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Nevertheless, the basic points that (1) sensory consciousness is necessarily stopped in jhna, and (2) that jhna

requires a
vision of a light or form nimitta, are simply never stated or implied in the sutta-s.
Of course jhna requires a nimitta, both in terms of cause and in terms of mental sign. One of the four satipat t hna-s is the
nimitta which serves as the cause for the eventual elimination of the five hindrances and, beyond that, the arising of the five
concomitant mental factors (pacagika) of the first jhna.
And the mental sign of the first jhna, according to the sutta-s, is the presence of these five mental factors: non-sensual
(nirmis) pti and sukha, as well as vitakka, vicra, and cittekaggat. This is not only the content of the standard jhna
formula (except cittekaggat), it is mentioned in the context of the nimitta of the first jhna in the discourses (e.g. A iv 418:
...idhekacco bhikkhu pan d ito byatto khetta kusalo vivicceva kmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkam
savicram vivekajam ptisukham pat hamam jhnam upasampajja viharati. So tam nimittam sevati bhveti bahulkaroti
svdhit t hitam adhit t hti.). The presence of these concomitant mental factors is the sign of having attained jhna.
Analayo (Grasping): In fact, at a later point the Upakkilesa-sutta speaks of directing attention to the meditative experience
of forms or to that of light in terms of the rpanimitta and the obhsanimitta (MN III 161). This passage explicitly uses the
term nimitta to refer to the vision of light and forms that Anuruddha and his companions had been unable to stabilize, a
usage where nimitta unequivocally stands for something that is perceived. From this it seems that the Upakkilesa-sutta could
indeed be describing the development of the mental nimitta required in order to enter the first absorption.
A: Not even the Visuddhimagga limits counterpart signs to visions of light or forms. According to the Visuddhimagga
analysis, of the 30 meditations which lead to jhna, 22 have counterpart signs as object. And of these, only 19 require any
sort of counterpart sign which is apprehended based solely on sight, and can therefore give rise to a mental image resulting
from that nimitta (the 10 stages of corpse decomposition and 9 kasin a-s, excluding the air kasin a which is apprehended by
way of both sight and tactile sensation).
As for the Upakkilesa Sutta, nowhere in this sutta does it say that either the obhsanimitta or the rpanimitta are essential
prerequisites for attaining the first jhna. Nor does this sutta maintain that the stopping of all sensory consciousness
whatsoever is essential for the arising of either of these two signs. Therefore, while these apperceptions and visions can
occur during the course of of meditational development, there is no explicit statement here, or elsewhere in the suttas, that
such apperceptions and/or visions must arise for one to enter jhna. Indeed, even the commentarial tradition doesnt maintain
that either of these types of nimitta-s are essential. Also, the Vimuttimagga understands the teaching in the Upakkilesa Sutta
to refer to the development of the divine eye. This is understandable as Anuruddh was designated as the foremost disciple
endowed with the divine eye.
Analayo (Grasping): Elsewhere the discourses also refer to the "sign of tranquillity", samathanimitta (DN III 213; SN V
66; SN V 105), to the "sign of concentration", samdhinimitta (DN III 226; DN III 242; DN III 279; MN I 249; MN I 301;
MN III 112; AN I 115; AN I 256; AN II 17; AN III 23; AN III 321), and to the "sign of the mind", cittanimitta (SN V 151;
AN III 423; Th 85). The unique contribution made by the Upakkilesa-sutta is that it offers a report of actual practice that
involves the nimitta in a context geared towards absorption attainment.
A: None of these references refer to any of these nimitta-s being an obhsanimitta or rpanimitta related to the context of the
Upakkilesa Sutta. The Upakkilesa Sutta is the only discourse where nimitta is used in that context.
Analayo (Grasping): Elsewhere the discourses in fact indicate that during the first absorption it is impossible to speak (SN
IV 217), and the hearing of sounds is an obstruction to its attainment (AN V 135). With the first absorption one has gone
beyond Mra's vision (MN I 159), having reached the end of the world of the senses (AN IV 430). These passages confirm
that the first absorption is indeed a state during which the mind is "absorbed" in deep concentration.
A: According to Ven. Anlayos interpretation of S iv 217 it would be impossible to breathe in the fourth jhna or any of
the formless attainments. Although this interpretation has also been put forward over the centuries, IMO its not a correct
interpretation of the discourse. One doesnt speak in the first jhna because there is no volitional intention to do so. And
while breathing can slow to the point of being imperceptible in the fourth jhna, this doesnt mean that one has completely
ceased breathing. Breathing even when imperceptible is an involuntary process.
As far as sounds are concerned, A iii 137 states that one must be able to tolerate sounds to both enter and remain in
sammsamdhi. And sammsamdhi is most commonly defined as the four jhna-s in the discourses, as is the training of
heightened mind (adhicittasikkh), as well as the faculty of concentration (samdhindriya) and the strength of concentration
(samdhibala) as practiced by a noble disciple (ariyasvaka). There is simply no integrated eightfold path without the
inclusion of jhna in the suttantika sense of jhna.
And A iv 430 doesnt say what Ven. Anlayo wants it to say. The kmagun (strings of sensuality) metaphor only applies
to sensory phenomena that are wished for and desired, agreeable and endearing, associated with sense-desire and tempting
to lust. A iii 410 tells us that they are not inherently kma in and of themselves. MN 13: Mahdukkhakkhandha Sutta tells
us that they are the allure (or gratification) of kma. It goes on to tell us that its the abandoning of desire-passion
(chandarga) for sensuality, which is the escape from kma. Thus external sensory objects are only strings of kma
insofar as they are desired and wished for. Returning to A iv 430, it states that it is only with the attainment of the cessation
of apperception and feeling that one actually comes to the end of the world (an attainment not necessary for liberation).
BTW, Ven. Anlayo goes to significant lengths to suggest that sammsamdhi is actually satipat t hna, and yet he also
maintains that jhna which he acknowledges is necessary at some point on the noble eightfold path is an absorption
somehow beyond sammsamdhi.
Regarding what else is present or absent in the four jhna-s, S v 214 states that the pleasure faculty (sukhindriya) doesnt
cease until the third jhna, and S v 211 defines the pleasure faculty as pleasure born of body contact. S iv 236 further tells us
that nirmis pti and sukha are what is experienced in jhna hence the pti and sukha of jhna are non-sensual, yet sukha is
still born of body contact.
Moreover, M i 293 and A iv 426 both explicitly state that it is only when abiding in the fully purified formless attainments
that the mind is isolated from the five sense faculties and doesnt attend to any apperceptions of the five sensory spheres. Its
worth quoting both. MN 43 Mahvedalla Sutta:

Friend, what can be known with the purified mental-consciousness (manovin a) isolated from the five [sense] faculties?
Friend, with the purified mental-consciousness isolated from the five faculties the sphere of infinite space can be known as
infinite space. The sphere of infinite consciousness can be known as infinite consciousness. The sphere of nothingness
can be known as there is nothing.
AN 9.37 Ananda Sutta:
Q: during first jhana one can still sense the body - but are you all really sure it is the physical body we sense?
A: I suspect that we are coming to this discussion from somewhat different perspectives. For myself, it doesn't really matter
what you or I or anyone else thinks jhna is; for the purposes of discussion I'm mainly interested in what the discourses have
to say on the matter. And from the statements I cited on my previous post from M i 293 and A iv 426, there is no reason to
exclude the body, or any other phenomena, from what can be experienced in jhna.
Neither of those statements from M i 293 or A iv 426 are of interpretive meaning (neyyattha). They aren't in need of further
interpretation. They are of definitive meaning (ntattha). They speak directly in terms of the faculties (indriya-s) and sense
spheres (yatana-s). A iv 426 is very explicit. Venerable nanda states that when not experiencing the form, sound, etc.,
yatana-s, one is percipient of one of the three formless perception attainments, or aphala samdhi.
If it were the case that one cannot experience any of these yatana-s while abiding in the four jhna-s, then this discourse
would have included the four jhna-s along with the three formless perception attainments and aphala samdhi.
The same holds true for S v 214 and S v 211 regarding the pleasure and equanimity faculties (sukhindriya & upekkhindriya).
Of course, the abhidhammikas reinterpreted all of this. And if one wants to follow that interpretation, that's fine by me.
Q: The rupa body has form (usually takes the form of our physical body but is changeable), one can see with it, hear, touch,
etc. How to discern it from the "gross"?
A: As DN 11 states, "And what is the gross acquisition of a self? Possessed of form, made up of the four great existents,
feeding on physical food: this is the gross acquisition of a self. And what is the mind-made acquisition of a self? Possessed
of form, mind-made, complete in all its parts, not inferior in its faculties: this is the mind-made acquisition of a self. And
what is the formless acquisition of a self? Formless and made of perception: this is the formless acquisition of a self."
The first type of "form" (rpa) is made of the "four great elements" (ctu-mahbhta), i.e. matter, etc.. The second type of
"rpa" is "mind-made" (manomaya). The third is formless (arpa) and made of perception (samaya). As best as I can
remember, tradition maintains that deities of the higher form-realm planes don't have all of the six senses (but I can't
remember the specifics).
Q: Do you know the Pali terms used in the Potthapada sutta for "the gross acquisition of a self", "the mind-made acquisition
of a self", and "formless acquisition of a self"?
A: They are ol riko attapat ilbho, manomayo attapat ilbho, arpo attapat ilbho.
Q: 3. The problem of the Infinite Space formula, and the affliction formula for 1st Jhana.
Is the sanna in rupasanna of the Infinite Space formula, perception as in the effect of apperception consequent on
phassa/contact with rupa, or can it mean something other than that? The PED attests to sannas polysemous character and
includes idea as a meaning of sanna (4th entry). This is perhaps the most congruent reading of rupasanna in the context
of the attainment of Infinite Space. One abandons the idea of rupa so totally to arrive at Infinite Space.
A: The sphere of infinite space formula also states with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance (pat ighasana)....
DN 15 states: "If, nanda, all those modes, characteristics, signs and exponents, by which the form-group is designated were
absent, would there be manifest any resistance-contact (pat ighasamphasso) in the name-group?" "There would not, lord."
The form group is the four great existents and derivatives of them. So the implication is that resistance contact is present in
the four jhna-s.
As I said in a previous post, M i 293 and A iv 426 both explicitly state that it is only when abiding in the fully purified
formless attainments that the mind is isolated from the five sense faculties and doesnt attend to any apperceptions of the five
sensory spheres.
Neither of those statements from M i 293 or A iv 426 are of interpretive meaning (neyyattha). They aren't in need of further
interpretation. They are of definitive meaning (ntattha). They speak directly in terms of the faculties (indriya-s) and sense
spheres (yatana-s). A iv 426 is very explicit. Venerable nanda states that when not experiencing the form, sound, etc.,
yatana-s, one can be percipient of one of the three formless perception attainments, or aphala samdhi.
If it were the case that one cannot experience any of these yatana-s while abiding in the four jhna-s, then this discourse
would have included the four jhna-s along with the three formless perception attainments and aphala samdhi.
The same holds true for S v 214 and S v 211 regarding the pleasure and equanimity faculties (sukhindriya & upekkhindriya).
Of course, the abhidhammikas reinterpreted all of this. And if one wants to follow that interpretation, that's fine by me.
Q: 4. The kaya problem - which "kaya" is suffused with Jhanic bliss?
I think the Commentaries are right to equate this "kaya" with the cetasika kaya
A: S v 214 states that the pleasure faculty (sukhindriya) doesnt cease until the third jhna, and S v 211 defines the pleasure
faculty as pleasure born of body contact. S iv 236 further tells us that nirmis pti and sukha are what is experienced in
jhna hence the pti and sukha of jhna are non-sensual, yet sukha is still born of body contact according to suttantika
analysis.
Q: Neither is it possible to argue that perhaps the body does not feel pleasure, but is purely equanimous. Here, the
Mahaniddana Sutta DN 15 will permit only one feeling to be experienced at a time. If it's sukha, the dukkha and neutral
feelings cannot be present at that time.
A: Please refer to S v 214 for which feeling faculties cease in which jhna-s.
Q: Are the predicates that follow "form" adjectives that limit the kamaguna to only forms which are agreeable, pleasing,
charming, endearing, fostering desire, enticing?
A: Do you truly experience all sights, sounds, odors, flavors, and tactile sensations as agreeable, pleasing, charming,
endearing, fostering desire, enticing? What about the odor and flavor of uncooked, rotting meat? Or feces? How about the

tactile sensations which arise from placing your hand on a red hot electric stove element? Or taking a bath in sulphuric acid?
I can say with certainty that I dont find any of those sense experiences agreeable in any way.
Q: Cakkhuvieyy rp it t h kant manp piyarp kmpasamhit rajany
ie forms cognisable by the eye - agreeable, pleasing, charming, endearing, fostering desire, enticing.
Are the predicates that follow "form" adjectives that limit the kamaguna to only forms which are agreeable, pleasing,
charming, endearing, fostering desire, enticing?
A: Indeed they are. I forgot to mention the following from SN 47.6 (S v 146), which differentiates between the kmagun a-s
and the four satipat t hna-s. It's worth remembering in this regard that the contemplation of the body satipat t hna includes
objects of contemplation such as mindfulness of breathing, the foul parts of the body, and the stages of corpse
decomposition. Clearly the body, the tactile sensations associated with the breath, the 32 parts of the body, and the stages of
corpse decomposition are not considered to be "strings of sensuality." SN 47.6 (S v 146):
Q: So from my point of experience I would say that kayanupassana is different from jhana.
A: Please see MN 119: Kyagatsati Sutta section on jhna.
Q: I found an occurence where Sariputta on being asked what is 1st jhana gives the usual formula with 4 factors, and in the
immediate next question about how many factors there are in 1st jhana he states 5 and adds cittekaggata...
A: It isn't a problem at all. IMO the few occurrences which list five factors are not as old as the basic jhna formula. At any
rate, the list of five factors doesn't add or take away anything from the formula for the first jhna.
A2: In the Pl i sutta-s the parts of the body are forms derived from the four great existents (mahbht). SN 22.56 (S iii 59)
Updnaparivatta Sutta:
And what is form? The four great existents and the form derived from them: this is called form. From the origination of
nutriment comes the origination of form. From the cessation of nutriment comes the cessation of form. And just this noble
eightfold path is the path of practice leading to the cessation of form, i.e., right view, right resolve, right speech, right action,
right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration.
SN 22.79 (S iii 86): Khajjanya Sutta:
And why do you call it 'form'? Because it is afflicted, thus it is called 'form.' Afflicted with what? With cold & heat & hunger
& thirst, with the touch of flies, mosquitoes, wind, sun, & reptiles. Because it is afflicted, it is called form.
For an analysis of the six elements as they pertain to a living sentient being, see MN 140: Dhtuvibhaga Sutta.
Actually it is precisely the other way around: earth (solidity), water (cohesion), fire (temperature), and air (motility) are
considered primary. All other forms, both internal and external, are derived from these four great existents ((mahbht).
Primary or not-derived (noupd) in the sense that they cannot be further reduced via phenomenological analysis. All other
forms are considered to be comprised of combinations of earth (solidity), water (cohesion), fire (temperature), and air
(motility). Therefore, all other forms are considered to be derived form (updya rpa).
Respectfully, it seems that you are unwilling to acknowledge that the Pl i sutta-sexplicitly define the four elements: the earth
element (pathavdhtu), water element (podhtu), fire element (tejodhtu), and the wind element (vyodht), in terms of
the constituent parts of the "biological body" which is one and the same as the gross body (DN 9: "I posit a gross self,
possessed of form, made up of the four great existents [earth, water, fire, and wind], feeding on physical food.")
Other passages from the relevant discourses dealing with the analysis of the four elements have already been provided. Yet,
you continue to insist upon reading notions into the sutta-s which simply are not stated or implied by any of the discourses
dealing with the elements.
Moreover, it seems that you are unwilling to comprehend the soteriological purpose of contemplating the elements in
meditation practice. The purpose is to develop renunciation (nekkhamma), disenchantment (nibbid), dispassion (virga),
eventually resulting in liberation (vimutti) from the continual round of rebirth and re-death which is samsra. The
contemplation of the elements as an application of mindfulness (satipat t hna) has nothing to do with developing the
iddhi-s per se.
And FTR, in the context of the Pl i sutta-s, the iddhi-s are considered mundane and superfluous. In DN 11: Kevat t a Sutta
the Buddha states:
Seeing this drawback to the miracle of psychic power, Kevatta, I feel horrified, humiliated, and disgusted with the miracle of
psychic power....
Seeing this drawback to the miracle of telepathy, Kevatta, I feel horrified, humiliated, and disgusted with the miracle of
telepathy.
MN 1 shows that there's no need to ever read any realist ontology or metaphysics of any sort into the discourses.
Q: By a coincidence, the schema in the Uppatipatika Sutta mirrors the Dhammasangini's enumeration of dhammas in the
Rupa Jhanas - which text influenced what text?
A: There is little doubt that SN 48.40 is the product of rather late redaction of the sutta corpus. This can be inferred because
there is no parallel in the extant Sarvstivda corpus, and the relevant stra cited in the Abhidharmakoabhsya, the
*Satyasiddhistra, and the Yogcra rvakabhmi gives an analysis of the feeling faculties in dhyna which is closer to the
standard jhna/dhyna formula.
Nevertheless, given that SN 48.36-48.39 define the feeling faculties the way they do, these vibha ga sutta-s are enough to
differentiate the suttantika interpretation of SN 48.40 from how the feeling faculties in relation to jhna are defined in the
Abhidhamma Pit aka.
A2: Indeed. Its worth noting just how closely related mindfulness of the body (kynupassan, kyagatsati) and the mental
factors of mindfulness and full awareness (sati and sampajaa) are to the development of the four jhna-s. This can be seen
from the following sutta excerpts. [AN 8.63] [SN 47.4] [AN 1.227] [MN 119] [MN 125] [SN 47.8] [MN 38]
Seeing that they have been abandoned within him, he becomes glad. Glad, he becomes enraptured. Enraptured, his body
grows tranquil (ptimanassa kyo passambhati). His body tranquil, he is sensitive to pleasure (passaddhakyo sukham
vedeti). Feeling pleasure, his mind becomes concentrated (sukhino cittam samdhiyati). [DN 2]

