Académique Documents
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Culture Documents
Mendoza brought this action against the PAL. After trial, the
lower court found that because of his failure to exhibit the
film "Himala ng Birhen" during the town fiesta, Mendoza
suffered damages or rather failed to earn profits in the
amount of P3K but finding the PAL not liable for said
damages, dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
- W/N PAL is a common carrier?
- W/N PAL is liable for the late delivery of goods to consignee
Mendoza?
RULING:
1) YES. The obvious reason for its non-inclusion in the Code of
Commerce was that at the time of its promulgation, transportation by
air on a commercial basis was not yet known. In the United Sates
where air transportation has reached its highest development, an
airline company engaged in the transportation business is regarded
as a common carrier. There can be no doubt, under the general law
of common carriers, that those air lines and aircraft owners engaged
in the passenger service on regular schedules on definite routes,
who solicit the patronage of the traveling public, advertise schedules
for routes, time of leaving, and rates of fare, and make the usual
stipulation as to baggage, are common carriers by air.
2) NO. Under Art. 1107 of the Civil Code, a debtor in good faith like
the defendant herein, may be held liable only for damages that were
foreseen or might have been foreseen at the time the contract of the
transportation was entered into. The trial court correctly found that
the defendant company could not have foreseen the damages that
would be suffered by Mendoza upon failure to deliver the can of film
on the 17th of September, 1948 for the reason that the plans of
Mendoza to exhibit that film during the town fiesta and his
preparations, specially the announcement of said exhibition by
posters and advertisement in the newspaper, were not called to the
defendant's attention.
Common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver
merchandise, and persons are not vested with the right of prompt
delivery, unless such common carriers previously assume the
obligation. Said rights and obligations are created by a specific
contract entered into by the parties.
Maritime Co. v. CA
FACTS:
- Rizal Surety was the insurer of 800 packages of PVC
compound loaded on the SS Doa Nati (owned by National
Tarlac, by armed men who took with them the truck, its
driver, his helper and the cargo.
-
ISSUE/S:
- W/N Cendena may, under the facts presented, be properly
characterized as a common carrier?
- W/N Cendena, assuming it is a common carrier, may be held
liable for the loss of goods?
RULING:
1. YES. It appears to the Court that private respondent is properly
characterized as a common carrier even though he merely "back-
Bascos v. CA
FACTS:
- Rodolfo Cipriano representing CIPTRADE entered into a
hauling contract with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corporation
whereby CIPTRADE bound itself to haul the latter's 2,000
m/tons of soya bean meal from Magallanes Drive, Del Pan,
Manila to the warehouse of Purefoods Corporation in
Calamba, Laguna.
- To carry out its obligation, CIPTRADE, through Rodolfo
Cipriano, subcontracted with Estrellita Bascos (petitioner) to
transport and to deliver 400 sacks of soya bean meal worth
P156,404 from the Manila Port Area to Calamba, Laguna at
the rate of P50/metric ton.
- Petitioner Bascos failed to deliver the said cargo. As a
consequence of that failure, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping
Agency the amount of the lost goods in accordance with the
contract which stated that: CIPTRADE shall be held liable
and answerable for any loss in bags due to theft, hijacking
and non-delivery or damages to the cargo during transport at
market value
- Cipriano demanded reimbursement from Bascos but the
latter refused to pay. Eventually, Cipriano filed a complaint
for a sum of money and damages with writ of preliminary
attachment for breach of a contract of carriage.
- RTC rendered a decision in favor of CIPTRADE. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE/S:
-
RULING:
1) Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as "(a)
person, corporation or firm, or association engaged in the business
of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public."
The test to determine a common carrier is "whether the given
undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier
which he has held out to the general public as his occupation
rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted." In
this case, petitioner herself has made the admission that she was in
the trucking business, offering her trucks to those with cargo to
move. Judicial admissions are conclusive and no evidence is
required to prove the same.
2) Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods transported by them. Accordingly, they
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the
goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. There are very few
instances when the presumption of negligence does not attach and
these instances are enumerated in Article 1734. In those cases
where the presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove
that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the
presumption.
To exculpate the carrier from liability arising from hijacking, he must
prove that the robbers or the hijackers acted with grave or irresistible
threat, violence, or force by virtue of Art. 1745 (6).
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have concluded that the
affidavits presented by petitioner were not enough to overcome the
presumption. Petitioner's affidavit about the hijacking was based on
what had been told her by Juanito Morden. It was not a first-hand
account. The affidavit of Jesus Bascos did not dwell on how the
hijacking took place. Moreover, while the affidavit of Juanito Morden,
the truck helper in the hijacked truck, was presented as evidence in
10
In the case at bar, petitioner denies liability for the damage to the
cargo. She claims that the "spoilage or wettage" took place while the
goods were in the custody of either the carrying vessel "M/V
Hayakawa Maru," which transported the cargo to Manila, or the
arrastre operator, to whom the goods were unloaded and who
allegedly kept them in open air for nine days from July
notwithstanding the fact that some of the containers were deformed,
cracked or otherwise damaged.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Survey Report of the Marine
Cargo Surveyors indicates that when the shipper transferred the
cargo in question to the arrastre operator, these were covered by
clean Equipment Interchange Report (EIR) and, when petitioner's
employees withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator, they did so
without exception or protest either with regard to the condition of
container vans or their contents.
To put it simply, Calvo received the shipment in good order and
condition and delivered the same to the consignee damaged. CA can
only conclude that the damages to the cargo occurred while it was in
the possession of the defendant-appellant. Whenever the thing is
lost (or damaged) in the possession of the debtor (or obligor), it
shall be presumed that the loss (or damage) was due to his
fault, unless there is proof to the contrary. No proof was
proffered to rebut this legal presumption and the presumption
of negligence attached to a common carrier in case of loss or
damage to the goods.
Anent petitioner's insistence that the cargo could not have been
damaged while in her custody as she immediately delivered the
containers to SMC's compound, suffice it to say that to prove the
exercise of extraordinary diligence, petitioner must do more than
11
12
ISSUE: Is the stipulation in the charter party of the owner's nonliability valid so as to absolve the American Steamship Agencies from
liability for loss? NO
the liability of the shipowner for acts or negligence of its captain and
crew, would remain in the absence of stipulation.
RULING:
A perusal of the charter party referred to shows that while the
possession and control of the ship were not entirely transferred to
the charterer, the vessel was chartered to its full and complete
capacity. Furthermore, the, charter had the option to go north or
south or vice-versa, loading, stowing and discharging at its risk and
expense. Accordingly, the charter party contract is one of
affreightment over the whole vessel rather than a demise. As such,
13
14
15
It also stipulated that the owners shall not be liable for loss of
or damage of the cargo arising or resulting from:
unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on
the part of the owners to make the vessel seaworthy, and to
secure that the vessel is properly manned, equipped and
supplied and to make the holds and all other parts of the
vessel in which cargo is carried, fit and safe for its reception,
carriage and preservation xxx
16
ISSUE:
- W/N VSI is a private/common carrier? PRIVATE
- W/N defendant may be held liable on account of the damage
of the cargo owned by plaintiff? NO
RULING:
In the instant case, it is undisputed that VSI did not offer its services
to the general public. As found by the RTC, it carried passengers or
goods only for those it chose under a "special contract of charter
party." The MV Vlasons I "was not a common but a private carrier.
Consequently, the rights and obligations of VSI and NSC, including
their respective liability for damage to the cargo, are determined
primarily by stipulations in their contract of private carriage or charter
party.
