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Rule 98

TRUSTEES
Procedure for Appointment of Trustees under Rule 98
Allowance of the instrument creating the trust (Probate of will)
Petition by the executor / administrator or the person
appointed as trustee in the instrument Notice to all
interested persons Appointment of the trustee by the court
Filing of bond by the trustees
When does this apply?

The rule comes into play only when the trustee is not
named
o Testator omits to appoint a trustee
o Such appointment is necessary to carry into
effect the provisions of the will

Applies only to express trusts, not to implied trusts.


Where to file

RTC which allowed the will (same probate


proceedings)

RTC of place where the property is located


Notes

Accounts must be filed under oath and filed annually


Court which has jurisdiction is RTC or MTC if
appointed to carry into effect provisions of a will
o If trustee dies, resigns or removed in a
contractual trust, RTC has jurisdiction in the
appointment of new trustee
May sell or encumber property of estate held in trust,
if necessary or expedient upon order of the court
Order of sale has no time limit
Appointed to carry into effect the provisions of a will
(testamentary trust) or written instrument (contractual
trust)
May be exempted from filing bond if provided in the
will or if beneficiaries requested exemption
Trusteeship is terminated upon turning over property
to beneficiary after expiration of trust
No obligation to pay debts of beneficiary or trustor.
Trustee must make a true inventory of all the real and
personal estate belonging to him as trustee (Sec 6)
Must render upon oath at least once a year until his
trust is fulfilled (Sec 6)

ADOPTION OF MINORS

Allows foreigners to adopt, but subject to certain


qualifications and requirements
Removed the adopters right to rescind the adoption
Case study report and supervised trial custody as part
of the procedure for adoption
Grounds for rescission of adoption (Sec 19)
o Repeated physical and verbal maltreatment
by the adopter despite having undergone
counseling
o Attempt on the life of the adoptee
o Sexual assault or violence
o Abandonment or failure to comply with
parental obligations

RP v. Maximo Wong
SUMMARY:
Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala Sr and
Segundina Alcala. When they were 2 and 9 yo respectively, he
and his sister were legally adopted by Hoon Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong (naturalized Filipinos who are childless
after 15 yrs of marriage.) When he turned 22, Maximo wants to
revert to his natural parents real name saying that the Chinese
surname of his adoptive parents embarrassed and isolate him
in his Muslim community. Likewise, it hampers the progress of
his business (furniture store). The adoptive mom does not
mind his action and even assured that he will still be entitled to
inherit from them despite the name change. RTC granted the
petition for change of name. SolGen resists because change of
name is an act of ingratitude to his adoptive parents who cared
for him. SC ruled in favor of Wong. It was proven that the
surname was detrimental to Maximos business. Likewise, the
change of Maximos surname was not done to defraud anyone.
Use of the adoptive parents surname is not the main objective
of adoption but merely one of its effects.
DOCTRINE:

From the very wordings of the law, it may be inferred


that the use of the surname of the adopter by the
adopted child is both an obligation and a right.

No person can change his name or surname without


judicial authority under Article 376 of the Civil Code,

A change of name is a proceeding in rem, strict


compliance with all jurisdictional requirements
essential to vest the court with jurisdiction
o It is a privilege granted only upon a showing
of a proper or reasonable cause or
compelling reason.

To justify a request for change of name, petitioner


must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name

In granting or denying petitions for change of name,


the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to
the sound discretion of the court

The change of the surname of the adopted child is


more an incident rather than the object of adoption
proceedings.
Lahom v. Sibulo
SUMMARY: Diosdado and Isabelita Lahom, a childless couple,
adopted John Melvin Sibulo. However, despite their requests,
he refused to use their surname, and instead kept on using his
own. Diosdado died, and a few years after, Isabelita filed an
action to rescind the adoption decree. She alleged that Jose
had not been giving her the care and affection expected of a
son, and was only after the properties of the spouses. Jose
filed a MTD, alleging that RA 8552, which was enacted a year
and a half before the petition was filed, had removed the right
of an adopter to rescind the adoption. The RTC dismissed the
petition, and the SC affirmed. It held that Isabelita had lost the
right when RA 8552 was passed, and that there was no vested
right to rescind. Morever, the action had already prescribed.
DOCTRINE: Interestingly, even before the passage of the
statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to
the 5-year bar rule under Rule 100of the RoC, and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree
after the lapse of such period. The exercise of the right
within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill
the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection.
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CUSTODY OF MINORS

