SANDOVAL vs.

COMELEC Case Digest

FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
[G.R. No.133842. January 26, 2000]
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for the
Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After canvassing the
municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly
elected congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the same day. Private respondent filed
with the Comelec a petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He alleged that
there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the canvass and proclamation of the
winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers proceeded with the canvass and proclamation
despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the
canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The Comelec en banc
issued an order setting aside the proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void. Hence,
this petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec order.
ISSUES:
1. whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98- 206
SPC No. 98-143 an "Urgent Appeal from the Decision of the Legislative District Board of Canvassers
for Malabon and Navotas with Prayer for the Nullification of the Proclamation of Federico S. Sandoval
as Congressman."
SPC No. 98-206. The petition sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation as congressman.
2. whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid.
RULING: On the first issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the petitions filed by
private respondent. The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. As
an exception, however, to the general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits candidates
in the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections from filing preproclamation cases. It states: "Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation cases Not Allowed in Elections for President,
Vice-President, Senator, and Members of the House of Representatives. For purposes of the elections
for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no preproclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be.
However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon
written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or
election returns before it." The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the
election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides
an exception to the exception. The second sentence of Section 15 allows the filing of petitions for
correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns even in elections for
president, vice-president and members of the House of Representatives for the simple reason that the
correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of
the winner in the election. This rule is consistent with and complements the authority of the COMELEC
under the Constitution to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and its power to "decide, except those involving
the right to vote, all questions affecting elections."
We now go to the second issue. Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject
matter and issue of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted
with illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having
been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing.
The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior
notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent's
allegations.

Public respondent submits that procedural due process need not be observed in this case because it
was merely exercising its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of
canvassers.
We cannot accept public respondent's argument.
Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's proclamation,
COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of the
COMELEC include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election
officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and
government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register
political parties, organizations or coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission, prosecute
election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or imposition of any other
disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its
directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct control and supervision over all
personnel involved in the conduct of election. However, the resolution of the adverse claims of private
respondent and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate of
canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear both parties to
determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a manifest error.
Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It
has been said that where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or
character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer
other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasi-judicial
tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by
private respondent.
The COMELEC order dated June 2, 1998 in SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206 is ANNULLED.
Midland Insurance Corporation vs Intermediate Appellate Court
143 SCRA 458
Adjudicatory Powers
FACTS: On October 1, 1984, a judgment was rendered by the Insurance Commission in favor of
complaint-appellee, Sisenando Villareal, and against herein petitioner Midland Insurance Corporation.
Petitioner's appeal was initially-accepted by the IAC as can be gleaned from the letter-advice dated
February 8, 1985, notifying petitioner's counsel to file appellant's brief. However, a Motion to Dismiss
appeal dated March 1, 1985 was filed by the complainant-appellee on the ground that the petitioner
herein, failed to perfect its appeal within the reglementary period. Despite the opposition thereto
interposed by petitioner Midland Insurance Corporation, the Respondent IAC, on August 14, 1985
granted the stated Motion to Dismiss on the ground that by said court's computation of the elapsed
period from the date of receipt by herein petitioner of the decision of the Insurance Commission to the
time the notice of appeal was filed before said Commission and notice of appeal and manifestation
submitted to the IAC on December 5, 1984, it would appear that petitioner's appeal was belatedly
made.
Respondent-appellant's contended that under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 the reglementary period of 15
days from receipt of the decision or judgment within which to file an appeal is not applicable to quasijudicial agencies such as the Insurance Commission. However, in its dismissal IAC ruled that the
applicable rule is explicit in No. 12 (c), providing for appellate procedure under the Interim Rules which
state that 'appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be
governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the
provisions of B.P. Blg. 129. The pertinent provisions in Rep. Act No. 5434 provide:
SEC. 2.
Appeals to the Court of Appeals shall be filed within the fifteen (15) days from notice of the
ruling, award, order, decision or judgment.
There is no conflict between the period to appeal in R.A. No. 5434 and Sec. 39, B.P. 129 which provides:

Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any
court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,
judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for
appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appeal from.
The petitioner's case, however, rests on the assumption that it had timely filed its appeal on November
7, 1984 because Section 2 of Republic Act No. 5434 which governs appeals originating from quasijudicial bodies grants a party ten (10) days from notice of the resolution denying a Motion for
Reconsideration. As notice of the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration by the Insurance
Commission was received by petitioner on October 30, 1984, the latter maintains that it had ten (10)
days thereafter or until November 9, 1984 within which to file its appeal and this was filed with the IAC
on November 7, 1984. Petitioner's submission is that the appeal was thus filed within the reglementary
period.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner had timely filed its appeal because Republic Act No. 5434 which
governs appeals originating from quasi-judicial bodies grants a party ten (10) days from notice of the
resolution denying a Motion for Reconsideration
RULING: Yes. It can be gleaned from the powers and duties of the Insurance Commissioner
enumerated in Sections 414-416, 187, and 241 of the Insurance Code performs quasi-judicial functions
a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
Section 2 of R.A. 5434 explicitly provides:
Sec. 2.
Appeals to the Court of Appeals shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
ruling, award, order, decision or judgment or from the date of its last publication if required by law for
its effectivity or in case a motion for reconsideration is filed within that period of fifteen (15) days, then
within ten (10) days from Notice or publication when required by law, of the resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration. No more than one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed by any part.
We find that petitioner herein is correct in maintaining that its appeal was timely filed. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Insurance Commission and advice of such denial was
received by petitioner on October 30, 1984. As petitioner would then have ten (10) days from October
30, 1984 or until November 9, 1984, its appeal was well within the ten day period within which an
appeal can be made to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.
What We note is that Respondent IAC fell into error because it failed to consider and apply the pivotal
Section 2 of R.A. 5434, which recites that "in case a motion for reconsideration is filed within that
period of fifteen (15) days, then within ten (10) days from Notice or publication, when required by law,
of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration ... ." Respondent's court's failure to do so led
to its erroneous conclusion.
The Insurance Commission is an administrative agency, with quasi-judicial functions. Consequently, the
period of appeal from final orders, decisions, resolutions or awards of said Insurance Commission may
not be necessarily modified or limited by section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
RATIO: "Quasi-judicial functions" is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature.
National Housing Authority vs Almeida
525 SCRA 383
Adjudicatory Powers
FACTS: On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several

portions of land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna.The records show that
Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of private respondent) and
Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the
remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is
the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be
the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960, allegedly
executed by Margarita Herrera.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of SelfAdjudication before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna.
On December 29, 1980, a decision on the case questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication was rendered
and the deed was declared null and void.
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an
application with the NHA to purchase the same lots submitting therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" executed by her mother. Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado,
protested the application.
In a Resolution dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by Francisca Herrera.
Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President. The NHA Resolution was affirmed
by the Office of the President in a Decision dated January 23, 1987. On February 1, 1987, Francisca
Herrera died. Her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they submitted to the
NHA. Said transfer of rights was approved by the NHA. The NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor
of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and titles were issued in their favor. Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca
Herrera directed Segunda Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises that she was occupying.
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the resolution of the NHA, private
respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs
of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on February 8, 1988, for "Nullification of Government Lot's Award,"
with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna.
In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of the disputed
properties, and re-raised the fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration of self-adjudication has been
adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs were disregarded.
The defendant heirs of Francisca Herrera alleged that the complaint was barred by laches and that the
decision of the Office of the President was already final and executory.
The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988 dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated June 26, 1989 reversed and held that the Regional Trial Court
had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case involving "title and possession to real property within its
jurisdiction." The case was then remanded for further proceedings on the merits.
On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of the NHA
and the decision of the Office of the President awarding the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It
declared the deeds of sale executed by NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null and void.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but a
disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said document must
first be submitted to probate before it can transfer property.
Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective motions for reconsideration