It is clear from the parties' Contract of Voyage Charter Hire that VSI
"shall not be responsible for losses except on proven willful
negligence of the officers of the vessel." The NANYOZAI Charter
Party, which was incorporated in the parties' contract of
transportation further provided that the shipowner shall not be liable
for loss of or a damage to the cargo arising or resulting from
unseaworthiness, unless the same was caused by its lack of due
diligence to make the vessel seaworthy or to ensure that the same
was "properly manned, equipped and supplied," and to "make the
holds and all other parts of the vessel in which cargo was carried, fit
and safe for its reception, carriage and preservation."
Because the MV Vlasons I was a private carrier, the shipowner's
obligations are governed by the foregoing provisions of the Code of
Commerce and not by the Civil Code which, as a general rule,
places the prima facie presumption of negligence on a common
carrier. It is a hornbook doctrine that: In an action against a private
17
18
RULING:
GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion
Industries, Inc., rendering or offering its services to no other
individual or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier.
Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation,
offering their services to the public, whether to the public in general
or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis.
The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or
goods, providing space for those who opt to avail themselves of its
transportation service for a fee. Given accepted standards, GPS
scarcely falls within the term "common carrier."
The above conclusion nothwithstanding, GPS cannot escape
from liability. In culpa contractual, upon which the action of
petitioner rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion Industries, Inc.,
the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its
compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The
law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a
party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of
the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A
breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid
cause for recovering that which may have been lost or suffered.
19
which, however, agreed with the trial court and affirmed its
decision in toto.
-
20
21
22
23
Moreover, under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are
bound to observe "extra-ordinary vigilance over goods according to
all circumstances of each case.
Since the carrier has failed to establish any caso fortuito, the
presumption by law of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier
applies; and the carrier must present evidence that it has observed
the extraordinary diligence required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code
in order to escape liability for damage or destruction to the goods
24
ISSUE/S:
-
RULING:
The payment made by the private respondent for the insured value
of the lost cargo operates as waiver of its (private respondent) right
to enforce the term of the implied warranty against Caltex under the
marine insurance policy. However, the same cannot be validly
interpreted as an automatic admission of the vessels seaworthiness
by the private respondent as to foreclose recourse against the
petitioner for any liability under its contractual obligation as a
common carrier. The fact of payment grants the private
respondent subrogatory right which enables it to exercise legal
remedies that would otherwise be available to Caltex as owner
25
From the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstance of each
case. In the event of loss, destruction or deterioration of the insured
goods, common carriers shall be responsible unless the same is
brought about, among others, by flood, storm, earthquake, lightning
or other natural disaster or calamity. In all other cases, if the goods
are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence.
Petitioner attributes the sinking of MT Maysun to fortuitous even
or force majeure. This tale of strong winds and big waves by the said
officers of the petitioner however, was effectively rebutted and belied
by the weather report from the PAGASA which the Court believed to
of greater merit. Therefore, petitioners vessel, MT Maysun, sank
with its entire cargo for the reason that it was not seaworthy. There
was no squall or bad weather or extremely poor sea condition in the
vicinity when the said vessel sank.
Anent the second issue, the SC held that the presentation in
evidence of the marine insurance policy is not indispensable in this
case before the insurer may recover from the common carrier the
insured value of the lost cargo in the exercise of its subrogatory right.
The subrogation receipt, by itself, is sufficient to establish not only
26
ISSUE: W/N the owner of the vessel should be held liable for the lost
goods? NO
RULING:
The CA correctly found that the subject container was not stripped of
its content at the pier zone. The two unstripped containers (together
with the 19 cases removed from the stripped third container) were
delivered to, and received by, the customs broker for the consignee
without any exception or notation of bad order of shortlanding. If
there was any suspicion or indication of irregularity or theft or
pilferage, plaintiff or consignee's representatives should have noted
the same on the gate passes or insisted that some form of protest
form part of the documents concerning the shipment. Yet, no such
step was taken. The shipment appears to have been delivered to the
customs broker in good order and condition and complete save for
the three cases noted as being apparently in bad order.
It logically follows that the case at bar presents no occasion for the
necessity of discussing the diligence required of a carrier or of the
theory of prima facie liability of the carrier, for from all indications, the
shipment did not suffer loss or damage while it was under the care of
the carrier, or of the arrastre operator.
27
28
Counsel for Leon Chan contends that the loss of the rice
was due to the sinking of the boat on which it was loaded, as
a result of a strong wind which struck her as she was
entering the port of San Fernando; and that appellants
should not be held responsible therefor, the loss having
resulted from an act of God ( fuerza mayor) or an
unavoidable accident (caso fortuto), and without blame
upon their part.
29
30
31
Upon arrival the shipmaster notified the consignee's "NotifyParty" that the vessel was already to discharge the cargo.
The discharging could not be affected immediately and
continuously because of certain reasons. First, the buoys
were installed only on September 11, 1985; second, the
discharge permit was secured by the consignee only on
September 13, 1985; third a wooden catwalk had to be
installed and extension of the wharf had to be made, which
was completed only on September 26, 1985; fourth, the
discharging was not continuous because there were
intermittent rains and the stevedores supplied by the
consignee did not work during the town fiesta.
32
33
The appellate court correctly ruled that the loss of cargo in the
present case was due solely to typhoon "Saling" and that private
respondent had shown that it had observed due diligence before,
during and after the occurrence of "Saling"; hence, it should not be
liable under Article 1739.
34
Defendant Eli Lilly, Inc., on the other hand, alleged that the
delay in the arrival of the the subject merchandise was due
solely to the gross negligence of petitioner Maersk Line.
35
on Article 1170 of the New Civil Code and not under the law on
Admiralty.
The bill of lading covering the subject shipment among others, reads:
6. GENERAL
(1) The Carrier does not undertake that the goods shall arive at
the port of discharge or the place of delivery at any particular time
or to meet any particular market or use and save as is provided in
clause 4 the Carrier shall in no circumstances be liable for any
direct, indirect or consequential loss or damage caused by delay.
If the Carrier should nevertheless be held legally liable for any
such direct or indirect or consequential loss or damage caused by
delay, such liability shall in no event exceed the freight paid for
the transport covered by this Bill of Lading.
It is not disputed that the aforequoted provision at the back of the bill
of lading, in fine print, is a contract of adhesion. Generally, contracts
of adhesion are considered void since almost all the provisions of
these types of contracts are prepared and drafted only by one party,
usually the carrier. The only participation left of the other party in
such a contract is the affixing of his signature thereto, hence the term
"Adhesion"
RULING:
Both the trial court and CA found petitioner liable for damages for the
delay in the delivery of goods, reliance was made on the rule that
contracts of adhesion are void. Added to this, the lower court stated
that the exemption against liability for delay is against public policy
and is thus, void. Besides, private respondent's action is anchored
36
In the case before us, we find that a delay in the delivery of the
goods spanning a period of two (2) months and seven (7) days falls
was beyond the realm of reasonableness. Described as gelatin
capsules for use in pharmaceutical products, subject shipment was
delivered to, and left in, the possession and custody of petitionercarrier for transport to Manila via Oakland, California. But through
petitioner's negligence was mishipped to Richmond, Virginia.
Petitioner's insitence that it cannot be held liable for the delay finds
no merit.
37
38
39
The fact remains that the order given by the acting mayor to dump
the scrap iron into the sea was part of the pressure applied by Mayor
Jose Advincula to shakedown the appellant for P5,000.00. The order
of the acting mayor did not constitute valid authority for
appellee Mauro Ganzon and his representatives to carry out.
40
41
42
43
In the case at bar, the Court found that the cause of blow-out was
known. The inner tube of the left front tire, according to petitioners
own evidence and as found by the CA was pressed between the
inner circle of the left wheel and the rim which has slipped out of the
wheel. This was a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a
fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus
had been subjected to a more thorough, or rigid check-up
before it took to the road that morning. Moreover, both the trial
court and CA found as a fact that the bus was running quite fast
immediately before the accident. Considering that the tire which
exploded was not new petitioner describes it as not so very worn
out the plea of casa fortuito cannot be entertained.
