Evaluating The Advocacy Coalition Framework

Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework
Author(s): Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Paul A. Sabatier

Source: Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1994), pp. 175-203
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Jnl Publ. Pol.,
14,
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175-203
Copyright ? 1994 Cambridge University Press
Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework

HANK C. JENK I NS- SM I TH, Political Science,Universityof New
Mexico
Studies, Universityof
PA U L A. S A B A TI ER, Environmental
Californiaat Davis
ABSTRACT
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) was developed to provide
a causal theory of the policy process which would serve as one of
several alternatives to the familiar stages heuristic, with its recognized
limitations. This paper first summarizes the central features of the
ACF, including a set of underlying assumptions and specific
hypotheses. We next review the implications for the framework of six
case studies by various authors dealing with Canadian education and
water,
telecommunications,
transportation,
with
American
environmental, and energy policy. While generally supportive of the
ACF, the case studies also suggest several revisions.
Many policy scholars have experienced growing dissatisfaction with

a set of widely used concepts about the policy process which Nakamura
(1987) dubbed 'the textbook approach' and which we refer to as 'the
stages heuristic'. This has channeled the way research projects are
framed concerning the policy process and how practitioners conceive
the role of policy analysis. While the textbook approach made important contributions during the I970S and early I98os and still retains
some value, it has outlived most of its usefulness.
The limitations of the textbook approach have stimulated efforts to
develop more conceptually integrated and empirically falsifiable theories of the policy process (Sabatier, 1991). The advocacy coalition
framework (ACF) deals with policy change over several decades, yet
specifically considers the role of policy-oriented learning over shorter
An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 1992 meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Chicago, September 2-5. The authors would like to thank John Scholz,
Joe Stewart, Hanna Mawhinney, and several JPP reviewers for their helpful comments on
previous versions of this paper.

176
Hank C. Jenkins-Smithand Paul A. Sabatier
periods of time within that broader process (Sabatier, I988; JenkinsSmith, I988). The focus of this article is on the results of recent
research that critically applied the ACF to cases of policy change
over several decades in Canadian education, the regulation and
deregulation of commercial airlines in the US., the controversy over
additional water projects in California, the development of television
design standards by the Federal Communications Commission, the
regulation of petroleum leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS),
and the regulation of land use and water quality in the Lake Tahoe
Basin (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, I993). The intent has been to test
some of the principal hypotheses and assumptions of the ACF over
a diverse set of cases.
What have we learned? After briefly reviewing the limits of the
textbook approach, we provide an overview of the ACF, including
explicit hypotheses drawn from elements of the framework. The second
part assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the ACF in light of the
case studies. While the results generally support the ACF, they also
suggest several important revisions and additions.
L Background
A. Limitationsof the Stages Heuristic
Beginning in the late I96os and early I970s, many policy scholars
adopted a stages heuristicto public policy derived from the work of
Harold Lasswell, David Easton and others. Briefly, it breaks the policy
process into functionally and temporally distinct sub-processes. Among
the most authoritative statements of the textbook model are Jones'
to the Study of Public Policy, Anderson's (I979)
(I977) An Introduction
Public Polic-Making, and Peter's (I986) AmericanPublic Policy. These
works all distinguish the stages of problem identification/agenda setting, policy formulation and adoption, policy implementation, and
policy evaluation and reformulation. All place these stages within a
broader political environment of federalism, political institutions,
public opinion, political culture, and other constraints.
Scholars working within the stages heuristic have certainly made
important contributions over the past two decades. The concept of a
processof policymaking operating across the various institutions of
government has provided an alternative to the institutional approach
of traditional political science. By shifting attention to the process
stream the stages model has encouraged analysis of phenomena that
transcend any given institution. In addition, the stages heuristic has
permitted useful analysis of questions that were less readily perceived

EvaluatingtheAdvocacyCoalitionFramework
177
within the institutionalist framework. Perhaps the most important of

these has been its focus on policy outcomes. Traditional institutional
approaches tended to stop at the output of that particular institution whether it be a law, a court decision or an administrative agency
rule, without specific attention to the ultimate outcome or impact of
the policy. Finally, the stages model has provided a useful conceptual
disaggregation of the complex and varied policy process into manageable segments, particularly regarding agenda setting (e.g. Cobb et al,
1976; Kingdon, 1984; Nelson, 1984) and policy implementation (e.g.,
Pressman and Wildavsky, I973; Barrett and Fudge, I98I; Mazmanian
and Sabatier, I989).

