Brazilian "Tenentismo"

Author(s): Robert J. Alexander

Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 (May, 1956), pp. 229-242
Published by: Duke University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2508666
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NOTES AND COMMENT

Brazilian "Tenentismo"
ROBERT

ONE

OF THE

J. ALEXANDER*

notable facts about Latin American politics

during the last quarter of a century or more has been the

rise of indigenous radical nationalist and reform parties
in a number of countries. The most famous of these is the Aprista
movement of Peru, headed by the almost mythical Victor Rauil Haya
de la Torre. From this Peruvian party these groups have acquired a
generic name-the Aprista parties.
The movement which will be discussed in this article is one of this
group. However, the Brazilian "Tenentes" are different fron most
of the other Aprista groups. First, the movement had its origins in
the army. Second, it never coalesced into a political party, despite
the fact that the Tenentes have shared power, when they have not
controlled the Brazilian government, since 1930.
In order to understand Tenentismo, one must comprehend the important role of the Brazilian army in the last half century. It was
the military who ousted the last emperor and established the Republic;
subsequently, the army took very seriously its role as the chief defender of the Republic and the supporter of constitutionalism. During
the first thirty years after the founding of the Republic the army
intervened in politics numerous timnes,and various of its leaders served
as president.
The Republic and the army's participation in its affairs did not
change the facts of the economy and politics of Brazil, which remained
essentially a rural nation, dependent almost completely on one or two
crops-principally coffee-for its foreign exchange and its prosperity.
The political power remained in the hands of the owners of the vast
coffee and sugar fazendas. The presidency tended to rotate between
the favorite so5ns of the large states of Sao Paulo and Minas Geraes,
none of whom desired or seriously attempted to change the status quo.
However, the first World War brought certain changes. Because
the country was cut off from its principal sources of supply for inailufactured goods-particularly foodstuffs and textiles-factory industry
received a tremendous shot in the arm. Manufacturing increased
* The author is a iembelh of the department of economies in Rutgers University.

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230

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rapidly and with it the middle class and the industrial working class
gained in numbers and importance. Both the new middle class and
the workers resented the continued domination of the country by the
landholding aristocracy. As occurred widely throughout Latin America in the post-World War I period, this discontent gave rise to new
political developments.
Even before World War I a labor movement had been born in
Brazil. In 1909 the first central labor organization, the Confederagao
Operaria Brasileira, was established under anarcho-syndicalist influence. During the war the labor movement gained much ground, and
there were several important strikes, perhaps the most notable being
a walkout of 150,000 textile workers in Rio de Janeiro and other cities
in 1919. The governments of the time were not sympathetic to the
labor movement; even some years later a leading political figure declared that "labor is a problem for the police," a sentiment which was
widely shared in ruling circles.'
However, labor and middle class unrest did meet with a certain
sympathetic response among the younger officers of the army, most
of whom were drawn from the middle class and shared the discontent
of these elements.2 The first evidence of this unrest in the army came
to light in 1922, when the soldiers of the Copacabaila fortress on the
outskirts of Rio de Janeiro rose in revolt, led by their junior officers,
of whom the principal leaders were Antonio Siqueira Campos aind
Eduardo Gomes. This revolt was fairly easily suppressed by loyal
elements in the army.
In 1924 a much more serious revolt occurred in the city of Sao
Paulo. It wNasled by Major Miguel Costa, Commander of Sao Paulo 's
state rnilitia, supported by General Isidoro Dias Lopes, Joaquiin and
Juarez Tavora, Eduardo Gomes, Cordeiro de Farias and Joao Alberto,
all of whom were junior officers except General Dias Lopes. The rebels
captured the city of Sao Paulo and held it for almost a month. As
loyal troops gathered outside the city, the forces of Major Costa withdrew and started the long march towards the Iguassu River, in southwestern Brazil.
Meanwhile, the regular armny's battalion of railroad engineers,
headed by twenty-six year old Captain Luiz Carlos Prestes, had revolted in the southernmost state of Brazil, Rio Grande do Sul, in
sympathy with the Sao Paulo rebels. After fighting their way through
greatly superior government troops, the Costa and Prestes groups
' Interview with Edgard Leuenroth, one-time secretary general of the Confederagao Operaria Brasileira, in Sao Paulo, 1946.
2 Virginio Santa Rosa, 0
sentido do tenentismo (Rio de Jaiieiro, 1933), p. 114.

