1

DIOSDADO MALLARI, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF

APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
.
FACTS:
Pat Manipon and Pfc. Esguerra received reliable information
that appellant Diosdado Mallari, who has a standing warrant of arrest
was seen at Tarlac.
Upon reaching the place, the arresting officers surrounded the
house of appellant, arrested him and told him to remain stationary.
Thereupon, the arresting officers searched him and found a
homemade gun (paltik) with one M-16 live ammunition
Appellant was handcuffed and brought to the Capas Police
Station where he was endorsed to the chief investigator while the
homemade gun and live ammunition were endorsed to the property
custodian.
In seeking the reversal of his conviction, petitioner questions the
factual finding of the Court of Appeals that at the time of his arrest,
there was a standing warrant against him in Criminal Case No. 471.
Petitioner posits that the absence of the requisite warrant is fatal and
renders the search and seizure unlawful. Corrolarily, the handgun and
ammunition seized from him are inadmissible in evidence. Petitioner
also contends that it was error for the Court of Appeals to conclude
that the search and seizure could be validly effected as it was done
on the occasion of a lawful warrantless arrest, particularly, while in the
act of committing the crime of illegal possession of firearms in the
presence of the arresting officers. Finally, petitioner claims that even
assuming that the handgun and ammunition had in fact been found in
his possession, the prosecution failed to prove that he had no license
therefor and absent this essential element of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms, it was manifest error for the Court of Appeals
to uphold his conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is guilty of illegal possession of firearms

an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession, and it is

the duty of the prosecution not only to allege it but also to prove it
beyond reasonable doubt.4[16] In the case at bench, the testimony of a
representative of, a certification from the PNP (FEU) that petitioner
was not a licensee of the said firearm would have sufficed for the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
the crime of illegal possession.5[17] The absence of the foregoing is
fatal to the prosecutions case and renders petitioners conviction
erroneous.
True that in the case of People vs. Mesal6[18], this Court
dispensed with a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit
(FEU) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) to establish the alleged
lack of license or permit on the part of the accused-appellant to
possess the M-14 rifle found in his possession. This was, however,
premised on the fact that:
The records reveal that the allegation was successfully
substantiated by other evidence which firmly and undisputably
established that accused-appellant did not have and could not
possibly have, the requisite license or authority to possess the M-14
rifle concerned. Technical Sgt. Alfredo Romasanta, Supply Officer of
the PC-INP 253rd PC Company, testified that the rifle concerned is the
type of weapon which only military men are authorized to possess x x
x.7[19]
The above enunciated doctrine is not applicable to this case.
The records are bereft of any evidence similar to that offered by the
prosecution in Mesal to prove that the petitioner did not have and
could not possibly have the requisite license or authority to possess
the paltik and the M-16 live ammunition.
In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and
the assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Diosdado Mallari is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence
and ordered immediately released unless there are other legal
grounds for his continued detention.
SO ORDERED.

RULING:
No. Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to discharge its
burden of proving that he did not have the requisite license for the
firearm and ammunition found in his possession. Anent this
contention, the Office of the Solicitor General does not even attempt
to point out any evidence on record of petitioners non-possession of
a license or permit for there really is no such evidence. It relies on the
theory that as the firearm involved is a homemade gun or paltik and
is illegal per se, it could not have been the subject of license.1[13] This,
according to the Solicitor General, dispenses with the necessity of
proving that petitioner had no license to possess the firearm. This is
where the prosecutions case fails and miserably so. This Court has
ruled that:
We do not agree with the contention of the Solicitor General
that since a paltik is a homemade gun, is illegally manufactures as
recognized in People vs. Fajardo, and cannot be issued a license or
permit, it This appears to be at first blush, a very logical proposition.
We cannot, however, yield to it because Fajardo did not say that
paltiks can in no case be issued a license or permit and that proof that
a firearm is a paltik with proof that it is unlicensed.2[14]
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution
has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: (a) the existence
of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess the same.3[15] The latter is a negative fact which constitutes

G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968

SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and
LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH)

FACTS:
Barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known
as the Judiciary Act of 1948, the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas
Tagalog commenced a civil case in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio
to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon
from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is

2
paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment
was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same
was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants
and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as
the Surety, on the 31st of the same month.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance during the pendency of the
appeal will prosper.

RULING: No.

As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First

Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before
the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the
question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was
exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety became a
quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed a counter-bond
for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of
origin. Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed specific
obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance with
sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of.
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counterbond the Surety not only filed a written opposition thereto praying for
its denial but also asked for an additional affirmative relief that it be
relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied
upon in support of its opposition lack of jurisdiction of the court a
quo not being one of them.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the
counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time
within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This motion was
granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the
motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different
ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or
estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds
of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the

discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is

not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity
or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court
to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case
just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the
question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter
of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
G.R. No. 86773 February 14, 1992
SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTERAQUACULTURE DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD), DR. FLOR
LACANILAO (CHIEF), RUFIL CUEVAS (HEAD, ADMINISTRATIVE
DIV.), BEN DELOS REYES (FINANCE OFFICER), petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JUVENAL
LAZAGA, respondents.

FACTS:

SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the

Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an
agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand by the governments of
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and the
Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country (Article 1,
Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC).
Private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research
Associate and a probationary basis by the SEAFDEC-AQD and was
appointed Senior External Affairs.Thereafter, he was appointed to the
position of Professional III and designated as Head of External Affairs
Office with the same pay and benefits.
Petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a
notice of termination to private respondent informing him that due to
the financial constraints being experienced by the department, his
services shall be terminated at the close of office hours and that he is
entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one (1) month of his basic
salary for every year of service plus other benefits.
Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD's failure to pay private respondent
his separation pay, the latter filed a complaint against petitioners for
non-payment of separation benefits plus moral damages and
attorney's fees.
Petitioners in their answer with counterclaim alleged that the NLRC
has no jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is
an international organization and that private respondent must first

3
secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money
accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid, and
which clearances had not yet been obtained by the private
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction to hear and decide respondent
Lazaga's complaint since SEAFDEC-AQD is immune from suit owing
to its international character and the complaint is in effect a suit
against the State which cannot be maintained without its consent
RULING:
No.
Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development CenterAquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency
beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.
It was established by the Governments of Burma, Kingdom of
Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia, Japan, Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia.
Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of
Thailand and Republic of Vietnam
Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC
mandates:
1. The Council shall be the supreme organ of the Center and all
powers of the Center shall be vested in the Council.
Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its
Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom
from control of the state in whose territory its office is located.
WHEREFORE, finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an international agency
beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or local agency of the Philippine
government, the questioned decision and resolution of the NLRC
dated July 26, 1988 and January 9, 1989, respectively, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been rendered without
jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 156034. October 1, 2003]

AN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. C & A CONSTRUCTION,
INC., respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan
Transport Lines, Inc., anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the
purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing the cargo oil tank.
Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report
from his radio head operator in Japani[5] that a typhoon was going to
hit Manilaii[6] in about eight (8) hours.iii[7] At approximately 8:35 in the
morning of October 21, 1994, Capt. Jusep tried to seek shelter at the
North Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already
congested.iv[8] At 10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at
the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles away from a Napocor power barge.
At that time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt.

Jusep ordered his crew to go full ahead to counter the wind which
was dragging the ship towards the Napocor power barge. To avoid
collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel.v[9] He
succeeded in avoiding the power barge, but when the engine was restarted and the ship was maneuvered full astern, it hit the deflector
wall constructed by respondent.vi[10] The damage caused by the
incident amounted to P456,198.24.vii[11]
Respondent demanded payment of the damage from petitioner
but the latter refused to pay. Consequently, respondent filed a
complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent; (2) If yes, whether or
not petitioner is solidarily liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for
the quasi-delict committed by Capt. Jusep?
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict. The test for determining the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care
and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.8[18]
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding
that Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding to transfer the vessel only
at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As early as 12:00
midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a report from his radio
head operator in Japan9[19] that a typhoon was going to hit Manilaviii[20]
after 8 hours.ix[21] This, notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 in
the morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at
the North Harbor, which unfortunately was already congested. The
finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship
could not have sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the transfer
was done earlier. It is not the speculative success or failure of a
decision that determines the existence of negligence in the present
case, but the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under
the circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the typhoon
was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently waited for the lapse of
more than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might change direction.x
[22]
He cannot claim that he waited for the sun to rise instead of
moving the vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the report
because of the difficulty of traveling at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is
way past sunrise. Furthermore, he did not transfer as soon as the sun
rose because, according to him, it was not very cloudyxi[23] and there
was no weather disturbance yet.xii[24]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is
DENIED. The June 14, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 59034 ordering petitioner Delsan Transport Lines, Inc.,
to pay respondent C & A Construction, Inc., damages in the amount of
P456,198.27, plus P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the award of P456,198.27 shall earn interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from October 3, 1995, until finality of this
decision, and 12% per annum thereafter on the principal and interest
(or any part thereof) until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979

8
9

4
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIANO C. CASTAEDA, JR., as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, and BENJAMIN F.
MANALOTO, respondents.
FACTS:

That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San
Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named a BENJAMIN F.
MANALOTO, with deliberate intent to commit falsification, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously counterfeit, imitate and
forge the signature of his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto in a deed of
sale executed by said accused wherein he sold a house and lot
belonging to the conjugal partnership of said spouse in favor of
Ponciano Lacsamana under Doc. No. 1957, Page No. 72, Book No.
LVII, Series of 1975, notarized by Notary Public Abraham Pa.
Gorospe, thereby making it appear that his spouse Victoria M.
Manaloto gave her marital consent to said sale when in fact and in
truth she did not. 2

ISSUES:

From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents emerges the

sole issues determinative of the instant petition, to wit: Whether or not
the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document filed against
herein private respondent Benjamin F. Manaloto who allegedly
forged the signature of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, in a deed of
sale, thereby making it appear that the latter gave her marital consent
to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership
when in fact and in truth she did not may be considered as a
criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife
and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.

RULING:
Yes.
We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the
marital disqualification rule, as a criminal case for a crime committed
by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.
1. The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of
Public Document is the forgery by the accused of his wife's signature
in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife
consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal
partnership when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be noted that
had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's
name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the
consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said
husband Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's

confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same
breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly,
filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a
crime committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a
conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of the
instant case.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower court

dated March 31, 1977, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying
for or against her husband, Benjamin Manaloto, in Criminal Case No.
1011, as well as the order dated May 19, 1977, denying the motion for
reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court is hereby lifted and the respondent Judge
is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of the case, allowing
Victoria Manaloto to testify against her husband.
SO ORDERED.