Despite its contributions, we believe the stages heuristic has serious
limitations for policy scholarship. First, the stages model is not really
a causal model. It lacks an identifiable force or forces that can drive
the policy process from one stage to another and generate activity
within specific stages. The literatures on each stage shows very little
integration with each other in terms of the major actors involved or
the causal factors which drive the process along. And because it fails
to specify the linkages, and influences that form the essential core of
theoretical models, the approach also does not providea clear basisfor
across stages or within multiple stages. The
empiricalhypothesis-testing
means for confirmation, alteration or elaboration of the model are
lacking, except within a specific stage.
Insofar as the stages heuristic posits a sequence of steps starting
with agenda-setting and then passing through policy formulation,
inaccurate.Proimplementation, and evaluation, it is often descriptively
from
the
stages, in
sequential
deviations
often
acknowledge
ponents
practice (see, e.g. Jones, 1977: 28-29). Empirical studies suggests that
deviations may be quite frequent: evaluations of existing programs
often affect agenda setting, and policy making occurs as bureaucrats
attempt to implement vague legislation (Lowi, I969; Majone and
Wildavsky, 1978; Barrett and Fudge, i98i; Kingdon, 1984; Nakamura,
1987).
More importantly, the stages heuristic suffers from a built-in legalistic, top-downfocus. It draws attention to a specific cycle of problem
identification, policy decision, and implementation that focuses on the
intentions of legislators and the fate of a particular policy initiative.
Such a top-down view results in a tendency to neglect other important
players (e.g., street-level bureaucrats), restricts the view of 'policy' to
a specific piece of legislation, and may be entirely inapplicable when
'policy' stems from a multitude of overlapping directives and actors,
none dominant (Sabatier, I986). Furthermore, focus on the policy
cycle as the temporal unit of analysis is often inappropriate. Policy

178
Hank C. Jenkins-SmithandPaul A. Sabatier
evolution usually involves multiple,interactingcyclesinitiated by actors

at different levels of government, as various formulations of problems
and solutions are conceived, partially tested, and reformulated by a
range of competing policy elites against a background of change in
exogenous events and related policy issue areas (Heclo, I974; Jones,
1975;
Nelson, 1984; Sabatierand Pelkey, I990).
These and other problems with the stages heuristic have encouraged
the development of other conceptualizations of the policy process
(Sabatier, i99i;
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: Chap.
I).
Two
major alternative schools of thought consist of an institutional rational
choice tradition (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Moe,
1984;
Ostrom, I990;
Chubb and Moe, I990; McCubbins and Sullivan, 1992; Ostrom et

al, 1993) and another in comparative public policy, generally operating
within a conceptual framework articulated by Hofferbert (I974; see
also Leichter, 1979; Lundqvist, I980; Mazmanian and Sabatier, i980;
Castles, I989). In this paper, we evaluate a third alternative, the
advocacy coalition framework.
B. The AdvocacyCoalitionFramework(ACF)
The ACF originated in dissatisfaction with the implementation literature it represented an effort to synthesize the best features of both
'top down' and 'bottom up' approaches to that stage of the policy
process (Sabatier, I986, Sabatier, I988; Jenkins-Smith, I988; Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: Chaps. 2-3).

The advocacy coalition framework has at least four basic premises.
First, understanding the process of policy change - and the role of
learning therein - requires a time perspective of a decade or more.
Second, the most useful way to think about policy change over such
a time span is through a focus on policy subsystems, i.e. the interaction
of actors from different institutions who follow, and seek to influence,
governmental decisions in a policy area. Third, subsystems must
include an intergovernmental dimension, at least for domestic policy.
Fourth, public policies or programs can be conceptualized in the same
manner as belief systems, i.e. as sets of value priorities and causal
assumptions about how to realize them.
The focus on a timespan of a decade or more comes directly from
the findings about the enlightenment function of policy research.
Weiss (1977) has persuasively argued that a focus on short-term
decision-making will underestimate the influence of policy analysis
because such research is used primarily to alter the perceptual apparatus of policy-makers over time. A corollary is that it is the cumulative
effect of findings from different studies and from every day knowledge

179
(Lindblom and Cohen, 1979) that has greatest influence on policy.

