Assignment 5.1 Case Compilation - CIAR

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO
CIAR, JULIE ANNE PRINCESS A 2D

ASSIGNMENT 5.1 CASE COMPILATION
MICROSOFT CORPORATION VS. BEST DEAL COMPUTER CENTER

CORPORATION
Microsoft Corporation filed a complaint against Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, et. al.
It alleged that defendants without authority or license copied, reproduced, distributed, installed
and/or loaded software programs owned by Microsoft into computer units sold by them to their
customers in violation of its intellectual property rights.
It prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain and enjoin defendants
from illegally reproducing, selling and distributing unlicensed software programs. It also applied
for the issuance of an ex parte order for the seizure and impounding of relevant evidence that
can be or may be found at defendants business premises.
The RTC of Las Pias denied Microsofts application for an ex-parte order but set petitioners
prayer for the issuance of TRO. Microsofts motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Microsoft then brought the matter directly to the Supreme Court supposedly because of the
importance of the issue involved and that it had no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
It also argued that it would be useless to first seek recourse thereat as the party aggrieved by the
appellate courts ruling would nonetheless elevate the matter to this Court. By then, Microsoft
surmised, the level of intellectual piracy would have worsened. Likewise, petitioner presumes
that direct resort to this Court is justified as the petition involves a pure question of law.
Issue: 1. WHETHER OR NOT the extraordinary writ of certiorari lie. WHETHER OR NOT
Microsoft violated the principle of hierarchy of courts.
Held:
1st issue
No. The extraordinary writ of certiorari will not lie. For certiorari to lie, it must be shown that
the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding.
A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested.
For an abuse to be grave the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act
in contemplation of law. There is grave abuse of discretion when respondent acts in a capricious
or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction
which was never shown by Microsoft in its petition. There being no hint of grave abuse of
discretion that can be attributed to the lower court, hence, it could be safely held that the
assailed orders were rendered in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
Significantly, even assuming that the orders were erroneous, such error would merely be
deemed as an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. As long as the
respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by
appeal. The distinction is clear: A petition for certiorari seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction
while a petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of
judgment include errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings. Certiorari under Rule
65 is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
Microsofts rights can be more appropriately addressed in the appeal.
2nd issue
Yes. Microsofts direct resort to the Supreme Court in the guise of speedy justice was in utter
disregard of the hierarchy of courts. The Court said that it found no exceptional or compelling

reason not to observe the hierarchy of courts. The Court reiterated its ruling in a catena of cases
that the Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared with
Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. The concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts
docket.
MANOTOC VS CA
Agapita Trajano (Agapita) filed for the recognition and/or enforcement of foreign judgment
rendered by the United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America for
wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence officials of
the Philippines allegedly under the command and direction of Imelda R. Marcos-Manotoc
(Imee).
Based on the complaint, the trial court issued summons addressed to petitioner at Alexandra
Condominium Corporation or Alexa Homes, E-2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig
City. The summons and a copy of the complaint were allegedly served upon Macky de la Cruz
(Macky), an alleged caretaker of Imees condominium unit. However, Macky refused to sign the
receipt for the summons. When Imee failed to file her answer, the trial court declared her in
default.
Imee by special appearance of counsel filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to invalid service of summons, i.e., the
procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted service of summons was ignored.
The RTC rejected the motion to dismiss and the plea for reconsideration. The CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT there was a valid service of summons.

Held:
The Court ruled in the negative. If the substituted service will be done at defendants office or
regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place.
Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the
office or business of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must
have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its
importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons.
There is a serious nonconformity from the requirement that the summons must be left with a
"person of suitable age and discretion" residing in defendants house or residence. Thus, there
are two (2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and
discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant. Both
requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriffs Return lacks information as to residence,
age, and discretion of Macky, aside from the sheriffs general assertion that Macky is the
"resident caretaker" of petitioner as pointed out by a certain Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist
and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It is doubtful if Macky is residing with petitioner
Manotoc in the condominium unit considering that a married woman of her stature in society
would unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the Imees allegation that
Macky is not her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to have additional
information in the Return of Summons. Besides, Mackys refusal to sign the Receipt for the
summons is a strong indication that he did not have the necessary "relation of confidence" with
petitioner. The person must have the "relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the

latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. To protect petitioners
right to due process by being accorded proper notice of a case against her, the substituted
service of summons must be shown to clearly comply with the rules. The sheriff should therefore
determine Mackys relationship with the defendant, and whether he comprehends the
significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the
defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons.
Agapita failed to demonstrate that there was strict compliance with the requirements of the
Rule. Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid substituted service, the
proceedings held before the trial court perforce was annulled.
PANTALEON VS. ASUNCION

Pantaleon instituted an action against Asuncion for recovery of a sum of money. Summons was
issued but was returned since according to reliable information, Asuncion is residing in B-24
Tala Estate, Caloocan, Rizal.
Hence, alias summons was issued. However, such summons was returned unserved since the
Sheriff found out that Asuncion was no longer residing in that address and diligent effort served
no purpose.
Upon Pantaleons motion, the court declared that Asuncion shall be summoned by publication.
Having failed to appear, the court declared him in default and rendered a decision against him.
It was only 46 days after rendition of the decision that Asuncion learned of the complaint as well
as of the adverse decision.
Aggrieved, Asuncion filed a petition for relief alleging that he had not been summoned or
notified of the hearing; no copy of the summons and publication were sent since he had not
received any; and his nonappearance is excusable it being due to the mistake of the authorities.
Issue: W the summons was served and thus conferred jurisdiction upon the lower court.
Held:
The summons was not served. Rue 7, Sec. 21 is applicable but such was not complied.
Section 21 is unqualified. It prescribes the proof of service by publication, regardless of
whether the defendant is a resident of the Philippines or not. Section 16 must be read in relation
to section 21, which complements it. Then, too, there is no reason why copy of the summons and
of the order for its publication should be mailed to non-resident defendants, but not to resident
defendants.
Considering that strict compliance with the terms of the statute is necessary to confer
jurisdiction through service by publication the conclusion is inescapable that the lower court
had no authority whatsoever to issue the order declaring Asuncion in default and to render
decision against Asuncion, and that both are null and void ad initio.
It is also constitutionally required that in action strictly in personam, like the one at bar,
personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the
court.
DEL MAR V. PAGCOR

PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as to whether or not it is
authorized by its Charter to operate and manage jai-alai frontons (courts) in the country.

The Secretary of Justice opined that the authority of PAGCOR to operate and maintain games of
chance or gambling extends to jai-alai which is a form of sport or game played for bets and that
the Charter of PAGCOR amounts to a legislative franchise for the purpose.
Petitioner Raoul B. Del Mar initially filed a Petition for Prohibition (GR 138298) to prevent
PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or Basque pelota games, by itself of in
agreement with Belle Corporation, on the ground that the controverted act is patently illegal and
devoid of any basis either from the Constitution or PAGCORs own Charter.
PAGCOR later entered into an agreement with Belle Jai Alai Corporation, wherein Belle will
make available to PAGCOR the required facilities, as well as provide the needed funding for jaialai operations with no financial outlay from PAGCOR, while PAGCOR handles the actual
management and operation of jai-alai.
Petitioner Del Mar filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari questioning the validity of the
agreement on the ground that PAGCOR is without jurisdiction, legislative franchise, authority or
power to enter into such Agreement for the opening, establishment, operation, control and
management of jai-alai games.
Petitioners Federico S. Sandoval II and Michael T. Defensor filed a Petition for Injunction (GR
138982) to enjoin PAGCOR from operating or managing said jai-alai games.
In this case, a Petition in Intervention was filed by Juan Miguel Zubiri alleging that the operatin
by PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal because it is not included in the scope of PAGCORs franchise
which covers only games of chance.
Procedural Issue:
Does the Court have jurisdiction to take original cognizance of a petition for injunction
because it is not one of those actions specifically mentioned in Sec. 1, Rule 57?
Substantive Issue:
Does PAGCOR have the authorization to manage or otherwise operate jai-alai games?
Ruling on Procedural Issue:

YES. It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and hence, the jurisdiction of
the court, are the allegations of the pleading and the character of the relief sought.
A cursory perusal of the petition in GR 138982 will show that it is actually one for Prohibition.
Even assuming arguendo, that it is an action for injunction, this Court has the discretionary
power to take cognizance of the petition at bar if compelling reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.
Rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice such that when
its rigid applications tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court has
the duty to suspend their operation.
Ruling on Substantive Issue:
NO. A historical study of the creation, growth and development of PAGCOR will really show that
it was never given a legislative franchise to operate jai-alai.
Section 1 of PD 1067-B provides the nature and term of PAGCORs franchise to maintain
gambling casinos (not a franchise to operate jai-alai);
Section 2 of the same decree spells out of the scope of the PAGCOR franchise to maintain
gambling casinos (not a franchise to operate jai-alai);
PD 1399, amending PD 1067-A and PD 1067-B did not have any amendments that changed the
nature and scope of the PAGCOR franchise to maintain gambling casinos.

EO No. 169, issued by President Corazon Aquino, revoked the franchise of the Philippines JaiAlai and Amusement Corporation controlled by the Romualdezes to operate jai-alai in Manila.
PAGCORs franchise to operate gambling casinos was not revoked; but neither was it given a
franchise to operate jai-alai.
It is abundantly clear from the aforequoted laws, executive orders and decrees that the
legislative practice is that a franchise to operate jai-alai is granted solely for that purpose and the
terms and conditions of the grant are unequivocably defined by the grantor. Such express grant
and its conditionalities protective of the public interest are evidently wanting in PD 1869, the
present Charter of PAGCOR.
In fine, PD 1869 does not have the standard marks of a law granting a franchise to operate jaialai as those found under PD 810 or EO 135. PD 1869 deals with details pertinent alone to the
operation of gambling casinos.
The short point is that PD 1869 does not have the usual provisions with regards to jai-alai.
Legislative franchise to operate jai-alai is imbued with public interest and involves an exercise of
police power. The familiar rule is that laws which grant the right to exercise a part of the police
power of the state are to be construed strictly and any doubt must be resolved against the grant.
A statute which legalizes a gambling activity or business should be strictly construed and every
reasonable doubt must be resolved to limit the powers and rights claimed under its authority.
In addition, PAGCORs franchise was not granted by a real Congress where the passage of the
law requires a more rigorous process; it was enacted in the exercise of the legislative power of
President Marcos. It is self-evident that there is a need to be extra cautious in treating this
alleged grant of a franchise as a grant by the legislature, as a grant by the representatives of our
people, for plainly it is not.
CRUZ VS SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Petitioners, as taxpayers and citizens brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus assailing
the constitutionality of RA 8371, otherwise known as the IPRA Law, together with its
implementing rules. The respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed its comment with the
view that said law is partly unconstitutional, on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous people and prays that the petition be granted in part.
The National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP), the agency created under the IPRA law
defended its constitutionality and pray that the petition be dismissed.
A group of intervenors also filed their respective comments defending the constitutionality of
the IPRA law.
The votes were equally divided 7 to 7 and the necessary majority was not obtained even after the
re-deliberation. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Sec 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure , the
petition is dismissed.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT the petitioners validly invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. WHETHER OR NOT the petitioners have the standing to file the suit as citizens and
taxpayers.
Held:
(Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug) For 1st issue
1st Issue
A cardinal requirement, is that one who invokes the Courts adjudication must have a personal
and substantial interest in the dispute; indeed, the developing trend would require a logical
nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated in order to ensure that
one is the proper and appropriate party to invoke judicial power. The rule requires a party to

aptly show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be
redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant his invocation of the Courts jurisdiction and
to render legally feasible the exercise of the Courts remedial powers in his behalf. If it were
otherwise, the exercise of that power can easily become too unwieldy by its sheer magnitude and
scope to a point that may, in no small measure, adversely affect its intended essentiality,
stability and consequentiality.
Nevertheless, where a most compelling reason exists, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance and paramount interest to the nation, the Court must take the liberal
approach that recognizes the legal standing of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as citizens and
taxpayers, to raise constitutional issues that affect them.
(Separate Opinion of Justice Kapunan) For 2nd issue
2rd Issue:
Petitioners, as citizens, possess the "public right" to ensure that the national patrimony is not
alienated and diminished in violation of the Constitution. Since the government, as the guardian
of the national patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos without distinction as to
ethnicity, it follows that a citizen has sufficient interest to maintain a suit to ensure that any
grant of concessions covering the national economy and patrimony strictly complies with
constitutional requirements. Thus, the preservation of the integrity and inviolability of the
national patrimony is a proper subject of a citizens suit.
In addition, petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the right to restrain officials from wasting public
funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. It is well-settled that a taxpayer
has the right to enjoin public officials from wasting public funds through the implementation of
an unconstitutional statute,49 and by necessity, he may assail the validity of a statute
appropriating public funds.50 The taxpayer has paid his taxes and contributed to the public
coffers and, thus, may inquire into the manner by which the proceeds of his taxes are spent. The
expenditure by an official of the State for the purpose of administering an invalid law constitutes
a misapplication of such funds.
MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC. VS RENE NIETO AND HELEN GARCIA
Defendants bought from plaintiff a parcel of land (New Manila Subdivision, QC). By a special
arrangement with the plaintiff, respondents were able to transfer the title to their names without
paying the full amount. Defendants maid partial payments and the balance (12,000) was
secured by a promissory note. The respondents agreed to pay plaintiff the balance in monthly
installments in not less than 500 per month.
The defendants paid only 100 in 2 installments. Plaintiff, thru its counsel, sent a letter of
demand which was received by the defendants. Despite receipt of letter, defendants did not
comply and even failed to make a reply.
There was an ex-parte reception of evidence because the defendants had been declared in
default, plaintiff having complied with the court's order allowing service of summons and copy
of the complaint upon the defendants-appellants through publication of the same in a
newspaper of general circulation (Daily Mirror), pursuant to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.
Plaintiff claims that summons could not be served personally upon the defendants because they
concealed themselves to avoid service upon them; and, that when the sheriff went to the Jai-Alai
Corporation of the Philippines at Cebu City where defendant-appellant Rene Nieto holds office,
as manager, he could not be found thereat but, when the decision was served at the same
address, the defendants were able to receive it.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT the lower court erred in allowing service of summons by
publication. Yes

Held:
It is true that in Fontanilla vs. Dominguez, it was held that service of summons by publication is
proper in all actions without distinction, provided the defendant is residing in the Philippines
but his Identity is unknown or his address cannot be ascertained. However, in a later case,
Pantaleon vs. Asuncion, the Court, ruled that "it is a well-settled principle of Constitutional Law
that, in an action strictly in personam, like the one at bar, personal service of
summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction divert the person of
the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court.
In other words, summons by publication cannot consistently with the due process clause in
the Bill of Rightsconfer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendant." And, quoting A
C.J.S., as follows: "Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal judgment,
and, when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to determine the personal rights and
obligations of the parties, personal service within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case
is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute compliance with the
constitutional requirement of due process. ... Although a state legislature has more control over
the form of service on its own residents than non-residents, it has been held that in actions in
personam ... service by publication on resident defendants, who are personally within the state
and can be found therein is not "due process of law", and a statute allowing it is
unconstitutional."
In the case of Citizens' Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Melencio-Herrera: ... the
Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a non-appearing defendant, absent
a personal service of summons within the forum... The proper recourse for a creditor in the
same situation as petitioner is to locate properties, real or personal, of the resident defendant
debtor with unknown address and cause them to be attached under Rule 57, Section 1 (f), in
which case, the attachment converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in remand the
summons by publication may then accordingly be deemed valid and effective."
CONSOLIDATED PLYWOOD INDUSTRIES, INC. (CPII) VS HON. AUGUSTO