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BRAZILIAN

TENENTISMO

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"

joined forces somewhere near the niighty Iguassu Falls.

The united

forces reorganized, with Major Costa as the nominal commander-inchief and Luiz Carlos Prestes as chief of genleral staff.
This fighting force, which at times dwindled to only a few hundred
men, was the famous Prestes Column. It took this name from its
second-in-command, who was the military genius of the Column, rather
than from its commander-in-chief. In the succeeding three years, it
walnderedback and forth across Brazil, crossing a majority of Brazil''s
states, piercing into several of them over and over again.
The fundamental object of the Prestes Column was to arouse the
eivilian population of the backlands against the then dominant regimie3
In this it failed. Almost everywhere it was met by the fierce though
ill-directed opposition of the local people, organized into a hastily
recruited militia. It never got control of any of the country's major
cities and thus made little contact with the labor movement or other
discontented elements in the urban communities.4
However, it was not entirely a failure. It built up a "mistica"
about the members of the group and particularly around Prestes,
which was still a force in Brazilian political life a quarter of a century
later. Prestes was greeted by even the hostile press as a military
geniius, beinog compared with Napoleon, Caesar and Alexander.5 He
was dubbed the "Kinight of Hope" and became virtually a legendary
figure. The lesser members of the Column shared in this buildup.
They developed an esprit-de-corps and a unity which was to be largely
responsible for the Revolution of 1930, and won the respect and loyalty of large elements of the eivilian population, particularly in rural
areas.
Those who participated in the activities of the Prestes Column were

the mlen who were to dominate the country's political life after the
Revolution of 1930. Major Juarez Tavora, leader of the Column's
advanee guard, became after 1930 governor of the whole of northeast-

ern Brazil and a power in the political and military life of his country
3 Abugar Bastos, in his biography of Prestes (p. 158) notes that the Column
'attempted, durilng three years, to arouse in the country the flame of revolution,
so as to destroy, once and for all, the power of the oligarchs, which dominated all
the states of Brazil. With the exception of Maranhao and Piaui, which contributed considerable niumbers of volunteers for the Column, the remiiaining regiolns
remained quiet and paralyzed, answering not this call."I
4 Jorge Ainado cites (p. 194) an interview which Prestes gave to La Naci6n
(Santiago de Chile), which appeared on December 28, 1941. Discussilng the
Column, Prestes said, ''What we attempted, principally, wvas to arouse the masses
of the interior, shaking them from the apathy in which they were living, indifferent
to the fate of the nation, hopeless of any remedy for their difficulties and sufferings. I
Abgiiar Bastos, Prestes e a revolugdo social (Rio de Janeiro, 1946), p. 178.

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for several decades. In 1955 he was a canididate for the presidenicy.