Q: Jhana is the same. The mind has ekkagattacitta or one-pointed mind. The mind is stuck on the arisien nimitta & factors of
jhana. Mind awareness is no longer within the body (kayanupassana) but the body receives the flowing benefits of jhana.
But the mind has gone beyong being aware of this. The mind is elsewhere.
A: What you are describing is a case of being "stuck internally" (MN 138). Such a description of jhna as sammsamdhi
cannot be sustained by a close reading of the sutta-s.
Phenomena present and abandoned in each jhna
the five hindrances are abandoned (pacanvaran ): sensual desire (kmacchanda), aversion (vypda), dullness and
drowsiness (thnamiddha), restlessness and anxiety (uddhaccakukkucca), doubt (vicikicch) [MN 43]
1st jhna:
pain faculty ceases (dukkhindriya) [SN 48.40] which is any physical pain, physical discomfort born of body-contact to be
experienced as pain and discomfort [SN 48.37]
apperception of sensual pleasure ceases (kmasa) [DN 9, AN 9.31]; sensual pleasure (kma) is the resolve of passion
(sakapparga) [AN 6.63]
unskillful resolves cease (akusal sakapp), which are the resolves of sensual pleasure, aversion, harmfulness
(kmasakappa, bypdasakappa, vihimssakappa) [MN 117]
sign of first jhna (nimitta): the first jhna which includes directed thought and evaluation, as well as rapture and pleasure
born of seclusion; he sticks with that sign, develops it, pursues it, and establishes himself firmly in it [AN 9.35]
directed thought and evaluation are present (vitakkavicr) [DN 22: standard jhna formula]
non-carnal rapture and pleasure are present (nirmis pti, nirmisa sukha) [SN 36.31]
actual refined apperception of rapture and pleasure born of seclusion is present (vivekajaptisukhasukhumasaccasa)
[DN 9]
rapture of seclusion (viveka pti): When a noble disciple enters and remains in the rapture of seclusion, at that time five
things do not occur for him: (1) pain and unhappiness connected with sensual pleasure do not exist at that time; (2) pleasure
and happiness connected with sensual pleasure do not exist at that time; (3) pain and unhappiness connected with the
unskillful do not exist at that time; (4) pleasure and happiness connected with the unskillful do not exist at that time; (5) pain
and unhappiness connected with the skillful do not exist at that time. [AN 5.176]
clear seeing of mental phenomena one by one as they occur (anupadadhammavipassan): Whatever mental phenomena
there are in the first jhna: directed thought, evaluation, rapture, pleasure, singleness of mind, contact, feeling, apperception,
intention, mind, desire, decision, persistence, mindfulness, equanimity, and attention; he ferreted them out one after another.
Known to him they arose, known to him they remained, known to him they subsided. He discerned, 'So this is how these
qualities, not having been, come into play. Having been, they vanish.' (Ye ca pat hame jhne dhamm vitakko ca vicro ca
pti ca sukhaca cittekaggat ca, phasso vedan sa cetan cittam chando adhimokkho vriyam sati upekkh manasikro
tyssa dhamm anupadavavatthit honti. Tyssa dhamm vidit uppajjanti, vidit upat t hahanti, vidit abbhattham gacchanti.
So evam pajnti evam kirame dhamm ahutv sambhonti, hutv pat iventi.) [MN 111]
seeing the three characteristics of the five aggregates (samanupassati): He sees whatever phenomena there that are
connected with form, feeling, apperception, fabrications, and consciousness, as impermanent, unsatisfactory, a disease, a
cancer, an arrow, painful, an affliction, alien, a disintegration, an emptiness, not-self. (So yadeva tattha hoti rpagatam
vedangatam sagatam sakhragatam vin agatam, te dhamme aniccato dukkhato rogato gan d ato sallato aghato
bdhato parato palokato suato anattato samanupassati.) [MN 64, AN 9.36]
2nd jhna:
unhappiness faculty ceases (domanassindriya) [SN 48.40] which is any mental pain, mental discomfort born of mindcontact to be experienced as pain and discomfort [SN 48.37]
directed thought and evaluation ceases (vitakkavicr) [AN 9.31]
skillful resolves cease (kusal sakapp), which are the resolves of renunciation, non-aversion, harmlessness
(nekkhammasakappa, abypdasakappa, avihimssakappa) [MN 117]
sign of second jhna (nimitta): the second jhna which has internal serene-clarity and unification of mind free from thought
and evaluation, and has rapture and pleasure born of concentration; he sticks with that sign, develops it, pursues it, and
establishes himself firmly in it [AN 9.35]
non-carnal rapture and pleasure are present (nirmis pti, nirmisa sukha) [SN 36.31]
actual refined apperception of rapture and pleasure born of concentration is present
(samdhijaptisukhasukhumasaccasa) [DN 9]
clear seeing of mental phenomena one by one as they occur (anupadadhammavipassan): same as first jhna minus
eliminated mental phenomena [MN 111]
seeing the three characteristics of the five aggregates (samanupassati): same as first jhna minus eliminated mental
phenomena [MN 64, AN 9.36]
3rd jhna:
pleasure faculty ceases (sukhindriya) [SN 48.40, AN 9.31] which is any physical pleasure, physical comfort born of bodycontact to be experienced as pleasure and comfort [SN 48.37]
sign of third jhna (nimitta): he remains equanimous, mindful and fully aware, and experiences pleasure with the body; he
sticks with that sign, develops it, pursues it, and establishes himself firmly in it [AN 9.35]
pleasure of equanimity is present (upekkhsukha) [AN 9.42]
non-carnal pleasure is present (nirmisa sukha) [SN 36.31]
actual refined apperception of equanimity is present (upekkhsukhasukhumasaccasa) [DN 9]
clear seeing of mental phenomena one by one as they occur (anupadadhammavipassan): same as first jhna minus
eliminated mental phenomena [MN 111]
seeing the three characteristics of the five aggregates (samanupassati): same as first jhna minus eliminated mental
phenomena [MN 64, AN 9.36]

4th jhna:
happiness faculty ceases (somanassindriya) [SN 48.40] which is any mental pleasure, mental comfort born of mind-contact
to be experienced as pleasure and comfort [SN 48.37]
in and out breathing has been calmed, has been stilled, has ceased (asssapasss) [SN 36.11, AN 9.31]
sign of fourth jhna (nimitta): the fourth jhna, which is without pleasure or pain, and includes the purity of equanimity and
mindfulness; he sticks with that sign, develops it, pursues it, and establishes himself firmly in it [AN 9.35]
non-carnal equanimity is present (nirmis upekkh) [SN 36.31]
actual refined apperception of neither pleasure nor pain is present (adukkhamasukhasukhumasaccasa) [DN9]
apperception of form is present (rpasa) [AN 9.42]
clear seeing of mental phenomena one by one as they occur (anupadadhammavipassan): same as first jhna minus
eliminated mental phenomena [MN 111]
seeing the three characteristics of the five aggregates (samanupassati): same as first jhna minus eliminated mental
phenomena [MN 64, AN 9.36]
Formless attainments:
only when abiding in the fully purified formless attainments is the mind isolated from the five sense faculties [MN 43] and
does not experience any of the five sensory spheres [AN 9.37]
Attainment of the cessation of apperception and feeling:
equanimity faculty ceases (upekkhindriya) [SN 48.40]
Q: I think, that if we allow for the possibility that "kyikaca vedana" actually refers to feelings born at any of the 6
ayatanas, many of the difficulties posed by the Uppapatika Sutta, SN 40.10 would disappear. Otherwise, it would really be
difficult to reconcile the persistance of the "bodily" equanimity feeling in the formless attainment with how the formless
attainments are understood.
A: Regarding the Uppat ipt ika Sutta (SN 48.40). since it is speaking specifically about the five feeling indriya-s in relation
to the jhna-s, if we first look at what other sutta-s have to tell us on these specific points, then we can find a very
satisfactory reading of the Uppat ipt ika Sutta.
First, if we look at AN 9.42 it tells us that the pleasure commonly referred to in the descriptions of the third jhna is actually
the pleasure of equanimity (upekkhsukha). This accords well with SN 48.40, when it states that the pleasure faculty
(sukhindriya) ceases in the third jhna. What remains is the equanimity faculty (upekkhindriya) and the happiness faculty
(somanassindriya), which in light of SN 48.37, in the third jhna refers to bodily equanimity (kya upekkh) and mental
pleasure (cetasika sukha).
And when SN 48.40 tells us that the happiness faculty (somanassindriya) ceases in the fourth jhna, what remains is both
bodily and mental equanimity (kya & cetasika upekkh) as stated in SN 48.37.
With regard to the formless attainments, since MN 43 states that it is with the attainment of the fully purified formless
apperception attainments that the mind is isolated from the five sense faculties and AN 9.37 states that the same is the case
with regard to the experience of the five sensory spheres, we can deduce from this that with entrance into the formless
attainments bodily equanimity (kya upekkh) is no longer experienced, and what remains is mental equanimity (cetasika
upekkh). And as SN 48.40 states, the equanimity faculty, i.e. mental equanimity, ceases with the attainment of the cessation
of apperception and feeling.
Once again the sutta-s explicate themselves, revealing an integral symmetry and remarkably high degree of internal
coherence.
Also, if we look at some discourses where the reference is specifically to the first satipat t hna, then it becomes clear that
the meaning of kya in the context of jhna doesn't entail interpreting it in terms of nmakya, and in fact to interpret it as
nmakya is completely uncalled for. As an example, MN 125:
Then the Tathagata trains him further: 'Come, monk, remain focused on the body in & of itself, but do not think any thoughts
connected with the body.' (Tamenam tathgato uttarim vineti 'ehi tvam, bhikkhu, kye kynupass viharhi , m ca
kmpasamhitam vitakkam vitakkesi.') ... With the stilling of directed thoughts & evaluations, he enters & remains in the
second jhna: rapture & pleasure born of composure, unification of awareness free from directed thought & evaluation
internal assurance.
And AN 8.63:
You should train yourself thus: I will remain focused on the body in & of itself ardent, alert, & mindful putting aside
greed & distress with reference to the world. That's how you should train yourself. When you have developed this
concentration in this way, you should develop this concentration with directed thought & evaluation, you should develop it
with no directed thought & a modicum of evaluation, you should develop it with no directed thought & no evaluation, you
should develop it accompanied by rapture... not accompanied by rapture... endowed with a sense of enjoyment; you should
develop it endowed with equanimity. (Evam sikkhitabbam: kye kynupass viharissmi tp sampajno satim, vineyya
loke abhijjhdomanassanti. Evahi te, bhikkhu, sikkhitabbam. Yato kho te, bhikkhu, ayam samdhi evam bhvito hoti
bahulkato, tato tvam, bhikkhu, imam samdhim savitakkasavicrampi bhveyysi, avitakkavicramattampi bhveyysi,
avitakkaavicrampi bhveyysi, sapptikampi bhveyysi, nipptikampi bhveyysi, stasahagatampi bhveyysi,
upekkhsahagatampi bhveyysi.
And AN 1.227:
When one thing is practiced & pursued, the body is calmed (kya passambhati), the mind is calmed (citta passambhati),
thinking & evaluating are stilled (vitakkavicr vpasama), and all qualities on the side of clear knowing go to the
culmination of their development. Which one thing? Mindfulness immersed in the body (kyagatsati).
Q: About km
A: SN 47.6 (S v 146) differentiates between the kmagun a-s and the four satipat t hna-s. It's worth remembering in this
regard that the contemplation of the body satipat t hna includes objects of contemplation such as mindfulness of breathing,
the foul parts of the body, and the stages of corpse decomposition. In light of this differentiation, the body, the tactile