BREVA AND MINDANAO HEMP EXPORT CORPORATION (MHEC)
CPII and MHEC are registered co-owners of a parcel of land measuring 5, 263 sq. m., with a
warehouse and office building standing thereon. It was CPII who occupied the property, using
the warehouse to store its products and the nearby building to quarter its personnel. It also
employed guards to secure the premises. In 1984, it made repairs and improvements on the
property which, together with the guard fees, allegedly amounted to P239,837.21. CPII sought to
recover from MHEC one half of the aforementioned amount as co-owner of the same property.
When extrajudicial demands produced no results, it filed suit for collection against MHEC in the
RTC.
Summons was issued to MHEC whose address was stated in the complaint to be at 413
Jaboneros St., Binondo, Manila. The same went unserved because MHEC was no longer doing
business at said address and nobody around the place knew the present whereabouts of said
defendant. The service of summons having already been attempted and failed, CPII moved for,
and the RTC ordered, service of summons by publication which was effected in the newspaper,
Philippine Daily Inquirer, on May 15 and June 1, 1987. No answer being filed within the 60
period after last publication prescribed in the alias summons, MHEC was declared in default
and CPII thereafter presented its evidence ex parte. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. Thus, CPII sought immediate recourse to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the service of summons by publication was sufficient to enable the court
to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
Held: No

While from the foregoing it may appear that resolution of the appeal is a simple and
straightforward matter of applying law and precedent to the facts established by the
evidence, such a result is precluded by the circumstance that due to a failure to effect proper
service of summons on MHEC, the Trial Court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of
said defendant and therefore could not lawfully render valid judgment thereon.
Petitioner's suit is for the collection of a sum of money, hence, a personal action, as
distinguished from a real action. It is, too, an action strictly in personam, as to which, in a
line of cases starting with Pantaleon vs. Asuncion, the Court has laid down and consistently
hewed to the rule that xxx personal service of summons within the forum, is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit
himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot
consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights confer upon the Court
jurisdiction over said defendant," and that "xxx (t)he proper recourse for a creditor in the
same situation as petitioner is to locate properties, real or personal, of the resident
defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be attached under Rule 57,
section 1(f) in which case, the attachment converts the action into a proceeding in rem or
quasi in rem and the summons by publication may then accordingly be deemed valid and
effective.
Accordingly, service of summons by publication here not having been preceded by
attachment of property of MHEC, it did not confer on the Trial Court jurisdiction over the
person of said defendant, and it is on this score that petitioner's action must be, as it is
hereby, DISMISSED.
ASIAVEST LIMITED VS CA AND ANTONIO HERAS
Asiavest filed a complaint against Heras to enforce a Hong Kong Court Judgment which
ordered the latter to pay the following amounts: a) USD1,810,265.40 or its equivalent in Hong
Kong currency; b) interest on the sum of USD 1,500 at 9.875% per annum; c) HK$905 at fixed
cost in the action and; d) at least USD80,000 representing attorneys fees, litigation expenses
and cost, with interest thereon from the date of the judgment until fully paid. Heras moved for
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Hong Kong Judgment was void for lack of
jurisdiction for want of notice.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Asiavest. It held that the Hong Kong court judgment
should be recognized and given effect in this jurisdiction for failure of HERAS to overcome the
legal presumption in favor of the foreign judgment. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court. It
held that under Hong Kong law, the substituted service of summons upon Heras effected in the
Philippines would be valid if it was done in accordance with Philippine laws, and since the
summons was not personally served on Heras, the same was rendered void for an action in
personam requires personal service in order to be valid. Thus, Asiavest sought relief from the
SC.
ISSUEs: a) Whether or not the Hong Kong Judgment can be validly enforced in this jurisdiction
b) Whether or not the Hong Kong Supreme Court validly acquired jurisdiction over Heras (this
involves the issue on whether the service of summons on Heras was defective under Philippine
law)
Held:
1st issue
Yes. At the outset it is important to note that a foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and
binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. Considering that both
Asiavest and Heras admitted to the existence and authenticity of the judgment, the same
confirmed the validity and enforceability of the judgment in this jurisdiction. However, the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,

collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In this case, the judgment is being assailed for
having been rendered without validly acquiring jurisdiction over the person of Heras.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process
upon the defendant are governed by the lex fori or the law of the forum, in this case, the law of
Hong Kong. However, there being no proof on the existence of a specific Hong Kong law
pertaining to service of summons either in actions in rem or in personam, the presumption of
identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption shall come into play. It will thus be
presumed that the Hong Kong law on the matter is similar to the Philippine law. In view of this,
issue on jurisdiction shall now be discussed.
2nd issue
No. Since the judgment sought to be enforced is a money judgment, the action is deemed in
personam which is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court
to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does
not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided
under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons
within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said
Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be
resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the
country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other
manner the court may deem sufficient.
However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the
state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is
possible if such defendant is physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the
case against him.
In the case at bar, the action filed in Hong Kong against HERAS was in personam, since it was
based on his personal guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor.
Accordingly, since HERAS was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him was,
indisputably, one in personam, summons should have been personally served on him in Hong
Kong. The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on
the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment
cannot be given force and effect here in the Philippines for having been rendered without
jurisdiction.
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK V. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT

BANK EMPLOYEES
LDB and ALDBE had a dispute whether or not LDB has violated their CBA and MOA on
promotion.
They agreed to submit their dispute on voluntary arbitration. Atty. Garcia, as voluntary
arbitrator, received the position papers of ALDBE but LDB failed to submit its position papers.
Without LDBs position papers, Atty. Garcia rendered a decision holding that LDB violated their
CBA and MOA on promotion.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court is the proper
remedy for the decision of the voluntary arbitrator.
Held:

The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite
limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of
the NLRC for that matter.
RA 6715 provides that "the award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator shall be final and
executory after 10 calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the
parties, while the "decision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within 10 calendar days from receipt
of such decisions, awards, or orders. Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the
decision of a labor arbiter, RA 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a
voluntary arbitrator.
A voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a
quasi-judicial agency, board or commission; still both he and the panel are comprehended
within the concept of a "quasi-judicial instrumentality."
The word "instrumentality," with respect to a state, contemplates an authority to which the state
delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function.
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power
delegated to him under the provisions therefore in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within
the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.
Thus, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be
appealable to the Court of Appeals just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and
commissions.
Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special
proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the
Regional Trial Court for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing
business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the controversy
may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having
jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the
award is vacated, modified or corrected.
In effect, the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trial court.
Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must
be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court.
Wherefore, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.
MARGARITA ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS VS ABELARDO B. LICAROS
Abelardo Licaros and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros were lawfully married on December 15,
1968. Out of this marital union were born Maria Concepcion and Abelardo, Jr. Ironically,
marital differences, squabbles and irreconcilable conflicts transpired between the spouses, such
that sometime in 1979, they agreed to separate from bed and board. In 1982, Margarita left for
the United States and there, to settle down with her two (2) children.
Abelardo commenced Civil Case No. 91-1757, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Margarita, based on psychological incapacity under the New Family Code. As Margarita was
then residing at 96 Mulberry Lane, Atherton, California, U.S.A., Abelardo initially moved that
summons be served through the International Express Courier Service. The court a quo denied
the motion. Instead, it ordered that summons be served by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time furnishing
respondent a copy of the order, as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition
at the given address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the

expense of Abelardo. Respondent was given sixty (60) days after publication to file a responsive
pleading. On November 8, 1991, the Decision was handed down in Civil Case No. 91-1757
declaring the marriage between Abelardo and Margarita null and void.
Almost nine (9) years later, on April 28, 2000, the petition at bench was commenced when
Margarita received a letter dated November 18, 1991 from a certain Atty. Angelo Q. Valencia
informing her that she no longer has the right to use the family name Licaros inasmuch as her
marriage to Abelardo had already been judicially dissolved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati
on November 8, 1991. Petitioner filed an instant petition regarding the validity of the declaration
of nullity of marriage based on the absence of a summon that should be served upon her. CA
rejected the petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Abelardo
HELD: Yes, Margarita was validly served with summons.
Margarita insists that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her person in the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage since she was never validly served with summons. Neither
did she appear in court to submit voluntarily to its jurisdiction.
On the other hand, Abelardo argues that jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident
defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not necessary. The trial and appellate courts
made a clear factual finding that there was proper summons by publication effected through the
Department of Foreign Affairs as directed by the trial court. Thus, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction to render the decision declaring the marriage a nullity.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service
of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.
As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine
courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over
his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in
rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine
courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have
jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not
essential.
Actions in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam are
directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand, actions in
rem or quasi in rem are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek
judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world.
At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991, Margarita was residing
in the United States. She left the Philippines in 1982 together with her two children. The trial
court considered Margarita a non-resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Since
the petition affects the personal status of the plaintiff, the trial court authorized extraterritorial
service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The term personal status
includes family relations, particularly the relations between husband and wife.
Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country
may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which
is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual
or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of
the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three
modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and
sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendants last
known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider
sufficient.
Applying the foregoing rule, the trial court required extraterritorial service of summons to be
effected on Margarita in the following manner:

x x x, service of Summons by way of publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a

week for three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time, furnishing respondent copy of this Order
as well as the corresponding Summons and copy of the petition at her given address at No. 96
Mulberry Lane, Atherton, California, U.S.A., thru the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the
expense of petitioner. (Emphasis ours)
The trial courts prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does not fall under the first or second
mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode. This refers to any other
means that the judge may consider sufficient.
The Process Servers Return of 15 July 1991 shows that the summons addressed to Margarita
together with the complaint and its annexes were sent by mail to the Department of Foreign
Affairs with acknowledgment of receipt. The Process Servers certificate of service of summons
is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out in the certificate. Before proceeding to declare the
marriage between Margarita and Abelardo null and void, the trial court stated in its Decision
dated 8 November 1991 that compliance with the jurisdictional requirements hav(e) (sic) been
duly established. We hold that delivery to the Department of Foreign Affairs was sufficient
compliance with the rule. After all, this is exactly what the trial court required and considered as
sufficient to effect service of summons under the third mode of extraterritorial service pursuant
to Section 15 of Rule 14.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58487 dismissing the
petition to annul judgment is AFFIRMED.
ANITA C. BUCE VS CA, SPS. BERNARDO C. TIONGCO AND ARACELI

TIONGCO, SPS. DIONISIO TIONGCO AND LUCILA TIONGCO, AND JOSE M.
TIONGCO
Buce leased a 56-square meter parcel of land in Manila. The lease contract was for a period of
fifteen years, "subject to renewal for another ten (10) years, under the same terms and
conditions."
Petitioner then constructed a building and paid the required monthly rental of P200. Private
respondents, through their administrator Jose Tiongco, later demanded a gradual increase in
the rental until it reached P400 in 1985.
For July and August 1991, petitioner paid private respondents P1,000 as monthly rental.
On 6 December 1991, private respondents counsel wrote petitioner informing her of the
increase in the rent pursuant to the provisions of the Rent Control Law.
Petitioner, however, did not pay the increased amount. Respondents refused to accept such
insufficient payment.
On 9 August 1993, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for
specific performance with prayer for consignation. She prayed that private respondents be
ordered to accept the rentals in accordance with the lease contract and to respect the lease of
fifteen years, which was renewable for another ten years, at the rate of P200 a month.
In their Answer, Under Republic Act No. 877, as amended, rental payments should already be
P1,576.58 per month; hence, they were justified in refusing the checks for P400 that petitioner
tendered. Moreover, the phrase in the lease contract authorizing renewal for another ten years
does not mean automatic renewal; rather, it contemplates a mutual agreement between the
parties.
During the pendency of the controversy, counsel for private respondents wrote petitioner
reminding her that the contract expired on 1 June 1994.
RTC declared the lease contract automatically renewed for ten years and considered as evidence
thereof (a) the stipulations in the contract giving the lessee the right to construct buildings and
improvements and (b) the filing by petitioner of the complaint almost one year before the
expiration of the initial term of fifteen years.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC, and ordered petitioner to
immediately vacate the leased premises on the ground that the contract expired on 1 June 1994
without being renewed and to pay the rental arrearages at the rate of P1,000 monthly.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition.
Petitioner contends that by ordering her to vacate the premises, the Appellate Court went
beyond the bounds of its authority because the case she filed before the RTC was for "Specific
Performance" not unlawful detainer. The power to order the lessee to vacate the leased premises
is lodged in another forum.
Additionally, private respondents did not pray for the ejectment of petitioners from the leased
premises in their Answer with Counterclaim; well-settled is the rule that a court cannot award
relief not prayed for in the complaint or compulsory counterclaim.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the petitioner to vacate the
premises which is a relief not prayed for in the complaint or compulsory counterclaim.
HELD: YES, the Court of Appeals went beyond the bounds of its authority, when after
interpreting the questioned provision of the lease contract in favor of the private respondents it
proceeded to order petitioner to vacate the subject premises.
After the lease terminated on 1 June 1994 without any agreement for renewal being reached,
petitioner became subject to ejectment from the premises.
It must be noted, however, that private respondents did not include in their Answer with
Counterclaim a prayer for the restoration of possession of the leased premises. Neither did they
file with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court an unlawful detainer suit against petitioner after
the expiration of the lease contact.
Moreover, the issues agreed upon by the parties to be resolved during the pre-trial were the
correct interpretation of the contract and the validity of private respondents refusal to accept
petitioners payment of P400 as monthly rental.
They later limited the issue to the first, i.e., the correct interpretation of the contract. The issue
of possession of the leased premises was not among the issues agreed upon by the parties or
threshed out before the court a quo. Neither was it raised by private respondents on appeal.
PETITION GRANTED.
MERCADER VS DBP
The Maderazos and the Mercaders rented the property of Manreals and cultivated the same. The
subject lot was mortgaged to DBP without the knowledge of the Mercaders. Manreals defaulted,
thus DBP foreclosed the property together with its improvements.
The Mercaders thereafter prayed that the DBP respect the improvements they introduced
therein and exclude them from the foreclosure. During the pre trial stage, the possibility of a
compromise was made. DBP provided options for the Mercaders in purchasing the property.
The Mercaders choose the lease purchase option. During the negotiations however, the DBP
rejected the extension request of the Mercaders. In short, the compromise was not successful
causing the termination of the pre trial stage.
The Mercaders thereafter filed a supplemental pleading alleging the validity and the
enforcement of the lease purchase option. The trial court ruled in favor of the Mercaders and
ordered the DBP to respect the lease contract between the Mercaders and Manreals. On appeal,
the CA ruled out the issue on lease purchase option because it was not alleged in the original
pleading.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding as material the leasepurchase option on the ground that it was not raised in the pleadings.
Held: Yes
The CA adverts to the lack of reference to the lease-purchase option in the initiatory pleadings,
this can be simply explained by the fact that the trial court only took cognizance thereof when it
became an integral component of the pre-trial proceedings. That is why the lease-purchase
option was included firstly, in the pre-trial order as one of the issues to be resolved at trial and
secondly, in the supplemental pleading subsequently filed by the MERCADERs.
As a supplemental pleading, it served to aver supervening facts which were then not ripe for
judicial relief when the original pleading was filed. As such, it was meant to supply deficiencies
in aid of the original pleading, and not to dispense with the latter. Hence, it was patently
erroneous for the Court of Appeals to pronounce that the lease-purchase option was not raised
in the pleadings. The DBP was even quite aware and knowledgeable of the supplemental
pleading because it filed an opposition thereto.
YUIJUICO V. QUIAMBAO
STRADEC held its annual stockholders meeting in its Pasig City. At the said meeting, the
following were elected members of the Board of Directors: Alderito Z. Yujuico, Bonifacio C.
Sumbilla, Dolney S. Sumbilla (petitioners herein), Cesar T. Quiambao, Jose M. Magno III and
Ma. Christina Ferreros (respondents herein). Petitioners Alderito Yujuico was elected Chairman
and President, while Bonifacio Sumbilla was elected Treasurer.
Respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), San Carlos City, Pangasinan a Complaint
against STRADEC. The complaint prays that: (1) the March 1, 2004 election be nullified on the
ground of improper venue, pursuant to Section 51 of the Corporation Code; (2) all ensuing
transactions conducted by the elected directors be likewise nullified; and (3) a special
stockholders meeting be held anew. Subsequently, respondents filed an Amended Complaint
dated September 2, 2004 further praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioners from discharging their
functions as directors and officers of STRADEC.
They filed a Supplemental Complaint praying that the court (1) direct Export Industry Bank,
Cezar T. Quiambao and Bonifacio G. Sumbilla to surrender to them the original and
reconstituted Stock and Transfer Book and other corporate documents of STRADEC; and (2)
nullify the reconstituted Stock and Transfer Book and all transactions of the corporation. Both
pleadings were admitted by the trial court.
Petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil (SEC) Case No. U-14. They prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds, among others: (a) the complaint does
not state a cause of action; (b) the action is barred by prescription for it was filed beyond the 15day prescriptive period provided by Section 2, Rule 6 of the Interim Rules and Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799; (c) respondents
prayer that a special stockholders meeting be held in Bayambang, Pangasinan "is premature
pending the establishment of a principal office of STRADEC in said municipality;" and (d)
respondents waived their right to object to the venue as they attended and participated in the
said March 1, 2004 meeting and election without any protest
RTC granting respondents application for preliminary injunction and the turn-over by
petitioner Bonifacio Sumbilla to the court of the duplicate key of the safety deposit box in Export

Industry Bank, Shaw Boulevard, Pasig City where the original Stock and Transfer Book of
STRADEC was deposited.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
Only the SEC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction to order the holding of a special stockholders
meeting involving an intra-corporate controversy;
Judge Meliton Emuslan had no authority to issue the assailed Order dated November 25, 2004
as Judge Aurelio Ralar, Jr. was already the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 48, Urdaneta City;
and
Assuming Judge Emuslan had authority to issue the assailed Order; he nonetheless acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
CA rendered the decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. It upheld the jurisdiction of the
RTC over the controversy and sustained the validity of Judge Emuslans Order of November 25,
2004. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated June 29, 2005
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT CA erred in ruling that the RTC has the power to call a special
stockholders meeting involving an intra-corporate controversy.
Held: SC said, we agree with respondents.