Joao Alberto chose civilian life after the Column period, but nonetheless played a key role in post-1930 politics. He held the posts of
interventor in the state of Sao Paulo, chief of the federal police, and
unumerous
other positions after 1930. Estillac Leal was a leadilng
figure in the Vargas regime, was Minister of War in 1951-1952, and
became an important spokesmani for strongly nationalist groups in
the army in the early 1950 's. Major Manuel Rabelo was a leader in
the 1930 Revolution and a leader of the abortive revolution of 1935.
Eduardo Gomes became head of the Brazilian airforce, led oppositioll
to the Vargas dictatorship in 1944-1945, and was unsuccessful canldidate for president in 1945 and 1950. Oswaldo Cordeiro de Farias also
remained in the armed forces, served as interventor of Rio Grande do
Sul in the 1940's, and was named Minister of War in place of another
ex-tenente, Estillac Leal, in 1952. Numerous other Tenentes played
leading parts in their country's destiny after 1930, owing their original prominence to their participation in the fabulous exploits of the
Prestes Column.
The Revolution of 1930 was largely the work of the Tenientes. In
the election of 1930, the then chief executive, Washilngtol L-uiz, virtually imposed as his successor a former cabinet member, Julio
Prestes-no relation to the leader of the famous Coluiin. Julio
Prestes's opponent in that contest was Getulio Vargas, thenl governor
of Rio Grande do Sul, the famous gaucho state. The idol of his own
region, he was widely popular throughout Brazil, but was defeated by
the government's vote-gathering and vote-counting machine. After
his defeat, Vargas began planning a revolution against President
Washington Luiz. In these plans he had the full cooperation of mnost
of the Tenentes.
The chief exception was the man who had given his name to the
Prestes Column. Luiz Carlos Prestes had been living in Buenos Aires
sinee a few months after the famous Column surrelndered to Bolivian
authorities early in 1927. There he had fumbled for an ideology.
Not satisfied with the vague ideas which had motivated the memnbers
of the Column, Prestes sought a more satisfactory and questiolnanswering dogma. In Buenos Aires, he came into contact with various
left-wing elements in Argentine politics, particularly with Rodolfo
Ghioldi, inumber-two man in the Argentine ComnmunistParty. The
ComnmunistInternational, which then had its Latin American headquarters in Montevideo, sent representatives to the Argentinie capital
to try to induce Prestes to join forces with them. The efforts of these
Comintern agents were reinforced by special representatives of the

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BRAZILIAN

" TENENTISMO

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"

Brazilian Communist Party. The Brazilian Trotskyites also attempted

to win Prestes to their side.6
But it was the Stalinites who succeeded in winning his allegialnce.
In March, 1930, Prestes issued a famous mnanifestodissociatilng himself
from the plans which he knew were then being made by his fellowTenentes to bring about a revolt in Brazil. He said that no revolt
would be worthwhile unless it had the cooperation of, and was based
onl, the urban working classes alnd the peasants. Early in 1931, after
the 1930 Revolution had occurred, Prestes made-it clear that he had
joined forces with the Communists.7

A few months later he left for

Moscow, where he stayed until early 1935, participating in the determination of policy for not only the Brazilian Communists but all of
the Communist parties of Latin America.8
Meanwhile, Prestes ' fellow Tenentes had successfully organized the
Revolution of 1930. Starting in Rio Grande do Sul, the rebel armies
began to march northward, fully expecting a civil war which would
last months, if not longer. Other rebel elements under Juarez de
Tavora seized control of most of northeastern Brazil. Within a
month the military authorities in Rio apparently decided that it was
not worth their while to fight, and surrendered. Getulio Vargas then
became provisional president, and the Tenentes became important
elements in his government. Jorge Amado sums up the position of
the Teneentesafter the 1930 Revolution thus :9
Thesewere the positionswhichthe "tenentes"had: Juarez a kind of dictatorship of the North and Northeast; Jo0o Alberto, interventorof Sao Paulo,
Juraci Magalhaesin Bahia; Jose Americode Almeida,the miagnificentnovelist, in the Ministry of Public Works, entering into conflict with the foreign
companies,raising the programof "tenentismo"to the level of anti-imperialism; Ari Parreiras in the State of Rio; Antenor Navarro in Paraiba; in
Maranhao,Reis Perdigao and Father Serra succeeding one another in the
government;in Rio Grande do Norte Irineu Jofily, courageousand honest;
in Ceara,carryingout a veirypopular government,ColonelMoreiraLima ...
in additionothers occupiedinnumerableposts of less importance. They had
a large percentageof the power of the country in their hands. They were
without doubt the most powerful force in the country at that moment.
However, the Tenentes were iiot successful in working out a conInterview with Aristides Lobo, the Trotskyite delegated to try to win over
Prestes, in Sao Paulo, June 17, 1953.
7 Bastos gives a detailed account of the evolution of Prestes from Tenente to
Communist in Chapters VI and VII.
Torres Giraldo, one-time secretary general of Com8 Interview with Ignaeio
munist Party of Colonmbia, and one-time member of the Executive Committee of
the Red International of Labor Unions. In Bogota, July 15, 1947.
9 Jorge Amado, Vida de Luis Carlos Prestes (Sao Paulo, undated), p. 235.
6