The literature on policy implementation also points to the need for
time frames of a decade or more, to complete at least one formulation/
implementation/reformulation cycle and to obtain a reasonably accurate portrait of success and failure (Mazmanian and Sabatier, I989).
Numerous studies have shown that ambitious programs that appeared
after a few years to be abject failures received more favourable evaluations when seen in a longer timeframe; conversely, initial successes
may evaporate over time (Bernstein, 1955; Kirst and Jung, 1982;
Hogwood and Peters, 1983).
Secondly, the most useful aggregate unit of analysis for understanding policy change in modern industrial societies is not a specific
governmental institution but rather a policy subsystem (or domain),
i.e. those actors from a variety of public and private organizations
who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue, such as
air pollution control or mental health, and who regularly seek to
influence public policy in that domain. Our conception of policy
subsystems should be broadened from traditional notions of iron triangles limited to administrative agencies, legislative committees, and
interest groups at a single level of government to include actors at
various levels of government, as well as journalists, researchers, and
policy analysts who play important roles in the generation, dissemination, and evaluation of policy ideas (Heclo, 1978; Dunleavy, I98I;
Jordan and Richardson, I983; Rhodes, I988; Scholz et al,
i99i).
The third basic premise is that policy subsystems will normally

involve actors from all levels of government. To examine policy change
only at the national level will, in most instances, be seriously misleading. Policy innovations may occur first at a subnational level and then
expand into nationwide programs; even after national intervention,
subnational initiatives normally continue. American cities such as
Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Chicago, and New York, had viable stationary
air pollution source controls 20 years before any significant federal
involvement, and California continues to be several years ahead on
most aspects of mobile source controls. Moreover, two decades of
implementation research has conclusively demonstrated that subnational implementing officials have substantial discretion in deciding
exactly how national 'policy' gets translated into thousands of concrete
decisions in very diverse local situations (Pressman and Wildavsky,
1973;
Barrettand Fudge, I98I; Hull and Hjern, 1987; Rhodes, I988;
Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989).

The fourth important premise is that public policies/programs incorporate implicit theories about how to achieve their objectives
(Pressman and Wildavsky, I973; Majone, 1980), and thus can be

I80
conceptualized in much the same way as belief systems. They involve

value priorities, perceptions of important causal relationships, perceptions of the state of the world (including the magnitude of the
problem), perceptions of the efficacy of policy instruments, etc. Mapping beliefs and policies on the same canvas permits assessing the
influence over time of the role of technical information or beliefs on
policy change.
Figure i presents a general overview of the framework. On the left
side are two sets of exogeneous variables - the one fairly stable, the
other more dynamic - that affect the constraints and opportunities of
subsystem actors. Air pollution policy, for example, is strongly affected
by the nature of air quality as a collective good, by the geographical
contours of air basins, and by political boundaries which are usually
quite stable over time. But there are also more dynamic factors,
including changes in socio-economic conditions (e.g. public opinion
and oil prices) and in the systemic governing coalition, which provide
some of the principal sources of major policy change.
Within the subsystem, the ACF assumes that actors can be aggregated into a number of advocacy coalitions composed of people from
various governmental and private organizations who share a set of
normative and causal beliefs and who often act in concert. In United
States automotive air pollution control, for example, one can distinguish an environmental coalition (composed of environmental and
public health groups, most officials in federal and state air pollution
agencies, some legislators at all levels of government, and specific
researchers and journalists), as distinct from an economic efficiency
coalition composed of most automobile manufacturers and petroleum
companies and their allies in legislatures, research enterprises, and
the mass media.
The belief systems of various coalitions are organized into an hierarchical, tri-partite structure, with higher/broader levels constraining
more specific beliefs. At the highest/broadest level, the 'deep core' of
the shared belief system includes basic ontological and normative
beliefs, such as the perceived nature of humans or the relative valuation of individual freedom or social equality, which operate across
virtually all policy domains; the familiar left/right scale operates at
this level. At the next level are 'policy core' beliefs which represent
a coalition's basic normative commitments and causal perceptions
across an entire policy domain or subsystem. They include fundamental value priorities, such as the relative importance of economic
development vs. environmental protection; basic perceptions concerning the general seriousness of the problem (e.g. air pollution) and its
principal causes; and strategies for realizing core values within the