which were both denied on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner
NHA elevated the case to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution of the NHA and the decision of the Office of the President have
attained finality, and if so, whether or not the principle of administrative res judicata bars the court
from further determining who between the parties has preferential rights for award over the subject
lots
RULING: Yes. Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court decisions in accordance with
the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata:
"the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority
applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and
boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers . It
has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the
property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a
certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata.
To be sure, early jurisprudence were already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to
apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without unreasonably
circumscribing the scope thereof and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the
defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.
the rule prescribing that "administrative orders cannot be enforced in the courts in the absence of an
express statutory provision for that purpose" was relaxed in favor of quasi-judicial agencies.
In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will always be subject to true judicial power
that which is held by the courts. Quasi-judicial power is defined as that power of adjudication of an
administrative agency for the "formulation of a final order."
This function applies to the actions, discretion and similar acts of public administrative officers or
bodies who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and
draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature.
However, administrative agencies are not considered courts, in their strict sense. The doctrine of
separation of powers reposes the three great powers into its three (3) branchesthe legislative, the
executive, and the judiciary. Each department is co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own
sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of
its agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is
empowered to "determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Courts have an expanded role under the 1987 Constitution in the resolution of societal conflicts under
the grave abuse clause of Article VIII which includes that duty to check whether the other branches of
government committed an act that falls under the category of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 where it is therein
provided that the Intermediate Appellate Court (now, Court of Appeals) shall exercise the "exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards, of the Regional
Trial Courts and Quasi-Judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling
within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution." and contends that
the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to rule over awards made by the NHA.
Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28, 2003, already ruled that
the issue of the trial court's authority to hear and decide the instant case has already been settled in

the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 26, 1989 (which has become final and executory on
August 20, 1989 as per entry of judgment dated October 10, 1989). We find no reason to disturb this
ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. The system of judicial review should not
be misused and abused to evade the operation of a final and executory judgment. The appellate
court's decision becomes the law of the case which must be adhered to by the parties by reason of
policy.
RATIO: A government agency performs adjudicatory functions when it renders decisions or awards
that determine the rights of adversarial parties, which decisions or awards have the same binding
effect as a judgment of a court of law, such that when they attain finality, they have the effect of res
judicata that even the courts of justice have to respect.
Destileria Limtuaco & Co. vs Advertising Board of the Philippines
572 SCRA 455
Adjudicatory Powers
FACTS: The present dispute focuses mainly on the power of the Advertising Board of the Philippines
(AdBoard) to require its clearance prior to commercial advertising and to impose sanctions on its
members who broadcast advertisements without its clearance. AdBoard is an umbrella non-stock, nonprofit corporation created in 1974 composed of several national organizations in the advertising
industry. Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. (Destileria) was formerly a member of PANA.
In January 2004, Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation (Convoy), through its advertising
agency, SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of the 4As, applied with the AdBoard for a clearance of the
airing of a radio advertisement entitled, Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba ng Kinse Anyos).
AdBoard issued a clearance for said advertisement. Not long after the ad started airing, AdBoard was
swept with complaints from the public. This prompted AdBoard to ask SLG for a replacement but there
was no response. With the continued complaints from the public, AdBoard, this time, asked SLG to
withdraw its advertisement, to no avail. Thus, AdBoard decided to recall the clearance previously
issued, effective immediately. Said decision to recall was conveyed to SLG and AdBoard's membersorganizations.
Petitioners protested the AdBoard's decision, after which, they filed a Complaint which was later on
amended, for Dissolution of Corporation, Damages and Application for Preliminary Injunction with
prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
On May 20, 2004, AdBoard issued ACRC Circular No. 2004-02, reminding its members-organizations of
Article VIII of the ACRC Manual of Procedures, which prohibits the airing of materials not duly screened
by it. On July 16, 2004, petitioners filed the present petition for writ of prohibition and preliminary
injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners argue that their right to advertise is a constitutionally protected right, as well as a property
right. Petitioners believe that requiring a clearance from AdBoard before advertisements can be aired
amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. They also argue that AdBoard's
regulation is an exercise of police power which must be subject to constitutional proscriptions.
The Amended Complaint sought the revocation/cancellation of AdBoard's registration and its
dissolution on the grounds, inter alia, that it was usurping the functions of the Department of Trade and
Industry and the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board by misrepresenting that it has
the power to screen, review and approve all radio and television advertisements.
As to the merits of petitioners' arguments, AdBoard counters that it derives its authority from the
voluntary submission of its members to its jurisdiction. According to AdBoard, there is no law that
prohibits it from assuming self-regulatory functions or from issuing clearances prior to advertising.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of AdBoard sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a
tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions

RULING: Yes. First of all, the petition filed in this case is one for prohibition, i.e., to command AdBoard
to desist from requiring petitioners to secure a clearance and imposing sanctions on any agency that
will air, broadcast or publish petitioners' ads without such clearance. Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it must establish the following requisites:
(a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in
excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has the power to determine what the
law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions
and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the
action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, which are required to investigate facts
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial function is one which an officer
or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard
for the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. What is at contest here is the power and
authority of a private organization, composed of several members-organizations, which power and
authority were vested to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case. The
definition and purpose of a writ of prohibition excludes the use of the writ against any person or group
of persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against private individuals
or corporations so acting.
RATIO: Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action and discretion of public
administrative officers or bodies, which are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the
context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his/its
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
De Guzman, Jr. vs Mendoza
453 SCRA 565
Adjudicatory Powers
FACTS: This is a complaint filed by Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. against Antonio O. Mendoza, Sheriff IV,
and Floro G. Calixihan, Jr., Branch Clerk of Court, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 58,
for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the judiciary. Specifically, the
respondents were charged with conniving with each other in causing the issuance of an alias writ of
execution and profiting on the rentals collected from the tenants of the subject property.
On October 13, 2000, a writ of execution was issued by then Judge Escolastico U. Cruz, Jr. which
ordered respondent sheriff to cause the satisfaction of a civil case decision rendered on May 2, 1988.
Complainant for this case was the counsel for the plaintiffs in the aforementioned civil case.
On April 4, 2001, an Alias Writ of Execution/Possession/Ejectment/Demolition and Others was issued.
Unlike the October 13, 2000 writ of execution which only ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens and payment of attorneys fees, the April 4, 2001 alias writ directed the transfer of
possession, ejectment, payment of monthly rentals, and demolition, which were not covered by the
courts decision dated May 2, 1988.
Thereafter, respondent sheriff, together with Atty. Melotindos who was the counsel for the defendant,
went to the subject property and served the Notice to Comply upon the five tenants of the plaintiffs.
Respondent sheriff allegedly intimidated the tenants to vacate the premises, pay monthly rentals of
P50,000.00, and demolish the structures therein.
Complainant averred that respondent sheriff intentionally failed to attach page 3 of the alias writ of

execution to the notice to comply. He insisted that the missing page was important because it contains
the signatory of the writ, the date it was signed, and the dispositive portion of the May 2, 1988 decision
which did not mention ejectment, monthly rentals, demolition or possession.
In his comment, Calixihan claimed that he does not know any of the parties in the civil case; thus, he
could not be charged with connivance. He averred that the void alias writ of execution was prepared
and issued by then Judge Cruz and implemented by the respondent sheriff. He never profited from the
rentals because he immediately turned over the same to Atty. Melotindos who issued a receipt. He
argued that as a clerk of court and a subordinate employee, he had no authority to prevent the judge
from conducting hearings or proceedings in court.
In the Agenda Report dated March 7, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator noted that the alias
writs have been declared null and void by this Court in its en banc Resolution dated September 18,
2001.
In his Report and Recommendation dated August 19, 2004, Executive Judge Sixto Marella, Jr. found
respondent sheriff guilty of simple misconduct and recommended his suspension for thirty days
without pay. It was established that on two occasions, he received P24,000.00 and P1,500.00
representing rentals from two tenants. In October 2001, he also received P500.00 from Atty.
Melotindos which he claimed as legal fees. The investigating judge, however, noted that the amount
exceeded the limit for legal fees provided under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, and the
respondent sheriff also failed to comply with the requirements stated therein.
In a Memorandum dated January 31, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator agreed with the
investigating judge that by receiving money from the lawyer of the prevailing party without complying
with Rule 141, the respondent sheriff is guilty of simple misconduct and act inimical to the best interest
of the judiciary. It thus recommended respondent sheriffs suspension from the service for one month
and one day without pay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent sheriff committed any infraction in the enforcement of the void
alias writ of execution
RULING: No. there is no proof that respondent sheriff participated in the issuance of the void alias writ
of execution. Neither did he commit any infraction in the enforcement of the same. Thus, when he
ordered the tenants to vacate the premises, pay monthly rentals of P50,000.00, and demolish the
structures therein, he was merely implementing the writ as issued by the judge. At the time of its
enforcement, respondent sheriff had no way of knowing that ultimately, the alias writs would be
nullified by this Court.
The duty of a sheriff to execute a valid writ is ministerial and not discretionary. A purely ministerial act
or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed
manner and without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of
the act done. A discretionary act, on the other hand, is a faculty conferred upon a court or official by
which he may decide the question either way and still be right.
In general, a sheriff is the proper officer to execute all writs returnable to the court, unless another is
appointed, by special order, for the purpose. It is not his duty to decide on the truth or sufficiency of
the processes committed to him for service. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his
duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and
promptness to execute it according to its mandate. He is supposed to execute the order of the court
strictly to the letter.
RATIO: Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of
facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done.

THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC., vs. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT
OF LAND PROBLEMS
TOPIC: AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY IS NOT A COURT.
FACTS: Dominican Hills, formerly registered as Diplomat Hills in Baguio City, was mortgaged to the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). It was eventually foreclosed and acquired later on by the said
bank as the highest bidder. On 11 April 1983, through its President Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., the subject
property was donated to the Republic of the Philippines. The deed of donation stipulated that
Dominican Hills would be utilized for the "priority programs, projects, activities in human settlements
and economic development and governmental purposes" of the Ministry of Human Settlements.
On December 12, 1986, then President Corazon Aquino issued EO 85 abolishing the Ministry of Human
Settlements. All agencies under the its supervision as well as all its assets, programs and projects,
were transferred to the Presidential Management Staff (PMS).
On 18 October 1988, United (Dominican Hills) submitted its application before the PMS to acquire a
portion of the Dominican Hills property. In a MOA, PMS and United agreed that the latter may purchase
a portion of the said property from HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATIO, acting as originator, on
a selling price of P75.00 per square meter.
Thus, on June 12, 1991, HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the property to UNITED. The deed of conditional
sale provided that ten (10) per cent of the purchase price would be paid upon signing, with the balance
to be amortized within one year from its date of execution. After UNITED made its final payment on
January 31, 1992, HIGC executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 1, 1992.
Petitioner alleges that sometime in 1993, private respondents entered the Dominican Hills property
allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was able to secure a demolition order
from the city mayor. Unable to stop the razing of their houses, private respondents, under the name
DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION (ASSOCIATION, for brevity) filed an
action for injunction before RTC Baguio City. Private respondents were able to obtain a temporary
restraining order but their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was later denied.
The ASSOCIATION filed a separate civil case for damages, injunction and annulment of the said MOA. It
was later on dismissed upon motion of United. The said Order of dismissal is currently on appeal with
the Court of Appeals.
The demolition order was subsequently implemented by the Office of the City Mayor and the City
Engineer's Office of Baguio City. However, petitioner avers that private respondents returned and
reconstructed the demolished structures.
To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order, private respondents filed a petition for
annulment of contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining order before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City Engineer's Office, the
City Mayor, as well as the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day, public respondent
COSLAP issued the contested order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo. Without filing a
motion for reconsideration from the aforesaid status quo order, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP.
ISSUE: W/O COSLAP is empowered to hear and try a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for
a TRO and to issue a status quo order and conduct a hearing thereof?
RULING: COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy. It discharges quasijudicial functions:
"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of public administrative
officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion
of a judicial nature."

However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeit one that
exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are
neither part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. The doctrine of separation of
powers observed in our system of government reposes the three (3) great powers into its three (3)
branches the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary each department being co-equal and
coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own
fiat, impose the judgment of one of its own agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered "to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
Antipolo Realty Corporation vs National Housing Authority
153 SCRA 399
Extent of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Powers of Administrative Agencies
FACTS: Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the
Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation under
a Contract to Sell. On 28 August 1974, Hernando transferred his rights over the said lot to private
respondent Virgilio Yuson, embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor. However, for
failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under
Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell (subdivision beautification), Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages
pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly
installment payments falling due thereafter.
On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson
advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and
requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson
replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the
representation in the notice. In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its
request, citing the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976 in
Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes, respondent") declaring
Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the
Contract to Sell. A formal demand was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of
P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the period
while the improvements were being completed i.e., between September 1972 and October 1976.
Yuson refused to pay the September 1972 - October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the
post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and
claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Yuson brought his
dispute with Antipolo Realty before NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a motion to dismiss, which NHA denied.
After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract
to Sell. A motion for reconsideration of Antipolo Realty was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NHA in ordering the reinstatement of
matter beyond its competence

the Contract To Sell, acted on a

RULING: No. The extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must be
determined by referring to the terms of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers' Decree." 11 Section 3 of this statute provides as follows:
National Housing Authority. The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this decree.
Presidential Decree No. 1344 (which amended Presidential Decree No, 957) clarified and spelled out
the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following quite
specific terms:
In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive

jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub- division lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
There is, in any case, no question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally
empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it
and under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are
faithfully performed.
Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain specified improvements in
the subdivision within the specified period of two years from the date of the execution of the Contract
to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence,
petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment payments made by the
private respondent as forfeited in its favor. The NHA was therefore correct in holding that private
respondent's prior installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of petitioner.
There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency
over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The very
definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. Under the
"sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
RATIO: Extent of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Powers of Administrative Agencies: Function ordinarily
judicial may be conferred. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly
interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of private parties under such contracts, and award
damages whenever appropriate. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the
interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely
judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts but may be conferred upon an administrative
agency.
Siapian vs Court of Appeals
327 SCRA 11
Extent of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Powers of Administrative Agencies
FACTS: The records disclose that the spouses Diosdado Tarlengao and Dominga de la Cruz owned a
residential lot located at Tandang Sora Street corner Katipunan, Caloocan City. In July 1947, the late
Dominga Siapian leased the said residential lot from the aforenamed spouses and built thereon a twostorey house where her family lived. The lessee religiously paid the agreed monthly rental of P100.00
until June 1979 when the lessor stopped collecting the same.
In a letter dated June 9, 1979, Theresa Yu informed Dominga Siapian that she purchased the lot from
its previous owners. Yu said that she wanted to take immediate possession of the property since she
had no other residential lot and she intended to make use of the lot for the construction of her own
house. She gave Dominga Siapian three months notice to vacate and to demolish the improvements
which the latter had built on the lot.
After four ejectment cases filed before the MeTC, the MeTC ruled in favor of private respondent. The
MeTC ruled that petitioner indeed failed to pay rentals in arrears and even requested for extension of
time to settle the same. It also held that petitioner did not deposit rentals due with the bank as the
latter claimed, for no evidence was adduced to prove it. In fact, when private respondent inquired from
the bank as to the alleged deposit, no statement was given.

Petitioner interprets the demand letter asking him to vacate the premises as merely asking him to pay
rentals. He contends that the said letter does not constitute a demand to vacate the leased premises
which is a condition precedent for instituting ejectment suit. He argues that the ejectment case must
fail since the jurisdictional requirement of demand was not fulfilled.
On appeal, the RTC reversed the MeTC decision. The RTC declared that the demand letter was not
precise in asking petitioner to vacate the premises because it only asked for payment of arrearages
and current rentals. It also held that this latest ejectment suit against petitioner is barred by the final
and executory decisions in previous cases. Hence, the ejectment suit was dismissed.
On review by the Court of Appeals, the appellate court reversed the aforequoted judgment of the RTC,
and in lieu thereof, reinstated the decision of the MeTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ejectment case must fail since the jurisdictional requirement of demand
was not fulfilled
RULING: No. Petitioner belabors the fact that the letter is not categorical and precise in seeking his
eviction from the property. He misses the point. It must be stressed that courts and quasi-judicial
bodies, in the exercise of their functions and in making decisions, must not be too dogmatic as to
restrict themselves to literal interpretation of words, phrases and sentences. A complete and wholistic
view must be taken in order to render a just and equitable judgment. When the lessor demanded
payment of the due and unpaid rentals or a case for ejectment would be filed against them, the owner
was giving strong notice that you either pay your unpaid rentals or I will file a court case to have you
thrown out of my property.
The word vacate is not a talismanic word that must be employed in all notices. The alternatives are
clear cut. The tenants must pay rentals which were fixed and which became payable in the past, failing
which they must move out. There can be no other interpretation of the notice given to them. Hence
when the owner demanded that either they pay or a case for ejectment would be filed against them,
the tenants were placed on notice to move out if they do not pay. There was, in effect, a notice or
demand to vacate.
In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the appellate court cannot be said to have erred in finding
that the written demand is sufficient to eject petitioner from the property subject of controversy.
RATIO: Courts and quasi-judicial bodies, in the exercise of their functions and in making decisions,
must not be too dogmatic as to restrict themselves to literal interpretation of words, phrases and
sentences. A complete and wholistic view must be taken in order to render a just and equitable
judgment.