sensations associated with the breath, the 32 parts of the body, and the stages of corpse decomposition are not considered to
be strings of sensuality. SN 47.6:
[Y]ou should not wander into what is not your proper range and is the territory of others. In one who wanders into what is
not his proper range and is the territory of others, Mara gains an opening, Mara gains a foothold. And what, for a monk, is
not his proper range and is the territory of others? The five strands of sensuality. Which five? Forms cognizable by the eye
agreeable, pleasing, charming, endearing, fostering desire, enticing. Sounds cognizable by the ear... Aromas cognizable
by the nose... Flavors cognizable by the tongue... Tactile sensations cognizable by the body agreeable, pleasing, charming,
endearing, fostering desire, enticing. These, for a monk, are not his proper range and are the territory of others.
Surely you wouldnt suggest that one must be isolated from the five sensory spheres in order to engage in kynupassan?
A: What constitutes a kmagun a is subjective, based on the apperception of the observer.
A: Youre missing the distinction between carnal and non-carnal rapture and pleasure (smis pti & sukha vs. nirmis pti
& sukha) [SN 36.31]. And in case youre going to suggest that non-carnal rapture and pleasure cannot be experienced via the
five sense spheres, Ill refer you to the DN 22 commentary.
A: AN 9.42: apperception of form (rpasa) is present in the fourth jhna. I see no good reason to interpret this as
conceptions of form or memories of form, etc. Any such adventitious conceptions and memories that do not pertain to
what is being immediately experienced in the fourth jhna would be an obstacle to the highly refined samdhi of this jhna.
A: Actually Ven. nanda gives four meditative states: the three formless apperception attainments and aphala samdhi.
Given the importance of the four jhna-s to the integral eightfold path of the sutta-s, if the jhna-s were definable in such
terms, then this sutta would have included them.
A: Because SN 48.37 expressly differentiates between kyika/cetasika and kyosamphassa/manosamphassa with regard to
the feeling faculties.
A: I still dont see how you arrive at the conclusion that sukha and dukkha arising from mind-contact in MN 148 must refer
to kyika vedan based on SN 36.6?
SN 48.38 states that the sukhindriya and somanassindriya are both sukha vedan. And the dukkhindriya and
domanassindriya are both dukkha vedan. Thus, based on the analysis of this vibha ga sutta the sukha and dukkha arising
from mind-contact in MN 148 are actually somanassa and domanassa. They are both cetasika vedan arising from
manosamphassa. Neither of them are kyika vedan.
Q: So, the commentary above, if taken on the terms of the suttanta understanding of somanassa as a cetasika vedana, does
not say that somanassa directly issues from phassa at the salayatana. It issues from subsequent phassa at the mano and can be
understood to simply say "Other-wordly pleasure is the name for the 6 pleasant cetasika feelings connected with the life of renunciation"
A: Yes, I agree. My point was just that the commentary interprets both carnal and non-carnal feelings in terms of somanassa
& domanassa, and body-contact would be present at some stage of the momentary cognitive series for the subsequent fifth
type of either carnal or non-carnal pleasure to arise.
A: Yes, I followed your analysis of the two sutta-s. But it seems to me, as I replied above, given that SN 48.38 states that the
sukhindriya and somanassindriya are both sukha vedan and the dukkhindriya and domanassindriya are both dukkha vedan,
therefore, based on the analysis of this vibhaga sutta the sukha and dukkha arising from mind-contact in MN 148 are
actually somanassa and domanassa. They are both cetasika vedan arising from manosamphassa. Neither of them are kyika
vedan followed by cetasika vedan.
Do you have a third sutta source which specifically states that vedan arising from manosamphassa is kyika?
A: SN 48.37 and SN 48.38 are exactly the same as SN 48.36 with the appropriate additions which bear directly on what is
stated in 48.36.
A: SN 48.39 speaks of all five faculties just as the preceding three vibha ga discourses do (SN.48.36-38). SN 48.39:
Sukhavedaniyam, bhikkhave, phassam paticca
uppajjati sukhindriyam.... Dukkhavedaniyam, bhikkhave, phassam paticca

uppajjati dukkhindriyam.... Somanassavedaniyam, bhikkhave, phassam paticca


uppajjati somanassindriyam....

Domanassavedaniyam, bhikkhave, phassam paticca


uppajjati domanassindriyam.... Upekkhvedaniyam, bhikkhave,

phassam paticca
uppajjati upekkhindriyam....

As such, the faculties mentioned in SN 48.39 are to be analyzed in exactly the same way as SN 48.36-38. It doesnt leave
open the possibility that kyika vedan is born of manosamphassa.
A: They do: Katamaca, bhikkhave, somanassindriyam? Yam kho, bhikkhave, cetasikam sukham, cetasikam stam,
manosamphassajam sukham stam vedayitam idam vuccati, bhikkhave, somanassindriyam.
Katamaca , bhikkhave, domanassindriyam? Yam kho, bhikkhave, cetasikam dukkham, cetasikam astam,
manosamphassajam dukkham astam vedayitam idam vuccati, bhikkhave, domanassindriyam....
Tatra, bhikkhave, yaca sukhindriyam yaca somanassindriyam, sukh s vedan datthabb.
Tatra, bhikkhave, yaca

dukkhindriyam yaca domanassindriyam, dukkh s vedan datthabb.

A: MN 137 is tangetical to this discussion of vedan in jhna which is very clearly analyzed with reference to SN 48.37-40
and other discourses which speak of vedan in jhna. I have already demonstrated this. But if we must look at MN 137, the
statement in question is:
In this case the Tathagata is not satisfied nor is he sensitive to satisfaction, yet he remains untroubled, mindful, & alert.
(Tatra, bhikkhave, tathgato na ceva anattamano hoti, na ca anattamanatam pat isamvedeti, anavassuto ca viharati sato
sampajno.)
Here the designation of anattamana is immediately qualified by anavassuto ca viharati sato sampajno. As for how
anavassuta relates to mindfulness of the body and the liberated mind see SN 35.243 (S iv 186, CDB 1246, ATI SN 35.202).
A: I can find nothing in any of these discourses which sustains your premise or the consequence of your premise, i.e. that
vedan born of manosamphassa includes vedan born of kyasamphassa. Regarding just one example, the relevant
statements in MN 149 simply highlight the interdependence of mind and body.
A: You have yet to provide a source which states that kyika vedan is born of manosamphassa.

A: There is nothing in the Salla Sutta to indicate that the context of bodily feeling under discussion extends beyond feelings
associated with the physical body. The context the discourse is to highlight that when an instructed noble disciple
experiences a painful physical feeling, they dont experience any mental distress because of that. Aversion doesnt arise
towards it. They remain detached. The point is that although physical pain and sickness are unavoidable, there need not be
any mental suffering because of it. MN 141 Saccavibha ga Sutta:
A: MN 137 Sal yatanavibhaga Sutta simply doesnt support you premise either. The entire discourse deals with
somanassa, domanassa, and upekkh. It nowhere states anything about mental kyika feelings.
A: You're missing the context and therefore the soteriological message of MN 137:
Here, by depending & relying on the six kinds of renunciation joy, abandon & transcend the six kinds of household joy. Such
is their abandoning, such is their transcending. By depending & relying on the six kinds of renunciation distress, abandon &
transcend the six kinds of household distress. Such is their abandoning, such is their transcending. By depending & relying
on the six kinds of renunciation equanimity, abandon & transcend the six kinds of household equanimity. Such is their
abandoning, such their transcending.
And finally: By depending & relying on non-fashioning, abandon & transcend the equanimity coming from singleness,
dependent on singleness. Such is its abandoning, such its transcending.
A: What I see is a category mistake of applying the term kyika to types of vedan which are not born of kyasamphassa.
A: Firstly, there are six types of feeling: feeling born of eye contact, feeling born of ear contact, feeling born of nose contact,
feeling born of tongue contact, feeling born of body contact, feeling born of mind contact (cakkhusamphassaj vedan,
sotasamphassaj vedan, ghnasamphassaj vedan, jivhsamphassaj vedan, kyasamphassaj vedan,manosamphassaj
vedan) as mentioned in SN 22.56.
If we look at SN 48.38 we can see how this sixfold classification is relevant in regard to kyasamphassaj vedan and
manosamphassaj vedan:
Katamaca, bhikkhave, sukhindriyam? Yam kho, bhikkhave, kyikam sukham, kyikam stam, kyasamphassajam sukham
stam vedayitam idam vuccati, bhikkhave, sukhindriyam.
Katamaca, bhikkhave, dukkhindriyam? Yam kho, bhikkhave, kyikam dukkham , kyikam
astam, kyasamphassajam dukkham astam vedayitam idam vuccati, bhikkhave, dukkhindriyam.
Katamaca, bhikkhave, somanassindriyam? Yam kho, bhikkhave, cetasikam sukham, cetasikam
stam, manosamphassajam sukham stam vedayitam idam vuccati, bhikkhave, somanassindriyam.
Katamaca, bhikkhave, domanassindriyam? Yam kho, bhikkhave, cetasikam dukkham, cetasikam
astam, manosamphassajam dukkham astam vedayitam idam vuccati, bhikkhave, domanassindriyam.
There is nothing mentioned in SN 36.6 Salla Sutta to indicate that the bodily feeling under discussion (i.e. kyikaca vedan)
extends beyond kyasamphassaj vedan. The context the discourse is to highlight that when a noble disciple experiences a
painful bodily feeling, etc., they dont experience any mental distress because of that. Aversion doesnt arise towards it. They
remain detached. The point is that although bodily pain and sickness are unavoidable, there need not be any mental suffering
because of it.
The following discourse where the Buddha visits a sick ward highlights how in this context a feeling of pain is dependent
upon the body, and how the discernment of conditionality leads to the abandoning of the underlying tendency. SN 36.7
Pat hamagelaa Sutta:
Tassa ce, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno evam satassa sampajnassa appamattassa tpino pahitattassa viharato uppajjati dukkh
vedan. So evam pajnti uppann kho myyam dukkh vedan. S ca kho paticca,
no appaticca.
Kim paticca?
Imameva

kyam paticca.
Ayam kho pana kyo anicco sakhato paticcasamuppanno.
Aniccam kho pana sakhatam

paticcasamuppannam
kyam paticca
uppann dukkh vedan kuto nicc bhavissatti! So kye ca dukkhya vedanya

aniccnupass viharati, vaynupass viharati, virgnupass viharati, nirodhnupass viharati, patinissaggnupass


viharati.

Tassa kye ca dukkhya ca vedanya aniccnupassino viharatope patinissaggnupassino


viharato, yo kye ca

dukkhya ca vedanya patighnusayo,


so pahyati.

A: The point of MN 137 Sal yatanavibhaga Sutta is to illustrate the gradual stepwise transcendence of somanassa,
domanassa, and upekkh. The end result of this stepwise transcendence is where the liberated mind has abandoned and
transcended all somanassa, domanassa, and upekkh through non-fashioning (atammayata).
Cetasika vedan (sukha, dukkha, or adukkhamasukha) is the vedan simpliciter born of manosamphassa. All other affective
defilements arising from the mind series proliferate from this. Theres no need to bring SN 36.6 into the analysis and assert
that the primary vedan born of manosamphassa is a newly created category of kyika vedan pertaining to the six
yatana-s when this isnt supported by the specific use of kyika and cetasika in the analysis of SN 48.38 nor the six types of
feeling stated in SN 22.56, etc.
Q: If you insist the 1st vedana that ensues from mind-contact based on recollection of previous acquisition to be cetasika
vedana, it directly violates the Salla Sutta's injunction against Ariyans experiencing cetasika vedana (based on the
kamagunas) or the anusayas.
A: Again, MN 137 illustrates the gradual stepwise transcendence of somanassa, domanassa, and upekkh. A noble disciple
abandons and transcends household somanassa in the process.
Q: By your argument, any form of vedana born of manosamphassa must be cetasika vedana would imply that arahants can
be touched by a cetasika vedana and will inexorably generate the corresponding anusayas.
A: The liberated mind has abandoned all deluded affective and cognitive defilements with regard to both kyika and cetasika
vedan. In terms of dependent arising, it isnt feeling thats the problem, its craving, which is rooted in ignorance. For
example, MN 38 and MN 148.
Q: Worse, cetasika vedanas WILL invariably trigger the anusayas (except in 3 cases outlined in MN 44).
A: Forgot to mention that the relevant section from MN 44 just highlights the three instances where pleasant feeling, painful
feeling, or neither-pleasant-nor-painful feeling can be engaged as part of the path without reinforcing the underlying
tendencies. Otherwise, in order to abandon the underlying tendencies one is to remain focused on the impermanence,

dissolution, dispassion, cessation, and relinquishment of all feelings (aniccnupass viharati, vaynupass viharati,
virgnupass viharati, nirodhnupass viharati, patinissaggnupass
viharati).

Q: Since you applied this restrictive definition of "kyasamphassaj" from SN 22.56 to SN 48.38, I think it would also be
legitimate to apply it to the Uppapatika Sutta in SN 48.40.
A: Once again you're overreaching. There is nothing stated in SN 48.40 or in my analysis of SN 48.38 which necessitates the
consequences that you wish to impose.
Q: I think it is not logical to assert that SN 36.6's analysis of kayika vedana is restricted to vedana arising from the contacttriad of body, body-consciousness and tactility. If you are correct, this must mean that the 2nd dart can never arise from eye-,
ear-, nose, or tongue-contact.
A: There is nothing in my analysis of SN 36.6 which necessitates the consequence that you wish to impose.
Q: I'm of the view that cetasika vedan is NOT the vedan simpliciter born of manosamphassa, but the complex range of
emotions that are felt on manosamphassa's 1st Dart. Based on my understanding of how SN 36.6 intersects with SN 48.36 40, cetasika vedan has to be more complex than vedan simpliciter. Cetasika vedan is marked with qualities such as
sorrow, lamentation, grieving, weeping, breast-beating. Essentially, that's domanassa, rather than the simple experience of
pleasant, painful or neutral.
A: You're certainly free to pursue any interpretive tangents that you wish. Nevertheless, cetasika vedan born of
manosamphassa is a necessary condition for the arising of sorrow, lamentation, grieving, weeping, or breast-beating.
Q: I know a lot of the modern readings of Jhana hinge on the suffusing of niramisa pitisukha through "this body" mentioned
in MN 119.18-21. The modern readings equate this "body" with the rupakaya.
A: Not only modern readings. The Vimuttimagga was written centuries before the Visuddhimagga. Ven. Upatissa, the
author of the Vimuttimagga, was knowledgeable of and quotes from the Uppat ipt ika Sutta, as well as the Dhammasagan i
and the Vibhaga of the Abidhamma Pit aka, and the early paracanonical Nettipakaran a and Pet akopadesa, etc. And when
commenting on the bathman simile for the first jhna he had no difficulty stating:
Just as the bath powder is moistened thoroughly and just as it, through adhering, does not scatter, so the yogin in the first
jhna is filled with pti from head to foot and from foot to skull, skin, and hair.
And:
[Q.] Pti and sukha are called formless phenomena. How then can they fill the body?
[A.] Nma depends on rpa. Rpa depends on nma. Therefore, if nma is full of pti, rpa is also full of pti. If nma is full
of sukha, rpa is also full of sukha.
And later in the same text:
When the yogin enters into concentration, he hears sounds, but he is not able to speak because the faculty of hearing and that
of speech are not united. To a man who enters form concentration, sound is disturbing. Hence the Buddha taught: To a man
who enters jhna, sound is a thorn.
Q: Well, I suppose I will have to invite you again to show how my reductio ad absurdum arguments are over-reaching.
A: Thanks, but at this point Ill decline. Ive already invested more time in this discussion than I ever intended. You are
certainly free to interpret the sutta-s according to your understanding of the Visuddhimagga, etc., but as I said previously, I
believe that my reading of the sutta material pertaining to this subject is at this point consistent and displays the internal
harmony and integral structure of the eightfold path as it was put together by the compilers of the sutta-s. In short, Ill stick
with the early Pl i sources and the Vimuttimagga.
Q: Perhaps you would care to explain how your reliance on SN 22.56's definition of "kyasamphassaj vedana" was not
intended to restrict SN 36.6's "kayika vedana"to the body that senses tactility.
A: It was but that doesn't entail the consequences that you seem to think it does.
Q: As for your reading of the Salla Sutta that cetasika vedana is the condition for sorrow, lamentation etc, why add that
interpretive overlay to the sutta's very simple proposition. Cetasika vedana IS sorrow, grieving, lamentation, breast beating
and distress, and NOT merely the condition for grieving etc.
A: If you think that sorrow (soka), grieving (parideva), etc., are not conditioned by cetasika dukkha, then thats fine by me.
Q: since you do not wish to engage further to explain away the absurd logical consequences of your SN 22.56 readings on
SN 48.40.
A: Just because you assert that a statement leads to absurd consequences doesn't make it so Sylvester. I've spent considerable
time showing the fallacious premises you've tried to establish in your previous failed attempts at reductio ad absurdum
argumentation. Moreover, repeated reliance on reductio ad absurdum argumentation doesn't further the conversation. In the
context of hermeneutics, repeatedly drawing on the most unlikely and therefore irrelevant extreme possible consequences of
a textual interpretation is nothing more than an attempt at misdirection.
Q: The problem is not with the Vimuttimagga, but the modern extrapolation that the eye, the nose, the ear, the tongue and the
tactility organ can form phassa/contact with a dhamma and thereby cognise pitisukha at the 5 indriyas. That's a clear
violation of MN 43.
A: This has all the makings of another pointless attempt at misdirection. Either you really don't understand the indriya-s,
yatana-s, and dhtu-s, or you're applying another idiosyncratic interpretation like your "kyika vedan pertaining to the six
yatana-s" to this as well.
Q: Forgive me for intruding and dragging this thread out, but can not the eye/ear/nose/tongue make contact with pitisukha
due to the fact that they are parts of the body which we have tactile/spatial consciousness of, though not in the sense that
they experience pitisukha in connection with their respective indriyas? If I'm missing something, let me know.
A: There's no need to establish that the eye, etc., makes contact with ptisukha per se. There is no such thing as contact
(phassa) without consciousness. And kyika sukha is certainly cognized by body consciousness.
Q: "SN 3.12 highlights what Ive been saying, i.e. what constitutes a string of sensuality for person A, may very well be
revolting to person B, and hence, not a string of sensuality for them at all. Its entirely subjective."

