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PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991


PEOPLE V ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
BIDIN, J.:p
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the
Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court,
Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of
Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article
11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act.The facts as summarized in the brief of the
prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the
appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went
to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita,
Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped
packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation
to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant
informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages
to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the
contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his
name, passport number, the date of shipment and the
name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER
FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland"
(Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could
examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however,
refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained
books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in
Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes
no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four
(4) packages were then placed inside a brown
corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styrofoam was placed at the bottom and on top of the
packages before the box was sealed with masking tape,
thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of
Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar
odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he
squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves
and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles,
he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the
opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on

one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams


of the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987;
Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the
shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the
cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's
shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was
interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes
informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in
his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI
agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at
Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's
packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI
agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam
and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the
gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been
contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38,
October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was
likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the
package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana
leaves. The package which allegedly contained
tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that
dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath
the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of
the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn,
pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but
to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport
being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents
requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On
August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the
Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light
on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On
the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted
the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for
laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves
were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic
chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).

Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for


violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the


preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.

After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.

Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee


against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in
the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:

In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following


errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED
OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT
HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE
UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT
OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE
APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME
INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p. 1;Rollo, p.
55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the
imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and
seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art.
III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same
should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art.
III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,


houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but uponprobable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1
[3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As
such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the
United States Federal Supreme Court and State
Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this
jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp
v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643,
81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in
Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as
inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a
defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the
process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's
Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of
evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure.
The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized
the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present
with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the
exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility
of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures.
(Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971];
Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v.
Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145
SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et
al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases
adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably
procured by the State acting through the medium of its
law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.

On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar


character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person,
acting in a private capacity and without the intervention
and participation of State authorities. Under the
circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that
his constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may
an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the
State?

The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457


P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who
searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof
found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and
participation of police authorities, was declared
admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of
narcotics.

We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental


interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.

And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429


S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure
clauses are restraints upon the government and its
agents, not upon private individuals (citing People v.
Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966);
State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v.
Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).

As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA


345 [1972]:

Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d


517 (1967). The Court there said:

1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search


and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person,
whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government, included in which is his residence, his
papers, and other possessions. . . .

The search of which appellant complains, however, was


made by a private citizen the owner of a motel in
which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left
behind a travel case containing the evidence***
complained of. The search was made on the motel
owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became
suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the
bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities.

. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such


have the access except under the circumstances above
noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house,
however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called
upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to
respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States,
116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct.
547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures
declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against
unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in
previous cases, its protection applies to governmental
action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign
authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon
other than governmental agencies; as against such
authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to
secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation
of his dwelling and the possession of his property,
subject to the right of seizure by process duly served.

The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do


not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a
search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only
proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into
possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable
search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason
why the same should not be admitted against him in the
prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that
NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the
evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which
resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to
be clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument
stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily
foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an
illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise.
Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job

Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who


made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection
was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on
the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before
delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the
Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18;
pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box
containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same
to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of
business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing
the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and
custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI
agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal
one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is
in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which
is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid
thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d
135). Where the contraband articles are identified without
a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not
the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v.
Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of
California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v.
State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was
likewise held that where the property was taken into
custody of the police at the specific request of the
manager and where the search was initially made by the
owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure
within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals
finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the
fundamental law of the land must always be subject to
protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner
Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights
answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of
fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against
the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship
between the individual and the state. Its concern is not
the relation between individuals, between a private

individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights


does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private
sphere inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship
Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986;
Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its agencies tasked with
the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers,
a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass
the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is
made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a
private establishment for its own and private purposes,
as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search
and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of
the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present
phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly
declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in
violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal
search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence
was procured by police authorities or private individuals
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the
constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people,
does not govern relationships between individuals.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications
introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III)
relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or
warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge
in the issuance thereof (SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167
SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and
Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications
introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the
restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and
seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the
State and did not shift to anyone else.

Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable


search and seizure may only be invoked against the
State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise
of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act
of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights
should also be construed as an act of the State would
result in serious legal complications and an absurd
interpretation of the constitution.

there any proof by the defense that appellant gave


uncounselled confession while being investigated. What
is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the
trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to
the testimony of appellant while under custodial
investigation which was utilized in the finding of
conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is
therefore misplaced.

Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an


individual effected through private seizure equally
applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, nongovernmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights
to privacy and communication.

3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error,


appellant would like us to believe that he was not the
owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs
but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom
appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the
course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael
requested him to ship the packages and gave him
P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German
national was about to leave the country the next day
(October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).

2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends


that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the
undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution
while under custodial investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully
examined the records of the case and found nothing to
indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not
informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave
statements without the assistance of counsel. The law
enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed
of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have
regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131)
and their testimonies should be given full faith and
credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What
is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that
appellant refused to give any written statement while
under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the
NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes.
What about the accused here, did you investigate the
accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the
girl but the accused availed of his constitutional right not
to give any written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987,
p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution
was not contradicted by the defense on crossexamination. As borne out by the records, neither was

Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find


appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and
contrary to human experience. It can easily be
fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger
struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to
entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out
P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily
accede to comply with the undertaking without first
ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a)
person would not simply entrust contraband and of
considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering
tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete
stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other
hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take
custody of the packages and ship the same from a
complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19,
Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the
errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight
in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight
than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571
[1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect
considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was
previously convicted of possession of hashish by the
Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on
January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated
shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was
likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an
hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich,

Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original


Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in
itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968],
citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also
People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v.
Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92
SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did
not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete
address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the
German national was the owner of the merchandise,
appellant should have so indicated in the contract of
shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the
contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and
shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption
that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts
of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule
131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to
claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the
trial court in rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.G.R. No. 93833
September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, VS
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S.
GARCIA, respondents.

The transcript on which the civil case was based was


culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon
M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang
nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta
rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano
ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong
binalikan, sabing ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic)
mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan
hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo,
nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung
kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi
hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon icocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung
gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok
dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka
kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan
na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D.
Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity
and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought moral damages,
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the
amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests
and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion.

ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng


mga no (sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok
sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung
gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam
kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI Eh, di sana


ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi
wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung
hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo,
makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina"
sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo
ang mga magulang ko.

jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named


accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by
Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with
said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly
record the said conversation and thereafter communicate
in writing the contents of the said recording to other
person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa


loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey
yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.

MARIANO M. CUNETA

CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga


Union.ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong
kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako.
Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil
tapos ka na.

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a


Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a
violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial
court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with
petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an
offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation
punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a
communication by a personother than a participant to the
communication. 4

CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.


ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi
kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako
makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.
3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and
alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other
purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation
of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted
herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro
D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in
Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the

Asst. City Fiscal

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a


Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which
forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial
court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding
that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus
quashing the information based on the ground that the
facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the
respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal
issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act
4200 does not apply to the taping of a private

conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.


She contends that the provision merely refers to the
unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party
other than those involved in the communication.8 In
relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or
content of the conversation must be alleged in the
Information, otherwise the facts charged would not
constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner
agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private
communication," not a "private conversation" and that
consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation
with private respondent was not illegal under the said
act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to
its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to
only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and
Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkietalkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the
parties to any private communication to secretly record
such communication by means of a tape recorder. The
law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought
to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute's intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication
who records his private conversation with another
without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records,


moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion
that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed
contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications
taken either by the parties themselves or by third
persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or
recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear to be
material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not
made by all the parties but by some parties and involved
not criminal cases that would be mentioned under
section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or
special proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an
effort to show the intent of the parties because the
actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even
subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of
their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would
you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within
the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this
bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in
the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in
Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on
tape recorded conversations taken without the
authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your
Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is
not sporting to record the observation of one without his
knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is
not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record
the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties
should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of
recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that
in meetings of the board of directors where a tape

recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the


parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks
and observations are being made should know that the
observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of
persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever you
say here may be used against you." That is fairness and
that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he
makes damaging statements against his own interest,
well, he cannot complain any more. But if you are going
to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a
person without him knowing that it is being taped or
recorded, without him knowing that what is being
recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12,
1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that
under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party
secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized
under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the
recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not
contemplated by the bill. It is the communication between
one person and another person not between a
speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March
12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision,
taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from
the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the
view held by the respondent court that the provision
seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions,
one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to
a violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information. What
R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,

intercepting or recording private communications by


means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his
COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in
the said law) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as
well as its communication to a third person should be
professed."14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private
communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary
meaning of the word "communication" to a point of
absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In
its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act
of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a
conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which
meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals
through a common system of symbols (as language
signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad
enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts"
which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.
Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the
phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to
rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and
"communication" were interchangeably used by Senator
Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to
fear from their conversations being overheard. But this
statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as
well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized
people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish
to expose. Freeconversations are often characterized by
exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the
expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to
be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of
communication, among others, has expressly been
assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the
framers of our Constitution must have recognized the
nature of conversations between individuals and the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and
of his intellect. They must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the
unaudited, and free exchange of communication

between individuals free from every unjustifiable


intrusion by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case
which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we
held that the use of a telephone extension for the
purpose of overhearing a private conversation without
authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a
telephone extension devise was neither among those
"device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19
following the principle that "penal statutes must be
construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant
case turns on a different note, because the applicable
facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A.
4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself
explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of
private communications with the use of tape-recorders as
among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case
at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with
no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a


telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 35).
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who
is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case because his regular
lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
According to the request, appellant went to the office of
Laconico where he was briefed about the problem.
(Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).
When complainant called up, Laconico requested
appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension so as to hear personally
the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant
heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the
figure had been increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of
the P8,000.00 had been made together with other
demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher
Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in
persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct
Assault against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City
Fiscal's Office;

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner, VS


INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before


the students of Don Bosco Technical High School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:


This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of
Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the
Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an
extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in
Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a
private
conversation
would
constitute
unlawful
interception of communications between the two parties
using a telephone line.
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the
respondent court's decision are not disputed by the
petitioner.
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty.
Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the
living room of complainant's residence discussing the
terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal
of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had

(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or


another section of Don Bosco Technical High School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the
Maltreatment case earlier filed against Manuel Montebon
at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's
affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case against
Atty. Laconico to be filed later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the
Don Bosco Technical School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the
Direct Assault Case to the mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August
26, 1981, pp. 47-48).
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask
Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico

answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait


for instructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn,
March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).

No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be


construed in favor of the petitioner.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:

Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to


give the money to his wife at the office of the then
Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier
alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary,
insisted that complainant himself should receive the
money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he
received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant
was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit
stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for
the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico
attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant.
Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation
without complainant's consent, complainant charged
appellant and Laconico with violation of the AntiWiretapping Act.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision
dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and
Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No.
4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year
imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision,
the petitioner appealed to the appellate court.
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court
affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the
communication between the complainant and accused
Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered
by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such
communication without the knowledge and consent of
the complainant; and that the extension telephone which
was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone
conversation between complainant and Laconico is
covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No.
4200.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the
decision of the appellate court and raises the following
issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation
between the complainant and accused Laconico was
private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension
telephone is covered by the term "device or
arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether or
not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said
telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being


authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkietalkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or
not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceeding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies
thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured
either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for
any other person or persons; or to communicate the
contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, that the use of such record or
any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3
hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
We rule for the petitioner.
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a
penal statute and not a rule of evidence. The issue is not
the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension
line of a telephone by a third party. The issue is whether
or not the person called over the telephone and his
lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line
should both face prison sentences simply because the
extension was used to enable them to both listen to an
alleged attempt at extortion.
There is no question that the telephone conversation
between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty.
Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words
uttered were made between one person and another as
distinguished from words between a speaker and a
public. It is also undisputed that only one of the parties
gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear
the caller's message with the use of an extension
telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member
of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the
alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order
to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge

against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's


Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening.
We have to consider, however, that affirmance of the
criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by
merely using a telephone line can force the listener to
secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying
the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against
the listener's.
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive
nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads
which telephone cables are made to carry in certain
areas, telephone users often encounter what are called
"crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick
up his telephone and who overhears the details of a
crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he
knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of
using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private
communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law
was never intended for such mischievous results.
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however,
revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other
device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone
unit such a device or arrangement as would subject the
user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six
years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an
alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their
bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use
answering or recording devices to record business
conversations
between
a
boss
and
another
businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message
for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for
that matter, would a "party line" be a device or
arrangement under the law?
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension
telephones are not included in the enumeration of
"commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do
they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic
devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964,
when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was
being considered in the Senate, telephones and
extension telephones were already widely used
instruments, probably the most popularly known
communication device.
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line
would be punishable was discussed on the floor of the
Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no
mention was made of telephones in the enumeration of
devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or

dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape


recorder or however otherwise described." The omission
was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were
intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.
The respondent People argue that an extension
telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device"
within the context of the aforementioned law because it is
not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone
apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a
movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of
telephone receiver not forming part of a main telephone
set which can be detached or removed and can be
transferred away from one place to another and to be
plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the
desired communication corning from the other party or
end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a
"device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly
overhearing,
intercepting,
or
recording
the
communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate
installation of a device or arrangement in order to
overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same
category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other
devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the
use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire
or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in
this case was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in
statutory construction that in order to determine the true
intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and
phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part
thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any
of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso
Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).
In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90
SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:
Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that
'however general the terms of a contract may be, they
shall not be understood to comprehend things that are
distinct and cases that are different from those upon
which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article
1374 of the same Code provides that 'the various
stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together,
attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may
result from all of them taken jointly.

xxx xxx xxx


Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of
the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should be
then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and
should not be construed as to comprehend all other
obligations of the decedent. The rule that
'particularization followed by a general expression will
ordinarily be restricted to the former' is based on the fact
in human experience that usually the minds of parties are
addressed specially to the particularization, and that the
generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other
fields if they stood alone, are used in contemplation of
that upon which the minds of the parties are centered.
(Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis.
603, 607, 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules
of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1
of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend
instruments of the same or similar nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be tantamount to
tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to
instruments whose installation or presence cannot be
presumed by the party or parties being overheard
because, by their very nature, they are not of common
usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very
common especially now when the extended unit does not
have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but
can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a
kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that
the party he is calling at the other end of the line
probably has an extension telephone and he runs the
risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line
or a telephone unit which shares its line with another. As
was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355,
U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):
Common experience tells us that a call to a particular
telephone number may cause the bell to ring in more
than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a
telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party
may have an extension telephone and may allow another
to overhear the conversation. When such takes place
there has been no violation of any privacy of which the
parties may complain. Consequently, one element of
605, interception, has not occurred.

In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct
of the party would differ in no way if instead of repeating
the message he held out his hand-set so that another
could hear out of it and that there is no distinction
between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to
use an extension telephone for the same purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must
be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in
case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an
extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or
arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as
not including an extension telephone. In the case of
People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we explained the
rationale behind the rule:
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this
rule to be the tenderness of the law of the rights of
individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the
discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Harris,
177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin
Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531,
69 NE2d; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE
1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The purpose is not
to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through
a technicality but to provide a precise definition of
forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in
Martin's Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed.
pp. 183-184).
In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the
construction or interpretation of a legislative measure,
the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent
and spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate
Congressional Records will show that not only did our
lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension
telephone as a prohibited device or arrangement" but of
greater importance, they were more concerned with
penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely
listening to a telephone conversation.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada. Another possible objection to that is
entrapment which is certainly objectionable. It is made
possible by special amendment which Your Honor may
introduce.
Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment
would be less possible with the amendment than without
it, because with the amendment the evidence of
entrapment would only consist of government testimony

as against the testimony of the defendant. With this


amendment, they would have the right, and the
government officials and the person in fact would have
the right to tape record their conversation.
Senator Taada. In case of entrapment, it would be the
government.
Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision,
neither party could record and, therefore, the court would
be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the
police officers or the defendant?" In these cases, as
experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with the
peace offices.
(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March
12, 1964).
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under
these conditions, with an agent outside listening in, he
could falsify the testimony and there is no way of
checking it. But if you allow him to record or make a
recording in any form of what is happening, then the
chances of falsifying the evidence is not very much.
Senator Taada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to
prevent the presentation of false testimony. If we could
devise a way by which we could prevent the presentation
of false testimony, it would be wonderful. But what this
bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record and other
electronic devices to intercept private conversations
which later on will be used in court.
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964,
p. 629).
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to
discourage, through punishment, persons such as
government authorities or representatives of organized
groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence
for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some
unwarranted advantage over the telephone users.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be
punishable must strictly be with the use of the
enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar
nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is
not among such devices or arrangements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August
16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner

is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep.


Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping
Act.G.R. No. L-68635 March 12, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY
ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLAILUSTRE in G.R. NO. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLAILUSTRE vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET
AL.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent to
Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz,
and a fourth letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to Justice Florentino
P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division of this COURT,
(mcorporated herein by reference), in feigned ignorance of the
Constitutional requirement that the Court's Divisions are composed of,
and must act through, at least five (5) members, and in a stance of
dangling threats to effect a change of the Court's adverse resolution,
petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre wrote in part:
Please forgive us for taking the Liberty of addressing you this letter
which we do hope you will read very carefully.
It is important to call your attention to the dismissal of Case No. G.R.
68635 entitled Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al. by an untenable minute-resolution although an extended one,
dated 14 May 1986 which we consider as an just resolution deliberately
and knowingly promulgated by the First Division of the Supreme Court
of which you are a member.
xxx xxx xxx
We consider the three minute-resolution: the first dated 14 May 1986; the
second, dated 9 July 1986; and the third, 3 September 1986, railroaded
with such hurry/ promptitude unequaled in the entire history of the
Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of
legal and judicial ethic.
xxx xxx xxx
Your attention is called to minute-resolution of 9 July 1986 which writes
finish to our case before the Supreme Court (... THIS IS FINAL.) There
is nothing final in this world We assure you that this case is far from
finished by a long shot For at the proper time, we shall so act and bring
this case before another forum where the members of the Court can no
longer deny our action with minute resolutions that are not only unjust
but are knowingly and deuberat only promulgated. The people deserve to
know how the members of the highest tribunal of the land perform in the
task of decision making by affixing their respective signed on judgments
that they render on petitions that they themselves give due course.
Please understand that we are pursuing further remedies in our quest for
justice under the law. We intend to hold responsible members of the First
Division who participated in the promulgation of these three minuteresolutions in question. For the members thereof cannot claim immunity
when their action runs afoul with penal sanctions, even in the
performance of official functions; like others, none of the division
members are above the law.

In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid doing injustice to anyone,


particularly the members of the First Division, providing that they had no
hand in the promulgation of the resolution in question. That is why we
are requesting you to inform us your participation in the promulgation of
these resolutions in question. Even we who are poor are also capable of
playing fair even to those who take advantage of our poverty by sheer
power and influence. We shall then wait for your reply. If, however, we
do not hear from you after a week, then we will consider your silence that
you supported the dismissal of our petition. We will then be guided
accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).
The letter also attacked the participation in the case of Justice Pedro L.
Yap, Chairman of the First Division in this wise:
As Division Chairman, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, as a copy of
Resolution dated 14 May 1986 we received indicate, did not even have
the elementary courtesy of putting on record that he voluntarily inhibited
himself from participating in the promulgation of this minute-resolution,
although an extended one, which he should have done consistent with
judicial decorum and the Canons of Judicial Ethics. After he is the law
partner of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez counsel for respondents, now the
distinguished Solicitor General ... indicative that even at this stage of the
proceeding in point of time, the Supreme Court still recognizes Atty.
Sedfrey A. Ordonez as counsel for respondents, even as he is already the
Solicitor General. For not withdrawing from the case formally Atty.
Ordonez has manifested his unmitigated arrogance that he does not
respect the Canons of Professional Ethics, to the actuation of his law
partner, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, Chairman of the First Division of
the Supreme Court, an act that further aggravates the growing wrinkles in
the domain of judicial statesmanship, impressed as it is, with very serious
and dangerous implications.
(9) By 11 April 1986, date of the reorganization of the First Division,
Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez already became the Solicitor General. With
such amazingly magical coincidence, Dr. Pedro Yap, law partner of Atty.
Sedfrey A. Ordonez in the law firm Salonga, Ordonez Yap, Padian
became the Chairman of the Division.
xxx xxx xxx
(11) So we see that on 11 August 1986 to 14 May 1986 when some
members of the Division were still busy putting their respective offices in
order and had possibly have no Idea about the Maravilla case.
Was it possible for Chairman Yap to have convinced the Division
members that Maravilla petition is without merit and since the members
the new ones knew nothing about the case, readily agreed to the
dismissal of the petition by a minute. resolution an extended one.
After all, this was the case of the Solicitor General. If this is what
happened, then we are sorry to say that you were deliberately "had"
After ala the 14 May 1986 untenable minute resolution although an
extended one, does not bear the signatures of the Division members. The
members should have signed the resolution, after ala the Supreme Court
had given the petition due course, indicating whether they concur, dissent
or otherwise abstain from voting.
The letter to Justice Herrera went on to state:
We assume, of course, that you had studied the case thoroughly since you
were with the original First Division under the chairmanship of then
Justice Claudio Teehankee. We assure you that we will bring this case
before another forum to hold responsible the members of the Division
who participated in the dismissal of the case by the unjust minute-

resolutions, knowingly rendered for intended objective that your


conscience you are aware.
xxx xxx xxx
We leave the next move to you by informing us your participation in the
promulgation of the minute-resolutions in question Please do not take this
matter rightly for we know justice in the end will prevail. For if we do
not hear from you within a week, we will consider your silence as your
admission that you supported the dismissal of the petition. In this way, we
shall then be guided accordingly. The moment we take action in the plans
we are completing, we will then call a press conference with TV and
radio coverage. Arrangements in this regard are being done. The people
should or ought to know why we were thwarted in our quest for plain
justice.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, in view of action that we are prepared to take in this case, that
will no doubt cause nationwide attention, and there should be anyone that
will cause me harm personally, may we request you to show this letter to
the authorities concerned so that they will know where to look, when it
becomes necessary. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforesaid letters were included in the Agenda of the First Division of
22 October 1986, were "Noted," and referred en consulta to the Court en
banc.
On 28 October 1986, the Court en banc took up the background and
history of the case, found no reason to take any further action, and
referred the case back to the First Division 11 as set forth in the latter's
resolution of October 27, 1986. " In this Resolution, the First Division
traced the history of the case, clarified that Justice Yap assumed his
position in this Court only on 2 May 1986; that when the resolution of
dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986, Justice Abad Santos was the
incumbent Chairman of the First Division, and that Justice Yap was
unaware that Atty. Ordonez was private respondents' counsel; that upon
realization thereof, Justice Yap inhibited himself from further
participation in the case; and that Justice Yap was designated Chairman of
the First Division only on 14 July 1986, after the compulsory retirement
of Justice Vicente Abad Santos on 12 July 1986. The Resolution of the
First Division (incorporated herein by reference) concluded thus:
The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study. Because a
case is resolved against the interests of a party, does not mean that it is an
"unjust decision" or that it has been "railroaded".
This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently rendered
justice without fear or favor. YAP, J., took no part.
On 3 November 1986, petitioner again addressed similar letters to
Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz, (incorporated herein by reference),
excerpts from which follow:
It is rather amazing that when we wrote you our previous letter, we never
dreamed that you would rush, as you did rush for assistance en consults
with the Honorable Court en banc. The unfortunate part of it all is the fact
that the Court en banc had to promulgate its resolution dated 28 October
1986 which to us when considered in its entirety, is just as untenable as
the First Division extended and unsigned minute-resolution of 14 May
1986.
Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry, to wit: 'Did you or did
you not approve the dismissal of our petition under

1) The l4 May l986 minute resolution? Yes or No.


2) The 9 July l986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
That was we asked. The other matters contained in our letter were
intended merely to give you the highlights of our case. This is what we
wanted to know to properly guide us when we finally bring our case to
the other forum of justice.
Did it ever occur to you that when you and the other members of the First
Division referred our letters to the Honorable Court en banc en consults it
was all your fault that the Court en banc had to promulgate its unsigned
extended minute-resolution that unfortunately exposed the distinguished
members of the newly reorganized Supreme Court and, at the same time,
convicted themselves as guilty of distorting facts involved in our
petition?
This, we are sure, will come as a shock to you. We will show you why.
xxx xxx xxx
This is just a sample of what we will expose to the nation before the other
forum of justice where we will soon bring this case beyond the reach of
the newly reorganized Supreme Court We are prepared to expose many
more of this kind of judicial performance readily constituting truvesty of
justice Ponder upon this well because it is our very firm conviction that
the people deserve to know how the distinguished members of the highest
tribunal of the land perform in duties in this most sensitive area of
decision making.
Anyhow, whether you referred our letter to the Court en banc consults) or
not, the situation remains the same. At the proper time, as we said, we
will bring this case before another forum of justice where the members of
the First Division, in fact the Honorable Court en banc may no longer
deny our action by mere untenable and unjust minute resolutions. Better
believe it that we intend to hold responsible members of the First
Division who took part in the promulgation of the untenable and unjust
extended minute-resolution that is not even signed by any of those who
promulgated it; therefore, to us, is clearly bereft of judicial integrity from
its very inception on 14 May 1986.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, we will bring this case before another forum of justice as Eva
Maravilla Ilustre against the distinguished members of the First Division,
in fact against the entire membership of the newly organized Supreme
Court (because of its en banc unsigned extended minute-resolution that
iswithout judicial integrity, dated 28 October 1986). But do not be
mislead (sic) for we are not alone in this fight. Other lawyers, not just by
their mere sympathy for me personally and my case, but by their firm
conviction that judicial statesmanship must be maintained at nines in the
highest tribunal of justice in the land, that they have offered their free
legal services when the legal confrontation begins.
xxx xxx xxx
Paragraph 4, found on page 3 of the en banc resolution projects the most
fantastic, most unbelievable picture of Division Chairman Justice Yap. It
states
...When the resolution of dismissal on May 14, 1986, Justice Yap was
unaware that Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez was private respondent's counsel.