First, the appellate court correctly ruled that the power to hear and decide controversies
involving intra-corporate disputes, as well as to act on matters incidental and necessary thereto,
have been transferred from the SEC to the RTCs designated as Special Commercial Courts. It
would be the height of absurdity, they argue, to require the filing of a separate case with the SEC
for the sole purpose of asking the said agency to order the holding of a special stockholders
meeting where there is already a pending case involving the same matter before the proper
court.
Upon the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, otherwise known as "The Securities Regulation Code"
which took effect on August 8, 2000, the jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate
controversies and other cases enumerated in Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A has been transferred to
the courts of general jurisdiction, or the appropriate RTC.
Second, Respondents never refuted petitioners assertion. The Court of Appeals, for its part,
dismissed petitioners allegation by merely ruling that "this is the first time they are raising this
issue which is much too late in the day. In any event, one cannot question the authority of the
court when it does not suit him and accepts such authority when it favors him. The ruling
suggests that petitioners are barred by laches and/or estoppel from raising that issue. The
appellate court likewise denied petitioners motion to set the case for oral arguments.
CA should have resolved the issue of whether Judge Emuslan had the authority to issue the
assailed Order, a jurisdictional question crucial to the resolution of the petition. It is elementary
that a jurisdictional controversy may be raised at any time.
THIRD, petitioners further contend that even if Judge Emuslan had the authority to issue the
challenged Order, still he issued it with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. They lament that the Order effectively disposed of the merits of the main case [Civil
(SEC) Case No. U-14].
Unfortunately, despite the significance of this issue, the Court of Appeals totally ignored it by
failing to render a ruling thereon. Respondents, for their part, merely aver that Judge Emuslan
"only had the best interest of STRADEC in mind" when he issued the questioned Order.

We find for petitioners.

In Section 1, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies
under R.A. No. 8799, among the intra-corporate controversies transferred to the special courts
are:
(3) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of
corporation, partnerships or associations;
Undoubtedly, therefore, the instant case is an intra-corporate controversy among the
stockholders themselves relative to the election of directors or officers of STRADEC, specifically
between respondents on one hand and petitioners, on the other. If there is still any doubt that
the Special Corporate Court can call for a stockholders meeting, Rule 6 (citing Sections 1 and 2)
of the Interim Rules completely puts to rest said issue.
Clearly, therefore, said Rule empowers the special corporate courts to decide election cases.
As pointed out by petitioners in their answer with counterclaim, under Section 3, Rule 6 of the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under R.A. No. 8799, an
election contest must be "filed within 15 days from the date of the election." It was only on
August 16, 2004 that respondents instituted an action questioning the validity of the March 1,
2004 stockholders election, clearly beyond the 15-day prescriptive period. In sum, Judge
Emuslan, in granting the writ of preliminary injunction, acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
GOCHAN VS YOUNG
Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation was registered with the SEC with Felix Gochan, Sr.,
et al. as its incorporators.
Felix Gochan Sr.'s daughter, Alice, mother of herein respondents, inherited 50 shares of stock in
Gochan Realty from the former.
Alice died leaving the 50 shares to her husband, John Young, Sr. The Regional Trial Court
adjudicated 6/14 of these shares to Alice's children, herein respondents Richard Young, et al.
Having earned dividends, these stocks numbered 179.
Gochan Realty refused John Sr.'s request to partition the shares of his late wife and issuing new
stock certificates in the names of Richard, et al., citing as reason, the right of first refusal granted
to the remaining stockholders by the Articles of Incorporation.
John, Sr. died, leaving the shares to the Richard, et al.
Cecilia Gochan Uy and Miguel Uy filed a complaint with the SEC for issuance of shares of stock
to the rightful owners, nullification of shares of stock, reconveyance of property impressed with
trust, accounting, removal of officers and directors and damages against respondents.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Spouses Uy could properly bring a derivative suit in the name of Gochan
Realty to redress wrongs allegedly committed against it for which the directors refused to sue
Whether or not the intestate estate of John D. Young Sr. is an indispensable party in the SEC
case considering that the individual heirs' shares are still in the decedent stockholder's name
HELD: The case should be remanded to the proper RTC, not to the SEC.
Derivative Suit and the Spouses Uy

As early as 1911, this Court has recognized the right of a single stockholder to file derivative
suits. In its words:
"Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires
acts, or negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy the
wrong, a single stockholder may institute that suit, suing on behalf of himself and other
stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a redress of the wrong done
directly to the corporation and indirectly to the stockholders."
The personal injury suffered by the spouses cannot disqualify them from filing a derivative suit
on behalf of the corporation. It merely gives rise to an additional cause of action for damages
against the erring directors. This cause of action is also included in the Complaint filed before
the SEC.
The Spouses Uy have the capacity to file a derivative suit in behalf of and for the benefit of the
corporation. The reason is that, as earlier discussed, the allegations of the Complaint make them
out as stockholders at the time the questioned transaction occurred, as well as at the time the
action was filed and during the pendency of the action.
Capacity of the Intestate Estate of John D. Young Sr.
Based on Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and Section 2 of Rule 87 of the same Rules,
while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the
deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily
applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule
categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate
have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the
heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to
see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the
interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of
the decedent are violated or dissipated.
The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. They cannot be interpreted
in such a way as to unnecessarily put undue hardships on litigants. For the protection of the
interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances recognized the heirs as proper
representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed by the
court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to
recognize the heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do not
specifically prohibit them from representing the deceased, and since no administrator had as yet
been appointed at the time of the institution of the Complaint with the SEC, this Court
sees nothing wrong with the fact that it was the heirs of John D. Young Sr. who represented his
estate in the case filed before the SEC.
FORTUNATO GOMEZ AND AURORA GOMEZ VS

COURT OF APPEALS, ADOLFO TROCINO AND MARIANO TROCINO
The defendants, through their counsel Atty. Expedito P. Bugarin, filed their Answer. Defendant
Caridad A. Trocino, respondents mother, verified said pleading.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its decision on March 1993, with the following
disposition.

Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
The latter are hereby ordered to jointly and severally execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the
plaintiffs and to deliver the owners duplicate copies of TCT Nos. 10616 and 31856, covering the
properties sold, to the plaintiffs within ten (10) days from the finality of the judgment, after
which plaintiffs shall pay in turn to the defendants the balance of P2,000,000.00. Otherwise,
the sale is rescinded and revoked and the defendants are directed to return to the plaintiffs the
amount of P500,000.00, with interest of 12% per annum computed from December 6, 1989,
until the full amount is paid.
In addition thereto, defendants are to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs, the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages; P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; P40,000.00 by way of
attorneys fees; and P10,000.00 as litigation expenses.
Due to the defendants failure to deliver the owners duplicate of TCT Nos. 10616 and 31856, the
RTC issued an order on August 29, 1995 declaring said titles null and void, and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Cebu City to issue new titles in the name of herein petitioners.
CA issued the assailed Decision granting the petition and annulling the decision of the RTCCebu (Branch 10). The decretal portion of the decision reads:
The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 10, in Civil Case No. CEB-11103 as
well as all Orders issued to implement the same are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The
Register of Deeds of Cebu City is hereby ENJOINED from cancelling Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 10616 and 31856. No pronouncement as to costs.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in declaring the need for personal and/or
extraterritorial service of summons, despite the nature of the cause of action being one in
rem.
HELD:
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service
of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. Any judgment
without such service in the absence of a valid waiver is null and void.
In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to
the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. This is specifically
provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,which states:
SEC. 7. Personal service of summons.-- The summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof
to the defendant in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him.
In the present case, petitioners cause of action in Civil Case No. CEB-11103 is anchored on the
claim that the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino reneged on their obligation to convey
ownership of the two parcels of land subject of their sale. Thus, petitioners pray in their
complaint that the spouses Trocino be ordered to execute the appropriate deed of sale and that
the titles be delivered to them (petitioners); or in the alternative, that the sale be revoked and
rescinded; and spouses Trocino ordered to return to petitioners their down payment in the
amount of P500,000.00 plus interests. The action instituted by petitioners affect the parties
alone, not the whole world. Hence, it is an action in personam, i.e., any judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.
It must be pointed out that while it was the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino who sold the
properties to petitioners, their right to proceed against Jesus Trocino when he died was passed
on to his heirs, which includes respondents and Caridad Trocino. Such transmission of right
occurred by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by
virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance
of a person are transmitted.When the process server personally served the summons on Caridad

Trocino, the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction over her person alone. Hence, the trial
courts decision is valid and binding with regard to her, but only in proportion to Caridad
Trocinos share. As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:
This Courts decision is therefore applicable to all the defendant heirs with the exception of
defendant Caridad Trocino considering that it was the latter who entered into the alleged sale
without the consent of her husband. She is therefore estopped from questioning her own
authority to enter into the questioned sale. Moreover, Caridad Trocino was validly served with
summons and was accorded due process.
The petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
BANCO DE BRASIL VS CA
Cesar Urbino, Sr. sued Poro Point Shipping Services for damages the former incurred when one
of the latters ship ran aground causing losses to Urbino. Urbino impleaded Banco Do Brasil
(BDB), a foreign corporation not engaged in business in the Philippines nor does it have any
office here or any agent. BDB was impleaded simply because it has a claim over the sunken ship.
BDB however failed to appear multiple times. Eventually, a judgment was rendered and BDB
was adjudged to pay $300,000.00 in damages in favor of Urbino for BDB being a nuisance
defendant.
BDB assailed the said decision as it argued that there was no valid service of summons because
the summons was issued to the ambassador of Brazil. Further, the other summons which were
made through publication is not applicable to BDB as it alleged that the action against them is in
personam.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the court acquired jurisdiction over Banco Do Brasil and whether
or not the summons were properly issued.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. Although the suit is originally in rem as it
was BDBs claim on the sunken ship which was used as the basis for it being impleaded,
the action nevertheless became an in personam one when Urbino asked for damages in the said
amount. As such, only a personal service of summons would have vested the court jurisdiction
over BDB.
The Supreme Court also ruled said that the summons was not properly issued. When the
defendant is a non-resident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served
extraterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, Section 17 (now section 15) of the Rules of Court.
Under this provision, there are only four (4) instances when extraterritorial service of summons
is proper, namely:
when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs;
when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which
the defendant claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent;
when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and
When the defendant non-residents property has been attached within the Philippines."
In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of the
country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the
court may deem sufficient.

Extrajudicial services of summons apply only where the action is in rem. However, where the
action is in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. When the defendant is a non-resident, personal service of
summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. This
cannot be done, however, if the defendant is not physically present in the country, and thus, the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the
case against him. In the present case, the relief demanded went beyond the res by making a
claim for damages, thus, converting the respondents action into an action in personam. Bearing
in mind the in personam nature of the action, personal or, if not possible, substituted service of
summons on petitioner, and not extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction over
the person of petitioner and validly hold it liable to private respondent for damages.
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner leased to private respondent Westin Seafood Market, Inc., a parcel of land with a
commercial building thereon located at Araneta Center, Cubao for a period of 9 years and 3
months with a monthly rental of approximately P600,000.00.
Private respondent failed to pay rentals despite several demands by petitioner. The arrearages
amounted to P8,608,284.66. Admittedly, non-payment of rentals constituted breach of their
contract; thus, pursuant to the express authority granted petitioner under Secs. 25 and 26 of the
lease agreement, petitioner repossessed the leased premises, inventoried the movable properties
found within and owned by private respondent and scheduled public auction for the sale of the
movables with notice to private respondent.
Private respondent filed with the MeTC of Quezon City a complaint against petitioner for
forcible entry with damages and a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. The court issued a TRO enjoining petitioner from selling private
respondents properties at a public auction.
Thereafter the parties agreed, among others, on the following: (a) private respondent would
deposit with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank in the name of the MeTC the
amount of P8,000,000.00 to guarantee the payment of its back rentals; (b) petitioner would
defer the sale of the personal properties of the Westin Seafood Market, Inc., until a final
settlement of the case had been arrived at; (c) petitioner shall allow private respondent to
retrieve all the perishable goods from inside the leased premises like frozen meat, vegetables
and fish, all properly receipted for; (d) petitioner shall allow three (3) maintenance personnel of
private respondent to enter the premises at reasonable working hours to maintain the restaurant
equipment; and (e) the parties shall negotiate for the restoration of the premises to private
respondent, and if no settlement be arrived at on or before January 8, 1993, the hearing on the
merits of the case shall proceed and the disposition of the amount deposited representing the
rental arrearages shall be left to the discretion of the court.
Private respondent did not comply with its undertaking to deposit with the designated bank the
amount representing its back rentals. Instead, with the forcible entry case still pending with the
MeTC, private respondent instituted another action for damages against petitioner with the RTC
of Quezon City.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the damage suit on the ground of litis pendencia and forum
shopping. The RTC issued an order archiving the case pending the outcome of the forcible entry
case being heard at the MeTC for the reason that "the damages is principally anchored on
whether or not the defendants (petitioner herein) have committed forcible entry." Petitioner
moved for reconsideration of the order and reiterated its motion to dismiss the suit for damages.

The court issued an order (a) denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, (b) admitting private
respondent's amended complaint, and (c) granting private respondent's application for a
temporary restraining order against petitioner.
Thus, petitioner filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari on the ground that the
MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amended complaint of private
respondent and issuing a restraining order against petitioner; in allowing private respondent to
engage in forum shopping; and, taking cognizance of the action for damages despite lack of
jurisdiction.
CA dismissed the petition due to the failure of petitioner to file a MR of MeTC's order of which,
it explained, was a prerequisite to the institution of a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issues: WHETHER OR NOT CA erred in (a) finding that petitioner failed to avail of its plain,
speedy and adequate remedy of a prior MR with the RTC; (b) ruling that the trial judge did not
act with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the action for damages and injunction
despite the pendency of the forcible entry case with the MeTC; and, (c) ruling that private
respondent did not commit forum shopping since the causes of action before the RTC and MeTC
were not identical with each other.
Held:
While generally a MR must first be filed before resorting to certiorari in order to give the lower
court an opportunity to correct the errors imputed to it this rule admits of exceptions. The filing
of the MR before availing of the remedy of certiorari is not sine qua non when the issue raised
is one purely of law, or where the error is patent or the disputed order is void, or the questions
raised oncertiorari are the same as those already squarely presented to and passed upon by the
lower court.
We now turn to the issue of whether an action for damages filed with the RTC by the lessee
against the lessor should be dismissed on the ground of pendency of another action for forcible
entry and damages earlier filed by the same lessee against the same lessor before the MeTC.
Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that any person deprived of the possession of
any land or building by force, indimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld, may bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, together with damages and costs. Otherwise expressed, no claim for damages
arising out of forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be filed separately and independently of
the claim for restoration of possession.
It is likewise basic under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that a party
may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule,
if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the other or
others.
Since actual and compensatory damages were already prayed for in the forcible entry case
before the MeTC, it is obvious that this cannot be relitigated in the damage suit before the RTC
by reason of res adjudicata.
A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of the amount of damages may be recovered
in one case and the rest, in another.
What then is the effect of the dismissal of the other action? Since the rule is that all such rights
should be alleged in a single complaint, it goes without saying that those not therein included
cannot be the subject of subsequent complaints for they are barred forever.