Allows participation of DSWD


Legal guardian may file petition
No priority in venue; based on the choice of the
petitioner
Best interest of the child prevails over agreement of
custody
Provides for provisional remedies

Provisional remedies

Provisional order awarding custody

Hold departure order

Protection order
Dacasin v. Dacasin
Summary: Sharon (Fil) and Herald (Am) were married and had
a child, Stephanie. Sharon obtained a divorce in the State of
Illinois which held that it was to retain jurisdiction in the
enforcement of the decree. They executed a joint custody
agreement in the Philippines and stipulated PH courts were to
govern. Herald sought to enforce the agreement. RTC held it
had no jurisdiction. SC reversed. RTC had jurisdiction
however, the agreement is null and void as it is contrary to PH
law which states that:
Doctrine: Article 213 of the Family Code: no child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother.
Upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody
under the law if the child is below seven years old and any
agreement to the contrary is void.
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto
SUMMARY: Crisanto Gualberto filed a petition to declare his
marriage to Joycelyn a nullity. The petition had an ancillary
prayer for custody pendente lite of their 4 year-old child. At first
the RTC awarded him custody, but later reversed itself and
awarded Joycelyn custody. CA reversed.
Doctrine: Art. 213 of the Family Code is mandatory. The
tender years presumption under this Article may be overcome
only by compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. Here,
Joycelyns alleged lesbian relations are not sufficient ground to
deprive her of custody. Sexual preference or moral laxity alone
does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. To deprive
the mother ofcustody, it must be clearly established that her
moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the
child. The best interest of the child is the paramount
consideration.
ASP: In this case, custody of minors was used as a provisional
remedy in nullity case. Am 03-04-04 is inapplicable, since
special proceedings (custody of minors) cannot be joined with
other civil actions (declaration of nullity).
Briones v. Miguel
SUMMARY: Joey filed a Petition for habeas corpus against
Loreta, the mother of his illegitimate child. He prayed that
custody be given to him. The CA ruled that it is the mother who
should have custody, there being no compelling reason to
separate the mother from the minor child. However, the CA
allowed the child to make a choice of which parent to live with
upon reach the age of 10, pursuant to Rule 99 Sec. 6. Held: In
general, it is the mother who has sole parental authority over

the illegitimate child. However, the application of Rule 99 Sec.


6 was improper, as this applied only when the parents are
married to each other but are separated. Here, Joey and
Loreta were never married.
DOCTRINE:The application of Rule 99 Sec. 6 was improper,
as this applied only when the parents are married to each other
but are separated.

An illegitimate child is under the sole parental


authority of the mother. In the exercise of that
authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her
company. The Court will not deprive her of custody,
absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to
exercise such authority and care.

HOSPITALIZATION OF INSANE PERSONS


Who may be committed?

Any insane person

Insane person who has committed a felony (RPC Art.


12)
Who may file?

Secretary of Health

According to Regalado, the custodian of the insane


person may also file the petition
o However, Sir San Pedro DISAGREES. There
is nothing stopping the custodian from
voluntarily bringing the insane person to the
hospital, hence there is no need to go to
court.
Discharge of insane person

May only be filed by the Secretary of Health


o Sec of Health cannot order a persons
release from the hospital without Court
approval.
o The court also cannot order a persons
release without recommendation by the
Secretaru

The guardians remedy is to file a petition for habeas


corpus.
People v. Dungo
Summary: Dungo killed Mrs. Sigua. During trial, Dungo raised
the defense of insanity. The RTC, as affirmed by the SC, held
Dungo guilty beyond reasonable doubt as evidence shows that
Dungo was sane during the time of commission of the crime.
His acts, prior to and after the commission of the crime, are
strong indications of his sanity.
Doctrine:

(topical) Dungo was ordered by the RTC to be


confined in the mental hospital

Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved


in favor of the accused. However, in the defense of
insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be
resolved in favor of sanity. The burden of proving the
affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

The writ of habeas corpus is a writ directed to the


person detaining another and commanding him to
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produce the body of the prisoner at a certain time and


place.
The essence of the petition is the detention of the
person. Actual and effective restraint is required.
The petition becomes moot when the petitioner is
released. (Olaguer vs. Military Commission)
o However when the conditions as to the
release are imposed so as to effectively
deprive the petitioner of liberty, the remedy
of habeas corpus is still available and is not
mooted. (Moncupa vs. Enrile)
The writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
custody of an officer under a process issued by the
court which has jurisdiction to do so. (Paredes vs.
Sandiganbayan)
The formalities required for petitions for habeas
corpus shall be construed liberally. Strict compliance
with the technical requirements for a habeas corpus
petition may be dispensed with where the allegations
in the application are sufficient to make out a case for
habeas corpus. (Fletcher vs. Director of Bureau of
Corrections)

Where habeas corpus is applicable

Detention cases
o Deprivation of a constitutional right
o Court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence
o Excessive penalty has been imposed
o Allowance of bail when bail has been denied
for a bailable offense

Custody cases
Where to file

RTC
o
o

In case there is no RTC judge, MTC (BP 129


Sec. 35)
Note that writs granted by the MTC/RTC are
enforceable only within their respective
judicial regions, while writs granted by the
CA and SC are enforceable throughout the
country.

CA
Supreme Court

Requisites for application (Sec. 3)

That the person in whose behalf the application is


made is imprisoned or restrained of liberty

Name of the officer or person who has custody


o If uncertain, description of such officer or
person

Place of imprisonment, in known

Copy of the commitment or cause of detention, if it


can be produced
o If the detention is without legal authority,
such fact must be alleged
Grounds for denial of the writ (Sec. 4)

Person is in the custody of an officer under process


issued by a court or judge

Person is detained by virtue of a judgment of a court


which had jurisdiction
Duties of the officer to whom the writ is directed (Sec. 6)

Have the body of the person detained brought to court


at the time and date specified
Summon the person causing the detention/restraint
and have him show cause of the detention

Moncupa vs. Enrile (1986)


FACTS: Moncupa was arrested, and was detained in Camp
Bago Bantay. The investigators recommend prosecution of
Moncupa for illegal possession of firearms and illegal
possession of subversive documents. Moncupa filed motions
for bail in the lower court which were denied. Thus, he filed a
petition for habeas corpus with the SC. During the pendency of
the case, Moncupa was temporarily released on orders of the
Minister of National Defense, with approval of the President.
The following restrictions were imposed on his temporary
release: he was required to ask for the Respondents' approval
to travel or change his abode, he was not allowed to participate
in interviews
conducted by the media, and he was required to report regular
to the Respondents. The respondents argue
that in light of Moncupa's temporary release, the petition for
habeas corpus has become moot and academic.
HELD: The Writ of Habeas Corpus does not only question
physical restraint. A release that renders petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus moot and academic must be one which is free
from involuntary restraints. In this case, the restraints imposed
upon Moncupa curtailed his freedom. The petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is granted. His temporary release is declared
absolute.
Olaguer vs. Military Commission (1987)
FACTS: During Martial Law, the petitioners, as civilians, were
arrested by the military authorities. They were criminally
charged, and were tried by the Military Commission. The
Commission found them guilty, and imposed the death penalty.
The petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the SC,
challenging the jurisdiction of the Military Commission. During
the pendency of the case, martial law was lifted, and eventually
when Pres. Aquino came to power, the petitioners were
released.
HELD: The petitioners having been released, the petition for
habeas corpus is moot and academic. The sole issue in
habeas corpus proceedings is detention. When the release of
the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas
corpus was filed is effected, the petition becomes moot and
academic. Inasmuch as the petitioners have been released
from their confinement, the petitions for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become
moot and academic.
People v. Simon
FACTS: Martin Simon was arrested in a buy-bust operation for
the alleged sale of 4 tea bags of marijuana. TC found him
guilty and he appealed to the Supreme Court. Simon was
contending that he was the victim of a frame up, that the
Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated was inadmissible in
evidence, and that he was not actually guilty of violating the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
HELD: Simon was guilty. However the penalty to be imposed
was modified with the amendment of the law under which he
was convicted. Habeas corpus is a proper remedy for
instances when the judgment which could be affected and
modified by the reduced penalties had already become final
and executory, or the accused is serving sentence thereunder.
Practice, procedure, and pragmatic considerations would
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warrant and necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial


authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus.
Parades vs. Sandiganbayan (1991)
FACTS: A criminal complaint was filed with the Tanodbayan
(now Ombudsman) against Paredes for violation of RA
3019. Although the summons was never received by Paredes,
the fiscal proceeded to conduct the preliminary examination
and found a prima facie case against Paredes. An information
was filed against Paredes in the Sandiganbayan and a warrant
for his arrest was issued and served upon him. Paredess wife
filed a petition for
habeas corpus.
HELD: The writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an
officer under a process issued by the court which has
jurisdiction to do so. In the absence of a preliminary
investigation, the remedy of the accused is not a petitionfor a
writ of habeas corpus, but a motion to quash the
warrant of arrest and/or the information, or ask for an
investigation/reinvestigation of the case.
Galvez vs. CA (1994)
FACTS: Galvez and Diego were charged with murder and
frustrated murder. However, before they could be arraigned, a
new prosecutor came in and had the informations withdrawn
and refiled. Among the remedies sought by the accused was a
petition for habeas corpus filed with the Supreme Court.
HELD: The writs of habeas corpus and certiorari may be
ancillary to each other where necessary to give effect to the
supervisory powers of the higher courts. A writ of habeas
corpus reaches the body and the jurisdictional matters, but not
the record. A writ of certiorari reaches the record but not the
body. Hence, a writ of habeas corpus may be used with the
writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. However, habeas
corpus does not lie where the petitioner has the remedy of
appeal or certiorari because it will not be permitted to perform
the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the purpose of
reviewing mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings of a
court having jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter. It has to be an exceptional case for the writ of habeas
corpus to be available to an accused before trial.
Aquino vs. Esperon (2007)
FACTS: Major Aquino was implicated in an alleged plan of a
group of military men to take over the Headquarters of the
Philippine Army. He was ordered arrested and confined at Fort
Bonifacio by Lt. Gen. Esperon. His wife filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus praying that the AFP Chief
of Staff and the Commanding
General be directed to immediately produce the body of Major
Aquino and explain why he should not be set at
liberty without delay.
HELD: The writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued. Major
Aquinos confinement was legal considering that all the
processes required by the Articles of War with regard to his
case were followed. The SC cannot look into questions
concerning the detainees conditions of confinement in a case
for habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus extends only to
the fact and duration of confinement. It is not a means for the
redress of grievances or to seek injunctive relief or damages.
Fletcher v. Director of Bureau of Corrections
Summary: Martin Fletcher filed the present petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his prison
sentence was commuted by then Pres. Ramos, which he had
more than served already. The OSG opposed his petition,