The Honorable Court en banc must think everybody stupid to swallow


this statement hook, line and sinker For Justice Yap we say. Tell that to
the marines. But more than this, we leave this matter to the conscience of
Justice Yap.
Ignoramus that we are, unschooled in the domain of law and procedure,
but we are learning a few as we promulgated our case within legitimate
that we state here that both resolutions that promulgated by the Court en
banc of 28 October 1986 and that promulgated by the First Division
dated 27 October 1986, are nothing but a desperate attempt when both are
considered in their respective entirety, to maneuver without success,
some semblance of justification on the untenable and unjust 14 May 1986
extended and unsigned minute-resolution that is bereft of judicial
integrity.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, if the members of the First Division and those of the Honorable
Court en banc think for one minute that because of their respective 4page minute but extended resolutions apparently impressive for their lack
of merit deliberately unsigned that exposed their lack of judicial integrity,
that we win now give up the fight, just forget it. Ignoramus that we are,
better believe it when we say we are prepared to carry the fight before
another forum of justice. When we do, we shall call for a press
conference with TV and radio coverage, so that we can present to the
entire nation our quest for justice against the steam-roller of power and
influence and, at the same time, to call the attention of the people to the
manner in which the members of the highest tribunal of the land perform
their respective individual and collective functions in the domain of this
most sensitive area of decision making.
Allow us to restate our previous and now, our present inquiry, to wit:
Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition under
a) The l4 May l986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
b) The 9 July l986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
c) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No. (Emphasis supplied).
True to her threats, after having lost her case before this Court, petitioner
filed on 16 December 1986 an Affidavit-Complaint before the
Tanodbayan, totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal
considerations set forth in this Court's aforecited Resolutions of the First
Division and en banc. Some Members of this Court were maliciously
charged with having knowingly and deliberately rendered, with bad faith,
an unjust, extended Minute Resolution "making" her opponents the
"illegal owners" of vast estates. Some Justices of the Court of Appeals
were similarly maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their
"unjust resolution" of 20 January 1984 "through manifest and evident bad
faith," when their Resolution had in fact and law been upheld by this
Court. Additionally, Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Justice
Pedro Yap of this Court were also maliciously charged with having used
their power and influence in persuading and inducing the members of the
First Division of this Court into promulgating their "unjust extended
Minute Resolution of 14 May 1986."
All the foregoing, in complete disregard of the Resolutions of this Court,
as the tribunal of last resort, 1) upholding the challenged judgment of the
Court of Appeals; 2) dismissing the Petition on the ground that the
doctrine of res judicata was clearly applicable not only as to the probate
of the Will of the decedent but also as to the heirship of petitioner, among
others, and their right to intervene and participate in the proceedings; and

3) finding that there was no attempt whatsoever on the part of Justice Yap
nor Solicitor General Ordonez to unduly influence the members of the
First Division.
The Complaint before the Tanodbayan (incorporated herein by reference)
was allegedly filed "in my quest for justice, something that has been
closed to me by the Supreme Court forever" and specifically charged:

properties whether under testate or intestate succession or mixed


succession (Emphasis supplied).
Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the
press, which was widely publicized in almost all dailies on 23 December
1986, without any copy furnished this Court nor the members who were
charged. The issue of the Daily Express of 23 December 1986 published
a banner headline reading

CHARGE NO. ONE


ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE GRAFT CHARGES
Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Justice Pedro Yap of 1) "persuading,
inducing, influencing the members of the newly organized First
Division ... into promulgating their unjust, extended minute
RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986, knowingly with deliberate intent with
such unusual hurry promptitude unequaled in the entire history of the
Supreme Court base on insignificant issues and deliberately
evading/prevaricating the more important substantial ones raised in my
petition, in violation of Section 3, sub-letter (a) of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, ... ; and
(2) Under the same Section 3, sub-letter (e) of the same Republic Act ...
for causing me and the other heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by
using their power and influence as Solicitor-General and Associate
Justice, respectively. ...
CHARGE NO. TWO

thereby making it unjustly appear that the Justices of this Court and the
other respondents were charged with "graft and corruption" when the
Complaint was actually filed by a disgruntled litigant and her counsel
after having lost her case thrice in this Court.
On 26 December 1986, the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) dismissed
petitioner's Complaint and decreed in the dispositive portion of his
Resolution (herein incorporated by reference) that:
WHEREFORE, all the premises considered, this Office resolves to
dismiss the complaint against Justices Pedro Yap, Isagani Cruz, Andres
Narvasa, Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, Vicente Abad Santos, and will
continue evaluating the complaint against Justices Serafin Cuevas, Luis
Javellana and Vicente Mendoza, Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordonez and
the private respondents.

Associate Justices Luis Javellana, Vicente Mendoza and Serafin Cuevas,


members of the then FOURTH SPECIAL CASES DIVISION,
Intermediate Appellate Court

The aforestated Resolution indicated at the bottom of the last page:

1) For knowingly rendering their unjust RESOLUTION dated 20 January


1984 in the exercise of their functions through manifest and evident bad
faith in CA-G.R. No. SP-13680, entitled "Francisco Q. Maravilla, et al. v.
Hon. Antonia Corpus Macandog, et al." in violation of article 204 of the
revised Penal Code,-

DEAN WENCESLAO LAURETA

2) For causing me and the other heirs such undue injury' by deliberately,
knowingly rendering their unjust RESOLUTION dated 20 January
1984 ... in violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, Section 3 (e)
thereof.
CHARGE NO THREE
Associate Justice Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then Chairman of the
First Division of the Supreme Court as of 14 May 1986, and Associate
Justice Isagani Cruz, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera and Pedro
Yap, ...
1) For knowingly and deliberately rendering their unjust extended
MINUTE RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986 dismissing my petition in
G.R. No. 68635, ... with manifest and evident bad faith to make the
clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez now the distinguished Solicitor
General the 'illegal owners' of the vast estates of my aunt Digna
Maravilla ...;
2) Under Section 3, sub-letter (e) Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, ...
for deliberately causing us heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by
depriving us of our rights over my aunt's vast estates because of their
manifest and evident bad faith in knowingly promulgating their unjust
extended minute RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986, deliberately intended
to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez, now the Solicitor
General the "illegal owners" of my aunt Digna Maravilla's estates when
under the law, these Ordonez clients are not entitled to own these vast

Copy Furnished:

Counsel for the Complainant


919 Prudencio Street
Sampaloc, Manila
In the Resolution of this Court en banc, dated January 29, 1986, it
required:
(1) Petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre to show cause, with in ten (10) days
from notice, why she should not be held in contempt for her aforecited
statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or
official actions of the Justices concerned, which statements, unless
satisfactorily explained, transcend the permissible bounds of propriety
and undermine and degrade the administration of justice; and
(2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, as an officer of the Court, to show cause,
within ten (10) days from notice, why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him for the aforecited statements, conduct, acts and charges
against the Supreme Court and the official actions of the Justices
concerned, and for hiding therefrom in anonymity behind his client's
name, in an alleged quest for justice but with the manifest intent to bring
the Justices into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts
and the orderly administration of justice. (pp. 383-384, Rollo).
(1)
In her Compliance-Answer filed on February 9, 1987, wherein Eva
Maravilla Ilustre prays that the contempt proceedings against her be
dismissed, she contends, in essence, that: (1) "there was no intention to
affront the honor and dignity" of the Court; (2) the letters addressed to the
individual Justices were private in character and were never meant for

anybody, much less the Supreme Court en banc, "there (being) a


constitutional mandate affording protection to privacy of
communications;" (3) if her statements in those letters were really
contemptuous, the Court "should have immediately taken disciplinary
proceedings" against her, and not having done so, the Court has
"forfeited" that right and is now "estopped" from doing so; this citation
for contempt is a "vindictive reprisal" for her having filed the complaint
before the Tanodbayan, "an action that lacks sincerity, taken not in the
spirit of judicial statemanship;" (4) she instituted the complaint before the
Tanodbayan "in my honest behalf that I lost my case before the Supreme
Court not because of lack of merit or of its own merits, assisted by
attorneys who offered their services in the prosecution of my case;" (5)
the newspaper publicity of this case "was no fault of mine; neither is it
the fault of my former counsel Dean Wenceslao Laureta, " who prevailed
upon her to call off the press conference with TV and radio coverage; that
she is not a "disgruntled litigant" who thrice lost before the Court, rather,
she has challenged the validity of the resolutions of the Court "containing
distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken inferences" particularly, in
that (a) there is no res judicata, (b) the Court of Appeals in its decision
declared that the judgment of the trial Court had long attained finality, so
that it can no longer be set aside, (c) her 11 opponents," clients of Atty.
Ordonez, are not entitled to own her aunt's "vast properties" whether
under the law of testate or intestate succession or mixed succession," (d)
that the statement in this Court's Resolution that the Court of Appeals had
denied intervention is an "unadulterated distortion of the facts;" (b) the
statement in the en banc Resolution that some Justices of the Court of
Appeals were similarly maliciously charged with knowingly rendering
their "unjust resolution" of 20 January 1984 is a bit "premature, a prejudgment over a case over which this Court does not have jurisdiction;"
(7) Atty. Laureta is not her counsel in the case before the Tanodbayan; (8)
before the latter body, she has "established not only probable cause but
has also proved the collective culpability (of the Justices concerned) as
charged;" (9) and that her 53 page Motion for Reconsideration before the
Tanodbayan is made an integral part of her Answer.
(2)
In his own Answer, Atty. Laureta maintains substantially that: (1) he is
not respondent Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and that she has
consulted and/or engaged the services of other attorneys in the course of
the prosecution of her case, fike Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan and Atty.
Vedastro B. Gesmundo; that he just learned from other sources that
respondent llustre was planning to bring her case to the Tanodbayan with
the assistance of other lawyers who offered her their legal services; (2) it
was he who dissuaded her from calling her intended press conference and
from circulating copies of her complaint "not only in the performance of
duty as an officer of the court, but also as a former president of Manila III
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and as a professional
lecturer in Legal and Judicial Ethics in some Manila law schools in his
desire to protect and uphold the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court
as the highest tribunal of the land." He should, therefore, be given "a little
bit of credit for what he did" instead of taking this disciplinary
proceeding against him; that Ms. Ilustre is not a "disgruntled litigant"
who "lost her case thrice in this Court;" (3) he did not prepare respondent
Ilustre's letters to the individual Justices, I appearances to the contrary
notwithstanding," that these letters were "never, at any time, considered
as constituting contempt of court" in the resolutions of this Court,
otherwise, "it would have taken immediate disciplinary action as it is
doing now;" the Court has lost its right to consider the statements in the
letters as constituting contempt and it is now "estopped" from proceeding
with this disciplinary action; (4) by doing so, this Court has
"unmistakably revealed the intent and character that underlie its present
action as a vindictive judicial vengeance, inconsistent with the spirit of

judicial statesmanship by hiding behind the well-recognized fact that the


Supreme Court is supreme in the domain of the administration of justice;"
(5) "there was no disregard intended to the Resolution of the Honorable
Court, as the tribunal of last resort, relative to its upholding the judgment
of the Court of Appeals;" he is just doing "his duty as an officer of the
court to put the records in this regard in their proper light;" particularly
(a) that the judgment of the trial court had attained its finality long ago,
(b) the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable, otherwise, this Court
would not have remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for review, (c)
the observation in the First Division's extended Resolution of 14 July
1986 that Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Ordonez was private
respondents' counsel "defies every vestige of human understanding," that
Justice Yap had forthwith inhibited himself from participating in the case
is not borne out by the record of this case. Justice Yap had "never
voluntarily entered on the record his inhibition" when he should have
done so when respondent Ilustre's petition was taken up; Justice Yap's
partner, Atty. Ordonez, continued to be recognized by this Court as
counsel for private respondents even as he was the Solicitor General; (b)
finally, "appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, he has not colted
acts unworthy of his profession. The truth of the matter is, he should at
least be credited in whatever small way for his acts and efforts taken by
him to protect and uphold the honor and dignity of the Honorable Court.
We find the explanations of both Ms. Ilustre and Atty. Laureta
unsatisfactory. Their claims that they had done nothing that could
constitute an affront to the honor and dignity of this Court dissipate in the
face of attendant facts and circumstances and "defy every vestige of
human understanding," to use their own language. Indeed, they should
not "think that they will win a hearing by the sheer multiplication of
words." (Mathew 6:7).
Respondents' reliance on the "privacy of communication" is misplaced.
Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the
performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial record
and are a matter of concern for the entire Court. The contumacious
character of those letters constrained the First Division to refer the same
to the Court en banc, en consults and so that the Court en banc could pass
upon the judicial acts of the Division. It was only in the exercise of
forbearance by the Court that it refrained from issuing immediately a
show cause order in the expectancy that after having read the Resolution
of the Court en banc of October 28, 1986, respondents would realize the
unjustness and unfairness of their accusations.
The Court is far from "estopped" in initiating these proceedings. The
Chief Justice had promptly announced his Statement, dated December 23,
1986, that "the Supreme Court will take appropriate steps on the matter
upon its resumption of sessions on the first working day of the year. "
There is no vindicative reprisal involved. The Court's authority and duty
under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and
dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his
client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.
We are not convinced that Atty. Laureta had nothing to do with
respondent Ilustre's letters to the individual Justices, nor with the com
plaint filed before the Tanodbayan. In the Motion for Reconsideration,
dated June 11, 1986, filed by Atty. Laureta in the main petition, he
stressed:
10. The composition of the First Division was reduced to five members.
Strangely enough, about one month later, the Honorable Court
promulgated its extended resolution with such promptitude in the entire
history of the Supreme Court, unequaled in a manner of speaking, ...

In the Manifestation and Motion, dated June 25, 1986, filed by Atty.
Laureta (p. 311, Rollo), the same phrases were incanted:
the promptitude with which the Resolution of 14 May 1986 was
promulgated (par. 9, Motion for Reconsideration, p. 5) unequaled in the
entire history of the Supreme Court in so far as petitions given due course
is concerned ... (Emphasis given)
Those same terms are reproduced verbatim in the letters ostensibly
authored by respondent Ilustre addressed to the individual Justices whom
respondents have charged. Thus:
We consider the three minute resolutions ... railroaded with such
hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court
under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and
judicial ethics" ltr., to Justice Narvasa, p. 2; Itr., to Justice Herrera, p. 2;
Itr., to Justice Cruz, p. 2).
xxx xxx xxx
with such unusual hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of
the Supreme Court (Ltr., to Justice Narvasa, p. 5; Itr., to Justice Herrera,
p. 5; Itr., to Justice Cruz, p. 5).
The same terminologies are reiterated in the Complaint and in the Motion
for Reconsideration filed before the Tanodbayan (p. 2).
Further, in his Manifestation & Motion, dated June 25, 1986, Atty.
Laureta stated:
counsel for petitioner personally inquired from Division Clerk of Court
Corazon Served the following:

The foregoing is bolstered by the reports received by the members of the


Court that copies of the complaint filed with the Tanodbayan were
distributed to the editors of the metropolitan newspapers in envelopes
bearing the name of respondent Laureta, who was heard over the radio
speaking on the same complaint, and that he was following up the
complaint and the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of
the Tanodbayan.
Furthermore, respondent Laureta as his co-respondent Ilustre's lawyer
had control of the proceedings. As stressed by this Court in an early case,
as such lawyer, "Whatever steps his client takes should be within his
knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal E
times should be reminded him that '(a) lawyer should use his best efforts
to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the
lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their
conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If
a client pursuits in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their
relation.' " (In Re: Contempt Proceedings in Surigao Mineral Reservation
Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1, 23) Respondent Laureta manifestly failed
to discharge such responsibility. For all intents and purposes, he appears
to have encouraged and abetted his client in denigrating the members of
the First Division of this Court, by baselessly charging them with
rendering an "unjust" resolution with "deliberate bad faith," because of
his stubborn insistence on his untenable arguments which had been
rejected as without merit by the Court's First Division, whose Resolution
was upheld by the Court en banc. Worse, the dissemination in the print
and broadcast media in bold captions falsely depicting the Justices as
"FAC(ING) GRAFT CHARGES" instead of the baseless rantings of a
disgruntled litigant appear to have been timed to place them in a bad light
at the height of the Christmas season.
We come now to the specific accusations of respondents.

(1) When was the above-entitled case deliberated by the First Division?
(2) Are there recorded minutes of such deliberation?
(3) Who among the members of the Division voted for dismissal of the
petition to be promulgated by resolution and who did not, if any?
(4) Who prepared the Resolution? (p.312, Rollo).
Atty. Laureta's obsession to receive the answer to his queries surfaces
again in the second letters dated November 3, 1986 to the individual
Justices under the supposed signatures of respondent Ilustre, thus:
Evidently you misunderstood our point of in our first letter. It is a very
simple inquiry, to wit Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our
petition under
1) The l4 May l986 minute resoluTion? Yes or No
2) The 9 July l986 minute resoluTion? Yes or No
3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No. (Emphasis supplied)
ltr., to Justice Narvasa, p. 1; to Justice Herrera, p. 1; to Justice Cruz, p. 1)
Additionally, the disparaging remarks like: exertion of "undue" and
"powerful influence" by Atty. Ordonez and Justice Yap; "distortion of
facts, conjectures and mistaken references"; "untenable minute resolution
although extend. "unjust minute resolution" repeated by Atty. Laureta in
his several pleadings, echoed and re-echoed in the individual letters to the
Justices, as well as in the Complaint and the Motion for Reconsideration
before the Tanodbayan, reveal the not-too-hidden hand of Atty. Laureta.

They charge Associate Justices Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then


Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme Court as of May 14,1986,
Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Pedro Yap for knowingly
and deliberately rendering their "unjust, extended Resolution of May 14,
1986" dismissing their petition in this case with manifest and evident bad
faith to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez (now the Solicitor
General) the "illegal owners" of the estates of Digna Maravilla, thereby
causing the heirs of Ponciano Maravilla (Digna's eldest brother) undue
injury by depriving them of their rights over the estates of Digna
Maravilla (Charge No. Three before the Tanodbayan). They further
charge Justice Yap (and Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez) of having 11
persuade(ed), inducted(ed) and influence(ed) the members of the newly
organized First Division into promulgating their "unjust, extended minute
Resolution of 14 May 1986" (Charge No. One before the Tanodbayan),
which Resolution, (the "Division Resolution, " for short) is herewith
attached as Annex "A ".
Preliminarily, respondents deny that respondent Ilustre lost three times in
this Court. It cannot be denied, however, that, as stated in the Resolution
of October 28, 1986 of the Court en banc, this is the third time (in fact,
the fourth, if we include Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla, L-18799, 10
SCRA 589 [1964]) that a controversy involving the estate of the late
Digna Maravilla is elevated to this Court. The first was in G.R. No. L23225 (37 SCRA 672 [1971], where this Court ruled:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the court below denying
probate of the 1944 will of Digna Maravilla (Exhibit "A") is reversed and
the said testament is hereby ordered probated. Let the records be returned
to the Court of origin for further proceedings conformable to law. ...

As stated in the en banc Resolution of October 28, 1986 (hereto attached


as Annex " B ", and hereinafter referred to as the "Banc Decision") while
respondent Ilustre was not a party in that case, upon remand of the case to
the probate Court, she and other children of the deceased brothers and
sisters of the testatrix filed two Motions for Intervention. Respondent
Ilustre's participation in the state involved, therefore, harks back to that
first case.
The Court of Appeals resolved the issue of intervention in CA-G.R. No.
05394, entitled "Heirs of Pastor Maravilla, et al. vs. Hon. Ernesto S.
Tengco, et al." in a Decision penned by Justice Venicio E scolin
(hereinafter referred to as the "Escolin Decision") wherein it was
categorically ruled that there was no point to allowing intervention on the
part of respondent Ilustre, et al., "for failure to show any right or interest
in the estate in question. " Thus:
(2) As heretofore stated, private respondents, in their counter-petition for
mandamus, seek this Court's resolution on the petitioners' motion for
intervention in Sp. Proc. No. 4977. In their respective pleadings and
memoranda, the parties have lengthily discussed the issue of whether or
not petitioners may be allowed to intervene; and the same may as well be
determined in the present case, if only 'to avoid or, at least, minimize
further protracted controversy' between the parties (PCIB vs. Hon.
Escolin, 56 SCRA 266). A resolution of this issue should render moot and
academic the question anent the disqualification of respondent Judge.
We agree with private respondents that petitioners' motions for
intervention are devoid of merit, for failure on their part to show any
right or interest in the estate in question. There is no dispute that the last
will and testament of the late Digna Maravilla had already been admitted
to probate in a final judgment which the Supreme Court promulgated on
March 2, 1971 (G.R. No. L-23225). In the said will Digna instituted her
husband Herminio Maravilla as
xxx xxx xxx
The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of Herminio
Maravilla over the residue of the decedent's present and future property
legally and completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral relatives of
the testatrix, from inheriting any part of the latter's estate through
intestate succession or mixed succession. Having no forced or
compulsory heirs, except her husband, the testatrix had the absolute
freedom to institute the latter as her sole, universal heir, and such
freedom is recognized by Article 842 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all
his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to
succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he
does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the
legitimate of said heirs.
There is therefore no point in allowing the petitioners, who clearly appear
to have no interest in the estate, to intervene in the proceedings involving
the settlement thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The aforesaid Decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. L-46155
on November 9, 1977 and has become final. That was the second case
involving the estate filed before this Court.

Respondents' contention, therefore, that the statement in the Banc


Resolution "that the Court of Appeals had denied intervention" is an
"unadulterated distortion of the facts" is obviously erroneous and
intended to mislead.
The "Escolin Decision" (in CA-G.R. No. 05394-R), which had become
final, also finally foreclosed any claim that respondent Ilustre, and those
who sought to intervene with her, may have had on the estate of Digna
Maravilla. In unmistakable terms, what the Court of Appeals held in that
Decision, affirmed by this Court, bears repeating:
The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of Herminio
Maravilla over the residue of the decedent's present and future property
legally and completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral relatives of
the testatrix, from inheriting any part of the latter's estate through
intestate succession or mixed succession. ...
To circumvent that judgment, however, two years later, or on February
29, 1979, respondent Ilustre, with respondent Laureta as counsel, filed a
complaint for partition of Digna Maravilla's estate and for damages
against the heirs of Digna Maravilla's husband, who had then passed
away (docketed as Civil Case No. X-404), before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, San Carlos City, Branch X, presided over
by Judge Antonia Corpuz Macandog. That Court, after declaring
defendants therein (private respondents in the petition under review) in
default, ordered "all properties of Digna Maravilla mentioned in this case
to go back to their trunk of origin, the plaintiffs herein who are
represented by Eva Maravilla Ilustre and Eva Maravilla Ilustre herself"
(hereinafter referred to as the "Macandog Decision"). In addition, the
judgment awarded damages to the respondent Ilustre, et al., (the plaintiffs
therein), and the sum of P100,000.00 to their counsel, respondent
Laureta.
A special civil action for certiorari was filed by the defeated parties
(private respondents in the petition under review) before this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. L-58014, praying that the lower Court's declaration
of default in Civil Case No. X-404 and all other actions or decisions
taken thereafter be declared null and void and that the dismissal of the
complaint be ordered. On January 21, 1982, this Court resolved to refer
the case to the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
questions of fact being involved.
In a Decision dated January 14, 1983, the Court of Appeals (Fourth
Division)', 1 in AC-G.R. SP No. 13680 (hereafter called the Busran
Decision"), dismissed the petition and denied certiorari stating in one
breath that "the judgment subject of assail had long become final" (at p.
13), and in another "for all we know, the judgment below had already
attained finality long ago." The reason relied upon was that petitioners
therein had the remedy of appeal but instead availed of Certiorari, which
is not a substitute therefor.
On motion for reconsideration, however, filed by petitioners (private
respondents in the petition under review), in that appealed case AC-GR
SP No. 13680), the same Court of Appeals (Fourth Special Cases
Division) 2 in its Resolution of January 20, 1984 (the "Javellana
Resolution"), reconsidered and set aside the BusRan Decision" and
entered another one:
1. Annulling the order of default of the Hon. respondent Court dated 29
April 1980 and its decision dated 11 August 1981; and
2. Dismissing private respondents' complaint in Civil Case No. X-404
and ordering the Hon. respondent Court not to take further action therein.

Respondent Ilustre challenged that reversal in the present Petition for


Review filed on October 22, 1984. This is the third case brought before
this Court involving the same estate. Review was denied in an extended
Resolution by the First Division of this Court in the challenged
Resolution of May 14, 1986, for the following reasons:
The appealed Decision stands on firm legal grounds.
(1) The Order of Default of the Trial Court was issued in grave abuse of
discretion. The Answer was only one day late besides the fact that when
so filed, the Order of default had not yet been issued by the Trial Court.
(2) While appeal is, indeed, the remedy from a judgment by default,
certiorari may be resorted to when a party has been illegally declared in 4
default Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation vs. Vallejos 63 SCRA
300-301 [19751), or where it is necessary to restore order to proceedings
in the Court below (Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 462-463 [19751).
(3) More importantly, the judgment of the Trial Court, in Civil Case No.
X-404 declaring that the Testatrix's collateral relatives have a rightful
claim to her estate to the exclusion of the husband who was designated
her sole and universal heir, nullifies the Will already probated by final
judgment and overturns the pronouncements of both the Appellate Court
and this Court on the case.
There being former judgments on the issues which have become final
rendered by Courts having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the
parties, the said judgments having been rendered on the merits, and there
being between the prior and subsequent action Identity of parties, subject
matter and substantial Identity of cause of action, it is clear that the
complaint below in Civil Case X-404 is barred by the principle of res
adjudicata, and whatever transpired therein are nun and void ab initio and
without any legal effect.
To rule otherwise would upset the fundamental issue on which res
judicata rests that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same
issue more than once, that when a right or fact has been judicially
determined, the judgment of the Court, so long as it remains unreversed,
should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in
law or estate (Sarabia vs. Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 2
SCRA 54 [1961]).
ACCORDINGLY, the review sought for is denied and respondent Court's
judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 13080 is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents decry the fact that the First Division set aside the due course
Order and denied review in an extended Minute Resolution instead of in a
signed Decision. They allege that said Resolution was "railroaded with
such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme
Court under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and
judicial ethics," unduly "persuaded, induced and influenced" by Solicitor
General Ordonez and Justice Pedro Yap.
Nothing is farthest from the truth. As explained in the "Banc Resolution"
The petition for review was assigned to the then First Division of seven
Justices, which initially gave it due course because the resolution of the
Intermediate Appellate Court had reversed a decision originally rendered
by the then Court of Appeals, and in order to have more time for further
study.