Moral damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a
passenger caused by the breach of CoC by virtue of Art. 1764 in rel
to Art. 2206.
Gatchalian v. Delim
WHO WON: Gatchalian
44
FACTS:
- Petitioner Reynalda Gatcalian boarded, as paying
passenger, respondents Thames mini bus at a point in San
Eugenio, LU bound for Bauang, LU. On the way, while the
bus was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc,
Bauang, Union, a snapping sound was suddenly heard at
one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle
bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off
the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch.
45
46
47
Thereupon, the old woman walked towards the left front door
facing the direction of Tiaong, carrying the child. When the
two were near the door, the train suddenly picked up speed.
As a result the two stumbled and they were seen no more. It
took 3 mins more before the train stopped at the next barrio,
Lusacan, and the victims were not among the passengers
who disembarked thereat. The next morning, the dead
bodies of the old woman and the child were seen in the
railroad tracks by the police.
CFI of Quezon convicted defendant-appellant Clemente
Brias for double homicide thru reckless imprudence but
acquitted Buencamino and Millan OTG of reasonable doubt.
Apart from imprisonment for violation of Art. 305 in rel to Art.
249 of the RPC, the lower court ordered Brias to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased. As to the responsibility of the
Manila Railroad Company, the court held that it shall be the
subject of a separate proceeding. CA affirmed.
Petitioner argues that it was negligence per se for Martina
Bool to go to the door of the coach while the train was still in
motion and that it was this negligence that was the
proximate cause of their deaths?
48
FACTS:
- On Oct 1987, the passenger jeepney driven by petitioner
Alfredo Mallari Jr. and owned by his co-petitioner Alfredo
Mallari Sr. collided with the delivery van of respondent
Bulletin Publishing Corp. (Bulletin) along the National
Highway in Barangay San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan.
- The collision occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera
while negotiating a curve in the highway. The points of
collision were the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney
and the left front side of the delivery van of Bulletin. The two
right wheels of the delivery van were on the right shoulder of
the road and pieces of debris from the accident were found
scattered along the shoulder of the road up to a certain
portion of the lane travelled by the passenger jeepney. The
impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left
side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was
Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his
injuries.
- Claudia G. Reyes, the widow of Israel M. Reyes, filed a
complaint for damages with the RTC against Alfredo Mallari
Sr. and Alfredo Mallari Jr., and also against Bulletin, its driver
Felix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands Insurance
Company. RTC found that the proximate cause of the
collision was the negligence of Felix Angeles, driver of the
Bulletin delivery van, considering the fact that the left front
portion of the delivery truck driven by Felix Angeles hit and
bumped the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney driven
by Alfredo Mallari Jr.
- CA modified the decision of the RTC and found no
negligence on the part of Angeles and Bulletin (his
employer). It ruled that the collision was caused by the sole
negligence of petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. who admitted that
immediately before the collision and after he rounded a
curve on the highway, he overtook a Fiera which had
stopped on his lane and that he had seen the van driven by
Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. CA ordered the Mallaris
to compensate Reyes and absolved respondent Bulletin.
49
liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof that it
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection of its employees.
RULING:
The SC found that the proximate cause of the collision resulting in
the death of Israel Reyes, a passenger of the jeepney, was the sole
negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner Alfredo
Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane
where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185
of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic
regulation. As found by the appellate court, petitioners failed to
present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal
presumption.
50
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N common carrier MEC is liable to plaintiff Del Prado? YES
2. W/N Del Prado is guilty of contributory negligence? YES
RULING:
1. As a general rule, there is no obligation on the part of a street
railway company to stop its cars to let on intending passengers
at other points than those appointed for stoppage.
Nevertheless, although the motorman of this car was not bound
to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do act that would
have the effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he was
attempting to board the car. The premature acceleration of the
car was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty.
The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its
patrons is of a contractual nature; and in failure on the part of
the carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers safely is a
breach of duty (culpa contractual) under articles 1101, 1103 and
1104 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of
passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding
the cars as well as to those alighting therefrom.
The distinction between these two kinds of negligence (culpa
contractual and culpa aquiliana) is important in this jurisdiction, for
51
52
ISSUE: W/N common carrier Aboitiz is liable for the death of Viana
resulting from the accidental fall of the crane towards him? YES
RULING:
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until
the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left
the vessel owner's dock or premises. Once created, the relationship
will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching
his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had
a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons
who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the
conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a
reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be
determined from all the circumstances, and includes a
reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his
departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated
merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried
to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the
carrier's premises to claim his baggage
In the case at bar, the SC ruled that there was justifiable cause for
the presence of Anacleto on or near the petitioners vessel an hour
after the petitioner disembarked from the vessel. It is of common
knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a
shipper, the passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of
time to disembark from the ship than other common carriers such as
a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the
number of passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of
accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity
of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will
need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from
the vessel and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can
easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short
period of time. When the accident occurred, the victim was in
the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to
do, from petitioner's vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty
bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their
destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim
their baggage.
53
ISSUE:
1. What was the proximate cause of the whole incident?
2. Whether or not the petitioner common carrier observed
extraordinary diligence to safeguard the lives of its passengers? NO
RULING:
1. Petitioner, in order to overcome the presumption of
fault/negligence under the law, states that the vehicular incident
resulting in the death of the passengers Beter and Rautraut was
caused by force majeure/casa fortuito.
The following essential characteristics of casa fortuito are: (1) The
cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure
of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of
the human will; (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which
constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid; (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner.
and (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause
of the incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic among
passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other
resulting in the falling off the passengers Beter and Rautraut
causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger
who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within context of
force majeure.
However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from
liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the
accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier
must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries
resulting from such accident.
54
Maranan v. Perez
WHO WON: Maranan
DOCTRINE: By virtue of Art. 1759 of the Civil Code, common
carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although
such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority
or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. Accordingly, it is
the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar
employees with due regard not only to their technical competence
and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their total
55
56
While the pilot and Villarin were talking, 'Zaldy' and one of
his companions walked to the rear and stood behind them.
'Zaldy' and his three (3) companions returned to their seats,
but after a few minutes they moved back to the rear throwing
ugly looks at Villarin.
Soon thereafter an exchange of gunshots ensued between
Villarin and 'Zaldy' and the latter's companions. 'Zaldy'
announced to the passengers and the pilots in the cockpit
that it was a hold-up and ordered the pilot not to send any
SOS. The hold-uppers divested passengers of their
belongings. Specifically, Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. was
divested of [pieces of jewelry] and cash in the total amount
of P18,650 out of which recoveries were made amounting to
P4,550. On the other hand, Gunther Leoffler was divested of
a wrist watch, cash and a wallet in the total of P1,700 As a
result of the incident, Quisumbing, Sr. suffered shock,
because a gun had been pointed at him by one of the
holduppers.
Upon landing at the Manila International Airport. 'Zaldy' and
his three companions succeeded in escaping.
Quisumbing and Loeffler brought suit against PAL in the CFI,
to recover the value of the property lost by them to the
robbers as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation. The plaintiffs declared that
their suit was instituted pursuant to Civil Code articles 1754,
998, 2000 and 2001 and on the ground that in relation to
said Civil Code article 2001 the complained-of act of the
armed robbers is not a force majeure, as the 'use of arms' or
'irresistible force' was not taken advantage of by said armed
Quisumbing v. CA
WHO WON: PAL
DOCTRINE: Where the [common carrier] has faithfully complied with
the requirements of government agencies and adhered to the
established procedures and precautions of the airline industry at any
particular time, its failure to take certain steps that a passenger in
hindsight believes should have been taken is not the negligence or
misconduct which mingles with force majeure as an active and
cooperative cause.