The records ineluctably show that the complaint lodged by private respondent with the RTC of
Quezon City contained no certification of non-forum shopping. When petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss the case raising among others the ground of forum shopping it pointed out the
absence of the required certification. The amended complaint, as well as the second and third
amended complaints, attempted to rectify the error by invariably stating that there was no other
action pending between the parties involving the same causes of action although there was
actually a forcible entry case pending before the MTC of Quezon City. By its admission of a
pending forcible entry case, it is obvious that private respondent was indulging in forum
shopping. This is a compelling reason to dismiss the second case.
ROGELIO MARISCAL VS CA AND BELLA C. CATALAN
Private respondent Bella Catalan filed a complaint against petitioner Rogelio Mariscal before the
RTC of Iloilo for the annulment of their marriage on the ground that it was void ab initio for
having been solemnized without a valid marriage license and being bigamous. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 20983. Previously, Catalan also filed criminal complaints against
Mariscal for bigamy and perjury before the Iloilo courts.
2 days later, Rogelio filed his own complaint against Bella before the RTC of Digos seeking
likewise the annulment of the same marriage on the ground that he was forced to marry her at
gunpoint and that they had no valid license.
In view of Civil Case No. 20983 which she earlier instituted in the RTC of Iloilo, Bella moved for
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2996 invoking litis pendencia, citing Civil Case No. 20983
pending before the RTC of Iloilo which involved the same parties and the same cause of action.
RTC of Digos denied the MTD as well as the subsequent MR.
On appeal, the RTC of Digos was reversed by the CA in its assailed decision thus --Both actions filed separately in the two courts by petitioner (respondent Bella herein) and
respondent Mariscal (Rogelio herein) are for the annulment of marriage contracted by them.
Common to the complaints filed in both cases is the ground that no license to contract marriage
was obtained by both parties. That the marriage contracted by respondent Rogeliol was
bigamous because he had contracted a previous marriage with another woman is another
ground alleged by petitioner in her complaint. Certainly the judgment to be rendered in the
action first instituted, regardless of which party is successful, will amount to res judicata against
the second action . .Petitioner's added claim of $32k against respondent Rogelio, her complaint
cannot militate against the fact that the causes of action and reliefs in both cases are identical.
WHEREFORE, the orders complained of . . are annulled and set aside. Accordingly, respondent
Rogelio's complaint in Civil Case No. 2996 is DISMISSED on the ground of litis pendencia . . . .
His MR having been rejected, petitioner Rogelio is now before us submitting that the CA erred
in ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2996 notwithstanding that the judgment that may be
rendered in either case will not constitute res judicata on the other; for, on the possibility that
the RTC of Iloilo dismisses the complaint for annulment, the RTC of Digos can still void the
marriage by ruling that Rogelio's consent to the marriage with Bella was vitiated by force,
duress, intimidation and threats.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the complaint filed by Rogelio should be dismissed on the ground
of litis pendencia.
HELD: Negative. The petition is devoid of merit.

It is not infrequent that this Court is given the opportunity to discuss litis pendenciaas ground
for the dismissal of an action which has become unnecessary and vexatious. In Victronics
Computers, Inc. v. RTC-Br. 63, Makati, we said
It is a rule that for litis pendencia to be invoked as ground for the abatement or dismissal of an
action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of parties, or at least
such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the 2 cases should
be such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
x first 2 requisites are present. The parties involved in Civil Case No. 20983 (RTC-Iloilo) are the
very same protagonists in Civil Case No. 2996 (RTC-Digos). The actions in both fora are based
on the same set of facts that gave rise to the uniformity of the principal reliefs sought, more
particularly, the ultimate dissolution of their marriage.
The third requisite is the bone of contention. Rogelio contends that there can be no res
judicata between the 2 simultaneous civil actions because of the different grounds for the
nullification of their marriage. According to him, the judgment in one case will not abate the
second because the basis for annulment in the former would not have even been traversed or
passed upon in the latter.
Petitioner Rogelio does not convince. In litis pendencia what is essential is the identity and
similarity of the issues under consideration. In his effort to have the case resolved in a different
venue, petitioner has resorted to nit-picking and in the process has lost track of the real issue
besetting the 2 actions which is simply the nullification of a marriage. Interestingly, in his
answer submitted in Civil Case No. 20983 (RTC-Iloilo), he prayed
WHEREFORE . . . . it is prayed . . . that the above-entitled case be dismissed; and/or, in the
alternative, that the alleged marriage contracts be declared void from the beginning for having
been performed illegally and under force, violence, intimidation, threats and strategy . . . .
By including such prayer in his answer, Rogelio has raised the issue of "force, violence,
intimidation, threats and strategy" before the RTC-Iloilo, the very same set forth in the RTCDigos. Hence, he cannot now deny that the issues as well as arguments raised before the 2 trial
courts are identical. Any decision or ruling promulgated in Civil Case No. 20983 by the RTC of
Iloilo will necessarily constitute res judicata on Civil Case No. 2996 pending before the RTC of
Digos and vice-versa.
In addition to specific denials, affirmative and special defenses wherein he questioned the
jurisdiction of the RTC of Iloilo over the nature of the action and that there was pending
between the same parties for the same cause Civil Case No. 2996 in the RTC of Digos, he also
presented a compulsory counterclaim in his answer. Therein he alleged that by reason of the
complaint filed by Bella in gross and evident bad faith, malice and harassment, he suffered
anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation, mental torture and sleepless nights thus
entitling him to moral damages of P1M exemplary damages of P500K as well as attorney's fees
of 35% of the amount of damages and value of the property or money involved but in no case
less than P500K plus initial litigation costs of P30K.
A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action against the
plaintiff in a case. To interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim and again invoke it in a
complaint against the same person or party would be splitting a cause of action not sanctioned
by the Rules. Indeed the Court is puzzled no end why he literally shied away from the RTC of
Iloilo where he could have just as well ventilated his affirmative and special defenses and
litigated his compulsory counterclaim in that court and thus avoided this duplicity of suits which
is the matrix upon which litis pendencia is laid.
A supervening development further dramatizes the puerile, if not needless, efforts of Rogelio to
derail the action pending before the RTC of Iloilo. In her Rejoinder, Bella informed the Court
that the RTC of Iloilo rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 20983 nullifying her marriage to

Rogelio on the ground that it was bigamous. Bella was awarded P100k as moral damages, P50k
as exemplary damages and P50k as attorney's fees. Her claim for reimbursement of US$32k was
however rejected as the evidence presented in support thereof was considered hearsay. With this
turn of events, any subsequent ruling by the RTC of Digos (were it allowed to proceed) which
deviates from the ruling of the RTC of Iloilo, a co-equal and coordinate court, could only lead to
absurd, if not chaotic, consequences. Indeed, this case underscores the importance of res
judicata or bar by prior judgment as a stabilizing factor in our judicial system. It forecloses not
only matters squarely raised and litigated but all such matters which could have been raised in
the litigation but were not.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the CA ordering the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 2996 pending before the RTC Digos, Davao del Sur, as well as the resolution
denying petitioner Rogelios MR, is AFFIRMED.
RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC., VS. THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF

PARAAQUE CITY,
Petitioner corporation was formerly known as Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated. On July 15, 1996, it
amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. As a
consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the transfer certificates
of title over real properties owned by the said corporation, all of which were under the old name,
Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated. For this purpose, petitioner instituted, on November 20, 1997, a
petition for amendment of titles with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City,
The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, apparently because
the titles sought to be amended, all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay
City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition that the lands covered
by the subject titles are located in Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject
titles are in the custody of the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City.
Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit AmendedPetition impleading instead as
respondent the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in
Paraaque City.In the meantime, however, the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu
proprio on the ground of improper venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the
Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and the properties are located in Pasay City. Petitioner filed with
the lower court a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. On the other hand, in view of the
dismissal of the petition, the lower court also denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended
Petition.The Solicitor General filed his Comment contending that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the res because it appeared from the original petition that the lands are
situated in Pasay City; hence,outside the jurisdiction of the Paraaque court. Since it had no
jurisdiction over the case, it could not have acted on the motion to admit amended petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of
improper venue?
HELD:
While the ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the petition below was clearly that of
improper venue, the Solicitor General confuses venue with jurisdiction. A distinction between
the two must be drawn. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred
only by law. It may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would
have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. On the other hand, the venue of an
action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties, and an objection on
improper venue may be waived by the failure of the defendant to raise it at the proper time. In
such an event, the court may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be
left to the consent or agreement of the parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and

hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict
their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court. It is said that the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It
relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Provisions
relating to venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant and not between
the court and the subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the
convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate
course of action at this stage of the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well
as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where the
defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he
cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong venue,
which is deemed waived.
Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue
cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the
venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the
rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants prerogative to
object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by
dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing
the procedure outlined in the rules of court to take its proper course. Although we are for the
speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary importance. The
ends of justice require that respondent trial court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to
afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be heard on his cause.
DACOYCOY VS INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT
Jesus Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti, Cainta, Rizal, filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint against private respondent Rufino de Guzman praying for the
annulment of two (2) deeds of sale involving a parcel of riceland situated in Barrio Estanza,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, the surrender of the produce thereof and damages for private
respondent's refusal to have said deeds of sale set aside upon petitioner's demand.
Before summons could be served on private respondent as defendant therein, the RTC Executive
Judge issued an order requiring counsel for petitioner to confer with respondent trial judge on
the matter of venue. After said conference, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground
of improper venue. It found, based on the allegations of the complaint, that petitioner's action is
a real action as it sought not only the annulment of the aforestated deeds of sale but also the
recovery of ownership of the subject parcel of riceland located in Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan,
which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.
Petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which in its
decision of affirmed the order of dismissal of his complaint.
Petitioner faults the appellate court in affirming what he calls an equally erroneous finding of
the trial court that the venue was improperly laid when the respondent, has not even answered
the complaint nor waived the venue.
Petitioner claims that the right to question the venue of an action belongs solely to the defendant
and that the court does not possess the authority to confront the plaintiff and tell him that the
venue was improperly laid, as venue is waivable. In other words, petitioner asserts, without the

defendant objecting that the venue was improperly laid, the trial court is powerless to dismiss
the case motu proprio.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the dismissal of petitioner's complaint is
proper because the same can "readily be assessed as (a) real action." He asserts that "every court
of justice before whom a civil case is lodged is not even obliged to wait for the defendant to raise
that venue was improperly laid. The court can take judicial notice and motu proprio dismiss a
suit clearly denominated as real action and improperly filed before it. . . . the location of the
subject parcel of land is controlling pursuant to Sec. 2, par. (a), Rule 4 of the New Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of
improper venue
Held: The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint by respondent trial court on the
ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to distinguish
between jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court. It is said that the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates
to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Provisions
relating to venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant and not between
the court and the subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the
convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case.
In the instant case, even granting for a moment that the action of petitioner is a real action,
respondent trial court would still have jurisdiction over the case, it being a regional trial court
vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein . . ." in accordance with Section 19 (2) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. With respect to the parties, there is no dispute that it acquired
jurisdiction over the plaintiff Jesus Dacoycoy, now petitioner, the moment he filed his complaint
for annulment and damages. Respondent trial court could have acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant, now private respondent, either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of legal process exercised over his person.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate
course of action at this stage of the proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as
in the courts of first instancE, may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where defendant fails to
challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in
a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue
cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the
venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the
rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to
object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by
dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing
the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court to take its proper course. Although we are for the
speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary importance. The
ends of justice require that respondent trial court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to
afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be heard on his cause.
POLYTRADE CORPORATION VS VICTORIANO BLANCO

Suit before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on four causes of action to recover the
purchase price of rawhide delivered by plaintiff to defendant. Plaintiff corporation has its

principal office and place of business in Makati, Rizal. Defendant is a resident of Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Defendant moved to dismiss upon the ground of improper venue. He claims that by
contract suit may only be lodged in the courts of Manila. The Bulacan court overruled him. He
did not answer the complaint. In consequence, a default judgment was rendered against him.
Defendant appealed.
Issue: Whether or not venue was properly laid in the province of Bulacan where defendant is a
resident
Held: Yes
Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions triable by courts of first
instance and this is one provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff." Qualifying this provision in Section 3 of the
same Rule which states that venue may be stipulated by written agreement "By written
agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one
province to another."
Defendant places his case upon Section 3 of Rule 4 just quoted. According to defendant, plaintiff
and defendant, by written contracts covering the four causes of action, stipulated that: "The
parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila." This agreement is valid. Defendant
says that because of such covenant he can only be sued in the courts of Manila.
No such stipulation appears in the contracts covering the first two causes of action. The general
rule set forth in Section 2 (b), Rule 4, governs, and as to said two causes of action, venue was
properly laid in Bulacan, the province of defendant's residence.
The stipulation adverted to is only found in the agreements covering the third and fourth causes
of action. An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, "The parties agree to sue and be sued
in the Courts of Manila," does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or
defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila.
Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue
are totally absent therefrom. The Court cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and defendant
bound themselves to file suits with respect to the last two transactions in question only or
exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or transfer venue. It simply is
permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may
resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in
Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
Venue here was properly laid.
The appealed judgment is hereby affirmed.
AUCTION IN MALINTA VS. LUYABEN
Respondent, a resident of Magsaysay, Tabuk, Kalinga, filed with the Kalinga RTC a complaint
for damages against petitioner Auction in Malinta, Inc., a corporation with business address at
Malinta, Valenzuela City. Respondent alleged that in an auction conducted by petitioner on May
29, 2001, he was declared the highest bidder for a wheel loader. Respondent tendered the
payment for the said item but petitioner could no longer produce the loader. It offered a
replacement but failed to deliver the same up to the filing of the complaint. Hence, respondent
instituted this case to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.