OF PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO

CASTANEDA Y SALES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
FACTS:
Private complainant AAA is a married woman, a mother of three
(3) minor children, and a vegetable vendor. She resides with her
family in xxx. She was usually left at home with her children as her
husband pastured ducks in the province of xxx.[4]
The crime at bar happened in the evening of June 12,
1992. Private complainant was at home with her children. The moon
was then bright and her house was lighted with three (3) kerosene
lamps. At about 10:00 p.m. , she exposed ampalaya leaves to
dewdrop outside her house. The leaves must be peddled fresh in the
market the following day. She was hanging the last bundle when she
noticed, at a distance of five (5) meters, a person walking towards her
house.
Private complainant sensed danger. She was alone as her
husband was in xxx. Her children were asleep. Her neighbors were
some twenty (20) meters away. She shouted. In no time, the intruder
grabbed private complainant, pulled back her hair with his left hand,
and poked a knife at her neck with his right hand. He demanded
money. She told him there was none. He reiterated his demand and
out of fear, private respondent indicated that her money was inside
the aparador in her house. The man forcibly dragged her to the
house.
Inside the house, private complainant was made to open the
aparador. With the light of the three (3) lamps, she clearly saw the
face of the man through the mirror of the aparadors upper
portion.[5] She handed her money to him, two hundred pesos
(P200. 00) in all. The measly amount disappointed the man. He led
her outside the house and at knife point, ordered her to pull down her
pants. She refused and pleaded: Huwag naman, may mga anak
ako, may asawa ako, maawa ka naman.[6] The man responded by
pressing harder the knife at her throat, and ordering her to perform
sexually perverted acts. After a while, the man was able to penetrate
her womanhood.[7]
His lust sated, the man warned her: Do not tell anybody
about this incident, if you report the matter to anybody, I will
come back and kill you.[8] He disappeared into the
darkness. Private respondent woke up her children and sought help
from BBB and his wife, CCC. The house of BBB is forty (40) to fortyfive (45) meters away from her house. She recounted her ordeal to
them but sealed her lips about the threat. BBB, in turn, summoned

5
Barangay Captain Ponciano Cunanan and Councilman Rodolfo
Manaloto. She retold her story to the barangay officials, who decided
to report the matter to the police authorities.
It was 11:00 p.m. The barangay officials walked with private
complainant to the police headquarters in xxx. On their way, she saw
a man wearing red shorts and white striped shirt passing in front of a
lighted house near the boundary of barangays xxx and xxx. She
recognized the man as the one who robbed and raped her. She
pointed him to BBB.[9] They confronted the man who turned out to be
accused-appellant. He was invited to the police station and clamped
in jail.
The following morning, June 13, 1991, private complainant went
to the xxx Municipal Station and again identified accused-appellant
as the culprit. Chief of Police Benito Sicat prepared the necessary
Police
Blotter
Report.[10] Dr.
Ramiro
Rodriguez
of
the xxx Hospital examined private complainant. His report showed
that her organ suffered superficial abrasion at 9 position, congestion
at 3 position. [11] Three days after, private complainant executed a
sworn statement narrating her revolting experience. In that
statement, she again identified accused-appellant.[12]
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION AND IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE FOR
THE DEFENSE.
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
Accused-appellant argues that his identity as the perpetrator of
the crime was not established beyond reasonable doubt. He claims
that private complainant did not immediately point to him as the
culprit upon seeing him at the bridge dividing barangays xxx and
xxx. She let him passed by and it was only as he was twenty (20)
meters away, that she looked back at him and said, It seems that is
the person who raped me.[19]
The argument lies on a faulty factual basis. Contrary to
accused-appellants claim, the records show that immediately upon
seeing a man coming to their direction, private complainant
recognized him as the criminal and pointed him to BBB, and then to
the barangay officials. Thus, she testified:
xxx
xxx
xxx
:
When you saw a person coming while you were in front of the
house which was lighted, what happened?
When that person was coming, I was able to recognize him and said to
BBB, BBB, that is the man, sir.[20]
From her testimony, it is clear that on sight, private
complainant immediately identified and pointed accusedappellant to Apolinar as the man who robbed and raped her. It is
true that accused-appellant had already passed by private
complainant when she pointed him to the barangay officials. But
this happened because the barangay captain and his
companions were walking ahead of private complainant and
BBB. Moreover, it was not only during their chance encounter that
private complainant identified the accused-appellant. An hour after
the incident, she again identified accused-appellant. She once
more identified accused-appellant at the xxx Police Headquarters
the next day.
We have no doubt that private complainant had a good look at
the physical features of accused-appellant. Private complainant had
an early look at accused-appellant while he was walking on the way
towards the formers house. While the robbery was being committed,
the lights coming from the three (3) kerosene lamps made it possible
for private complainant to see accused-appellants face and clothes
through the mirror of the aparador in the house. During the rape,
private complainant was close to accused-appellant as is physically
possible, for a man and a woman cannot be physically closer to each
other than during a sexual act.[21] There is, therefore, no reason to
doubt the accuracy of private complainants visual perception of
accused-appellant as the criminal. Nor is there any reason to doubt
her honesty of intention for there is no showing that she identified
accused-appellant due to a corrupt motive.

Be that as it may, accused-appellant still contends that he was

misidentified as barangay tanod David testified that the culprit was
described by private complainant as tall, slim, and a
Liarves. Allegedly, this description was given in the presence of
barangay officials who were not called as witnesses by the
prosecution. He charges the prosecution with suppression of
evidence.
The contention cannot succeed. The rule on suppression of
evidence cannot be invoked by accused-appellant where the same
evidence is available to him. In the case at bar, accused-appellant
could have subpoenaed the barangay officials who allegedly heard
the description of the culprit given by the private complainant. These
barangay officials were not under the control of private complainant, a
lowly housewife in barangay xxx. It is far fetched to accuse her and
the prosecution of suppressing their testimonies.
Moreover,
their
testimonies
could
only
be
corroborative. In People v. Lorenzo,[22] we held that the
presumption laid down in Section 5(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced does not apply when the testimony of the witness not
produced would only be corroborative.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the judgment of the trial court, finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with
Rape, is AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 122954. February 15, 2000]

NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,
MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA (IN PLACE OF THE JAIL
WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE
OF BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and THE
CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since
May 21, 1981, up to presentxiii[1] by reason of his conviction of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide. Some twelve (12) years later, or on
June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be transferred from the Manila City
Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City,xiv[2] but the Jail
Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of the
RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be effected without
the submission of the requirements, namely, the Commitment Order
or Mittimus, Decision, and Information.xv[3] It was then discovered that
the entire records of the case, including the copy of the judgment,
were missing. Petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus praying for his discharge from confinement on the
ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is
illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere loss or destruction of the records of a
criminal case subsequent to conviction of the accused will render the
judgment of conviction void, or will it warrant the release of the convict
by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus
RULING:
No.
The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public
respondents to initiate the reconstitution of the judgment of the case
under either Act No. 3110,xvi[26] the general law governing
reconstitution of judicial records, or under the inherent power of courts
to reconstitute at any time the records of their finished cases in
accordance with Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.xvii[27]
Judicial records are subject to reconstitution without exception,

6
whether they refer to pending cases or finished cases.xviii[28] There is
no sense in limiting reconstitution to pending cases; finished cases
are just as important as pending ones, as evidence of rights and
obligations finally adjudicated.xix[29]
Petitioner belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by the
Government to reconstitute the missing records of the trial court. We
reiterate, however, that "reconstitution is as much the duty of the
prosecution as of the defense."xx[30] Petitioners invocation of Ordoez
v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152 (1994), is misplaced since the
grant of the petition for habeas corpus therein was premised on the
loss of records prior to the filing of Informations against the prisoners,
and therefore "[t]he government has failed to show that their
continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by the
pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause
whatsoever." In this case, the records were lost after petitioner, by his
own admission, was already convicted by the trial court of the offense
charged. Further, the same incident which gave rise to the filing of the
Information for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to another case
for Illegal Possession of Firearm,xxi[31] the records of which could be of
assistance in the reconstitution of the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102079 November 22, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HENRY SALVERON, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Leopoldo C. Nagera, Jr. for accused-appellant.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT FAILURE TO INCLUDE GREGORIO IN THE
LIST INVALIDATE HIM AS A WITNESS
The fact that Gregorio was not in the list of witnesses that was
attached to the information was satisfactorily explained by the
prosecution. The record shows that the criminal complaint filed with
the municipal court on March 29, 1986 did not include Gregorio
among the witnesses because his sworn statement was taken only on
April 1, 1986, and it was this list that was merely copied when the
information was prepared by the provincial prosecutor. At any rate,
the omission did not disqualify Gregorio from testifying later because,
as we said in People v. Pacabes: 12
We have held in a long line of decisions that the prosecution is
allowed to call witnesses other than those named in the complaint
and information. While the accused in a criminal prosecution is
entitled to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him, it
does not mean that he entitled to know in advance the names of all
the witnesses for the prosecution. The success of the prosecution
might be endangered if such right be granted to an accused for the
known witnesses might be subjected to pressure or coerced not to
testify. The time for the accused to know all the witnesses against him
is when they take the witness stand.
The trial court convicted Salveron of murder but did not explain how it
was qualified by evident premeditation or treachery as alleged in the
information. The allegation was simply accepted without proof. This
Court itself has gone over the records and finds that neither of these
circumstances attended the commission of the crime.

CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:

Raul Salveron was shot to death inside a bus by a passenger who

escaped and has not been arrested to date. A few weeks later, Jesus
Dalida was killed in his house under mysterious circumstances that
have yet to be unraveled. Mauricio Dumangas was luckier: he too
was attacked with apparent intent to kill but survived to accuse his
attackers.
They were, according to him, Rosibal de Felipe, the husband of Gloria
de Felipe, Marianito Billones, Jr., and Jessie Vito, who were all
eventually charged with frustrated homicide.
It was during the pendency of this case that Rosibal de Felipe was
himself gunned down, on March 26, 1986, in Barangay Dolores,
Municipality of Balasan, Iloilo. The killing was mounted to the herein
appellant, Henry Slaveron, son of the late Raul Salveron, in an
information for murder filed against him and Federico Sadava. 1 This
is the case now before the Court.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Victoriano Gregorio as its star
witness.

The prosecution has not established the essential elements of evident

premeditation, to wit: a) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; b) an overt act showing that the culprit had clung to
his determination to commit the crime; and c) a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and the execution of the crime as to allow
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 13 In fact, no
evidence whatsoever of any of these elements was presented by the
People.
Like evident premeditation, treachery cannot be merely presumed,
and certainly not from the environmental facts of the particular case
before us. While it may be argued that Salveron ambushed Rosibal
on his way home, there is absolutely no positive evidence of this
conjecture. On the other hand, it may also be supposed that, because
he was riding on his motorcycle, Rosibal could have used the vehicle
to avert the attack upon him or even ram his attacker or at least
deflect his fire. We resolve the doubt in favor of the accused. We hold
that there was no treachery because it has not been shown that
Salveron employed means, methods or forms calculated to insure the
execution of the killing without risk to himself arising from the defense
the victim might have made. 14
In the absence of either of the alleged qualifying circumstances, we
must find that the crime committed by Salveron was merely homicide
and not murder. Homicide is punishable with reclusion temporal; 15 in
this case in its medium period, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
penalty is reduced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from prision

7
mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal in its medium period as
maximum.

to cross-examine Kaplin, respondent association was entitled to have

the direct testimony of the witness stricken off the record.

We hope that the bloody trail of vendetta that began with the alleged
robbery and rape of Gloria de Felipe will end with the killing of her
husband, Rosibal de Felipe in the case we here decide. Whatever
retribution is warranted upon the guilty in this tangled web of
vengeance upon vengeance must be decreed, not by those who feel
they have been wronged, but by the law itself through the processes
of the courts.

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing

witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in
proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers,
is fundamental right which is part of due process. (Savory
Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., 1975, 62
SCRA 258)

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and the appellant

is hereby declared guilty not of murder but of homicide, for which he
is sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. He shall also indemnify the heirs of Rosibal de Felipe in
the sum of P50,000.00 and pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26136 October 30, 1978
THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC. and/or "BACHRACH
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC", as operator of the RURAL
TRANSIT, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and RURAL TRANSIT
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, respondents.
Flores, Macapagal Ocampo & Balbastro for petitioners.
Carlos Santiago for private respondent.
MUOZ PALMA, J.:
In 1958 the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. and/or the "Bachrach
Transportation Co., Inc.", now petitioner in this case, was in the
transportation business and operated what was then known as the
"Rural Transit". In that year the Rural Transit Employees Association
went on strike and the dispute between the management and the
union reached the Court of Industrial Relations for compulsory
arbitration.

