
~:ember that it W;tS impossible tll foncast intention.
lie said
that perhaps the,'e was a lack of appI"eciatioll for what constituted
the Indications "nd Warning System and, if that were the case, then
the HIS Intelligence Di.vision r.light \:ish to clearly identify, In
futllre briefins. items that deviated from Indications and
Narnings.
The United Kingdom Member J'cminded Members of the
Soviets' histone-aI, slIccessfu.1 use (If the element of surprise
and cited the Arab/Isr:Jel i War llf 1973 as an example \,here the
high state of re"diness was idelltifi,d but the key moment of
intent missed.
lie said the Soviets had been in a high state of
rC'adiness as a rcsult of the Polish ~;ituation for some time and
lDlsslIed as !1(I-:5TN-f("INT) -UAG-179-8I, 17 Dec 81
RC'cord -

~C-CBX-~4-81

NATO SI:CRET

NATO SECRET,

it was necessary to remind people of this and of the fact that

deception was a' key part of their policy.
The Greek Member thanked Captain Rostgard for his
briefing which had bee-n presented as a resul t of his requBst.
lie stated that tIle briefing had givell a clear indication of how
a continental nation such as the Soviet Union could build a large
naval force in a relat ively short period.
The Italian Member pointed out that the Soviet Union had
no ships permanently stationed in the Mediterranean fourteen
years previously and now had a;->:,roximately fi fty high (Jual ity vessels
in station.
The Turkish ,'Iember provided an example of the increase
in Soviet submarines In the Hediterranean during the past twenty
years.
The Un ited States ~tcml>er stressed that the Soviet Union
was continuing with th'e desires or old Russia to make the
transition from :1 cont inental t" an international power and the
information cont:lined in the briefin:: gave evidence tllat they had
reached that status.
The Chairman asked about slIpport capability in the
Pacific area for Soviet aviation ships and their aircraft and
if the Soviets ~'c)uld I::aintain large anti-submarine cruisers in
the Paei fie flee t.
The Briefer responded that some support
capabilities existedln the Vladivostok area.
He said the HINSK
was permanently :,tationed in the Pacj,fic and the LENINGRAD was
the only ship to stay in the Inclian Ocean [or a period of time.
The Un i ted States Mem'ler 0 Ffered the information that
the Soviet UnIon had complete LiCTlities at Vladivostok to
support the MINS" and this ship had also been operating out of
a Vietnam naval 'lase huilt by the Uni,ted States.
THE

CO"f~tI TTF E

Record - NC-CBX-S4-8J

TOOK 'JOTE.

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