FACTS:
- Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. and Gunther Leoffler were among
the of PALs Fokker 'Friendship' PIC-536 plane in its flight
of November 6, 1968 which left Mactan City at about 7:30 in
the evening with Manila for its destination.
- After the plane had taken off, Florencio O. Villarin, a Senior
NBI Agent who was also a passenger of the said plane,
noticed a certain 'Zaldy,' a suspect in the killing of Judge
Valdez, seated at the front seat near the door leading to
the cockpit of the plane.
- Villarin then scribbled a note addressed to the pilot of the
plane requesting the latter to contact NBI duty agents in
Manila for the said agents to ask the Director of the NBI to
send about six NBI agents to meet the plane because the
suspect in the killing of Judge Valdez was on board
57
58
negligent,
and
RULING:
Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, Cabils negligence
gave rise to the presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were
themselves negligent in the selection and supervision of their
employee.
The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer,
the Fabres, who owned the bus, failed to exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their
employee is fully supported by the evidence on record. Indeed, it
59
60
Cariaga v. LTB
WHO WON: Cariaga
DOCTRINE:
- The income of the plaintiff which he could have earned if he
should he finish his course and pass the board exams must
be deemed to be within the natural and probable
consequences of the breach along with medical, hospital
and other expenses because they could have reasonably
been foreseen by the parties at the time the plaintiff boarded
the bus owned and operated by the common carrier.
- Moral damages may only be awarded upon showing of any
of the instances enumerated under Art. 2219 of the New Civil
Code or upon showing of bad faith or fraud under Art. 2220
of the same Code.
- Attorneys fees may only be recovered upon showing of any
of the instances enumerated under Art. 2208 of the New Civil
Code.
FACTS:
- At about 1PM on June 18, 1952, a passenger bus of the
Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. (LTB) driven by Alfredo Moncada,
left for Lilio, Laguna, with Edgardo Cariaga, a fourth-year
medical student of the University of Santo Tomas, as
one of its passengers.
- As the bus reached that part of the poblacion of Bay,
Laguna, where the national highway crossed a railroad track,
it bumped against the engine of a train then passing by
with such terrific force that the first six wheels of the
train were derailed, the engine and the front part of the
body of the bus was wrecked, the driver of the bus died
instantly, while many of its passengers, Edgardo among
them, were severely injured.
61
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N Manila Railroad Company should also be held liable in the
collision? NO
2. W/N the award of compensatory damages to Eduardo is
inadequate considering the nature and the after effects of the
physical injuries suffered by him? YES
3. W/N Edgardo Cariaga is entitled to moral damages and
attorneys fees? NO
RULING:
1. The Supreme Court quoted the lower courts finding regarding
LTBs contention on Manila Railroad Companys alleged liability to
wit: While the train was approximately 300 meters from the
crossing, the engineer sounded two long and two short whistles and
upon reaching a point about 100 meters from the highway, he
sounded a long whistle which lasted up to the time the train was
about to cross it. The bus proceeded on its way without slackening
its speed and it bumped against the train engine, causing the first six
wheels of the latter to be derailed
62
Davila v. PAL
WHO WON: Davila
DOCTRINE:
- According to Article 2206, paragraph (1), of the Civil Code,
"the defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased and indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter." This Article, while referring to "damages
for death caused by crime or quasi-delict," is expressly made
applicable by Article 1764 "to the death of a passenger
caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.
- The formula to compute damages for Davilas death is this:
his life expectancy (2/3 x [80-age of death]) x net income
(gross income-expense)
- According to Article 2206, in relation to Article 1764, of the
Civil Code, the parents of the deceased are entitled to moral
damages for their mental anguish.
- According to Article 2232 of the Civil Code, in contracts and
quasi-contracts the court may award exemplary damages if
the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner.
FACTS:
- The case arose from the tragic crash of a passenger plane
of the defendant which took the lives of all its crew and
passengers. The plane was a DC-3 type of aircraft,
manufactured in 1942 and acquired by the defendant in
1948. It had flown almost 18,000 hours at the time of its
ill-fated flight. Despite its age, however, it had been certified
as airworthy by the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
- On November 23, 1960, at 5:30PM, it took off from the
Manduriao Airport, Iloilo, on its way to Manila, with 33 people
on board, including the plane's complement. It did not reach
its destination, but crashed at Mt. Baco, Mindoro, one hour
and fifteen minutes after take-off. A massive search was
undertaken by the defendant and by other parties as soon as
it was realized that the plane's arrival in Manila was overdue.
63
ISSUE: W/N PAL is liable for violation of its contract of carriage and if
so, for how much?
RULING:
What is undisputed is that the pilot did not follow the route (IloiloRomblon-Manila) prescribed for his flight, at least between Romblon
and Manila. Since up to that point over Romblon, where he was
supposed to intersect airway "Amber I" the weather was clear, the
most reasonable conclusion is that his failure to do so was
intentional, and that he probably wanted to fly on a straight line to
Manila. It was a violation of air-craft traffic rules to which, under the
circumstances, the accident may be directly attributable. In any case,
absent a satisfactory explanation on the part of the defendant as to
how and why the accident occurred, the presumption is that it was at
fault, under Article 1756 of the Civil Code.
The trial court fixed the indemnity for his death in the amount of
P6,000. Pursuant to current jurisprudence on the point it should
be increased to P12,000.
According to Article 2206, paragraph (1), of the Civil Code, "the
defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of
the deceased and indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter." This Article, while referring to "damages for death caused by
64
De Lima v. LTB
WHO WON: De Lima et al
DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, a party who does not appeal from the decision
may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other
than what he has obtained from the lower court, if any, whose
decision is brought up on appeal. By way of exception, the claim for
legal interest and increase in the indemnity may be entertained in
spite of the failure of the claimants to appeal the judgment, as
warranted by the circumstances, pursuant to Art. 2210 of the Civil
Code which provides that interest may, in the discretion of the court,
be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract.
FACTS:
- This present action arose from a collision between a
passenger bus of the Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. (LTB) and a
delivery truck of the Seven-up Bottling Co. of the Philippines
resulting in the death of Petra de la Cruz and serious
physical injuries of Eladia de Lima and Nemesio Flores,
all passengers of the LTB bus.
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N legal interest on damages should be awarded from the date
of the trial courts decision? YES
2. W/N the indemnity for the death of Petra de la Cruz should be
increased? YES
RULING:
1. It is true that the rule is well-settled that a party cannot impugn the
correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him, and while he
65
Marchan v. Mendoza
WHO WON: Mendoza
DOCTRINE:
66
FACTS:
- On Feb 1954, around 9PM, a passenger bus operated by
the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines (PRBL) and driven by
Silverio Marchan fell into a ditch somewhere in Barrio
Malanday, Polo, Bulacan, while travelling on its way to
Manila. The said bus was traveling at a high rate of speed
without due regard to the safety of the passengers. So much
so that one of the passengers had to call the attention of
Marchan who was then at the steering wheel of said bus to
lessen the speed or to slow down, but then Marchan did not
heed the request of said passenger; neither did he slacken
his speed. On the contrary, Marchan even increased his
speed while approaching a six-by-six truck which was
then parked ahead, apparently for the purpose of
passing the said parked truck and to avoid collision with
the incoming vehicle from the opposite direction.
