Boer, Monica den, ‘Intelligence Exchange and the Control of Organised Crime: From Europeanisation

via Centralisation to Dehydration?’, in Anderson & Apap (eds.), pp. 151-163.

Main motto of the article: “The EU law enforcement co-operation represents a pattern of centralisation
rather than decentralization at the level of the member states. Problem is that the national and regional
intelligence officers tend to keep their intelligence and not supply it to the centre. Thus Europol should build
thrust by giving them feedback, whenever their intelligence has been used to the benefit of transnational
criminal coordination by Europol”.

Introduction:

“Intelligence-led policing”
- the pivotal method within the era of modern policing and a core element of international police co-
operation, specially as regard of control of organized crime and terrorism.
- Can be defined as a collection of investigation techniques, which allows the pro-active and preventive
search for cues, eventually culminating in a synthesized picture of a crime to be committed.
- As such, ‘intelligence’ can be contrasted with reactive or repressive information-gathering, which is
usually performed after a crime has already been perpetrated.

The main thesis of this article

- the intelligence-sharing model within the EU tends to favor centralization.
- efficacy of centralised coordination suffers from the lack of trust in national and supranational agents.
- centralisation needs to be complemented by various forms of decentralization (regionalization) in
order to restore trust and to keep sensitive intelligence close to its source.

Reinforcing Centralisation: The Paradox of Europeanisation

- On the one hand, EU regulatory framework in the field of JHA may trigger a form of organizational
convergence between the MS; on the other hand, Europeanisation may be used domestically as an
argument to support administrative revision.
- Regulatory instruments adopted by the JHA Council may be expected to propel centralisation within the
national administrations. Examples: 1/ establishment of a common mechanism for the collection and
analysis of information with a view to providing Europol with comparable date for the development of
an annual Organised Crime Situation Report. 2/ Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime, which
formulates 30 recommendations that should be implemented in accordance with various timetables.
- These examples illustrate the efforts made at EU level to centralise and harmonise anti-organise crime
bodies within the national police organizations (other examples of directives p 154-155).
- Next to these 3rd Pillar instruments, relevant initiatives also evolve from communitarian co-operation:
1. 1989 creation of the Anti-Fraud Unit of the European Commission – UCLAF (since 1999 OLAF) –>
propelled organizational changes on national level.
2. 1991 EC Money Laundering Directive – obliged the member states to create financial intelligence
structures that collect and analyze information from financial institutions.
- Schengen Implementing Agreement – major impact on police and judicial cooperation in Europe,
although it was not designed with the purpose of controlling international organised crime: creation of
the National Schengen Information Systems (NSIS) caused the creation of national SIRENE bureaux.
- Main finding: centralisation tendencies are often paralleled by decentralisation patterns.

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Focus 1: Centralisation

- Examples: 1/ recent merger of the two Luxembourg police forces, the Police and the Gendarmerie
Grand-Ducale, into one single force, 2/ recent merger of the three Belgian police forces, the Judicial
Police, the Gendarmerie and the Municipal Police, into one integrated federal police force.
- The control of organised crime demands special expertise, specific investigations tools and elaborate
authorisation procedures, which are not always available at local or regional level.
- Moreover, the call for an internationally coordinated response often leads to central agencies.
- Also at the level of the prosecution service, some MS also made reforms towards a more central
coordination.

Focus II: Decentralisation

- There are strong indications that the degree and intensity of regionalisation processes depend on the
character of the national system: in a traditionally centralised system regionalisation is less likely to
be introduced than in a decentralised system.
- However, the strengthening of regional bodies and unites does not necessarily take place to the detriment
of the national level, in some cases the regionalisation may have more the character of centralisation
than decentralisation.

Focus III: Return of the Paradox

- On the one hand, the role of national ministries of home affairs has been reinforced as the steering
agent of coordinated (intelligence) co-operation across the borders; on the other hand, these same agents
are faced with the diminishing capacity to manage their internal security affaires independently.
- One important aspect that may contribute to the perception of ever-growing centralisation is institution-
building (since Amsterdam & Tampere –> Eurojust, European Police College; Europol newly granted
the right of initiative – allows it to demand member states to cooperate and share intelligence).
- Decentralisation seems to be an endemic feature when it concerns the storage of sensitive information: to
some extent, intelligence is purposefully fragmented, and only one part of it is stored in general
computerised databases. Europol officials regard decentralisation as an obstacle to exchange information
at an international level.

The sting is (always?) in the Tail

- Intelligence-led policing is complicated and sensitive practice in which trust plays a crucial importance.
- Although generally police intelligence is regarded as a critical factor of success for a modern proactive
response to organised crime, the value of it often tends to be compromised by the information monopoly
of the individual intelligence officer and the “I’ve got a secret” mentality.
- Intelligence-led policing on an international scale can only be successful if and when intelligence officers
suspend their ego-culture and adopt a partnership mentality. Europol should more often reach out to
intelligence officers and give them feedback – thus boosting trust-building.