It argued that the correct venue is the RTC of Valenzuela City pursuant to the stipulation in the
Bidders Application and Registration Bidding Agreement which states that: All Court litigation
procedures shall be conducted in the appropriate Courts of Valenzuela City, Metro Manila.
The Kalinga RTC held that the clear intention of the parties was to limit the venue to the proper
court of Valenzuela City and thus dismissed respondents complaint on the ground of improper
venue. Respondent appealed to the CA which reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the stipulation in the parties Bidders Application and Registration
Bidding Agreement effectively limited the venue of the instant case exclusively to the proper
court of Valenzuela City.
Held: Petition denied
The general rule on the venue of personal actions, as in the instant case for damages filed by
respondent, is embodied in Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. It provides: Sec. 2. Venue of
personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.
The aforequoted rule, however, finds no application where the parties, before the filing of the
action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. But the mere stipulation on the
venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. It
must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words, such as "exclusively" and "waiving for this purpose any other venue," "shall only"
preceding the designation of venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar
import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as
limiting venue to the specified place.
This has been the rule since the 1969 case of Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco. It was held
therein that the clause "[t]he parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila," does
not preclude the filing of suits in the court which has jurisdiction over the place of residence of
the plaintiff or the defendant. The plain meaning of the said provision is that the parties merely
consented to be sued in Manila considering that there are no qualifying or restrictive words
which would indicate that Manila, and Manila alone, is the agreed venue. It simply is permissive
and the parties did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in
Section 2 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
In the instant case, the stipulation in the parties agreement, i.e., "all Court litigation procedures
shall be conducted in the appropriate Courts of Valenzuela City, Metro Manila," evidently lacks
the restrictive and qualifying words that will limit venue exclusively to the RTC of Valenzuela
City. Hence, the Valenzuela courts should only be considered as an additional choice of venue to
those mentioned under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the present case for
damages may be filed with the (a) RTC of Valenzuela City as stipulated in the bidding
agreement; (b) RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga which has jurisdiction over the residence of
respondent (plaintiff); or with the (c) RTC of Valenzuela City which has jurisdiction over the
business address of petitioner (defendant). The filing of the complaint in the RTC of Bulanao,
Tabuk, Kalinga, is therefore proper, respondent being a resident of Tabuk, Kalinga.
NESTLE PHILIPPINES V. FY SONS

Petitioner and respondent entered into a distributorship agreement (agreement) whereby

petitioner would supply its products for respondent to distribute to its food service outlets.
A deed of assignment was also executed by respondent in favor of petitioner, assigning the time
deposit of a certain Calixto Laureano in the amount of P500,000 to secure respondents credit
purchases from petitioner. A special power of attorney was likewise executed by Laureano
authorizing the respondent to use the time deposit as collateral.
In 1990, Krem-Top liquid coffee creamer was sold to Augustus Bakery and Grocery, an act which
was allegedly proscribed by their agreement. Hence, Petitioner imposed a P40,000 fine which
respondent refused to pay.
Thereafter, respondent, through counsel, wrote petitioner to complain about the latters
breaches of their agreement and the various acts of bad faith committed by petitioner against
respondent. Respondent demanded the payment of damages.
In turn, petitioner sent respondent a demand letter and notice of termination, alleging that the
latter had outstanding accounts of P995,319.81. When the alleged accounts were not settled,
petitioner applied the P500,000 time deposit as partial payment.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner.
In its answer, petitioner interposed a counterclaim for the balance of respondents overdue
accounts, with interest from the date of default until fully paid, other damages, attorneys fees
and costs of suit.
Makati City RTC ruled in favor of the respondent
Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. CA rendered a decision affirming the RTCs decision
with modification
Both the CA and the RTC found, among others, that petitioner indeed failed to provide support
to respondent, its distributor; that petitioner unjustifiably refused to deliver stocks to
respondent; that the imposition of the P20,000 fine was void for having no basis; that petitioner
failed to prove respondents alleged outstanding obligation; that petitioner terminated the
agreement without sufficient basis in law or equity and in bad faith; and that petitioner should
be held liable for damages.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT the CA committed a grave error in law when it ruled that the
respondents non- payment of the outstanding balance was not sufficiently proven despite the
fact that Florentino Yue, the manager of the respondent admitted in open court in answer to the
question of the judge that the distributorship agreement was terminated by the petitioner
because of the unpaid balance of the respondent.
Held:
Petitioners argument is palpably without merit and deserves scant consideration. It quoted Mr.
Yues statement in isolation from the rest of his testimony and took it out of context. The said
statement was merely in answer to the question of the presiding judge on what ground
petitioner supposedly terminated the agreement. The witness was not being asked, nor was he
addressing, the truth of such ground. Obviously, Yues statement cannot be considered a
judicial admission that respondent had an unpaid obligation of P900,000 and that the
agreement had been terminated for this reason.
FRANCEL REALTY VS RICARDO SYCIP
Petitioner and respondent entered into a contract to sell a house and lot. Upon execution of the
contract to sell, respondent made a down payment, which was considered as monthly rentals at

the rate ofP2,686.00 per month. On March 16, 1990, the townhouse subject of the contract to
sell was transferred in the name of respondent. Despite the transfer of the title in the name of
respondent, the latter refused to pay the balance. Despite several demands made by petitioner
to respondent, the respondent refused to reconvey the subject property to petitioner.
Petitioner filed an illegal detainer case against the respondent.
The respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but the lower
court denied the motion stating that the ground relied upon by respondent did not appear to be
indubitable.
Denying the material allegations of the complaint, the respondent again invoked the courts lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Further, there is a pending case between the
same parties and involving the same townhouse before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board for unsound real estate business practices. Likewise, the respondent justified his refusal
to pay the amortizations alleging that the petitioner sold and delivered to him a defective
townhouse unit.
The Court of Appeals held that the case involved not just reconveyance and damages, but also a
determination of the rights and obligations of the parties to a sale of real estate under PD 957;
hence, the case fell exclusively under the jurisdiction of the HLURB. The appellate court
observed that respondent and other buyers of the townhouses had notified petitioner of their
intention to stop paying amortizations because of defective structures and materials used in the
construction; they had in fact filed other cases, also before the HLURB, against petitioner for
unsound real estate business practice.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT the lower court can dismiss, after full blown trial, the case, on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.
WHETHER OR NOT the lower court can dismiss this case in spite of the indisputable fact that
respondent never secured HLURB authority or clearance to stop payment of monthly rentals.
Held:
1st issue:
From the very beginning, the present respondent has been challenging the jurisdiction of
the trial court and asserting that the HLURB is the entity that has proper jurisdiction
over the case. Consonant with Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, he had raised
the issue of lack of jurisdiction in his Motion to Dismiss. Even when the Motion was
denied, he continuously invoked lack of jurisdiction in his Answer with affirmative
defenses, his subsequent pleadings, and verbally during the trial. This consistent and
continuing objection to the trial courts jurisdiction defeats petitioners contention that
raising other grounds in a Motion to Dismiss is considered a submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Significantly, petitioner has previously sued respondents brother and co-complainant
before the HLURB over the same subdivision project. In Francel Realty v. Court of
Appeals and Francisco Sycip, petitioners Complaint for unlawful detainer was premised
on the failure of respondents brother to pay monthly amortizations on the basis of his
right to stop paying them under PD 957. In that case, the Court had ruled that the issue
involved a determinative question x x x exclusively cognizable by the HLURB; that is, a
determination of the rights and obligations of parties in a sale of real estate under P.D.
957.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the HLURB is not deprived of jurisdiction to hear
and decide a case merely on the basis that it has been initiated by the developer and not
by the buyer.

2nd issue:
Apropos, to require clearance from the HLURB before stopping payment would not be in
keeping with the intent of the law to protect innocent buyers of lots or homes from scheming
subdivision developers. To give full effect to such intent, it would be fitting to treat the right to
stop payment to be immediately effective upon giving due notice to the owner or developer or
upon filing a complaint before the HLRUB against the erring developer. Such course of action
would be without prejudice to the subsequent determination of its propriety and consequences,
should the suspension of payment subsequently be found improper.
RUBIO V. MTCC, BR.4, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY

Sps. Lim Liong Kang and Lim Pue King (respondents) filed an ejectment case against Rubio
(petitioner) with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). The MTCC favored the
respondents.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MTCC decision in toto. Petitioner
sought further relief from the Court of Appeals which (CA) also affirmed the judgment of the
MTCC. The records of the case were remanded to the MTCC after the entry of the CA decision
was effected. The respondents filed before the MTCC a Motion for the Issuance of an Order of
Demolition. Rubio was given 30 days within which to remove the property in question.
Otherwise, demolition will be ordered in order to enforce the right of the respondents. Petitioner
moved for a reconsideration alleging that the same was prematurely issued and without
procedural basis as the court a quo had not yet issued a writ for the execution of the final
judgment of the CA; that the order of demolition was a gross violation of the last paragraph of
the dispositive portion of the judgment of the MTCC. MTCC denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and granted respondent's second motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition
Hence, this Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner contends that pursuant to the mandate of the last paragraph of the MTCC decision,
the earliest that said decision could be executed was six months after when records of the case
were received on remand by the MTCC.
The petitioner further contends that the demolition of his houses was carried out before the
expiration of the thirty-day period granted for him to file his Motion for Reconsideration. In
computing the thirty-day period, he started from January 3, 1989 when he received a copy of the
December 19, 1988 Order, and deducted the time during which his motion for reconsideration
was pending, i.e., from January 4, 1989, the day he filed the same, to February 6, 1989, the date
he received a copy of the January 27, 1989 Order denying his motion for reconsideration. He
further deducted from the said thirty-day period the time between February 6, 1989 when he
received notice of the January 27, 1989 Order, and February 12, 1989 when he actually received
a copy of the Writ of Demolition dated February 2, 1989. With the interruption, only 15 days had
elapsed from January 3, 1989 to the demolition of his houses on February 20, 1989.
Petitioner contends that the decision over a case which declared the respondents, buyers in bad
faith of the same land involved in the case at bench and ordered the cancellation of the title
issued to the latter, has changed the situation of the parties in this case, as would justify a
suspension of the final and executory judgment of the CA. The RTC decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, and finally by the SC.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT the decision of the MTCC is immediately executory. WHETHER OR
NOT the writ of demolition is tantamount to a writ of execution.WHETHER OR NOT the
execution of the judgment was carried out before the expiration of the thirty-day period granted
to petitioner for him to file his Motion for Reconsideration. WHETHER OR NOT the
circumstances over the parties changed their situation that would render execution inequitable
and unjust.

Held:
First Issue: Yes
The decision of the MTCC is immediately executory. Both parties have misread the last
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the MTCC decision:
Execution shall issue immediately except on the order to vacate the premises which shall issue
after six (6) months from and after receipt by defendant of this decision, unless an appeal has
been perfected and defendant to stay execution file a supersedeas bond . . . (emphasis supplied)
Where the decision becomes executory by the petitioner's failure to appeal or to file a
supersedeas bond and deposit the rentals that may become due from time to time. By providing
that the order to vacate could only be executed six months from and after the defendant's receipt
of the decision, what the MTCC actually intended to do was to give petitioner a grace period of
six months. The effect of the grace period is that even if the MTCC decision should attain finality
within six months from and after receipt thereof by the defendant, and could otherwise be
executed immediately thereafter, the execution could not be carried out until after the expiration
of the six-month period provided for. In other words, execution of the portion of the MTCC
decision dealing with the order to vacate was suspended, so that the earliest that said portion of
the decision could be executed was six months from and after receipt thereof by therein
defendant, notwithstanding that it may have earlier attained finality.
That six-month period could, however, become moot and academic upon petitioner's perfecting
an appeal. This is in consequence of the "unless an appeal has been perfected" provision. The
fulfillment of this condition would render inoperative the six-month period because the appeal
would in fact extend it indefinitely, as what actually transpired in the case at bench. Thus,
petitioner had effectively availed himself of the six-month grace period, which was stretched to
more than three years by the pendency of his appeal. He cannot further delay the execution of
the MTCC decision, as affirmed by the CA, by seeking to avail of a grace period already spent by
him.
Note must likewise be taken of the fact that the six-month period was to be reckoned "from and
after receipt" by the defendant of the MTCC decision, and not from the finality thereof. It is
quite obvious then that the six-month period had long lapsed when the decision of the MTCC, as
affirmed by the CA, was executed.
Second Issue: Yes
While the writ was denominated as one for demolition, it nonetheless substantially complied
with the form and contents of a writ of execution as provided for under Section 8, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, the writ was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines by the
court in which the judgment or order was entered. It clearly referred to such judgment, stating
the court, province and municipality where it is of record, the amount actually due thereon and
requiring the sheriff to deliver possession of the premises to plaintiffs. This is sufficient to
constitute a writ of execution of the CA judgment under the oft-repeated rule that the Rules of
Court shall be liberally construed in order to promote its object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding
The form of the writ was in substantial compliance with the Rules. No substantial right of
petitioner was transgressed thereby. Petitioner was duly notified and heard on the motion for
issuance of the writ of demolition and was given reasonable time to remove his houses, in
accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
He was even heard on a motion for reconsideration.
Third Issue: No
The period subject to interruption by a motion for reconsideration is the period to appeal. The
order of December 19, 1988 is an interlocutory order because it required the parties to perform

certain acts for final adjudication of certain incidents in the case. Being an interlocutory order, it
was not appealable and, therefore, there was no period to suspend or interrupt.
Fourth Issue: No
Once a judgment has become final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the courts to order
its execution, is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, as in cases of special and
exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to suspend its
execution; or whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice or when certain facts
and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which render the execution of the
judgment impossible or unjust. A change in the situation of the parties was considered a
circumstance that would render execution inequitable and unjust.
Here, when the MTCC issued its order favoring the respondents, the RTC decision that the
respondents are buyers in bad faith had not yet become final and executory, it being on appeal
before the CA. In fact, the Writ of Demolition had been fully enforced months before the CA
promulgated its decision in the appealed case, which decision was further appealed to this
Court. On these facts alone, it is evident that the RTC decision could not serve to stay the
execution of the final and executory judgment in the ejectment case, the right over the land in
question being still undetermined by final judgment.
To say that the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 8983 has changed the situation of the parties in
the ejectment case is incorrect because petitioner is not a party to Civil Case No. 8983. Even
assuming, for the sake of argument, that Civil Case No. 8983 is between the same parties as in
the ejectment case, still, the situation of the parties is not changed.
ROBIN M. CANO VS THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, EDGAR C.

GALVANTE, AS POLICE DIRECTOR FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS
MANAGEMENT, PNP, AND THE DILG
A complaint for grave misconduct was filed with the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)
under the DILG against petitioner, then Police Chief Inspector of the Calauan Police Station.
The Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP) found petitioner guilty and ordered his
summary dismissal from the service. Petitioner appealed his dismissal to the National Appellate
Board of NAPOLCOM. The NAPOLCOM reversed the decision of the PNP Chief and modified
his penalty of dismissal to suspension for three months. NAPOLCOM stated that since petitioner
has been under suspension for almost two years, the penalty imposed was deemed served.
The NAPOLCOM decision having been allowed by both parties to become final and executory,
petitioner was restored to full duty status. With the modification of his penalty to three months
suspension, petitioner filed a claim for payment of back salaries and other allowances
corresponding to the period he was allegedly unjustly discharged from service until he was
restored to full duty status. However, this claim was denied by respondent Police Director Edgar
C. Galvante of the PNP Directorate for Personnel and Records Management (DPRM). Petitioner
asked for a reconsideration of the denial but the same was rejected.
On account of said denial, petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC for the recovery of his
back salaries and other allowances for the said period. The court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that petitioner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the trial court's decision, but his motion was denied.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the instant appeal via petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to
him so as to render the filing of the complaint with the trial court premature

Held: Yes
Under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, an appeal by certiorari to this Court should
raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth in the petition. A review is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special
and important reasons therefor. As the error raised herein includes one of fact and law, and not
a proper subject for a petition for review on certiorari, the Court is constrained to decline
exercise of its equity jurisdiction in this case.
Petitioner also failed without justifiable cause to observe due regard for the hierarchy of courts.
The policy of the Court respecting the hierarchy of courts and, consequently, prohibiting the
filing of a petition in the Court in view of the concurrent jurisdiction with the lower courts has
been consistently observed in the absence of any compelling reason for departing from such
policy. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, petitioner should have taken his
appeal to the Court of Appeals.
FORTICH VS CORONA
The Office of the President issued a decision through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres,
which approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four hectare land from agricultural to
agro-industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called Win-Win Resolution on
November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final
and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agroindustrial area only to the extent of forty-four hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred
hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
The petitioners cried foul and some alleged farmer-beneficiaries staged a dramatic and wellpublicized hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon
City. They have come to the Court urging to annul and set aside the Win-Win Resolution and
to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform from
implementing the said Resolution. Petitioners allege that respondent then Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his
jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution. Petitioners availed of this extraordinary
writ of certiorari because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject resolution because it
is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek reconsideration. The
respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that it be dismissed
outright.
ISSUES:
Is the recourse of the petitioners proper?
Whether the final and executory Decision dated March 29, 1996 can still be substantially
modified by the Win-Win Resolution.
HELD:
1st issue
Yes. It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of
any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, including the Office of the
President (OP), may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review

within fifteen days from notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution, whether the
appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. However, we hold
that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that
the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is patently illegal and
was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C.
Coronas) jurisdiction when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of
March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue
raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an
appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed
resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners
have correctly done. The Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of
the petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed. Pursuant to said judicial policy,
we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy justice
and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as
correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the
problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution.
2nd issue
No. The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable. When the
Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the Decision of March 29,
1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto,
the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having
lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second
motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became
the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and
Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that only one motion for
reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a
second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious
cases, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion
for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to
lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and
substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and
executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations. The orderly administration of justice requires that the
judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the
law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all.
Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of
March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void.
VICTORIO ALERIA, JR. VS

HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE, RTC-BRANCH 20, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Petitioner Victorio Aleria, Jr. was accused of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Murder. Both
cases arose out of the same incident and are being tried jointly by respondent Judge.
Petitioner filed a Petition to Admit Bail in Illegal Possession where the recommended bail is
P300,000.00 and in Murder where no bail was recommended.