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sistent program or in organizing a Tenentista Party. This was their

great tragedy: they could not organize, on a civilian plane, to establish
a party which would rally the forces of unrest and discontent with
the old regime existent in Brazil at that time. Nor were they able to
develop a consistent body of doctrine, such as Haya de la Torre and
his friends in Peru evolved during the 1920's.
Their ideas, however, evolved rapidly in the months following the
October, 1930 Revolution. During the period of the Prestes Column,
and even during the preparation of the 1930 revolt, they had had a
simple political program, summed up in the old slogan, "a new broom
sweeps clean, " but with little reference to social issues. Once in power,
however, they quickly became aware that they must come to grips
with social problems.
During the time of the Prestes Column the magazine, "5 de
Julho," which spoke for the Column, expressed the ideas of the Revolutionaries

thus :10

Reasons: financialand economicdisorder;exorbitanttaxes; administrative

dishonesty;lack of justice; perversionof the vote; subornationof the press;
political persecution;disrespectfor the autonomyof the states; lack of social
legislation; reform of the constitutionunder the state of siege. Ideals: to
assurea regimeloyal to the republicanConstitution;to establishfree primary
instruction and professional and technical training throughoutthe country;
to assure liberty of thought; to unify justice, putting it under the aegis of
the Supreme Court; to unify the treasury; to assure municipal liberty; to
castigate the defrauders of the patrimony of the people; to abolish the
anomalywhereby professional politicians becomeprosperous at the expense
of the public purse; rigorouseconomyof public moneys in keeping with efficient aid to the economicforces of the country.
This was not in any sense a "socialistic" program. By the outbreak of the 1930 Revolution the leaders of the Tenentes had developed
somewhat in their thinking on social problems. Thus Juarez Tavora,
in arguing against Prestes' endorsement of communist methods early
in 1930 says of his former chief's position:
One sees betweenthe lines of his recent manifesto a frank revolt against
the injustices of the present bourgeoisorganizationof our society. He is not
in agreementwith the monstrositywherebyan insignificantminority of bourgeois potentates .

. oppresses the great majority who work and produce.

Tavora agrees with Prestes' indictment of contemporary Brazilian

society, saying that he "recognizes the inequity of this order of things
under which the proletarian majority labors," but he does not feel
that it can be righted by "upsetting the existing order." His pre10

Ibid., p. 193.

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"TENENTISMO

scription for the situation was " proportional representationi of all

social classes" and some less fundamental changes."
One contemporary Brazilian commentator on Tenentismo, writinlg
a few years after the 1930 Revolution, maintained that the Teilente
programnin the Revolution was "social democratic" and nioted that it
included demands for government recognition of trade unions and
cooperatives; labor legislation, including minimum wage alnd maximum hour laws and anti-child labor legislation. The Tenentes also
generally favored nationalization of the mines and of foreign trade,
and a divisioni of the latifundia, that is, an agrarian reform. They
sought, says this writer, a "moderate, petty-bourgeois capitalism. "12
Some of the measures were carried out by the provisional government of Getulio Vargas. Legal recognition-and extensive government
control-was extended to the trade union and cooperative movement.
Several years later minimum wage and maximum hour laws were
passed. There was extensive government intervention in the economy,
though little niationalization of the nation 's resources or industries.
To this day, there has been no agrarian reform.
However, although some of the things in which the Tenentes believed were enacted after the Revolution of 1930, as a group they were
never able to establish a political organization which could assure the
orderly eiiactment of the program in which they believed. This failure
to establish a Tenente political party was due in part to the fact that
they had come to power in alliance with essentially conservative elements, such as Vargas himself, Arturo Bernardes, the old-line Paulista
opposition, and other groups; and these conservative elements attempted to play downi as much as possible the role which the Teneiites
had played in the 1930 Revolution. Jorge Amado describes this
process :13
They began to ridicule the military side of the revolution. Even today
the Revolution of '30 appears to many people as a revolutionin which the
governmentfled before armies and revolutionaryleaders who existed only in
their own imagination.