ISSUE:
The respondent court erred in dismissing the petition of the herein
petitioner, after ordering the testimony of Joseph Kaplin to be stricken
off the record, notwithstanding the fact that the service records of
Maximo Jacob, upon the basis of which his dismissal could be
justified were admitted by it.
1. Respondent court did not err in ordering the dismissal of
Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob. Petitioner presented
only one witness, Joseph Kaplin to prove its case against driver
Jacob. The witness failed however to appear at the scheduled
hearings for his cross-examination for the simple reason that he left
for abroad. Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of its right

In Ortigas Jr. v. Luftansa German Airlines, 1975, defendant's witness

failed to appear at the continuation of hearing during which the
witness was to be cross-examined by plaintiff's counsel. The trial
court denied defendant's motion for postponement and ordered the
unfinished testimony of the witness Lazzari stricken off the record. In
sustaining said order, this Court held inter alia:
Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete,
that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse
party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the
fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and
cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party
offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered
incompetent.
The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is
invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the
accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of
the accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto of
parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an
indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental
law. ... Until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony
of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not,
therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by
the court in deciding the case. (64 SCRA 610, 636- 637; emphasis
supplied)
Parenthetically, the situation in Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng
Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., supra, was different. There, the
witness, Atty. Morabe, had finished his direct testimony and he was
ready and available for cross-examination. Motions for postponement
of the cross-examination were made however by the adverse counsel
from time to time until one day Atty. Morabe succumbed to a fatal
heart attack without the cross-examination having been
accomplished. On motion of the respondents the Court of Industrial
Relations ordered the testimony of Atty. Morabe deleted from the
record. On a petition for certiorari by Savory Luncheonette, this Court
set aside the order and held that by their own actuations,
respondents were considered to have impliedly waived and thereupon
lost their right to cross-examine the witness, for such a right may be
forfeited by a party litigant through his own conduct. Petitioner
contends however that it was ready to present another witness, Mrs.
Ursula Silva, to Identify the documents, Exhibits "1" to "8-F", but it did
not proceed to call the witness for the reason that during the hearing
of January 16, 1965, respondent's counsel, Atty. Santiago, manifested
that he was admitting the signatures of Joseph Kaplin on the
aforesaid documents. 8 However true that may be, what Atty. Santiago
admitted merely was the signature of Mr. Kaplin and not the truth of
the contents of the documents. 9 The opposing party was still entitled
to cross-examine the witness on the matters written on Exhibits "1" to
"8-F" especially if they adversely affected the substantial rights of the

8
party against whom they were being presented, namely, driver
Maximo Jacob. When Atty. Santiago admitted that the signature
appearing in Exhibits "1" to "8-F" was that of witness Kaplin, the
counsel of petitioner then, Atty. Joven Enrile, should have inquired if
the party was admitting likewise the veracity of the contents of the
documents; not having done so, petitioner must now suffer the
consequences. Exhibits "1" to "8-F" were admitted by respondent
court only for "whatever they may be worth." Evaluating them,
however, it did not consider said documents, and rightly so, as
competent proof of the truthfulness of their contents without the
supporting testimony of witness Kaplin. As stated in the order under
review "(N)o other witness was presented by respondent company
(now petitioner) to testify on the intrinsic value of those exhibits";
consequently, they are hearsay. Inasmuch as the testimony of Joseph
Kaplin is stricken off the record and the contents of Exhibits "1" to "8F" are hearsay, and there is no other evidence which substantiates
the charges against Maximo Jacob, the dismissal of the company's
petition to discharge Jacob from its service is in order.

relationship between the Caparas and the Paezes. One day, Simeon
was shot by one named Patricio Diamsay.
The shotgun used by Patricio Diamsay in shooting Simeon Paez
belonged to Eufemio Caparas

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT SALVADORS TESTIMONY SHOULD BE

ADMITTED

RULING:
WHEREFORE, We hereby render judgment affirming the order of
respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated March 1, 1966, now
under review, with the sole modification that petitioner shall pay its
driver Maximo Jacob three (3) years backwages at the rate of the last
salary received before he was suspended, without qualification and
deduction. With costs against petitioner. Order modified.

The most damaging testimony against appellant Caparas is that of

Laureano Salvador. It would actually make him a principal by
inducement. Conspiracy would thus be proven by direct evidence.
With the same effect is the testimony of Lydia Posadas who allegedly
heard Caparas and Diamsay talking on how to kin Simeon Paez by
provoking him into a quarrel.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-47411 February 20, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUFEMIO CAPARAS Y PAEZ and PATRICIO DIAMSAY Y
GREGORIO, defendants-appellants.
DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
This is the tragic story of two first cousins, accused Eufemio Caparas
and the deceased Simeon Paez, one of whom planned the killing of
the other because of conflicts over proprietary rights.
Since the lots were covered by several titles, Eufemio Caparas
requested that all the lots be titled in his name alone so that after the
subdivision of the whole parcel each of them would have portions
contiguous to each other (pp. 7-8, Id.). Everyone agreed to the
proposal and everything went along fine. From 1967 to 1970, Pedro
Paez and his sons Simeon and Pablo tilled their ten-hectare share of
the land. On the latter date, the tenants of the lots filed leasehold
petitions with the Court of Agrarian Relations. As a result, Eufemio
Caparas proposed to Pedro Paez that they sell the land to the
government under the Land Reform Program at P5,000.00 per
hectare and he would give Pedro Paez the amount of P23,000.00 (pp.
8-9, Id). Sensing that they would be prejudiced because the proceeds
of the sale of the ten-hectare land turn by them should be
P50,000.00, the Paezes refused to agree to the proposal of Caparas.
Hot words ensued between Eufemio Caparas and his cousin Simeon
Paez, the latter blurting out that "what you are doing to us is not
helping us but it is defrauding us." (pp. 9-11, Id.). From then on

The testimony of Laureano Salvador is sought to be totally discarded

by appellants on the ground that this witness was not fully crossexamined by the defense counsel. It appears, however, that the
witness was not fully cross-examined not because of the fault of the
prosecution, for the witness, although unable to be present on three
previous hearings, subsequently appeared, ready to be crossexamined. But defense counsel asked for postponement which the
court denied and declared a waiver on the part of the defense to
further cross-examine the witness. At any rate, this witness had
already been cross-examined on the material facts testified to. The
case relied upon by appellants in their effort to discard Laureano
Salvador's whole testimony Ortigas vs. Lufthansa Airlines, 64
SCRA 610-611 is thus not applicable because there, the witness
disappeared and was never cross-examined even partly.
WHEREFORE, We find the appealed judgment to be in accordance
with law and the evidence except only as to the minimum of the
penalty imposed on appellant Diamsay which should be reduced to
17 years of reclusion temporal, to comply with the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Voluntary surrender of appellant
Diamsay was properly appreciated in his favor to justify the lesser
penalty imposed upon him than that imposed on appellant Caparas.
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from, modified as herein
indicated, is hereby affirmed, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-47411 January 18, 1982
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUFEMIO CAPARAS y PAEZ and PATRICIO DIAMSAY y
GREGORIO, defendants-appellants.

9
RESOLUTION

A I said, 'if there is, I give thanks', but he said that the land he was
giving me had some trouble.

DE CASTRO, J.:
Q And what did you say?
Thus, Caparas points out that Laureano's testimony was extracted
through leading questions, and he quotes:
Q Do you know the purpose of Carlos Gregorio in coming to your
house?
A Yes, sir.

A I said' that seems hard',but he said,'that is easy'.

Q What else transpired?
A I asked him what he meant by easy and he said 'it is easy under
this condition', and I asked him what condition, and he said you kill
him.

Q What was his purpose?

Q During all that time, who were present inside that house?
A Regarding the landholding I was farming and his help I requested.
A Tisio Diamsay.
Q Did you go to any place with Carlos Gregorio after that?
Q Who else?
A Yes, sir.
A Eufemio Caparas, sir.
Q Where?
Q Anybody else?
A To his house.
A Carting Gregorio, sir.
Q You are referring to the house of Carlos Gregorio?
Q And you?
A Yes, sir.
A I was present.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you arrived at the house of Carlos Gregorio, who were with
you?
A Carlos Gregorio, sir.
Q Who were the persons, ff any, that you have seen at the house of
Carlos Gregorio?

Q Now, in the vernacular, in Tagalog Language that you have been

testifying, you said, 'Patayin n'yo, means plural, do you know to whom
this word 'n'yo' referred to?
A He was ordering me, Carling, and Tisio Diamsay,sir.
Q Ordering to what?

A Eufemio Caparas and Diamsay, sir.

A To kill.
xxx xxx xxx
Q To kill Simeon Paez?
Q Now, when you arrived in that house, what happened?
A Yes, sir.
A We talked regarding the landholding, sir.
Q You said, 'we' to whom are you referring?
A Eufemio Caparas, sir.
Q What did you talk about that landholding?
A Regarding the landholding which he said would be given to me. He
said there is already one.
Q And what did you answer when this was said to you by Eufemio
Caparas?

We are constrained to agree that the testimony of Laureano on the

supposed conspiracy was elicited by means of leading questions, the
probative value of which, according to accepted legal authorities, is
thus diminished or lessened.
The probative value of a witness' testimony is very much lessened
where it is obtained by leading questions which are so put that the
witness merely assents to or dissents from a statement or assertion of
an examining consul put with such vocal inflection as to be question. 1

10
After a careful and conscientious review of the evidence, We are now
convinced that the testimonies of the two aforementioned petitioned
witnesses were accorded more than what they deserve by way of
credence and veracity. Doubts as to the truth of their testimonies
assail the mind of the Court, occasioned by many improbabilities in
their testimonies, and in the case of Lydia, by direct contradiction by
his own sister, Priscilla Posadas.
To begin with Laureano Salvador, it is not without significance that he
was not listed in the information to be among the prosecution
witnesses. Only during the trial on June 2, 1973, and after more than
two years after the commission of the crime, that he surfaced and
testified on what he allegedly knew about the crime. From his
testimony, it would appear that he did not inform the authorities nor
his relatives what he knew about the crime, and that it was only to
Pablo Paez that he told his story about the crime, but only after
almost two years after its commission. This fact in itself is contrary to
human experience because the natural reaction of one who has
knowledge of the crime is to reveal it to the authorities, except only if
he is the author thereof. Indeed, as held in People vs. Basuel, 5 the
silence of the witnesses for about two years detracts from their
trustworthiness.