"What constitutes a kmagun a is subjective, based on the apperception of the observer."


I trust I have not misrepresented you on the above?
A: Neither of those statements entails an "idealist model."
Moreover, it has been shown that the discourses differentiate between the kmagun a-s and the four satipat t hna-s, and also
that kyasamphassa vedan is experienced in jhna. You have yet to cite one textual source which informs us that the body is
a kmagun a or that kyasamphassa vedan is not dependent on body phassa.
Q: I thought I'd always confined them to forms, sounds, smells, tastes and tactility.
A: What about the experience of breathing in and out (MN 10, kynupassan npnapabba, steps 1-3)? In the context of
kynupassan do you know of any textual sources which inform us that tactual sensation associated with the breath is a
kmagun a, or that a feeling of pleasure associated with the experience of breathing in and out when engaging in
kynupassan is carnal pleasure (smisa sukha)?
How about the nimitta-s of the stages of corpse decomposition (i.e. apperception of a skeleton, apperception of a worminfested corpse, apperception of a blue-black [corpse], apperception of a [corpse] full of holes, or apperception of a bloated
[corpse] DN 33)? In the context of kynupassan are the nimitta-s of these apperceptions kmagun a-s?
And what about the visible sphere consisting of the ridges & hollows, the river ravines, the tracts of stumps & thorns, the
craggy irregularities associated with the apperception of wilderness (MN 121)? Is the nimitta of the apperception of
wilderness a kmagun a? Is a feeling of pleasure associated with the apperception of wilderness carnal pleasure (smisa
sukha)?
Q: I'd rather not get entangled in the "Objective Idealism" versus "Subjective Idealism" debate, if you do not mind. When I
identify your model as being subjective idealism, it does not entail radical idealism
A: Subjective idealism isnt applicable either. But this is beyond the scope of the present discussion.
Q: Since I do not hold that kynupassan (as the 1st satipatthana) is done whilst in Jhana
A: Surely body contact can be present during the engagement in any of the four satipat t hna-s? And while engaging in the
satipat t hna-s there can be concomitant sukha. What about at the pre-jhna stage of sammsati, if when engaging in
kynupassan or the other three satipat t hna-s the five hindrances have been abandoned, but the five jhna factors arent
fully present? If one has developed renunciation and the hindrances have been abandoned is this concomitant pleasure still
smisa sukha?
Q: There is nothing in MN 10 to suggest that during kynupassan npnapabba there is niramisa piti or niramisa sukha.
A: There is nothing to suggest that there is smisa pti or sukha either. Its my understanding of MN 118 as well as the
Pat isambhidmagga npnassatikath that one doesnt necessarily need to enter jhna in order to practice
vedannupassan. For example, with regard to sukhapat isamved the npnassatikath states:
Pleasure (sukha): there are two kinds of pleasure: bodily pleasure and mental pleasure.
What is bodily pleasure?
Any bodily well-being, bodily pleasure, well-being and pleasure born of body contact, welcome satisfactory feeling born of
body contact, is bodily pleasure.
And so if one is practicing sukhapat isamved vedannupassan and has abandoned the five hindrances but has not entered
jhna, why would the presence of pti and sukha necessarily be smisa pti and sukha?
Q: why should the presence of samisa piti, samisa sukha in kynupassan be relevant or objectionable?
A: Well, as we have already seen, according to SN 47.6 one is instructed to not wander into the range of the kmagun a-s
(and by extension smisa sukha), but to instead remain in the proper range of the four satipat t hna-s:
Q: I am of the view that apperception of wilderness is nothing more than the 1st satipatthana.... So, the absence of niramisa
piti and niramisa sukha here will not conflict with the presence of samisa pitisukha in this sanna.
A: If smisa sukha is present is it accurate or advisable to suggest that the practitioners mind takes pleasure, finds
satisfaction, settles, & indulges in its perception of wilderness (araasaya cittam pakkhandati pasdati santit t hati
adhimuccati)? Especially in light of the above injunction from SN 47.6, and also MN 66 which informs us that any sukha
and somanassa that arises dependent upon the kmagun a-s is not to be cultivated or developed, rather it is to be feared:
Now, any pleasure & happiness that arises dependent on these five strings of sensuality is called sensual pleasure, a filthy
pleasure, a run-of-the-mill pleasure, an ignoble pleasure. And of this pleasure I say that it is not to be cultivated, not to be
developed, not to be pursued, that it is to be feared.
And also SN 35.115:
Now, there are forms cognizable via the eye agreeable, pleasing, charming, endearing, fostering desire, enticing. If a
monk does not relish them, welcome them, or remain fastened to them, he is said to be a monk freed from forms cognizable
by the eye. He has not gone over to Mara's camp; he has not come under Mara's power. The Evil One cannot do with him as
he wills.
Im wondering why you find in necessary to maintain that all visible forms, sounds, odors, flavors, and tactual objects are
kmagun a-s? Given that SN 3.12 tells us that:
Those same forms... sounds... odors... flavors... tactual objects that are agreeable to one person, great king, are disagreeable
to another.
Is there something intrinsic to all visible forms, sounds, odors, flavors, and tactual objects which binds the mind? In your
view, what is it about all visible forms, sounds, odors, flavors, and tactual objects that is agreeable, pleasing, charming,
endearing, fostering desire, enticing and therefore requires all of them to be kmagun a-s?
Q: Surely body contact can be present during the engagement in any of the four satipat t hna-s? And while engaging in the
satipat t hna-s there can be concomitant sukha. What about at the pre-jhna stage of sammsati, if when engaging in
kynupassan or the other three satipat t hna-s the five hindrances have been abandoned, but the five jhna factors arent
fully present? If one has developed renunciation and the hindrances have been abandoned is this concomitant pleasure still
smisa sukha?

A: Absolutely! I agree with almost everything you suggest here. But I have to be really cautious about inferring that the
sukha in upacara samadhi (hope you'll forgive the commentarial shortform) is niramisa sukha. Perhaps both niramisa and
samisa sukha are present on the cusp of Jhana. But I hesitate to promote this, lest I be accused of the poly-citta heresy.
Frankly, nothing will please me more to believe that niramisa sukha can be present in upacara samadhi. But I have to bear in
mind that the allowance in MN 44 for pleasure which does not trigger raganusaya extends only to Jhana. If niramisa sukha
does exist in upacara samadhi, MN 44 should extend the allowance to upacara samadhi. But it doesn't...
The same reservation extends to the sukhapat isamved vedannupassan in anapanasati.
Q: If smisa sukha is present is it accurate or advisable to suggest that the practitioners mind takes pleasure, finds
satisfaction, settles, & indulges in its perception of wilderness (araasaya cittam pakkhandati pasdati santit t hati
adhimuccati)? Especially in light of the above injunction from SN 47.6, and also MN 66 which informs us that any sukha
and somanassa that arises dependent upon the kmagun a-s is not to be cultivated or developed, rather it is to be feared:
A: This is a very good point. May I venture to explain that the Buddha's injunction was against sukha AND somanassa. It's
the same old kayika/cetasika vedana pair at work again. If pleasure derived from the kamagunas were to be faulted, it would
be quite inconsistent with SN 36.6 which clearly states Ariyans "too feel a pleasant/painful/neutral" feelings" without feeling
the 2nd Dart. There is nothing wrong with the kamagunas or the pleasure per se; the problem is kamacchanda - AKA the
intention for passion from AN 6.63. When the 2nd Dart arises, that's when the blame game begins.
May I trouble you for a favour? Is the "finds satisfaction" ( pasidati) mentioned in arannasanna above the same "satisfaction"
(pasada?) experienced by the Buddha in the 3 satipatthanas of MN 137? I'm lazy and a very, very slow Pali reader.
Q: Im wondering why you find in necessary to maintain that all visible forms, sounds, odors, flavors, and tactual objects are
kmagun a-s? Given that SN 3.12 tells us that:
Those same forms... sounds... odors... flavors... tactual objects that are agreeable to one person, great king, are disagreeable
to another.
Is there something intrinsic to all visible forms, sounds, odors, flavors, and tactual objects which binds the mind? In your
view, what is it about all visible forms, sounds, odors, flavors, and tactual objects that is agreeable, pleasing, charming,
endearing, fostering desire, enticing and therefore requires all of them to be kmagun a-s?
A: I think the answer is to be found in SN SN 35.115 which you cited.
Now, there are forms cognizable via the eye agreeable, pleasing, charming, endearing, fostering desire, enticing. If a
monk does not relish them, welcome them, or remain fastened to them, he is said to be a monk freed from forms cognizable
by the eye. He has not gone over to Mara's camp; he has not come under Mara's power. The Evil One cannot do with him as
he wills."
I can't help but notice that both conditional statements "If he relishes..." and "If he doesn't relish..." are appended to a
standard kamaguna stock formula.
As I've said before, I am of the view that kamagunas are affectively neutral. There is nothing inherent or intrinsic in a
kamaguna that makes it attractive, repulsive or neither. The movement of the mind to establish contact does not depend on
any quality inherent in form, sound, smell, taste, tactility or dhamma. That movement is very simply due solely to the
intention for passion from AN 6.63.
Q: Frankly, nothing will please me more to believe that niramisa sukha can be present in upacara samadhi. But I have to bear
in mind that the allowance in MN 44 for pleasure which does not trigger raganusaya extends only to Jhana. If niramisa sukha
does exist in upacara samadhi, MN 44 should extend the allowance to upacara samadhi. But it doesn't...
A: It seems that the DN 22/MN 10 commentaries which we looked at make for this allowance.
Q: If pleasure derived from the kamagunas were to be faulted, it would be quite inconsistent with SN 36.6 which clearly
states Ariyans "too feel a pleasant/painful/neutral" feelings" without feeling the 2nd Dart. There is nothing wrong with the
kamagunas or the pleasure per se; the problem is kamacchanda - AKA the intention for passion from AN 6.63. When the 2nd
Dart arises, that's when the blame game begins.
A: MN 66 tells us that any sukha and somanassa that arises dependent upon the kmagun a-s is a filthy pleasure, a run-ofthe-mill pleasure, an ignoble pleasure to be feared:
Now, any pleasure & happiness that arises dependent on these five strings of sensuality is called sensual pleasure, a filthy
pleasure, a run-of-the-mill pleasure, an ignoble pleasure. And of this pleasure I say that it is not to be cultivated, not to be
developed, not to be pursued, that it is to be feared.
Seems pretty clear to me. Of course we disagree on what kmagun a means, as well as kyika and cetasika, etc.
Q: Is the "finds satisfaction" ( pasidati) mentioned in arannasanna above the same "satisfaction" (pasada?) experienced by
the Buddha in the 3 satipatthanas of MN 137?
A: MN 137 uses the terms anattamana (not satisfied) and attamana (satisfied).
Q: As I've said before, I am of the view that kamagunas are affectively neutral.
A: And as Ive said before, Im of the view that sense objects are neutral, but kmagun a-s are any sense objects which one
considers to be agreeable, pleasing, charming, endearing, fostering desire, enticing. The inner felt-sense of nirmisa
ptisukha which arises in jhna is of a completely different kind. For one thing it doesnt arise in dependence upon external
sensory impingement.
Q: So, it should be apparent that how our differences on the little zeroth premises underlying our understanding of the Suttas
can lead to such wildly divergent models of Jhana.
A: Our models may not be that widely divergent. For example, I can interpret cognition in jhna in terms of manovin a
and thus avoid the sahajta citta-s issue. But I wouldn't go as far as to agree that Ajahn Brahm's demarcation for what
qualifies as jhna is the only correct jhna.
Q: And I seriously doubt if our short little engagement over the last 2 weeks is going to make the debate go away.
A: Indeed. It's a pretty old debate. It can be found in the Abhidharmakoabhsya, and as you know, was at some point
included in the Kathvatthu.