. .

. They carried on a campaign of ridicule against

Juarez Tavora, transforminghis victories in the Northeast into more or less

pornographicanecdotes. They arousedthe massesin Sao Paulo against Joao
Alberto, exploiting regional and even separatist sentiments. When Juraci
Magalhaes,on the recommendationof Juarez, went to take over as Interventor of Bahia, the students, the youth, the masses, who shortly before had
applauded, defended and supported the revolutionaries,received him with
hostilities,the oligarchymanipulatingthe crowdand the crowdallowingitself
to be manipulated.
1

Bastos, pp. 231-232.

Amado, p. 238.

12

Santa Rosa, p. 114.

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Without any solid political organization among the civilian population, the Tenentes were unable to counter this kind of attack. Most
of them continued in the armed forces, under military discipline,
which implied loyalty to the Vargas regime, and were thus prevented
from taking an open part in civilian political activities. After the
writing of the Constitution of 1934-which showed the Tenente influenee in its provision for functional representation in Congressand the election of Vargas as constitutional president, Getulio dismissed most of the remaining Tenentes from the key posts which they
had held until that time.14
The failure of the Tenentes to organize and the consequent dispersion of their forces was thus due, to a very considerable degree, to the
skillful opposition of Getulio Vargas, one of the ablest politicians this
hemisphere has seen in the twentieth century. Right down to the end
of his life, Getulio sueceeded in playing one group of his multitudinous
enemies off against another, aligning one group of opponelnts with
him temporarily so as to circumvent a second group. Thus, even those
Tenentes who, unlike their earlier companions now obedient in the
army, turned against him and participated during the next twenty
years in various movements of opposition to him were ineffective because they were almost always split among themselves and sooner or
later fell victim to the political intriguing of " 0 pae dos pobres. "
In the first months after the 1930 Revolution, several attempts
were made by elements among the Tenentes to form an enduring political organization. In Sao Paulo, Joao Alberto, who became interventor after the Revolution, worked more or less closely with a kind
of "popular front" formed by dissident communists, anarchists, and
other elements active among the workers and lower mniddleclass; but
no permanent political party emerged from this amalgam.15 In Rio
de Janeiro, too, the Tenentes made an effort with the Club 3 de
Outubre. This organizatioln, which funetiolled for several years after
the 1930 Revolution, was compared by Virginio Santa Rosa to the
Jacobin Club of the French Revolution.16 Its secretary was Major
Juarez Tavora, and, according to Augusto Machado, "it sought to
orient the ilation 's politics. But Getulio with his extraordinary political ability succeeded in transforming it into his own instrument. 'l7
In 1933 the Tenentes of the Club 3 de Outubre attempted to form
Ibid., p. 239.
Interview with Plinio Mello, leader of the Sao Paulo dissident eolmmunists
in 1930-1931, later Socialist leader. In Sao Paulo, June 16, 1953.
14

15

6 Santa

Rosa, p. 114.

Augusto Machado, Caminho da revolugdo operaria e campesinta (Rio de

Janeiro, 1934), p. 90.
1

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BRAZILIAN " TENENTISMO "9

237

a political party. In a revolutionary congress, sponsored by the Club,

the short-lived Partido Socialista Brasileiro was formed.'8 The congress drew up a program which adopted "a general line tending to
socialism, subordinate to Brazilian conditions. "19 It proclaimed
"unionization and representation of classes in Parliament are the two
fundamental theses which we write upon our banner."20
The five principles of the P.S.B., as set forth in its manifesto, were
the following :21
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Socialism-adapted to the times and the nationalnecessitiesand traditions.