The trial court also inferred conspiracy from its finding that appellant
Caparas, in ordering the killing of the deceased, was motivated by
resentment against the deceased as a result of a conflict between
them over proprietary rights involving a portion of agricultural land:
and that the gun used in killing the deceased was owned by Caparas.
While conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence
provided that it is competent and convincing, in the instant case, the
evidence with which to link Caparas in a conspiracy with Diamsay to
kill the deceased does not rest on solid ground. The records do not
show that Caparas harbors intense resentment against the Paezes as
to go to the extent of liquidating them. On the contrary, it was the
Paezes who had all the reason to be angry with Caparas who,
according to them, was defrauding them of their rightful rights. In the
case of Diamsay , he apparently acted on his own. Diamsay hated the
Paezes because of the latter's "insulting attitude" toward him, as may
be gleaned from the decision of the trial court when it states:
When Simeon Paez ,was about to have the same land planted,
Diamsay stopped the planters. This angered the former causing him
to utter slanderous remarks against Diamsay. Pedro Paez also
resented the actuations of Diamsay in (sic) stopping of the land.
As regards the finding that the gun used by Diamsay in killing Simeon
Paez was owned by Caparas, this is easily explained by the fact that
as overseer of Caparas, Diamsay was authorized to carry the gun.
Pedro Paez himself admitted that when he was still the overseer of
Caparas, he also used to carry a gun given him by Caparas.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, We cannot but entertain
doubts as to the veracity of the testimonies of the two witnesses
which alone provided the basis for the finding of ,conspiracy against
Caparas. These doubts now disturb the mind of the Court as to his
culpability, and must accordingly be resolved in favor of appellant

Caparas it being preferably to acquit a guilty person rather than

convict all; innocent one. 8
WHEREFORE, the decision of February 20, 1980 is hereby affirmed
with respect to appellant Diamsay, but reversed with respect to
appellant Caparas who is hereby acquitted, on ground of reasonable
doubt, of the crime charged. With costs de oficio as to appellant
Caparas.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122740. March 30, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WINSTON DE
GUZMAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Winston de Guzman was accused of raping 14-year-old Jovelyn
Geram. Geram was sleeping at around two o clock that afternoon
when she was awakened by the weight of something on top of her.
Upon opening her eyes, she saw De Guzman naked and sitting on
her thighs. Geram instinctively tried to shout for help but De Guzman
covered her mouth and nose with his hand and warned her not to
resist or she would be killed. A struggle between the two ensued
thereafter. The strength of appellant and the strain of Gerams efforts
at resistance took its toll on the latter, causing her to feel weak and
faint. On recovering her senses, Geram discovered that she was
already undressed and she saw blood on her vagina. She also
noticed some white fluid on her abdomen and thighs. She felt pain on
her genitals and other parts of her body. De Guzman was no longer
around, and Geram was left crying over the tragedy which had
befallen her. De Guzman was convicted by the trial court and on
appeal, he assails the fact that Geram stated in her complaint and in
her testimony given during the preliminary investigation that he
committed the crime of rape through the application of odorous
chemicals over her nose and mouth which caused her to sleep. This
fact was not repeated by complainant in the trial court but she merely
claimed the crime was consummated by De Guzman through force
and intimidation. Such inconsistency, according to De Guzman,
destroys Gerams credibility, thus warranting a reversal of the lower
courts judgment of conviction. In affirming the conviction, the
Supreme Court said that it is universally accepted that a witness
cannot be impeached by evidence of contradictory or prior
inconsistent statements until the proper foundation or predicate has
Karl Vincent B. Raso ALS D-2012 Page 4 of 9 been duly laid by the
party against whom said witness was called. The American rule on
laying the predicate is embodied in Rule 132 of our own Rules of
Court, to wit: SEC. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of
inconsistent statements. - Before a witness can be impeached by
evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent
with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him,
with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons
present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements,
and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they
must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them. Although the whole record of the testimony of
complainant at the preliminary examination was offered in evidence
by the defense and admitted by the trial court, complainant cannot
now be discredited through any of her extrajudicial statements which
were not brought to her attention during the trial. Thus, it has been
held that granting arguendo the alleged contradictions, previous
statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of a
witness unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies
and he was then given an opportunity to explain them. In People vs.
Resabal, the Court explicitly ruled that the mere presentation of the
prior declarations of a witness without the same having been read to
the witness while he was testifying in court is insufficient for the
desired impeachment of his testimony. As explained therein, the
apparent contradiction between the declarations of the witness before
the former justice of the peace court and those before the then court

11
of first instance was insufficient to discredit him since he was not
given ample opportunity, by reading to him his declarations before the
lower court, to explain the supposed discrepancy. In this case, Geram
was never confronted during the proceedings in the trial court with her
answers allegedly given in the same testimony at the preliminary
investigation regarding De Guzmans resort to sleep-inducing
chemicals. In fact, no sub-markings for such particular answers as
exhibits were made in the records of her testimony in the preliminary
investigation, much less offered by the counsel of De Guzman for that
purpose during the trial of the case WHEREFORE, the judgment of
the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
the indemnity to be paid by accused-appellant Winston de Guzman is
increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with the present case law
thereon.
SO ORDERED.
SALES VS CA (CANNOT BE FOUND)
G.R. No. 139610 August 12, 2002
AUREA R. MONTEVERDE, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Monteverde was purportedly charged with the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of a commercial document forallegedly
falsifying the document she had submitted to show that the money
donated by PAGCOR was used and spent forlighting materials for her
barangay.
ISSUE:
The OSGs Memorandum which recommended acquittal, and which
petitioner adopted, raised the following issues:
"Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in:
[1.] finding petitioner guilty of falsification despite its finding that no
estafa was committed[;]
[2.] holding that Exhibit 9, a sales invoice, was a commercial/public
document[; and]
[3.] applying the presumption that petitioner was the author of
falsification in the absence of any proof that she benefited from it."20

two different Sales Invoices, falsification becomes doubtful. The OSG

is correct in observing as follows:
"x x x. For petitioner or anybody acting on her behalf to falsify the
customers copy of Sales Invoice No. 21568, she/he would have to
erase or cover with correction fluid the spaces pertaining to the name
of the customer, date, quantity, unit, description of articles, unit price
and amount, before the insertions could be written. Neither the
appealed decision nor the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN)
point out various tell-tale signs of falsification despite opportunity of
the prosecution to see the original of Exh. 9. The only observation the
respondent Court mentioned was with respect to the date: [t]he
superimposition of January 17, 1991 is too apparent to be
disregarded, and the alteration of the date has affected both the
veracity and the effects of the said document. But the changing of the
date was the easiest to accomplish. The more cumbersome, as they
affect wider space, would [have been] the name of the customer and
the purchases. The total absence of any hint or sign of alteration on
these areas is revealing."38
The only logical explanation for the existence of both Exhibits 9 and
D- 1 is that there are two extant documents. Whether one is the
original and the other is falsified depends on the proof. This the
prosecution had to prove, but unfortunately failed to. In all criminal
prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the
accused may raise, the burden of proof establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt remains with the prosecution.39
Further, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove each and every
element of the crime charged in the information.40 We repeat that, in
this case, it failed to discharge this duty.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision
and Resolution SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ERNANDO C. LAYNO, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
Anunciatico M. Navarro for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS

RULING:

Briefly, the facts as found by the Sandiganbayan are as follows:

ACQUITTED:

The petitioner was the incumbent municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao

del Sur, on 16 March 1980, having been elected to that position in the
elections held in that year. As chief executive of the municipality, he
had the authority to appoint employees in the municipal government
of Lianga.

The gut issue in this case is whether the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner with regard to
the crime of falsification. A determination of this question will
necessarily require an examination of the facts as presented before
the Sandiganbayan.
As a rule, an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raises only questions of law.35 However, this Court, in exceptional
cases, has taken cognizance of questions of fact in order to resolve
legal issues. This is especially true in cases in which a palpable error
or a grave misapprehension of facts was committed by the lower
court.36 Criminal cases elevated by public officials from the SBN
deserve the same thorough treatment by this Court as criminal cases
brought up by ordinary citizens, simply because the constitutional
presumption of innocence must be overcome by proof beyond
reasonable doubt in both instances. Indeed, in a criminal case, a
persons life or liberty is at stake.37
Petitioner asserts that the SBN erroneously applied the presumption
that the possessor of a forged or falsified document who uses it is the
author of the forgery or falsification. The OSG concurs with her on this
point. That is why it recommended that she be acquitted.
We agree. To our mind, the prosecutions evidence is not sufficient to
convict. As correctly observed by the OSG, the Decision of the SBN is
based on the assumption that there was only one set of sales
invoices issued by Sanford Hardware. On such a premise, petitioners
Exhibit 9 thus becomes obviously falsified when compared with
respondents Exhibit D-1. But on the premise that the two Exhibits are

On 16 March 1980, the petitioner appointed Fernando Y. Layno, his

legitimate son, meat inspector in the office of the municipal treasurer
of Lianga. He signed the appointment document Civil Service Form
No. 35 twice, first as the appointing authority and second, as the
personnel officer, certifying" (t)hat all the required supporting papers
pursuant to MC 5, s. 1974, as amended. have been complied with,
reviewed and found to be in order."
Among the supporting papers required for the appointment is the
Certification (Exh. "B") signed by the petitioner, reading as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In connection with the appointment of MR. FERNANDO Y. LAYNO,
Lianga, Surigao del Sur, in the Office of Municipal Treasurer, Lianga,
Surigao del Sur at the rate of FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
THIRTY TWO PESOS ONLY per annum (P4,632.00), effective March
16, 1980. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. He is not related to me to (sic) any person exercising immediate
supervision over him within the third degree of either consanguinity or
affinity.

12
On the same day, i.e., 16 March 1980, Fernando Y. Layno took his
oath of office with the petitioner as the administering officer.
Thereafter, the appointment paper, together with the required
supporting documents, was forwarded to the Davao Regional Office
of the Civil Service Commission and was received by the said office
on 17 May 1980. On 20 May 1980, the OIC, Jorge Mindanao, acting
by authority of the Commission, approved the appointment of
Fernando Y. Layno. Three (3) days later, the approved appointment
was returned to the office of the petitioner.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
The appointee, however, neither assumed the position to which he
was appointed nor collected the salary corresponding to it. 1
On 28 September 1988, petitioner was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of falsification of public document
defined in Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, in an
Information reading as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about March 16, 1980, in the Municipality of Lianga,
Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court. the above-named accused, a public officer,
being then the incumbent Municipal Mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur,
taking advantage of his official position and committing the offense in
relation to his duties, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously prepare and falsify a document or certification, wherein
said accused is legally bound to disclose the truth, by stating that a
certain Fernando Y. Layno of Lianga. Surigao del Sur is not related to
him within the third degree of either consanguinity or affinity, when in
truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew, said Fernando Y.
Layno is his son, thus, making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts, to the damage of the public interests.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT LAYNOS SIGNATURE HAS BEEN
SUBSTANTIALLY PROVEN
RULING:
YES
Under Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, the
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who "has seen
writing purporting to be his upon which the witness acted or been
charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person." Otherwise stated, any witness any be called who has, by
sufficient means, acquired knowledge of the general character of the
handwriting of the party whose signature is in question. Prosecution
witness Amando R. Pandi, Jr. was competent to testify on the
signature of Petitioner on the Certification, Exhibit "B" because in the
course of his employment as municipal secretary and designated
personnel officer in the municipal government of Lianga. Surigao del
Sur, he had seen records under his charge bearing the long and short
signatures of the petitioner, and, as such, he had acquired knowledge
of the general character of the handwriting of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of
the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-11201February 15, 1917
ROSA DUPILAS, administratrix of the estate of the deceased,
Cecilio Alumising,Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. VICTORIANO
CABACUGAN, ET AL.,Defendants-Appellees.
Morales and Gwekoh for appellant.
Valentin Manglapus for appellees.
TRENT, J.:
The history of the transactions relating to the execution of Exhibits D,
E, and F and the turning over to Leon Alumising of the stage grants is
stated by Marcelino Cabacugan substantially as follows: Gregorio

Cabacugan obtained the state grants from the Spanish government.