However, when he veered his truck to resume position
over the right lane, the rear tires of said truck skidded
67
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N there was a CoC between petitioners and respondent and if
there was breach? YES
2. W/N the awarding of damages by the CA was proper? YES
RULING:
1. It is undisputed by the evidence on record that Silverio Marchan
was then at the steering wheel of the vehicle of the defendant
transportation company. At that moment, the riding public is not
expected to inquire from time to time before they board the
passenger bus whether or not the driver who is at the steering wheel
of said bus was authorized to drive said vehicle or that said driver is
acting within the scope of his authority and observing the existing
rules and regulations required of him by the management. To hold
otherwise would in effect render the aforequoted provision of law
(Article 1759) ineffective." It is clear from the above Civil Code
provision that common carriers cannot escape liability "for the
death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence and
willful acts of the former's employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority
or in violation of the orders.
2. The amount of P40,000 awarded as compensatory damages is
quite reasonable and fair, considering that plaintiff Arsenio Mendoza
had suffered paralysis on the lower extremities, which will
incapacitate him to engage in his customary occupation
throughout the remaining years of his life, especially so that
Mendoza was only 26 years old when he met an accident and
taking the average span of life of a Filipino, he may be expected to
live for 30 years more; and bearing in mind the earning capacity of
Arsenio Mendoza who before the happening of this accident derived
an income of almost P100/month from the business of his fatherin-law as Assistant Supervisor of the small fairs and his income
of P100/month which he derived as a professional boxer.
Considering that respondent Arsenio Mendoza was only in his middle
twenties when, thru the negligence of petitioners, he lost the use of
68
This arrangement went well until Osorio and her copassengers arrived in SF, U.S.A. the next day at around 1:31
p.m., SF local time. No instructions having been received
regarding them by petitioner's SF Office due to the delay
in the transmission of the telex messages from Manila,
Osorio and her co-passengers were asked to deplane
and wait while contact with Manila was being made. This,
It was only on the following day (April 16), after spending the
night at YMCA (cost her $5) that Osorio learned through her
companions Atty. Laud and Mrs. Sim that her ticket for LAX
and luggage were ready for pick-up any time.
Notwithstanding, Osorio preferred to pick up her luggage on
April 17 and fly to LAX with a Western Airlines ticket which
she purchased for $56. Osorio spent the night at Mrs Sims
friends house for free but was obliged to buy groceries for
the hostess.
Osorio filed before the CFI a complaint for damages for
breach of CoC against CAL. CFI found for CAL. It absolved
petitioner airline from any liability except for the sum of
P1248 as reimbursement for the $100 spent by Osorio as an
involuntary rerouted passenger in SF and the $56 for her
Western Airlines ticket.
IAC reversed. It found a breach of CoC and ordered CAL to
pay Osorio in addition to the actual damages, moral and
exemplary damages in the amount of P100K and P20K,
respectively plus P5K attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
69
RULING:
1. It was upon CALs traffic agent Mrs. Diana Lim's assurance of an
immediate flight connection from San Francisco that Osorio agreed
to be re-routed to San Francisco. Due, however, to the delay in the
receipt of the telex messages regarding Osorios status and the
arrangements to be made for her, the promised immediate flight
connection was not reaped.
Verily, petitioner airlines committed a breach of contract in
failing to secure an immediate flight connection for private
Osorio. Under Article 1755 of the Civil Code, petitioner, as a
common carrier, is duty bound to "carry passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances." The reliance of petitioner on the subject telex
communications falls short of the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person expected of it, thereby rendering it liable for its
failure to abide by the promised immediate connection.
However, the Court found that the breach of contract committed
by CAL was NOT attended by gross negligence, or wanton
disregard of the rights of Osorio as a passenger. Telex was the
established mode of communication between petitioner's
Manila and San Francisco offices. Contact by telephone was not
a practice due to the time difference between the two places.
Thus, while petitioner may have been remiss in its total reliance upon
the telex communications and therefore considered negligent in view
of the degree of diligence required of it as a common carrier, such
negligence cannot under the obtaining circumstances be said
to be so gross as to amount to bad faith.
2. The Court is also convinced that CALs personnel were NOT
motivated by ill will or malice in their dealings with Osorio, let along
70
DOCTRINE:
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, it
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or
interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
FACTS:
- On May 31, 1994, Priscilla L. Tan and Connie Tan boarded
Northwest Airlines in Chicago, U. S. A. bound for the
Philippines, with a stop-over at Detroit, U. S. A. They arrived
at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) the next day
at about 10:40PM.
-
71
FACTS:
72
ISSUE: W/N defendant carrier is liable for breach of CoC and if so,
how much?
73
Zalamea v. CA
WHO WON: Zalameas
DOCTRINE:
Overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers
concerned to an award of moral damages
FACTS:
-
74
Even in the next TWA flight to LAX, Mrs. Zalamea and her
daughter could not be accommodated because it was fully
booked. Thus, they were constrained to book another flight
and purchased two tickets from American Airlines which cost
them $918.
The Zalameas filed an action for damages based on breach
of CoC before the RTC. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. On
appeal, CA held that moral damages are recoverable in a
damage suit predicated upon breach of CoC only when there
is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of record that
overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of
airlines in the US and is specifically allowed under the Code
of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no
fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on TWA. CA then
modified the lower courts decision insofar as the award of
moral and exemplary damages was deleted.
ISSUE: W/N there was fraud or bad faith on the part of defendant
carrier so as to hold them liable for damages? YES
RULING:
The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has
never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can
the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a
certificate that such officer has custody. Respondent TWA relied
solely on the statement of its customer service agent that the
Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board
allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official
publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus,
respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically
allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in
fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the
same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the
principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the
place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by
the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of
the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the
defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the
Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.
75
76
RULING:
The Civil Code provides that "exemplary or corrective damages are
imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good" (Art
2229); and that in contracts "the Court may award exemplary
damages if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner" (Art. 2232).
De Lara points out that the act referred to in Article 2232 must
be one which is coexistent with and characterizes the breach of
the contract on which the suit is based, and not one which is
subsequent to such breach and therefore has no causal relation
thereto, such as the herein defendant's failure to placate
(pacify) the sufferings of the plaintiff.
77
FACTS:
-
78
79
Verily, the omission from Article 2206 (3) of the brothers and
sisters of the deceased passenger reveals the legislative intent
to exclude them from the recovery of moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Thus, the CA
erred in awarding moral damages to the respondents.
KLM v. CA
80
81
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N Art. 30 of the Warsaw Convention (WC) is applicable to the
case? NO
2. W/N KLMs liability for the tortuous conduct of Aer Lingus is limited
based on the stipulation printed on respondents tickets expressly
limiting KLMs liability for damages? NO
3. W/N respondents entered into a series of independent contracts
with several carriers which took them on various segments of the trip
and KLM as a mere travel agency should not be held liable for
breach in any of those contracts? NO
RULING:
1. The applicability insisted upon by the KLM of article 30 of the
Warsaw Convention cannot be sustained. That article presupposes
the occurrence of either an accident or a delay, neither of which
took place at the Barcelona airport. In the case at bar, Aer
Lingus, through its manager in Barcelona, refused to transport
the respondents to their planned and contracted destination.
Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention has no application in the
case at bar which involves, not an accident or delay, but a willful
misconduct on the part of KLMs agent, the Aer Lingus.
(Pointed out by the respondent although it wasnt mentioned if the
Court upheld respondents contention): Article 25 of the WC is
applicable in the case at bar viz:
ART. 25. (1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself
of the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his
liability, if the damage is caused by his willful misconduct or
by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of
the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be
equivalent to willful misconduct.
(2) Similarly, the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself
of the said provisions, if the damage is caused under the
same circumstances by any agent of the carrier acting within
the scope of his employment.