END OF MAIN DISCUSSION


Q (nugu): Lets start with the first word, rpasaa. On which sense base does it depend on, from which sense base does
it originate?
A: In the suttas such as DN22 it lists 6 types of saa: Rpasa, Saddasa, Gandhasa, Rasasa,
Phot t habbasa, Dhammasa.
Q: Why didn't the Buddha use Dhammasa then to avoid any other implication of the word?
A: Because we have suttas such as MN 102 to furnish the context of rpasa. Because using "dhammasa" in the Arupa
transition formula is totally inappropriate. The only 'place' where the perception of dhamma-s is completely transcended is
Nirodha sammapatti. "Infinite Space" (with the iti clitic) is a dhamma...
-What MN 102 suggests in its usage of rpasa and arpasa is that these terms are NOT functioning as a compound of
2 nouns, where rpa/arpa dhammas are the patient of sa, but as a compound of an adjective (denoted by the stems
rpa/arpa) and noun (sa). It does not mean "perception of immaterial things" but "immaterial perception".
If one is to insist that the cognition of sense objects/ km persists in a Jhana, then all of the Jhana's "vivicceva kamehi"
formula, plus suttas such as AN 10.72 (Thorns Sutta), will have to be rewritten. Alternatively, wherever km appears in the
Canon, they will have to be interpreted as sensual desire, instead of sense objects. I wonder what the First Sermon will look
like thereafter...
As for your point #3, standard Buddhist cosmology distinguishes the kmaloka from the rupaloka by the absence of the
km in the latter. Which sutta actually provides an episode where a Brahma used eyes and ears to phusati visual data and
sounds? It might be the AN episode concerning the return of Hatthaka Alavaka, but as I recall that sutta, the "gross rupa" that
'he' took was only after the Buddha suggested it. Even then, there is no indication in that sutta to suggest that that Brahma
did not communicate like Brahma Sahampati in the Invitation suttas, ie read the Buddha's mind.
PS - if you're thinking of MN 49, there's a problem reading that sutta literally, instead of being a metaphor...
Q (nugu): It would be misleading on Buddha's part to use perception based on visible form to designate perception of object
coming from the mind only.
A: You've not proven that "rpa" in "rpasaa" means "cakkhuvieya rpa", so how can you read the Buddha as intending
"perception based on visible form"? You still have not offered any rejoinder to how MN 102 furnishes the context in which
rpasaa and arpasaa are to be understood.
Geoff: Kama refers to those sense objects, from the five senses, that are enticing. The breath and one's own body is not.
To give up craving for sense objects is to give up the craving to see, to hear etc as well. This leads very well to internalising
one's focus away from the 5 sense bases. But of course, the mind sense is intact- hence the action of the hindrances and the
upakilesas (upakilesa sutta) remain. When even these are overcome we are heading into deep samadhi territory. The journey
is well explained in positive terms in the anapanasati sutta (ie in reference to the changes of the breath, the arising of
niramisa piti sukha and other changes to the mind). The upakilesa sutta mentions the light in some detail. That's how I see it,
based on the suttas cross referenced with personal experience.
Q Syl, A daverupa
Q: It's the same old "present tense" problem. What is indicated by the "sees" is given by the standard vipassana proxy
"samanupassati"; it does not mean eye-sight.
A: The Sutta I mentioned, however, did not say one sees with the eye. "I see what you're saying" <-- this is a similar use of
the word, yes? Nevertheless, the Sutta said that, in 1-4 jhana, whatever exists of material form was to be seen with wisdom.
Focusing on "see" is a red herring, because the point is that there is instruction on material form for rupa jhana, and not for
arupa jhana.
Q: Firstly, none of the present tense verbs in this passage can be read to necessarily infer contemporaneity with the "viharati"
verb that marked Jhana.
A: Viharati = enters and dwells in, or maybe abiding? Well, the word "therein" in the Sutta seems to claim what you are
denying. Whatever material form therein, not whatever material form afterwards.
Q: Secondly, three of the subsequent present tense verbs samanupassati, pat ivpeti and upasamharati all require vitakkavicara, which is certainly present in 1st Jhana, but absent in 2nd Jhana upwards. These verbs cannot be describing actions
that are happening whilst in the Jhana.
A: Require vitakka-vicara? Where is this stated elsewhere?
Q: So, no need to worry about MN 64 being inconsistent with the rest of the Canon. The inconsistency only appears when a
reader's English grammar is forced onto the Pali, and when one forgets that there is no anupassati without dhammavicaya.
A: The thing is, as far as I can tell it isn't inconsistent with the SuttaVinaya, but it is inconsistent with the Canon. That means
it's inconsistent with resources I don't consider valid, so no problem thus far...
Q (nugu): There can be temporary seeing without kma for a person who has suppressed kma.
A (Geoff): Yes, you are quite correct. AN 4.12 informs us that singleness of mind can be maintained and the five hindrances
suppressed while walking, standing, sitting, or reclining.
Q (daverupa): The Sutta I mentioned, however, did not say one sees with the eye. "I see what you're saying" <-- this is a
similar use of the word, yes? Nevertheless, the Sutta said that, in 1-4 jhana, whatever exists of material form was to be seen
with wisdom. Focusing on "see" is a red herring, because the point is that there is instruction on material form for rupa jhana,
and not for arupa jhana.
A: Ahh, I see where you're coming from. But what sort of "material" rupa is in 1st Jhana?
Firstly, let's acknowledge that the adjective "material" is not in the Pali. But we can definitely follow the Namarupa
definition (SN 12.2) and accept that "rupa" is the 4 dhatus and the "rupa" derived therefrom.
Would this be a worthwhile enquiry to find out what is actually meant by "rupa"? Does one take Hamilton's commentary that
it is which constitutes "appearance", while Nama is that which allows the observer to conceive/conceptualise that Rupa? Or
perhaps Ven Nanananda's commentary of Rupa as 'striking', in the context of patighasamphassa?

Bearing in mind that the dhatus are not little digitised atoms in the Western sense, but are merely designations for certain
qualities (solidity, fluidity, heat, motion), what exactly is a rupa?
Q: Viharati = enters and dwells in, or maybe abiding? Well, the word "therein" in the Sutta seems to claim what you are
denying. Whatever material form therein, not whatever material form afterwards.
A: The point I was trying to make was that "viharati" occurs in the sentence preceding what you quoted; that sentence with
"viharati" demarcates Jhana
Idhnanda, bhikkhu upadhivivek akusalnam dhammnam pahn sabbaso kyadutthullnam
patippassaddhiy
vivicceva

kmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkam savicram vivekajam ptisukham pathamam


jhnam upasampajja viharati.

So yadeva tattha hoti rpagatam vedangatam sagatam sakhragatam vin agatam te dhamme aniccato dukkhato
rogato gan d ato sallato aghato bdhato parato palokato suato anattato samanupassati. So tehi dhammehi cittam
pativpeti
...

The "therein"/"tattha"/"in that place" is certainly referring to the states in 1st Jhana (referred to in the sentence preceding the
vipassana sentence), but the issue was whether or not the "seeing" was taking place during Jhana, or post-Jhana.
Q: Require vitakka-vicara? Where is this stated elsewhere?
A: Actually, the sutta itself says so, if you read the Pali. Let's take the verb "upasamharati". What is the meditator doing ?
So tehi dhammehi cittam pativpetv
amatya dhtuy cittam upasamharati etam santam etam pan tam yadidam

sabbasakhrasamatho sabbpadhipatinissaggo
tan hkkhayo virgo nirodho nibbnanti.

The moment you see the clitic "ti", the passage is reporting a thought. Can one think without "vitakka-vicara"?
Q: what exactly is a rupa?
A (daverupa): I guess "material form" is in fact redundant, so that's fun. =)
I don't think it's precisely the -rupa of namarupa. It's alongside the other qualities directly according to the five aggregate
scheme, so I define it thusly as the form-aggregate. I then simply note that rupa and arupa jhana differ in this respect, and
conclude that the names of rupajhana and arupajhana are obviously referring to the presence, or absence, of the potential to
discern form in these states.
Perhaps jhana 1-4 offer concentration to such a degree that vinnana can remain exclusively defined according to the mental
sense base for the duration, but that's speculation on my part. In any event, the Sutta seems clear enough. (I would be
interested to see the Agama correlate to the Sutta in question.)
Syl Answer: I think MN 28 places the rupa khandha squarely within the Namarupa scheme. And more tellingly, it mentions
the internal and external constituents of the rupa khandha. Rupa khandha is not one's body, but simply one's experience of
internal and external dhatus.
As for "material form", BB explains he decided to change Ven Nanamoli's uniform rendition of rupa to "form", so as to be
able to distinguish between rupa as rupa khandha, and rupa as cakkhuvinneya rupa (visual data).
Q (daverupa): Perhaps jhana 1-4 offer concentration to such a degree that vinnana can remain exclusively defined
according to the mental sense base for the duration, but that's speculation on my part. In any event, the Sutta seems clear
enough.
A (Geoff): Mental consciousness (manovin a) can take the body sensory sphere as an object. Moreover, SN 47.6
Sakun agghi Sutta explicitly differentiates between the five strands of sensual pleasure (kmagun) and the four applications
of mindfulness (satipat t hn), and so neither the body nor the breath are strands of sensual pleasure. Thus, all of this is
really a moot point.
But if one really wants to split hairs, in commentarial terms the form portion of the "whole body" (sabbakya) experienced in
jhna is mind-produced form which pervades the physical body. The Dghanikyat k: Mind-produced form (cittajarpa)
suffuses every area where there is kamma-produced form (kammajarpa). Also see the Vimuttimagga:
Q: What if the original definition was "collection", aka flow? In this case "samadhi + sati + uppekha might be the definition
of a lucid flow-state called jhana. Would this make sense in the suttas?
A: (daverupa): Nope. Jhanas aren't "flow states" because flow states can involve focus on sensual pleasure. Jhana is never
like that.
Q2: As far as I know, fourth jhana is defined by the presence of the perfected sati and uppekha. I think we all agree on what
sati is, and there is no reason to assume that it can not be there during a state of Flow. So what about uppekha? What is, in
you definition, uppekha, and why can't it be there during Flow?
A2: You don't there from here; flow states aren't secluded from sensuality or secluded from unwholesome states, whereas
jhana necessarily is so secluded. Also, one can practice sati and uppekha without being in jhana, so it is unsurprising they
can be present in Flow states. In fact, flow states probably have a strong correlation to sampajaa, but they are definitely
not jhana.
Q3: How does on practice uppekha without jhana?
A3: It's one of the 40 meditation topics; metta, karuna, & mudita form the other three of the four immeasurables, and just as
mettabhavana, so too upekkhabhavana.
Q4: Could you please give your definition of sampajanna and why you think it correlates to flow?
A4: It's awareness, clear comprehension - what is sometimes incorrectly referred to as "mindfulness" in pulp self-help. It
seems maybe flow is a state too focused to really qualify as sampajanna, but since the flow state focus is quixotic and/or
sensual, I guess "flow state" doesn't really correlate perfectly with any Pali term. So it isn't really pertinent to practice at all,
in the end.

Q: Let me get this straight: you think that when Gautama moved through the levels of jhana he "sidesteped" fourth jhana and
entered another samadhi to access the "recall all my previous lives iddhi"?

A: I don't think one can decide to move from one Jhana to the next, not when one is abiding in a Jhana. I think suttas that
best exemplifies how one moves from one Jhana to another is probably the Pabbateyya Gavi Sutta, AN 9.35. The decision to
move from 1st Jhana to 2nd Jhana appears to be made outside of Jhana, which probably explains the Buddha's deathbed
attainments - He leaves an attainment before moving on to the next.
Q: Please explain to me what kind of rupa is transcended between 4th Jhana to reach base of infinite space?
I have provided sutta quotes to justify straitforward reading of the suttas and what they mean by rpa.
Sylvester: "DN 9 specifically says that in 1st Jhana, kmasa ceases"
And rpasa ceases after 4th Jhna, the Base of infinite space.
So there is the difference between "kma" and "rpa".
kma means = pleasure; lust; enjoyment; an object of sexual enjoyment.
Of course one has to secluded from these things for optimal meditation. Even an Arahant while 5 senses are functional, no
longer has kma.
A (Syl): I seriously doubt if we are going to be able to gap this, if you keep insisting on discussing "kma" when the Jhana
pericope addresses "km" instead. I don't see why you keep confusing the 2...
And going by your example of the Arahant bereft of kma, does this mean that the Arahant satisfies the 2 seclusion formula
24/7 and thereby abides constantly in pitisukha born of seclusion?
No, I do not agree that one has to be secluded from pleasure for optimal meditation. The Jhana-s are described to be
sambodhi sukha, besides the usual pitisukha predicate.
As for kma being an "object of sexual enjoyment", where is that to be found in the 4 Nikayas pls?
As for "rupa", how about the plain old canonical definition of the 4 dhatus and the rupa derived therefrom? Is there anything
inherent in this definition that entails phassa with sights, smells, sounds, tastes and tactility? You might like to consider sutta
#5 in the Brahma Samyutta, where the Buddha and His disciples maintained some sort of rupa based on the fire dhatu when
visiting an unnamed Brahma in 'his' world. Apparently, the Buddha's "fire element" rupa was perceptible to the Brahma as a
radiance; cakkhuvinneya or manovinneya, it does not say.
Q: "rupa based on the fire dhatu" and "radiance" are visible , they have shape and/or color. So this quote again reinforces
that Rpa is visible. Radiance as rpa, can only be seen.
A (Syl): Isn't this another case of petitio principii? You're presuming again the very thing that you're trying to prove, ie that a
radiant thing's visibility is due to it being a cakkhuvinneya rupa. Just because "passati" was used in the text to describe the
Brahma's seeing, says nothing, since passati is also used to denote mental cognition. Bear in mind that I said "some sort of
rupa", as the text itself does not use the word rupa.
Q: Rpa has these major contexts in the suttas:
1) As material form derived from the four great elements ex: rpa in nmarpa
Feeling, perception, volition, contact and attention these are called mentality. The four great elements and the material
form derived from the four great elements these are called materiality
"And why do you call it 'form'?(rpanti)[1] Because it is afflicted,[2] thus it is called 'form.' Afflicted with what? With cold
& heat & hunger & thirst, with the touch of flies, mosquitoes, wind, sun, & reptiles. Because it is afflicted, it is called form.
If rpa is some sort of mental only object with no physical base that can be seen, then how can it ever experience "touch of
flies, mosquitoes, wind, sun, & reptiles." It is clearly a 3-dimensional object that can be seen.
A (Syl): We are still discussing, I hope, rpasaa ? You're still assuming that this term means "perception of form", while
MN 102 suggests another meaning.
Let's do a little experiment to bring out the possibilities in rpasaa, based on the previous state transcended, ie kmasaa.
Is kmasaa only present when one contacts a kma? Doesn't the idea of a kma itself qualify as a dhamma that can give
rise to kmasaa on contact?
Equally, why must rpa be present in order for rpasaa to be present? As you said
Purely mental object is dhamma, not Rpa.
Dependent on the intellect & ideas there arises consciousness at the intellect.
Is not a thought of rpa that is cognised also going to give rise to "perception of form"?
Q: ksnacyatanam sampannassa rpasa niruddh hoti. Also dozens of suttas state that one overcomes
rpasanam, pat ighasanam, and nnattasanam when one enters Base of Infinite Space (ksnacyatanam).
A (Syl): I would suggest that if you were sincere about the discussion, don't just point out that there are these standard
pericopes on the Arupa transition formula and rpasanam, pat ighasanam, and nnattasanam. Let's discuss what
the suttas suggest the 3 terms rpa, pat igha and nnattasa mean, and a good start would be DN 15 which furnishes the
context for these 3 terms, especially since DN 15 has sections devoted to the stations of consciousness and the attainments.
Q: ANY seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching is cognized by the mind. But the mind operates through corresponding
sense door for corresponding cognition.
A (Syl): You may have overlooked the allowance in MN 43 for mind to experience vicariously the 5 senses, presumably by
mano contacting any of the Namakaya associated with sights, smells, sounds, tastes and touches.
Q: Because it is an object of the eye, Cakkhuca pat icca rpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvin am.
A (Syl): More petitio principii, when you've not established that the "rupa" in rupasanna refers to cakkhuvinneya rupa, rather
than MN 102's explanation. If you wish to assign that meaning to this polysemous word, pls work out your arguments,
instead of begging the question again and again, and running away from the semantics and nit-picking. It's because there's
not enough semantic exactness and nit-picking that the rupa component of Namarupa gets confused with cakkhuvinneya
rupa, which the vivicceva kamehi pericope clearly excludes.
I can think of no clearer exposition on the difference between rupa as a kma, and rupa in the Rupa Jhanas than SN 5.4
Rp sadd ras gandh,
photthabb
ca manoram;

Niyytaymi tuyheva,

mra nham tenatthik.