The land was divided, as appears in the state grants, by the surveyor.
Notwithstanding the fact that the titles were issued in the names of
the three Cabacugans, the whole of the land belonged to Gregorio
Cabacugan. Gregorio Cabacugan owed Leon Alumising the sum of
P77.50. Gregorio could not meet this obligation at the time the
payment was demanded by Leon. Thereupon Leon proposed that he
be given a power of attorney to pledge the three titles in Manila. The
titles were then turned over to Leon. Sometime later Leon informed
Gregorio that he was unable to pledge the titles and requested that
the necessary documents be executed, purporting to sell the lands to
Leon, Gregorio to make the simulated sales, which was done, as
appears from Exhibits D, E and F. No money was received by the
Cabacugan as a result of the execution of those documents. The
only purpose of executing the documents was to authorize Leon to
sell or pledge the lands. On receipt of the letter, Exhibit 4, the
Cabacugans took the P77.50 to Moncada for the purpose of paying
Gregorio's debt and obtaining the deeds and state grants. The debt
was then paid to Leon, but the documents were not returned, Leon
saying that they had been mislaid. Leon promised to return the
documents as soon as they could be found. After the death of Leon of
Cabacugans made a demand upon Leon's family for the return of
the documents. The members of the family stated that they did not
know where the titles were. In 1908 Cecilio Alumising instituted an
action in the justice of the peace court for the possession of the land,
but failed, the Cabacugans being absolved. Later Cecilo instituted
another action against Donato, which suit was abandoned by Cecilio
in the Court of First Instance.
The defendants, Dionisio Macadangdang and Angelo Austria, have
established that they are the owners, with other parties, of the parcels
of land occupied by them. This ownership is evidenced by Torrens title
issued on March 5, 1908, and November 11, 1910, respectively. The
trial court found that the Cabacugans and their heirs are now, and
have been since sometime prior to the issuance of the state grants, in
the open, peaceable, and quiet possession as owners of the
remainder of the land in question and that neither Leon Alumising nor
anyone pretending to hold under him has ever been in the possession
of the whole or any part of these lands, nor received at any time any
of the products therefrom. The result is that the Cabacugans, as a
matter of fact, never sold the lands to Leon Alumising. Exhibit D, E,
and F were executed at the instance of Leon Alumising in order that
he might sell or pledge the lands for the Cabacugans. The Gregorio
Cabacugan debt to Leon of P77.50 was paid during the lifetime of
the latter. At the time Leon's widow attempted to sell the lands to
Cecilio Alumising, Cecilio, who lived in the same community, knew
that the lands were then in the possession of the Cabacugans and
had been all the time. He also knew that neither Leon nor Alejandra
had ever been in possession and had ever received any of the
products from the land. If he paid the widow the amount stated in the
document, he did so with full knowledge of these facts.
ISSUES:
whether Cecilio Alumising acquired title to the lands by virtue of the
document executed in his favor by Alejandra
RULING:
NO.
Public instruments are evidence, even against a third person, of the
fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.\
virtual law library
They shall also be evidence against the contracting parties and their
legal representatives with regard to the declarations the former may
have made therein.
Article 1219 provides that public instruments, made for the purpose of
impairing a former instrument, between the same parties, shall be
effective against third parties only when the contents of the former
should have been entered in the proper public registry or in the
margin of the original instrument, and in that of the transcript or copy,
by virtue of which the third person may have acted. Article 1215 and
1219 have no special application to the question under consideration.

13
Article 1218 establishes a rule of evidence with reference to the
probative force of public documents. This rule is not absolute in the
sense that the contents of a public document is conclusive evidence
against the contracting parties as to the truthfulness of the statements
made therein. The supreme court of Spain, in its decision of July 10,
1896, said:
Neither from articles 1218 and 1248 of the Civil Code, nor from any
other provision of law, may it be concluded that public documents had
always greater weight than any other evidence.
Manresa, in commenting upon article 1218, says in volume 8 at page
465, that It having been determined who are to be considered as third persons,
the provisions of article 1218 leave no room for doubt; public
instruments, public documents in general, are perfect evidence, even
against third persons, if the act which the officer witnessed and
certified to or the date written by him in the document are not shown
to be false; but they are not perfect evidence with respect to the
truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties.
Section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that, When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing by the
parties, it is to be considered as containing all those terms, and
therefore there can be, between the parties and their representatives
or successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of agreement
other than the contents of the writing, except in the following cases:
1. Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties, is put in issue by
the pleadings;
2. Where the validity of the agreement is the fact in dispute. But this
section does not exclude other evidence of the circumstances under
which the agreement was made, or to which it relates, or to explain an
intrinsic ambiguity, or to establish its illegality of fraud. The term
"agreement" includes deeds and instruments conveying real estate,
and wills as well as contracts between parties.
Consequently, the defendants in the instant case had a right to offer
any competent evidence for the purpose of establishing their defense
to the effect that the execution of the deeds, Exhibits D, E, and F,
were obtained in the manner indicated above.
The plaintiff's ownership was evidenced by a state grant. The
defendant sought to overcome the state grant by oral testimony
alone. This Court held that The possessor of a title issued in due form has in his favor the legal
presumption that in the issuance thereof all the requisites prescribed
therefor by law have been fulfilled. . . If titles duly issued by the
Government under the laws in force could be destroyed or invalidated
by purely parol evidence nobody would be secure in his property, and
even one who had the very best title would be in danger of losing if, if
parol evidence could in any manner prevail as a general rule over
documentary proof.
So long as the composition title secured by the plaintiff Gregorio
Escario, through a final judgment rendered after a hearing had in due
form and according to the provisions of the laws that treat of the
efficacy and validity of the titles granted by the state with reference to
sale and composition, has not been declared null and void and
without force or effect, he is the only one to be regarded as the
ligitimate owner of the lands in question, to the exclusion of anybody
else who cannot exhibit better right and title thereto.
The sum of the parol evidence adduced by the defendants has not
satisfactorily demonstrated that said composition title was fraudulently
obtained or vitiated by any defect that would nullify it, and therefore
no legal reason exists to declare it null and void.
In the instant case Cecilio Alumising knew at the time he purchased
the lands that the defendants were, and had been for many years, as
we have said, in the actual, open, visible, and exclusive possession of
the entire parcel. These facts were sufficient to put him upon inquiry
as to the claims of the defendants. By a reasonably diligent
investigation he could have ascertained the nature and character of
such claims. The defendants' possession under claim of ownership
was notice to Cecilio of whatever interest they had in the land. Their
interest being inconsistent with the title of the apparent owner of
record, it necessarily follows that Cecilio's purchase was subject to

the defendant's rights and that the recording of Exhibits D, E, and F,

which were obtained by means of fraud, did not validate them as to
Cecilio. It is very probable that if the defendants hereafter wish to
record any instruments relating to this same land, it will be necessary
for them to procure cancellation of the record of the deeds, Exhibits
D, E, and F, buy the fact that they had not commenced any such
action did not prohibit them from proving, when they were sued for the
possession of the land, that the deeds under which the plaintiffs
claims were obtained by Leon Alumising by means of fraud. For the
foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against the appellant. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
G.R. No. 127263 April 12, 2000
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA,
BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Sy vs. Court of Appeals
The case:
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga,
denying the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of
the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
The facts:
Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted
marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes
in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed
with two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their
conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately and their
two children were in the custody of their mother. On February 11,
1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of
San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for
separation of property. Judgment was rendered dissolving their
conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of
properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the
spouses. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted
parricide against her husband. RTC Manila convicted Fernando only
of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced him to 20
days imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of
absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of
psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC and Court of
Appeals denied the petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this appeal by certiorari, petitioner for the first time, raises the issue of
the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time
of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage license and marriage
certificate is contained in their marriage contract which was attached
in her petition for absolute declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
before the trial court. The date of the actual celebration of their
marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and
marriage license are different and incongruous.
The Issues:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent is void from the beginning for lack of marriage license at
the time of the ceremony?

14
Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at
the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its
absolute nullity?
Held:
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. The pieces of evidence presented by
petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably show
that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage
license. The marriage contract also shows that the marriage license
number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet neither petitioner
nor respondent ever resided in Carmona. From the documents she
presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after the
ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable
in this case, there being no claim of exceptional character
enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. The
remaining issue on the psychological capacity is now mooted by the
conclusion of this court that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is
void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time heir marriage was
solemnized.
Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973
between petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy is
hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time
of celebration
G.R. No. 113779-80 February 23, 1995
ALVIN TUASON y OCHOA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
Complainant CIPRIANA F. TORRES is a public school teacher of
Kaligayahan Elementary School, Novaliches. Her work requires her to
leave her maid, JOVINA MADARAOG TORRES, alone in her house.
Her husband is in Australia while her children go to school.
The incident transpired at around 8:45 in the morning of July 19,
1988. Somebody knocked at the gate of the Torres residence
pretending to buy ice. As the maid Madaraog handed the ice to the
buyer, one of the robbers jumped over the fence, poked a gun at her,
covered her mouth, and opened the gate of their house. 4 The ice
buyer and his companions barged in. Numbering four (4), they
pushed her inside Torres' house and demanded the keys to the car
and the safety vault. 5 She told them she did not know where the keys
were hidden. 6 They tied up her hands and dragged her to the second
floor of the house. Petitioner was allegedly left downstairs as their
lookout. 7
On order of the accused, Madaraog sat on Torres' bed, her body
facing the bedroom door with her back on the vault. They also gagged
her mouth and ransacked Torres' room. One of the accused stumbled
upon a box containing keys. They used the keys to open drawers and
in the process found the car key. Petitioner was then summoned

upstairs and given the car key. He tried it on the car and succeeded in
starting its engine.
In twenty (20) minutes, accused were able to loot the vault and other
valuable items in the house. They then tied Madaraog's hands and
feet to the bed's headboard and escaped using Torres' car.
Still gripped with fear, Madaraog loosened her ties with her fingers,
hopped to the stairs and cried for help. After several days, petitioner
was arrested for the crime charged.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED ARE
SUFFICIENT TO HELD PETITIONER LIABLE

RULING:
NO.
We reverse.
Time and again, this Court has held that evidence to be believed,
must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible witness but the
same must be credible in itself. 19 The trial court and respondent
appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of prosecution witness
Madaraog that from her vantage position near the door of the
bedroom she clearly saw how petitioner allegedly participated in the
robbery. After a careful review of the evidence, we find that the
identification of petitioner made by Madaraog and Quintal is open to
doubt and cannot serve as a basis for conviction of petitioner.
The respondent appellate court, however, dismissed this claim of
petitioner as self-serving. Again, the ruling misconstrues the meaning
of self-serving evidence. Self-serving evidence is not to be literally
taken as evidence that serves one's selfish interest. Under our law of
evidence, self-serving evidence is one made by a party out of court at
one time; it does not include a party's testimony as a witness in court.
It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is
the lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party,
and on the consideration that its admission would open the door to
fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On the other hand, a party's
testimony in court is sworn and affords the other party the opportunity
for cross-examination. 34 Clearly, petitioner's testimony in court on how
he was identified by the prosecution witnesses in the NBI
headquarters is not self-serving.
Petitioner's main defense is alibi. He professed that on July 19, 1988
he was mixing dough at TipTop Bakeshop from 7:00 o'clock in the
morning till 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. With the usual traffic jam, it
takes him two (2) hours to commute from Lagro to Tondo. It was thus
physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis. He said he
learned about the robbery thru his neighbor three (3) days thereafter.
He did not flee. He was arrested by the NBI agents more than one (1)
month after the crimes were perpetrated.