The predominanceof the union over the states.
The interests of the group above those of the individual.
The interestsof Brazil above internationalism.
All power resting on the wishes of the citizens without any distinctionsof
any kind.

This Partido Socialista was short-lived. It sought to gain a foothold

in the labor movement through a group known as Accao Trabalhista,
but this never struck deep roots.22 The party itself died within a few
months.
The Tenente movement began to break up. How far disintegration had gone became obvious in 1934 and 1935 with the organization
of the National Liberation Alliance (A.L.N.). The heart of this movement was the Communist Party, of which ex-Tenente Luiz Carlos
Prestes became chief after his return from Moscow early in 1935. He
was also named honorary president of the A.L.N. which, being a
frankly anti-Vargas coalition, now won the support of many exTenentes. These included Major Rabelo, the commander-in-chief of
the northeaste'rn military district; General Miguel Costa, Roberto
Sisson, Agildo Barrata, and various others.23
It is no surprise that the National Liberation Alliance appealed to
the Tenentes. Its program, issued in the middle of 1935, called for
agrarian reform, unity of the labor movement, support for the struggles of the workers and peasants, the end of the influence of foreignowned "imperialist" corporations in Brazil, and the repudiation of
the country 's foreign-held national debt.24 This program was de18 This should not
be confused with the present-day Partido Socialista Brasileiro, formed in 1947 as a result of the fusion of the post-dictatorship Esquerda
Democratica and the group of doctrinaire socialists gathered around the small
weekly Vanguardia Socialista.
" Reis Peraigao, Manifesto do partido socialista
brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro,
1933), p. 25.
20
21
Ibid., p. 62.
Ibid., p. 63.
22
Machado, p. 91.
23 Amado, p. 250.
24

Bastos, p. 312.

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238

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signed to appeal to both the nationalist and the revolutionary sentiments of the Tenentes. It seemed to give cohesion and doctrinal basis
to the amorphous movement to which the young officers had given
birth more than a decade before.
However, not all of the Tenentes supported the A.L.N. and the
revolution which it made in November, 1935. Tenente stalwarts such
as Joao Alberto, Eduardo Gomes, and others remained loyal to President Vargas. The November revolt was put down fairly easily after
less than a day's fighting in Recife and Rio de Janeiro, and after it
was crushed the Tenentes virtually ceased to exist as a cohesive force
in Brazilian politics. Symbolic of the dissolution of the movement
was the fact that the head of the military tribunal which tried Luiz
Carlos Prestes for his participation in the November, 1935 revolt was
General Maynard Gomes, an old member of the Prestes ColuMn1.25
A few Tenentes followed Prestes into the Communist Party, but
their number was small. Others, such as Miguel Costa, retired from
politics. Still others, such as Cordeiro de Farias, Juarez de Tavora,
Eduardo Gomes and Estillac Leal, continued in the army. No matter
what the members of this last group may have thought of what Vargas
was doing, they went along with his attempt in 1937 to convert Brazil
ilnto a fascist-patterned corporate state.
Upon the modification of the Vargas dictatorship in 1944, many
of the Tenentes returned to activity in the political arena. Genleral
Eduardo Gomes, chief of the Brazilian air force, took the lead in
organizing the Uniao Democratica Nacional, rallying point for all
anti-Vargas forces, which called for ain ending, once and for all, of
Getulio's regime. Once Vargas had actually promised elections for
December, 1945, the old Tenentes, who by that time domillated the
army, used their influenee to make sure that he carried out his promise. When the old Tenente leader Joao Alberto was dismissed as chief
of the federal police in October, 1945, in a move apparently designed
to postpone the election, the army moved to oust the man they had
put into office fifteen years earlier. In the election which followed,
Eduardo Gomes, "O Brigadeiro," was a candidate for president, but
was defeated by General Eurico Dutra, who appears to have played
no role in the Tenente movement.
Gomes was again candidate for the presidency in the 1950 election.
This time he was defeated by Vargas hiimself. Several old Tenentes
participated in the new government of Getulio. Vargas named as his
war minister old Tenente Estillac Leal, whom he removed later, however, on charges of being too lax about infiltration of Communists into
25

Arnado, p. 317.