Alitalia v. IAC
WHO WON: Dra. Pablo
DOCTRINE:
82
FACTS:
- Dr. Felipa Pablo an associate professor in the
University of the Philippines and a research grantee of
the Philippine Atomic Energy Agency was invited to
take part at a meeting of the Department of Research and
Isotopes of the Joint FAO-IAEA Division of Atomic
Energy in Food and Agriculture of the United Nations in
Ispra, Italy. She was invited in view of her specialized
knowledge in "foreign substances in food and the
agriculture environment." She accepted the invitation, and
83
francs per passenger. 4. The limits prescribed shall not prevent the court
from awarding, in accordance with its own law, in addition, the whole or part
of the court costs and of the other expenses of litigation incurred by the
plaintiff. The foregoing provision shall not apply if the amount of the
damages awarded, excluding court costs and other expenses of the
litigation, does not exceed the sum which the carrier has offered in writing to
the plaintiff within a period of six months from the date of the occurrence
causing the damage, or before the commencement of the action, if that is
later.
84
FACTS:
- Petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier took British Airways flight
from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. Once on
board, she allegedly requested Julian Halliday (Halliday),
one of the respondents flight attendants, to assist her in
placing her hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin.
However, Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her,
and even sarcastically remarked that "If I were to help all
300 passengers in this flight, I would have a broken
back!"
- Petitioner further alleged that when the plane was about to
land in Rome, Italy, another flight attendant, Nickolas
Kerrigan (Kerrigan), singled her out from among all the
passengers in the business class section to lecture on
plane safety. Allegedly, Kerrigan made her appear to the
other passengers to be ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and
in need of lecturing on the safety rules and regulations
of the plane. Affronted, petitioner assured Kerrigan that she
knew the planes safety regulations being a frequent traveler.
Thereupon, Kerrigan allegedly thrust his face a mere few
centimeters away from that of the petitioner and menacingly
told her that "We dont like your attitude."
- Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to
respondents ground manager and demanded an
apology. However, the latter declared that the flight
stewards were "only doing their job."
- Thus, petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC of Makati
for damages praying that respondent be ordered to pay P5M
as moral damages, P2M as nominal damages, P1M as
exemplary damages, P300K as attorneys fees, P200K as
litigation expenses, and cost of the suit.
- Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served
on the respondent through Violeta Echevarria, General
Manager of Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc.
- Respondent by way of special appearance through
counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the
respondent. Respondent alleged that only the courts of
85
within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of
a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a
territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of
another Power, even though that Power is not a party to this Convention. A
carriage without such an agreed stopping place between territories subject
to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High
Contracting Party is not deemed to be international for the purposes of this
Convention.
86
Although the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in
this country, being a treaty commitment assumed by the Philippine
government, said convention does not operate as an exclusive
enumeration of the instances for declaring a carrier liable for breach
of contract of carriage or as an absolute limit of the extent of that
liability. The Warsaw Convention declares the carrier liable for
damages in the enumerated cases and under certain limitations.
However, it must not be construed to preclude the operation of the
Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less
exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights
of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful
misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or
established.
FACTS:
- On 19 October 1975, respondent Tomas L. Alcantara was a
first class passenger of petitioner Cathay Pacific
Airways, Ltd. (CATHAY) on its flight from Manila to
Hongkong and onward from Hongkong to Jakarta on another
flight. The purpose of his trip was to attend the following
day, a conference with the Director General of Trade of
Indonesia, Alcantara being the Executive Vice-President
and General Manager of Iligan Cement Corporation,
Chairman of the Export Committee of the Philippine
Cement Corporation, and representative of the Cement
Industry Authority and the Philippine Cement
Corporation.
- Alcantara checked in his luggage which contained not only
his clothing and articles for personal use but also papers and
documents he needed for the conference.
- Upon his arrival in Jakarta, respondent discovered that
his luggage was missing. When he inquired about his
luggage from CATHAY's representative in Jakarta,
Alcantara was told that his luggage was left behind in
Hongkong. For this, respondent Alcantara was offered
$20.00 as "inconvenience money" to buy his immediate
personal needs until the luggage could be delivered to him.
87
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N the award of damages was proper? YES save for the award
of temperate damages.
2. W/N the Warsaw Convention is applicable to the present case?
NO
RULING:
1. Both the trial court and the appellate court found that CATHAY
was grossly negligent and reckless when it failed to deliver the
luggage of petitioner at the appointed place and time. CATHAY
alleges that as a result of mechanical trouble, all pieces of luggage
on board the first aircraft bound for Jakarta were unloaded and
transferred to the second aircraft which departed an hour and a half
later. Yet, as the CA noted, petitioner was not even aware that it
left behind private respondent's luggage until its attention was
called by the Hongkong Customs authorities. More, bad faith or
otherwise improper conduct may be attributed to the employees
88
Within our jurisdiction, the Court has held that the Warsaw
Convention can be applied, or ignored, depending on the peculiar
facts presented by each case. Thus, we have ruled that the
Convention's provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other
breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and
employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage.
Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of
some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and
preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention.
Likewise, the Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil
Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less
exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights
of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful
misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or
established.
FACTS:
- On 13 October 1989 respondent Willie J. Uy, a revenue
passenger on United Airlines Flight No. 819 for the San
Francisco Manila route, checked in together with his
luggage one piece of which was found to be overweight
at the airline counter.
- To his utter humiliation, an employee of petitioner rebuked
him saying that he should have known the maximum weight
allowance to be 70 kgs. per bag and that he should have
packed his things accordingly. Then, in a loud voice in
front of the milling crowd, she told respondent to repack
his things and transfer some of them from the
overweight luggage to the lighter ones.
- The airline then billed him overweight charges which he
offered to pay with a miscellaneous charge order or an
airline pre-paid credit. However, the airline's employee,
and later its airport supervisor, adamantly refused to
honor the MCO pointing out that there were conflicting
figures listed on it. Despite the explanation from
respondent that the last figure written on the MCO
represented his balance, petitioner's employees did not
accommodate him. Faced with the prospect of leaving
89
ISSUE:
1. W/N the notice of appeal to the appellate court was timely filed?
YES
2. W/N Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention should apply to the case at
bar? NO
RULING:
1. Respondent filed his notice of appeal two (2) days later than the
prescribed period. Although his counsel failed to give the reason for
the delay, we are inclined to give due course to his appeal due to the
unique and peculiar facts of the case and the serious question of law
it poses. In the now almost trite but still good principle, technicality,
when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration.
Moreover, the Court also took note of the fact that while respondent
filed his complaint more than two (2) years later (beyond the period
of limitation prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for filing a claim
for damages), it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from
immediately filing an action because petitioner airline gave him
the runaround, answering his letters but not giving in to his
demands. True, respondent should have already filed an action at
the first instance when his claims were denied by petitioner but the
90
Within our jurisdiction, the Court has held that the Warsaw
Convention can be applied, or ignored, depending on the
peculiar facts presented by each case. Thus, we have ruled that
the Convention's provisions do not regulate or exclude liability
for other breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of
its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional
type of damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to
justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage
resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond
the limits set by said Convention. Likewise, the Convention
does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other
pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the
carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its
passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful
misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or
established.
Respondent's complaint reveals that he is suing on two (2) causes of
action: (a) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received from
petitioner's employees at the San Francisco Airport which caused
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ISSUE/S:
1. W/N there was an exclusive contract of carriage between
Antiporda and Lufthansa such that the nature of such contract if a
continuous carriage from MNL to AFRICA? YES.
2. W/N Sec. 2 Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention is applicable to
the case at bar? NO.