EvaluatingtheAdvocagyCoalitionFramework
i 8i
I: RevisedDiagram of the AdvocacyCoalitionFramework
FIGURE
I
RELATIVELY STABLE SYSTEM PARAMETERS
Basic attributes
1)
of the problem area (good)
I
12) Basic distribution
13) Fundamental socio-cultural

structure
4) Basic constitutional
resources
of natural
values
POLICYSUBSYSTEM
j Coalition
Resources
I--- >1
Subsystem
Actors
conditions
I
|
Policy
Brokers
Strategy Al
re guidance
I
i
>1.1
Coalition
a) Policy betiefs
b) Resources
(SYSTEM)EVENTS
and inpacts
| b) Resources
_____________________
14) Policy decisions

subsysteem
J a) Policy beliefs
'I
of
12) Changes in public opinion

I
3) Chwnges in systemic governing
Constraints
I1
and
1) Changes in socio-economic
(rutes)
I__________________________________________
EmXBL
and sociat
-'
structure
I iI
Strategy
R1
re uidance
instruments
instruIments
|1
Decisions by SovereigrR
Regarding Institutlonal
Rules,
Rudgats, and Parsonnel
coatition
.
from other
SCoversnantal
Program
*---
-----
Poticy
Outputs
Policy
Ilacts
........>
------->
subsystem, such as the appropriate division of authority between

governments and markets, the level of government best suited to deal
with the problem, and the basic policy instruments to be used. Finally,
the secondary aspects of a coalition's belief system within a specific
policy domain comprise a large set of narrower beliefs concerning the
seriousness of the problem or the relative importance of various causal
factors in specific locales, policy preferences regarding desirable regulations or budgetary allocations, the design of specific institutions,
and the evaluations of various actors' performance.
In general, deep core beliefs are very resistant to change - essentially
akin to a religious conversion. A coalition's policy core beliefs are
somewhat less rigidly held. While several are almost exclusively normative and thus very difficult to modify, most involve empirical
elements which may change over a period of time with the gradual

182
accumulation of evidence, as in Weiss's enlightenment function. For

example, whereas all environmental groups in the United States supported command-and-control regulation in the early 1970S, a few have
gradually come to prefer economic incentives as a policy instrument
in many situations (Liroff, I986). Beliefs in secondary aspects are
assumed to be more readily adjusted in the light of new data, experience, or changing strategic considerations.
At any particular point in time, each coalition adopts a strategy
or strategies involving the use of guidance instruments (changes in
rules, budgets, personnel, or information) to attempt to alter the
behavior of one or more governmental institutions in order to make
them more consistent with its policy objectives. Conflicting strategies
from various coalitions are normally mediated by a third group of
actors, here termed policy brokers, whose principal concern is to find
some reasonable compromise which will reduce intense conflict. The
end result is one or more governmental programs, which in turn lead
to policy outputs. These outputs - mediated by a number of other
factors - result in a variety of impacts on targeted problems (e.g.
ambient air quality), as well as side effects.
On the basis of perceptions of decisions and their resulting impacts,
as well as new information, each advocacy coalition may revise its
beliefs, primarily in the secondary aspects, and/or alter its strategies.
The latter may involve seeking major institutional revisions at the
collective choice level, more minor revisions at the operational level
(Kiser and Ostrom, 1982), or even going outside the subsystem by
seeking changes in the dominant electoral coalition at the systemic
level.
This framework has a particular interest in understanding policyoriented learning. Following Heclo (1974: 306), this refers to relatively
enduring alterations of thought or behavioral intentions which result
from experience and are concerned with the attainment or revision
of policy objectives. Policy-oriented learning involves the internal feedback loops depicted in Figure i, perceptions concerning external
dynamics, and increased knowledge of problem parameters and the
factors affecting them. The framework assumes that such learning is
instrumental, i.e. that members of various coalitions seek to understand
better the world in order to further their policy objectives. They will
resist information suggesting that their core or policy core beliefs may
be invalid or unattainable, and they will use formal policy analyses
primarily to buttress and elaborate those beliefs or attack their
opponents' views.
Such learning comprises only one of the forces affecting policy
change over time. In addition, there is a real world that changes.