Respondent Judge duly conducted bail hearings and thereafter issued the questioned Order
which denied the bail of the Petitioner.
Accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds that the aforesaid Order denying bail
is not supported by the evidence on record, and that the Order failed to state the grounds for
denying bail and the evidence relied upon to show that the evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong.
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge issued an Order dated September
2, 1996 denying the same.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari with prayer for inhibition and temporary restraining
order assailing the issuance of the aforementioned Orders with a prayer that petitioner be
allowed to post bail in such amount as shall be reasonably affordable, and that respondent
Judge be ordered to inhibit himself from further trying the instant case and that the same be
raffled to another sala.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT petitioner may be allowed to post bail
Held:
The constitutional mandate is that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. . . .". Petitioner is
unquestionably charged with a capital offense, Murder, which at the time of its commission
(January 9, 1995) and at the time of the application for bail (July 17, 1995), is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death. The grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinges on the issue of
whether or not the evidence of guilty of the accused is strong. Hence the need for the trial court
to conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution and defense are afforded sufficient
opportunity to present their respective evidence. The determination, however, of whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. To
be sure, the discretion of the trial court "is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound,
and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves the
exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be
guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of
his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control. In other words, judicial
discretion is not unbridled but must be supported by a finding of the facts relied upon to form
an opinion on the issue before the court. In numerous case, we have repeatedly ruled that the
court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilty is strong. Indeed,
the summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the judge's evaluation of the
evidence may be considered as an aspect of judicial due process for both the prosecution and the
defense. A review of the questioned orders would readily show that they are indeed lacking in
specificity, and therefore, fatally flawed.
However, petitioner insists that in the event the aforesaid Orders are declared invalid, this Court
should be tasked to review the evidence as to whether the guilt of the accused is sufficiently
strong to warrant denial of bail based on the transcript of stenographic notes and the pertinent
pleadings which petitioner painstakingly attached to the petition.
As repeatedly ruled, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Rule 114, Section 17 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94, provides that bail is
generally filed in the "court where the case is pending." If the petition to be admitted to bail is
denied by the trial court, then the review jurisdiction of this Court can be invoked, but not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief is also available therein.
Indeed, while this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals to issue the writ
of certiorari, such concurrence does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of a
forum on the matter of denial of bail.

Petitioner here is not without recourse in the Court of Appeals. "There is after all hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ('inferior') courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. . . . . It is a policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding
of the Court's docket."
QUINAGORAN VS CA
The heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela Cruz (respondents), filed a Complaint
for Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and Damages
against Victorino Quinagoran (petitioner) before the RTC of Tuao, Cagayan. They alleged that
they are the co-owners of a a parcel of land which they inherited from the late
Juan dela Cruz; that in the mid-70s, petitioner Quinagoran started occupying a house on the
north-west portion of the property by tolerance of respondents; that in 1993, they asked
petitioner to remove the house as they planned to construct a commercial building on the
property; that petitioner refused, claiming ownership over the lot; and that they suffered
damages for their failure to use the same. Respondents prayed for the reconveyance and
surrender of the disputed land and to be paid damages, attorneys fees, costs of the suit and
other reliefs.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
case under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to include all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein which does not exceed P20,000.00. He argued that
since the 346 sq m lot which he owns adjacent to the contested property has an assessed value
of P1, 730.00, the assessed value of the lot under controversy would not be more than the said
amount.
The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, stating that the complaint partakes of the
nature of action publiciana (sic) and jurisdiction over said action lies with the Regional Trial
Court, regardless of the value of the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
ISSUE: Does the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the
value of the property involved?
HELD: No
The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as
affirmed by the CA -- that all cases of recovery of possession oraccion publiciana lies with the
regional trial courts regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true. As things
now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the assessed value of which is
below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.
Republic Act No. 7691 which amended Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and which was already in
effect[ when respondents filed their complaint with the RTC expressly provides:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:

xxxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.
xxxx
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. --- Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of , real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages or whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes,
the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court has also declared that all cases involving title to or possession of real property with an
assessed value of less than P20,000.00 if outside Metro Manila, falls under the original
jurisdiction of the municipal trial court.
Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction. Specifically,
the regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve
x x x possession of real property. However, if the assessed value of the real property involved
does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of MetroManila, the
municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property
JOEL R. UMANDAP VS HON. JUDGE JOSE L. SABIO, JR., AND DOMINGO F.

ESTOMO
In August, 1997, private respondent Domingo Estomo filed against petitioner Joel Umandap an
action for damages based on breach of contract. On February 3, 1998, Process Server
Marmolejo effected substituted service of the summons and copy of the Complaint upon
petitioner, by leaving a copy thereof at petitioner's home and office address to a certain Joseph
David who refused to receive and acknowledge the same.
Petitioner failed to file his Answer and, on motion of private respondent, was declared in
default. Thereafter, private respondent was allowed to adduce his evidence ex parte.
The trial court rendered a judgment against petitioner. A Writ of Execution was issued and
petitioner's deposit and receivables were garnished. Petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment by Default and Quash Writ of Execution which respondent Court denied in an
Order. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the Courts order.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioner argued before the Court of Appeals that the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over his person because there has been no valid service of summons; that

the substituted service of summons was improper and invalid since the process server's return
failed to show on its face the impossibility of personal service.
In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals found that the process server's Return is "valid
and regular on its face, and readily reveals that earnest efforts were exerted to find the
defendant personally but such efforts failed." The Court of Appeals also held that the "return is
clothed with the mantle of presumption of regularity under Section 3[m], Rule 131 of the New
Rules on Evidence; and that said presumption is not overcome by petitioner's unsubstantiated
and self-serving assertion that the process server went to his home and office address only
once."
Hence, this petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT petitioner was served valid summons so as to bring him within the
jurisdiction of the court.
Held: We find petitioner's contentions to be devoid of merit.
There can be no dispute that service of summons upon the defendant is necessary in order that a
court may acquire jurisdiction over his person. Any judgment without such service in the
absence of a valid waiver is null and void.
Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, the general rule in this jurisdiction
is that summons must be served personally on the defendant, it reads:
"SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served
by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it,
by tendering it to him."
However, when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time after efforts
to locate him have failed, substituted service may be made. Section 7, Rule 14 of the Revised
Rules of Court reads:
"SEC. 7. Substituted Service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof."
In fine, the two modes for effecting substituted service of summons are: (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion; and
(b) by leaving copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof. Among these two modes of substituted service, the sheriff or the
process server may choose that which will more likely insure the effectiveness of the service.
In Venturanza vs. Court of Appeals,[6] this Court described how the impossibility of personal
service should be shown:
"The substituted service should be availed only when the defendant cannot be served promptly
in person. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find
the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts. The statement should be made in the
proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service. Substituted service is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be
used only as prescribed in the circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, the statutory
requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and any substituted
service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective."

The proof of service alluded to is the return required by Section 4 of Rule 14 which reads:
"Sec. 4 Return - When the service has been completed, the server shall, within five (5) days
therefrom, serve a copy of the return, personally or by registered mail, to the plaintiff's counsel,
and shall return the summons to the clerk who issued it, accompanied by proof of service."
We are inclined to uphold the view of the Court of Appeals that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions holds in this case. Indeed, in the absence of contrary
evidence, a presumption exists that a sheriff has regularly performed his official duty. In the
instant case, no proof of irregularity in the process server's return was presented by
petitioner. On the contrary, a perusal of the process server's return in the instant case shows
compliance with the requirements of substituted service in accordance with the requirements
set forth in Laus vs. Court of Appeals.
First. The return indicates the location or address of the defendant where the summons was
served. Second. It indicates the efforts and/or prior attempts at personal service made by the
process server and that such attempts had proved futile, prompting the latter to resort to
substituted service. Third. It indicates that summons was left or tendered to Joseph David
"receiving of said office."
Petitioner's argument that assuming the summons was validly served the Court of Appeals
should have nevertheless set aside the default judgment rendered against him invoking the
liberal construction of the rules is clearly untenable. Liberal construction of the Rules may be
invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a
pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at
least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. In the instant case, we agree with the
trial court's observations of petitioner's resort to technicalities in an apparent attempt to
frustrate the ends of justice.
JESUS LIM ARRANZA; LORENZO CINCO; QUINTIN TAN; JOSE ESCOBAR;

ELBERT FRIEND; CLASSIC HOMES VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.; BF
NORTHWEST HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.; AND UNITED BF
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. VS B.F. HOMES, INC. AND CA
Respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI), is a domestic corporation engaged in developing
subdivisions and selling residential lots. One of the subdivisions that respondent developed was
the BF Homes Paraaque Subdivision, which now sprawls across not only a portion of the City
of Paraaque but also those of the adjoining cities of Las Pias and Muntinlupa
When the Central Bank ordered the closure of Banco Filipino, which had substantial
investments in respondent BFHI, respondent filed with the SEC a petition for rehabilitation and
a declaration that it was in a state of suspension of payments. On 18 March 1985, the SEC placed
respondent under a management committee. Upon that committees dissolution on 2 February
1988, the SEC appointed Atty. Florencio B. Orendain as a Receiver, and approved a Revised
Rehabilitation Plan.
As a Receiver, Orendain instituted a central security system and unified the sixty~five
homeowners associations into an umbrella homeowners association called United BF
Homeowners Associations, Inc. (UBFHAI), which was thereafter incorporated with the Home
Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC).
Respondent, through Orendain, turned over to UBFHAI control and administration of security
in the subdivision, the Clubhouse and the open spaces along Concha Cruz Drive. Through the
Philippine Waterworks and Construction Corporation (PWCC), respondents managing
company for waterworks in the various BF Homes subdivisions, respondent entered into an

agreement with UBFHAI for the annual collection of community assessment fund and for the
purchase of eight new pumps to replace the over~capacitated pumps in the old wells.
Herein petitioners filed with the HLURB a class suit "for and in behalf of the more than 7,000
homeowners in the subdivision" against respondent BFHI, BF Citiland Corporation, PWCC and
A.C. Aguirre Management Corporation "to enforce the rights of purchasers of lots" in BF Homes
Paraaque. Petitioners raised "issues" on the following basic needs of the homeowners:
rights~of~way; water; open spaces; road and perimeter wall repairs; security; and the
interlocking corporations that allegedly made it convenient for respondent "to
compartmentalize its obligations as general developer, even if all of these are hooked into the
water, roads, drainage and sewer systems of the subdivision."
Petitioners thereafter filed an urgent motion for a cease~and~desist/status quo order. Acting on
this motion, HLURB Arbiter Charito M. Bunagan issued a 20~day temporary restraining order
to avoid rendering nugatory and ineffectual any judgment that could be issued in the case; and
subsequently, an Order granting petitioners prayer for preliminary injunction was issued.
Respondent thus filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition. It
contended in the main that the HLURB acted "completely without jurisdiction" in issuing the
Order granting the writ of preliminary injunction considering that inasmuch as respondent is
under receivership, the "subject matter of the case is one exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the SEC."
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision annulling and setting aside the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the HLURB.
ISSUE: Which body has jurisdiction over petitioners claims, the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)?
Held: HLURB
In the case at bar, petitioners complaint is for specific performance to enforce their rights as
purchasers of subdivision lots as regards rights of way, water, open spaces, road and perimeter
wall repairs, and security. Indisputably then, the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint.
The boom in the real estate business all over the country resulted in more litigation between
subdivision owners/developers and lot buyers with the issue of the jurisdiction of the NHA or
the HLURB over such controversies as against that of regular courts. It has consistently been
that the NHA or the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the
subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer
to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to
live in.
The fact that respondent is under receivership does not divest the HLURB of that jurisdiction.
Petitioners complaint against respondent is for specific performance. P.D. No. 902~A, as
amended, defines the jurisdiction of the SEC; while P.D. No. 957, as amended, delineates that of
the HLURB. These two quasi~judicial agencies exercise functions that are distinct from each
other. The SEC has authority over the operation of all kinds of corporations, partnerships or
associations with the end in view of protecting the interests of the investing public and creditors.
On the other hand, the HLURB has jurisdiction over matters relating to observance of laws
governing corporations engaged in the specific business of development of subdivisions and
condominiums. The HLURB and the SEC being bestowed with distinct powers and functions,
the exercise of those functions by one shall not abate the performance by the other of its own
functions. As respondent puts it, "there is no contradiction between P.D. No. 902~A and P.D.
No. 957."
In this case, under the complaint for specific performance before the HLURB, petitioners do not
aim to enforce a pecuniary demand. Their claim for reimbursement should be viewed in the light
of respondents alleged failure to observe its statutory and contractual obligations to provide
petitioners a "decent human settlement" and "ample opportunities for improving their quality of
life." The HLURB, not the SEC, is equipped with the expertise to deal with that matter.

Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is
REMANDED to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board for continuation of proceedings
with dispatch as the Securities and Exchange Commission proceeds with the rehabilitation of
respondent BF Homes, Inc., through the Board of Receivers.
SOLID HOMES VS PAYAWAL
Payawal alleged that Solid Homes contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina for
P28,080.00
Solid Homes executed a deed of sale over the land upon payment of the purchase price but failed
to deliver the certificate of title.
It appeared that Solid Homes mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company.
The plaintiff asked for delivery of the title to the lot or, alternatively, the return of all the
amounts paid by her plus interest.
Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction,
this being vested in the National Housing Authority under PD No. 957.
The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the
following nature:
Unsound real estate business practices;
Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
Cases involving specific performance of contractual statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Issue: Who has jurisdiction over the claim?

Held:
The language of this section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that
"exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is vested
not in the Regional Trial Court but in the National Housing Authority.
As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create
more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities.
Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof
with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of
justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.
Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to
enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose.
It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck
down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. The only exception is where the party
raising the issue is barred by estoppel, which does not appear in the case before us. On the

contrary, the issue was raised as early as in the motion to dismiss filed in the trial court by the
petitioner, which continued to plead it in its answer and, later, on appeal to the respondent
court. We have no choice; therefore, notwithstanding the delay this decision will entail, to nullify
the proceedings in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.
C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. V. HON. ROMEO HIBIONADA, EFREN

DIONGON AND PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Petitioner as agent of respondent Pleasantville sold a subdivision lot on installment to Diongon.