Tejada vs Homestead Property Corporation

178 SCRA 164
Extent of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Powers of Administrative Agencies
FACTS: Private respondent offered to sell to petitioner a lot owned by respondent corporation. Private
respondent suggested that petitioner pay a reservation fee of P 20,000.00, which would form part of
the consideration in case they reach a final agreement of sale and which amount was to be returned to
the petitioner should the parties fail to reach an agreement.
Petitioner paid the reservation fee with the tentative agreement that the said lot would cost P 1,150.00
per square meter, or a total price of P 230,000.00. A 24% downpayment was to be paid by petitioner.
The balance will be payable monthly within 1 or 2 years, depending upon the terms of the agreement.
However, when the terms were unilaterally altered by respondent corporation by increasing the
proposed amortization payments, petitioner refused to go through with the proposed purchase and he
asked the private respondents to return the reservation payment. Respondents refused to return the
amount.

Petitioner filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money with damages against respondents
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. Petitioner alleged that defendants refused to return the
reservation payment for no justifiable reason despite verbal and written demands. Petitioner further
contended that such refusal to refund the amount constitutes malicious and wanton breach of legal
duty that makes them liable to pay moral damages.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss disputing the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and claiming
that jurisdiction lies with the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC). The trial court denied
the motion. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court.
Private respondents brought the case to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari claiming that
the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled
that the jurisdiction over the controverted case is with the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission,
now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.
Hence, the instant petition wherein petitioner argues that inasmuch as there is no perfected contract of
sale between the parties, the claim for recovery of the reservation fee properly falls within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts and not that of the HSRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the claim for recovery of the reservation fee falls within the jurisdiction of the
courts
RULING: No. There can be no doubt that under Presidential Decree No. 1344, the NHA has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims involving refund and other claims filed by a subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, etc. There is no such qualification in said provision
of law that makes a distinction between a perfected sale and one that has yet to be perfected. The
word "buyer" in the law should be understood to be anyone who purchases anything for money.
Under the circumstances of this case, one who offers to buy is as much a buyer as one who buys by
virtue of a perfected contract of sale.
Moreover, upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 90, if, is therein provided that the HLRB has
exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers, and
dealers, among others. The former provision that the claim be made by a buyer has been eliminated.
Thus, any previous doubt as to who may file the claim has been eliminated. Now, any claim for refund
whether by a buyer or other in any other capacity is definitely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HLRB.
When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating
to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction
of said administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored. Since in this case the action for
refund of reservation fee arose from a proposed purchase of a subdivision lot obviously the HLRB has
exclusive
jurisdiction
over
the
case.
RATIO: Split jurisdiction not favored. - The rule is that when an administrative body or agency is
conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its
specialization are deemed to be included within its jurisdiction. Split decision is not favored.
Thus, an agency with exclusive jurisdiction over controversies involving sale of subdivision lots has
also jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for refund by a subdivision buyer.
GUERZON V CA
FACTS:
Petitioner executed with Basic Landoil Energy Corp (later acquired by Shell) a Service Station Lease
and Dealers Sales Contract. Respondent Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) approved the latter
contract and issued a Certificate of Authority in Petitioners favor. After the contract, respondent Shell

wrote Guerzon informing him that they are not renewing the contract. A copy of said letter was
furnished to BEU. Thereafter, BEU issued an order directing petitioner to vacate the premises and to
show cause in writing why no administrative order and/or criminal proceedings shall be instituted for
his violations. Shell was able to secure the possession of the gas station. Guerzon then filed with the
RTC a complaint but such was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to annuk the order of a quasi-judicial
body of equivalent category as the RTC.
ISSUES
W/N the BEU has the authority to order petitioner to vacate the premises.
RULING
NO. The power of an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted (here PD
1206) to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Said PD states that
after notice and hearing, it can impose and collect a fine and failure to pay the fine or to cease and
discontinue the violation of the law (i.e. illegal trading in petroleum products) shall be sufficient reason
for suspension, closure or stoppage of operations. Nowhere in the order is it stated that petitioner
engaged inillegal trading or any other violation of BP 33. It merely made a vague reference to
violation of BEU laws, rules and regulation. The BEU (like its predecessor, the Oil Industry
Commission) has no power to decide contractual disputes between gasonline dealers and oil
companies. It cannot order petitioner to vacate the premises as this is an appropriate case in the vicil
courts for unlawful detainer. Assuming arguendo that it did had the authority, it still failed to comply
with the requirement of notice and hearing. NOTE: Nevertheless,petitioner could not require that
possession be given to him as the contract was not renewed.
Provident tree farms vs Batario mar 28 1994
DOCTRINE:
Cases before the BOC must be fully fleshed out before it prior to elevating the issues to a regular court
in keeping with the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
FACTSIn the extrant case, PTFI seeks to set aside the 8 February 1990 order of respondent court and
prays for the continuation of the hearing inCivil Case No. 89-48836. PTFI claims that what was brought
before the trial court was a civil case for injunction, i.e., "restraining the entry of safety matches into
the country . . . for the purpose of securing compliance with Sec. 36 (l) of the Forestry Code and for
damages, "to seek redress of its right which has been clearly violated by the importation of safety
matches . . . . (which) is a denial to the petitioner of the protection and incentive granted it by Section
36 (l) of the Forestry Code . . . ."
Naturally, PTFI asserts the inapplicability of the procedures outlined in R.A. No. 1125 relative to
incidents before the Court of TaxAppeals because the instant action is not a protest case where the
aggrieved party is not an importer. It then argues that since it could not avail of the remedies afforded
by the Tariff and Customs Code, resort to the courts is warranted, citing Commissioner of Customs v.
Alikpala. Petitioner asserts his complaint on a statutory privilege or incentive granted under Sec. 36,
par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code. The only subject of this incentive is a ban against importation of
wood, wood products or wood-derivated products which is to be enforced by the Bureau of Customs
since it has, under the Tariff and Customs Code, the exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture cases and, in fact, it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction over
prohibited importations .The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised
Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner
to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any
legal basis. Now it follows that to allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner to impound the
imported matches, as petitioner insisted, is clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases. An order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit
must inevitably be based on his determination and declaration of the invalidity of the importation,
hence, an usurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs. In other words, the reliefs directed against the Bureau of Customs as well as the prayer for

injunction against importation of matches by private respondent AJIC may not be granted without the
court arrogating upon itself the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs .ISSUEw/n the BOC
holds jurisdiction in the matter of wood product importation
HELD
Petitioners position is inconceivable! The claim of petitioner that no procedure is outlined for the
enforcement of the import ban under theTariff and Customs Code, if true, does not at all diminish the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over the subject matter. The enforcement of statutory rights is
not foreclosed by the absence of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner of Customs has the power
to"promulgate all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of this (Tariff and Customs)
Code . . . subject to the approval of the Secretary of Finance." Moreover, it has been held that ". . . .
(w)here the statute does not require any particular method of procedure to be followed by an
administrative agency, the agency may adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions."But
over and above the foregoing, PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the
legality of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the
pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction

Cario v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among
them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers
Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted actions to
dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act
upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latters attention.
The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.
ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations
RULING: No.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of
finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary
of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that
the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so;
whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory
powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like
alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law
to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to
such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have.

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not try and resolve on
the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has
announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their
human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
Sanado vs. Court of Appeals
356 SCRA 546
Legal effect of a decision rendered by an administrative body in a case filed in the regular courts
FACTS:
Sanado was issued by the now defunct Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary Fishpond Permit
covering an area of 50 hectares. On July 16, 1973, Sanado executed a contract with Nepomuceno
wherein the latter agreed to develop 30 hectares of the 50 hectares covered by Sanados fishpond
permit. Two days later, the parties modified this earlier agreement by excluding the area of 10 hectares
already cultivated and fully developed and providing that the contract is renewable on terms
acceptable to both of them.
Sept. 28, 1979
Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources recommended to the then Ministry of Natural Resources the
conversion of Sanados fishpond permit into a 25-year fishpond loan agreement which covered a
reduced area of 26.745 hectares. Accordingly, a Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued.
July 17, 1981
Sanado filed a complaint against Nepomuceno with the RTC for recovery of possession and damages,
alleging that Nepomuceno failed to deliver Sanados share of the net harvest among other things.
While this case was pending, the then Minister of Agriculture and Food canceled the Fishpond Lease
Agreement, forfeiting the improvements thereon in favor of government. Later, said order was
reconsidered to the extent that Nepomuceno was given priority to apply for the area and that his
improvements thereon were not considered forfeited in favor of the government.
Sanado elevated the matter to the Office of the President but appeal was dimissed. Meanwhile, the
trial court rendered a decision over Sanados complaint for recovery of possession in his favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President has any legal effect on the civil case for
recovery of possession
Whether or not the judgment of the trial court has attained finality
HELD:
What is the nature of the July 31, 1989 Malacaang decision and what is its effect on the resolution of
Civil Case No. 2085?
The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a license,
permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial.
The act is not purely administrative but quasi-judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon the
ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights
and liabilities determined. As such, the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is explicitly
an official act of and an exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive Department headed by the
highest officer of the land. It thus squarely falls under matters relative to the executive department
which courts are mandatorily tasked to take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of