15
Angeli Tuason's corroborative testimony established that her brother
had an eye examination on July 17, 1988 35 and she reminded him to
work early on July 19, 1988 which he did.
Judges should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi.
Alibi should be considered in light of all the evidence on record for it
can tilt the scales of justice in favor of the accused. 36 In People vs.
Omega, 37 we held:
Although alibi is known to be the weakest of all defenses for it is easy
to concoct and difficult to disprove, nevertheless, where the evidence
for the prosecution is weak and betrays lack of concreteness on the
question of whether or not the accused committed the crime charged,
the defense of alibi assumes importance.
The case at bench reminds us of the warning that judges seem
disposed more readily to credit the veracity and reliability of
eyewitnesses than any amount of contrary evidence by or on behalf
of the accused , whether by way of alibi, insufficient identification, or
other testimony. 38 They are unmindful that in some cases the
emotional balance of the eyewitness is disturbed by her experience
that her powers of perception becomes distorted and her identification
is frequently more untrustworthy. Into the identification, enter other
motives, not necessarily stimulated originally by the accused
personally the desire to requite a crime, to find a scapegoat, or to
support, consciously or unconsciously, an identification already made
by another. 39
IN VIEW THEREOF, the Decision of December 16, 1993 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner Alvin Tuason is
ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 118423. June 16, 1999]

LE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CESARIO SANCHEZ
@ SATUR, REMEGIO JOSE @ OSING, RODRIGO ABAYAN @
LUDRING, FEDERICO ROBIOS @ RICO, GAUDENCIO
CONTAWE @ GODING, accused-appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts: The deceased Miranda was celebrating the birthday of his
daughter with his friends at a fishpond. On their way home, the
accused and others, holding bolos and stones, stopped the group and
confronted Miranda about his accusation. As the argument heated,
Sanchez moved back to his companion and encircled the Mirandas
group. They assaulted Miranda and threatened the others. Miranda
died as a result of the stabbing.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES
BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT OFFERED
RULING:
Appellants contend that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were not formally offered as required by the Rules, and
therefore should not have been considered by the trial court. Indeed,
a perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes will show that no
formal offer of testimonial evidence was made prior to or after the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. However, the transcripts
also reveal that in spite of the lack of formal offer of the testimonial
evidence, appellants failed to object to the presentation of such

evidence, and even subjected the prosecution witnesses to a rigorous

cross-examination.xxii[43] Thus, in People v. Cadocio, 228 SCRA 602,
609 (1993) and People v. Java, 227 SCRA 668, 679-680 (1993), we
had occasion to rule that:
Indeed, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
requires that for evidence to be considered, it should be formally
offered and the purpose specified. This is necessary because a judge
has to rest his findings of fact and his judgment only upon the
evidence formally offered by the parties at the trial. (People v.
Pecardal, G.R. No. 71381 [1986]).
Under the new procedure as spelled out in Section 35 of the
said rule which became effective on July 1, 1989, the offer of the
testimony of a witness must be made at the time the witness is called
to testify. The previous practice was to offer the testimonial evidence
at the end of the trial after all the witnesses had testified. With the
invocation, the court is put on notice whether the witness to be
presented is a material witness and should be heard, or a witness
who would be testifying on irrelevant matter or on facts already
testified to by other witnesses and should therefore, be stopped from
testifying further.
In the case at bar, we note that Pastor Valdez was not one of the
witnesses originally intended to be presented by the prosecution. He
was merely called to the witness stand at the latter part of the
presentation of the prosecutions evidence. There was no mention
why his testimony was being presented. However, notwithstanding
that his testimony was not formally offered, its presentation was not
objected to either. Section 36 of the aforementioned Rule requires
that an objection in the course of the oral examination of a witness
should be made as soon as the grounds therefore shall become
reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of
evidence was made in the court below, an objection raised for the first
time on appeal will not be considered. (Asombra v. Dorado, 36 Phil.
883). (italics supplied)
Thus, the failure of the defense to interpose a timely objection to
the presentation of the prosecutions testimonial evidence results in
the waiver of any objection to the admissibility thereof. Appellants
belated invocation of the strict interpretation of the Rules of Evidence
to suit their purposes is clearly misplaced.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50, in Criminal Case No. V-0092 finding
accused-appellants Cesario Sanchez, Remegio Jose, Rodrigo
Abayan, Federico Robio and Gaudencio Contawe guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED,
with modification as to the award of damages as follows: accusedappellants are jointly and severally held liable for and hereby ordered
to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity
for the death of Hilario V. Miranda, P13,000.00 as actual damages,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
RAMOS VS DOMINGO
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that respondents are the owners of an undivided
one-half portion of a parcel of land; that respondent Domingo
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing Elpidio
Domingo to sell one-half portion of said parcel of land; that Elpidio,
acting pursuant to the provisions of the SPA sold, with a right to
repurchase within five months, one-half of the land covered by TCT
No. 172510 to petitioner; and that respondent Domingo failed to
redeem or repurchase the disputed land within the five-month period
provided for under the Deed of Sale Under Pacto de Retro, thus,
ownership over the subject land was consolidated in petitioner.
Respondent Domingo filed an Answer/Oppositionxxiii[4] to the Petition
alleging that the SPA was executed for the purpose of enabling
Elpidio to secure a loan of P150,000.00 by using Domingos share in
the land covered by as security. The proceeds of the loan was
supposed to be used for the construction of a duplex residential
house to be supervised by Elpidio. However, Elpidio obtained a loan

16
of P350,000.00 and used a substantial portion thereof for his personal
advantage and benefit. As Elpidio had exceeded his authority,
Domingo claimed that he revoked the SPA through several letters and
by a formal notice of revocation sent by his counsel. As for the pacto
de retro sale, Domingo maintains that the same was simulated as
Elpidio had already obtained a loan totaling P350,000.00 from
petitioner as evidenced by a Real Estate Mortgage executed by the
two of them. In any case, he claims that the pacto de retro sale
should be treated as an equitable mortgage which cannot be enforced
through a petition for consolidation of ownership.
ISSUE:
The Petition mainly raises the questions of whether the Court of
Appeals erred in applying the rule enunciated in the case of Vda. De
Oate v. Court of Appeals pertaining to the admission and
consideration of evidence not formally offered,
RULING:
NO.
Petitioner argues that it is axiomatic that the court shall not
consider evidence which has not been formally offered.xxiv[22] In this
regard, they argue that Exhibits 1 to 7, inclusive of sub-markings,
should not have been considered by the trial court in its Decision
considering that the same were not formally offered in evidence. To
support this assertion, petitioner quotes from our following
pronouncement in Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Avilesxxv[23]:
It is instructive at this point to make a distinction between
identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an
exhibit. The first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied
by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit. The second is done only
when the party rests its case and not before. The mere fact that a
particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not
mean it will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the
party. The party may decide to formally offer it if it believes this will
advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In
the latter event, the trial court is, under Rule 132, Section 35 (sic) not
authorized to consider it.
Similarly, relied upon by petitioner was our holding in Chua
v. Court of Appealsxxvi[24] where we declared that:

axxvii[25] and People v. Matexxviii[26] relative to the admission and

consideration of exhibits which were not formally offered during the
trial. We declared in Vda. De Oatexxix[27] that
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be
considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere
fact that a particular document to identified and marked as an exhibit
does not mean that is has already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles [186 SCRA
385], we had the occasion to make a distinction between identification
of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said
that the first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by
the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the second is done
only when the party rests its case and not before. A party, therefore,
may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes that it will
advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to
do the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider
the same.
However, in People v. Napat-a [179 SCRA 403] citing People
v. Mate [103 SCRA 404], we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed
evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the
trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz: first,
the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded
and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of
the case. (Underscoring supplied.)
In this case, we find and so rule that these requirements
have been satisfied. The exhibits in question were presented and
marked during the pre-trial of the case thus, they have been
incorporated into the records. Further, Elpidio himself explained the
contents of these exhibits when he was interrogated by respondents
counsel.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition is
DENIED and the Court of Appeals Decision dated 16 October 1998
and Resolution dated 13 January 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48544,
affirming the 24 January 1995 Decision of the Manila Regional Trial
Court, Branch 45 in Civil Case No. 93-66439 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the judge

to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Such offer may be made
orally or in writing sufficient to show that the party is ready and willing
to submit the evidence to the court.
Petitioner also assails the Court of Appeals for its alleged
improper application of rule enunciated in Vda. De Oate, as the
requirements laid out in said case, relative to the admission of
evidence which was not formally offered, were not observed in the
present case. Petitioner insists she was deprived of due process as
she no opportunity to file her objection to or comment on respondent
Domingos exhibits. Moreover, she was denied the occasion to cross
examine the witness regarding their exhibits.
We are not convinced.
The applicable provision of the Rules of Court on this matter
is Sec. 34, Rule 132. It reads:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which
the evidence is offered must be specified.
The case of Vda. De Oate, which was relied upon by the
Court of Appeals, reiterated our previous rulings in People v. Napat-

People vs Gondora
FACTS:
In the morning of May 19, 1992, at about 9:30 a.m., Antonio Malinao
and his common-law wife Edma Malinao went to Villa Barbara, Tramo
Street, Pasay City collect a loan from a certain Junior. However,
they were not able to collect said loan, and were merely asked to
return the next day (TSN, August 6, 1992, pp. 6-7).
While on their way home passing via an alley suggested by Junior,
two (2) persons, one known as Bogie, herein appellant and another
known as Totoy Killer, suddenly appeared from nowhere. The latter
boxed Antonio Malinao, and when he fell down, appellant repeatedly
stabbed him. Simultaneously, Totoy Killer stabbed Antonio (TSN, Ibid,
p. 7).
Edma Malinao pleaded for mercy and tried to embrace the
[assailants], but was instead pushed and kicked aside. Thereafter,
the two (2) [assailants] ran towards opposite directions and escaped
(TSN, Id., pp. 2-3).
With the help of a tricycle driver, Edma Malinao brought Antonio to
the Manila Sanitarium. Thereat, Dr. Prudencio Sta. Lucia, Jr. found

17
the victim with a dilated pupil, 0/0 blood pressure and 0/0 cardiac
rate. Said doctor pronounced Antonio dead
ISSUE:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED ON (SIC) CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED SOLELY ON THE UNCORROBORATED AND BIASED
TESTIMONY OF WITNESS EDMA MALINAO, THE COMMON-LAW
WIFE OF VICTIM ANTONIO MALINAO, JR.;
RULING:
NO.
The rule is that witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. [9] It
has never been uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis
of the testimony of a single witness.[10]
Concretely, appellant points to certain alleged inconsistencies in
the testimony of Edma Malinao. Appellant alleges that in one of her
sworn statements, Edma Malinao mentioned that the victim was
suddenly and immediately stabbed by two men (at pagtapat sa amin
ay walang sabi-sabing bigla na lang sinaksak si Tony) [11], while in
another affidavit, she stated that one of the assailants boxed the
victim first before the latter was stabbed by them simultaneously (At
sinuntok noong isang lalaki and aking asawa at siya ay
bumagsak. Pagbangon ng aking asawa ay pinagsasaksak siya ng
dalawang lalaki sa bahagi ng katawan ng aking asawa). [12] The
inconsistency refers to minor details and has no bearing on the
credibility of the witness. It is rather immaterial to dwell exhaustively
on whether the victim was boxed first when the cause of the death of
the victim is the multiple stab wound inflicted on his person. On this
point, Edma Malinao consistently testified and remained unwavering
in her stand that appellant and Totoy Killer, repeatedly stabbed the
victim to death. A certain latitude must be given to whatever minor
mistake the witness might have said about the actual
confrontation. For apart from the shock and the numbing effect of the
whole incident, the rapidity with which the sequence of events took
place must have taken its toll on the accuracy of the witness account.