arguing, among others, that there Fletchers petition did not


comply with the RoC, Rule 102, Sec. 3. The SC ruled that
though the petition did not comply with the RoC, Rule 102,
Sec. 3, it should not be dismissed for that reason. However, for
other reasons, Fletchers petition should still be denied.
Doctrines:
1) Strict compliance with the technical requirements for a
habeas corpus petition, as provided in the RoC, may
be dispensed with where the allegations in the
application are sufficient to make out a cause for
habeas corpus.
2) The formalities required for petitions for habeas
corpus shall be construed liberally.
3) A petition deficient in form may be entertained so long
as its allegations sufficiently make out a case for
habeas corpus.
4) The writ, however, should not be issued when the
custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial
process or a valid judgment.
Go v. Ramos
SUMMARY: A complaint-affidavit for deportation was filed
against Jimmy Go, alleging that he was an alien (Chinese).
Two warrants of deportation were issued by the Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration. For the first
apprehension, Jimmy Go initially filed a petition for habeas
corpus but the same was eventually dismissed because of his
provisional release on bail. Jimmy then filed a petition for
certiorari questioning the decision of the Board. This petition
was dismissed by CA, and subsequently, the second warrant
of deportation was issued Jimmy was apprehended pending
his deportation to China. Jimmy then filed another petition for
habeas corpus. SC ruled against Jimmy. The petition for
habeas corpus must be dismissed.
DOCTRINE: Once a person detained is duly charged in court,
he may no longer question his detention through a petition for
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to
quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued.
The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party
sought to be released had been charged before any court. The
term "court" in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of
governmental agencies authorized to order the person's
confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration.
Ampatuan v. Macaraig
SUMMARY: PO1 Ampatuan was arrested by the PNP for his
alleged involvement with the murder of 2 COMELEC lawyers.
Pending investigation by the PNP, the City Prosecutor of
Manila recommended that the criminal case against him be set
for further investigation and ordered his release from custody.
However, the PNP officials did not release him. Armed with the
Prosecutor's recommendation, PO1 Ampatuan's wife filed a
petition for habeas corpus with RTC Manila alleging that PO1
Ampatuan was being illegally detained by the PNP. RTC issued
the writ and required the PNP officials to produce PO1
Ampatuan's body and show cause as to the restraint of his
liberty. PNP relates that while, to date, no criminal case was
filed against PO1 Ampatuan, PO1 Ampatuan is under
RESTRICTIVE CUSTODY of the PNP since he is facing an
administrative case for grave misconduct. RTC, thereafter,
dismissed the petition. Ampatuan now argues that there was
no administrative case filed against her husband on the date
she filed her petition and that the pieces of proof presented by
the PNP officials were antedated.
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HELD: RTC properly dismissed the petition. The objective of


the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is
valid or lawful. The writ, however, should not be issued when
the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or
a valid judgment. In this case, PO1 Ampatuan was placed
under Restrictive Custody by virtue of the administrative
charges against him; hence, the petition should be dismissed.
DOCTRINE: Restrictive Custody and monitoring of movements
or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their
superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is
beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor
effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy
prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure
the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are
always accounted for.
Hernandez v. San Juan
SUMMARY: As the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir
of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San
Juan family. Lulu went to live with her father and his new
family. She was then 10 years old and studying at La
Consolacion College. But then she stopped attending school.
Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulus
properties. Upon Felixs death in 1993, petitioner half-siblings
took over the task of administering Lulus properties. After
sometime, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first
cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that
petitioners had been dissipating her estate. Jovita then filed a
petition for guardianship allegeing that Lulu was incapable of
taking care of herself and managing her estate because she
was of weak mind. This was granted. While in an apartment,

Lulu was abducted and later on found out to be with petitioners


by the PACER. Hence, Jovita filed habeas corpus writ. SC
ruled that petition for guardianship and writ for habeas corpus
were proper.
DOCTRINE: An ordinary witness may give his opinion on the
mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted. Persons who, though of sound mind but by reason
of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are
incapable of taking care of themselves and their property
without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. A writ of habeas corpus
extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by
which the rightful custody of person is withheld from the one
entitled thereto.
Bagtas vs. Santos (2009)
FACTS: The Sps. Gallardo are the maternal grandparents of
Maryl Joy. Bagtas and Sioson are the couple with whom Maryl
Joys mother left her. The Sps. Gallardo filed a petition for
habeas corpus with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the action on
the ground that the action had become moot because Maryl
Joy had already been produced in court and turned over to the
Sps. Gallardo.
HELD: In cases involving minors, the purpose of a petition for
habeas corpus is not limited to the production of the
child before the court. The main purpose of the petition for
habeas corpus is to determine who has the rightful custody
over the child. The childs welfare is the supreme
consideration, and not the rights of the claimants. The RTC
should not have dismissed the petition but should have
conducted a proper hearing on who should have rightful
custody.

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