183
Changes in relevant socio-economic conditions and system-wide governing coalitions, such as the 1973 Arab oil boycott or the 1979
election of Margaret Thatcher, can dramatically alter the composition
and the resources of various coalitions and, in turn, public policy,
within the subsystem. Turnover in personnel constitutes a second
non-cognitive source of change which can substantially alter the political resources of various coalitions.
The basic argument of the ACF is that while policy-oriented learning
is an important aspect of policy change, and can often alter secondary
aspects of a coalition's belief system, changes in the policy core aspects
of a governmental program are usually the results of perturbations in
non-cognitive factors external to the subsystem, such as macroeconomic conditions or the rise of a new systemic governing coalition.
It differs from Heclo
(I974;
1978)
in its emphasis on ideologically
based coalitions and in its conception of the dynamics of policyoriented learning. It can also be clearly distinguished from analyses
which view formal organizations as the basic actors, or those which
focus on individuals seeking to attain their self-interest through the
formation of short-term minimum winning coalitions (Riker, I962).
Table I lists a set of hypotheses drawn from the ACF regarding
advocacy coalitions, policy change, and policy learning (Sabatier,
I988). The three hypotheses concerning coalitions are all based on
the premise that the principal glue holding a coalition together is
agreement over policy core beliefs. Since these are very resistant to
change, the lineup of allies and opponents within a subsystem will
remain stable over periods of a decade or more (Hypotheses i).
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are essentially a restatement of the underlying
premise. Given the arguments concerning the stability of a coalition's
policy core beliefs and its desire to translate those beliefs into governmental programs, Hypothesis 4 contends that the policy core attributes
of such programs will not change as long as the dominant coalition
which instituted that policy remains in power although the secondary
aspects of those programs may well change. Given the logic thus far,
it follows that the only way to change the policy core attributes of
governmental policy is through some shock originating outside the
subsystem which fundamentally alters the distribution of political
resources among coalitions within the subsystem (Hypothesis 5). The
last four hypotheses deal with the conditions conducive to policyoriented learning acrossbelief systems, i.e. between coalitions. These
are based upon the premise that coalitions resist changing their policy
core beliefs or important secondary aspects of their belief systems,
and thus only very, very solid empirical evidence is likely to lead
them to do so. It is hypothesized that such evidence is most likely

i84
TABLE

i:
HypothesesDrawnfrom the AdvocacyCoalitionFramework
Hypotheses Concerning Advocacy Coalitions:

Hypothesis i:
On major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy core
beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be
rather stable over periods of a decade or so.
Hypothesis 2:
Actors within an advocacy coalition will show substantial consensus on
issues pertaining to the policy core but less so on secondary aspects.
Hypothesis 3:
An actor or coalition will give up secondary aspects of a belief system
before acknowledging weaknesses in the policy core.
Hypotheses Concerning Policy Change:
Hypothesis 4:
The policy core attributes of a governmental program are unlikely to
be significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy coalition
which instituted the program remains in power.
Hypothesis 5:
The policy core attributes of a governmental action program are unlikely
to be changed in the absence of significant perturbations external to
the subsystem, i.e. changes in socio-economic conditions, system-wide
governing coalitions, or policy outputs from other subsystems.
Hypotheses Concerning Coalition Learning:
Hypothesis 6:
Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there
is an intermediate level of informed conflict between the two coalitions.
This requires that:
i) Each have the technical resources to engage in such a debate; and
that
ii) The conflict be between secondary aspects of one belief system
and core elements of the other or, alternatively, between important
secondary aspects of the two belief systems.
Hypothesis 7:
Problems for which accepted quantitative data and theory exist are
more conducive to policy-oriented learning across belief systems than
those in which data and theory are generally qualitative, quite subjective,
or altogether lacking.
Hypothesis 8:
Problems involving natural systems are more conducive to policyoriented learning across belief systems than those involving purely social
or political systems because in the former many of the critical variables
are not themselves active strategists and because controlled experimentation is more feasible.
Hypothesis 9:
Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there