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BRAZILIAN

" TENENTISMO"

239

the armed forces. In place of Tenente Estillac Leal, Vargas named

Tenente Cordeiro de Farias.
Estillac Leal soon afterwards became the candidate of an extreme
nationalist group for president of the Circulo Militar, the officers'
club of Rio. Elections in this organization are generally believed to
mirror the opinion of the Brazilian officer caste. Hence the importance of this contest. In spite of nation-wide campaign, in which the
Communists took more than a small part, Estillac Leal was defeated.
In spite of Leal's defeat, this contest and his dismissal from office
which gave rise to it served to highlight the influence of what might
be called perverted Tenentismo, which still exists in the ranks of the
Brazilian army. It consists of two groups that cooperate for the time
being, but may not always do so. One of these elements in a group
of extreme Nationalists, who appear to have much influence among
the younger officer group. The other consists of those who covertly
or openly are sympathetic to the Communist Party.
The older officers, who were the original Tenentes, are for the most
part no longer "revolutionary. " Since the death of Vargas they have
concerned themselves largely with the defense of "constitutionalism. "
However, the fact that they have not completely abandoned the ideals
of their youth is demonstrated by the candidacy of Juarez Tavora in
the 1955 presidential election campaign and the wide support which
he received from the higher ranks of the army.
Whatever influence Tenentismo continues to have in the army, it
has still by the middle 1950's failed to organize a civilian political
party expressive of its ideas and ideals. And this is the great tragedy,
for there has developed a vacuum in Brazilian politics. A relatively
small group is loyal to the Communist Party, not as a representative
of the old Tenentismo, but rather as a program in its own right.
Another much larger group is loyal to the memory of Getulio Vargas,
again not as a representative of Tenentismo, but as the president
responsible for most of the country's social legislation. The third
major organized element in the Brazilian political picture of the middle 1950's consists of the traditionally anti-Vargas elemenlts, principally middle class, grouped largely in the Uniao Democratica Nacionlalparty.
However, a sizable segmenit of the Braziliani electorate is alienated
from all three of these groups and is seeking a new political home.
There are several proofs of this. The most striking was provided
by the 1953 and 1954 elections in the state of SAo Paulo. In the former year a political unknown, Janio Quadros, backed by two small
parties, the Partido Socialista Brasileiro and the Partido Democratico

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Cristao, swept the election for mayor of Sho Paulo city. In the following year, backed only by the Partido Socialista, he won election as
governor of the state of Sao Paulo. One of the most notable facts
about these two elections was the decline of the votes of the Communists, the Vargasistas, and even of the Uniao Democratica Nacional.
The Communist decline was spectacular, their vote falling from over
100,000 in 1947 to about 20,000 in 1953. The Vargasista Partido
Trabalhista support fell almost as disastrously.26
Another indication of the fall, particularly of the Vargas and
communist forces, is given by the trade union movement. Although
the top officials of the labor organizations-who are subject to very
close control by the government-remain largely Vargasistas, and
the Comnmunistscontinue to have considerable influence in many of
the lower-echelon trade union groups, the situation has changed radically between the late 1940's and 1955.
The writer spent a considerable period in Brazil in 1946 studying
the trade union movement there. At that time virtually all trade
union officials with whom he talked were either supporters of Getulio
or of the Communist Party. Trips to the country in 1953 and 1954
revealed the decline of both of these groups and the growth of a wide
"independeint" element among the lower-echelon labor leadership, as
a direct result of the disillusionment of the workers with both the communist and Vargas groups.
There is a multitude of small parties trying to fill this vacuumnin
Brazilian politics and to capture the imagination of the Brazilian
people. Chief among these are the Partido Socialista Brasileiro, a
mnoreor less orthodox democratic Socialist Party with a distinctly
Brazilian flavor, and the Partido DemnocraticoCristao, modeled after
the post-World War II Catholic parties of western Europe.
It is doubtful whether either of these can fill the vacuum caused by
the deeline of Vargasismo and the set-backs of the communists. What
is really needed in Brazilian polities is a nationalist democratic, socialist party of the type which Tenentismo promised in the 1920's aiid
early 1930's, buit in the end failed to establish.
The 1955 presidential election campaign presented a picture of a
peculiar revival of Tenentismo, with old Tenenite Juarez Tavora rullning oni a program reminiscent of that of the movement of the early
1930 Ys.27 Juarez's opening campaign speech, made in accepting the
Interview with Plinio Mello, June 16, 1953.
First nominated by the Partido Socialista Brasileiro and the Partido Democratico Cristao, Tavora also received the backing of the anti-Vargas Uniio
Democratica Nacional and Partido Libertador. However, the management of his
26