Court. Judicial notice must be taken of the organization of the Executive Department, its principal
officers, elected or appointed, such as the President, his powers and duties.
The rendition of the subject July 31, 1989 Malacaang decision is premised on the essential function of
the executive department which is to enforce the law. In this instance, what is being enforced is
Presidential Decree No. 704 which consolidated and revised all laws and decrees affecting fishing and
fisheries. Such enforcement must be true to the policy behind such laws which is "to accelerate and
promote the integrated development of the fishery industry and to keep the fishery resources of the
country in optimum productive condition through proper conservation and protection" (Section 2, P.D.
No. 704).
Further, the issue of whether or not petitioner is still entitled to possession of the subject fishpond area
is underpinned by an ascertainment of facts. And such task belongs to the administrative body which
has jurisdiction over the matter the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. The policy of the courts as
regards such factual findings is not to interfere with actions of the executive branch on administrative
matters addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies. This policy is specially applicable
in the grant of licenses, permits, and leases, or the approval, rejection, or revocation of applications
therefor (Manuel vs. Villena, 37 SCRA 745 [1971]). Such respect is based on the time-honored doctrine
of separation of powers and on the fact that these bodies are considered co-equal and coordinate rank
as courts. The only exception is when there is a clear showing of capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment or grave abuse of discretion, which we find absent in the case at bar.
The reasons given by the Office of the President in dismissing petitioner's appeal are quite clear.
Transferring or subletting the fishpond granted to a licensee without the consent or approval of the
administrative body concerned, as well as the failure to develop the area required by the fisheries
rules, are definitely solid and logical grounds for the cancellation of one's license. Withal, if petitioner
disagrees with the decision of the Office of the President, he should have elevated the matter by
petition for review before the Court of Appeals for the latter's exercise of judicial review. Nowhere in
the record do we find such action on petitioner's part.
Understandably, to restore petitioner to the possession of the fishpond area is to totally disregard the
July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President which can hardly be described as an unrelated
matter, considering its patent implications in the result of both Civil Case No. 2085 and CA-G.R. CV No.
23165. For how could the appellate court award possession to the very same party whose license has
been cancelled by the executive or administrative officer tasked to exercise licensing power as regards
the development of fishpond areas, and which cancellation has been sustained by the Office of the
President? Petitioner must remember the essence of the grant of a license. It is not a vested right given
by the government but a privilege with corresponding obligations and is subject to governmental
regulation. Hence, to allow petitioner to possess the subject area is to run counter to the execution and
enforcement of the July 31, 1989 decision which would easily lose its "teeth" or force if petitioner were
restored in possession.
The trial courts decision did not attain finality. It was appealed within the reglementary period. If the
court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever
circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and
circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has
become final and executory (David vs. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 710 [1999]) and when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it (People vs. Gallo, 315
SCRA 461 [1999]), what more if the judgment has not yet attained finality?
It is thus plain in the case at bar that the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is a
substantial supervening event which drastically changed the circumstances of the parties to the
subject fishpond lease agreement. For to award possession to petitioner is futile since he has lost the
fishpond license.
In point is our ruling in Baluyot vs. Guiao (315 SCRA 396 [1997]) where we held that judgment is not
confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but also covers those necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto. For example, where the ownership of a parcel of land is decreed in the

judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included in the decision, it
appearing that the defeated party's claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership.
By analogy, the July 31, 1989 decision, is not confined to the validity of the cancellation by the Ministry
of Agriculture and Food of petitioner's Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 3090 for violation of the terms
thereof and/or the fisheries rules. The right to possess the subject fishpond area is necessarily included
in the decision. The cancellation or revocation of petitioner's license necessarily eliminated his right to
possess the same since the new licensee would then be the one to enjoy this right.
PHIL. CONSUMERS FOUNDATION INC V SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
FACTS
In 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education submitted a report, which favorably recommended
to the DECS courses of action with respect to the Government's policy on increases in school fees for
SY 1987-1988. On this basis, the Secretary of DECS issued an order authorizing a 15-20% increase in
school fees as recommended by the Task Force. Philippine Consumers Foundation Inc (PCFI) opposed
the order on the ground that the increases were too high. DECS issued Dept Order No. 37 reducing the
increases to a lower ceiling of 10-15%. Again, PCFI opposed.
ISSUE W/N DECS has the power to prescribe school fees
HELD
YES. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school
fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such,
the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its
functions and duties under the law. The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may
be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior
notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates
prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and
hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an
administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country,
they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to
a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. Is
Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? YES. The
assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private
schools in the country for SY 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to
the validity of its issuance.
Radio Communications v NTC G.R. No. L-68729 May 29, 1987
Facts:
RCPI operated a radio communications system since 1957 under legislative franchise granted by
Republic Act No. 2036 (1957). The petitioner established a radio telegraph service in Sorsogon,
Sorsogon (1968). in San Jose, Mindoro (1971), and Catarman, Samar (1983).
Kayumanggi Radio, on the other hand, was given the rights by the NTC to operate radio networks in
the same areas.
RCPI filed a complaint in the NTC and sought to prohibit Kayumanggi Radio to operate in the same
areas. The NTC ruled against the RTCs favor and commanded RCPI to desist in the operation of radio
telegraphs in the three areas.
RTC filed a MFR in 1984. This was denied.
In the SC, Petitioner alleged that the Public Service Law had sections that was still in effect even if the
Public Service Commission was abolished and the NTC was established.

These were S13- the Commission shall have jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all public
services and their franchises S 14- Radio companies are exempt from the commissions authority
except with respect to the fixing of rates And S 15-no public service shall operate in the Philippines
without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as
"certificate of public convenience,"
Issue: Whether or not petitioner RCPI, a grantee of a legislative franchise to operate a radio company,
is required to secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity before it can validly operate its
radio stations including radio telephone services in the aforementioned areas
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Presidential Decree No. 1- the Public Service Commission was abolished and its functions were
transferred to three specialized regulatory boards, as follows: the Board of Transportation, the Board of
Communications and the Board of Power and Waterworks. The functions so transferred were still
subject to the limitations provided in sections 14 and 15 of the Public Service Law, as amended.
The succeeding Executive Order No. 546- the Board of Communications and the Telecommunications
Control Bureau were abolished and their functions were transferred to the National Telecommunications
Commission
Section 15- b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators of public
service communications; and determine and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the operation of
such public utility facilities and services except in cases where charges or rates are established by
international bodies or associations of which the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies
recognized by the Philippine Government as the proper arbiter of such charges or rates;
c. Grant permits for the use of radio frequencies for wireless telephone and telegraph systems and
radio communication systems including amateur radio stations and radio and television broadcasting
systems;
The exemption enjoyed by radio companies from the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission and
the Board of Communications no longer exists because of the changes effected by the Reorganization
Law and implementing executive orders.
The petitioner's claim that its franchise cannot be affected by Executive Order No. 546 on the ground
that it has long been in operation since 1957 cannot be sustained.
Today, a franchise, being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign power of the state and
owing its existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police power
through its administrative agencies. Pangasinan transportation Co.- statutes enacted for the regulation
of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the State of its police power, are applicable not only to
those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established
and in operation .
Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D. No. I insofar as it amends the Public
Service Law (CA No. 146, as amended) is applicable to the petitioner who must be bound by its
provisions.
The position of the petitioner that by the mere grant of its franchise under RA No. 2036 it can operate a
radio communications system anywhere within the Philippines is erroneous.
Sec. 4(a). This franchise shall not take effect nor shall any powers thereunder be exercised by the
grantee until the Secretary of Public works and Communications shall have allotted to the grantee the
frequencies and wave lengths to be used, and issued to the grantee a license for such case.