Imin ptikyena,
bhindanena pabhagun;
Attymi
harymi,

kmatan h samhat.
Ye ca rppag satt,
ye ca arpatthyino;

Y ca sant sampatti,
sabbattha vihato tamoti.
Q: I have yet to see any sutta where rpa is not an object of the mind. I've just looked at MN102 again, and there is nothing
there to contradict this.
There is this statement: Yadi rpasanam yadi arpasanam yadi ekattasanam yadi nnattasanam natthi kici'ti
kicayatanam eke abhivadanti appamn am nejam.
And I suggest that you look at the preceding passage, where its discusses perception which is form-ly or formless Tatra,
bhikkhave, ye te saman abrhman saim attnam paapenti arogam param maran , rpim v te bhonto
saman abrhman saim attnam paapenti arogam param maran , arpim v te bhonto saman abrhman saim
attnam paapenti arogam param maran , rpica arpica v ...
This passage furnishes the context for the interpretation of rpasaa and arpasaa. Rpim and arpim are adjectives,
which indicates that rpasaa is denoting a noun with a quality.
Q: What is "formly perception" ? Eye sees form, or at least it is a visual perception. Form or color is a visual data.
"perception of form" or "form-ly perception" seem to mean the same thing. Form is perceived. BTW, formly is not even a
proper word. Please don't invent new English words to twist the meaning of Buddha's words.
A: I think the neo-logism is justified as an abbreviation for "perception with reference to form". Given what MN 28 allows
in terms of the form aggregate and purely mental phassa, there is every reason to take rupasanna to simply mean "perception
with reference to form-world/form-jhana). This ties in neatly with the foil presented by MN 102's arupasanna.
Q: MN102 talks about conception of Self after death. If one is reborn in rpa loka, then one has rpa perception (unless one
is in asai state). If one is reborn in arpa plane, then one has only arpa perception (or base of neither perception nor nonperception). How difficult is this to understand?
A: Very easy to understand, if you note that MN 102 is using "rupim" and "arupim" as adjectives of the types of sanna in the
respective worlds.
Q: Jhana is absorption in the 6th sense, the mind. Nothing more, and certainly nothing less. The 5 senses are gone, all
thoughts are gone, the sense of time is gone and the will to influence the process is gone also.
A (Geoff): "Jhna" as it occurs in the suttas can refer to either (i) jhna which scrutinizes an object-support
(ramman panijjhna) or (ii) jhna which scrutinizes characteristics (lakkhan panijjhna). The former is also called
samatha jhna and the latter is also called vipassan jhna. Mahsi Saydaw, The Wheel of Dhamma: Jhna means closely
observing an object with fixed attention. Concentrated attention given to a selected object of meditation, such as breathing
for tranquility concentration, gives rise to samatha jhna, whereas noting the characteristic nature of mind and body and
contemplating on their impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and insubstantiality brings about vipassan jhna.
Jhna which scrutinizes characteristics (lakkhan panijjhna) occurs during any moment of the development of vipassan
(vipassanbhvan), as well as during any path or fruition attainment. As Saydaw U Pandita explains in In This Very Life:
The Vipassana Jhanas, vipassan jhna can occur with the jhna factors of each of the four jhnas, and therefore fulfill the
criteria of the standard jhna formula.
But even with regard to jhna which scrutinizes an object-support (ramman panijjhna), attending to a mental
representation (nimitta) in jhna doesn't require that all the five senses are totally shut down. There is a difference between
attending to a mental representation via mental consciousness, and the formless attainments wherein the mind is totally
isolated from the five sense faculties.
In commentarial terms, attending exclusively to a cognitive representation already occurs at the stage of access samdhi.
Thus, the engagement is exclusively that of the recognition of the counterpart representation via mental consciousness. The
difference between access samdhi and and the first jhna is the degree of stability of the jhna factors. The difference
between the first jhna and the formless attainments is indicated in both the Vimuttimagga and the Visuddhimagga when
they discuss the formless attainments and mention Al ra Klma not seeing or hearing the five-hundred carts passing by
when abiding in a formless attainment.
Sensual pleasures (km) are either objects or defilements which arise in dependence upon those objects. As Nettippakaran a
4.22 states:
The five strands of sensual pleasure are the proximate cause (padatthna)
of passion for sensual pleasure. The five faculties

with form are the proximate cause of passion for form. The sixth sense sphere is the proximate cause of passion for
existence.
Thus, if one is not attending to the five strands of sensual pleasure (kmagun ) there is no proximate cause for the
occurrence of passion for sensual pleasure (kmarga) with regard to any of those five strands of sensual pleasure. The five
faculties (eye-, ear, nose-, tongue-, and body-) don't serve as a proximate cause for the occurrence of sensual pleasure.
Moreover, the five faculties (pacindriyni) are not shut off in jhna, as they are the proximate cause for attachment to
rpvacara phenomena.
Q: Whatever any teacher says, contemplation can not be the development of concentration. I don't see how that is not
obvious. That doesn't mean contemplating is useless as a whole, but it is a formation of the hindrance of restlessness (or
possibly doubt) during concentration development.
A (Geoff): Contemplation (anupassan) leads to integral meditative composure (sammsamdhi). Contemplating one of the
four applications of mindfulness is the cause of integral meditative composure. MN 44 Culavedalla Sutta:

This relationship between the development of the four applications of mindfulness (catunna satipat t hn bhvan) and
integral meditative composure is also presented in SN 47.4 Sla Sutta:
The mental qualities of remaining ardent (tp) and fully aware (sampajna), which are standard in the descriptions of
integral mindfulness, are here directly related to remaining unified (ekodibht), with a limpid mind (vippasannacitt),
composed (samhit), with singleness of mind (ekaggacitt). This discourse also indicates the relationship between
mindfulness, contemplation, and meditative composure in order to know as they really are (yathbhta n ya) the body,
feelings, mind, and phenomena; fully understand (pariya) the body, feelings, mind, and phenomena; and remain detached
from (visamyutt) the body, feelings, mind, and phenomena.
Regarding the relationship between the applications of mindfulness and the jhna factors of the four jhnas, we find the
following instructions in AN 8.63 Sakhittadesita Sutta:
I will remain contemplating the body in the body... feelings in feelings... mind in mind... phenomena in phenomena, ardent,
fully aware, mindful, having removed covetousness and unhappiness with regard to the world. That, monk, is how you
should train.
When, monk, this meditative composure is developed in this way and made much of, you should develop this meditative
composure with directed thought and evaluation, you should develop it without directed thought but with mere evaluation,
you should develop it without directed thought and evaluation, you should develop it with joy, you should develop it without
joy, you should develop it with comfort, you should develop it with equanimity.
Q: The same goes for having more than one sense active. By the very definition of the word "one" , one pointed
concentration can not be involved with more than one of the 6 senses. Because the mind always backs up the other 5 senses
and those can not be noticed separately, the one sense to be concentrated on is the mind itself. Having 5 sense activity is the
first hindrance of sensual craving at work.
A (Geoff): AN 4.12 Sla Sutta informs us that singleness of mind can be maintained and the five hindrances abandoned in
any of the four postures (standing, walking, sitting, reclining). Moreover, the occurrence of light nimittas and other
rpvacara phenomena in jhna requires the activity of the corresponding sense faculties. This has already been indicated in
the quotation from Nettippakaran a 4.22.
Q (daverupa): Is it not the case that one can practice anapanasati within jhana? It simply seems to me that this is why, in the
anapanasati section of the Samyutta Nikaya the term appears there as both anapanasati and anapanasatisamadhi. This, paired
with the instruction about material form while in rupa jhana, makes simple and elegant sense to me.
A (Geoff): Indeed. The purpose of developing jhna is to refine sati and sampajna. This is clearly evident from the
Pet akopadesa's analysis and enumeration of the jhna factors of each of the four jhnas, which accords well with the suttas:
Q: I am familiar with this distinction from Mahasi-school teachers and the commentarial literature.
However, I'm a little hazy about references to the vipassana jhanas in the Suttas themselves. Are you able to point to some
examples?
A (Geoff): There is AN 4.41 Samdhibhvan Sutta, which instructs us on how to develop meditative composure which
leads to mindfulness and full awareness: And what, monks, is the development of meditative composure that, when developed
and cultivated, leads to mindfulness and full awareness? Here, monks, feelings are known to a monk as they arise, known as
they are present, known as they disappear. Recognitions are known to him as they arise, known as they are present, known as
they disappear. Thoughts are known to him as they arise, known as they are present, known as they disappear. This, monks,
is the development of meditative composure that, when developed and cultivated, leads to mindfulness and full awareness.
-Note how the phrase "known to him as they arise, known as they are present, known as they disappear" also occurs in MN
111 Anupada Sutta which describes the clear seeing of phenomena one by one as they occur (anupadadhammavipassan):
-Now Sriputtas clear seeing of phenomena one by one as they occurred was this:
-Whatever phenomena there are in the first jhna: directed thought, evaluation, joy, pleasure, singleness of mind, contact,
feeling, recognition, intention, mind, desire, decision, energy, mindfulness, equanimity, and attention; he analyzed these
phenomena one by one as they occurred. Known to him they arose, known they were present, known they disappeared.
Also, the jhna factors of the four jhnas are embedded within the seven factors of awakening. The seven factors of
awakening are one of the most commonly found developmental models in the Pli dhamma. SN 46.71 Anicca Sutta informs
us that sustained, dedicated practice of the recognition of impermanence will create the optimal conditions for the arising of
all seven factors of awakening. SN 46.71 Anicca Sutta
-The same is then said in SN 46.72 for the recognition of unsatisfactoriness in what is impermanent, and in SN 46.73 for the
recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory. All of these passages offer ample canonical support for Saydaw U
Pandita's teaching of vipassan jhna occurring with the jhna factors of each of the four jhnas, and therefore fulfilling the
criteria of the standard jhna formula.
AA: Which probably explains why AN 5.28 leaves the 5th factor of Samma Samadhi unnamed. The Buddha probably
foresaw the sticks-&-stones that would fly when trying to name such a variably different experience!
AA (rupa): MN 36 and MN 22 aren't in conflict; the problem is thinking that the four jhanas of Buddhism are at all related
to jhanas as understood and practiced prior to the Buddha and, mostly, since. I'm not so sure this has ever adequately been
shown - the later texts make this connection explicit, such that we speak of eight or nine jhanas in a sequence, but this is
definitely later thinking on the matter.
It appears that the Buddha trained under those two teachers and then, afterwards, recollected the rose-apple tree experience he did not recollect teachings, and he did not recollect either teacher, in connection with this discovery and followup
It seems to me that this idea about the connection between jhana and formless attainments is taking it as a given, however.
Rather, suppose that those with formless attainment abilities could do jhana as well as those without such abilities, and this
distinction was noted but not really given soteriological importance. They aren't an alternative route, and they aren't even
properly supplementary. They are other, but necessary, in a way that the formless stuff is not.
Q: You mean the Buddha used terminology in a way that was un-related to the common understanding of that terminology at
that time and that the Buddha's way of using that terminology never really took root?

A (rupa): I simply consider that most early arahants et al were brahmins first, and their prevailing bhavana modalities were
bound to find a place. They seem to have done so in a rather complex, and perhaps not altogether accommodating, way.
I think we can say that the brahmin cosmology was adopted to varying degrees, and the relationships between realms and
meditation states made a formless presence somewhat obligatory. Jhana is subtle, and easily lost in such flurry, I expect,
especially as the Sangha strove to maintain an institutional presence post-Buddha.
Narratives I'm familiar with all mention the jhana platform discovered during the Bodhisatta's youth, and the lack of any
such jhana platform being based on his later teachers further suggests that the suttas in fact do support the idea that
sammasamadhi was not around prior to the Buddha's dispensation.
There were probably quite a few ways to jhayati back in the day, just as there are now, but only one set of jhana is
sammasamadhi.
-Indeed, if you're referring to a sign of light (obhsanimitta) and a sign of form (rpanimitta) mentioned in MN 128
Upakkilesa Sutta. Some contemporary teachers and commentators have suggested that the sign of light (obhsanimitta)
and/or the sign of form (rpanimitta) mentioned in MN 128 Upakkilesa Sutta are canonical references to what later came to
be designated as the counterpart sign (pat ibhganimitta) in the commentaries, and thus establishes that these nimittas were
considered an essential aspect of the development of jhna even in the early tradition.
-There are a couple of points worth mentioning in this regard. Firstly, MN 128 is the only discourse where the term nimitta is
used in this context. None of the other canonical occurrences of nimitta as either samdhinimitta, samatha nimitta, or
cittanimitta refer to any of these nimittas being an obhsanimitta or rpanimitta as explained in the Upakkilesa Sutta.
-Secondly, nowhere in the Upakkilesa Sutta does it state that either the obhsanimitta or the rpanimitta are essential
prerequisites for attaining the first jhna. Nor does this sutta maintain that the complete elimination of any experience of the
five sensory spheres is essential for the arising of either of these two cognitive signs. Therefore, while these apperceptions of
light and visions of form can occur during the course of meditational development, there is no explicit statement here, or
elsewhere in the suttas, that such apperceptions must arise for one to enter jhna. Indeed, even the commentarial tradition
doesnt maintain that either of these types of nimittas are essential for the first jhna.
-For example, the Vimuttimagga takes the instructions offered in the Upakkilesa Sutta to refer to the development of the
divine eye. This is understandable, as Anuruddh, the main interlocutor in this discourse with the Buddha, was later
designated as the foremost disciple endowed with the divine eye.
-And not even the Visuddhimagga limits counterpart signs to apperceptions of light or forms. According to the
Visuddhimagga analysis, of the thirty meditations which lead to jhna, twenty-two have counterpart signs as object. And of
these, only nineteen require any sort of counterpart sign which is apprehended based solely on sight, and can therefore give
rise to a mental image resulting from that nimitta (the ten stages of corpse decomposition and nine kasin as, excluding the air
kasin a which can be apprehended by way of either sight or tactile sensation).
-And so taking all of the above into consideration, according to the early Pl i dhamma there is no need to establish a jhna
nimitta (or samathanimitta or cittanimitta) apart from the jhna factors. And even according to the Vimuttimagga and
Visuddhimagga where the presentation of the method using a counterpart sign is explicitly developed there is no
suggestion that a counterpart sign necessarily must be a sign of light (obhsanimitta) and/or a sign of form (rpanimitta).
Indeed, according to the Vimuttimagga, when employing mindfulness of breathing in order to attain jhna, the counterpart
sign should be concomitant with the pleasant feeling which arises as one attends to the breath at the nostril area or the area of
the upper lip, which is likened to the pleasant feeling produced by a breeze. The text says that this counterpart sign doesnt
depend on color or form, and any adventitious mental images which arise in the course of practice should not be attended to.
-Piya Tan's survey of MN 111 fails to take into account the wording of the entire sutta. MN 111 informs us that all the mental
factors of the first jhna (the dhamma-s of vitakka, vicra, pti, sukha, cittekaggat, phassa, vedan, sa, cetan, vriya,
sati, manasikra, etc.) are working together in complete harmony. Moreover each can be individuated and clearly seen via
vipassan as it persists. The same is true when correctly engaging in the remaining three jhna-s and first three formless
attainments.
-MN 111 informs us that the two exceptions to this are the meditative attainment of the sphere of neither-apperception-nornonapperception and the attainment of the cessation of apperception and feeling. In both of these cases one must emerge
from that attainment before applying insight to the past mental factors which were present therein. This is because
apperception (sa) isn't sufficiently functional while abiding in either of these two attainments for vipassan to occur.
-Moreover, not only does MN 111 describe vipassan occurring within jhna, so does the earliest strata of abhidhamma texts.
For example, the Dhammasagan states that vipassan occurs at the time of abiding in jhna. And the Pat isambhidmagga
npnassatikath states that the coupling of samatha and vipassan while one is correctly abiding in jhna is the proper
training of heightened mind (adhicittasikkh).
Q: . It's directly pertinent to the issue of whether satipatthana is possible within Jhanas.
A: The earliest detailed word commentary on the standard jhna formula is found in Pet akopadesa 7.72. It clearly defines
vitakka and vicra:
-Here, for fulfilling non-passion he thinks the thought of renunciation. Here, for fulfilling non-aggression he thinks the
thought of non-aversion. Here, for fulfilling non-delusion he thinks the thought of harmlessness.
-Here, for fulfilling non-passion he is secluded from sensual pleasures. Here, for fulfilling non-aggression and fulfilling nondelusion he is secluded from unskillful phenomena. And so he enters and remains in the first jhna, which includes directed
thought and evaluation, as well as joy and pleasure born of seclusion.
-Directed thought: There are three kinds of directed thought, namely the thought of renunciation, the thought of nonaversion, and the thought of harmlessness.
-Here, directed thought is the first instance while evaluation is the evaluation of what is thereby received. Just as when a
man sees someone approaching in the distance he does not yet know whether it is a woman or a man, but when he has
received [the apperception] that it is a woman or it is a man or that it is of such color or that it is one of such
shape, then when he has thought this he further scrutinizes, How then, is he ethical or unethical, rich or poor? This is