27

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v vTENENTISMOv

241

Socialist Party's nomination, recalled the Juarez Tavora of the days

of Tenentismo's glory; it expressed the old Tenente revulsion against
political corruption, the old nationalism, desire for social reform, and
endorsement of trade unionism and agrarian reform. Finally, it reflected the old Tenente concern for the sanctity of the Constitution.
Juarez Tavora started off his discourse by saying, ". .. I am more
a nationalist than a socialist, but we are united by the same preoccupation with the greatest problem facing our country-the social problem in its many aspects." He promised his support to the building
of a really free trade union movement, commenting:
I recognize the right to strike within the terms of the constitution which
we must loyally obey, particularly if we are in power. I promise, democratically, so long as it is not repealed, to fulfill the present labor legislation insofar as it does not conflict with the constitution. But I promise sincerely and
loyally to reform the law so as to adapt it to the letter and spirit of the
constitution.

He went on to promise, "I will defend the liberty and autonomy of

the unions . . I propose, first, to guarantee the complete freedom of
elections in the unions; second, to help see to it that these elections
are a true democratic expression of the majority, by fulfilling the legal
obligation of holding elections in the work places. . "
Juarez promised to support the policy of economic nationalism
represented by the government's oil monopoly Petrobras. He also
said that he would push industrialization of the country, but in a
way to assure the participation of the workers in the increased productivity of the economy.
Perhaps mnostfundamnental of all was his promise to carry out an
agrarian reform, expropriating unused land, and turning it over to
small proprietors, and imposing a progressive land tax. This plank
in his platform represented an aspiration of the Tenentes of the 1930 's
which remained unfulfilled in 1955.
Juarez Tavora ended his speech thus :28
. . .The essential, fundamental thing is that we know how to carry out our
duty. To do this, we muist under all circumstances tell the people those
truths which they are no longer accustomed to hearing, as men who do not
wish to hide the truth, who are not afraid of confronting those interests which
oppose the developmenit, the restoration, and the liberation of Brazil. It is
under this banner, with thi.s inspiration, that I propose to realize our program in this country . . . no loinger as a, revolutionary Tenente of those
canipaign, aiid the program upon wlhieh he ran Awerelargely the work of the leftwing of Juarez's supporters in the Frenite de Reiiovaqqo Nacionial.
28 Election throwaway, Juatrez, o candlidato do povo, issuedl by the Partido
Socialista Drasileiro.

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bloody days, but still animatedwith the same spirit of the Tenente of 1922,
a new revoluition,not of bayonets,not a revolutionof violence, but a revolution of the free democraticvote, to save this country.
Thus harking back to the early Tenente movement, Juarez Tavora
seemed in the 1955 election campaign to be attempting once more to
establish Tenentismo as an indigenous popular political movement,
socialist and nationalist in ideology. His failure to attain the presidency and the success of Juseelino Kubitschek, the heir of Vargas, in
gaining it demonstrate both the vitality of the old master's machine
and the continuing failure of Tenentismo's ideas to capture Brazilian
popular imagination. Juarez Tavora's campaign, although hampered
by the lack of a well-organized Tenente party, showed the persistence
in Brazil of the ideas which have given rise to the Aprista parties in
other Latin American countries.

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