Thus, in the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was a precondition before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas where it
desires to operate.
The records of the case do not show any grant of authority from the then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications before the petitioner installed the questioned radio telephone services in San Jose,
Mindoro in 1971. The same is true as regards the radio telephone services opened in Sorsogon,
Sorsogon and Catarman, Samar in 1983. No certificate of public convenience and necessity appears to
have been secured by the petitioner from the public respondent when such certificate,was required by
the applicable public utility regulations.
The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature nor can a franchise be
granted except that it must be subject to amendment, alteration, or even repeal by the legislature
when the common good so requires.
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ 180 SCRA 218; GR NO 84818 18 DEC 1989
Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for
certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the
National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent
(15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was
issued without prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public
Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on
June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that
although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are
meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative
character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication.
Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It,
however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental
to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While
respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such
rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural
requirements of notice and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to
make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or
permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didnt scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the
petitioner
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. But respondents contention that
notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire
proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, providing for
the proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to
fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the exceptions, limitations or saving
provisions.

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without
first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial
whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own
motion as in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VERA
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non Delegation of Legislative Powers]
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme
Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed
by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for
execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation
Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for
hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other
things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the
Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary
opposition, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only
in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation
officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation
Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the
Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the
salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to
make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different
provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than
those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no
probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The
Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of
the provinces and this is the actual situation now appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of
a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without
a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.
US v Ang Tang HoGR L-17122February 27, 1922Johns

Facts: The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions, Section
1,authorizing the governor-General fro any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out
the purposes of the Act. Thus, on August 1, 1919, the Governor-General signed EO 53, fixing the price
of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang TangHo was caught selling a ganta of rice at the price of eighty
centavos, a price higher thanthat fixed by EO 53. Defendant was found guilty and now assails the
constitutionality of the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of legislative powers.
Issue:Won Act 2868 is unconstitutional?
Held:Yes. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act authorized the
Governor-General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to effect thelaw. The said
Act was not complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify what conditions the GovernorGeneral shall issue the proclamation as the said Act states for any cause. It also failed to define
extraordinary rise that such proclamation by theGovernor-General aims to prevent. Lastly, the said
Act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures by the Governor-General
US v. Ang Tang Ho
G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922
Issue:
whether Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power
Held:
Yes. This question involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it
authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that
section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause
resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary
rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the
promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the GovernorGeneral. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what
reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued for any
cause, and leaves the question as to what is any cause to the discretion of the Governor-General.
The Act also says: For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn. The Legislature does not specify or define what is an extraordinary rise. That is
also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, with
the consent of the Council of State, is authorized to issue and promulgate temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act. It does not specify or define what is a
temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures
shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has
not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and
discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not a cause, and what is or what is not
an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency
measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and
the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any
dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been
any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an
emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation,
and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.
A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch
of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or
delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but
which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact
or event.

The law says that the Governor-General may fix the maximum sale price that the industrial
or merchant may demand. The law is a general law and not a local or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other
and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and
different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of
legislative power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial
treasurers and their deputies, who are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all
instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper
enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities. The issuance of the proclamation
by the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub
delegation of that power.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which
constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other
words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what
was not any cause for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn, and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice
should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be
issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and
when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was any cause, or
what was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn, Neither did it specify or define the
conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime
was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of
rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos
(P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.
Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a
proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to
make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.
US v. Barias
Facts:
On November 2, 1911, defendant Segundo Barias, a motorman for the Manila Electric Railroad and
Light Company, was driving his car along Rizal Avenue and stopped at an intersection to take on some
passengers. He looked backward, presumably to be sure that all passengers were aboard, and then
started the car. At that moment, Fermina Jose, a 3-year old child, walked or ran in front of the car. She
was knocked down and dragged at some distance to death. Defendant knew nothing of this until his
return, when he was informed of what happened. He was charged and found guilty of homicide
resulting from reckless negligence.
Issue:
Whether the evidence shows such carelessness or want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant
as to amount to reckless negligence
Held:
Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care
is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.
The evidence shows that the thoroughfare on which the incident occurred was a public street in a
densely populated section of the city. The hour was six in the morning, or about the time when the
residents of such streets begin to move about. Under such conditions a motorman of an electric street

car was clearly charged with a high degree of diligence in the performance of his duties. He was bound
to know and to recognize that any negligence on his part in observing the track over which he was
running his car might result in fatal accidents. He had no right to assume that the track before his car
was clear. It was his duty to satisfy himself of that fact by keeping a sharp lookout, and to do
everything in his power to avoid the danger which is necessarily incident to the operation of heavy
street cars on public thoroughfares in populous sections of the city. At times, it might be highly proper
and prudent for him to glance back before again setting his car in motion, to satisfy himself that he
understood correctly a signal to go forward or that all the passengers had safely alighted or gotten on
board. But we do insist that before setting his car again in motion, it was his duty to satisfy himself that
the track was clear, and, for that purpose, to look and to see the track just in front of his car. This the
defendant did not do, and the result of his negligence was the death of the child.
We hold that the reasons of public policy which impose upon street car companies and their employees
the duty of exercising the utmost degree of diligence in securing the safety of passengers, apply with
equal force to the duty of avoiding the infliction of injuries upon pedestrians and others on the public
streets and thoroughfares over which these companies are authorized to run their cars. And while, in a
criminal case, the courts will require proof of the guilt of the company or its employees beyond a
reasonable doubt, nevertheless the care or diligence required of the company and its employees is the
same in both cases, and the only question to be determined is whether the proofs shows beyond a
reasonable doubt that the failure to exercise such care or diligence was the cause of the accident, and
that the defendant was guilty thereof.
Standing erect, at the position he would ordinarily assume while the car is in motion, the eye of the
average motorman might just miss seeing the top of the head of a child, about three years old,
standing or walking close up to the front of the car. But it is also very evident that by inclining the head
and shoulders forward very slightly, and glancing in front of the car, a person in the position of a
motorman could not fail to see a child on the track immediately in front of his car; and we hold that it is
the manifest duty of a motorman, who is about to start his car on a public thoroughfare in a thicklysettled district, to satisfy himself that the track is clear immediately in front of his car, and to incline his
body slightly forward, if that be necessary, in order to bring the whole track within his line of vision. Of
course, this may not be, and usually is not necessary when the car is in motion, but we think that it is
required by the dictates of the most ordinary prudence in starting from a standstill.

KMU Labor Center v. Garcia GR 115381 Dec. 23, 1994

FACTS:
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Secretary Oscar M. Orbos issued
Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando that will allow provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates
within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year to be
implemented on August 6, 1990. The Memo read as is the liberalization of regulations in the transport
sector and to move away gradually from regulatory policies and make progress towards greater
reliance to market forces: Chairman Fernando informed Sec. Orbos that the Memo is not legally
feasible and recommended for further studies because (1) under Public Service Act rates should be
approved by public service operators; there should be publication and notice especially to affected
sectors; and a public hearing be held; (2) it was untimely due to an earthquake happened on July 16;
(3) it will trigger upward adjustment in bus fares especially in trips bound for Northern Luzon; and (4)
DOTC should consider reforms that will be uplifting after the earthquake. On December 5, 1990 the
Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate
increase. On December 14, 1990 LTFRB released a fare schedule based on a straight computation. On
March 30, 1992 DOTC Sec. Pete Nicomedes Prado issued Department Order No 92-587 defining the
framework on the regulation of transport services. Then on October 8, 1992 DOTC Sec. Jose B. Garcia
issued a memorandum to LTFRB for the swift action on the adoption of the rules and procedures to
implement Department Order No. 92-587 that laid down the deregulation and other liberalization
policies for the transport sector. LTFRB issued on February 17, 1993
On March 16, 1994. Kilusang Mayo Uno anchors its claim on two (2) grounds. First, the authority given
by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%)
percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above

the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid
and illegal. Second, the establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for a
proposed transport service without having to prove public necessity is illegal for being violative of the
Public Service Act and the Rules of Court and petitions before the LTFRB.
LTFRB dismissed because of lack of merit.
The Court, on June 20, 1994, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining, prohibiting and preventing
respondents from implementing the bus fare rate increase as well as the questioned orders and
memorandum circulars. This meant that provincial bus fares were rolled back to the levels duly
authorized by the LTFRB prior to March 16, 1994. A moratorium was likewise enforced on the issuance
of franchises for the operation of buses, jeepneys, and taxicabs.
DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. and the LTFRB asseverate that the petitioner does not have the
standing to maintain the instant suit. They further claim that it is within DOTC and LTFRBs authority to
set a fare range scheme and establish a presumption of public need in applications for certificates of
public convenience.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners have the right to petition of this case?
Whether or not the fare adjustment is constitutional?
HELD:
(1) YES. KMU has a locus standi (or ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient
connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that partys participation in the
case) which is inherent in the Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
NO. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged
administrative issuances and orders, namely: DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, LTFRB
Memorandum Circular
No. 92-009, and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB are hereby DECLARED
contrary to law and invalid insofar as they affect provisions therein (a) delegating to provincial bus and
jeepney operators the authority to increase or decrease the duly prescribed transportation fares; and
(b) creating a presumption of public need for a service in favor of the applicant for a certificate of
public convenience and placing the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service to
the oppositor. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June 20, 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT
insofar as it enjoined the bus fare rate increase granted under the provisions of the aforementioned
administrative circulars, memoranda and/or orders declared invalid.
Gerochi vs. DOE
Facts: RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), which
sought to impose a universal charge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose of funding
NAPOCORs projects, was enacted and took effect in 2001.
Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA, stating that the imposition of the universal charge
on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation for not
giving the consumers a chance to be heard and be represented.
Issue: Whether or not the universal charge is a tax.