Pleadings were submitted, the last being on May 3, 1985, which can be
considered as the date when this case was submitted for resolution.
The First Division of seven (7) was not able to act on the case up to the
February, 1986 political upheaval The last incident in the case was a
motion for the early release of decision filed by petitioner on November
19, 1985.
When this Court was reorganized in April of 1986, the membership of the
First Division was reduced to five (5) Justices. Taking account of the
motion of petitioner for early release of decision, the new First Division,
then chairmanned by Justice Abad Santos, realizing that the doctrine of
res judicata was clearly applicable not only as to the probate of the will
but also as to the heirship of petitioner, among others, and their right to
intervene and participate in the proceedings resolved, on May 14,
1986 to dismiss the petition through an extended resolution which at the
same time recalled the due course order. The new Division of 5 acted
unanimously.
The recall of a due course Order after a review of the records of the case
is a common occurrence in the Court. Respondents speak as if it were
only their petition which has been subjected to such recall. They have lost
all objectivity in this regard. They are hardly qualified, and cannot
presume to speak of the I entire history" of the Supreme Court.
As to the participation of Justice Yap in the ease, the "Banc Resolution"
stated:
Justice Yap clarified that he was an official mission to Switzerland for the
Presidential Conunission on Good Government after his appointment to
the Supreme Court an April 11, 1986 and did not assume his position in
the Supreme Court his return on May 2, 1986. When the resolution of
dismissal on May 14, 1986 was issued, Justice Yap was unaware that
Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez was private respondent's counsel.
On June 11, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was taken up by the First Division on July 9, 1986 with Justice Abad
Santos still the Chairman. This time, Justice Yap, realizing that his former
partner, Atty. Ordonez, had submitted the pleadings for petitioner,
inhibited himself and Justice Edgardo L. Paras was designated under
Special Order No. 21, dated July 9, 1986, to sit in the Division in his
place. The motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on July 9,
1986.
Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First Division on July 14,
1986.
On August 7, 1986, petitioner asked leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration, which was denied on September 3, 1986, entry of
judgment of the May 14, 1986 resolution having been made on July 28,
1986. Justice Yap again took no part in the deliberation of the case.
But respondents continue to claim derisively that Justice Yap could not
have been "unaware" of the appearance of Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez. They
reacted by saying "ten it to the marines" (Letters of November 3, 1986 to
Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz, at p. 8, respectively). But that was
the true and untarnished fact. With so many cases being handled by the
Court, the appearances of lawyers during deliberative sessions very often
escape attention, concentration being centered on the issues to be
resolved.
Respondents also fault the Court for "still recogniz(ing) Atty. Ordonez as
counsel" for their opponents in the case. In the same " Banc Resolution,"
it was clarified:

A copy of the resolution, dated May 14, 1986, was sent by the Releasing
Clerks to Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez as his name still appears on the cover
page of the Rollo. It was not necessarily because the Supreme Court still
recognizes him as counsel for respondents (at p. 4)
The fact of the matter is that even Atty. Laureta continued to recognize
Atty. Ordonez as counsel as shown by his pleadings filed before the
Court, which inevitably contained the notation "copy furnished Atty.
Sedfrey Ordonez." No withdrawal of appearance having been presented
by Atty. Ordonez in the main petition, his name continues to be in the
Rollo of the case and the personnel concerned continue to furnish him
with copies of Resolutions of this Court.
In respect of the charge that the Resolutions of the First Division of May
14, 1986, July 9, 1986 denying the Motion for Reconsideration with
finality, and September 3, 1986 denying leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration since entry of judgment of the May 14, 1986 Resolution
had been made on July 28, 1986, were "unjust" and were "railroaded," the
Banc Resolution, adopting the Division Resolution, explained:
The aforesaid resolutions were by no means 'railroaded.' The pleadings
filed by the parties, as in any other case, were included in the Agenda of
the First Division as soon as feasible. The Division acts promptly on all
Agenda items, and the minutes of its deliberations are released as soon as
possible after Agenda day.
xxx xxx xxx
The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study. Because a
case is resolved against the interests of a party, does not mean that it is an
'unjust decision;' or that it has been "railroaded."
This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently rendered
justice without fear or favor. (at p. 4)
Respondents insist that the doctrine of "res judicata" is inapplicable. In
their own words "the ordered probate of the 1944 Will of Digna
Maravilla by judgment of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225 is
conclusive only as to the genuineness and due execution of said will but
not upon the validity of testamentary provision, particularly with the
invalid designation of Herminio Maravilla as sole and universal heir of
Digna Maravilla."
On this point, the "Javellana Resolution," in reversing the Busran
Decision" AC-GR SP No. 13680), aptly held:
The then Court of Appeals held that the questioned decision does not run
counter to the decision of the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225
admitting the will of Digna Maravilla to probate because the latter refers
to the extrinsic validity of the will while the former concerns its intrinsic
validity. We cannot agree with this observation because it is quite clear
from the questioned decision that the will was in effect declared not to
have been freely and voluntarily executed by the deceased Digna
Maravilla but was the result of the evil and fraudulent machinations of
her husband, Herminio Maravilla, and sets aside said will The declaration
that private respondents, as collateral relatives of the deceased Digna
Maravilla, are entitled to her estate, is an indication that the Hon.
respondent Court has nullified the will. Private respondents are not
compulsory heirs and, in the absence of their being named legatees or
devisees in the will, they could only lay claim to the estate of Digna
Maravilla if the latter died without a will, pursuant to Art. 1003 of the
New Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants ascendants, illegitimate children or


a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.'
However, assuming arguendo, that the matter complain d of by private
respondents referred only to the intrinsic validity of the will, still, it was
improper for them to have instituted a separate action in a court other
than that in which the probate proceeding was pending.
xxx xxx xxx
It seems clear from these provisions of the law that while the estate is
being settled in the Court of First Instance in a special proceeding, no
ordinary action can be maintained in that court or in any other court by a
person claiming to be the heir, against the executor or against other
persons claiming to be heirs, for the purpose of having the rights of the
plaintiffs in the estate determined The very purpose of the trial or hearing
provided for in section 753 is to settle and determine those questions, and
until they are settled and determined in that proceeding and under that
section no action such as the present one can be maintained.
Considering that the "Escolin Decision, " as affirmed by this Court on
November 9, 1977 in G.R. No. L-46155, had become final, the "Javellana
Resolution" aptly observed:
3. The questioned decision of the Hon. respondent Court dated 12 August
1981 (referring to the "Macandog Decision") unsettles and reviews issues
which had long been laid to rest by the Hon. Supreme Court and the then
Court of Appeals.
But respondents ask: if res judicata were applicable, why did this Court,
in G.R. No. L-50814, refer the case to the Court of Appeals? The answer
is simple. The issue of whether the remedy of petitioners' in that case was
appeal and not certiorari had to be resolved. If certiorari were proper,
then the "Macandog Decision" had not become final. If appeal, its finality
would be the consequence. The "Javellana Resolution," which -reversed
the Busran Decision," held that certiorari was proper when a party has
been illegally declared in default. It follows that the "Macandog
Decision" had not attained finality.
Still undaunted, respondents claim that the Court of Appeals "deliberately
evaded divaricated" two important issues: (1) that the judgment of the
Trial Court (in CC No. X-404) had attained finality as in fact the Court of
Appeals had held that the "judgment of assail had long become final,"
and (2) that Digna Maravilla's husband could not be instituted as the sole
and universal heir of the wife on indestructible ground of moral
impossibility and could not inherit wife's vast estate on the ground of
utter unworthiness.
The penchant of respondents for making misleading statements is again
obvious. It was not in the "Javellana Resolution" that the Court of
Appeals held that "the judgment of assail (referring to the 'Macandog
Decision') had long become final." That was in the BurRan Decision,"
which was precisely reversed by the " Javellana Resolution."
As to the alleged unworthiness of the husband to inherit from his wife,
the "Javellana Resolution" pointedly observed:
The last will and testament of Digna Maravilla which instituted her
husband, Herminio Maravilla, as her sole and universal heir, was
admitted to probate, pursuant to a final judgment of the Hon. Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-23225, 27 February 1971. This probate foreclosed
all questions as to the age and mental capacity of the testator, the signing
of the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the

acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required


member of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the
act. In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, 168). Yet, more than ten years
later, the Hon. respondent Court would nullify the effects of the probate
by declaring that Digna Maravilla did not voluntarily and sanely execute
the probated last will and testament, unifying the institution of Herminio
Maravilla as her sole and universal heir, and ordering the return of the
properties of Digna Maravilla to the trunk of origin.
The soundness of the legal conclusions arrived at in the "Escolin
Decision" and "Javellana Resolution" commends itself. Only a
disgruntled litigant and a defeated lawyer would claim that those
judgments were accepted "hook, line and sinker" by this Court. The
doctrine of res judicata is inescapably applicable. Thus it was that the
First Division, in its challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, found it
unnecessary, after further study, to have a signed Decision and, instead,
recalled the due course Order, which it had previously issued to give it
"more time for further study" (p. 2, Banc Resolution, October 28, 1986).
Contrary to respondents' claim, the Court is not "duty bound" to render
signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate
Decisions and/or minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given,
depending on its evaluation of a case.
But obdurately enough, respondents have seen fit to take their case to the
Tanodbayan charging the members of the First Division of this Court
collectively with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an "unjust
extended minute Resolution" with deliberate bad faith in violation of
Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code 3 and for deliberately causing
"undue injury" to respondent Ilustre and her co-heirs because of the 11
unjust Resolution" promulgated, in violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt
Practices Act. 4
Respondents' action is brazenly unjustifiable. Nor can they plead
ignorance. As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December
24, 1986, which the Court hereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that
the Supreme Court is supreme the third great department of government
entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality
all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency
may pass upon its judgments or declare them "unjust." " It is elementary
that "(A)s has ever been stressed since the early case ofArnedo vs.
Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) "controlling and irresistible reasons of
public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk
of occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies
submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by
law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter
beyond the control even of the court which rendered them for the purpose
of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the
court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are
organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions
submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the
parties." (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86
SCRA 305, 316-317)
Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the
Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment" refer to
an individual judge who does so "in any case submitted to him for
decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass
judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the
proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either the
Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise
know that said penal article has no application to the members of a
collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their
conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective

judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a


charge of violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act on the
ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper.
The Chief Justice's Statement of the supremacy of the Supreme Court's
judicial power is by no means a "display of arrogance" as per
respondents' puerile contention, but a restatement of the fundamental
principle of separation of powers and checks and balances under a
republican form of government such as ours, viz. that the three co-equal
branches of government, the executive, legislative and judicial, are each
supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere Neither one
can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other. (Forbes vs.
Chuoco 16 Phil. 534 [1910]). As restated by the late Justice Jose P. Laurel
in the 1936 landmark case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil.
134), our Constitution "as a definition of the powers of
government"placed upon the judiciary the great burden of "determining
the nature, scope and extent of such powers" and 'when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments . . . but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation entrusted to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which the instrument
secures and guarantees to them.' "
As an officer of the Court, respondent Laureta, should realize that the
cardinal principle he would grossly impair and violate is that of the
independence of the judiciary, which the members of the bar are called
upon to defend and preserve. The independence of the judiciary is the
indispensable means for enforcing the supremacy of the Constitution and
the rule of law.
To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a
judge, more so a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by
him in good faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and judicial
functions is to subvert and undermine that very independence of the
judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. "For it is a
general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration
of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him,
shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone who
might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be
inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that
independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or
useful." (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335).
Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether
en banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and
credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same
principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs.
Pons 34 Phil 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Parades, et al., 61 Phil. 118;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme Court's
pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t is well settled that the enrolled
bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by petitionerimporter who unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees] on which
we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by
judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court
orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis (Casco Phil.
Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs.

Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias
vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1)
The Court has consistently stressed that "the doctrine of separation of
powers calls for the executive, legislative and judicial departments being
left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43
SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the same way that the judiciary has
a right to expect that neither the President nor Congress would cast doubt
on the mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should refrain from
speculating as to alleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled
either coordinate branch into acting the way it did. The concept of
separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and between the
three departments of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275,
286-287)
To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the
members acted "with deliberate bad faith" and rendered and "unjust
resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of their high office to act
upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at
hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of
such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the
presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow such
collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine
the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable
disputes.
Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the
separation of powers mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another
forum the final judgment of this Court on legal issues submitted by them
and their adversaries for final determination to and by the Supreme Court
and which fall within the judicial power to determine and adjudicate
exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as may be established by law.
In resume, we find that respondent Ilustre has transcended the
permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the
orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual
Justices quoted in the show-cause Resolution of this Court en banc,
particularly the underlined portions thereof; in the language of the
charges she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted and underscored in the
same Resolution; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the
Supreme Court and/or the official actions of the Justices concerned and
her ascription of improper motives to them; and in her unjustified
outburst that she can no longer expect justice from this Court. The fact
that said letters are not technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that
they were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved
does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The
constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be
used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court.
We likewise find that Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an
officer of the Court for his stance of dangling threats of bringing the
matter to the "proper forum" to effect a change of the Court's adverse
Resolution; for his lack of respect for and exposing to public ridicule, the
two highest Courts of the land by challenging in bad faith their integrity
and claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgments (Montecillo
vs. Gica 60 SCRA 234 [1974]); for authoring, or at the very least,
assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing the contemptuous
statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client, respondent
Ilustre, notwithstanding his disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to
do with them, which we find disputed by the facts and circumstances of
record as above stated; for totally disregarding the facts and
circumstances and legal considerations set forth in this Court's

Resolutions of the First Division and en banc, as the Tribunal of last


resort; for making it appear that the Justices of this Court and other
respondents before the Tanodbayan are charged with "graft and
corruption" when the complaint before the Tanodbayan, in essence, is a
tirade from a disgruntled litigant and a defeated counsel in a case that has
been brought thrice before this Court, and who would readily accept
anything but the soundness of the judgments of the Courts concerned, all
with the manifest intent to bring the Justices of this Court and of the
Court of Appeals into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the
Courts.
Atty. Laureta should be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but
to the administration of justice; to that end, his chent's success is wholly
subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. For like the Court itself, "a lawyer is an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." (Surigao Mineral
Conservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 [1970]; Castaneda vs. Ago,
65 SCRA 505 [1975[).
In assessing the penalty on respondent Laureta, the Court notes that
"disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are suit generis. Neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit,
but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaint nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges
as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actions as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney." Viewed in the
light of the demonstrated persistence of grave misconduct and
undermining public confidence in the honor and integrity of the Court
and its members (at a time when the Court is exerting every effort to
regain public confidence in our courts after the trauma and debacle
undergone by them in the past regime), the Court shall impose upon him
an indefinite suspension, leaving it to him to prove at some future and
opportune time, that he shag have once again regained the fitness to be
allowed to resume the practice of law as an officer of the Courts. (In re:
Almacen, 31 SCRA 562)
ACCORDINGLY, (1) respondent Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in
contempt, and is hereby fined in the amount of P1,000.00 only, mindful
that the power of contempt should be exercised on the preservative and
not on the vindictive principle of punishment; and
(2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional
misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, and is
hereby suspended from the practice of law until further Orders, the
suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all Courts of the country for
their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty.
Wenceslao Laureta.
G.R. No. L-69377

July 20, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, VS

ALEXANDER ALBOFERA and ROMEO LAWI-AN, accusedappellants.


MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Mandatory review of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XVIII, Digos, Davao del Sur, in Criminal Case No. 184.* which
convicted accused Alexander Albofera and Romeo Lawi-an of Murder,
inflicted on them the capital punishment, and ordered them to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the amount of P35,000.00, "by way of moral as
well as actual damages."
There is no direct evidence linking both accused to the crime charged,
their alleged participation therein having been found by the Trial Court to
have been proved by circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution
as follows:
Sometime in June or July 1980, at about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
Rodrigo Esma was tending his onion farm located in Upper Bagong
Silang, Managa, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, near the place of the accused
Romeo Lawi-an, a long time acquaintance, when accused Alexander
Albofera, whom Esma also knew for years and likewise a resident of the
same place, called him and informed him they would ran after somebody.
Esma acceded (tsn, October 20, 1982, pp. 38-42). Together, Albofera and
Esma proceeded at once to the house of accused Lawi-an. There Lawi-an
told Albofera that the forester was around making a list of people
engaged in "caingin" (tsn, October 20, 1982, p. 43). Whereupon, Albofera
asked Esma to join him in going after the forester. The two were able to
overtake the forester, a certain Teodoro Carancio, at the lower portion of
the road (tsn, October 20, 1982, p. 44). Albofera at once put his arm on
the shoulder of Carancio and asked him to go with them to the upper
portion because they will do something there. Carancio was taken to the
house of accused Lawi-an where several persons were already gathered,
among whom were accused Lawi-an, a certain alias Jun, Boy Lawi-an,
and Joel Maldan. Once inside and seated, Albofera began questioning
Carancio about his purpose in the place. Carancio replied that he was
there to inspect the "caingin" as a forester Albofera resented this, telling
Carancio that his acts hurt the poor people who were making a plain and
simple living. Carancio answered that he was only complying with the
orders of the government. Albofera then asked Carancio should he be set
free not to come back anymore. Carancio, however, replied that he would
still come back and bring his nephew who is an army man. Thereupon,
Albofera intimated to Carancio that he is a member of the NPA and that
the NPA's were against the forestry personnel. Thereafter, the persons
gathered decided to kin Carancio. Right then and there, Albofera tied
Carancio's hands at the back. Carancio pleaded for mercy. Unheeding,
Albofera, Romeo Lawi-an, alias Jun, Boy Lawi-an, and Joel Maldan
decided to bring, and they indeed brought, Carancio to the forest some
200 meters away from Lawi-an's house. Esma did not join the group but
remained in the house of Lawi-an (tsn, October 20, 1982, pp. 44-51). Not
long after, the group returned to Lawi-an's house, but without Carancio.
Albofera's hands, as wen as alias Jun's hands were bloodied. After
washing their hands, Albofera announced that they had already finished
the killing. He also warned everyone, particularly Esma, against revealing
or saying anything to any person or the military, otherwise he (Albofera)
would hold him accountable. After that, E smaller went home (tsn,
October 20, 1982, pp. 52-54).
Meanwhile, at about the same time Efren Sisneros and his wife were
weeding their farm in Barangay Buenavista, Bansalan, which is adjacent
to Bagong Silang, Managa, also in Bansalan, when the son of accused
Lawi-an, who is his compadre, arrived and informed him that his father
(the accused) wanted him (Sisneros) in his house. So, Sisneros went with

Lawi-an's son (tsn, September 16, 1982, pp. 3-7, 11). On reaching the
front yard of the Lawi-ans, Sisneros saw the ac cused Lawi-an at the
window. A lot of people were likewise in the house, and he recognized
Boy Lawi-an and a certain Jun Menez among others. Sisneros called for
accused Lawi-an. The latter went down and they talked downstairs.
Accused Lawi-an explained that he had Sisneros fetched, because the
people inside the house were discussing on what to do with somebody
a Bureau of Forestry employee-later on Identified as Teodoro Carancio
who was also inside the house at the time, and that they were inclined
to kill that person who, according to Lawi-an, was a hindrance to the
farmers, because he (the forester) had caused Lawi-an's uncle and
brother-in-law to be put in jail and fined for cutting trees in the forest.
Shocked, Sisneros could only say "do not do that because killing a person
is great sin toward God." Thereafter, accused Lawi-an went upstairs.
Sisneros who was left downstairs went home (tsn, September 16, 1982,
pp. 11-16, 21).
The following day, at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning, Sisneros was at
his farm when accused Lawi-an and Jun Menez passed by and called him.
When Sisneros got near the two, accused Lawi-an told him that the
forester was already killed and warned him not to reveal this matter to
anybody otherwise he would be killed (tsn, September 16, 1982, pp. 1620.)
The threat to his life caused Sisneros to be cautious in not reporting at
once the matter to the authorities. However, in June 1981, Sisneros
finally reported the killing of that forester to his brother Margarito, a
CHDF member in Bansalan. Margarito then accompanied him to the
municipal hall to see the Chief of Police, P/Sgt. Arnulfo Gohol. Sisneros
related the killing to Sgt. Gohol. That forester must have already been
reported missing, for Sgt. Gohol told Sisneros that the slain forester was
Teodoro Carancio. Sisneros asked that his Identity be kept secret in the
meantime pending the arrest of Albofera and Lawi-an. Sgt. Gohol
acceded (tsn. September 16, 1982, pp. 19-20, 21-22).
The police authorities arrested accused Albofera on July 2, 1981. ...
xxx

xxx

xxx

Accused Romeo Lawi-an was subsequently arrested on July 4, 1981 (pp.


12, 15, Record).
Also in July, 1981, the two accused, shortly after their arrest, led the
police authorities to the place in Bagong Silang where they buried the
slain forester, specifically in a hilly portion near the forest where the trees
were not quite big besides a coffee plantation (tsn, January 6, 1983, pp,
84-87). And on the very spot pointed to by the two accused, the
authorities dug and recovered the cadaver, together with the clothings,
namely: a maroon sweater, a semi-green trousers and fatigue briefs worn
by the victim, still intact. After placing these in a sack, the group left at
about 6:00 o'clock p.m. and returned to the municipal building at around
10:00 p.m. (tsn, January 6, 1983, pp. 87-89, 94-101).
xxx

xxx

xxx1

On July 2, 1981, Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before


the Municipal Circuit Judge. He stated therein that he was forced to join
the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had ordered the
"arrest" of the victim, Carancio, a Forest Guard in the National Park,
because he was "a very strict employee of the government who arrested
several kaingeros already in the National Park and Romeo Lawi-an being
one of his victims before, got mad of his actuations prompting the latter
to report said person to the NPA for possible punishments;" and that the

group "sentenced him (the victim) to die by stabbing." Albofera further


declared:
Q. 21- Was said Carancio killed by the group?
A. Yes, sir, Carancio was stabbed to death by alias John, Romeo Lawi-an,
alias "Dolly" Fred, Albert and myself in succession.
Q. 22- Do you mean to say that you have participated in stabbing
Carancio to death?
A. I was the last to thrust said bolo but I know that said victim was
already dead when I did it.
Accused for their part, maintain:

contradict with each other even though we have exculpated you we will
instead be together here if how many years will be my sentence yours
will also be the same because I will include you anyway you were present
in the incident nobody force us nobody can witness that you were force
by me because that is not the truth. And Ding, I have not squeal because
it's difficult the other side no jail its's better for the government because
we will just be imprisoned you are the one who win know how to
understand we win help one another in order that no hazard of both of us
anyway you will not be imprisoned of this you will only help me in order
that I can get out here. This is our agreement, is it not.
I hope you will remember our being together before we are very close but
now because we have a misunderstanding but our complainant you do not
even know him will they look back at you after this.

That in or about the middle of 1980, both the accused-appellants


ALEXANDER ALBOFERA and ROMEO LAWI-AN, who were farmerresidents at that time of Sitio Balutakay, Barangay Mansaga, a remote
settlement in the Municipality of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, were fetched
from their farm houses by four (4) persons, known to be NPA elements
operating in their locality and Identified with their aliases "Fred",
"Dolly", "John", and "Albert". Both accused together with Efren Sisneros
and Rodrigo Esma were brought by the said four (4) NPA's to a secluded
forested area in order to witness the execution of a man, whom the
prosecution later claimed to be one Teodoro Carancio, an employee of the
Bureau of Forest Development. Thereafter, both the accused, Efren
Sisneros and Rodrigo Esma were ordered by these armed NPA to bury the
remains of the victim. Afterwards, they were warned, with threat to their
lives, not to reveal or report to the government authorities. 2

Your mercy

In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented a letter written in the
Visayan dialect by accused Alexander Albofera, while under detention, to
witness Rodrigo Esma several days before the latter testified on October
20, 1982, which was translated into English by the Trial Court interpreter
and reads as follows:

That the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur gravely erred in finding
both accused guilty of murder, as charged in the information, and
ordaining a sentence of death, instead of dismissing the charge anchor
absolving them as the entire proceedings on the case in the Municipal
Court of Bansalan up to rendition of judgment in the CFI of Davao del
Sur are void ab initio and a nullity for being tainted with serious
illegalities and jurisdictional infirmities as from the inception of
appellant's illegal arrest, tortures, and detention without bait their
fundamental constitutional and human rights were blatantly violated,
brazenly trampled upon and utterly reduced to naught.

10-5-82
Dear Odeng,
Ding first of all how are you are in good health. As to me if you will also
ask me I am here suffering from hardship, so that Ding, help me that I
can get out in this difficult condition because your affidavit is the one that
has weight. Ding, you go with Mining to my lawyer so that I can study
your reason because I will ride if what is your affidavit. If you will not
appear before the lawyer it will mean that you will pushed us. Ding, you
know about this incident and that I do not want this to happen but you
were the one persisting in fact I asked you and you acceded so that that
happened. But now you are going to put us down will you not pity the
uncle of your wife and furthermore you were not threatened by me we
have agreed about this thing now you will free yourself. Ding you must
bear in mind that you are a part of this if that will happen to me I will
include you so that we will be together in jail anyway your affidavit is
there that you are one of those who apprehended the forestry and Noy
Roming will testify that no one threatened us and also according to him
that he will declare that the two of us apprehended so that the three of us
win be convicted. Ding why is it that we are not going to understand one
another so that we will not be hard-up we have still a way that will be
taught by my lawyer in which we have nothing to fear each one of us.
Anyway you can still be a witness of the other side my lawyer wants to
know only your reason so that he can study this in order that I ran prepare
and ride on it so that you will not be included and I can also get out from
this case because if you will not make any arrangement our reasons will

(Sgd.) Alex Albofera. 3


Rodrigo Esma's Affidavit referred to in the letter taken on July 21, 1981,
mentioned accused "Albofera and "alias Jun" "as having killid the victim.
After trial, the lower Court found the circumstantial evidence sufficient to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt of both accused for the
crime charged, and sentenced them to death in its Decision of October 5,
1984, now before us.
The accused raise the following errors:
I

II
That the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur gravely erred-in failing to
consider at all the prosecution's evidence on record, which reasonably
raises doubt upon the conclusiveness of the bases as to the supposed
victim's (1) Identity; (2) his alleged fact of death as stated in the
certificate of death [Exh. D]; (3) the place of death and, the approximate
or credible date of death; and-consequently, in not finding that on the
basis of the above-factual hiatus, the evidence has failed to establish the
guilt of both accused beyond that quantum of reasonable doubt as
zealously mandated by the constitution.
III
That the Court a quo erred in holding that evidence adduced against
accused-appellants conceded to be merely circumstantial in character and
confirmed as such in the appealed decision, has attained such degree of
proof and weight of moral persuasion as to leave no vestige of reasonable
doubt on the guilt of both accused.
IV

That the Court a quo erred in appreciating as competent evidence the


letter written by accused Alexander Albofera to Rodrigo Esma (Exh. B),
the admissibility thereof being specifically excluded under Sec. 4, Art. IV
of the 1973 Constitution.

On the Admissibility of the Extra-Judicial Confession of Accused A


Alexander Albofera:
The preliminary questions addressed to said accused when his Sworn
Statement was taken read:

V
P R E L I M I N A R Y:
That the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur gravely erred in admitting
and considering as competent evidence the illegally extracted extrajudicial confession of accused Alexander Albofera (Exh. C) in violation
of, and contrary to Sec. 20, Art. IV of the Philippine Constitution of 1973
and the Supreme Court's judicial precedents in point.
VI
That the Trial Court gravely erred (1) in sustaining the prosecution's
theory that both accused-appellants were responsible and culpable for the
killing of the alleged victim; (2) in according credence to the testimonies
of prosecution's witnesses Efren Sisneros and Rodrigo K. Esma; (3) in
failing to sustain the defense theory; and (4) in convicting and sentencing
both accused-appellants.
VII
Furthermore, the lower court gravely incurred the following patent
reversible errors: (1) in finding aggravating and qualifying circumstances
in the alleged commission of murder, and (2) in not absolving the two
accused-appellants, and awarding damages. 4

Mr. Albofera, I am reminding you that you are now under investigation in
connection with the commission of an offense, but before I will proceed
in it, I would like to inform you that under the Constitution of the
Philippines it is so provided that you have the right to remain silent, the
right to counsel of your own choice to be present with you while being
investigated, the right to self-incrimination and the right to due process,
do you understand this:
Answer Yes sir, I do.
I would like to inform you further, that the manner in which this
investigation will be conducted in English, but however, the contents of
the same will be interpreted to you in dialect you fully understand and
speak, and if you choose to answer one of the question or questions
propounded to you, your answer will be reduced into writing and the
same will be used in evidence against you or to your favor in any court of
justice in the country, do you understand what I am explaining to you?
Answer Yes. sir, I understand it because you explained it to me clearly.
Do you need then the assistance of counsel to assist you while
investigated?

Succintly stated, the essential issues posed are:

Answer I think I do not need any yet this time because I know what I
am going to declare here it being the truth of the matter, sir.

1) Whether or not "serious illegalities and jurisdictional infirmities," in


fact, attended the proceedings below and "constitutional and human
rights of the accused brazenly trampled upon."

Since you do not (have) any lawyer yet, are you willing to proceed with
this investigation and submit yourself freely into it?

2) Whether or not the extrjudicial confession of accused Alexander


Albofera, and his letter to Rodrigo Esma are admissible in evidence;

Answer I wish that this investigation will be continued because lawyer


is not necessary yet.

3) Whether or not the Identity of the victim and the fact of his death were
duly proved;

Are you willing to swear and sign this statement of yours freely to justify
that your submission into the said investigation is free and voluntary?

4) Whether or not the circumstantial evidence adduced is sufficient to


warrant conviction; and

Answer Yes sir, I will sign it if only to prove that all what I have stated
are true and to the best of my knowledge and ability.

5) Whether or not qualifying and aggravating circumstances were duly


proved.

(Sgd.) Alex Albofera


(Exhibits "C", "C-1").

On Irregularities alleged:
The charge of illegalities and infirmities is absolutely without basis.
There was nothing illegal in the accused's detention without bail. They
were charged with and held for the crime of murder, a capital offense
and, therefore, were not entitled to bail where the evidence of guilt was
strong. That was for the Trial Court to evaluate. The preliminary
investigation was far from being "hasty and farcical." If the second stage
thereof was not held it was because the accused had waived the same and
prayed for the transmittal of the case to the then Court of First Instance
for trial on the merits; it was not because they were deprived of the right.
Much less has due process been denied the accused. They were duly
informed of the charge against them and they were given fun opportunity
to interpose and prove their defense.