examination. With directed thought he fixes. With examination he moves about and turns over [what has been thought].
-And just as a winged bird first accumulates [speed] and then accumulates no more [speed when gliding], so too, directed
thought is like the accumulation, and evaluation is like the outstretched wings which keeps preserving the directed thought
and evaluation....
-Directed thought is like a text-reciter who does his recitation silently. Evaluation is like him simply contemplating it.
-This word commentary accords with MN 78 Saman amun d ika Sutta, which tells us that skillful resolves (kusal sa kapp)
consisting of the resolve of renunciation (nekkhamma- sakappa), the resolve of non-aversion (abypdasa kappa), and the
resolve of harmlessness (avihimssakappa) dont cease until the second jhna. This provides some context as to the
meaning and significance of directed thought and evaluation in the standard jhna formula:
-And what are skillful resolves? Being resolved on renunciation, on non-aversion, on harmlessness. These are called skillful
resolves. What is the cause of skillful resolves? Their cause, too, has been stated, and they are said to be apperceptioncaused. Which apperception? for apperception has many modes and permutations. Any renunciation-apperception, nonaversion-apperception or harmlessness-apperception: That is the cause of skillful resolves.
-Now where do skillful resolves cease without trace? Their stopping, too, has been stated: There is the case where a monk,
with the stilling of directed thought and evaluation, enters and remains in the second jhna, which has internal sereneclarity and unification of mind free from thought and evaluation, and has joy and pleasure born of concentration. This is
where skillful resolves cease without trace.
Q: I would suggest that the Abhidhammic notion of insight within Jhana is an outcome of its resort to the lokuttara jhana
concept.
A: The Dhammasagan states that vipassan is present in rpvacarajjhna as well as lokuttarajjhna. Moreover, the
Sarvstivda *Mahvibhs (Apidamo dapiposha lun), the Abhidharmakoabhs ya, the *Mahprajpramitopadea (Dazhi
du lun), the *Prakaran ryavcastra (Xianyang shengjiao lun), and the Yogcrabhmistra all maintain that vipassan
should be developed within jhna, just like the Pl i Abhidhammapit aka.
Q: The Petakopadesa treatment of vitakka and vicara does not tally with how MN 117 treats the synonyms for vitakkavicara.
A: Of course it does. Pls read the relevant section carefully. It employs the same mundane/supramundane analysis found in
the Abhidhammapit aka.
Q: Could you share your thoughts pls as to why the particular verb tenses used in MN 111 necessitate contemporaneity of
the 2 verbs?
A: Reading the entire sutta in context we find that it explicitly states that one must emerge from the sphere of neither
perception nor non-perception in order to employ insight regarding that attainment:
Furthermore, with the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, Sariputta entered & remained in the
dimension of neither perception nor non-perception. He emerged mindfully from that attainment. On emerging mindfully
from that attainment, he regarded the past qualities that had ceased & changed: 'So this is how these qualities, not having
been, come into play. Having been, they vanish.'
-This qualification is neither stated nor implied with regard to the seven previous perception attainments (i.e. the four jhnas
and the first three formless attainments). Ven. T hnissaro comments on this section of the sutta as follows: Notice that, with
each of the previous levels of attainment, Sariputta was able to ferret out the various mental qualities arising there while he
was still in the attainment. With this attainment and the following one, however, he was not able to analyze the mental
qualities present and absent there until after he had left the attainment. The difference here is related to the point made in
AN IX.36 that all the attainments up through the dimension of nothingness are "perception-attainments." And that, "As far as
the perception-attainments go, that is as far as gnosis-penetration goes. As for these two dimensions the attainment of the
dimension of neither perception nor non-perception & the attainment of the cessation of feeling & perception I tell you
that they are to be rightly explained by those monks who are meditators, skilled in attaining, skilled in attaining & emerging,
who have attained & emerged in dependence on them."
-This understanding also accords with the pan-Buddhist abhidharma interpretation that vipassan can and should function in
all seven perception attainments, but cannot function in the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception or the attainment
of the cessation of perception and feeling.
Q: Could you perhaps furnish the Dhammasangani passage which mentions vipassana within lokiya jhana?
A: We have to fill in the appropriate ellipses (here provided by U Kyaw Khine). Dhammasa gan Cittuppdakan d a (CSCD
edition):
Rpvacarakusala
Catukkanayo
160. Katame dhamm kusal? Yasmim samaye rppapattiy maggam bhveti vivicceva kmehi vivicca akusalehi
dhammehi savitakkam savicram vivekajam ptisukham pat hamam jhnam [pat hamajjhnam (s.)] upasampajja viharati
pathavkasin am, tasmim samaye phasso hoti pe [complete this ellipse with the remainder of paragraph 1] avikkhepo
hoti pe [complete this ellipse with the remainder of paragraphs 2 to 145] ime dhamm kusal.
-The second ellipse includes paragraph 55:
55. Katam tasmim samaye vipassan hoti? Y tasmim samaye pa pajnan vicayo pavicayo dhammavicayo sallakkhan
upalakkhan paccupalakkhan pan d iccam kosallam nepuam vebhaby cint upaparikkh bhr medh parin yik
vipassan sampajaam patodo pa paindriyam pabalam pasattham papsdo paloko paobhso
papajjoto paratanam amoho dhammavicayo sammdit t hi ayam tasmim samaye vipassan hoti.
Q: Pls elaborate on the Petakopadesa and why you believe it is consistent with MN 117.
A: MN 117: And what is the right resolve that has effluents, sides with merit, & results in acquisitions? Being resolved on
renunciation, on freedom from ill will, on harmlessness. This is the right resolve that has effluents, sides with merit, &
results in acquisitions.

-This passage includes what is classified as rpvacarajjhna in the Abhidhammapit aka. A number of academics and
translators have noted that MN 117 has bhidhammika type additions not found in the gama version of this discourse.
-However, the Pet akopadesa is actually closer to the treatment of the four jhnas found throughout the suttas than what is
found in MN 117 or the Pl i Abhidhammapit aka.
-Moreover, the Pet akopadesa word commentary on the jhna factors of all four jhnas is in close agreement with not only
the Pl i suttas, but also the main non-Pl i Abhidharma texts, i.e. the Sarvstivda *Mahvibhs (Apidamo dapiposha lun),
the Abhidharmakoabhs ya, the *Mahprajpramitopadea (Dazhi du lun), the *Prakaran ryavcastra (Xianyang
shengjiao lun), and the Yogcrabhmistra. Thus, parts of the Pet akopadesa may preserve very early, possibly even presectarian commentarial material.
Q: Are we supposed to pluck out everything in paras 2 onwards pertaining to the kamavaracarakusala arupi dhammas and
export them wholesale to the rupavacarakusala lists?
A: Yes
Q: The same peyyala instruction is also given in the arupavacarakusala dhammas and it should be very clear that stuff such
as piti, sukha, vitakka, vicara etc etc from the kamavacarakusala list has no place in the rupa (at least beyond the 1st and 2nd
Jhanas for the examples cited) list, much less the arupa list.
A: Omissions are made of paragraphs no longer relevant to the higher jhnas. The formless attainments retain the same
paragraphs as those pertaining to the fourth jhna, with further omissions appropriate to the fourth formless attainment.
Q: I think I see where the problem is with our discussion of the Petakopadesa. You've offered an English translation of that
text, where vitakka and vicara are rendered "directed thought" and "evaluation" respectively, with the corresponding
denominative verb being rendered "thinks". I'm not accusing you of sleight of hand, but don't you think that reliance on this
particular English translation is simply begging the question in the issue "What does vitakka-vicara mean?"
A: No. Survey the appropriate passages from the Suttapit aka and Abhidhammapit aka, as well as the context of that section
of the Pet akopadesa. Then survey the appropriate passages from non-Pl i Abhidharma sources. Then you may have
consulted enough source materials to offer an informed opinion. Lance Cousins, who has done such a survey, has given the
following translations for the two registers of vitakka and vicra in the Dhammasa gan :
vitakka: 1. takka 2. vitakka 3. sakappa 4. appan 5. byappan 6. cetaso abhiniropan 7. sammsa kappa
1. speculation 2. thought 3. thought formation 4. fixing 5. firm fixing 6. applying the mind 7. right thought formation.
vicra: 1. cra 2. vicra 3. anuvicra 4. upavicra 5. cittassa anusandhnat 6. anupekkhanat
1. wandering 2. wandering about 3. repeated wandering about 4. frequenting 5. explorativeness of mind 6. constant
examination.
Q: Since you've mentioned that MN 117 looks "Abhidhammic", what do you think about Mrs Rhys Davids's suspicions
about the status of MN 111 as not originating from the Buddha's time?
A: I think that there are probably many suttas which don't originate from the Buddha's time. There is no way of ever arriving
at "original Buddhism," and even the notion of "early Buddhism" relies much more on the Abhidhamma and commentaries
than some proponents of the "early Buddhism" idea are willing to acknowledge.
Q: While I share part of your belief about the role of sanna in the preceding 7 attainments, I do not take the view that there is
a necessary temporal conjunction between the sanna refrain and the vipassana refrain.
A: Every significant Abhidhamma/Abhidharma treatise that I've consulted, except the Visuddhimagga, mentions
vipassan/vipayan as a mental factor employed in the four jhnas/dhynas. Most explicitly state that the four
jhnas/dhynas are the optimal samdhis for the development of supramundane vipassan/vipayan. All of these treatises
are basing this understanding on the same Nikya/gama source materials.
Q: Your quote above posits an absolute ontological statement
A: My quote doesn't posit anything of the sort. The Dhammasagan Cittuppdakan d a offers lists of phenomena present
(meaning mental factors concomitantly engaged) in a skillful, unskillful, etc, cognition. Thus, it's concern is
phenomenological. The section on Rpvacarakusala lists the mental factors engaged in an optimally skillful
rpvacarajjhnacitta. This list includes sammdit t hi, sammsati, sampajaa, samatha, and vipassan. Taking the
canonical Pl i treatises into consideration, as well as the numerous major non-Pl i Abhidharma treatises, there is nothing
whatsoever unusual about the inclusion of vipassan here. In all of our discussions you have yet to offer any canonical
support for the premise that vipassan cannot be engaged while abiding in jhna.
Q: You may wish to gloss over the peyyala series as "phenomenological", but the Dhammasangani itself is couched in very
unmistakable "conditionality" form that it should be obvious that "existence" was not being discussed but
pat iccasamuppann
A: Paragraph 1 of the Dhammasagan Cittuppdakan d a is a list of numerous phenomena that arise concomitantly on a
specific occasion, which are then defined in paragraphs 2 to 57. Paragraph 1 includes the arising of both samatha and
vipassan, specifically, at that time. These are then defined in paragraphs 54 and 55:
-What at that time is samatha? That which at that time is stability of mind, steadfastness of mind, thorough steadfastness of
mind, unshakableness, non-distraction, imperturbability, calmness of mind, faculty of concentration, strength of
concentration, right concentration. This at that time is samatha.
-What at that time is vipassan? That which at that time is discernment (pa), thorough understanding, investigation,
comprehensive investigation, investigation of phenomena, consideration, discrimination, direct discrimination, erudite
intelligence, proficiency, refined intelligence, discriminative examination.... This at that time is vipassan.
-Are you seriously suggesting that this passage be interpreted to preclude the concomitant occurrence of samatha and
vipassan?
Q: This probably accounts for why it is not meaningful to interpret the Padabhjan list as a catalogue of each dhamma to be
found in common in every citta. The qualifier "tasmim samaye"/"on that accassion" should be a clear signal that these 56