Held: NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the States
police power. That public welfare is promoted may be gleaned from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA, which
enumerates the policies of the State regarding electrification. Moreover, the Special Trust Fund feature
of the universal charge reasonably serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes
for which the universal charge is imposed (e.g. to ensure the viability of the countrys electric power
industry), further boosting the position that the same is an exaction primarily in pursuit of the States
police objectives
If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a
tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make
the imposition a tax.
The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. The theory behind the exercise of the
power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of
promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.

CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL

(G.R. No. L-4043, May 26, 1942)
FACTS
This is a petition to review a decision of Auditor General denying petitioners claim for quarters
allowance as manager of the National Abaca and other Fibers Corp. (NAFCO).
Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of P15,000.00
NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650 for
1949.
This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise council under
Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the Auditor
general on two grounds:
a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managers salary to P15,000/year.
b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.
ISSUES: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Owned and
Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void.
Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional.
DECISION: R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is not illegal delegation of legislative power to the executive
as argued by petitioner but a mandate for the President to streamline GOCCs operation. Executive
Order 93 is valid because it was promulgated within the 1 year period given. Petition for review
DISMISSED with costs
CERVANTES VS. AUDITOR-GENERAL
G.R. No. L-4043 May 26, 1952
FACTS: Cenon Cervantes, Manager of the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation (NAFCO)
receiving P15,000 salary a year, assailed the decision of the Auditor General denying his claim for
quarters allowance. By a resolution of the Board of Directors of NAFCO, Cervantes was granted
quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a month effective the first of August, 1949. The resolution
was disapproved by the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises on strength of the
recommendation of the NAFCO auditor, concurred in by the Auditor General, because of the following

reasons: (1) that quarters allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited by the charter of
the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the general manager thereof at the sum not to exceed P15,000 a
year, and (2) that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did not warrant the granting of
such allowance. The President promulgated Executive Order No. 93 creating the Government
Enterprises Council creating the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises pursuant to
Republic Act No. 51 approved by Congress authorizing the President of the Philippines, among other
things, to effect such reforms and changes in government owned and controlled corporations for the
purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 51 is unconstitutional on the ground that it is an undue delegation of
legislative power.
HELD:
No. The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is established by the
statute" there is no undue delegation. (11 Am. Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the
President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in government-controlled
corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies
attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent government of the Philippines and to
promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy
fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in
question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative
power.

Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General

FACTS:
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders
to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public
funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders.

Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any
person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
the executive orders aforementioned.
ISSUE:
Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have the
authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department.
RULING:
Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise
of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the
Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does not
include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional
mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in him by the
Constitution.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.
ALEGRE vs COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (1929) G.R. L-30783
FACTS:
Petitioner is engaged in the production of abaca and its exportation to foreign markets. He applied to
the respondent for a permit to export one hundred bales of abaca to England, but was denied. He was
advised by the respondent that he would not be permitted to export the abaca in question without a
certificate from the Fiber Standardization Board.

So he filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the provisions of the Administrative Code
for the grading, inspection and certification of fibers, in particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that
Code, are unconstitutional and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority vested in the Fiber Standardization Board is a delegation of legislative
power.
HELD: NO.
The Legislature has enacted a law which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp before
they can be exported to other countries and the creation of a board for that purpose, vesting it with the
power and authority to do the actual work.
Such authority is not a delegation of legislative power and is nothing more than a delegation of
administrative power in the Fiber Board to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very
nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the
power to do that would have to be vested in a board or commission.
The petitioners contention would leave the law, which provides for the inspection, grading and baling
of hemp, without any means of its enforcement. If the law cannot be enforced by such a board or
commission, how and by whom could it be enforced? The criticism that there is partiality or even fraud
in the administration of the law is not an argument against its constitutionality.
EDU VS ERICTA
G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970 En Banc [Non-delegation of power; police power]
FACTS:
Judge Ericta and Teddy C. Galo filed suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
assailing the validity of enactment of the Reflector as well as Admin Order No. 2 implementing it, as an
invalid exercise of the police power for being violative of the due process clause. Galo followed with a
manifestation that in the event that Judge would uphold said statute constitutional, A.O. No. 2 of the
Land Transportation Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of
legislative power.

ISSUE:

Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is constitutional and valid.

RULING:
Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public safety and order.
Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus
"be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state." The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual
citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative
Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such
administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect
reproducing what was set forth in the Act.
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not
delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception
that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is
the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To
determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority.
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code.
Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on
public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a
categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate
rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is
clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-fromformidable, launched against it by respondent Galo.
Edu v Ericta
Facts:
1. Assailed is the validity of the Reflector Law and Admin Order No. 2 which implements it. Under the
law, a vehicle has to comply with the requirements of having reflective device prior to being registered
at the LTO.
2. The respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorists, filed a suit for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an invalid exercise
of the police power for being violative of the due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with
a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge
would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation
Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of
legislative power.
Issue: W/N Reflector Law is unconstitutional, and w/n AO2 is valid
YES, both the law and AO 2 are valid.

It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to
promote public safety. What is delegated is authority which is non-legislative in character, the
completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.
1. Police Power
It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. "the most essential,
insistent, and at least illimitable of powers," (Justice Holmes) aptly pointed out "to all the great public
needs."
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: "Needs that
were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the
nation.
2. Delegation of Legislative Power
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not
delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception
that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is
the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To
determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process
can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done,
and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the
law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying
the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the
charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks
its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated
may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily
met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety.
ECHEGARAY v. SEC. OF JUSTICE
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled
on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing
that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the
power of the executive to grant reprieve.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been
rendered that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an
executive function.

HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of
an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the
three branches of our government.
Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998
Per Curiam
Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 yearold daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said
crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY
LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the
grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a
violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation of
legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate,
and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the
Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive
or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the
questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more
economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A.
No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary
of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as
Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged
similarly with Echegarays arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass
constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or

inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue
delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.
Issue:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?
Held:
No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out
lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said
drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of
the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties
cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or
mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment.
Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death;
but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution.
It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection
render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons discussed, the
implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and
expertise of administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time and
date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner
already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the
accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and
10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the
judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of
notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in
conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death
sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from
the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to
the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict
is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty
became final and executor wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and
spiritual affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in the
intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the
choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading
and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated.

First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise
only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or
ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection
allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence
whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all
personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such
task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death
penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death
penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and
since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are
cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished."
The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method
of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for
the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime
and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final
judgment rendered by a competent court."
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly
on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.
3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map
out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the
death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the
lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient
to cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel
involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task."
The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The
question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out
the penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the
exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, canalized within banks that keep it
from overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could
not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing
rules which provides a manual for the execution procedure. It was supposed to be confidential.
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a vacuum. The Secretary
of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to

the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and approval. Being a
mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a
manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as
the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental
responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.
4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent
Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be
suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection
shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or
while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the
death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an
invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17
amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death
sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after
delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.
While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659,
suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year
after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as
an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no
longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve
after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based
discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of the
applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain
consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.
Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and
that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on
October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the
Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the
choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a
public assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not
content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words lawful
cause, opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by
the government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies
against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot
pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on
February 14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy

resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly
those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September
20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically
Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a
disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition
for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right
that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very
basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated
that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the
rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional
rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it contentbased because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and influencing in
of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally,
maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of
the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the
exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate
compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at
least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30)
days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be
required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every
city or municipality that has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated preemptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance,
is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE
the requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED
G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919 RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
MINDORO, defendant. D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff. Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes
for defendant.
Rubi Vs Prob Brd of Mindoro.
FACTS : February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25. That said
resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the Secretary of the
Interior of February 21, 1917. December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive

order No. 2. Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of
Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711. That Rubi and
those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable
to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711. That the undersigned has not
information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it
must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711. It thus appears that
the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in
question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the
provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with
section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the
Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the
Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon
the decide.
ISSUE : WON Whether or not the said law is constitutional
HELD : By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the
Administrative Code. Among other things, it was held that the term non-Christian should not be given
a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization.
The term non-Christian it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area,
and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the other hand,
none of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the
Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the
general welfare and the public interest. when to advance the public welfare, the law was found to be a
legitimate exertion of the police power, And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt registration of
titles to land in the Philippines constitutes an advancement of the public interests, for, besides
promoting peace and good order among landowners in particular and the people in general, it helps
increase the industries of the country, and makes for the development of the natural resources, with
the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And these ends are pursued in a special manner by
the State through the exercise of its police power. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the
provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other
things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to
our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems
to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it
applies alike to all of a class.
People v Rosenthal
68 Phil. 328 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies Public Interest as Sufficient
Test
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were founders and shareholders of the ORO Oil Company. Later,
Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty of selling their shares to individuals without actual tangible
assets. Their shares were merely based on speculations and future gains. This is in violation of Sections
2 and 5 of Act No. 2581.
Section 2 provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell
in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file
previously with the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay
the required tax of twenty-pesos.
Section 5, on the other hand, provides that whenever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is
satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership,
association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided
for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a
certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership, association or corporation has complied

with the provisions of this act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers
or agents are entitled to order the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale; that said
Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when ever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to
cancel said certificate or permit, and that an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may
be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance.
Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which
can guide said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued,
thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that,
legislative powers being unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal Treasurer.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer
to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The
certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or
corporation applying therefor has complied with the provisions of this Act, and this requirement,
construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be
issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with. Upon the
other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly
conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the public interest.
In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 to protect the public against speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of stock in flyby-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations,
the SC held that public interest in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in
reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits.
Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated
criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a
mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations. The purpose of
the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the context of the provision in question show the contrary. . .

---------------------------------------------------------

Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs Secretary of Education

95 Phil. 806 Political Law Civic Efficiency
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No.
2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the
ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be
secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted the right to own and operate
a private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that
must be followed by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban
certain textbooks from being used in schools.

PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could
exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of
law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an
undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue delegation because the law did not specify
the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to
ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it
suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by
the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution
provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental
objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic
conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control of
private education was intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals.
This is still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER CO. vs PANGIL FEDERATION OF LABOR

70 Phil 602
Sufficiency of Standards
FACTS: This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the resolution, dated December 23, 1939, of
the Court of Industrial Relations entered in its Case No. 103, entitled "Pagil Federation of Labor vs.
International Hardwood and Veneer Company.
The petitioner claims that if section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is held to empower the Court of
Industrial Relations to determine minimum wages in connection with an industrial dispute, the section
is unconstitutional as constituting an undue delegation of legislative power to the Court at depriving

the petitioner of the equal protection of the laws. In support of this claim, petitioner argues that the
determination of minimum wages is a legislative function, and that section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
103 "does not indicate in what manner. by what standards, or in accordance with what rules, the Court
of Industrial Relations shall determine minimum wages under said section."
Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act,
the court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Assembly, by this Section 20, furnished a sufficient standard by
which the court will be guided in exercising its discretion in the determination of any question or
controversy before it.
RULING: Yes. discretionary power thus conferred is judicial in character and does not infringe upon the
principle of separation of powers, the prohibition against the delegation of legislative function, and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
RATIO: "Justice and equity and substantial merits of the case" is a sufficient standards.
Tatad v. Secretary of Energy [Nov. 5, 1997]
FACTS:
The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. The deregulation process has two phases: (a) the
transition phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and the (b) full deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No. 372).
Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the
Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the
Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry, and the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil
in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US
dollar is considered stable.
Issue:
w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is unconstitutional.
sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power, and (b)
w/n the Executive misapplied RA No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as factor
in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in Feb. 1997.
HELD/RULING:
(a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. RA No. 8180
provided that the full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997 regardless of the occurrence of
any event. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation.
Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the Presidenthe is to time it as far as
practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum in the world market are declining and when the
exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Webster defines practicable as meaning possible to practice or perform, decline as meaning to
take a downward direction, and stable as meaning firmly established.
(b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the
Executive before ordering full deregulation. The Executive department failed to follow faithfully the
standards set by RA No. 8180 when it co0nsidered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund.

The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in RA No.
8180 for it has no powers to make laws.
BILL MILLER vs. ATANACIO MARDO and MANUEL GONZALES G.R. No. L-15138 July 31, 1961
FACTS: These appeals present one identical question of law, namely, the validity of Reorganization Plan
No. 20-A, prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission under
the authority of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it confers
jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of
laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc. In G.R. No. L-15138, Manuel Gonzales filed with
Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, in Manila, a complaint against Bill Miller (owner and
manager of Miller Motors) claiming to be a driver of Miller from December 1, 1956 to October 31, 1957,
on which latter date he was allegedly arbitrarily dismissed, without being paid separation pay. He
prayed for judgment for the amount due him as separation pay plus damages. Upon receipt of said
complaint, Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo of Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor
required Miller to file an answer. In G.R. No. L-16781, Cresencio Estano filed with Regional Office No. 3
of the Department of Labor, a complaint (RO 3 Ls. Case No. 874) against Chin Hua Trading Co. and/or
Lao Kang Suy and Ke Bon Chiong, as Manager and Assistant Manager thereof, respectively, claiming to
have been their driver from June 17, 1947 to June 4, 1955, for which service he was not paid overtime
pay (for work in excess of 8 hours and for Sundays and legal holidays) and vacation leave pay. He
prayed for judgment for the amount due him, plus attorney's fees. In G.R. No. L-15377, appellant
Numeriana Raganas filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a complaint (Civil Case No. R-5535)
against appellees Sen Bee Trading Company, Macario Tan and Sergio Tan, claiming that she was
employed by appellees as a seamstress from June 5, 1952 to January 11, 1958, for which service she
was underpaid and was not given overtime, as well as vacation and sick leave pay. She prayed for
judgment on the amount due her for the same plus damages. In G.R. No. L-16660, Vicente B. Romero
filed with Regional Officer No. 2 of the Department of Labor a complaint (Wage Case No. 196-W)
against Sia Seng, for recovery of alleged unpaid wages, overtime and separation pay. Sia Seng, filed an
answer. In G.R. No. L-17056, Mariano Pabillare instituted in Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of
Labor a complaint (IS-2168) against petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc., alleging that petitioner engaged
his services as Chief Mechanic, Air conditioning Department, from October 1947 to February 19, 1959,
when he was summarily dismissed without cause and without sufficient notice and separation pay. The
petitioners questioned the authority of the regional offices to take cognizance of the subject matter
involved in their cases as provided for by paragraph 25 of Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A,
which provided that: 25. Each regional office shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
falling under the Workmen's Compensation law, and cases affecting all money claims arising from
violations of labor standards on working conditions including but not restrictive to: unpaid wages,
underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers; and unpaid
wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and payment for medical services of domestic help.
ISSUE: Whether or not the jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases affecting money claims such as
those sought to be enforced in these proceedings, is a new conferment of power to the Department of
Labor not theretofore exercised by it.
HELD: It is true that in Republic Act No. 1241, amending Section 4 of Republic Act 997, which created
the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission, the latter was empowered (2) To abolish
departments, offices, agencies, or functions which may not be necessary, or create those which way be
necessary for the efficient conduct of the government service, activities, and functions. (Emphasis
supplied.) But these "functions" which could thus be created, obviously refer merely to administrative,
not judicial functions. For the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was created to carry
out the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the National Government (See Section 3 of R.A. No.
997, as amended by R.A. No. 1241), which plainly did not include the creation of courts. And the
Constitution expressly provides that "the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such inferior courts as may be established by law.(Sec. 1, Art. VII of the Constitution). Thus, judicial
power rests exclusively in the judiciary. It may be conceded that the legislature may confer on
administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and
discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions. But in so doing, the legislature
must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi- judicial

prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with
the performance of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts. If a statute itself actually
passed by the Congress must be clear in its terms when clothing administrative bodies with quasijudicial functions, then certainly such conferment can not be implied from a mere grant of power to a
body such as the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission to create "functions" in
connection with the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government.