Judicial precedents5 have laid down the rule that the foregoing form of
questioning, does not satisfy the Constitutional requirement that an
accused be apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel. It is, at best, ceremonial and perfunctory, with the answers being
mere formalisms put into the mouth of the affiant. What is contemplated
is the transmission of meaningful information, comprehended by the
person under investigation, not a mere recitation of the Constitutional
mandates.
More, the extra-judicial confession was extracted without the assistance
of counsel contrary to the rulings of this Court in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile,
No. L-61016, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538, affirmed in People vs.
Galit, No. L-51770, March 20, 1985, 135 SCRA 465, People vs. Burgos,
L-68955, September 4, 1986, 144 SCRA 1, that "no custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel

engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed


by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on
his behalf."
While Albofera seemingly waived his right to counsel, which he is
allowed to do, aside from the fact that we are not convinced that the
waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent, the waiver was not valid
because it was made without the assistance of counsel.6 That principle is
now enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly requires that the
waiver be in writing and in the presence of counsel.7
For failure to meet such exacting standards, the extrajudicial confession
of accused Albofera must be stricken out and held inadmissible in
evidence against him.8
On the admissibility of Albofera's Letter.
Accused Albofera contends that his letter to prosecution witness, Rodrigo
Esma (Exhibit "B"), is inadmissible in evidence against him under the
exclusionary provisions of Section 4, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
(substantially reproduced in Section 3, Article III of the 1987
Constitution), which provides:
Sec. 4 (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the Court, or when public safety
and order require otherwise.
2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The submission is untenable. The foregoing provision implements
another Constitutional provision on the security of a citizen against
unreasonable search and seizure. The production of that letter by the
prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was
it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera's privacy.
Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo
Esma himself, who produced and Identified the same in the course of his
testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in
the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in
his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera's) favor. Furthermore, nothing
Albofera stated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a
determination of his culpability.
On the Identity of the Victim and the Fact of Death:
Accused argue that corpus delicti had not been established as the body of
the victim, Teodoro Carancio, was not Identified, nor the fact, place and
approximate date of his death established.
The term corpus delicti stands for the substance of the crime, the fact that
a crime has actually been committed.9The evidence adduced in this case
sufficiently proved the commission of the crime. In fact, the accused
themselves pointed to the grave where the body of a person, allegedly
slain in their presence, had been dumped and which, when dug, produced
human remains, which turned out to be those of the victim.
The skeletal remains of the victim were Identified by his brother,
Benjamin Carancio, through the victim's front teeth whose "base seemed
rusty" and which bore resemblance to his own, as well as through the
victim's clothes, fatigue briefs, maroon sweater and trousers, which
Benjamin recognized.10 Prosecution witness Esma also Identified the
victim from a photograph which was presented to him.11
On the Circumstantial Evidence:

Circumstantial evidence is admissible in the absence of an eyewitness to


the commission of a crime, and it is sufficient for conviction if: (1) there
is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.12
The circumstances testified to by prosecution witnesses meet the
foregoing criteria. Even disregarding Albofera's extra-judicial confession,
the combination of circumstances sufficiently point to his guilt. The
presence of both accused at the scene of the incident is admitted by them.
They also admit that they witnessed the execution of the victim, although
they claim that they were merely compelled to do so. The foregoing
version, however, is negated by Rodrigo Esma's testimony from which it
is clear that it was Albofera, his long-time friend, who had fetched
witness Esma and informed the latter that they would run after somebody.
Together, they proceeded to the house of accused Lawi-an who informed
Albofera that the victim was around making a list of "kaingeros."
Albofera asked Esma to join him in going after the forester. Overtaking
the latter, Albofera took him to Lawi-an's house where a group had
already congregated and a discussion followed as to the victim's fate.
Albofera resented the victim's determination to do his duty and the latter's
statement that he was bringing an army man to help him. Sufficient
motive was provided to do away with the victim. Albofera tied the
victim's hands and, with Lawi-an and three others, took the victim to the
forest. When the group returned not long after, the victim was no longer
with them. Witness Esma noticed Albofera's and "alias Jun's" hands
bloodied. After they had washed their hands, Albofera announced to
everyone present at Lawi-an's house that the victim had been done away
with and warned everyone not to reveal the incident to anyone including
the military.
Apparent from the foregoing narrated circumstances is the fact that it was
Albofera who was "calling the shots;" that it was he who was the leader
of the group and not "alias Jun" as he would want this Court to believe.
Esma's testimony is worthy of credence. He was a friend of long standing
of Albofera.lawphi1 There was no reason for him to attribute to Albofera
the commission of such a serious crime as Murder, if such not the truth.
Accused Lawi-an must be held equally culpable. That he was part of the
criminal design from its initial stages until its culmination is revealed
through the circumstances brought out by prosecution witness, Sisneros
who testified that while he was weeding his farm, Lawi-an, his
"compadre," sent his son to fetch him (Sisneros). With the son, they
proceeded to Lawi-an's house where Sisneros saw many people. Lawi-an
went down the house and explained to Sisneros that they were discussing
what to do with the victim, and that they were inclined to kill him.
Sisneros advised against it and went home. The following morning,
Lawi-an passed by Sisneros farm and informed the latter that the victim
had already been killed with the warning to Sisneros not to reveal the
incident to anyone.
Prosecution witness, Esma, further buttressed the fact of Lawi-an's
participation in the criminal plot when he testified that it was Lawi-an
who informed Albofera that the victim was around making a list of
"kaingeros;" that it was on the strength of that information that Albofera
coaxed Esma into joining him to search for the victim; that Lawi-an was
with Albofera and three others who, starting from Lawi-an's house, took
the victim to the forest and then returned thereafter without the victim,
obviously because the latter had been done away with.
While the degree of actual participation by Lawi-an in committing the
offense is not described with accuracy, Lawi-an's conduct before and

after the commission of the crime shows that he acted in concert with his
co-accused Albofera. He indubitably cooperated with the latter and three
other persons in bringing about the death of the victim goaded by
resentment against the latter for his strict enforcement of forestry laws,
which led to the incarceration of Lawi-an's uncle and brother-in-law and
the imposition of fines against them. The circumstances proven
sufficiently establish a community of purpose-a conspiracy among the
perpetrators such that the crime committed in furtherance thereof must
be held to be the act of all regardless of the extent and character of an
accused's active participation.13
On the Attendance of Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances:
No reversible error was committed by the Trial Court in appreciating the
presence of qualifying and aggravating circumstances.

On March 24, 1947, Lope Sarreal filed a complaint (amended on April


10, 1947, to include Harry Lyons) seeking a money judgment against
petitioners on three causes of action in the total of P1,256,229.30.
On May 27, 1947, Sarreal filed a motion for the production and
inspection of the following documents:
I. Books or Papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc.:
1. Cash Receipts Journal
2. Cash Payments Journal
3. All Individual Ledgers, specially of the following persons or entities
(a) British-American Engineering Corporation

The killing of the victim was committed treacherously, his hands having
been tied behind his back so that he was totally helpless and defenseless,
and in no position to resist nor fight back. The accused employed means
which tended directly to insure the execution of the crime without risk to
themselves arising from the defense which the victim might have made.

(b) Philippine Refinery

Evident premeditation was likewise present as both accused and their coconspirators had deliberately planned to commit the crime and had
persistently and continuously followed it notwithstanding that they had
ample time to reflect and allow their conscience to overcome their
resolution to kill.14

(e) Standard Oil Company of New York

The accused likewise took advantage of superior strength although this


cannot be appreciated separately as it is deemed absorbed in treachery.15

(h) Filipino Businessmen's Syndicate

The killing of the victim because of his strictness and the resentment
against him as a forester constitutes the aggravating circumstance of
disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank,16
and not because the victim was engaged in the discharge of his duties
under Article 14 (5) of the Revised Penal Code as found by the Trial
Court.
With the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and two
(2) generic aggravating circumstances with no mitigating circumstance to
offset them, the crime committed is Murder and the death penalty
imposed by the Trial Court is proper. However, with the abolition of the
death penalty under Section 19(l), Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
and as mandated therein the death penalty imposed by the Trial Court
should be reduced toreclusion perpetua.

(c) Felipe Buencamino


(d) Luzon Stevedoring

(f) Philippine Exchange Co., Inc.


(g) Manila Laundry Company

(i) Material Distributors Inc., Wichita, Kansas


(j) Harry Lyons
4. All letters exchanged between Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc.,
Material Distributors, Inc. of Wichita, Kansas and Harry Lyons, between
October 9, 1946 and March 31, 1947.
5. All cablegrams exchanged between Material Distributors (Phil.), Inc.,
and Material Distributors, Inc., Wichita, Kansas, between October 9,
1946 to March 31, 1947.
II. Books and Papers of the defendant Harry Lyons.
1. Letters exchanged between Harry Lyons and Material Distributors,
Inc., Wichita, Kansas between September 14, 1946 and March 24, 1947.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby affirmed with


modification that the accused Alexander Albofera and Romeo Lawi-an
are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim, Teodoro Carancio, in the amount of
P30,000.00, and each to pay one-half (1/2) of the costs.

2. Cablegrams exchanged between Harry Lyons and Material


Distributors, Inc., Wichita, Kansas, between September 14, 1946 and
March 24, 1947.

G.R. No. L-1716

4. Cash Payments Journal.

June 28, 1949

3. Cash Receipts Journal.

MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS (PHIL.), INC., and HARRY LYONS,


petitioner, VS

On June 4, 1947, Sarreal filed a supplemental motion for the production


and inspection of the originals of Annexes A and B of the complaint.

FELIPE NATIVIDAD, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and LOPE


SARREAL, respondents..

On June 12, 1947, petitioner filed a memorandum and opposition to


Sarreal's above mentioned original and supplemental motion on the
ground that he failed to show good cause and that the motion were
evidently filed for the purpose of fishing evidence.

PERFECTO, J.:

On July 16, 1947, respondent judge, granting both motions, required


petitioners to produce the documents and annexes in question on July 24,
1947.
On account of the absence in the Philippines of Harry Lyons, petitioner
moved, reserving whatever rights they have under the Rules of Court, to
postpone the inspection of the documents and annexes in question and
accordingly respondent judge postponed it to August 15, 1947.
On August 13, 1947, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the
order of July 16, on the following grounds:
"(a) Article 46 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits the delivery,
communication and general examination of the correspondence of
merchants, a substantial right, as well as the petitioners' right to the
inviolability of their correspondence as guaranteed by the Constitution
would be violated by the order requiring the production of the following
documents:
BOOKS AND PAPERS OF DEFENDANT HARRY LYONS
(1) Letters exchange between Harry Lyons and Material Distributors,
Inc., of Wichita, Kansas, between Sept. 14, 1946 and March 24,1947;
(2) Cablegrams exchanged between Harry Lyons and Material
Distributors, Inc., of Wichita, Kansas, between September 14, 1946 and
March 24, 1947.
BOOKS AND PAPERS OF MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS (PHIL.) INC.
(4-5) All letters and cablegrams exchanged between Material Distributors
(Phil.), Inc., Material Distributors, Inc., of Wichita, Kansas, and Harry
Lyons between October 9, 1946 and March 31, 1947.
"(b) That the production for the plaintiff's inspection of all the foregoing
documents above enumerated, as well as of the following documents,
would constitute a "fishing expedition," not allowed by Rule 21 of the
Rules of Court, since their materiality or probable materiality is not
shown by the pleadings of the parties except by movant's bare allegation
which are disputed by your petitioners:
BOOKS AND PAPERS OF MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS (PHIL.) INC.
1-2. Cash Receipts Journal and Cash Payments Journal.
3. All individual Ledgers, specially of the following persons or entities.
(b) Philippine Refinery.
(c) Felipe Buencamino.
(d) Luzon Stevedoring.
(e) Standard Oil Company of New York.
(f) Philippine Exchange Co., Inc.
(g) Manila Laundry Company.
"(c) That plaintiff is not entitled to the production and inspection of the
originals of Annexes A and B because his only purpose, as stated in his
supplemental motion, Exhibit D, was to find out if a case of falsification
has been made; that the issue between the parties in this regard is material
only to your petitioners' affirmative defense, and if the plaintiff's purpose
was as stated in said supplemental motion, then your petitioners claimed

their privilege against self-incrimination. That this letter privilege was


also claimed insofar as the production and inspection of the other
documents were concerned by your petitioners in view of counsel for
respondent Lope Sarreal's charge to the Honorable City Fiscal for the
City of Manila that your petitioners were violating our Corporation Law."
On September 27, 1947, respondent judge denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioners impugn the validity of the orders of July 16 and September
27, 1947, as were issued by the respondent judge in excess of his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of his discretion, and prayed for the
annulment or modification of the order of July 16, 1947.
Respondent Sarreal advanced the following reasons to show that the
orders complained of were not issued in excess of the trial court's
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion:
(a) The motions of the respondent Lope Sarreal of May 27, 1947 and
June 4, 1947 contain allegations of the ultimate fact that the books and
papers mentioned in said motions constitute or contain evidence material
to the matters involved in the case and are in the possession, custody or
control of the petitioners herein, and allegation to this effect is adequate
showing of good cause for the production and inspection of the
documents mentioned therein, being an allegation in the very words used
in Form 11 of the Appendix Forms of our Rules of Court, and therefore a
sufficient compliance with said Rule (Go Tianco vs. Judge Diaz, G. R. L7, January 22, 1946, reported in the June 1946 issue of the official
Gazette).
(b) Article 46 of the Code of Commerce invoked by the petitioners does
not apply to cases of production and inspection of books and papers
belonging to a party to the action in which such production and
inspection are sought(Decision of Supreme Court of Spain of March 30,
1894). At any rate, said Article of the Code of Commerce has been
impliedly repealed by Act No. 190, pertinent portions of which are now
embodied in our Rules of Court (3 Op. of Atty. Gen., 380).
(c) Neither would the inspection of books and papers of the petitioners
amount to a violation of the inviolability of the correspondence under
Sec. 1, No. 5, Article III of the Constitution of the Philippines,
considering that the inspection of said books and papers are sought
through proper order of the trial court, and the Constitutional provision
invoked by the petitioners precisely allows inspection of communication
and correspondence upon lawful order of the court. Moreover, this
provision of our Constitution creates no new right, being merely a reenforcement of the Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures (Sinco, Philippine Government and Political Law,
4th Edition, p. 632), and when the inspection of such books and papers
was allowed "upon lawful order of the court" made through the
respondent Judge, such inspection cannot be considered as unreasonable
although such books and papers are private in character (First National
Bank vs. Hughes, 6 Fed., C 737, 741, appeal dismissed for want of
jurisdiction in 106 U.S., 523, 27 Law ed., 268, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 489;
Johnson Steel Street-Rail Co. vs. North Branch Steel Co., 48 Fed., 191;
Victor G. Beede Co. vs. Joseph Bancroft and Sons Co., 98 Fed., 175,
affirmed in 52 L. R. A., 734, 45 C. C. A., 354, 106 Fed., 396, where this
question was not involved; Burnham vs. Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226, 74 A.
Dec., 676; United States vs. Terminal R. Assoc., 148 Fed., 486; Re Dunn,
9 Mo. App., 225; Elder and Bogardus, 1 Edm. Sel Cas., 110; Boston and
M. R. Co. vs. States [N. H.], 77 Atl., 996; Hopkinsonvs. Burghley, L. R.
2ch., 447; Groker-Wheeler Co. vs. Bullock [C. C.], 134 Fed., 241; Re
Bolster, 110 Pac., 547.).

(d) The inspection of the said documents is not for the purpose of "fishing
evidence" but with a view to enabling the respondent Lope Sarreal to
designate with the particularity of the subpoena duces tecum to be
obtained in connection with trial of the case on its merits the specific
books and papers containing the entry of receipts and payments made by
the petitioners, such books and papers being material to the case in view,
among others, of the allegation in the amended complaint that the
defendants, the petitioners herein, had been remitting all or the greater
volume of the proceeds from the sales of equipment and materials of the
defendants in Civil Case No. 2059 outside the jurisdiction of the trial
court and had been disposing of their properties with the intention of
defrauding their creditors. At any rate, "fishing expedition" is allowed
and is precisely contemplated in Rule 21 of our Rules of Court as a
weapon of discovery (XXVI Am. Bar. Ass. Jur. No. 1, Jan. 1940, 48;
Golden vs. Arcadia Mutual Casualty Company, D. C. III., 1942, 3 F. R.
D., 26; Leach vs. Griff Bros. Coop. Corp., D. C. Miss, 1942 2 F. R. D.,
444; Civil Aeronautics Board of Aeronautics Authority vs. Canadian
Colonial Airways, D. C., 1941, 41 F. S., 1006; Quemus Theatre Co. vs.
Warner Bros. Pictures, D. C. N. J., 1940, 35 F. S., 949; United Mercantile
Agency vs. Silver Fleet Motor Express, D. C. Ky., 1941, F. R. D., 709;
Walling vs. Richmon Screw Anchor Company, D. C. N. Y., 1943,4 F. R.
D., 265; Monarch Liquor Corp. vs. Schenley Distillers Corp., D. C. N.Y.,
1941, 2 F. R. D., 51; Walsh vs. Comm. Mutual Life Insurance Company
of Hartford, Conn. [1939], 26 F. Supp., 556; Olson Transportation
Companyvs. Socony Vacuum Oil Company, 7 F. R. D., 234).
(e) The originals of Annexes A and B are relevant not only to the case of
the defendants but also to that of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2059 here
involved, in view of the issue of fact raised by the pleadings of the parties
as to whether the originals of Annexes A and B have been falsified by the
insertion therein of the names of Gil J. Puyat and Raymond Lehmann
after said Annexes were signed by respondent Lope Sarreal and delivered
to the petitioner Harry Lysons, in view of which respondent Lope Sarreal
is entitled to the production and inspection thereof under the provisions
of Rule 21 of our Rules of Court.
(f) Even if ocular inspection of said Annexes A and B may reveal
falsification thereof by the petitioners amounting to a violation of the
applicable provisions of our Revised Penal Code, the petitioners cannot
exempt themselves from the production of said exhibits for mere
inspection and copying, inasmuch as the Constitutional prohibition
against self-incrimination has been extended in specific case only to the
production of documents as evidence, and only when the person
producing them is made to take the witness stand and identify them under
oath, and not to the production of such documents for mere inspection
(Comm. vs. Southern Express Co., 1914, 160 Ky., 1, 169 SW., 517,
annotated cases 1916A, 373, L. R. A., 1915B, 913; U. S. vs. Hughes, 12
Blatchff, 553); the reason being that the Constitutional prohibition is one
against compelling a person to be a "witness against himself", and this
has been held to meantestimonial compulsion or extraction of admission
form the person's own lips (4 Wigmore, 865, 2263; Wilsonvs. U. S., 55
Law, ed., 776, citing cases).
(g) Moreover, the corporate records sought to be inspected are not
covered by the Constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination, even
though such documents may contain evidence tending to subject any or
all of the officers of a corporation to a criminal indictment (Wilson vs. U.
S., 221 U. S., 361, 51 Law. ed., 771; Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. vs.
Walling, 327 U. S.,186, 90 Law. ed., 614, 627-629; U. S. vs. Baunch &
Lamp Optical Co., 321U. S., 707, 88 Law. ed., 1024, 1037 [1944]; U. S.
vs. White, 88 Law. ed., 1547).

(h) Production and inspection of documents have been allowed and


sustained in decided cases, under Orders which were broader than those
here assailed, for the production and inspection of all books of accounts,
all memoranda and records, stocks book, ledger, journal, cash book, bank
book, bank deposit slip, check book, voucher, contract, income tax return,
booking record and correspondence (U. S. vs. Duoder, 1 F. R. S., 466, U.
S. D. C. June 16, 1939; Orange Country Theater Corp. vs. League, 1 F. R.
S., 448).
(i) The respondent Judge, before issuing the Orders complained of, gave
the parties full opportunity, not only to discuss the question involved by
repeated oral arguments but also by written memoranda, and in the
exercise of his discretion issued the Orders complained of only after full
consideration of all the questions of fact and law involved.
The production and inspection of documents and books here in question
call for the interpretation and application of section 1 of Rule 21, which
reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. Upon motion
of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice to all other
parties, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to
produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or
on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers,
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control;
or (b) order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other
property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated
relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time,
place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and
photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
Petitioners contend that in filling his original and supplemental motions,
Sarreal has failed to show good cause for the issuance of the requested
order. It appears, however, in the original motion of May 27, 1947, that
the books and papers therein mentioned "constitute or contain the
evidence material to the matters involved in the above entitled case."
In the supplemental motion of June 4, 1947, it is alleged that there is
direct conflict between the allegations of the complaint and amended
complaint and those of the answer and amended answer as to whether or
not the names of Gil J. Puyat and Raymond W. Lehmann appear in any
part of the originals of Annexes A and B of the complaint, and plaintiff
Sarreal wanted the production and inspection of said originals to show
that they did not contain the names of Gil J. Puyat and Raymond W.
Lehmann, and that if said names should appear now typed in said
Annexes A and B, said additional names must have been typed by
direction of Harry Lysons without the knowledge or consent of Sarreal
and after said originals were delivered by Harry Lysons and filed by the
latter and that the changes so introduced are a forgery.
With these allegations in the original and supplemental motions Sarreal
has fulfilled the requirements of showing good cause for the production
and inspection of the books and documents in question under Rule 21.
Petitioners contained that the order of the trial judge violated petitioner's
constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
We have considered carefully persons advanced by petitioners and
memoranda in support of this allegation and we found nothing in them to
show how, without the inspection of Annexes A and B of the complaint,

petitioners may incriminate themselves. We have, therefore, to dismiss


such contention.

legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine


which petitioner had filed against her husband.

(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizure shall not be
violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." (Sec. 1. Art. III, Constitution of the Philippines.)

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and
papers and for damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered
judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of
plaintiffs Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return
and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her
behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and
attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta
and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court. Hence this petition.

(5) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable


except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and order
require otherwise. (Sec. 1. Art. III, Constitution of the Philippines.)
The orders in question, issued in virtue of the provisions of Rule 21,
pertain to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with the
unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution. But in the
erroneous hypothesis that the production and inspection of books and
documents in question is tantamount to a search warrant, the procedure
outlined by Rule 21 and followed by respondent judge place them outside
the realm of the prohibited unreasonable searches. There is no question
that, upon the pleadings in the case, Sarreal has an interest in the books
and documents in question, that they are material and important to the
issues between him and petitioners, that justice will be better served if all
the facts pertinent to the controversy are placed before the trial court.
The constitutional guarantee of privacy of communication and
correspondence will not be violated, because the trial court has power and
jurisdiction to issue the order for the production and inspection of the
books and documents in question in virtue of the constitutional guarantee
making an express exception in favor of the disclosure of communication
and correspondence upon lawful order of a court of justice.
After a careful consideration of the legal question raised by petitioners,
this Court has arrived at the conclusion that the trial judge, in issuing the
order of July 16, 1947, has not exceed his jurisdiction or acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
Petition denied with costs against petitioner.
[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X)
which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her
from private respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and
consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo
Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband,
a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and
private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in
her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for

There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to


private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his
wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that
reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties
of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private
respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing
from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts
decision, petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso
Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as
Annexes A-i to J-7 of respondents comment in that case) were
admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioners attorney,
Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For
this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondents
complaint.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was
for disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo
Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents
in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct
because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the
complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following
defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be impressed with merit:2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso
Felix, Jr.], he maintains that: xxx
xxx
xxx
4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the
Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila
Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex
A-I to J-7. On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said
order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a
restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the
order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Courts
order, respondents request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and
authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice.
Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity
of the questioned annexes. At that point in time, would it have been
malpractice for respondent to use petitioners admission as evidence
against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is- not malpractice.

G.R. No. 102653


Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by
Dr. Martin himself under oath. Such verified admission constitutes an
affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner
became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her
husbands admission and use the same in her action for legal separation
cannot be treated as malpractice.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to
no more than a declaration that his use of the documents and papers for
the purpose of securing Dr. Martins admission as to their genuiness and
authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the
trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the
admissibility of the documents and papers in question.

It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the


charge of violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial
court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and papers,
enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by
this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial courts order was
dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the
documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable3 is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by
her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.4 Any violation
of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them
in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them
for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses
by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing
is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one
to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with
the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
X-----------------X-------------------X-------------------X-----------------X
FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATION
PRIOR RESTRAINT

March 5, 1992

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, petitioner, vs


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 102925

March 5, 1992

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE represented by ZOILO DEJARESCO,


JR., as its Past Chairman and President, and FRAULIN A. PEASALES
as its Corporate Secretary, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by HON. CHRISTIAN
MONSOD, its Chairman; HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE and HON.
ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, respondents.

G.R. No. 102983

March 5, 1992

KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTERS SA PILIPINAS; MAKATI


BROADCASTING NETWORK; MOLAVE
BROADCASTING
NETWORK; MASBATE COMMUNITY BROADCASTING CO., INC.,
RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC.; ABS-CBN BROADCASTING
CORP.; FILIPINAS BROADCASTING; RADIO PILIPINO CORP.;
RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC.; EAGLE BROADCASTING
CORP.; MAGILIW COMMUNITY BROADCASTING CO., INC.; for
themselves and in behalf of the mass media owners as a class; ANDRE S.
KHAN; ARCADIO M. CARANDANG, JR.; MALOU ESPINOSA
MANALASTAS; MIGUEL C. ENRIQUEZ; JOSE ANTONIO K.
VELOSO; DIANA G. DE GUZMAN; JOSE E. ESCANER, JR.; RAY G.
PEDROCHE; PETER A. LAGUSAY; ROBERT ESTRELLA;
ROLANDO RAMIREZ; for themselves as voters and in behalf of the
Philippine electorate as a class; ORLANDO S. MERCADO and
ALEJANDRO de G. RODRIGUEZ; for themselves as prospective
candidates and in behalf of all candidates in the May 1992 election as a
class, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
In the three (3) consolidated Petitions before us, the common question
raised by petitioners is the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of Republic
Act No. 6646.
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media
which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political
advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for
national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992
elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be
informed of election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being
curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act
No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising
freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed
by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles
out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only

publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or


political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that
the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to
provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion
relevant to election issues. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b)
abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of
media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in
the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and
television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the
quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in
the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to
information and opinion.
The statutory text that petitioners ask us to strike down as
unconstitutional is that of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646,
known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:
Sec. 11 Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. In addition to the
forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful;
xxx

xxx

xxx

b)
for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station,
other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or
to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other
political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Sections
90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any
elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such
during the campaign period. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 should be taken together with
Sections 90 and 92 of B.P. Blg. 881, known as the Omnibus Election
Code of the Philippines, which provide respectively as follows:
Sec. 90. Comelec space. The Commission shall procure space in at
least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city:
Provided, however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication
shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in said province or city,
which shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein candidates can
announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge,
equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within
the area in which the newspaper is circulated.xxx xxx
xxx
Sec. 92. Comelec time. The Commission shall procure radio and
television time to be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated
equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage
of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all
radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to
provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the
campaign. (Emphasis supplied)
The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the equalizing, as far as
practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the
former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign
"war chests." Section 11 (b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space
and air time "for campaign or other political purposes" except to the
Commission on Elections ("Comelec"). Upon the other hand, Sections 90
and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to procure
"Comelec space" in newspapers of general circulation in every province
or city and "Comelec time" on radio and television stations. Further, the
Comelec is statutorily commanded to allocate "Comelec space" and
"Comelec time" on a free of charge, equal and impartial basis among all

candidates within the area served by the newspaper or radio and


television station involved.
No one seriously disputes the legitimacy or the importance of the
objective sought to be secured by Section 11 (b) (of Republic Act No.
6646) in relation to Sections 90 and 92 (of the Omnibus Election Code).
That objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which,
like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution
between the economic elite and the rest of society, and by the prevalence
of poverty, with the bulk of our population falling below that "poverty
line." It is supremely important, however, to note that objective is not
only a concededly legitimate one; it has also been given constitutional
status by the terms of Article IX(C) (4) of the 1987 Constitution which
provides as follows:
Sec. 4. The Commission [on Elections] may, during the election
period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises
or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective
of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or
permits for the operation of media of communication and information.
The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" has been
spelled out in the Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time,
and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates
of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public
information campaigns and forums among candidates." 1
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights
which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom
of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in conjunction
with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision
applicable during a specific limited period i.e., "during the election
period." It is difficult to overemphasize the special importance of the
rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in a democratic
polity, in particular when they relate to the purity and integrity of the
electoral process itself, the process by which the people identify those
who shall have governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that
these rights are accorded a preferred status in our constitutional hierarchy.
Withal, the rights of free speech and free press are not unlimited rights
for they are not the only important and relevant values even in the most
democratic of polities. In our own society, equality of opportunity to
proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial
resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important
value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article
II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State
shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." 2
The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen
to be that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of
supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the
purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political
office, although such supervision or regulation may result in some

limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. For supervision or
regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely conceivable
without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the
general, time-honored one that a statute is presumed to be
constitutional and that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must
discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving that assertion. 3
Put in slightly different terms, there appears no present necessity to fall
back upon basic principles relating to the police power of the State and
the requisites for constitutionally valid exercise of that power. The
essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or
administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power
of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and
information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has
gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so
as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and
freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not
gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of
media operations during election periods.
In the constitutional assaying of legislative provisions like Section 11 (b),
the character and extent of the limitations resulting from the particular
measure being assayed upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press
are essential considerations. It is important to note that the restrictive
impact upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press of Section 11
(b) is circumscribed by certain important limitations.
Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and
enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the
Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to
election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328 dated 2 January 1992, the
Comelec, acting under another specific grant of authority by the
Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from 12 January
1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period.
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of
application. Analysis of Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to apply
only to the purchase and sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a
donation, 4 of print space and air time for "campaign or other political
purposes." Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the
reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or newsworthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties
and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach
commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or
broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of
candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at
least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact
advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section
11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other
coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for
political office. We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid
political advertisements of particular candidates.
The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) that it
does not restrict either the reporting of or the expression of belief or
opinion or comment upon the qualifications and programs and activities
of any and all candidates for office constitutes the critical distinction
which must be made between the instant case and that of Sanidad v.
Commission on Elections. 5 In Sanidad, the Court declared
unconstitutional Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 which
provided as follows:

Sec. 19. Prohibition on Columnists, Commentators or Announcers


During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on
plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign
for or against the plebiscite issues.
Resolution No. 2167 had been promulgated by the Comelec in
connection with the plebiscite mandated by R.A. No. 6766 on the
ratification or adoption of the Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region. The Court held that Resolution No. 2167 constituted a restriction
of the freedom of expression of petitioner Sanidad, a newspaper
columnist of the Baguio Midland Courier, "for no justifiable reason." The
Court, through Medialdea, J., said:
. . . [N]either Article, IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 [b], 2nd
par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also
been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media
practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression
during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in the plebiscite.
Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory
basis." 6 (Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied)

There is a third limitation upon the scope of application of Section 11 (b).