to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which

has transpired.
People vs Espanol
FACTS:
On April 20, 1989 at about 9:00 oclock in the morning, complainant
Teofila de los Santos and some members of the local farmers
association, including appellant Benjamin Espanol, attended a group
work locally known to them as pahina or pintakasi on the land of
Mayor Saturnino Bohol situated in Barangay Silano, Mutina,
Zamboanga Del Norte (tsn, March 6, 1991, pp. 3 to 4).
At around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Teofila, before going home,
rested a little as she and some of her companions, including
appellant, lived in Barangay San Francisco, Mutina, Zamboanga Del
Norte. Barangay San Francisco is about four (4) kilometers away from
Barangay Silano. After resting for about thirty (30) minutes, Teofila,
Picto Maghinay and appellant started to walk home (Ibid., p. 5). Later,
Picto Maghinay followed another road leading to his house, hence,
Teofila and appellant were left alone (Ibid.).
Along the way, appellant and Teofila passed by a creek and upon
crossing the creek, appellant suddenly stopped and held her
arm. Teofila resisted and tried to push appellant away but he was
able to hold her tight and drag her by the side of the trail. Then,
appellant boxed Teofila at her thigh and pointed a handgun at
her. Teofila struggled to free herself but he prevailed since he was
stronger. He removed Teofilas pants, and his own pants. At this
point, Teofila continued to resist appellant but she could not shout
because she was intimidated by the handgun pointed at her by
appellant. Thereafter, appellant lay on top of her and had sexual
intercourse with her (Ibid., pp. 5 to 7).
After appellant had satisfied his lust, he got up and left
Teofila (Ibid., p. 8). On her part, Teofila immediately proceeded home
and informed her husband about the incident. The following day,
Teofila and her husband reported the matter to the police authorities
at Dapitan City (Ibid., pp. 9 to 10).[4]

[13]

Appellant likewise makes issue of the fact that in Edma

Malinaos third affidavit[14], she mentioned that the motive for the
commission of the crime was allege quarrel between one Onio and
the victim, when no such declaration was made in the previous
affidavits. Again, appellants claim is not worthy of credit. For one,
the imputed inconsistency is misplaced as there is no inconsistency at
all, but rather, an omission which relates to the apparent motive for
the killing. Such motive is inconsequential in view of the positive
identification of the perpetrators of the crime. Moreover, we attribute
the omission to state the motive of the crime to the apparent
reluctance of witness Edma Malinao to divulge the illegal dealings of
her common-law husband. We note that the deceased was into the
business of dealing illegal drugs and the same must have been the
cause of his death.
The above alleged inconsistencies pointed out by appellant
were all contained in the three (3) affidavits executed by Edma
Malinao in connection with the filing of the case. The contradictions, if
any may be explained by the fact that an affidavit can not disclose the
whole facts, and oftentimes and without design, incorrectly describe,
without the deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences
narrated. Being taken ex parte, an affidavit is almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions,
and sometimes from the want of suggestions and inquiries. [15] It has
thus been held that affidavits are generally subordinated in
importance to open court declarations because the former are often
executed when an affiants mental faculties are not in such a state as

ISSUE:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT
AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
OFFENDED PARTY DESPITE THAT THE SAME WAS FRAUGHT
WITH INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES.
RULING:
NO.
We find appellants assertions without merit. As pointed out by
the Solicitor General in his Brief, as to who were complainants
companions prior to the incident is inconsequential, since only
appellant is involved in this case.[15]
Indeed, the alleged inconsistencies are more imagined than
real. We have carefully studied the transcript of Teofilas testimony,
and do not find the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant. While it
is true that Teofila mentioned Perfecto Maghinay as a companion on
the way home, she did not say that there were no other persons with
them at some earlier time. Remember that after the conclusion of the
pahina, the participants left en masse. Teofila enumerated her
companions, upon prompting of the defense lawyer on crossexamination.[16]

18
Even assuming there are inconsistencies, these are on minor or
trivial matters, which serve to strengthen rather than weaken the
credibility of Teofila because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed
testimony.[17]
We have oft repeated that, when the issue raised refers to the
credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to conflicting
versions of the prosecution and the defense, as in the instant case,
we defer to the trial court, unless there appears to be cogent reasons
to disregard its observation. The rationale behind the rule is that the
trial court had the opportunity, not available to the appellate court, to
see the witnesses on the stand and determine by their demeanor
whether or not they are testifying truthfully.[18]
Appellant further contends that the trial court erred when it
disregarded his assertion that he and Teofila were lovers, as
corroborated by his witnesses. The fiction of their being lovers is
exposed by appellants own affidavit vigorously denying such
relationship. We defer to the trial court and quote with approval its
conclusions on this point:
[Appellants] testimony and those of his witnesses were
impeached by their own sworn statements.
Accused Benjamin Espanol testified that he and Teofila were
lovers long before the incident; that it was their mutual agreement to
meet and make love at the copra dryer of Mr. Saliot that
afternoon. But on May 26, 1989, a month after the incident, he
executed an affidavit denying having sex with Teofila. Part of his
affidavit is quoted:
That I vehemently deny the allegations made by the complainant in
her complaint, particularly the allegations that I have sexually abused
her in the afternoon near the school of our barangay in San
Francisco, Dapitan City; That on April 20, 1989, I was with our group
who made a pahina at Silano, Mutia, Zamboanga del Norte; that we
finished our pahina at about 4:00 in the afternoon; that after our
work, I, together with Perfecto Maghinay and Elbing Palaca started to
go home but we stopped at a sari-sari on the way to take and have a
drink of tuba; that when we were in the sari-sari store, another group
passed along, and Teofila de los Santos parted with the group and
joined us in drinking; that later Honorato Altamera and his wife passed
along the store and we decided to join them in going home; that after
crossing the Dipolog River, Teofila de los Santos took another way in
going home; that Elbing Palaca also took another way in going
home; that Honorato and his wife remained to be my companions
until I reached home at San Francisco; that after reaching my
house, my companions continued their way to Sigayan when they are
leaving (sic); that since it was already dark when I arrived home and I
was also dead tired, I went to sleep after taking my supper; (pars. 3
and 4, Exh. B, italics supplied)
In his testimony, he declared he took 2 bottles of beer in the
sari-sari store. In his affidavit quoted above they drank tuba.
Defense witness Catalino Dahilog declared that Teofila was
wearing long pants and stripe T-shirt at the time she followed
Benjamin to the copra dryer. But in his affidavit which the defense
submitted as Exh. 2, he swore that after Teofila exclaimed: naay
tawo, she struggled to get up and hurriedly wore her skirt and
started to go down x x x. He also testified that when Teofila left the
dryer she was walking slowly and at times turning her head. In his
affidavit he swore:
Q - How did she go down?
A - She was running. (Page Two, Exh. 2-A)
xxx

xxx

xxx

But what is surprising is why was Dahilog able to see Teofila

Struggling to get up and wear her pants after the foundation on which
he was stepping slipped? The flooring of the dryer could not be seen,

he declared, if one just steps on the ground. Moreover, the natural

course a peeping tom would do after having been detected is to run
away.[19]
The general rule is that contradictions and discrepancies
between the testimony of a witness and his statements in an affidavit
do not necessarily discredit him. This rule is not without exception, as
when the omission in the affidavit refers to a very important detail of
the incident that one relating the incident as an eyewitness would not
be expected to fail to mention, or when the narration in the sworn
statement substantially contradicts the testimony in court.[20] In the
instant case, the contradictory statements of the defense witnesses
erode the credence of their testimonies.
Appellants claim that Teofila fabricated the charge of rape to
hide her illicit relationship from her husband is incredible.
We agree with the trial court that appellants claim is belied by
the fact that Teofila reported the crime committed upon her chastity to
her husband immediately upon her arrival home. [21]if Teofila had
consented to have sexual intercourse with appellant, her natural
reaction would have been to conceal it or keep silent as this would
bring disgrace to her honor and reputation as well as to her family.[22]
The bruise found on Teofila s thigh is consistent with her
testimony that appellant boxed her at that part of her body when she
resisted his bestial advances. On the other hand, her story that she
sustained the injury when she got hit by his knees as she struggled to
stand up when she heard a sound is preposterous. If according to
him she pushed him upon hearing a sound like a falling coconut and
stood up, how could his knees have hit her thigh with such force as to
produce contussion and hematoma thereon?
In sum, we find that appellants guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE VS JALON
FACTS:
The present case arose from the killing of Pelarito Abujan in Barangay
Baikingon, Cagayan de Oro City. The victim died apparently of
gunshot wounds in the forehead and neck which were inflicted on him
on the night of May 28, 1986. 6 It appears, that the deceased was on
his way to the dance hall of Barangay Baikingon when he was
waylaid. Prosecution witness Allan Gamlot recalled that only he and
Alexander Abujan were with the victim during the incident. 7 On the
other hand, the other principal witness for the prosecution, Eddie
Apus, said that the deceased was with other companions, namely,
himself (Apus), Alexander Abujan, Allan Gamlot and a certain Mario
Diamar. 8.
ISSUE:
Appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of
conviction and faulting the court below of having erred (1) in finding
him as the perpetrator of the crime charged and in not relying on the
testimony of appellant and his corroborating witness; and (2) in
holding that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution
is sufficient for his conviction.
RULING:
THE APPELLANT MUST BE ACQUITTED.

A thorough review of the records convinces us that the findings of the

trial court herein complained of have no evidentiary support. Said
court failed to take into account material and substantial
inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the principal
witnesses for the prosecution, Allan Gamlot and Eddie Apus, which to
this Court are indubitably corrosive of their credibility. This necessarily
sweeps away the strands in the web of circumstantial evidence
proffered by the prosecution, which evidence the Solicitor General
submits are the following:

19
1. Allan Gamlot and Eddie Apus categorically stated
that they saw appellant, armed with a handgun,
together with an unidentified companion emerge
from the banana groove (sic) from where the shots
rang out;
2. Appellant and his companion ran away after
emerging from said banana groove (sic);
3. Appellant himself admitted that Pelarito Abujan
killed the former's brother sometime in 1983. At
best, it can rightfully be said that he had an axe to
grind against the deceased;
4. Appellant's flight is a strong indication of guilt;
5. Luisito Ragmac's testimony on rebuttal to the
effect that appellant boasted of having killed
Pelarito Abujan. Luisito is the "bilas" of appellant. 24
A conviction may rest upon circumstantial evidence alone as direct
evidence is not always necessary to prove the guilt of the
accused 25 nor is it readily available. But the well-entrenched rule is
that such evidence should be acted upon and weighed with extreme
caution, particularly where, as in this case, the crime for which the
accused stands to be convicted carries with it the highest imposable
penalty of reclusion perpetua. 26 For such evidence to support a
conviction, it is essential that (a) there must be more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such that
there can be no doubt as to the guilt of the accused, thus warranting
his conviction. 27 Earlier, in People vs. Subano, 28 the Court laid down
the rule that

marijuana sticks taken from the accused Joseriel Rigodon. The two
accused were brought to Clarin (pp. 18-19, supra).
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT:
1. erred in convicting Joseriel Rigodon despite the fact that there is no
evidence against him. That he should have been acquitted like coaccused Efren Torrejano, because the role played by Joseriel
Rigodon was actually for the pointing out of the dwelling and person
of the big time supplier of marijuana in Bohol. That his conviction is an
irony.
2. That the Honorable Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
Branch Two (2) erred in convicting Joseriel Rigodon despite the fact
that the prosecution completely failed to present the alleged 15 sticks
of marijuana, completely failed to present any laboratory analysis,
completely failed to present their named chemist. What was
presented was only the complaint and the two (2) ten peso bills and
two (2) five peso bills claimed as marked which can easily be
produced by anybody. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 1-2)
RULING:
YES.
Not all the evidence required for proving the crime charged were
presented by the prosecution. It is indispensable that the identity of
the marijuana which constitutes the corpus delicti must be established
before the court (People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 [1993]).