RULING:
1. Antiporda was issued a confirmed Lufthansa ticket all throughout
the five-leg trip. The fourth paragraph of the "Conditions of Contract"
stipulated in the ticket indubitably showed that the contract of
carriage was considered as one of continuous air transportation from
Manila to Blantyre, Malawi, thus: carriage to be performed
hereunder by several successive carriers is regarded as a
single operation. From the ticket, therefore, it is indubitably clear
that it was the duty and responsibility of the defendant Lufthansa to
transport the plaintiff from Manila to Blantyre, on a trip of five legs.
The posture taken by the defendant that it was Air Kenya's, not
Lufthansa's, liability to transport plaintiff from Bombay to Malawi, is
unacceptable. The plaintiff dealt exclusively with the defendant
Lufthansa which issued to him the ticket for his entire trip and which
in effect guaranteed to the plaintiff that he would have sure space in
Air Kenya's flight to Nairobi. Plaintiff, under that assurance of the
defendant, naturally, had the right to expect that his ticket would be
honored by Air Kenya, to which, in the legal sense, Lufthansa had
endorsed and in effect guaranteed the performance of its principal
engagement to carry out plaintiff's scheduled itinerary previously and
mutually agreed upon by the parties. Defendant itself admitted that
the flight from Manila, Singapore, Bombay, Nairobi, Lilongwe,
Blantyre, Malawi, were all confirmed with the stamped letters "OK"
thereon. The contract of air transportation was exclusively between
the plaintiff Antiporda and the defendant Lufthansa, the latter merely
endorsing its performance to Air Kenya, as its subcontractor or
agent.
In light of the stipulations expressly specified in the ticket defining the
true nature of its contract of carriage with Antiporda, Lufthansa
cannot claim that its liability thereon ceased at Bombay Airport
and thence, shifted to the various carriers that assumed the
actual task of transporting said private respondent. In the very
nature of their contract, Lufthansa is clearly the principal in the
contract of carriage with Antiporda and remains to be so,
regardless of those instances when actual carriage was to be
performed by various carriers. The issuance of a confirmed
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Yu Con v. Ipil
WHO WON: Yu Con
DOCTRINE:
- The old Code of Commerce absolved the shipowner from
liability for the negligence of the captain and its crew but, in
the light of the principles of modern law, this doctrine on the
non-liability of the shipowner for the unlawful acts, crimes or
quasi crimes, committed by the captain and the crew can no
longer be maintained in its absolute and categorical terms.
- It is well and good that ship owners be not held criminally
liable for such crimes or quasi crimes; but he cannot be
excused from liability for the damage and harm which, in
consequence of those acts, may be suffered by the third
parties who contracted with the captain, in his double
capacity of agent and subordinate of the shipowner himself.
- In maritime commerce, the shippers and passengers in
making contracts with the captain do so through the
confidence they have in the shipowner who appointed him;
they presume that the owner made a most careful
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FACTS:
- Yu Con (plaintiff), a merchant and a resident of the town of
San Nicolas, Cebu, engaged in the sale of cloth and
domestic articles and having a share in a shop situated in
the town of Catmon had several times CHARTERED from
the defendant Narciso Lauron, a banca named Maria
belonging to the latter, of which Glicerio Ipil was master
and Justo Solamo, supercargo, for the transportation of
certain merchandise and some money to and from the said
town and the port of Cebu.
- On or about the 17th of October, 1911, Yu Con chartered the
said banca from the defendant Lauron for the transportation
of various merchandise from the port of Cebu to Catmon, at
the price of P45 for the round trip, which merchandise was
loaded on board the said craft which was then at anchor in
front of one of the graded fills of the wharf of said port.
- The following day, Yu Con delivered to the other two
defendants, Ipil, and Solamo, master and supercargo,
respectively, of the afore-named banca, the sum of P450,
which was in a trunk belonging to the plaintiff and was
taken charge of by said two defendants, who received
this money from the plaintiff, for the purpose of its
delivery to the latter's shop in Catmon for the purchase
of corn in this town.
- While the money was still in said truck abroad the vessel, on
the night of the said Oct 18 the time scheduled for the
departure of the Maria from the port of Cebu, said master
and said supercargo transferred the P450 from the
plaintiff's trunk, where it was, to theirs, which was in a
stateroom of the banca, from which stateroom both the
trunk and the money disappeared during that same
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The trial court held that the sole cause of the disappearance
of the money from the said banca was the negligence of the
master (Ipil) and the supercargo (Solamo) and that
defendant Lauron was responsible for that negligence, as
owner of the banca pursuant to articles 589, 587 and 618 of
the Code of Commerce, Yu Con therefore being entitled to
recover the amount lost.
ISSUE: W/N Defendants are liable for the loss of plaintiffs sum of
money placed in the banca? YES
RULING:
It is therefore beyond all doubt that the loss of the money occurred
through the manifest fault and negligence of Ipil and Solamo, for
not only did they fail to take the necessary precautions in order that
the stateroom containing the trunk in which they kept the money
should be properly guarded by members of the crew and put in such
condition that it would be impossible to steal the trunk from it or that
persons not belonging to vessel might force an entrance into the
stateroom from the outside but also they did not expressly station
some person inside the stateroom for the guarding and safe-keeping
of the trunk.
All of these circumstances, together with that of its having been
impossible to know who took the trunk and the money, make the
conduct of Ipil, Solamo, and the other crew members eminently
suspicious and prevent our holding that the disappearance or loss of
the money was due to a fortuitous event, to force majeure, or that it
was an occurrence which could not have been foreseen, or which, if
foreseen, was inevitable.
The old Code of Commerce absolved the shipowner from liability for
the negligence of the captain and its crew but, in the light of the
principles of modern law, this doctrine on the non-liability of the
shipowner for the unlawful acts, crimes or quasi crimes, committed
by the captain and the crew can no longer be maintained in its
absolute and categorical terms.
It is well and good that ship owners be not held criminally liable for
such crimes or quasi crimes; but he cannot be excused from liability
for the damage and harm which, in consequence of those acts, may
be suffered by the third parties who contracted with the captain, in
his double capacity of agent and subordinate of the shipowner
himself.
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FACTS:
- On March 12, 1920, there were loaded in the motor boat
Alfonso 2,000 cases of petroleum and 8,473 cases of
gasoline, of which 5,000 cases of gasoline and 2,000 of
petroleum were placed in the hold of said motor boat, and
the balance on deck. Said loading was done without
permission from the customs authorities. Said cases were
loaded by means of straps supporting 10 or 12 cases at a
time. Said cases were placed in the hold of the ship, which
is 14ft from the boiler of the main engine and 4ft from the
boiler of the smaller engine.
- On the evening of March 13, the smaller engine was in
operation preparatory to the departure of the motor boat
which, at the time, was getting ready to leave. A fire in said
motor boat burst out with an explosion followed by a violent
expulsion of gasoline and petroleum.
- Due to the proximity of the motor boat to a steamer Y.
Sontua owned by plaintiff, the magnitude of the fire and
the inflammability of the material that served as fuel, the
fire spread to the said steamer and so rapidly that it was
impossible for the crew of the Y. Sontua, and so rapidly that
it was impossible for the crew of the said steamer to check
its progress.
- Thus, plaintiff brought a civil action to recover from
defendant (owner and agent of the subject motor boat)
damages to her deck amounting to P67,400. Defendant
alleges, as a special defense, that he has taken no part
either directly or indirectly in the acts alleged in the complaint
and that if plaintiff sustained damages, they are not
imputable to the negligence of his agents, employees or
mandatories.
- Trial court sentenced the defendant to pay plaintiff the
abovementioned sum with legal interest.