Section 11 (b) exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation
to the Comelec of print space or air time, which space and time Comelec
is then affirmatively required to allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of
charge, among the individual candidates for elective public offices in the
province or city served by the newspaper or radio or television station.
Some of the petitioners are apparently apprehensive that Comelec might
not allocate "Comelec time" or "Comelec space" on a fair and equal basis
among the several candidates. Should such apprehensions materialize,
candidates who are in fact prejudiced by unequal or unfair allocations
effected by Comelec will have appropriate judicial remedies available, so
long at least as this Court sits. Until such time, however, the Comelec is
entitled to the benefit of the presumption that official duty will be or is
being regularly carried out. It seems appropriate here to recall what
Justice Laurel taught in Angara v. Electoral Commission 7 that the
possibility of abuse is no argument against the concession of the power or
authority involved, for there is no power or authority in human society
that is not susceptible of being abused. Should it be objected that the
Comelec might refrain from procuring "Comelec time" and "Comelec
space," much the same considerations should be borne in mind. As earlier
noted, the Comelec is commanded by statute to buy or "procure"
"Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in mass media, and it must be
presumed that Comelec will carry out that statutory duty in this
connection, and if it does fail to do so, once again, the candidate or
candidates who feel aggrieved have judicial remedies at their disposal.
The points that may appropriately be underscored are that Section 11 (b)
does not cut off the flow of media reporting, opinion or commentary
about candidates, their qualifications and platforms and promises.
Newspaper, radio broadcasting and television stations remain quite free
to carry out their regular and normal information and communication
operations. Section 11 (b) does not authorize any intervention and much
less control on the part of Comelec in respect of the content of the normal
operations of media, nor in respect of the content of political
advertisements which the individual candidates are quite free to present
within their respective allocated Comelec time and Comelec space. There
is here no "officious functionary of [a] repressive government" dictating

what events or ideas reporters, broadcasters, editors or commentators


may talk or write about or display on TV screens. There is here no
censorship, whether disguised or otherwise. What Section 11 (b), viewed
in context, in fact does is to limit paid partisan political advertisements to
for a other than modern mass media, and to "Comelec time" and
"Comelec space" in such mass media.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access
to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however,
bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective
set out in Article IX(C) (4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is
precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television
time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to
make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of
the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with
shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C) (4) of the Constitution and
Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which
Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to
bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for
political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot be
gainsaid.
My learned brother in the Court Cruz, J. remonstrates, however, that
"t[he] financial disparity among the candidates is a fact of life that cannot
be corrected by legislation except only by the limitation of their
respective expenses to a common maximum. The flaw in the prohibition
under challenge is that while the rich candidate is barred from buying
mass media coverage, it nevertheless allows him to spend his funds on
other campaign activities also inaccessible to his strained rival." True
enough Section 11 (b) does not, by itself or in conjunction with Sections
90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code, place political candidates on
complete and perfect equality inter se without regard to their financial
affluence or lack thereof. But a regulatory measure that is less than
perfectly comprehensive or which does not completely obliterate the evil
sought to be remedied, is not for that reason alone constitutionally infirm.
The Constitution does not, as it cannot, exact perfection in governmental
regulation. All it requires, in accepted doctrine, is that the regulatory
measure under challenge bear a reasonable nexus with the
constitutionally sanctioned objective. That the supervision or regulation
of communication and information media is not, in itself, a forbidden
modality is made clear by the Constitution itself in Article IX (C) (4).
It is believed that, when so viewed, the limiting impact of Section 11 (b)
upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves may be seen to
be not unduly repressive or unreasonable. For, once again, there is
nothing in Section 11 (b) to prevent media reporting of and commentary
on pronouncements, activities, written statements of the candidates
themselves. All other fora remain accessible to candidates, even for
political advertisements. The requisites of fairness and equal opportunity
are, after all, designed to benefit the candidates themselves.
Finally, the nature and characteristics of modern mass media, especially
electronic media, cannot be totally disregarded. Realistically, the only
limitation upon the free speech of candidates imposed is on the right of
candidates to bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisements
commonly repeated in the mass media ad nauseam. Frequently, such
repetitive political commercials when fed into the electronic media
themselves constitute invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. It
might be supposed that it is easy enough for a person at home simply to
flick off his radio of television set. But it is rarely that simple. For the
candidates with deep pockets may purchase radio or television time in
many, if not all, the major stations or channels. Or they may directly or
indirectly own or control the stations or channels themselves. The

contemporary reality in the Philippines is that, in a very real sense,


listeners and viewers constitute a "captive audience." 8
The paid political advertisement introjected into the electronic media and
repeated with mind-deadening frequency, are commonly intended and
crafted, not so much to inform and educate as to condition and
manipulate, not so much to provoke rational and objective appraisal of
candidates' qualifications or programs as to appeal to the non-intellective
faculties of the captive and passive audience. The right of the general
listening and viewing public to be free from such intrusions and their
subliminal effects is at least as important as the right of candidates to
advertise themselves through modern electronic media and the right of
media enterprises to maximize their revenues from the marketing of
"packaged" candidates.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions should be, as they are hereby, DISMISSED
for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 147571

May 5, 2001

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and


KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing business as
MANILA STANDARD, petitioners, vs
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock,
non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields,
including economics, politics, demography, and social development, and
thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the results
thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation
publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which
features news- worthy items of information including election surveys.
1wphi1.nt
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission
on Elections from enforcing 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act),
which provides:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15)
days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be
published seven (7) days be- fore an election.
The term "election surveys" is defined in 5.1 of the law as follows:
Election surveys refer to the measurement of opinions and perceptions of
the voters as regards a candidate's popularity, qualifications, platforms or
a matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including voters
preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during the
campaign period (hereafter referred to as "Survey").
The implement 5.4, Resolution 3636, 24(h), dated March I, 2001, of
the COMELEC enjoins
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15)
days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be
published seven (7) days be- fore an election.
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey
throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local levels
and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish

them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other


hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last
day of the elections on May 14,2001.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey
results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech
without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim
that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of
surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two
days before the election day without causing confusion among the voters
and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the
conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting
process posed by election surveys. They point out that no similar
restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on
newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles
concerning political issues up to the day of the election. Consequently,
they contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied
access to the results of election surveys, which are relatively objective.
1wphi1.nt
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of
R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of
the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before
the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of
election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a
rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the
debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys,
bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to
meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of
freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in
duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7
days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election
survey results but only require timeliness. Respondent claims that in
National Press Club v. COMELEC,1 a total ban on political
advertisements, with candidates being merely allocated broadcast time
during the so-called COMELEC space or COMELEC hour, was upheld
by this Court. In contrast, according to respondent, it states that the
prohibition in 5.4 of RA. No. 9006 is much more limited.
For reasons hereunder given, we hold that 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006
constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech,
expression, and the press.
To be sure, 5.4Iays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression,
and the press prohibiting the publication of election survey results
affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days
immediately preceding a national election seven (7) days before a local
election. Because of tile preferred status of tile constitutional rights of
speech, expression, and he press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty
presumption of invalidity.2 Indeed, any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy Presumption against its
constitutional validity. ...The Government thus carries a heavy burden of
showing justification for in enforcement of such restraint. "'3 There, thus
a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every
legislation.

Nor may it be argued that because of Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution,


which gives the COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the enjoyment
or utilization of franchise for the operation of media of communication,
no presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure like 5.4. For as we
have pointed out in sustaining tile ban on media political advertisements,

the grant of power to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 is limited to


ensuring "equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply" as well as
uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media
facilities "public information campaigns and forums among candidates."4
This Court stated:
The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen
to be that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of
supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the
Purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political
office, although such supervision or regulation may result in some
limitation of the rights of free speech and free press.5
MR JUSTICE KAPUNAN dissents. He rejects as inappropriate the test
of clear and present danger for determining the validity of 5.4. Indeed,
as has been pointed out in Osmea v. COMELEC,6 this test was
originally formulated for the criminal law and only later appropriated for
free speech cases. Hence, while it may be useful for determining the
validity of laws dealing with inciting to sedition or incendiary speech, it
may not be adequate for such regulations as the one in question. For such
a test is concerned with questions of the gravity and imminence of the
danger as basis for curtailing free speech, which is not the case of 5.4
and similar regulations.
Instead, MR JUSTICE KAPUNAN purports to engage in a form of
balancing by "weighing and balancing the circumstances to determine
whether public interest [in free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections] is served by the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights"
(page 7). After canvassing the reasons for the prohibition, i.e., to prevent
last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect to favor
candidates, misinformation, the junking" of weak and "losing" candidates
by their parties, and the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas"
and invoking the State's power to supervise media of information during
the election period (pages 11-16), the dissenting opinion simply
concludes:
Viewed in the light of the legitimate and significant objectives of Section
5.4, It may be seen that its limiting impact on the rights of free speech
and of the press is not unduly repressive or unreasonable. In Indeed, it is
a mere restriction, not an absolute prohibition, on the publication of
election surveys. It is limited in duration; it applies only during the period
when the voters are presumably contemplating whom they should elect
and when they are most susceptible to such unwarranted persuasion.
These surveys may be published thereafter. (Pages 17-18)
The dissent does not, however, show why, on balance, these
considerations should outweigh the value of freedom of expression.
Instead, reliance is placed on Art. IX-C, 4. As already stated, the
purpose of Art. IX-C, 4 is to "ensure equal opportunity, time, and space
and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates. " Hence the
validity of the ban on media advertising. It is noteworthy that R.A. No.
9006, 14 has lifted the ban and now allows candidates to advertise their
candidacies in print and broadcast media. Indeed, to sustain the ban on
the publication of survey results would sanction the censorship of all
speaking by candidates in an election on the ground that the usual
bombasts and hyperbolic claims made during the campaigns can confuse
voters and thus debase the electoral process.
In sum, the dissent has engaged only in a balancing at the margin. This
form of ad hoc balancing predictably results in sustaining the challenged
legislation and leaves freedom of speech, expression, and the press with
little protection. For anyone who can bring a plausible justification

forward can easily show a rational connection between the statute and a
legitimate governmental purpose. In contrast, the balancing of interest
undertaken by then Justice Castro in Gonzales v. COMELEC,7 from
which the dissent in this case takes its cue, was a strong one resulting in
his conclusion that , 50-B of R.A. No. 4880, which limited the period of
election campaign and partisan political activity, was an unconstitutional
abridgment of freedom of expression.
Nor can the ban on election surveys be justified on the ground that there
are other countries - 78, according to the Solicitor General, while the
dissent cites 28 - which similarly impose restrictions on the publication of
election surveys. At best this survey is inconclusive. It is note worthy that
in the United States no restriction on the publication of election survey
results exists. It cannot be argued that this is because the United States is
a mature democracy. Neither are there laws imposing an embargo on
survey results, even for a limited period, in other countries. As pointed
out by petitioners, the United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Macedonia, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Ukraine, some of which are no older
nor more mature than the Philippines in political development, do not
restrict the publication of election survey results.
What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional
validity of 5.4? The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice
Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien:
[A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression
and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.8
This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based
from content neutral regulations and is said to have "become canonical in
the review of such laws."9 is noteworthy that the O 'Brien test has been
applied by this Court in at least two cases.10
Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental
interest is "not unrelated to the Expression of free expression." Moreover,
even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law
should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of
expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental
purpose in question.
Our inquiry should accordingly focus on these two considerations as
applied to 5.4.
>First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the
causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest
makes such interest "not related to the suppression of free expression."
By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the
possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the
election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while
allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by
newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists,
and other opinion takers. In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a particular
subject matter, if not viewpoint, by referring personal opinion to
statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression
means that "the government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."11 The

inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the expression falls within


one of the few unprotected categories dealt with in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 12 thus:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words - those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality
Nor is there justification for the prior restraint which 5.4Iays on
protected speech. Near v. Minnesota,13 it was held:
[The] protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited.
But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases. No
one would question but that a government might prevent actual
obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates
transports or the number and location of troops. On similar grounds, the
primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene
publications. The security of the community life may be protected against
incitements to acts of violence and overthrow by force of orderly
government

Thus, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition


imposed by 5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a
limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited
time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and
substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and
is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days
immediately before a national election and seven (7) days immediately
before a local election. ..
This sufficiently distinguishes 5.4 from R.A. No. 6646, 11(b), which
this Court found to be valid in National Press Club v. COMELEC,14 and
Osmea v. COMELEC.15 For the ban imposed by R.A. No. 6646, 11(b)
is not only authorized by a specific constitutional provision,16 but it also
provided an alternative so that, as this Court pointed out in Osmea, there
was actually no ban but only a substitution of media advertisements by
the COMELEC space and COMELEC hour.
Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is
unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free
expression is only incidental, 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4]
of the O 'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is
necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, 5.4
aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of
bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to
the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as
these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the
sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be
more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech
because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such
evils. Thus, under the Administrative Code of 1987,17 the COMELEC is
given the power:
To stop any illegal activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any
unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election propaganda, after due
notice and hearing.

This is surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained in


5.4. Pursuant to this power of the COMELEC, it can confiscate bogus
survey results calculated to mislead voters. Candidates can have their
own surveys conducted. No right of reply can be invoked by others. No
principle of equality is involved. It is a free market to which each
candidate brings his ideas. As for the purpose of the law to prevent
bandwagon effects, it is doubtful whether the Government can deal with
this natural-enough tendency of some voters. Some voters want to be
identified with the "winners." Some are susceptible to the herd mentality.
Can these be legitimately prohibited by suppressing the publication of
survey results, which are a form of expression? It has been held that
"[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public
convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal
activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of
rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions."18
To summarize then, we hold that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a
prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is
only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of
expression.

Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992


petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving
Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116,
119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public
viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against
other religions which is expressly prohibited by law."
Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action against the respondent
Board. On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President
the classification of its TV Series No. 128. It succeeded in its appeal for
on December 18, 1992, the Office of the President reversed the decision
of the respondent Board. Forthwith, the Board allowed Series No. 128 to
be publicly telecast.
On December 14, 1992, petitioner also filed against the respondent Board
Civil Case No. Q-92-14280, with the RTC, NCR Quezon City. 1
Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR
tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program
Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board
invoked its power under PD No. 1986 in relation to Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code.

On the other hand, the COMELEC contends that under Art. IX-A, 7 of
the Constitution, its decisions, orders, or resolution may be reviewed by
this Court only certiorari. The flaws in this argument is that it assumes
that its Resolution 3636, March 1, 2001 is a "decision, order, or
resolution" within the meaning of Art. IX-A, 7. Indeed, counsel for
COMELEC maintain that Resolution 3636 was "rendered" by the
Commission. However, the Resolution does not purport to adjudicate the
right of any party. It is not an exercise by the COMELEC of its
adjudicatory power to settle the claims of parties. To the contrary,
Resolution 3636 clearly states that it is promulgated to implement the
provisions of R.A. No. 9006. Hence, there is no basis for COMELEC's
claim that this petition for prohibition is inappropriate. Prohibition has
been fund appropriate for testing the constitutionality of various election
laws, rules, and regulations.19

On January 4, 1993, the trial court held a hearing on petitioner's prayer


for a writ of preliminary injunction. The parties orally argued and then
marked their documentary evidence. Petitioner submitted the following
as its exhibits, viz.:

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibited GRANTED and 5.4 of R.A.


No. 9006 24(h) of COMELEC Resolution 3636, March 1, 2001, are
declared unconstitutional. 1wphi1.nt

Need more opinions for this particular program. Please subject to more
opinions.

G.R. No. 119673

(2)
Exhibit "A-1," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television
showing its September 11, 1992 subsequent action on petitioner's Series
No. 115 as follows: 3

July 26, 1996

IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.), petitioner, vs


THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW
FOR MOVING PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE
HENRIETTA S. MENDOZA, respondents.
PUNO, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated March 24, 1995 of the
respondent Court of Appeals affirming the action of the respondent Board
of Review for Moving Pictures and Television which x-rated the TV
Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo."
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a
television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2
every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents
and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often
times in comparative studies with other religions.

(1)
Exhibit "A," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television
showing its September 9, 1992 action on petitioner's Series No. 115 as
follows: 2
REMARKS:
There are some inconsistencies in the particular program as it is very
surprising for this program to show series of Catholic ceremonies and
also some religious sects and using it in their discussion about the bible.
There are remarks which are direct criticism which affect other religions.

REMARKS:
This program is criticizing different religions, based on their own
interpretation of the Bible.
We suggest that the program should delve on explaining their own faith
and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faith.

(3)
Exhibit "B," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television
showing its October 9, 1992 action on petitioner's Series No. 119, as
follows: 4
REMARKS:
The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says
that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned
because nowhere it is found in the bible that we should do so.

This is intolerance and robs off all sects of freedom of choice, worship
and decision.

against another religion which is expressly prohibited by law. Please be


guided in the submission of future shows.

(4)
Exhibit "C," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television
showing its October 20, 1992 action on petitioner's Series No. 121 as
follows: 5

After evaluating the evidence of the parties, the trial court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction on petitioner's bond o P10,000.00.

REMARKS:
I refuse to approve the telecast of this episode for reasons of the attacks,
they do on, specifically, the Catholic religion.
I refuse to admit that they can tell, dictate any other religion that they are
right and the rest are wrong, which they clearly present in this episode.
(5)
Exhibit "D," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television
showing its November 20, 1992 action on petitioner's Series No. 128 as
follows: 6
REMARKS:The episode presented criticizes the religious beliefs of the
Catholic and Protestant's beliefs.
We suggest a second review.
(6)
Exhibits "E," "E-1," petitioner's block time contract with ABSCBN Broadcasting Corporation dated September 1, 1992. 7
(7)
Exhibit "F," petitioner's Airtime Contract with Island
Broadcasting Corporation. 8
(8)
Exhibit "G," letter dated December 18, 1992 of former
Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S.
Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board which x-rated the
showing of petitioner's Series No. 129. The letter reads in part:xxx
xxx
xxx
The television episode in question is protected by the constitutional
guarantee of free speech and expression under Article III, section 4 of the
1987 Constitution.
We have viewed a tape of the television episode in question, as well as
studied the passages found by MTRCB to be objectionable and we find
no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger
sufficient to limit the said constitutional guarantee.
(9)
Exhibits "H," "H-1," letter dated November 26, 1992 of Teofilo
C. Ramos, Sr., addressed to President Fidel V. Ramos appealing the
action of the respondent Board x-rating petitioner's Series No. 128.
On its part, respondent Board submitted the following exhibits, viz.:
(1)
Exhibit "1," Permit Certificate for Television Exhibition No.
15181 dated December 18, 1992 allowing the showing of Series No. 128
under parental guidance.
(2)

Exhibit "2," which is Exhibit "G" of petitioner.

(3)
Exhibit "3," letter dated October 12, 1992 of Henrietta S.
Mendez, addressed to the Christian Era Broadcasting Service which reads
in part:xxx
xxx
xxx
In the matter of your television show "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" Series No.
119, please be informed that the Board was constrained to deny your
show a permit to exhibit. The material involved constitute an attack

The trial court set the pre-trial of the case and the parties submitted their
pre-trial briefs. 9 The pre-trial briefs show that the parties' evidence is
basically the evidence they submitted in the hearing of the issue of
preliminary injunction. The trial of the case was set and reset several
times as the parties tried to reach an amicable accord. Their efforts failed
and the records show that after submission of memoranda, the trial court
rendered a Judgment, 10 on December 15, 1993, the dispositive portion
of which reads:xxx xxx
xxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Board
of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (BRMPT) to grant
petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo the necessary permit for all the series of "Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo" program.
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, however, is directed to refrain from offending
and attacking other existing religions in showing "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo"
program.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration 11 praying: (a) for the deletion of
the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Decision, and (b)
for the Board to be perpetually enjoined from requiring petitioner to
submit for review the tapes of its program. The respondent Board
opposed the motion. 12 On March 7, 1993, the trial court granted
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. It ordered: 13
xxx

xxx

xxx

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is granted. The second


portion of the Court's Order dated December 15, 1993, directing
petitioner to refrain from offending and attacking other existing religions
in showing "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program is hereby deleted and set
aside. Respondents are further prohibited from requiring petitioner Iglesia
ni Cristo to submit for review VTR tapes of its religious program "Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo."
Respondent Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after its motion for
reconsideration was denied. 14
On March 5, 1995, the respondent Court of Appeals 15 reversed the trial
court. It ruled that: (1) the respondent board has jurisdiction and power to
review the TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and (2) the respondent
Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit
for the exhibition on TV of the three series of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" on
the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion.
It also found the series "indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good
customs.
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner raises
the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE "ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO"
PROGRAM IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS A
FORM OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AND EXPRESSION.

II

iv)
Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market
for violence or pornography;

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS


ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT BEING AN EXERCISE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE "ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO"
PROGRAM IS SUBJECT TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE
ONLY IN THE EXTREME CASE THAT IT POSES A CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTRCB IS VESTED WITH THE
POWER TO CENSOR RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE "ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO," A
PURELY RELIGIOUS PROGRAM IS INDECENT AND CONTRARY
TO LAW AND GOOD CUSTOMS.
The basic issues can be reduced into two: (1) first, whether the
respondent Board has the power to review petitioner's TV program "Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo," and (2) second, assuming it has the power, whether it
gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner's
religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they
constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent,
contrary to law and good customs.
The first issue can be resolved by examining the powers of the Board
under PD No. 1986. Its section 3 pertinently provides:
Sec. 3
Powers and Functions. -- The BOARD shall have the following
functions, powers and duties:xxx
xxx
xxx
b)
To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein
defined, television programs, including publicity materials such as
advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such motion pictures and
publicity materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution for
television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced in the
Philippines and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or for
export.

v)
drugs;

Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of prohibited

vi)
Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and
reputation of any person, whether living or dead;
vii)
Those which may constitute contempt of court or of any quasijudicial tribunal, or pertain to matters which are subjudice in nature
(emphasis ours).
The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all
"television programs." By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the
power to "approve, delete . . . and/or prohibit the . . . exhibition and/or
television broadcast of . . . television programs . . ." The law also directs
the Board to apply "contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard" to
determine those which are objectionable for being "immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the
Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency
to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime."
Petitioner contends that the term "television program" should not include
religious programs like its program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." A contrary
interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the
Constitution which guarantees that "no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed."
We reject petitioner's submission which need not set us adrift in a
constitutional voyage towards an uncharted sea. Freedom of religion has
been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws,
past and present. We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it
is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to
allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs,
and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good." 16 We have also laboriously defined
in our jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right
to religious profession and worship. To quote the summation of Mr.
Justice Isagani Cruz, our well-known constitutionalist: 17
Religious Profession and Worship

c)
To approve, delete objectionable portion from and/or prohibit
the importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale,
lease, exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures,
television programs and publicity materials, subject of the preceding
paragraph, which, in the judgment of the BOARD applying contemporary
Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of
the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or
crime, such as but not limited to:
i)
Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion
or sedition against the State, or otherwise threaten the economic and/or
political stability of the State;
ii)
Those which tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the
people, their government and/or duly constituted authorities;
iii)

Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;

The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz.,
freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is
absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare.
(1)

Freedom to Believe

The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning


the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories about life and death;
worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any
religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to
his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul -- in fact,
cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However
absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical
to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not
be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability
to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. "Men may believe what

they cannot prove." Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be
called to account because he cannot prove what he believes.
(2)

Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs

But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that
affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of
the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the
other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a
proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere
invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it
impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can
be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is
true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction
and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or
prohibitions of the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: "The constitutional provision on
religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges.
It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from
conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law
because of religious dogma.
Accordingly, while one has lull freedom to believe in Satan, he may not
offer the object of his piety a human sacrifice, as this would be murder.
Those who literally interpret the Biblical command to "go forth and
multiply" are nevertheless not allowed to contract plural marriages in
violation of the laws against bigamy. A person cannot refuse to pay taxes
on the ground that it would be against his religious tenets to recognize
any authority except that of God alone. An atheist cannot express in his
disbelief in act of derision that wound the feelings of the faithful. The
police power can validly asserted against the Indian practice of the suttee,
born of deep religious conviction, that calls on the widow to immolate
herself at the funeral pile of her husband.
We thus reject petitioner's postulate that its religious program is per se
beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television
is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court
iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by
the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some
substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious
detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals,
or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be
seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its
blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern
in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and
bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious
differences. Our country is still not safe from the recurrence of this
stultifying strife considering our warring religious beliefs and the
fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs. Even
now, we have yet to settle the near century old strife in Mindanao, the
roots of which have been nourished by the mistrust and misunderstanding
between our Christian and Muslim brothers and sisters. The bewildering
rise of weird religious cults espousing violence as an article of faith also
proves the wisdom of our rule rejecting a strict let alone policy on the
exercise of religion. For sure, we shall continue to subject any act
pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened
scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of
man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should
not stand still.