The installment payments having been completed, Diongon demanded the delivery of the
certificate of title to the land. When neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a
complaint for specific performance and damages in the RTC of Negros Occidental.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the competent body
to hear and decide the case was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. RTC denied the
motion to dismiss.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT RTC has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
In holding that the complaint for specific performance with damages was justiciable under the
Civil Code and so came under the jurisdiction of the regular courts under B.P. 129, the trial court
failed to consider the express provisions of P.D. No. 1344 and related decrees. It also erred in
supposing that only the regular courts can interpret and apply the provisions of the Civil Code,
to the exclusion of the quasi-judicial bodies. P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and
otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," provides
that the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive authority to regulate the real estate
trade and business.
P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered the National Housing
Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions under P.D. No. 957,
specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the agency as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
Unsound real estate business practices;
Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers
of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman. (Emphasis supplied)
Under E.O. No. 648 dated February 7, 1981, the regulatory functions conferred on the National
Housing Authority under P.D. Nos. 957,1344 and other related laws were transferred to the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, which was renamed Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board by E.O. No. 90 dated December 17, 1986.It is clear from Section 1(c) of the
above quoted PD No. 1344 that the complaint for specific performance with damages filed by
Diongon with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental comes under the jurisdiction of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Diongon is a buyer of a subdivision lot seeking
specific performance of the seller's obligation to deliver to him the corresponding certificate of
title.The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the

provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of
administrative bodies now performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the
legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the
principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their particular
expertise.
There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative
agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The
very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers.
The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes
the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical
knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular
courts.
The argument of the private respondents that the petition is premature because no motion for
reconsideration of the questioned order of trial court had been filed stresses the rule but
disregards the exception. It is settled that the motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with
if the issue raised is a question of law, as in the case at bar. The issue pleaded here is lack of
jurisdiction. It could therefore be raised directly and immediately with this Court without the
necessity of an antecedent motion for reconsideration.
We hold, in sum, that the complaint for specific performance and damages was improperly filed
with the respondent court, jurisdiction over the case being exclusively vested in the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board. We also hold that the order denying the motion to dismiss was
subject to immediate challenge before this Court as the filing (and denial) of a motion for
reconsideration was not an indispensable requirement.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
HILADO VS CHAVEZ
Celso Zayco was the owner of a large parcel of agricultural land located in Kabankalan City
Negros Occidental. Zayco mortgaged the property to the Pacific Banking Corporation as
security for a loan; however, the bank foreclosed the mortgage upon Zaycos failure to pay his
account.
The bank sold the property to Julieta C. Salgado. No liens or encumbrances whatsoever or any
notice that the property had been placed under the agrarian reform laws were annotated at the
dorsal portion thereof.
Subsequently, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted Emancipation Patents to (20)
tenants on the property on the basis of which titles were issued in their favor.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Sangguniang Bayan ng Kabankalan approved, in 1996, a
resolution, reclassifying the property partly as property for light industry, and the rest as
residential
In 1997, the respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the (20) petitioners, who
were all occupants-farmers on the property, with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
of Kabankalan City.
The respondent alleged that according to the respondent, the petitioners were not agricultural
tenants under the agrarian reform laws.
MTCC: judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants .The court Ordered
the defendants to vacate the areas they respectively occupy and to return the same to plaintiff;
Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the premises.

In their answer with motion to dismiss the complaint, the petitioners, alleged that the
landholding had long been placed under Operation Land Transfer, and that they became the
owners thereof under Presidential Decree No. 27. The petitioners prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
The court a quo applied the Rules of Summary Procedure. After due proceedings, the court a
quo rendered judgment in favor of the respondent. The court a quo rejected the petitioners
contention that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) had exclusive
original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, ruling that the action was one for
unlawful detainer over which it had exclusive original jurisdiction.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal. However, a motion to disapprove the notice of
appeal and for execution of final judgment was filed by the respondent.
The courta quo issued an Order granting the motion of the respondent and disapproved the
notice of appeal filed by the petitioners. Writs of execution were also issued by the MTCC.
The petitioners filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court against the respondent for the
annulment of the decision of the MTC.
The petitioners asserted that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
of the respondent, it being an agrarian dispute between the petitioners, as patentees, and the
respondent; hence, the court a quos decision was null and void. They contended that the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (PARAD) had exclusive jurisdiction over the
action.
Respondent countered that the petitioners participated in the proceedings in the MTCC and
were, thus, estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the court a quo. It posited that the
petitioners were not entitled to injunctive relief because the decision of the MTC had become
final and executory.
The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the petition on the ground that the MTCC had exclusive
jurisdiction over the action of the plaintiff over the persons of the defendants therein.The RTC
also held that the petitioners failed to file a motion to dismiss the complaint in the MTCC and
even participated in the proceedings therein; hence, they were estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the MTCC.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, but the RTC issued an order
denying the same.
Instead of appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals by writ of error, the petitioners filed
their petition with this Court, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the
decision of the RTC on questions of law.
They appended to their petition, certified true copies of the transfer certificates of title issued to
each of them to prove that long before the respondent filed its complaint with the MTCC, the
Register of Deeds had issued such titles to each of them.
The petitioners assert that, instead of appealing the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals,
they filed their petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because the issues raised by them
are only legal issues.
They aver that the RTC erred when it declared that instead of filing their answer to the
respondents complaint in the MTCC, participating in the proceedings and praying for reliefs
therein, the petitioners as defendants in said case, should have filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint. The petitioners posit that they could not have filed such motion because the
proceedings in ejectment cases are summary in nature and such motion to dismiss the
complaint is a prohibited pleading.

The petitioners point out that they incorporated in their answer to the complaint a motion to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action which should
be considered as a motion for a hearing on their affirmative defenses.
They also aver that the action filed before the MTCC is an agrarian case involving agricultural
land placed under Operation Land Transfer, for which they were issued Emancipation Patents
by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform even before such complaint for ejectment was filed against
them. They note that the issue involved the validity of the Emancipation Patents issued to them,
and was decisive of the issue of jurisdiction in the MTCC; hence, the MTCC had no original
jurisdiction over the action of the respondent.
The petitioners assert that by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 and the Emancipation
Patents issued to them, they became owners of the property and were entitled to the possession
thereof.
For its part, the respondent asserts that, if at all, the RTC decision is appealable, the proper
remedy of the petitioners from the said decision was to appeal, by writ of error, to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as amended, and not via a petition for review on
certiorari to this Court under Rule 45 of the said Rules. It contends that, as gleaned from the
petition, the petitioners raised factual issues.
ISSUES:
Whether it is proper for the petitioners to file a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court with this Court from the decision of the RTC;
Whether the MTCC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondent; and,
Whether the decision of the MTCC is null and void
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE:
We agree with the respondent that the remedy of a party aggrieved by the decision of the RTC,
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, is to appeal by writ of error to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, in which questions of facts and/or of law may be raised by
the parties. However, under Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, where only questions of
law are raised or are involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules. However, even if only questions or issues are raised by the
party in his appeal, it should be made to the Court of Appeals and not to the Supreme Court,
unless there are compelling reasons to allow such appeal.
We agree with the petitioners and the RTC that the issues before it were legal: (1) whether the
MTCC had properly exercised jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action of the
respondent based on the material allegations of said complaint, as well as the relevant pleadings
of the parties in said case; and (2) whether the petitioners were estopped from assailing the
decision of the MTCC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
SECOND ISSUE:
On the issue of jurisdiction, Section 33, paragraph 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7691 provides that Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court
and Metropolitan Trial Court, have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases for unlawful
detainer. The proceedings in ejectment cases are covered by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and
the Rules on Summary Procedure. However, such courts have no original jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian disputes which are within the exclusive original and
appellate jurisdiction of the DARAB.

The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought
therein.In Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation we ruled
that the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for,
otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. [28] Once
jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.
The MTCC does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a
party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the
parties. But it is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy.
If after hearing, tenancy had in fact been shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the
case for lack of jurisdiction.
In this case, even on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint, more so if the answer
with motion to dismiss the petition and position papers of the parties are considered, the
DARAB, and not the MTCC, had primary and original jurisdiction over the action of the
respondent.
THIRD ISSUE:
On the third issue, we reject the contention of the respondent that the decision of the MTCC had
become final and executory because of the petitioners failure to perfect the appeal therefrom;
hence, immutable. Neither do we agree with the respondents contention that by participating
in the proceedings before the MTCC, the petitioners were estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the MTCC.
As we held in Arevalo v. Benedicto [F]urthermore, the want of jurisdiction by a court over the subject-matter renders its judgment
void and a mere nullity, and considering that a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by
which no rights are divested, from which no rights can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars
any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out of are void, and
considering further, that the decision, for want of jurisdiction of the court, is not a decision in
contemplation of law, and, hence, can never become executory, it follows that such a void
judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the judgment cannot be changed by agreement of the parties or
by the act or omission of each of them that will contravene the legislative will. A party should
not be allowed to divest a competent court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously or even
deliberately in derogation of the law.
The petitioners believed that the decision of the MTCC was null and void for want of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action filed therein; hence, they are not proscribed from assailing
such decision in a direct action. The remedy resorted to by their counsel should not prejudice
and bar them from assailing the MTCC decision before the RTC on a petition to annul the same
for lack of jurisdiction. Neither are they estopped from assailing the decision, simply because
they filed their answer and motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action. After all, the only relief prayed for by them in their answer
was the dismissal of the complaint.
It bears stressing that the petitioners are now the registered owners of the portions of the
landholding and entitled to the possession thereof. For us to deny the petition and affirm the
decision of the RTC would be to sanction the eviction of the petitioners who are the registered
owners of the landholding and, as such, are entitled to the possession thereof and allow the
respondent to take possession thereof in derogation of law.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decisions of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities and the Regional Trial Court are SET ASIDE and
declared NULL and VOID. The writ of execution issued by the MTCC is also set aside. No costs.
RODRIGO AND ANA AMUETE VS MARCELO ANDRES AND CA
A parcel of landl was awarded by the then National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA) to petitioner Rodrigo Almuete in 1957. Since then, Rodrigo Almuete
exercised exclusive possession of the property, cultivating it and planting thereon.
However, unknown to Rodrigo Almuete, on August 17, 1979, an Agrarian Reform Technologist
filed a field investigation and inspection report stating that the whereabouts of the original
awardee of the subject property, Rodrigo Almuete, was unknown and that he had "waived all his
rights as a NARRA settler due to his poor health beyond his control and financial hardship." It
was also stated therein that "the actual occupant of the land is Marcelo Andres since April 1967
to date." She recommended to the Director of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan that the award in favor of Rodrigo Almuete be cancelled and that the land
be awarded to respondent Marcelo Andres. The latter was granted and issued a homestead
patent.
DAR issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-52521 in the name of Marcelo Andres,
which certificate was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Isabela. Shortly thereafter, Marcelo
Andres, accompanied by ten (10) other persons armed with bolos and other bladed implements,
entered the subject property, claiming exclusive right of ownership and possession. They felled
the narra trees, converting the same to lumber, and destroyed the mongos planted by the
Almuetes. Marcelo Andres gained control, and took possession, of approximately half of the
subject property.
Rodrigo Almuete wasted no time in complaining to the DAR authorities of Marcelo Andres'
encroachment into and occupation of the subject property. It was only then that he learned that
the subject property had been titled in the name of Marcelo Andres and that the award in his
favor had been cancelled because he had allegedly abandoned the subject property. Upon
Rodrigo Almuete's inquiry, the records of the local office of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) showed that he was still the listed owner of the subject property.
Consequently, Rodrigo Almuete and his daughter, Ana Almuete, filed an action for reconveyance
and recovery of possession. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of plaintiffs.
Andres failed to appeal; thus, the trial court's decision became final and executory. On February
15, 1994, a writ of execution was issued. Marcelo Andres filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution, but the trial court did not act on it on the ground that it had no more jurisdiction over
the case. Andres filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. He argued that since
the subject property was agricultural land covered by a homestead patent, exclusive jurisdiction
was with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (or DARAB), not with the
regular courts. Respondent Andres also stressed that the original action was for ejectment,
which was cognizable by the municipal trial courts, not by the Regional Trial Courts.
Consequently, for want of jurisdiction, the trial court's decision was null and void; and cannot be
enforced by writ of execution or any other legal means. A motion for reconsideration was denied
by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Does the case fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB?
Held: No
The action filed by petitioners before the trial court was for recovery of possession and
reconveyance of title. The issue to be resolved was who between petitioner Rodrigo Almuete and

respondent Marcelo Andres has a better right to the subject property considering that both of
them are awardees of the same property. It was thus a controversy relating to ownership of the
farmland, which is beyond the ambit of the phrase "agrarian dispute." No juridical tie of
landowner and tenant was alleged between petitioners and respondent, let alone that which
would so characterize the relationship as an agrarian dispute. In fact, petitioner and respondent
were contending parties for the ownership of the same parcel of land.
"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, as any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
ARZAGA VS COPIAS
Petitioners filed with the RTC of San Jose, Antique, a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages against the private respondents. They contended that they are the co-owners of Lot No.
5198, being the purchasers thereof in a tax delinquency sale dated February 15, 1995. Sometime
prior to 1994, private respondents allegedly entered and occupied the disputed property without
the consent of the petitioners. Despite several demands, private respondents refused to vacate
the premises.
In their answer with counterclaim, private respondents alleged that they are the amortizing
owners of Lot Nos. 5198-A, 5198-B and 5198-D, being the tenant-beneficiaries of one
Fuentebella, the previous owner. As tenant-cultivators for almost twenty (20) years, private
respondent Prudencio Calandria was issued an Emancipation Patent and a TCT over Lot No.
5198-D; and over Lot No. 5198-B. On the other hand, private respondent Salvacion Copias,
through her husband, Leoncio, was issued Emancipation Patent and TCT over Lot No. 5198A. They prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that the subject matter thereof
was cognizable by the DARAB and not by the regular courts, because the controversy involves an
agricultural tenancy relationship.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated the following (a) That Lot Nos. 5198-A,
5198-B, and 5198-D are parts of Lot No. 5198 situated at Barangay Inabasan, San Jose, Antique,
all of which are agricultural lands devoted to agriculture; (b) that the defendant Prudencio
Calandria was issued Emancipation Patents and, consequently Transfer Certificate of Title over
Lot No. 5198-[D] and TCT over Lot No. 5198-B; (c) that the TCT covering Lot No. 5198-A was
issued to one Leoncio Copias; (d) that Lot No. 5198 is declared in the name of Dalmacio Arzaga
under Tax Declaration; (e) that a Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Real Property to Purchaser
covering Lot No. 5198 was executed in favor of Rodolfo and Francis both surnamed Arzaga; and
(f) that the TCT covering Lot No. 5198-[B], EP. covering Lot No. 5198-A and EP. covering Lot
No. 5198-D are existing.
Trial court issued a resolution dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It ruled
that the case was cognizable by the DARAB because it involved possession and ownership of
agricultural lands, as well as issuance of emancipation patents. CA affirmed.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT the trial court has jurisdiction
Held: Yes
Under Rule II, Section 1, paragraph (a), of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Department of
Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board, the DARAB exercises primary jurisdiction both
original and appellate to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies,

and matters or incidents involving the implementation of agrarian laws and their implementing
rules and regulations. Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of such tenurial arrangements.
It was held that for DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy
relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it
would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements to wit: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. It is not enough that these requisites are
alleged; these requisites must be shown in order to divest the regular court of its jurisdiction in
proceedings lawfully began before it. These conditions have not been met in the case at bar.
In the case at bar, the element that the parties must be the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee, on which all other requisites of the tenancy agreement depends, is
absent. Tenancy relationship is inconsistent with the assertion of ownership of both parties.
The records of the case would fail to show any juridical tie binding between private respondents
and petitioner or their predecessors-in-interest, let alone that which would so characterize the
relationship as an agrarian dispute. It would appear that the owner of the land, Don Rafael
Chico, gave the property to petitioner Pedro Chico in 1954 and, since then, the latter or his
representative had taken over the land and had exercised acts of ownership thereover. There
was no evidence adduced that any tenancy agreement had been concluded between Pedro Chico
and private respondent Martin Mananghaya. Worse, the land subject matter of the controversy
was not shown to be an agricultural land; to the contrary, the land would appear to be located
within a residential area adjacent to the National Highway. Compounding the matter, no receipt,
or any other evidence, was presented by private respondents to prove their claim that the
harvest was shared between petitioners and private respondents.
The basic rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an
answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely
upon the whims of the defendant. From the averments of the complaint in the instant case, it is
clear that the petitioners action does not involve an agrarian dispute, but one for recovery of
possession, which is perfectly within the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.
CALLEJA VS. PANDAY
Respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur for quo
warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners.
Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they had
been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but
sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the incorporators and stockholders of
said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which supposedly
belonged to Respondents.
RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Regional Trial Court in Naga City.
According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified petition showed petitioners therein (herein