ISSUE:
- W/N defendant is liable to plaintiff? YES
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RULING:
(1) Expert testimony introduced by Sontua shows the explosion and
fire, which caused the damages, are imputable to the negligence of
the persons having charge of Alfonso at that time. It was shown that:
o Due to the manner by which the cases were loaded (by
means of straps), the cases would receive violent bumps
resulting in damage to the cans and consequent leakage.
o The gases formed by the volatilization are apt to accumulate
in a compartment (hold of a ship) without sufficient
ventilation.
o This accumulation will cause the gases to ignite upon
coming in contact with a spark or upon temperature being
sufficiently raised (smaller engine was in operation).
Under these circumstances, the Court held that the fire which caused
the damages for which the plaintiff seeks redress was the inevitable
effect of the explosion and fire which occurred in the motor boat and
that this explosion and fire was imputable to the negligence of the
persons having charge at that time of said motor boat and under
whose direction the loading of the aforesaid cases of petroleum and
gasoline had been performed.
DOCTRINE:
The doctrine of limited liability gives the ship agents or owners right
of abandonment of the vessel and earned freight and such
abandonment provides the cessation of the responsibility of the ship
agent/owner. In other words, the ship agent/owners liability is
merely co-extensive with his interest in the vessel that a total loss
thereof results in its extinction, no vessel, no liability.
FACTS:
- Chua Yek Hong is a duly licensed copra dealer based at
Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, while Guno and Olit are the
owners of the vessel M/V Luzviminda I, a common carrier
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ISSUES:
(1) W/N MV Asilda was seaworthy when it left the port of
Zamboanga? YES
(2) W/N the limited liability under Art. 587 of the Code of
Commerce should apply? NO
(3) W/N PHILAMGEN was properly subrogated to the rights and
legal actions which the shipper had against FELMAN, the
shipowner? YES
RULING:
(1) MV Asilda was unseaworthy when it left the port of
Zamboanga. In a joint statement, the captain as well as the chief
mate of the vessel confirmed that the weather was fine when they
left the port of Zamboanga. According to them, the vessel was
carrying 7,500 cases of 1-liter Coca-Cola softdrink bottles, 300
sacks of seaweeds, 200 empty CO2 cylinders and an
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103
FACTS:
- On December 21, 1974, 60,000 bags of Urea Nitrogen were
shipped from Niihama Japan, on board the S/S St. Lourdes,
claimed to be owned and operated by defendant Citadel
Lines, Inc. The goods were consigned to Borden
International Phils., Inc. (BIP), and insured by Switzerland
General Insurance Co (SGIC) for the sum of P9M against
all risks.
- The shipment was discharged from the vessel S/S St.
Lourdes shipside into lighters owned by Mabuhay Brokerage
Company, Inc., but when the same was subsequently
delivered to and received by the consignee, it was found to
have sustained losses and/or damage amounting to P38K.
- The amount was then paid by SGIC to BIP, by virtue of which
payment it became subrogated to the rights of the latter.
- SGIC made demands against Oyama Shipping Co. (Oyama
Lines), Citadel Lines and/or Mabuhay Brokerage Co. Inc.
(MBC) but no payment was made and, uncertain in whose
custody the goods were damaged, impleaded the private
respondents as alternative defendants to determine their
respective liability.
- On December 24, 1975, SGIC thru its agent, F. E. Zuellig
Inc., filed an admiralty case against Oyama Lines, Citadel
and/or Mabuhay Brokerage Co., Inc (MBC).
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the vessel, in whose custody the goods were lost or damaged, are
exempt from liability therefrom and that the damage was caused by
factors and circumstances exempting them from liability.
The Code of Commerce provides, among others, that the ship agent
shall also be liable for the indemnities in favor of third persons which
arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods which
the vessel carried; but he may exempt himself therefrom by
abandoning the vessel with all her equipments and the freightage he
may have earned during the voyage. (Article 587).
It appearing that the Citadel Lines is the ship agent for the vessel
S/S "St. Lourdes" at the port of Manila, it is, therefore, liable to the
petitioner, solidarily with its principal, Oyama Shipping Co., Ltd., in an
amount representing the value of the goods lost and or damaged,
amounting to P38,698.94, which was likewise the amount paid by
petitioner, as insurer, to the insured consignee As found by the court
a quo, there has been no proof presented to show that the officers of
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ISSUE:
(1) Who, among the carrier, consignee or insurer of the goods, is
liable for the additional charges or expenses incurred by the owner of
the ship in the salvage operations and in the transshipment of the
goods via a different carrier? ESLI
(2) W/N respondent court committee an error in concluding the
expenses incurred in saving the cargo are considered general
average? YES
RULING:
(1) It is worthy to note at the outset that the goods subject of the
present controversy were neither lost nor damaged in transit by the
fire that razed the carrier. In fact, the said goods were all delivered to
the consignees, even if the transshipment took longer than
necessary.
It is erroneous for the respondent Court to say that fire is considered
a natural calamity. Fire may not be considered a natural disaster
or calamity since it almost always arises from some act of man
or by human means. It cannot be an act of God unless caused
by lightning or a natural disaster or casualty not attributable to
human agency.
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that a small flame was detected
on the acetylene cylinder and that by reason thereof, the same
exploded despite efforts to extinguish the fire. Neither is there any
doubt that the acetylene cylinder, obviously fully loaded, was stored
in the accommodation area near the engine room and not in a
storage area considerably far, and in a safe distance, from the
engine room. Moreover, there was no showing, and none was
alleged by the parties, that the fire was caused by a natural disaster
or calamity not attributable to human agency. On the contrary, there
is strong evidence indicating that the acetylene cylinder caught
fire because of the fault and negligence of respondent ESLI, its
captain and its crew through the ff. instances:
The acetylene cylinder which was fully loaded should not
have been stored in the accommodation area near the
engine room where the heat generated therefrom could
cause the acetylene cylinder to explode by reason of
spontaneous combustion. Respondent ESLI should have
easily foreseen that the acetylene cylinder, containing highly
inflammable material was in real danger of exploding
because it was stored in close proximity to the engine room.
ESLI should have known that by storing the acetylene
cylinder in the accommodation area supposed to be
reserved for passengers, it unnecessarily exposed its
passengers to grave danger and injury. Curious passengers,
ignorant of the danger the tank might have on humans and
property could have handled the same or could have lighted
and smoked cigarettes while repairing in the accommodation
area.
The fact that the acetylene cylinder was checked, tested and
examined and subsequently certified as having complied
with the safety measures and standards by qualified experts
before it was loaded in the vessel only shows to a great
extent that negligence was present in the handling of the
acetylene cylinder after it was loaded and while it was on
board the ship. Indeed, had the respondent and its agents
not been negligent in storing the acetylene cylinder near the
engine room, the same would not have leaked and exploded
during the voyage.
(2) As a rule, general or gross averages include all damages and
expenses which are deliberately caused in order to save the vessel,
its cargo, or both at the same time, from a real and known risk. While
the instant case may technically fall within the purview of the said
provision, the formalities prescribed under Articles 813 and 814 of
the Code of Commerce in order to incur the expenses and cause the
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ISSUE:
(1) W/N Manila Steamship Co is exempt from liability to Abdulhaman
bec it had exercised ordinary diligence in the selection of its
employees under Art. 1903 of the NCC? NO
(2) W/N Manila Steamship Co. is liable for the negligence of his
agents and employees? YES
(3) W/N Lim Hong To (owner of M/L Consuelo) is exempt from
liability in view of the total loss of his vessel that sank as a result of
the collision? NO
RULING:
(1) While it is true that Abdulhamans action against Manila
Steamship Co is based on a tort or quasi-delict, the tort in question is
NOT a civil tort under the Civil Code but a maritime tort resulting in
a collision at sea, governed by Articles 826-939 of the Code of
Commerce. Under Article 827 of the Code of Commerce, in case of
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