It is also petitioner's submission that the respondent appellate court


gravely erred when it affirmed the ruling of the respondent Board xrating its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. The records
show that the respondent Board disallowed the program series for
"attacking" other religions. Thus, Exhibits "A," "A-1," (respondent
Board's Voting Slip for Television) reveal that its reviewing members xrated Series 115 for ". . . criticizing different religions, based on their own
interpretation of the Bible." They suggested that the program should only
explain petitioner's ". . . own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other
faiths." Exhibit "B" shows that Series No. 119 was x-rated because "the
Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that
our Catholic veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because
nowhere it is found in the bible that we should do so. This is
intolerance . . ." Exhibit "C" shows that Series No. 121 was x-rated ". . .
for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the Catholic
religion. . . . (T)hey can not tell, dictate any other religion that they are
right and the rest are wrong
. . ." Exhibit "D" also shows that Series No. 128 was not favorably
recommended because it ". . . outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs."
On second review, it was x-rated because of its "unbalanced
interpretations of some parts of the bible." 18 In sum, the respondent
Board x-rated petitioner's TV program series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128
because of petitioner's controversial biblical interpretations and its
"attacks" against contrary religious beliefs. The respondent appellate
court agreed and even held that the said "attacks" are indecent, contrary
to law and good customs.
We reverse the ruling of the appellate court.
First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all
prior restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that
restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should
be greeted with furrowed brows. 19 It is the burden of the respondent
Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden,
its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
Second. The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated
petitioners TV series for "attacking" either religions, especially the
Catholic church. An examination of the evidence, especially Exhibits
"A," "A-1," "B," "C," and "D" will show that the so-called "attacks" are
mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other
religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as
they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the
respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence,
can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986.
This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and
interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. It misappreciates the
essence of freedom to differ as delineated in the benchmark case of
Cantwell v. Connecticut, so viz.: 20xxx xxx
xxx
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp
differences arise. In both fields, the tenets of one man may seem the
rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view,
the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification
of men who have been, or are prominent in church or state or even to
false statements. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light
of history that inspite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these
liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right
conduct on the part of the citizens of democracy.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions
by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,

however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not
the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an
attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war
and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the
establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from
leaning towards any religion. Vis-a-vis religious differences, the State
enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable
stance. In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said
religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a
State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and
the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is
better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought
and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas.
When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that
speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite
speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.
Third. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against
another religion" in x-rating the religious program of petitioner. Even a
sideglance at section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is not among the
grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's
television program. The ground "attack against another religion" was
merely added by the respondent Board in its Rules. 21 This rule is void
for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and
regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to
enforce.
It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize" attack against any
religion" as a ground allegedly ". . . because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986
prohibits the showing of motion pictures, television programs and
publicity materials which are contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3)
of the Revised Penal Code punishes anyone who exhibits "shows which
offend any race or religion." We respectfully disagree for it is plain that
the word "attack" is not synonymous with the word "offend." Moreover,
Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be invoked to
justify the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any religion.
It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech. It must be
emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included "attack
against any religion" as a ground for censorship. The ground was not,
however, carried over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it.
There can be no other intent. Indeed, even the Executive Department
espouses this view.
Thus, in an Opinion dated November 28, 1985 then Minister of Justice,
now President of the Senate, Neptali Gonzales explained:xxx
xxx
xxx
However, the question whether the BRMPT (now MTRCB) may preview
and censor the subject television program of INC should be viewed in the
light of the provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of PD 1986, which is
substantially the same as the provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of E.O.
No. 876-A, which prescribes the standards of censorship, to wit:
"immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the
prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people or with dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence, or of a wrong" as
determined by the Board, "applying contemporary Filipino cultural
values as standard." As stated, the intention of the Board to subject the
INC's television program to "previewing and censorship is prompted by
the fact that its religious program makes mention of beliefs and practices
of other religion." On the face of the law itself, there can conceivably be
no basis for censorship of said program by the Board as much as the
alleged reason cited by the Board does not appear to he within the

contemplation of the standards of censorship set by law. (Emphasis


supplied).
Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents
failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible
Society v. City of Manila, 22 this Court held: "The constitutional
guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any
restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of
expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent." In Victoriano
vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 23 we further ruled that ". . . it is only
where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave
danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of
religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent
necessary to avoid the danger."
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by
the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to
justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute
impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the
gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech,
including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but
only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken
the life of a reality already on ground.
It is suggested that we re-examine the application of clear and present
danger rule to the case at bar. In the United States, it is true that the clear
and present danger test has undergone permutations. It was Mr. Justice
Holmes who formulated the test in Schenck v. US, 24 as follows: ". . . the
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent." Admittedly, the test was originally designed to
determine the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses
anti-government action. Bannered by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, the
test attained its full flowering in the decade of the forties, when its
umbrella was used to protect speech other than subversive speech. 25
Thus, for instance, the test was applied to annul a total ban on labor
picketing. 26 The use of the test took a downswing in the 1950's when the
US Supreme Court decided Dennis v. United States involving communist
conspiracy. 27 In Dennis, the components of the test were altered as the
High Court adopted Judge Learned Hand's formulation that ". . . in each
case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger." The imminence requirement of the test was thus
diminished and to that extent, the protection of the rule was weakened. In
1969, however, the strength of the test was reinstated in Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 28 when the High Court restored in the test the imminence
requirement, and even added an intent requirement which according to a
noted commentator ensured that only speech directed at inciting
lawlessness could be punished. 29 Presently in the United States, the
clear and present danger test is not applied to protect low value speeches
such as obscene speech, commercial speech and defamation. Be that as it
may, the test is still applied to four types of speech: speech that advocates
dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction, out of
court contempt and release of information that endangers a fair trial. 30
Hence, even following the drift of American jurisprudence, there is
reason to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar which
concerns speech that attacks other religions and could readily provoke
hostile audience reaction. It cannot be doubted that religious truths
disturb and disturb tenribly.

It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear and present


danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of
speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the
speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal
connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be
established. The contention overlooks the fact that the case at bar
involves videotapes that are pre-taped and hence, their speech content is
known and not an X quantity. Given the specific content of the speech, it
is not unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board, with its
expertise, can determine whether its sulphur will bring about the
substantive evil feared by the law.

United States Supreme Court and pertaining to the United States


Postmaster-General), that the courts will not interfere with the decision of
the Director of Posts unless clearly of opinion that it was wrong. (Bates
& Guilid Co. vs. Payne [1904], 194 U.S., 106; Smith vs. Hitchcock
[1912], 226 U.S., 63; Masses Pub. Co. vs. Patten [1917], 246 Fed., 24.
But see David vs. Brown [1900], 103 Fed., 909, announcing a somewhat
different doctrine and relied upon by the Attorney-General).

Finally, it is also opined by Mr. Justice Kapunan that ". . . the


determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification,
exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of
protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be
arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." He
submits that a "system of prior restraint may only be validly administered
by judges and not left to administrative agencies. "The same submission
is made by Mr. Justice Mendoza.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals


dated March 24, 1995 is affirmed insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction
of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner's TV program entitled
"Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and is reversed and set aside insofar as it
sustained the action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV
Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. No costs.

This thoughtful thesis is an attempt to transplant another American rule in


our jurisdiction. Its seedbed was laid down by Mr. Justice Brennan in his
concurring opinion in the 1962 case of Manual Enterprise v. Day 31 By
1965, the US Supreme Court in Freedman v. Maryland 32 was ready to
hold that "the teaching of cases is that, because only a judicial
determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary
sensitivity to freedom of expression only a procedure requiring a judicial
determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint." 33

MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION


BOARD
(MTRCB),
vs
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION and LOREN
LEGARDA, respondents.

While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to hold that
it is unconstitutional for Congress to grant an administrative body quasijudicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its
decision subject to review by our courts. As far back as 1921, we upheld
this set-up in Sotto vs. Ruiz, 34 viz.:
The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege
which can be regulated in order to avoid its abuse. Persons posses no
absolute right to put into the mail anything they please, regardless of its
character.
On the other hand, the exclusion of newspaper and other publications
from the mails, in the exercise of executive power, is extremely delicate
in nature and can only be justified where the statute is unequivocably
applicable to the supposed objectionable publication. In excluding any
publication for the mails, the object should be not to interfere with the
freedom of the press or with any other fundamental right of the people.
This is the more true with reference to articles supposedly libelous than to
other particulars of the law, since whether an article is or is not libelous,
is fundamentally a legal question. In order for there to be due process of
law, the action of the Director of Posts must be subject to revision by the
courts in case he had abused his discretion or exceeded his authority. (Ex
parte Jackson [1878], 96 U.S., 727;

To be sure, legal scholars in the United States are still debating the
proposition whether or not courts alone are competent to decide whether
speech is constitutionally protected. 35 The issue involves highly
arguable policy considerations and can be better addressed by our
legislators.

G.R. No. 155282

January 17, 2005

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, filed by petitioner Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) against ABSCBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN) and former Senator Loren
Legarda, respondents, assailing the (a) Decision dated November 18,
1997,1 and (b) Order dated August 26, 20022 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 77, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-93-16052.
The facts are undisputed.
On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN
aired "Prosti-tuition," an episode of the television (TV) program "The
Inside Story" produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted
female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for
their tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps,
customers, and some faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine
Womens University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the
students involved and the facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue,
Manila conspicuously served as the background of the episode.

Public Cleaning House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; Post Publishing
Co. vs. Murray [1916]. 23 - Fed., 773)

The showing of "The Inside Story" caused uproar in the PWU


community. Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the
PWU, and the PWU Parents and Teachers Association filed lettercomplaints3 with petitioner MTRCB. Both complainants alleged that the
episode besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in the harassment
of some of its female students.

As has been said, the performance of the duty of determining whether a


publication contains printed matter of a libelous character rests with the
Director of Posts and involves the exercise of his judgment and
discretion. Every intendment of the law is in favor of the correctness of
his action. The rule is (and we go only to those cases coming from the

Acting on the letter-complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a


formal complaint with the MTRCB Investigating Committee, alleging
among others, that respondents (1) did not submit "The Inside Story" to
petitioner for its review and (2) exhibited the same without its
permission, thus, violating Section 7 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.

19865 and Section 3,6 Chapter III and Section 7, 7 Chapter IV of the
MTRCB Rules and Regulations.8

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. 24


Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

In their answer,9 respondents explained that the "The Inside Story" is a


"public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial,"
the airing of which is protected by the constitutional provision on
freedom of expression and of the press. Accordingly, petitioner has no
power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint
upon respondents.
On February 5, 1993, after hearing and submission of the parties
memoranda, the MTRCB Investigating Committee rendered a Decision,
the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the aforementioned premises, the respondents are
ordered to pay the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00) for non-submission of the program, subject of this case for
review and approval of the MTRCB.
Heretofore, all subsequent programs of the The Inside Story and all
other programs of the ABS-CBN Channel 2 of the same category shall be
submitted to the Board of Review and Approval before showing;
otherwise the Board will act accordingly." 101awphi1.nt
On appeal, the Office of Atty. Henrietta S. Mendez, Chairman of the
MTRCB, issued a Decision dated March 12, 1993 affirming the above
ruling of its Investigating Committee. 11 Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated April 14, 1993. 12
Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, Quezon City. It seeks
to: (1) declare
as
unconstitutional
Sections
3(b),13 3(c),14 3(d),15 4,16 7,17 and 1118 of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections
3,19 7,20 and 2821 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations; 22 (2) (in the
alternative) exclude the "The Inside Story" from the coverage of the
above cited provisions; and (3) annul and set aside the MTRCB Decision
dated March 12, 1993 and Resolution dated April 14, 1993. Respondents
averred that the above-cited provisions constitute "prior restraint" on
respondents exercise of freedom of expression and of the press, and,
therefore, unconstitutional. Furthermore, the above cited provisions do
not apply to the "The Inside Story" because it falls under the category of
"public affairs program, news documentary, or socio-political editorials"
governed by standards similar to those governing newspapers.
On November 18, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision 23 in favor of
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE the assailed Decision and
Resolution of MTRCB dated March 12, 1993;2. DECLARING AND
DECREEING that Sections 3 (b), (c), and (d), 4, 7, and 11 of P.D. No.
1986 and Sections 3, 7, 28 (a) of its Implementing Rules do not cover the
TV Program "The Inside Story" and other similar programs, they being
public affairs programs which can be equated to newspapers;
and3. MAKING PERMANENT the Injunction against Respondents or
all persons acting in their behalf.
SO ORDERED."

Petitioner MTRCB through the Solicitor General, contends inter


alia: first, all television programs, including "public affairs programs,
news documentaries, or socio-political editorials," are subject to
petitioners power of review under Section 3 (b) of P.D. No. 1986 and
pursuant to this Courts ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of
Appeals ;25second, television programs are more accessible to the public
than newspapers, thus, the liberal regulation of the latter cannot apply to
the former; third, petitioners power to review television programs under
Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount to "prior restraint;"
and fourth, Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not violate respondents
constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.
Respondents take the opposite stance.
The issue for our resolution is whether the MTRCB has the power or
authority to review the "The Inside Story" prior to its exhibition or
broadcast by television.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The present controversy brings into focus the provisions of Section 3 of
P. D. No. 1986, partly reproduced as follows:
"SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The BOARD shall have the following
functions, powers and duties:
xxxxxx
b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein
defined, television programs, including publicity materials such as
advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such motion pictures and
publicity materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution, for
television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced in the
Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or
for export.1a\^/phi1.net
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or
prohibit the importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution,
sale, lease exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures,
television programs and publicity materials subject of the preceding
paragraph, which, in the judgment of the BOARD applying contemporary
Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of
the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or
crime, such as but not limited to:
xxx
d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the
importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease,
exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials, to the end and that no such pictures,
programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be
objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be imported,

exported, produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased,


exhibited and/or broadcast by television;
x x x x x x."
Vis-a-vis the foregoing provisions, our task is to decide whether or not
petitioner has the power to review the television program "The Inside
Story." The task is not Herculean because it merely resurrects this
Court En Bancsruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals.26 There,
the Iglesia ni Cristo sought exception from petitioners review power
contending that the term "television programs" under Sec. 3 (b) does not
include "religious programs" which are protected under Section 5, Article
III of the Constitution. 27 This Court, through Justice Reynato Puno,
categorically ruled that P.D. No. 1986 gives petitioner "the power to
screen, review and examine "all television programs," emphasizing the
phrase "all television programs," thus:
"The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all
television programs. By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the
power to approve, delete x x x and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or
television broadcast of x x x television programs x x x. The law also
directs the Board to apply contemporary Filipino cultural values as
standard to determine those which are objectionable for being immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of
the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or
crime."
Settled is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not
make any exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless
there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it. 28 Ubi lex non
distinguit nec distinguere debemos. Thus, when the law says "all
television programs," the word "all" covers all television programs,
whether religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc. 29 The principle
assumes that the legislative body made no qualification in the use of
general word or expression.30
It then follows that since "The Inside Story" is a television program, it is
within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which it has power of review.
Here, respondents sought exemption from the coverage of the term
"television programs" on the ground that the "The Inside Story" is a
"public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial"
protected under Section 4,31 Article III of the Constitution. Albeit,
respondents basis is not freedom of religion, as in Iglesia ni Cristo,32 but
freedom of expression and of the press, the ruling in Iglesia ni
Cristo applies squarely to the instant issue. It is significant to note that
in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of religion has been
accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past
and present, "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs x x x."
Yet despite the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded
a preferred status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni
Cristos religious program from petitioners review power.
Respondents claim that the showing of "The Inside Story" is protected by
the constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press.
However, there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the
Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred
status.

If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from
the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more
reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom "The Inside Story"
which, according to respondents, is protected by the constitutional
provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom
bearing no preferred status.
The only exceptions from the MTRCBs power of review are those
expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television
programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its
departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels. Thus:
"SEC. 7. Unauthorized showing or exhibition. It shall be unlawful for
any person or entity to exhibit or cause to be exhibited in any
moviehouse, theatre, or public place or by television within the
Philippines any motion picture, television program or publicity material,
including trailers, and stills for lobby displays in connection with motion
pictures, not duly authorized by the owner or his assignee and passed by
the BOARD; or to print or cause to be printed on any motion picture to
be exhibited in any theater or public place or by television a label or
notice showing the same to have been officially passed by the BOARD
when the same has not been previously authorized, except motion
pictures, television programs or publicity material imprinted or
exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and
agencies, and newsreels."
Still in a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents contend that the
"The Inside Story" falls under the category of newsreels.
Their contention is unpersuasive.
P. D. No. 1986 does not define "newsreels." Websters dictionary defines
newsreels as short motion picture films portraying or dealing with current
events.33 A glance at actual samples of newsreels shows that they are
mostly reenactments of events that had already happened. Some concrete
examples are those of Dziga Vertovs RussianKino-Pravda newsreel
series (Kino-Pravda means literally "film-truth," a term that was later
translated literally into the French cinema verite) and Frank Capras Why
We Fight series.34 Apparently, newsreels are straight presentation of
events. They are depiction of "actualities." Correspondingly, the
MTRCB Rules and Regulations 35 implementing P. D. No. 1986 define
newsreels as "straight news reporting, as distinguished from news
analyses, commentaries and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are
not considered newsreels."36 Clearly, the "The Inside Story" cannot be
considered a newsreel. It is more of a public affairs program which is
described as a variety of news treatment; a cross between pure television
news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of
opinions.37 Certainly, such kind of program is within petitioners
review power.
It bears stressing that the sole issue here is whether petitioner MTRCB
has authority to review "The Inside Story." Clearly, we are not called
upon to determine whether petitioner violated Section 4, Article III (Bill
of Rights) of the Constitution providing that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of oppression or the press. Petitioner
did not disapprove or ban the showing of the program. Neither did it
cancel respondents permit. Respondents were merely penalized for their
failure to submit to petitioner "The Inside Story" for its review and
approval. Therefore, we need not resolve whether certain provisions of P.
D. No. 1986 and the MTRCB Rules and Regulations specified by
respondents contravene the Constitution.

Consequently, we cannot sustain the RTCs ruling that Sections 3 (c) (d),
4, 7 and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7 and 28 (a) of the MTRCB
Rules and Regulations are unconstitutional. It is settled that no question
involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with
the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (1) that the question must
be raised by the proper party; (2) that there must be an actual case or
controversy; (3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and, (4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.38

allowing the live radio and television coverage of the


concomitant court proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.l^vvphi1.net The


assailed RTC Decision dated November 18, 1997 and Order dated August
26, 2002 are hereby REVERSED. The Decision dated March 12, 1993 of
petitioner MTRCB is AFFIRMED. Costs against respondents.

Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in


mind the right of the public to vital information affecting the nation.

A.M. No. 01-4-03-S.C.

June 29, 2001

RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF IN


THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST
THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN
NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO,
RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO,
petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
VITUG, J.:
The travails of a deposed President continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to
start hearing the criminal charges against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media
seeks to cover the event via live television and live radio broadcast and
endeavors this Court to allow it that kind of access to the proceedings.
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga BroadKaster ng
Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised and
authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a
letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the
anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against
former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to
assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history."2 The request was seconded by Mr.
Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and,
still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.
On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez
formally filed the instant petition,3 submitting the following exegesis:
"3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of
the former highest official of the land, members of his family,
his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that the
prosecution thereof, definitely involves a matter of public
concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire citizenry
has the right to know, be informed and made aware of.
"4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matters of public concern, as in the
instant cases, can best be recognized, served and satisfied by

"5. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the


proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the
desired transparency in the administration of justice in order to
disabuse the minds of the supporters of the past regime of any
and all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived attempts on the part
of the present dispensation, to railroad the instant criminal
cases against the Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada."4

In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd October 1991


resolution of this Court in a case for libel filed by then President Corazon
C. Aquino. The resolution read:
"The records of the Constitutional Commission are bereft of
discussion regarding the subject of cameras in the courtroom.
Similarly, Philippine courts have not had the opportunity to rule
on the question squarely.
"While we take notice of the September 1990 report of the
United States Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on
Cameras in the Courtroom, still the current rule obtaining in the
Federal Courts of the United States prohibits the presence of
television cameras in criminal trials. Rule 53 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure forbids the taking of photographs
during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio
broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. A trial of
any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all
concerned and should not be treated as a means of
entertainment. To so treat it deprives the court of the dignity
which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious
quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are
formulated.
"Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media
by forbidding the broadcasting or televising of a trial while
permitting the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom,
since a television or news reporter has the same privilege, as
the news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or
printing press into the courtroom.
"In Estes vs. Texas. the United States Supreme Court held that
television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent
denial of the due process rights of a criminal defendant. Voting
5-4, the Court through Mr. Justice Clark identified four (4)
areas of potential prejudice which might arise from the impact
of the cameras on the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the
defendant. The decision in part pertinently stated:
"Experience likewise has established the prejudicial
effect of telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might be
frightened, play to the camera, or become nervous.
They are subject to extraordinary out-of court
influences which might affect their testimony. Also,
telecasting not only increases the trial judge's
responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the
defendant, it may as well affect his own performance.

Judges are human beings also and are subject to the


same psychological reactions as laymen. For the
defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment
and subjects him to excessive public exposure and
distracts him from the effective presentation of his
defense. 1wphi1.nt
'The television camera is a powerful weapon which
intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused
and his case in the eyes of the public.'
"Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply
for a writ of mandate to compel a court to permit them to attend
a trial, since within the courtroom, a reporter's constitutional
rights are no greater than those of any other member of the
public. Massive intrusion of representatives of the news media
into the trial itself can so alter or destroy the constitutionally
necessary judicial atmosphere and decorum that the
requirements of impartiality imposed by due process of law are
denied the defendant and a defendant in a criminal proceeding
should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and
photographers each time he enters or leaves the courtroom.
"Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to
due process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of
justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press
and the right of the people to information may be served and
satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means,
live radio and television coverage of court proceedings
shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news
purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the
courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel
taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No
video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial
proper.
" Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due
process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the
proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of
justice, the Court resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of
court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted
as above indicated."
Admittedly, the press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public
consciousness, and it has become an important instrument in the quest for
truth. 5 Recent history exemplifies media's invigorating presence, and its
contribution to society is quite impressive. The Court, just recently, has
taken judicial notice of the enormous effect of media in stirring public
sentience during the impeachment trial, a partly judicial and partly
political exercise, indeed the most-watched program in the boob-tubes
during those times, that would soon culminate in EDSA II.
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the
weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and
the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental
rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional
power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial
trial.6

When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence 7 tells us that
the right of the accused must be preferred to win.
With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the
very life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an
accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate
judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of
credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any
kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid
of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts
free from improper influence, 8 and decreed by a judge with an
unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the
contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings
nor made an object of public's attention9 and where the conclusions
reached are induced not by any outside force or influence 10 but only by
evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and
calm ambiance is demanded.
Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able
to thrive in hardy climate, with every reason to presume firmness of mind
and resolute endurance, but it must also be conceded that "television can
work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on."11
Even while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that
media can bring to bear on them directly and through the shaping of
public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many
ways and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that
such a coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision
of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all
unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. 12 It might be
farcical to build around them an impregnable armor against the influence
of the most powerful media of public opinion.13
To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to near
nirvana the subtle threats to justice that a disturbance of the mind so
indispensable to the calm and deliberate dispensation of justice can
create.14 The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of proof,
but it is not far-fetched for it to gradually erode our basal conception of a
trial such as we know it now. 15
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to
him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically
in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and
would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not
compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors
must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats,
conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small
as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the
trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally
free to report what they have observed during the proceedings. 16
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press
and the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted
power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of
conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public
with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse,

the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to


due process17 which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its
constitutional proportions. Justice Clark thusly pronounced, "while a
maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying out the
important function of informing the public in a democratic society, its
exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance
of absolute fairness in the judicial process."18
This Court, in the instance19 already mentioned, citing Estes vs.
Texas,20 the United States Supreme Court holding the television coverage
of judicial proceedings as an inherent denial of due process rights of an
accused, also identified the following as being likely prejudices:
"1. The potential impact of television x x x is perhaps of the
greatest significance. x x x. From the moment the trial judge
announces that a case will be televised it becomes a cause
celebre. The whole community, x x x becomes interested in all
the morbid details surrounding it. The approaching trial
immediately assumes an important status in the public press
and the accused is highly publicized along with the offense
with which he is charged. Every juror carries with him into the
jury box these solemn facts and thus increases the chance of
prejudice that is present in every criminal case. x x x.
"2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be
impaired. The impact upon a witness of the knowledge that he
is being viewed by a vast audience is Simply incalculable.
Some may be demoralized and frightened, some cocky and
given to overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone
speaking publicly, and accuracy of statement may be severely
undermined. x x x. Indeed, the mere fact that the trial is to be
televised might render witnesses reluctant to appear and
thereby impede the trial as well as the discovery of the truth.
"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional
responsibilities the presence of television places on the trial
judge. His job is to make certain that the accused receives a fair
trial. This most difficult task requires his undivided attention. x
xx
"4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom
television on the defendant. Its presence is a form of mental if
not physical-harassment, resembling a police line-up or the
third degree. The inevitable close-up of his gestures and
expressions during the ordeal of his trial might well transgress
his personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to
concentrate on the proceedings before him -sometimes the
difference between life and death -dispassionately, freely and
without the distraction of wide public surveillance. A defendant
on trial for a specific crime is entitled to his day in court, not in
a stadium, or a city or nationwide arena. The heightened public
clamor resulting from radio and television coverage will
inevitably result in prejudice."
In his concurring opinion in Estes, Mr. Justice Harlan opined that live
television and radio coverage could have mischievous potentialities for
intruding upon the detached atmosphere that should always surround the
judicial process.21
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16 Apri1 2001,
expressed its own concern on the live television and radio coverage of the

criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to paraphrase: Live television and radio


coverage can negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the
hearings intended to assure a fair trial; at stake in the criminal trial is not
only the life and liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the
Philippine criminal justice system, and live television and radio coverage
of the trial could allow the "hooting throng" to arrogate unto themselves
the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such that the verdict of the
court will be acceptable only if popular; and live television and radio
coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends of justice but will only
pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
It may not be unlikely, if the minority position were to be adopted, to see
protracted delays in the prosecution of cases before trial courts brought
about by petitions seeking a declaration of mistrial on account of undue
publicity and assailing a court a quo's action either allowing or
disallowing live media coverage of the court proceedings because of
supposed abuse of discretion on the part of the judge.
En passant, the minority would view the ponencia as having modified the
case law on the matter. Just to the contrary, the Court effectively
reiterated its standing resolution of 23 October 1991. Until 1991, the
Court had yet to establish the case law on the matter, and when it did in
its 23rd October resolution, it confirmed, in disallowing live television and
radio coverage of court proceedings, that "the records of the
Constitutional Commission (were) bereft of discussion regarding the
subject of cameras in the courtroom" and that "Philippine courts (had) not
(therefore) had the opportunity to rule on the question squarely."
But were the cases decided by the U.S. courts and cited in the minority
opinion really in point?
In Nebraska Press Association vs, Stewart,22 the Nebraska State trial
judge issued an order restraining news media from publishing accounts of
confession or admissions made by the accused or facts strongly
implicating him. The order was struck down. In Richmond Newspaper;
Inc., vs, Virginia,23 the trial judge closed the courtroom to the public and
all participants except witnesses when they testify. The judge was
reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court which ruled that criminal trials were
historically open. In Globe Newspaper vs. Superior Court,24 the US
Supreme Court voided a Massachusetts law that required trial judges to
exclude the press and the public from the courtroom during the testimony
of a minor victim of certain sexual offenses.
Justice Steward, in Chandler vs. Florida,25 where two police officers
charged with burglary sought to overturn their conviction before the US
Supreme Court upon the ground that the television coverage had
infringed their right to fair trial, explained that "the constitutional
violation perceived by the Estes Court did not stem from the physical
disruption that might one day disappear with technological advances in
the television equipment but inhered, rather, in the hypothesis that the
mere presence of cameras and recording devices might have an effect on
the trial participants prejudicial to the accused."26
Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts
do not allow live television and radio coverage of their proceedings.
The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great
dimensions so involving as they do a former President of the Republic. It
is undeniable that these cases have twice become the nation's focal points
in the two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III where the
magnitude of the events has left a still divided nation. Must these events

be invited anew and risk the relative stability that has thus far been
achieved? The transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to turn
a blind eye to yet another possible extraordinary case of mass action
being allowed to now creep into even the business of the courts in the
dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a change in
the standing rule of the court contained in its resolution of 23 October
1991 may not appear to be propitious.
Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the popular will
of the people in any sense which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate
justiciable controversies on the basis of what alone is submitted before
them.27 A trial is not a free trade of ideas, Nor is a competing market of
thoughts the known test of truth in a courtroom.28
The Court is not all that umnindful of recent technological and scientific
advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a
hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are
provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a
price too high to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
AMELITO
R.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