respondents) to be residents of Naga City, then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, the action for quo warranto should be brought in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents
resides.
However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the subject
case for quo warranto, stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo
warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction.
The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons on herein petitioners (respondents
below). Petitioner Tabora filed his Answer, raising therein the affirmative defenses of (1)
improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction, and (3) wrong remedy of quo warranto.
RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order denied the motion to dismiss and remanded to RTC
Branch 23, Naga City to try and decide the case.
Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order and, instead,
immediately elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In their Comment, respondents argue that the present petition should be denied due course and
dismissed on the grounds that an appeal under Rule 45 is inappropriate in this case because the
Order is merely an interlocutory order and not a final order as contemplated under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioners erred in filing appeal by certiorari under rule 45 on the ground that
the motion to dismiss is merely an interlocutory order and cannot ordinarily be reviewed
through a petition under Rule 45?
Whether or not a branch of the regional trial court which has no jurisdiction to try and decide a
case has authority to remand the same to another co-equal court in order to cure the defects on
venue and jurisdiction?
Held:
1st issue: Yes. But in this case, the SC nonetheless gave due course to the petition.
The Court notes that, indeed, petitioners chose the wrong remedy to assail the Order of July 13,
2005. It is hornbook principle that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs appeals
from judgments or final orders.4 The Order dated July 13, 2005 is basically a denial of herein
petitioners prayer in their Answer for the dismissal of respondents case against them.
As a consequence of the trial courts refusal to dismiss the case, it then directed the transfer of
the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court that had been designated as a special
court to hear cases formerly cognizable by the SEC. Verily, the order was merely interlocutory as
it does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something more to be done on its merits.
Such being the case, the assailed Order cannot ordinarily be reviewed through a petition under
Rule 45.
As we held in Tolentino v. Natanauan, 5 to wit:
In the case of Bangko Silangan Development Bank vs. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated
the well-settled rule that:
. . . an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable,
nor can it be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed
in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure

to be followed in that event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse,
reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment.
It appears, however, that the longer this case remains unresolved, the greater chance there is for
more violence between the parties to erupt. In Philippine Airlines v. Spouses Kurangking,7 the
Court proceeded to give due course to a case despite the wrong remedy resorted to by the
petitioner therein, stating thus: While a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 would
ordinarily be inappropriate to assail an interlocutory order, in the interest, however, of arresting
the perpetuation of an apparent error committed below that could only serve to unnecessarily
burden the parties, the Court has resolved to ignore the technical flaw and, also, to treat the
petition, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, as a special civil action for
certiorari. Not much, after all, can be gained if the Court were to refrain from now making a
pronouncement on an issue so basic as that submitted by the parties.
In this case, the basic issue of which court has jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by
the SEC under Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 902-A (P.D. No. 902-A), and the propensity of
the parties to resort to violence behoove the Court to look beyond petitioners technical lapse of
filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
with the proper court. Thus, the Court shall proceed to resolve the case on its merits.
2nd issue: No.
Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents
petition for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one
involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No.
8799 and the aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never
designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over
cases previously cognizable by the SEC.
Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the
transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br.
58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. In HLC
Construction and Development Corp. v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners
Association,13 the Court held that the trial court, having no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the complaint, should dismiss the same so the issues therein could be expeditiously heard and
resolved by the tribunal which was clothed with jurisdiction.
PANLILIO V. JUDGE SALONGA AND FE. V. FEDERIS
Michael Lancelot F. Panlilio is the natural child of petitioner Jose Marcel E. Panlilio and private
respondent Fe V. Federis, whereas principal petitioners Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio are the
natural grandparents of the minor.
Owing to the so-called cruelty, moral depravity and gross neglect of private respondent, the
grandparents felt obliged to exercise substitute parental authority over the minor which
apprehension led to the initiation on December 14, 1993 of special proceedings geared towards
securing their appointment as guardians ad litem.
Branch 15 of the RTC of Naic, Cavite issued an order depriving of parental authority of the
natural mother herein respondent Fe. V. Federis.
A petition for habeas corpus was submitted by private respondent and later assigned to Branch
149 of the Makati RTC, wherein Federis claimed to have been duped into allowing the child to go

with his grandparents and waiting in vain on account of the vehement and persistent reluctance
of petitioners to return the child despite repeated demands therefor.
The Makati RTC immediately issued the writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the habeas corpus petition on the basis of litis pendentia as well as
lack of cause of action.
Private respondent filed her own motion to dismiss in the Cavite custody case, anchored on
improper venue and the existence of a prejudicial question.
Issue:
Did the Makati RTC have jurisdiction to take cognizance of, and thereafter grant, the writ of
habeas corpus?
Ruling:
NO. The immediate assumption of authority by the Makati court, although possibly motivated
by a noble goal, is tantamount to defeating the very essence of the order emanating from the
Cavite court.
While habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of minor children, this principle is
understood to presuppose that there is no other previous case whose issue is necessarily
interwoven with the nature of a habeas corpus proceeding.
Acquisition of jurisdiction by a court of concurrent jurisdiction divests another of its own
jurisdiction.
In addition, when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is
finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to
interfere with its action. This is essential to the proper and orderly administration of laws; and
enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the
process.
The petition was granted, and the Hon. Josefina G. Salonga of the Makati RTC was directed to
dismiss the habeas corpus case.
#39 UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HOUSING AND LAND USE

REGULATORY BOARD
In 1973, Martha David purchased from Fereit Realty Development Corporation (FRDC) a
condominium unit with parking space in the condominium project known as Europa
Condominium Villas in Baguio City. Martha David the 20% downpayment leaving her with a
balance of P173,600 which was payable in 60 monthly installments. Later on, Martha David
took possession of the condominium is said to have completed 22 monthly installments.
Unknown to Martha and without prior approval of NHA, FRDC mortgaged the condominium
project to Bancom, predecessor-in-interest of UBP as security for a loan.
FRDC failed to pay its obligation which led to the foreclosure of the mortgage including Marthas
condominium and 45 others. The sheriff executed a certificate of sale in favor of Bancom and
Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) and after the expiration of the redemption period,
UBP held out the units for sale.

Martha David and Teresita Quazon (who purchased Davids Condo) filed a complaint in the
HLURB against the FRDC, UBP and FEBTC to annul the title of UBP over Marthas unit and to
order the issuance of a new certificate of title in favor of Quazon.
UBP and FEBTC filed their answer assailing the jurisdiction of HLURB to decide the case and
UBP filed a motion to dismiss on the same ground.
The motion was denied by the HLURB arbiter. The UBP filed a petition assailing HLURBs
jurisdiction.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT the HLURB has jurisdiction to hear and decide on the complaint
filed by David and Quazon.
Held:
The issue in HLURB Case No. REM-062689-4077 is the validity of the real estate mortgage of
David's condominium unit that FRDC executed in Favor of the Union Bank and Far East Bank
without prior approval of the National Housing Authority and legality of the title which the
mortgagee banks acquired as highest bidder, therefore in the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The
applicable provisions of P.D. No. 957 otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyer's Protective Decree" are quoted hereunder as follows:
Sec. 3. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY. The National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the
provisions of this decree. (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 18. MORTGAGES. No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or
developerwithout prior written approval of the Authority. Such approval shall not be granted
unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of
the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been provided to ensure
such utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined
and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at
his option pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the
payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit
being paid for with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly
after full payment thereof.
By EO no 648, it provided for the transfer of this function of the NHA to the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission. EO 90 renamed the commission to HLURB.
Clearly, FRDC's act of mortgaging the condominium project to Bancom and FEBTC, without the
knowledge and consent of David as buyer of a unit therein, and without the approval of the NHA
(now HLURB) as required by P.D. No. 957, was not only an unsound real estate business
practice but also highly prejudicial to the buyer. David has a cause of action for annulment of the
mortgage, the mortgage foreclosure sale and the condominium certificate of title that was issued
to the UBP and FEBTC as highest bidders at the sale. The case falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NHA (now HLURB) as provided in P.D. No. 957 of 1976 and P.D. No. 1344 of
1978 the latter law expanding the jurisdiction of then NHA to hear and decide cases which
involve among others Unsound real estate business practices.
We hold that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to
include jurisdiction over complaints for specific performance of the sale, or annulment of the
mortgage, of a condominium unit, with damages.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (UBP) VS HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB), AND MARTHA DAVID, TERESITA QUAZON
AND ALFONSO QUAZON

Martha David purchased from Fereit Realty Development Corp. (FRDC) a condominium unit in
Baguio City the purchase price of which was payable in 60 montly installments.
The condominium was in the process of completion, a project known as Europa Condominium
Villas.
Martha took possession and already paid 22 installments.
FRDC, without knowledge of Martha and without approval of NHA, mortgaged the
condominium project to Bancom Development Corp. (Bancom), predecessor-in-interest of UBP,
as security for a loan of P40M.
FRDC failed to pay; Bancom foreclosed the 45 condominium units including that of Marthas.
The units were sold to Bancom and Far East bank and trust company (FEBTC) as the highest
bidder.
Teresita purchased Marthas unit. Upon knowledge of the mortgage and foreclosure sale, they
filed a complaint in HLURB againt UBP, FRDC and FEBTC to annul the title of UBP and FEBTC
over Marthas unit and to order the issuance of certificate of title in the name of Teresita.
UBP and FEBTC filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction of HLURB to hear
and decide the case. They argue that RTC has jurisdiction. HLURB denied the motion, so UBP
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT HLURB has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
Held: Yes, HLURB has jurisdiction.
The issue of the case is the validity of the mortgage of the condominium without prior approval
of NHA and the legality of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale to UBP, successor of Bancom, and
FEBTC. PD 957 or the subdivision and condominium buyers protective decree applies.
Under PD 957, NHA has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate real estate trade and business and no
mortgage on any unit shall be made by the owner or developer without prior written approval of
NHA.
Then, PD 1344 expanded the jurisdiction of NHA which included exclusive jurisdiction over
cases of the ff. nature:
Unsound real estate business practices
claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman
Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman
Then, NHA transferred its regulatory and quasi-judicial functions to HLURB.
Clearly, the case falls within the jurisdiction of HLURB.
FRDCs act of mortgaging the condo project to Bancom without the knowledge of Martha and
approval of NHA (now HLURB) was an unsound business practice which was prejudicial to the
buyer. Martha has a cause of action to annul the mortgage by FRDC and foreclosure sale to UBP
and FEBTC.
The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include
jurisdiction over complaints for specific performance of the sale, or annulment of the mortgage,
of a condominium unit, with damages.

ALFONSO ESCOVILLA, JR., CECILIO M. MERIS AND CUISON ENGINEERING

AND MACHINERY CO., INC.,PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, SIBAGAT TIMBER CORPORATION AND CONCHITA DEL
ROSARIO,RESPONDENTS.
In a civil case entitled Cuison Engineering and Machinery Co. Inc. vs. del Rosario and Sons
Logging Enterprises Inc., the CFI awarded to Cuison a certain sum of money and damages.
Deputy Sheriff Escovilla levied and seized 1 unit of electric welding machine. A 3 rd party claim
over said item was filed by Rana (manager of Sibagat Corp).
Because of such levy, an action for prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed before the
RTC (Special Civil Case) by Sibagat Corp against petitioners. Deputy Sheriff Meris seized and
levied 1 unit motor launch by virtue of a writ of execution issued in the civil case. Del Rosario
filed a 3rd party claim over the subject property claiming ownership of such.
A TRO was issued in the special civil case directing Meris to refrain from proceeding with the
public auction sale. After the TRO had lapsed and upon motion of Cuison Inc, the RTC in the
civil case directed Escovilla to proceed with the auction sale of the motor launch with authority
to lawfully retrieve the same wherever it may be store.
Despite the orders of the court in the Special Civil case directing the Sheriff to return the motor
launch and to desist from proceeding with the auction sale, the auction sale was conducted upon
motion of Cuison Inc. and upon order of Judge Saludares in the Civil Case. The subject motor
launch was sold at public auction by Deputy Sheriff Robiza in lieu of Escovilla who was then in
Gen. Santos City.
Trial on the merits was held in the special civil case. The court ruled in favor of Sibagat Corp and
ordered Escovilla to return the motor launch to Del Rosario or to pay its value (500,000). The
said decision was affirmed by the CA but with modification (pay 120,000 for the value).
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT an action for prohibition will still proper as a remedy for acts
already accomplished. - Yes
Held:
There is no dispute that the private respondents are indeed the actual owners of the subject
properties by virtue of a sale in their favor by Del Rosario and Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc.
Such finding is based on evidence on record which this Court does not find any reason to
disturb. This petition merely attacks the procedure adopted by the respondents.
In such a case, the point to be borne in mind is that the power of the court in the execution of
judgments extends only over properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. This
is precisely the very nature of the proceedings in the action for prohibition with preliminary
injunction filed by the private respondents with the RTC which is sanctioned by Section 17, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court. As held in Rivera vs. Florendo: Another fundamental rule which
appears to have been violated in the case at bar is that no advantage may be given to one to the
prejudice of the other, a court should not by means of a preliminary injunction transfer the
property in litigation from the possession of one party to another where the legal title is in
dispute and the party having possession asserts ownership thereto. Similarly, the primary
purpose of an injunction is to preserve the status quo, that is the last actual peaceable
uncontested status which preceded the controversy.
In the instant case, the private respondents properly instituted a Special Civil Case which is a
separate and independent action to vindicate their claims over the subject properties. If at all the
petitioners had any doubts as to the veracity of the third-party claims, then the separate action
instituted was the proper forum to ventilate such protestations. The action for prohibition was
filed on February 5, 1985. On February 18, 1985 the respondent Sheriffs admitted having seized
the disputed properties but assured the court that they will not remove them from its
jurisdiction nor sell or dispose of the same.

The rule is clear. If a third party claim is filed, the sheriff is not bound to proceed with the levy of
the property unless he is given by the judgment creditor an indemnity bond against the claim.
The judgment creditor, by giving an indemnity bond, assumes the direction and control of the
sheriffs action; so far as it might constitute a trespass and thus he becomes, to that extent, the
principal and the sheriff, his agent. This makes him responsible for the continuance of the
wrongful possession and for the sale and conversion of the goods and for all real damages which
the owner might sustain.
Thus, in this case, even if the auction sale has been conducted and the sheriffs certificate of sale
was issued in favor of the winning bidder, the liability of the judgment creditor and
consequently, the purchaser to the real owners of the properties levied and executed is not
extinguished. We also take note of the trial court's finding that Sheriffs Escovilla and Meris
misled the Davao court as to the ownership of the properties they had seized knowing quite well
that the petitioners in the Special Civil Case were the actual owners of the property.
Corollary to the main issue raised is the argument that the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City
cannot restrain or interfere with the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
which is its coordinate and co-equal authority on matters properly brought before it. This issue
has been clearly settled in the case of Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
where the Court held: Generally, the rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction
with the judgments or decrees of a concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to
grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction, is applied in cases where no third-party claimant
is involved, in order to prevent one court from nullifying the judgment or process of another
court of the same rank or category, a power which devolves upon the proper appellate court. The
purpose of the rule is to avoid conflict of power between different courts of coordinate
jurisdiction and to bring about a harmonious and smooth functioning of their proceedings.

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Assignment 5.1 Case Compilation - CIAR

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UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

CIAR, JULIE ANNE PRINCESS A 2D

MICROSOFT CORPORATION VS. BEST DEAL COMPUTER CENTER

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT there was a valid service of summons.

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

PANTALEON VS. ASUNCION

DEL MAR V. PAGCOR

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

Ruling on Procedural Issue:

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

CRUZ VS SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC. VS RENE NIETO AND HELEN GARCIA

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

CONSOLIDATED PLYWOOD INDUSTRIES, INC. (CPII) VS HON. AUGUSTO

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

ASIAVEST LIMITED VS CA AND ANTONIO HERAS

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK V. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

MARGARITA ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS VS ABELARDO B. LICAROS

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

x x x, service of Summons by way of publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a

ANITA C. BUCE VS CA, SPS. BERNARDO C. TIONGCO AND ARACELI

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

Held: SC said, we agree with respondents.

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

We find for petitioners.

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

FORTUNATO GOMEZ AND AURORA GOMEZ VS

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS COURT OF APPEALS

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

ROGELIO MARISCAL VS CA AND BELLA C. CATALAN

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC., VS. THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

DACOYCOY VS INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

POLYTRADE CORPORATION VS VICTORIANO BLANCO

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

AUCTION IN MALINTA VS. LUYABEN

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

NESTLE PHILIPPINES V. FY SONS

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

Petitioner and respondent entered into a distributorship agreement (agreement) whereby

FRANCEL REALTY VS RICARDO SYCIP

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

RUBIO V. MTCC, BR.4, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

ROBIN M. CANO VS THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, EDGAR C.

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CIVPRO

VICTORIO ALERIA, JR. VS