"factors" in the Padabhjan were not intended to list what is common to each and every citta. Were that to be the case, I'm
sure the Abhidhamma would have listed 56 universals, instead of just 7.
A: Another non-starter. These 56 factors are not "common to each and every citta." They are common to skillful kmvacara
cittas accompanied by somanassasa and associated with n a and skillful rpvacarajjhna cittas. (There are altogether eight
categories of skillful kmvacara cittas. The section in question only pertains to the first.)
Q: Of course samatha and vipassana can arise concurrently in the Dhammasangani schema, based on a casual reading of the
English translation.
A: This has nothing to with "a casual reading of the English translation." This is a specific enumeration of dhammas which
occur concomitantly on a specific occasion, and which are all dependently arisen according to these appropriate conditions.
Q: Where in the Dhammasangani does it state that these dhammas occur concomitantly? Instead of the locative absolute
which permits of 2 temporal possibilities, the redactors could have easily used the missakiriya to expressly exclude temporal
disjunction, so that there is no doubt that contemporaneity was intended.
A: All of the dhammas in any specific category of citta occur "at that time." The context excludes any other interpretation of
the grammar employed, just as in MN 111 the context excludes your forced grammatical interpretation. In the case of MN
111 the grammar reflects the speaker (the Buddha) narrating events which have already transpired. The context also makes it
clear that Ven. Sriputta knew those various dhammas as they occurred within jhna while in the first seven abidings.
Q: I notice that you have also elected to remain silent on Ven Analayo's absorption model which agrees with the Brahm
model.
A: There is a major difference between Ven. Analayo's understanding of sammsamdhi and that of Ven. Brahmavamso and
Ven. Sujato. In keeping with the Pat isambhidmagga, Ven. Analayo understands that one doesn't have to have mastery of
any model of absorption prior to entering the first noble path.
Q: Your claim that the entire commentarial community is pro-discursive jhana, save for Ajahns Brahm and Sujato, is a wild
exaggeration in an attempt to appeal to authority.
A: I never claimed anything of the sort. I said that in the greater pan-Buddhist history of exegesis it is widely (probably
universally) accepted that jhna and vipassan are not incompatible, and that the optimal development of vipassan is
understood to occur within the four jhnas. It is only among people who have either been largely influenced by the
Visuddhimagga or someone like Ven. Brahmavamso that jhna and vipassan are considered incompatible. I haven't seen any
historical evidence of this view outside of the classical Sinhalese Theravda sub-school.
I would encourage you to do your own leg work. But I'll offer a few passages from major Abhidharma texts. The
Sarvstivda *Mahvibhs (Apidamo dapiposha lun):
In the four dhynas, amatha and vipayan are equal in strength, and thus they are named a pleasant dwelling.
The Abhidharmakoabhs ya:
Samdhi is in fact excellent: it is a dhyna filled with "parts," which goes by the means of the yoke of amatha and
vipayan [that is to say, in which amatha and vipayan are in equilibrium], that is termed in the Stra "happiness in this
world" and "the easy path," the path by which one knows better and easily.
The Yogcrabhmistra:
Furthermore, only by depending on the dhynas and the access concentration preceding the first dhyna, the incompletely
attained concentration, can one make the [initial] breakthrough to the noble truths. The formless attainments are
inadequate. What is the reason? In the state of the formless attainments, the path of amatha is superior, whereas the path of
vipayan is inferior. The inferior path of vipayan is incapable of attaining the [initial] breakthrough to the noble truths.
-The *Tattvasiddhistra (Chengshih lun), the *Prakaran ryavcastra (Xianyang shengjiao lun), and the
*Mahprajpramitopadea (Dazhi du lun) make similar statements to these.
Q: Your Proposition - Vipassana is invariably present in every rupavacara citta
A: The discussion at hand is whether or not vipassan can occur within the four jhnas. I have provided canonical support
which states that it can. If one wants to choose to allow for the Dhammasa gan to also include the four jhnas without n a
that's fine by me. But it's quite irrelevant to the discussion of whether or not vipassan can occur within jhna.
Q: I suppose the redactors of the Dhammasangani will have to be faulted for allowing your perverse interpretation of the 56
dhamma as being invariably concommitant in every kamavacara and rupavacara citta.
A: As I've already said: These 56 factors are not "common to each and every citta." They are common to skillful kmvacara
cittas accompanied by somanassasa and associated with n a and skillful rpvacarajjhna cittas. (There are altogether
eight categories of skillful kmvacara cittas. The section in question only pertains to the first.)
It should be obvious to anyone who isn't motivated by an infatuation for pointless debate that my inclusion of
rpvacarajjhna cittas in the above statement was in reference to the first jhna. And the part in brackets was in reference to
the eight categories of skillful kmvacara cittas. The second category begins at paragraph 146. U Kyaw Khine's text
includes all of the emendations for which paragraphs should be omitted in reference to these remaining seven categories.
Q: So, does this mean that you concede that the Dhammasangani per se is unable to substantiate your proposition that
vipassana occurs in 2nd Jhana upwards?
A: This enterprise of yours is an exercise in pointless argumentation. The statement: My inclusion of rpvacarajjhna cittas
in the above statement was in reference to the first jhna, was in reference to the prior statement: These 56 factors are not
"common to each and every citta." They are common to skillful kmvacara cittas accompanied by somanassasa and
associated with n a and skillful rpvacarajjhna cittas. Thus it should be quite obvious that the 56 factor enumeration
pertains to the first jhna, and the appropriate emendations are made to the enumeration of the higher jhnas where vitakka,
etc. are not present. None of these statements imply that J2 to J4 are devoid of vipassan.

Q: I still cannot understand why you cannot bring yourself to address Ven Nyanaponika's point about vipassana being a
"potentiality", when the locative absolute construction of all Dependant Origination relations allow for "that" "hoti" to be in
the future.
A: The enumeration of 56 factors are fully present and engaged in skillful kmvacara cittas accompanied by somanassasa
and associated with n a and skillful first rpvacarajjhna cittas. They aren't merely "potentialities." Likewise, with the
omission of vitakka and vicra, the remaining factors are fully present and engaged in skillful second rpvacarajjhna cittas,
and so on.
Q: The textbook grammatical form of the events described by the 2 clusters of verbs in MN 111 are clearly pointing to the
"pajanati" being temporally disjunct from and subsequent to the 7 attainments itself.
A: The passage from MN 111 which is of import is the following:
tyssa dhamm anupadavavatthit honti; tyssa dhamm vidit uppajjanti, vidit upatthahanti,
vidit abbhattham

gacchanti.
these phenomena were defined by him one by one as they occurred; known to him these phenomena arose, known they were
present, known they disappeared.
-Here in the first seven attainments these phenomena are differentiated and known as they occur. But when we get to the
final two attainments the above passage is replaced by the following:
so tya sampattiy sato vutthahati.
so tya sampattiy sato vutthahitv
ye dhamm att niruddh viparin at te dhamme

samanupassati 'evam kirame dhamm ahutv sambhonti, hutv pativent'ti

-He emerged mindful from that attainment. Having done so, he contemplated the phenomena that had passed, ceased and
changed, thus: 'So indeed, these phenomena, not having been, come into being; having been they vanished.'
-In the final two attainments phenomena weren't differentiated and known as they occurred because apperception wasn't
sufficiently engaged.
A: These 56 factors are not "common to each and every citta." They are common to skillful kmvacara cittas accompanied
by somanassasa and associated with n a and skillful rpvacarajjhna cittas. (There are altogether eight categories of
skillful kmvacara cittas. The section in question only pertains to the first.)
Q: I suppose we just disagree of whether the vipassana refrain starts with the "pajanati" series or with the "vavatthita" series.
A: The phrase anupadadhammavipassanya hoti (vipassan of phenomena one by one as they occurred) which is found at
the start of the sutta, connects vipassan with the passage common to the first seven attainments: tyssa dhamm
anupadavavatthit honti; tyssa dhamm vidit uppajjanti, vidit upat t hahanti, vidit abbhattham gacchanti.
these phenomena were defined by him one by one as they occurred; known to him these phenomena arose, known they were
present, known they disappeared.
Therefore this passage pertains to vipassan.
Q: I've not seen U Kyaw Khine's translation but if he has translated it in the same manner as Mrs Rhys Davids, then I
suppose you would be justified in reading the list of 56 dhammas as being all present in all kamavacarakusala cittas
A: How many times do I have to repeat that I do not and never have maintained that all 56 dhammas are present in all
skillful kmvacara cittas? There are eight categories of skillful kmvacara cittas:
1. accompanied by happiness and associated with knowledge
2. accompanied by happiness, associated with knowledge and caused by (internal or external) prompting
3. accompanied by happiness, but not associated with knowledge
4. accompanied by happiness, but not associated with knowledge and caused by (internal or external) prompting
5. accompanied by equanimity and associated with knowledge
6. accompanied by equanimity, associated with knowledge and caused by (internal or external) prompting
7. accompanied by equanimity but not associated with knowledge
8. accompanied by equanimity, not associated with knowledge and caused by (internal or external) prompting
-The list of 56 is emended to exclude the dhammas not pertaining to certain categories.
Q: I note your point about the "anupadadhammavipassanya hoti" preface. I think I will go with the standard sutta formula
of insight/vipassana being described by "pajanati", which in MN 111 is found only in the 2nd cluster, and not with the 1st
cluster.
A: Again, your forced interpretation fails to account for anupadadhammavipassanya hoti (vipassan of phenomena one by
one as they occurred). With regard to the first seven attainments, it's not vipassan of phenomena that had passed, ceased,
and changed, it's vipassan of phenomena one by one as they occurred:
tyssa dhamm anupadavavatthit honti; tyssa dhamm vidit uppajjanti, vidit upatthahanti,
vidit abbhattham

gacchanti.
these phenomena were defined by him one by one as they occurred; known to him these phenomena arose, known they were
present, known they disappeared.
-Here in the first seven attainments these phenomena are differentiated and known as they occur. But when we get to the
final two attainments the above passage is replaced by the following:
so tya sampattiy sato vutthahati.
so tya sampattiy sato vutthahitv
ye dhamm att niruddh viparin at te dhamme

samanupassati 'evam kirame dhamm ahutv sambhonti, hutv pativent'ti

He emerged mindful from that attainment. Having done so, he contemplated the phenomena that had passed, ceased and
changed, thus: 'So indeed, these phenomena, not having been, come into being; having been they vanished.'
-In the final two attainments phenomena weren't differentiated and known as they occurred because apperception wasn't
sufficiently engaged.
Q: It's clear that the Patisambhidamagga's usage of "vavattheti" allows for post-Jhana work.
A: Read the Psm in toto. The Psm allows for the development of vipassan pre-jhna, within jhna, and post-jhna.
A: MN 111 informs us that in the first seven attainments phenomena are differentiated and known as they occur: these
phenomena were defined by him one by one as they occurred; known to him these phenomena arose, known they were

present, known they disappeared.


-This is a description of vipassan of phenomena one by one as they occurred (anupadadhammavipassanya hoti). But
according to Ven. Brahmavamso's jhna, there can be no comprehension within jhna. In The Jhnas Ven. Brahmavamso
states: When perspective is removed, so is comprehension. Thus in jhna, not only is there no sense of time, but also there
is no comprehension of what is going on.
-This lack of comprehension precludes any differentiation and knowing of phenomena one by one as they occur in jhna. For
Ven. Brahmavamso this differentiation and knowing of mental factors is impossible within jhna. He continues:
Furthermore, the ultra-stillness of mindfulness in jhna freezes the activity of mind called comprehension to the extent that,
while in jhna, one can hardly make sense of one's experience. The landmarks of jhna are only recognized later, after
emerging and reviewing.
-Therefore, according to Ven. Brahmavamso, the MN 111 statement that "these phenomena were defined by him one by one
as they occurred," would be impossible. This passage would have to be discarded for all of the first seven attainments and
replaced by the passage: "He emerged mindful from that attainment. Having done so, he contemplated the phenomena that
had passed, ceased and changed, thus: 'So indeed, these phenomena, not having been, come into being; having been they
vanished.'"
-But in the sutta this passage only pertains to the final two attainments because in the final two attainments phenomena
cannot be differentiated and known as they occur.
Q: But you read the vavatthita as vipassana, and I read vavatthita as pertaining to sanna.
A: Vipassan is also related to sa. It is sa which identifies and differentiates unique particulars, not vitakka or vicra.
This also addresses your qualms about what you characterize as "discursive jhna" and the presence of vipassan without
vitakka or vicra.
Q: The anupada...honti/"one by one as they occurred", establishes no temporal linkage between the vavattheti, vidita and
pajanati with the dhammas one by one as they occured, given again the difference in the tenses between the verbs.
A: Your interpretation cannot successfully establish a temporal discontinuity between anupadadhammavipassanya hoti
(vipassan of phenomena one by one as they occurred) and tyssa dhamm anupadavavat
thit honti; tyssa dhamm vidit uppajjanti, vidit upat t hahanti, vidit abbhattham gacchanti (these phenomena were
defined by him one by one as they occurred; known to him these phenomena arose, known they were present, known they
disappeared). The phrase tyssa dhamm anupadavavatthit honti could also be translated as "these phenomena were defined
one after another as they occurred."
Q: "One by one" captures only sequence, but "as they occured" was probably used by BB/Ven N to import also the fact that
the sequential train was continuous and uninterrupted. Bhante G says so much himself, when he renders anupada as
'uninterrupted' (although he applied the qualifier to the jhana, rather than to the train of dhammas)
A: One has to consider the entire phrase, not just anupada. For example, anupadadhammavipassanya hoti and tyssa
dhamm anupadavavatthit honti. It is the hoti and honti here which have been translated as "as they occurred."
Q: This is the first time I have seen the simple verb "is" and "are" interpreted in such a manner.
A: PTS PED:
Hoti, hotabba etc. see bhavati.
Bhavati: Meanings. 1. to happen, to occur
The meaning of any phrase can only be understood by taking the entire phrase into consideration. This includes considering
the full semantic range of all terms employed. This doesn't always allow for direct one-to-one correspondences when
translating from Pli to English. Ven. Bodhi has correctly understood the meaning of these phrases.
Q: And how does one "do" real-time vavatthita without vitakka-vicara?
A: Again, it is sa which identifies, individuates, differentiates unique particulars, not vitakka or vicra.
Q: I'm sure you don't need me to point out that sa perceiving sa real-time is going to give rise to the poly-citta heresy.
I think the presence of sa in the things being differentiated is further demonstration of vavattheti of things past.
A: No, it's the reflexiveness of sa (as one cognitive aspect of the reflexiveness of vin a in general).
Q: It is possible only if vitakka-vicara were present to mobilise the attention, and vitakka-vicara certainly is not supposed to
be present in 2nd Jhana up.
A: It is cetan which performs this function, not vitakka nor vicra. Neither vitakka nor vicra "mobilize attention." This
notion is due to a very late commentarial semantic-shift of the meaning of these two terms.
Q: How does a one-pointed mind have so many objects without being an oxymoron
A: These mental factors are all concomitant with one object-support (ramman a). Thus there is no difficulty whatsoever.
-Something which really needs to be addressed is that anyone who relies on the jhna theory of Ven. Brahmavamso (as well
as many people who rely on the Visuddhimagga jhna without a careful study of all relevant older material) is going to have
a very different understanding of what jhna is, than someone who relies on the Tipit aka as canonical authority and has also
studied other early para-canonical Pl i and other Sthaviravda treatises.
-For example, in The Jhnas Ven. Brahmavamso describes singleness of mind as follows:
One-pointedness describes the mindfulness that is so sharply focused on a minute area of existence. It is one-pointed in
space because it only sees the point source of bliss, together with a small area surrounding the bliss caused by the first jhna
wobble.
-But the canon offers a much different understanding of singleness of mind (citta ekagga, cittekaggat). For example, AN
4.12 Sla Sutta: If while he is walking, standing, sitting, or reclining, a monk is free from greed and ill will, from sloth and
torpor, from restlessness and worry, and has discarded doubt, then his will has become strong and impregnable; his
mindfulness is alert and unclouded; his body is calm and unexcited; his mind is concentrated and collected (samhitam
cittam ekaggam).
-And also, differing from Ven. Brahmavamso's jhna, the canon describes the mind in jhna as vast and expansive. MN 127
describes the expansive liberation of mind (mahaggat cetovimutti), which is a synonym for the mastery of jhna, as follows:

And what, householder, is the expansive liberation of mind? Here a monk abides resolved upon an area the size of the root
of one tree, pervading it as expansive: this is called the expansive liberation of mind. Here a monk abides resolved upon an
area the size of the roots of two or three trees, pervading it as expansive: this too is called the expansive liberation of mind.
Here a monk abides resolved upon an area the size of one village, pervading it as expansive ... an area the size of two or
three villages... an area the size of one major kingdom... an area the size of two or three major kingdoms... an area the size of
the earth bounded by the ocean, pervading it as expansive: this too is called the expansive liberation of mind.
-As happens in every case, these canonical references are completely incompatible with Ven. Brahmavamso's jhna theory.
Q: your aversion to grammar
A: Once again you are either unwilling or unable to comprehend what I'm trying to convey. Grammatical structure is only
one of numerous factors which need to be considered when interpreting any passage or text. With regard to MN 111, your
over-reliance on grammatical structure imposes a false division between Sriputta and the mind-stream of Sriputta. At best,
your interpretations of all passages and texts that we've discussed here and on previous threads can only offer a possible
alternate interpretation. In every case, your interpretations rely on novelty. There is nothing whatsoever compelling in this. In
Buddhist hermeneutics novelty isn't desirable.
Q: MN 127 is yet more evidence in support of the canonical concept of Jhana that has little to do with a mind doing many
things.
A: I have no idea what you mean by "a mind doing many things," but you would do well to study how multiple mental
factors (dhammas) occur concomitantly with the object-support (ramman a) in jhna, as presented in the Abhidhamma
treatises.

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