MUTUC,

FERNANDO, J.:
The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc,
then a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this
special civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of
respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle
for campaign purposes, was not in vain. Nor could it be considering the
conceded absence of any express power granted to respondent by the
Constitutional Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such
implication arising from any provision found therein, if deference be paid
to the principle that a statute is to be construed consistently with the
fundamental law, which accords the utmost priority to freedom of
expression, much more so when utilized for electoral purposes. On
November 3, 1970, the very same day the case was orally argued, five
days after its filing, with the election barely a week away, we issued a
minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. This
opinion is intended to explain more fully our decision.
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970,
petitioner, after setting forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga,
and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a
telegram sent to him five days previously, informed him that his
certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibited him from
using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud
speakers, an order which, according to him, is "violative of [his]
constitutional right ... to freedom of speech." 1 There being no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would seek a
writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction.
On the very next day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring
respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer not later than
November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the case for hearing for
Tuesday November 3, 1970. No preliminary injunction was issued. There

was no denial in the answer filed by respondent on November 2, 1970, of


the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for the
prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention
Act, 2which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce,
request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such
as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or
materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like,
whether of domestic or foreign origin." 3It was its contention that the
jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of
a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above
statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for
lack of merit. The case was argued, on November 3, 1970, with petitioner
appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena arguing in
behalf of respondent.
This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for
urgency, the election being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon
of the same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition,
setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent
to impose such a ban in the light of the doctrine ofejusdem generis as
well as the principle that the construction placed on the statute by
respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about its
validity, considering the infringement of the right of free speech of
petitioner. Its concluding portion was worded thus: "Accordingly, as
prayed for, respondent Commission on Elections is permanently
restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding
compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political jingles by
candidates. This resolution is immediately executory." 4
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question
before us was one of power. Respondent Commission on Elections was
called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat,
no such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It
did contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes
unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being
made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding
with the words "and the like." 5 For respondent Commission, the last three
words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently.
What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle
of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being
applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically
referred to. 6 It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act
was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution.
The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent
Commission was its failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of
construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being in
consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command
or prescription. 7 Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions were
given a "construction which should be more in harmony with the tenets
of the fundamental law." 8 The desirability of removing in that fashion the
taint of constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always
commended itself. The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of
words to avert any collision between what a statute provides and what the
Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation
rendering it free from constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice
Cardozo, if at all possible, the conclusion reached must avoid not only
that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score. 9

2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its


favor obeisance to such a cardinal precept. The view advanced by him
that if the above provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to
lend itself to the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited,
then the challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For,
in unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free
speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding that this preferred
freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be
curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful
the equally vital right of suffrage. What respondent Commission did, in
effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this
constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify
its action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped
jingle, would be free, either by himself or through others, to use his
mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be
emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not
perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical
contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent Commission, then
the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That
cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution
in express terms assures. 10

enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid


order banning the use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement

3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law,
setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether
proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a
postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the
rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost
rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the
discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to
yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard
lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be
transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or
disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as
found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate
what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial
review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in
the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that
the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure
that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its
being the supreme law.

It is faced with the reconciliation of two values esteemed highly and


cherished dearly in a constitutional democracy. One is the freedom of
belief and of expression availed of by an individual whether by himself
alone or in association with others of similar persuasion, a goal that
occupies a place and to none in the legal hierarchy. The other is the
safeguarding of the equally vital right of suffrage by a prohibition of the
early nomination of candidates and the limitation of the period of election
campaign or partisan political activity, with the hope that the timeconsuming efforts, entailing huge expenditures of funds and involving the
risk of bitter rivalries that may end in violence, to paraphrase the
explanatory note of the challenged legislation, could be devoted to more
fruitful endeavors.

To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission


was aptly summed up by the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the
branch of the executive department although independent of the
President to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of
the 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely
'administrative questions.'"11 It has been the constant holding of this
Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission
cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and
there is no higher law than the Constitution. 12 Our decisions which
liberally construe its powers are precisely inspired by the thought that
only thus may its responsibility under the Constitution to insure free,
orderly and honest elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no
justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from
respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a
constitutional right as free speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from
the time of its filing, stood on solid footing.
WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970,
respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from

as to costs.
G.R. No. L-27833

April 18, 1969

IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF


RE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT 4880. ARSENIO
GONZALES and FELICISIMO R. CABIGAO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:A statute designed to maintain the purity and integrity
of the electoral process by Congress calling a halt to the undesirable
practice of prolonged political campaign bringing in their wake serious
evils not the least of which is the ever increasing cost of seeking public
office, is challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic
liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom
of association are invoked to nullify the act. Thus the question
confronting this Court is one of transcendental significance.

The task is not easy, but it is unavoidable. That is of the very essence of
judicial duty. To paraphrase a landmark opinion, 1 when we act in these
matters we do so not on the assumption that to us is granted the requisite
knowledge to set matters right, but by virtue of the responsibility we
cannot escape under the Constitution, one that history authenticates, to
pass upon every assertion of an alleged infringement of liberty, when our
competence is appropriately invoked.
This then is the crucial question: Is there an infringement of liberty?
Petitioners so alleged in his action, which they entitled Declaratory Relief
with Preliminary Injunction, filed on July 22, 1967, a proceeding that
should have been started in the of Court of First Instance but treated by
this Court as one of prohibition in view of the seriousness and the
urgency of the constitutional issue raised. Petitioners challenged the
validity of two new sections now included in the Revised Election Code,
under Republic Act No. 4880, which was approved and took effect on
June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates 2 and
limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity. 3
The terms "candidate" and "election campaign" or "partisan political
activity" are likewise defined. The former according to Act No. 4880
"refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office
regarded of whether or not said person has already filed his certificate of
candidacy or has been nominated by any political party as its candidate."
"Election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to acts designed
to have a candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy of a person or
persons to a public office." Then the acts were specified. There is a

proviso that simple expression of opinion and thoughts concerning the


election shall not be considered as part of an election campaign. There is
the further proviso that nothing stated in the Act "shall be understood to
prevent any person from expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates for
public office whom he supports." 4
Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing 6f the petition, an
incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista
Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was
subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the
other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila
and a political leader of his co-petitioner. It is their claim that "the
enforcement of said Republic Act No. 4880 in question [would] prejudice
[their] basic rights..., such as their freedom of speech, their freedom of
assembly and their right to form associations or societies for purpose not
contrary to law, guaranteed under the Philippine Constitution," and that
therefore said act is unconstitutional.
After invoking anew the fundamental rights to free speech, free press,
freedom of association and freedom of assembly with a citation of two
American Supreme Court decisions, 5 they asserted that "there is nothing
in the spirit or intention of the law that would legally justify its passage
and [enforcement] whether for reasons of public policy, public order or
morality, and that therefore the enactment of Republic Act [No.] 4880
under, the guise of regulation is but a clear and simple abridgment of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the
right to form associations and societies for purposes not contrary to
law, ..." There was the further allegation that the nomination of a
candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of
political expediency and convenience which only political parties can
regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or
mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation
of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of
clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional
rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect.
To the plea of petitioners that after hearing, Republic Act No. 4880 be
declared unconstitutional, null and void, respondent Commission on
Elections, in its answer filed on August 1, 1967, after denying the
allegations as to the validity of the act "for being mere conclusions of
law, erroneous at that," and setting forth special affirmative defenses,
procedural and substantive character, would have this Court dismiss the
petition.
Thereafter the case was set for hearing on August 3, 1967. On the same
date a resolution was passed by us to the following effect: "At the hearing
of case L-27833 (Arsenio Gonzales, et al. vs. Commission on Elections),
Atty. F. Reyes Cabigao appeared for the petitioners and Atty. Ramon
Barrios appeared for the respondent and they were given a period of four
days from today within which to submit, simultaneously,, their respective
memorandum in lieu of oral argument."
On August 9, 1967, another resolution, self-explanatory in character,
came from this Court. Thus: "In ease G.R. No. L-27833 (Arsenio
Gonzales, et al. vs. Commission on Elections), the Court, with eight (8)
Justice present, having deliberated on the issue of the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 4880; and a divergence of views having developed
among the Justices as to the constitutionality of section 50-B, pars. (c),
(d) and (e) of the Revised Election Code: considering the Constitutional
provision that "no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without

the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the (Supreme) Court'


(sec. 10, Art, VII), the Court [resolved] to defer final voting on the issue
until after the return of the Justices now on official leave."
The case was then reset for oral argument. At such hearing, one of the copetitioners, now Vice-Mayor Felicisimo Cabigao of the City of Manila
acting as counsel, assailed the validity of the challenged legislation
relying primarily on American Supreme Court opinion that warn against
curtailment in whatever guise or form of the cherished freedoms of
expression, of assemble and of association, all embraced in the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Respondent Commission
on Elections was duly represented by Atty. Ramon Barrios.
Senator Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae. That
he did, arguing most impressively with a persuasive exposition of the
existence of undeniable conditions that imperatively called for regulation
of the electoral process and with full recognition that Act No. 4880 could
indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech
and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment
however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the
substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being
debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of
partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of
efficiency in government but of lives as well.
The matter was then discussed in conference, but no final action was
taken. The divergence of views with reference to the paragraphs above
mentioned having continued, on Oct. 10, 1968, this Court, by resolution,
invited certain entities to submit memoranda as amici curiae on the
question of the validity of R.A. Act No. 4880. The Philippine Bar
Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P.
Women Lawyers' Circle were included, among them. They did file their
respective memoranda with this Court and aided it in the consideration of
the constitutional issues involved.
1. In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection was
raised by five members of the Court. 6 It is their view that respondent
Commission on Elections not being sought to be restrained from
performing any specific act, this suit cannot be characterized as other
than a mere request for an advisory opinion. Such a view, from the
remedial law standpoint, has much to recommend it. Nonetheless, a
majority would affirm, the original stand that under the circumstances it
could still rightfully be treated as a petition for prohibition.
The language of Justice Laurel fits the case "All await the decision of this
Court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent
multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that [its]
constitutionality ... be now resolved." 7 It may likewise be added that the
exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount
public interest, and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national
elections being, barely six months away, reinforce our stand.
It would appear undeniable, therefore, that before us is an appropriate
invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an alleged
unconstitutional statute. We are left with no choice then; we must act on
the matter.
There is another procedural obstacle raised by respondent to be hurdled.
It is not insuperable. It is true that ordinarily, a party who impugns the
validity of a statute or ordinance must have a substantial interest in the

case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement. 8 Respondent cannot see such interest as being possessed
by petitioners. It may indicate the clarity of vision being dimmed,
considering that one of the petitioners was a candidate for an elective
position. Even if such were the case, however, the objection is not
necessarily fatal. In this jurisdiction, the rule has been sufficiently relaxed
to allow a taxpayer to bring an action to restrain the expenditure of public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
legislative measure. 9
2. In the answer of the respondent as well as its memorandum, stress was
laid on Republic Act No. 4880 as an exercise of the police power of the
state, designed to insure a free, orderly and honest election by regulating
"conduct which Congress has determined harmful if unstrained and
carried for a long period before elections it necessarily entails huge
expenditures of funds on the part of the candidates, precipitates violence
and even deaths, results in the corruption of the electorate, and inflicts
direful consequences upon public interest as the vital affairs of the
country are sacrificed to purely partisan pursuits." Evidently for
respondent that would suffice to meet the constitutional questions raised
as to the alleged infringement of free speech, free press, freedom of
assembly and 'freedom' of association. Would it were as simple as that?
An eloquent excerpt from a leading American decision 10 admonishes
though against such a cavalier approach. "The case confronts us again
with the duty our system places on this Court to say where the
individual's, freedom ends the State's power begins. Choice on that
border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual.
presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place
given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms
secured by the First Amendment.... That priority gives these liberties a
sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. And it is the
character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines what
standard governs the choice..."
Even a leading American State court decision on a regulatory measure
dealing with elections, cited in the answer of respondent, militates against
a stand minimizing the importance and significance of the alleged
violation of individual rights: "As so construed by us, it has not been
made to appear that section 8189, Comp. Gen. Laws, section 5925, Rev.
Gen. St., is on its face violative of any provision of either the state or
Federal Constitution on the subject of free speech or liberty of the press,
nor that its operation is in any wise subversive of any one's constitutional
liberty." 11 Another leading State decision is much more emphatic: "Broad
as the power of the legislature is with respect to regulation of elections,
that power is not wholly without limitation. Under the guise of regulating
elections, the legislature may not deprive a citizen of the right of trial by
jury. A person charged with its violation may not be compelled to give
evidence against himself. If it destroys the right of free speech, it is to
that extent void." 12
The question then of the alleged violation of Constitutional rights must be
squarely met.lawphi1.nt
3. Now as to the merits. A brief resume of the basic rights on which
petitioners premise their stand that the act is unconstitutional may prove
illuminating. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of
expression is of course a fundamental postulate of our constitutional
system. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press .... 13 What does it embrace? At the very least, free speech and free
press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully

any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment. 14 There is


to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, 15prosecution for sedition, 16 or
action for damages, 17 or contempt proceedings 18 unless there be a clear
and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to
prevent.
The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of expression is
undeniable whether as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of
attaining the truth, of assuring participation by the people in social
including political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance
between stability and change. 19 The trend as reflected in Philippine and
American decisions is to recognize the broadcast scope and assure the
widest latitude to this constitutional guaranty. It represents a profound
commitment to the principle that debate of public issue should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. 20 It is not going too far, according to
another American decision, to view the function of free speech as inviting
dispute. "It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger." 21 Freedom of speech and of the press thus
means something more than the right to approve existing political beliefs
or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, to take
refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public
consequence. So atrophied, the right becomes meaningless. The right
belongs as well, if not more, for those who question, who do not
conform, who differ. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the
thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us. 22
So with Emerson one may conclude that "the theory of freedom of
expression involves more than a technique for arriving at better social
judgments through democratic procedures. It comprehends a vision of
society, a faith and a whole way of life. The theory grew out of an age
that was awakened and invigorated by the idea of new society in which
man's mind was free, his fate determined by his own powers of reason,
and his prospects of creating a rational and enlightened civilization
virtually unlimited. It is put forward as a prescription for attaining a
creative, progressive, exciting and intellectually robust community. It
contemplates a mode of life that, through encouraging toleration,
skepticism, reason and initiative, will allow man to realize his full
potentialities. It spurns the alternative of a society that is tyrannical,
conformist, irrational and stagnant." 23
From the language of the specified constitutional provision, it would
appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be
passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of
life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation.
Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist
that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered
and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for
recognition. How is it to be limited then?
This Court spoke, in Cabansag v. Fernandez; 24 of two tests that may
supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction. Thus: "These
are the 'clear and present danger' rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule.
The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high' before the utterance can be
punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought
to be prevented." It has the advantage of establishing according to the
above decision "a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the
criterion as to what words may be public established."

The Cabansag case likewise referred to the other test, the "dangerous
tendency" rule and explained it thus: "If the words uttered create a
dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such
words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate
acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that
such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the
language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body seeks to prevent.

grievances. All these rights while not identical are inseparable. They are
cognate rights and the assurance afforded by the clause of this section of
the Bill of Rights wherein they are contained, applies to all. As
emphatically put in the leading case of United States v.
Cruikshank, 32 "the very idea of a government, republican in form, implies
a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances." As in
the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much
less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.

We posed the issue thus: "Has the letter of Cabansag created a sufficient
danger to a fair administration of justice? Did its remittance to the PCAC
create a danger sufficiently imminent to come under the two rules
mentioned above?" The choice of this Court was manifest and
indisputable. It adopted the clear and present danger test. As a matter of
fact, in an earlier decision, Primicias v. Fugoso, 25 there was likewise an
implicit acceptance of the clear and present danger doctrine.

5. Our Constitution likewise recognizes the freedom to form association


for purposes not contrary to law. 33 With or without a constitutional
provision of this character, it may be assumed that the freedom to
organize or to be a member of any group or society exists. With this
explicit provision, whatever doubts there may be on the matter are
dispelled. Unlike the cases of other guarantee which are mostly American
in origin, this particular freedom has an indigenous cast. It can trace its
origin to the Malolos Constitution.

Why repression is permissible only when the danger of substantive evil is


present is explained by Justice Branders thus: ... the evil apprehended is
so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full
discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy
to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence." 26 For him the
apprehended evil must be "relatively serious." For "[prohibition] of free
speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be
inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to
society." Justice Black would go further. He would require that the
substantive evil be "extremely serious." 27 Only thus may there be a
realization of the ideal envisioned by Cardozo: "There shall be no
compromise of the freedom to think one's thoughts and speak them,
except at those extreme borders where thought merges into action." 28 It
received its original formulation from Holmes. Thus: "The question in
every case is whether the words used in such circumstances and of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question
of proximity and degree." 29
This test then as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the
danger or evil a substantive character that the state has a right to prevent.
Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine, the danger must not only be
clear but also present. The term clear seems to point to a causal
connection with the danger of the substantially evil arising from the
utterance questioned. Present refers to the time element. It used to be
identified with imminent and immediate danger. The danger must not
only be probable but very likely inevitable.
4. How about freedom of assembly? The Bill of Rights as thus noted
prohibits abridgment by law of freedom of speech or of the press. It
likewise extends the same protection to the right of the people peaceably
to assemble. As was pointed out by Justice Malcolm in the case of United
States v. Bustos, 30 this right is a necessary consequence of our republican
institution and complements the right of free speech. Assembly means a
right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect
to public affairs. From the same Bustos opinion: "Public policy, the
welfare of society and orderly administration of government have
demanded protection for public opinion." To paraphrase the opinion of
Justice Rutledge speaking for the majority in Thomas v. Collins, 31 it was
not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of
the press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of

In the United States, in the absence of an explicit provision of such


character, it is the view of Justice Douglas that it is primarily the first
amendment of her Constitution, which safeguards freedom of speech and
of the press, of assembly and of petition "that provides [associations]
with the protection they need if they are to remain viable and continue to
contribute to our Free Society." 34 He adopted the view of De Tocqueville
on the importance and the significance of the freedom to associate. Thus:
"The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for himself,
is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures and
of acting in common with them. The right of association therefore
appears to me almost inalienable in its nature as the right of personal
liberty. No legislator can attack it without impairing the foundation of
society." 35
There can be no dispute as to the soundness of the above observation of
De Tocqueville. Since man lives in social it would be a barren existence
if he could not freely associate with others of kindred persuasion or of
congenial frame of mind. As a matter of fact, the more common form of
associations may be likely to be fraternal, cultural, social or religious.
Thereby, for almost everybody, save for those exceptional few who glory
in aloofness and isolation life is enriched and becomes more meaningful.
In a sense, however, the stress on this freedom of association should be
on its political significance. If such a right were non-existent then the
likelihood of a one-party government is more than a possibility.
Authoritarianism may become unavoidable. Political opposition will
simply cease to exist; minority groups may be outlawed, constitutional
democracy as intended by the Constitution may well become a thing of
the past.
Political parties which, as is originally the case, assume the role
alternately of being in the majority or in the minority as the will of the
electorate dictates, will lose their constitutional protection. It is
undeniable therefore, that the utmost scope should be afforded this
freedom of association.
It is indispensable not only for its enhancing the respect that should be
accorded a human personality but equally so for its assurance that the
wishes of any group to oppose whatever for the moment is the party in
power and with the help of the electorate to set up its own program of
government would not be nullified or frustrated. To quote from Douglas

anew: "Justice Frankfurter thought that political and academic affiliations


have a preferred position under the due process version of the First
Amendment. But the associational rights protected by the First
Amendment are in my view much broader and cover the entire spectrum
in political ideology as well as in art, in journalism, in teaching, and in
religion. In my view, government can neither legislate with respect to nor
probe the intimacies of political, spiritual, or intellectual relationships in
the myriad of lawful societies and groups, whether popular or unpopular,
that exist in this country." 36
Nonetheless, the Constitution limits this particular freedom in the sense
that there could be an abridgment of the right to form associations or
societies when their purposes are "contrary to law". How should the
limitation "for purposes not contrary to law" be interpreted? It is
submitted that it is another way of expressing the clear and present
danger rule for unless an association or society could be shown to create
an imminent danger to public safety, there is no justification for abridging
the right to form association societies. 37 As was so aptly stated: "There is
no other course consistent with the Free Society envisioned by the First
Amendment. For the views a citizen entertains, the beliefs he harbors, the
utterances he makes, the ideology he embraces, and the people he
associates with are no concern to government until and unless he
moves into action. That article of faith marks indeed the main difference
between the Free Society which we espouse and the dictatorships both on
the Left and on the Right." 38 With the above principles in mind, we now
consider the validity of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 4880 of the
too early nomination of candidates and the limitation found therein on the
period of election campaign or partisan political activity alleged by
petitioners to offend against the rights of free speech, free press, freedom
of assembly and freedom of association. In effect what are asked to do is
to declare the act void on its face evidence having been introduced as to
its actual operation. There is respectable authority for the court having the
power to so act. Such fundamental liberties are accorded so high a place
in our constitutional scheme that any alleged infringement manifest in the
wording of statute cannot be allowed to pass unnoticed. 39
In considering whether it is violative of any of the above rights, we
cannot ignore of course the legislative declaration that its enactment was
in response to a serious substantive evil affecting the electoral process,
not merely in danger of happening, but actually in existence, and likely to
continue unless curbed or remedied. To assert otherwise would be to
close one's eyes to the realities of the situation. Nor can we ignore the
express legislative purpose apparent in the proviso "that simple
expressions of opinion and thoughts concerning the election shall not be
considered as part of an election campaign," and in the other proviso
"that nothing herein stated shall be understood to prevent any person
from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from
mentioning the names of the candidates for public office whom he
supports." Such limitations qualify the entire provision restricting the
period of an election campaign or partisan political activity.
The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates presents a question
that is not too formidable in character. According to the act: "It shall be
unlawful for any political party political committee, or political group to
nominate candidates for any elective public officio voted for at large
earlier than one hundred and fifty days immediately preceding an
election, and for any other elective public, office earlier than ninety days
immediately preceding an election." 40
The right of association is affected. Political parties have less freedom as
to the time during which they may nominate candidates; the curtailment
is not such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic right. Their

scope of legitimate activities, save this one, is not unduly narrowed.


Neither is there infringement of their freedom to assemble. They can do
so, but not for such a purpose. We sustain in validity. We do so
unanimously.
The limitation on the period of "election campaign" or "partisan political
activity" calls for a more intensive scrutiny. According to Republic Act
No. 4880: "It is unlawful for any person whether or not a voter or
candidate, or for any group or association of persons whether or not a
political party or political committee, to engage in an election campaign
or partisan political activity except during the period of one hundred
twenty days immediately preceding an election involving a public office
voted for at large and ninety days immediately preceding an election for
any other elective public office. The term 'candidate' refers to any person
aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, regardless of whether or
not said person has already filed his certificate of candidacy or has been
nominated by any political party as its candidate. The term 'election
campaign' or 'partisan political activity' refers to acts designed to have a
candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy of a person or persons
to a public office ..."
If that is all there is to that provision, it suffers from the fatal
constitutional infirmity of vagueness and may be stricken down. What
other conclusion can there be extending as it does to so wide and allencompassing a front that what is valid, being a legitimate exercise of
press freedom as well as freedom of assembly, becomes prohibited? That
cannot be done; such an undesirable eventuality, this Court cannot allow
to pass.
It is a well-settled principle that stricter standard of permissible statutory
vagueness may be applied to a statute having inhibiting effect on speech;
a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free
dissemination of ideas may be the loser.41 Where the statutory provision
then operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedom affirmatively
protected by the Constitution, the imputation of vagueness sufficient to
invalidate the statute is inescapable. 42 The language of Justice Douglas,
both appropriate and vigorous, comes to mind: "Words which are vague
and fluid ... may be as much of a trap for the innocent as the ancient laws
of Caligula." 43Nor is the reason difficult to discern: ."These freedoms are
delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society. The
threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions." 44
7. The constitutional objections are thus formidable. It cannot be denied
that the limitations thus imposed on the constitutional rights of free
speech and press, of assembly, and of association cut deeply, into their
substance. This on the one hand.
On the other, it cannot be denied either that evils substantial in character
taint the purity of the electoral process. There can be under the
circumstances then no outright condemnation of the statute. It could not
be said to be unwarranted, much less arbitrary. There is need for
refraining from the outright assumption that the constitutional infirmity is
apparent from a mere reading thereof.
For under circumstances that manifest abuses of the gravest character,
remedies much more drastic than what ordinarily would suffice would
indeed be called for. The justification alleged by the proponents of the
measures weighs heavily with the members of the Court, though in
varying degrees, in the appraisal of the aforesaid restrictions to which
such precious freedoms are subjected. They are not unaware of the clear

and present danger that calls for measures that may bear heavily on the
exercise of the cherished rights of expression, of assembly, and of
association.
This is not to say, that once such a situation is found to exist there is no
limit to the allowable limitations on such constitutional rights. The clear
and present danger doctrine rightly viewed requires that not only should
there be an occasion for the imposition of such restrictions but also that
they be limited in scope.
There are still constitutional questions of a serious character then to be
faced. The practices which the act identifies with "election campaign" or
"partisan political activity" must be such that they are free from the taint
of being violative of free speech, free press, freedom of assembly, and
freedom of association. What removes the sting from constitutional
objection of vagueness is the enumeration of the acts deemed included in
the terms "election campaign" or "partisan political activity."
They are: "(a) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or
other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or
candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences,
meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against a candidate or party;(c) making speeches, announcements or
commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election or any
party or candidate for public office; (d) publishing or distributing
campaign literature or materials; (e) directly or indirectly soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any party;
(f) giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for election campaign
purposes, either directly or indirectly." 45 As thus limited the objection
that may be raised as to vagueness has been minimized, if not totally set
at rest. 46
8. This Court, with the aforementioned five Justices unable to agree, is of
the view that no unconstitutional infringement exists insofar as the
formation of organization, associations, clubs, committees, or other
groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda or both for or against a candidate or party is
restricted 47 and that the prohibition against giving, soliciting, or receiving
contribution for election purposes, either directly or indirectly, is equally
free from constitutional infirmity. 48
The restriction on freedom of assembly as confined to holding political
conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other
similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda or both for or against a candidate or
party, 49 leaving untouched all other legitimate exercise of such poses a
more difficult question. Nevertheless, after a thorough consideration, and
with the same Justices entertaining the opposite conviction, we reject the
contention that it should be annulled. Candor compels the admission that
the writer of this opinion suffers from the gravest doubts. For him, such
statutory prescription could very well be within the outermost limits of
validity, beyond which lies the abyss of unconstitutionality.
The other acts, likewise deemed included in "election campaign" or
"partisan political activity" tax to the utmost the judicial predisposition to
view with sympathy legislative efforts to regulate election practices
deemed inimical, because of their collision with the preferred right of
freedom of expression. From the outset, such provisions did occasion
divergence of views among the members of the Court. Originally only a

minority was for their being adjudged as invalid. It is not so. any
more. 50 This is merely to emphasize that the scope of the curtailment to
which freedom of expression may be subjected is not foreclosed by the
recognition of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil, the debasement of the electoral process.
The majority of the Court is thus of the belief that the solicitation or
undertaking of any campaign or propaganda whether directly or
indirectly, by an individual, 51 the making of speeches, announcements or
commentaries or holding interview for or against the election for any
party or candidate for public office, 52 or the publication or distribution of
campaign literature or materials, 53 suffer from the corrosion of invalidity.
It lacks however one more affirmative vote to call for a declaration of
unconstitutionality.
This is not to deny that Congress was indeed called upon to seek remedial
measures for the far-from-satisfactory condition arising from the tooearly nomination of candidates and the necessarily prolonged, political
campaigns. The direful consequences and the harmful effects on the
public interest with the vital affairs of the country sacrificed many a time
to purely partisan pursuits were known to all. Moreover, it is no
exaggeration to state that violence and even death did frequently occur
because of the heat engendered by such political activities. Then, too, the
opportunity for dishonesty and corruption, with the right to suffrage
being bartered, was further magnified.
Under the police power then, with its concern for the general welfare and
with the commendable aim of safe-guarding the right of suffrage, the
legislative body must have felt impelled to impose the foregoing
restrictions. It is understandable for Congress to believe that without the
limitations thus set forth in the challenged legislation, the laudable
purpose of Republic Act No. 4880 would be frustrated and nullified.
Whatever persuasive force such approach may command failed to elicit
the assent of a majority of the Court. This is not to say that the conclusion
reached by the minority that the above poisons of the statute now assailed
has passed the constitutional test is devoid of merit.
It only indicates that for the majority, the prohibition of any speeches,
announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or
against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the
prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or
materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly,
or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or
against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.
To that extent, the challenged statute prohibits what under the
Constitution cannot by any law be abridged.
More specifically, in terms of the permissible scope of legislation that
otherwise could be justified under the clear and present danger doctrine,
it is the consideration opinion of the majority, though lacking the
necessary vote for an adjudication of invalidity, that the challenged
statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited
more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a
valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine.
In a 1968 opinion, the American Supreme Court made clear that the
absence of such reasonable and definite standards in a legislation of its
character is fatal. 54 Where, as in the case of the above paragraphs, the
majority of the Court could discern "an over breadth that makes possible
oppressive or capricious application" 55 of the statutory provisions, the
line dividing the valid from the constitutionally infirm has been crossed.