PEOPLE VS RIGODON

During the trial, the sticks of marijuana were never presented as

evidence to prove that appellant indeed sold the same during the
entrapment operation.
It is an entrenched rule in our jurisprudence that indispensable in
every prosecution for illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is
the submission of proof that the sale for the illicit drug took place
between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof, and the presentation
further of the marijuana, the corpus delicti, as evidence in court
(People v. Pacleb, 217 SCRA 92 [1993]; People v. Labarias, 217
SCRA 483 [1993]).

FACTS:

PEOPLE VS RAMOS

That in the afternoon of July 30, 1992 there was a report that a drug
pusher was selling marijuana. They decided to conduct a buy-bust
operation. The Detachment Commander PO4 Ranulfo Villamor,
assembled them and formed a team which was composed of PO3
Hercules Chatto, PO3 Fulgencio Claro and himself (pp. 8-9, supra).

FACTS:

Before conviction can be had upon circumstantial

evidence, the circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the
author of the crime.

They went and arrived at Tubigon and proceeded to Clarin between

6:30 to 7:30 o'clock in the evening of July 31, 1992 (p. 5, tsn, Oct. 23,
1992) where they met their confidential agent. He approached a
person near a building shop and told him that he would buy five
pieces of marijuana for P30.00 (pp. 11-13, tsn, Oct. 21, 1992). His
companion (sic) served as a back-up. He was able to buy from
Joseriel Rigodon and Efren Torrejano. It was the accused Joseriel
Rigodon who handed to him the five sticks of marijuana for which he
paid P30.00 Philippine currency consisting of two ten-peso bills and
two five-peso bills (p. 14, supra). He then examined the five sticks of
marijuana and smelled them and found the same to be marijuana (p.
15, supra). At this juncture he signaled to his companions by taking
off his Piercing (sic) cap. His companions immediately effected the
arrest of the two accused Joseriel Rigodon and Efren Torrejano and
recovered the money he paid. The bills paid were initialed by their
Detachment Commander (pp. 15-17, supra). There were ten more

Complainant's family was sleeping in their house at Barangay San

Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan one night in April, 1995 when the rape
complained of was committed by appellant.
On this particular night, complainant's mother and youngest sister
slept inside the lone bedroom of their house while she, her brother
and two other sisters slept outside of this room in an adjoining
area. Sleeping together with them at that time was complainant's
father, appellant in this mandatory review.
Complainant woke up when appellant carried her brother and two
sisters and transferred them for where they were sleeping to another
area of the house. After appellant had lain down beside complainant,
he held both of her hands and proceded to undress her. Appellant
also removed his own clothes and then inserted his penis into
complainant's vagina. Complainant could only wail as her father
forcibly committed sexual congress with her. She was warned by

20
appellant not to report the matter to anyone or he would kill her. All
these took place while complainant's sibling continued sleeping
nearby.
From this night on, appellant would repeat his dastardly acts against
his daugther a number of times. In fact, appellant's sexual abuse of
his daugther would not have discovered had complainant not suffered
an abortion of the fetus she was carrying in her womb.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE CONVICTED OF
SIMPLE RAPE FOR LACK OF QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES IN
THE INFORMATION
HELD:
YES.
As this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the
information or in the complaint against appellant, he cannot be
convicted of qualified rape because he was not properly informed that
he is being accused of qualified rape. The Constitution guarantees
the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. [43]This
right finds amplification and implementation in the different provisions
of the Rules of Court. [44] Foremost among these enabling provisions is
the office of an information.
The facts stated in the body of the information determine the
crime of which the accused stands charged and for which he must be
tried. [45] This recital of the essentials of a crime delineate the nature
and cause of accusation against an accused.
It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is
composed must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main
purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in
an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense. [46]
An accused person cannot be convicted of an offense higher
than that with which he is charged in the complaint or information on
which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the
evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any
offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which
he is tried or is necessarily included therein. He has a right to be
informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before
he is put on trial. To convict an accused of a higher offense than that
charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried would be
an unauthorized denial of that right. [47]
To be more precise, we declared in Garcia that it would be a
denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges
against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is
charge with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form
punishable with death although the attendant circumstance qualifying
the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the
indictment on which he was arraigned.

Contrary, therefore, to the pose of the lower court and the

Solicitor General, the non-allegation of the relationship between
appellant and offended party in an information for a rape is a bar to
the imposition of the death penalty since relationship in this particular
form of rape is a qualifying and not merely aggravating. Having been
informed only of the elements of simple rape, appellant can only be
convicted of such crime and accordingly be punished with reclusion
perpetua.
Now, it is accepted that qualifying circumstances not pleaded in
the indictment but duly proven without objection during the trial may
be considered as aggravating circumstances. [48]The general
principles of criminal law provide that aggravating circumstances,
even if not alleged in the information, may be proven during the trial
over the objection of the defense and may be appreciated in imposing
the sentence. Such evidence merely forms part of the proof of the
actual commission of the offense and its consideration by the courts
do not violate the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [49]
However, in the case before us, the aggravating circumstance of
relationship becomes inconsequential in view of the nature
of reclusion perpetua prescribe for the felony of simple rape. Our
general criminal code states that in all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may
have attended the commission of the deed. [50]
PAL VS NLRC ( I CHECKED THE SCRA TAPOS 1998 LUMALABAS.
THERE ARE 3 PAL VS NLRC CASES DURING 1998 SO DI KO
ALAM ALIN SA KANILA. :/)
CUEVAS VS MUNOZ
Cuevaz v. Muoz (G.R. No. 140520; December 18, 2000)Facts:
The Hong Kong Magistrates Court at Eastern Magistracy issued a
warrant for the arrest of respondent Juan Antonio Muoz for seven (7)
counts of accepting an advantage as an agent and seven(7) counts of
conspiracy to defraud, contrary to the common law of Hong KongThe
Department of Justice received a request for the provisional arrest of
the respondent from theMutual Legal Assistance Unit, International
Law Division of the Hong Kong Department of Justicepursuant to
Article 11(1) of the RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement. Upon
application of the NBI, RTCof Manila issued an Order granting the
application for provisional arrest and issuing the correspondingOrder
of Arrest. Consequently, respondent was arrested pursuant to the said
order, and is currentlydetained at the NBI detention cell.Respondent
filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for
certiorari
, prohibition and mandamus withapplication for preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or writ of
habeas corpus
assailing the validity of the Order of Arrest. The Court of Appeals
rendered a decision declaring the Order of Arrest null andvoid on the
grounds, among others that the request for provisional arrest and the
accompanyingwarrant of arrest and summary of facts were
unauthenticated and mere facsimile copies which areinsufficient to
form a basis for the issuance of the Order of Arrest.Thus, petitioner
Justice Serafin R. Cuevas, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Justice,lost no time in filing the instant petition.
I
ssue:
Whether or not the request for provisional arrest of respondent and its
accompanying documentsmust be authenticated.
Held:

21
The request for provisional arrest of respondent and its
accompanying documents is valid despitelack of authentication.
There is no requirement for the authentication of a request for
provisional arrestand its accompanying documents. The enumeration
in the provision of RP-Hong Kong ExtraditionAgreement does not
specify that these documents must be authenticated copies. This may
be gleanedfrom the fact that while Article 11(1) does not require the
accompanying documents of a
request forprovisional arrest
to be authenticated, Article 9 of the same Extradition Agreement
makesauthentication a requisite for admission in evidence of any
document accompanying a
request forsurrender or extradition
. In other words, authentication is required for the request for
surrender orextradition but
not
for the request for provisional arrest.The RP-Hong Kong Extradition
Agreement, as they are worded, serves the purpose sought to
beachieved by treaty stipulations for provisional arrest. The process
of preparing a formal request forextradition and its accompanying
documents, and transmitting them through diplomatic channels, is
notonly time-consuming but also leakage-prone. There is naturally a
great likelihood of flight by criminalswho get an intimation of the
pending request for their extradition. To solve this problem,
speedierinitial steps in the form of treaty stipulations for provisional
arrest were formulated. Thus, it is anaccepted practice for the
requesting state to rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic
cable.Respondents reliance on
G
arvida v. Sales, Jr.
is misplaced. The proscription against the admission of apleading that
has been transmitted by facsimile machine has no application in the
case at bar forobvious reasons. First, the instant case does not
involve a pleading; and second, unlike the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure which do not sanction the filing of a pleading by
means of a facsimile machine, P.D.No. 1069 and the RP Hong Kong
Extradition Agreement do not prohibit the transmission of a request
forprovisional arrest by means of a fax machine.
PEOPLE VS UMANITO
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUFINO UMANITO G.R. No. 17
2607 April 16, 2009FACTS: The instant case involved a charge of
rape. The accused Rufino Umanito was found by the RTC
guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.The alleged 1989
rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy
and the birth of a childhereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of that
fact, as well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the
Courtdeemed uncovering whether or not Umanito is the father of
BBB.With the advance in genetics and the availability of new

technology, it can now be determined with reasonablecertainty

whether appellant is the father of AAA's child. The DNA test result
shall be simultaneously disclosed tothe parties in Court. The [NBI] is,
therefore, enjoined not to disclose to the parties in advance the DNA
testresults.The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe the confidentiality
of the DNA profiles and all results or other informationobtained from
DNA testing and is hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until
such time as the accused hasbeen acquitted or served his
sentence.The DNA analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained
on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB], and Umanito, todetermine
whether or not Umanito is the biological father of [BBB], showed that
there is a Complete Match in allof the 15 loci tested between the
alleles of Umanito and [BBB]; That based on the above findings, there
is a99.9999% probability of paternity that Umanito is the biological
father of BBB. The defense admitted that if thevalue of the Probability
of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable
presumption of paternity.ISSUE: Whether Umanito is the biological
father of [BBB].RULING: Court resolved, for the very first time, to
apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNAEvidence
(DNA Rules). The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and
that as testified to by AAA,Umanito had fathered the child she gave
birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after the day she said she
wasraped by Umanito. Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted but may be contradicted andovercome by other
evidence (Rule 131, Section 3).The disputable presumption that was
established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and
overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did
notobject to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits
"A" and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) norpresented evidence to rebut
the same.By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Umanito is deemed to
have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the Courtof Appeals
finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand the indemnification of the private
complainant in the sum of P50,000.00.Given that the results of the
Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the conclusions of the lower
courts, andthat no cause is presented for us to deviate from the
penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to
denyUmanitos Motion to Withdraw Appeal.The instant case is now
CLOSED and TERMINATED

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