Such provisions offend the constitutional principle that "a governmental


purpose constitutionally subject to control or prevent activities state
regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 56
It is undeniable, therefore, that even though the governmental purposes
be legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved. 57 For precision of regulation is the touchstone in an
area so closely related to our most precious freedoms. 58
Under the circumstances then, a majority of the Court feels compelled to
view the statutory provisions in question as unconstitutional on their face
inasmuch as they appear to range too widely and indiscriminately across
the fundamental liberties associated with freedom of the mind. 59
Such a conclusion does not find favor with the other members of the
Court. For this minority group, no judgment of nullity insofar as the
challenged sections are concerned is called for. It cannot accept the
conclusion that the limitations thus imposed on freedom of expression
vitiated by their latitudinarian scope, for Congress was not at all
insensible to the problem that an all-encompassing coverage of the
practices sought to be restrained would seriously pose.
Such an approach finds support in the exposition made by the author of
the measure, Senator Lorenzo M. Taada, appearing before us as amicus
curiae. He did clearly explain that such provisions were deemed by the
legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate
response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual
existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship,
dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably
marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country.
He did invite our attention likewise to the well-settled doctrine that in the
choice of remedies for an admitted malady requiring governmental
action, on the legislature primarily rests the responsibility. Nor should the
cure prescribed by it, unless clearly repugnant to fundamental rights, be
ignored or disregarded.
More than that, he would stress the two provisos already mentioned,
precisely placed in the state as a manifestation of the undeniable
legislative determination not to transgress the preferred freedom of
speech, of press, of assembly and of association. It is thus provided:
"That simple expressions or opinion and thoughts concerning the election
shall not be considered as part of an election campaign [and that nothing
in the Act] shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing his
views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the
names of the candidates for public office whom he supports. 60 If properly
implemented then, as it ought to, the barrier to free, expression becomes
minimal and far from unwarranted.
For the minority of the Court, all of the above arguments possess
sufficient persuasive force to blunt whatever cutting edge may be
ascribed to the fears entertained that Congress failed to abide by what the
Constitution commands as far as freedom of the mind and of association
are concerned. It is its opinion that it would be premature to say the least,
for a judgment of nullity of any provision found in Republic Act No.
4880. The need for adjudication arises only if in the implementation of
the Act, there is in fact an unconstitutional application of its provisions.
Nor are we called upon, under this approach, to anticipate each and every
problem that may arise. It is time enough to consider it when there is in
fact an actual, concrete case that requires an exercise of judicial power.

9. To recapitulate, we give due recognition to the legislative concern to


cleanse, and, if possible, render spotless, the electoral process. There is
full acceptance by the Court of the power of Congress, under narrowly
drawn legislation to impose the necessary restrictions to what otherwise
would be liberties traditionally accorded the widest scope and the utmost
deference, freedom of speech and of the press, of assembly, and of
association. We cannot, however, be recreant to the trust reposed on us;
we are called upon to safeguard individual rights. In the language of
Justice Laurel: "This Court is perhaps the last bulwark of constitutional
government. It shall not obstruct the popular will as manifested through
proper organs... But, in the same way that it cannot renounce the life
breathed into it by the Constitution, so may it not forego its obligation, in
proper cases, to apply the necessary,..." 61
We recognize the wide discretion accorded Congress to protect vital
interests. Considering the responsibility incumbent on the judiciary, it is
not always possible, even with the utmost sympathy shown for the
legislative choice of means to cure an admitted evil, that the legislative
judgment arrived at, with its possible curtailment of the preferred
freedoms, be accepted uncritically. There may be times, and this is one of
them, with the majority, with all due reject to a coordinate branch, unable
to extend their approval to the aforesaid specific provisions of one of the
sections of the challenged statute. The necessary two-third vote, however,
not being obtained, there is no occasion for the power to annul statutes to
come into play.
Such being the case, it is the judgment of this Court that Republic Act
No. 4880 cannot be declared unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the writ of prayed for
denied. Without costs.
G.R. No. L-69500 July 22, 1985
JOSE ANTONIO U. GONZALEZ in behalf of MALAYA FILMS,
LINO BROCKA, JOSE F. LACABA, and DULCE Q.
SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
CHAIRMAN
MARIA KALAW KATIGBAK,
GENERAL
WILFREDO C. ESTRADA (Ret.), and THE BOARD OF REVIEW
FOR
MOTION
PICTURES
AND
TELEVISION
(BRMPT), respondents.
.FERNANDO, C.J.:
In this case of first impression, a certiorari proceeding filed on January
10, 1985, there is a persuasive ring to the invocation of the constitutional
right to freedom of expression 1 of an artistand for that matter a man of
letters tooas the basis for a ruling on the scope of the power of
respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television and how
it should be exercised. The dispute between the parties has been narrowed
down. The motion picture in question, Kapit sa Patalim was classified
"For Adults Only." There is the further issue then, also one of first
impression, as to the proper test of what constitutes obscenity in view of
the objections raised. Thus the relevance of this constitutional command:
"Arts and letters shall be under the patronage of the State. 2
The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez, 3 President of the
Malaya Films, a movie production outfit duly registered as a single
proprietorship with the Bureau of Domestic Trade. The respondent is the
Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television, with Maria Kalaw

Katigbak as its Chairman and Brig. Gen. Wilfredo C. Estrada as its ViceChairman, also named respondents.
In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondent Board of October 23,
1984, a permit to exhibit the film Kapit sa Patalim under the
classification "For Adults Only," with certain changes and deletions
enumerated was granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioners stating that the classification of the film "For Adults Only"
was without basis. 4 Then on November 12, 1984, respondent Board
released its decision: "Acting on the applicant's Motion for
Reconsideration dated 29 October 1984, the Board, after a review of the
resolution of the sub-committee and an examination of the film, Resolves
to affirm in toto the ruling of the sub-committee. Considering, however,
certain vital deficiencies in the application, the Board further Resolves to
direct the Chairman of the Board to Withheld the issuance of the Permit
to exhibit until these deficiencies are supplied. 5 Hence this petition.
This Court, in a resolution of January 12, 1985, required respondent to
answer. In such pleading submitted on January 21, 1985, as one of its
special and affirmative defenses, it was alleged that the petition is moot
as "respondent Board has revoked its questioned resolution, replacing it
with one immediately granting petitioner company a permit to exhibit the
film Kapit without any deletion or cut [thus an] adjudication of the
questions presented above would be academic on the case." 6 Further:
"The modified resolution of the Board, of course, classifies Kapit as foradults-only, but the petition does not raise any issue as to the validity of
this classification. All that petitioners assail as arbitrary on the part of the
Board's action are the deletions ordered in the film. 7 The prayer was for
the dismissal of the petition.
An amended petition was then filed on January 25, 1985. The main
objection was the classification of the film as "For Adults Only." For
petitioners, such classification "is without legal and factual basis and is
exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression. The film is an
integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the Board
now offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the film.
Viewed as a whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations
advanced by the Board as basis for its classification. 8 There was an
answer to the amended petition filed on February 18, 1985. It was therein
asserted that the issue presented as to the previous deletions ordered by
the Board as well as the statutory provisions for review of films and as to
the requirement to submit the master negative have been all rendered
moot. It was also submitted that the standard of the law for classifying
films afford a practical and determinative yardstick for the exercise of
judgment. For respondents, the question of the sufficiency of the
standards remains the only question at issue.
It would be unduly restrictive under the circumstances to limit the issue
to one of the sufficiency of standards to guide respondent Board in the
exercise of its power. Even if such were the case, there is justification for
an inquiry into the controlling standard to warrant the classification of
"For Adults Only." This is especially so, when obscenity is the basis for
any alleged invasion of the right to the freedom of artistic and literary
expression embraced in the free speech and free press guarantees of the
Constitution.
1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the
communication of Ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. Their
effects on the perception by our people of issues and public officials or
public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits is considerable. Nor
as pointed out in Burstyn v. Wilson 9 is the "importance of motion pictures

as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed
to entertain as well as to inform. 10 There is no clear dividing line between
what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction
were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression.
Our recent decision in Reyes v. Bagatsing 11 cautions against such a move.
Press freedom, as stated in the opinion of the Court, "may be Identified
with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public
concern without censorship or punishment. 12 This is not to say that such
freedom, as is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if "there
be a 'clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a
right to prevent. 13
2. Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all there is to free
speech or free press. If it were so, then such basic rights are emasculated.
It is however, except in exceptional circumstances a sine qua non for the
meaningful exercise of such right. This is not to deny that equally basic is
the other important aspect of freedom from liability. Nonetheless, for the
purposes of this litigation, the emphasis should rightly be on freedom
from censorship. It is, beyond question, a well-settled principle in our
jurisdiction. As early as 1909, in the case of United States v. Sedano, 14 a
prosecution for libel, the Supreme Court of the Philippines already made
clear that freedom of the press consists in the right to print what one
chooses without any previous license. There is reaffirmation of such a
view in Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 15 where an order of
respondent Commission on Elections giving due course to the certificate
of candidacy of petitioner but prohibiting him from using jingles in his
mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers was
considered an abridgment of the right of the freedom of expression
amounting as it does to censorship. It is the opinion of this Court,
therefore, that to avoid an unconstitutional taint on its creation, the power
of respondent Board is limited to the classification of films. It can, to
safeguard other constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures
are for general patronage and what may require either parental guidance
or be limited to adults only. That is to abide by the principle that freedom
of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The power to
exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is
against its validity. 16
3. The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of excession may be
limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive
character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only
be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that what is feared
may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection
must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its
imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if
such danger be only probable. There is the require of its being well-nigh
inevitable. The basic postulate, wherefore, as noted earlier, is that where
the movies, theatrical productions radio scripts, television programs, and
other such media of expression are concerned included as they are in
freedom of expression censorship, especially so if an entire production
is banned, is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil to public public morals, public health
or any other legitimate public interest. 17 There is merit to the observation
of Justice Douglas that "every writer, actor, or producer, no matter what
medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the censor. 18
4. The law, however, frowns on obscenity and rightly so. As categorically
stated by Justice Brennan in Roth v. United States 19 speaking of the free
speech and press guarantee of the United States Constitution: "All Ideas
having even the slightest redeeming social importance unorthodox
Ideas, controversial Ideas, even Ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable

because they encroach upon the limited area of the First Amendment is
the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance. 20 Such a view commends itself for approval.
5. There is, however, some difficulty in determining what is obscene.
There is persuasiveness to the approach followed in Roth: "The early
leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by
the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible
persons. Regina v. Hicklin [1868] LR 3 QB 360. Some American courts
adopted this standard but later decisions have rejected it and substituted
this test: whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest. The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by
the effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons, might
well encompass material legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be
rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and
press. On the other hand, the substituted standard provides safeguards
adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity. 21
6. The above excerpt which imposes on the judiciary the duty to be ever
on guard against any impermissible infringement on the freedom of
artistic expression calls to mind the landmark ponencia of Justice
Malcolm in United States v. Bustos, 22 decided in 1918. While
recognizing the principle that libel is beyond the pale of constitutional
protection, it left no doubt that in determining what constitutes such an
offense, a court should ever be mindful that no violation of the right to
freedom of expression is allowable. It is a matter of pride for the
Philippines that it was not until 1984 in New York Timer v.
Sullivan, 23 thirty-years later, that the United States Supreme Court
enunciated a similar doctrine.
7. It is quite understandable then why in the Roth opinion, Justice
Brennan took pains to emphasize that "sex and obscenity are not
synonymous. 24 Further: "Obscene material is material which deals with
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g.,
in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny
material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press.
Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life has indisputably
been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one
of the vital problems of human interest and public concern. 25
8. In the applicable law, Executive Order No. 876, reference was made to
respondent Board "applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as
standard, 26 words which can be construed in an analogous manner.
Moreover, as far as the question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it
cannot be stressed strongly that the arts and letters "shall be under the
patronage of the State. 27 That is a constitutional mandate. It will be less
than true to its function if any government office or agency would invade
the sphere of autonomy that an artist enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in
what passes for beauty or for reality. It is for the artist to determine what
for him is a true representation. It is not to be forgotten that art
and belleslettres deal primarily with imagination, not so much with ideas
in a strict sense. What is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to
respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully
may be considered obscene. As so wen put by Justice Frankfurter in a
concurring opinion, "the widest scope of freedom is to be given to the
adventurous and imaginative exercise of the human spirit" 28 in this
sensitive area of a man's personality. On the question of obscenity,
therefore, and in the light of the facts of this case, such standard set forth
in Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid
any taint of unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was stated in a recent
decision 29 citing the language of Justice Malcolm in Yu Cong Eng v.

Trinidad, 30 it is "an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal role of


construction, applied when considering constitutional questions, that
when a law is susceptible of two constructions' one of which will
maintain and the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the
former. 31 As thus construed, there can be no valid objection to the
sufficiency of the controlling standard and its conformity to what the
Constitution ordains.
9. This being a certiorari petition, the question before the Court is
whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion. That there was an
abuse of discretion by respondent Board is evident in the light of the
difficulty and travail undergone by petitioners before Kapit sa
Patalim was classified as "For Adults Only," without any deletion or cut.
Moreover its perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be
unduly restrictive. This Court concludes then that there was an abuse of
discretion. Nonetheless, there are not enough votes to maintain that such
an abuse can be considered grave. Accordingly, certiorari does not lie.
This conclusion finds support in this explanation of respondents in its
Answer to the amended petition: "The adult classification given the film
serves as a warning to theater operators and viewers that some contents of
Kapit are not fit for the young. Some of the scenes in the picture were
taken in a theater-club and a good portion of the film shots concentrated
on some women erotically dancing naked, or at least nearly naked, on the
theater stage. Another scene on that stage depicted the women kissing and
caressing as lesbians. And toward the end of the picture, there exists
scenes of excessive violence attending the battle between a group of
robbers and the police. The vulnerable and imitative in the young
audience will misunderstand these scenes." 32 Further: "Respondents
further stated in its answer that petitioner company has an option to have
the film reclassified to For-General-Patronage if it would agree to remove
the obscene scenes and pare down the violence in the film." 33 Petitioners,
however, refused the "For Adults Only" classification and instead, as
noted at the outset, filed this suit for certiorari.
10. All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the
concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of
this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls
for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the
patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there
is a set. Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers of the
programs therein shown. As was observed by Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the
sexual fantasies of the adult population. 34 it cannot be denied though that
the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring
for the welfare of the young.
WHEREFORE, this Court, in the light of the principles of law enunciated
in the opinion, dismisses this petition for certiorari solely on the ground
that there are not enough votes for a ruling that there was a grave abuse
of discretion in the classification of Kapit sa Patalim as "For-AdultsOnly."

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs.


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the
right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.

Justice Robert A. Jackson


West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette[1]

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a


marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity;
that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that
because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide
their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point
guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. Commission on Elections.[6] Ang Ladlad laid out its national
membership base consisting of individual members and organizational
supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.[7]

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to


choose is that others may make different choices choices we would not
make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may
shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally
prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and
debate about important questions of public policy is a core value
protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on
genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in
opinion.

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the


COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds,
stating that:

Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about
the definitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral
convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is
an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox philosophical
justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same
time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that
practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates;
accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than
rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if
not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.

x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is


particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity.

Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with
an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009[2] (the
First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009[3] (the Second
Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed
Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to
accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA)
No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.[4]
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who
identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006.
The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no
substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again
filed a Petition[5] for registration with the COMELEC.

x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the


Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community,
thus:

and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:


x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional
and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with,
individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one
gender.
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that
petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. In
Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:

For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even
their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature:
And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned
in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is
unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error
which was meet.

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:


For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women ye are
indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds. (7.81) And we rained
down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of
those who indulged in sin and crime! (7:84) He said: O my Lord!
Help Thou me against people who do mischief (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated
October 2, 2008:

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as


indicated in the Petitions par. 6F: Consensual partnerships or
relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007,
Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as
670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license,
relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to
be complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which
defines nuisance as Any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or
disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting
parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code
provides that Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are inexistent
and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and
indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from
six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and
fine, shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly
contrary to public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their
knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the
owners/operators of the establishment selling the same; (b) Those who,
in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or
immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the
obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows,
whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall
include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no
other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography;
(3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of
prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good
customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints,
engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for
advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it
said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not
violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the
elections.
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we
will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to

the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and
writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that older practicing homosexuals
are a threat to the youth. As an agency of the government, ours too is the
States avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to
protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.[8]
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,[9] three commissioners voted
to overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y.
Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three
commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration
(Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R.
Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for
the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed
Resolution, stating that:

I.

The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the


party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its underrepresentation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads
expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the
purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional representatives
is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the
ability of an organization to represent its constituencies, then all
representative organizations would have found themselves into the partylist race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The partylist system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of
misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system
is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals
whose interests are also the nations only that their interests have not
been brought to the attention of the nation because of their under
representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that
having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial
to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system
will remain just that.
II.

No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades


Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays,
homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a special class of individuals. x
x x Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a
constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that nothing in the U.S.
Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the
social or legal equality of homosexual relations, as in the case of race or
religion or belief.
xxxx

Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of


LGBTs is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies
are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female
protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike .xxxx

Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to


intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to
Intervene[18] which motion was granted on February 2, 2010.[19]

IV. Public Morals


The Parties Arguments
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or
Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular
religious groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted
as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals.
They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot
ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such
that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic]
into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V.

Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law
of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of
prision mayor upon Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim
doctrines openly contrary to public morals. It penalizes immoral
doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows.
Ang Ladlad apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear
from its Petitions paragraph 6F: Consensual partnerships or
relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007,
Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as
670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as
any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality x x x. These are all unlawful.[10]
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the
Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant
Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the
issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the
COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin
printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00
noon of January 11, 2010.[11] Instead of filing a Comment, however, the
OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until
January 16, 2010 to Comment.[12] Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG
later filed a Comment in support of petitioners application.[13] Thus, in
order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position,
we required it to file its own comment.[14] The COMELEC, through its
Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.[15]
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a
temporary restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately
and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the
COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed
Resolutions.[16]
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching
thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.[17] The CHR opined that the
denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards
and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified


the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional
guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed
that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as
well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations
against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the
COMELEC erred in denying petitioners application for registration since
there was no basis for COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also
opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which
should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate
classification.
However, insofar as the purported violations of
petitioners freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were
concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on
these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and
that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued
for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence
contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.

Our Ruling
We grant the petition.Compliance with the Requirements of the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the
ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution
and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in
the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani
stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated
in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under
the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,[20] the enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful
statements in its petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence

through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims


that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that save for a
few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all
provinces in the country.[21]

Norte

Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City

This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition


when it alleged its national existence is a new one; previously, the
COMELEC claimed that petitioner was not being truthful when it said
that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated
or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the
elections.
Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners
accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions.
This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioners
alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC prior to
the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular
procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondents
theory, and a serious violation of petitioners right to procedural due
process.

Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur

Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)

LUMINA Baguio City

Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila

Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila

Naga City Gay Association Naga City

ONE BACARDI

Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila

PUP LAKAN

RADAR PRIDEWEAR

Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila

San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan

Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory


perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to
exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that
the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at
least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around
the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.[22]
Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella
organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the
following LGBT networks:

Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del

Abra Gay Association

Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP)


Metro Manila

Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan

Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal

Albay Gay Association

The Link Davao City

Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija

Tayabas Gay Association Quezon

Boys Legion Metro Manila

Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila

Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)

Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City[23]

Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila

Cebu Pride Cebu City

Circle of Friends

Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte

Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)

Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality


(GALANG) Metro Manila

Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD
LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner
had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings
are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is
registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently
demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the
belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the
respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as
a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the

guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims,


lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for
Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for
is government neutrality in religious matters.[24]
Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality.[25] We thus find that it was grave violation of the
non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed
Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to
advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to
religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular
purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in
Estrada v. Escritor:[26]
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily
secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds.
"Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the
civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on
grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies
upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the
resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some
might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would
therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by
a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious
freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious
beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also
tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would
not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full
religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those
whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of
immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a
secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because
it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend
the existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct
is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although
admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling
influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions
would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all,
they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious
opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the
human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions
of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven.
Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or
utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the
religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos
and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine
constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent
neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue
its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold
religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible

constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is


secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
[27]
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for
Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of
homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has
long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The
COMELEC argues:
Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group
consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people
especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector
which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with
individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the
standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society
without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.
[28]
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct,
and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal
disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure
religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family,
and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and
their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has
not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these generally accepted public morals have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law.[29]
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral
act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should
have been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups members have
committed or are committing immoral acts.[30] The OSG argues:

x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the


same gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender, but mere
attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide
between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts
could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of
disqualification cases against both the straights and the gays. Certainly
this is not the intendment of the law.[31]
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be
prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither
has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably
damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the
state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality,
sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will
and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society.
Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with
the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or
another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and
explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly
then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our
scrutiny.

We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our


penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of
the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards
decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the
Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement
without judicial proceedings.[32] A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized
that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of
dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications give rise
to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals
themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible
act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection
clause.

Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution,
which provides nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the
laws, courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute
prohibition on classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the
same treatment of similar persons.[33] The equal protection clause
guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances.[34]
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the
classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
government end.[35] In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v.
Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,[36] we declared that [i]n our jurisdiction,
the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have
followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to
legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there
is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.[37]

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population


considers homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this
constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for
the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief.
No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or
parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume
that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state
interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not
a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review
under the equal protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and
its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the
formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no
legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a
disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list
system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated.
State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating
LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned
does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals
and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We
disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in
themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause.[38] We are
not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting
special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient
evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling
today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under
the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the
COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible classification not
justified by the circumstances of the case.
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its
agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position
through normal democratic means.[39] It is in the public square that
deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and
deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:[40]
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is
distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion,
every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has
access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life
together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by,
or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the
public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited
from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be
proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed
process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary
principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation
on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely
reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or
median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a
constitution and the limits it specifies including protection of religious
freedom "not only for a minority, however small not only for a

majority, however large but for each of us" the majority imposes upon
itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise
could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are
favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any
restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the
COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise
stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no
better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a
disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual
conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions
concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a political
association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even
overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct violates public
morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.[41] European
and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights
claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy
and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts.[42] To
the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have
reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on
Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the
Courts analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts
have ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian
rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a
particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their
actions were caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.[43]
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and
beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political
party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional
structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes
it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has
emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and
whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a
proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of
association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the
authorities or the majority of the population.[44] A political group should
not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial
political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone
concerned.[45] Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward
policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the
protection of the freedom of association guarantee.[46]
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that
homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are
entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and
their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that
relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent

to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express


that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy
precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the
community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of
the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age
for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve
to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of
this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do
not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut
strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt
nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this
Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor
subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have
not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has
been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The
OSG argues that:

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or


any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to
review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party
applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of
duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the
members of the petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections.
Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right
to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner
contends that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition has the clear and
immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its
members to fully and equally participate in public life through
engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but
a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x[47]
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its
qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by
the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a
limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has
been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly
expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal
basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list
candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of
petitioners fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope
and promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown

dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world
order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural
and governmental support, international human rights norms are
particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic
legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal,
standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations
to protect and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly
recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to
electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the
ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of
general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons,
regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not
specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article
26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that
the reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include
sexual orientation.[48] Additionally, a variety of United Nations
bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to
be prohibited under various international agreements.[49]
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through
freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his
country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the
right to electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights

Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public


Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
1.
Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of
every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote
and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever
form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires
States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary
to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it
protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on
the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the
Covenant. x x x x
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to
stand for elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free
choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election,
such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable
criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should
not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as
education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No
person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because
of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the
legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons
from elective office.[50]
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international law
obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea
for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioners invocation of the
Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights
Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),[51] which
petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta
Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are
declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not
reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in
any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice.[52] Petitioner has not
undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles
of international law to ascertain their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain
segment of society wants or demands is automatically a human right.
This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or
subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for
human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies
many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international
law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of
diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if wants are
couched in rights language, then they are no longer controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles,
consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law
professors, are at best de lege ferenda and do not constitute binding
obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary
international law is characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote international
cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which
amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of
either State practice or opinio juris.[53]

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues
presented by this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in
flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in
opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its own view of acceptable
behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can,
uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our
democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of


the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December
16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application
for party-list accreditation.
xxxxxx

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