exists a forum which is:
i) Prestigious enough to force professionals from different coalitions to
participate;
ii) Dominated by professional norms.
to be developed and accepted in fields where accepted quantitative

data and consensual theories are available (Hypothesis 7), in the
natural sciences more than the social sciences (Hypotheses 8), when
a prestigious professional forum requiring the participation of experts
from various coalitions exists (Hypothesis 9), and in situations involving an intermediate level of conflict, i.e. high enough to be worth
expending analytical resources but not involving direct normative
conflict (Hypothesis 6).

185
I. Assessingthe ACF on the Basis of Six Cases

As part of a larger project designed to test these hypotheses and the
overall utility of the ACF, we collected a set of six case studies
covering a range of substantive issues, levels of government, and
methods of analysis (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Contributions
were sought from scholars who were specialists in diverse policy areas
and who had no vested interest in supporting the ACT:'
(i) Hanne Mawhinney (I993) applied the ACF to efforts by the Frenchspeaking minority in Ontario to gain their own secondary schools in that
province.Her account, which focuses on the period from about 1970 to the
approval of the Canadian Bill of Rights in I983, offers some fascinating
parallels to the struggles of Southern blacks to abolish separate schools in
the United States.
(2) Anthony Brown and Joseph Stewart (I993)
analyzed the deregulationof
commercialairlines in the United States. They reviewed the rather stable
coalitionswithin this subsystemover a very long period, with the late 1970S
marking the transformationof a long-time minority coalition into majority
status as the result of policy learning and external events.
(3) John Munro (I993) examined Californiawater supply policy over the
past 50 years,with particularemphasison the changefroma clearlydominant
water developmentcoalition during 1930-69 to a stalemate starting in the
mid-1970s because of the growing strength of environmentalistsand, we
would argue, efficiency-orientedeconomists. Learning played an important
role, as did external events, particularlydrought, the energy crisis, and
gubernatorialelections. The analysis also contains a fascinatingcase study
about how extremists from both camps blocked an effort by Gov. Jerry
Brown to brokera solution in the early i980S.
(4) Richard Barke (I993) describes how technical advisory committees of
the United States FederalCommunicationsCommissionmanagedto develop
a unifiedtechnologyfor the developmentof monochromeand color television
in the 1940s and 1950S. As predicted by the ACF, learning and eventual
agreementwere facilitatedby the presenceof a quasi-professionalforumand
tractable technical issues, despite intense conflict involving enormouseconomic stakes.
(5) Jenkins-Smith.and Gil St. Clair (I993) examinetwentyyears of testimony
before Congressionalcommitteesdealing with petroleumexplorationon the
Outer ContinentalShelf (OCS). This policy subsystem had been examined
previouslyby TheodoreHeintz (I988) a senior policy analyst for the Department of Interior,using a qualitativecase-studyapproach.Jenkins-Smithand
St. Clair demonstratehow more systematicmethods of data acquisitionand
analysis, when added to qualitativetechniques,allow importantdistinctions
to emerge.
(6) Sabatierand Anne Brasher(1993) analyze I90 testimoniesat legislative
and administrativehearings dealing with land use and water quality policy
in the Lake Tahoe Basin (Californiaand Nevada) between I960 and I984.
They demonstratehow a rather fluid situation in the I960s coalesced into
two very distinct coalitions by the mid-I970s.

i 86
While these six cases do not constitute an exhaustive or formal test

of the underlying assumptions or hypotheses of the ACF, they do
provide a guide to its strengths and weaknesses in a variety of situations. They cases provide substantial support for the ACF; they also
suggest several important revisions of, and additions to, the framework.
A. The Importance
of AdvocacyCoalitions
First and foremost, the cases confirm the presence of advocacy coalitions and show the utility of focusing on them to simplify policy change
over a decade or more. An advocacy coalition does consist of actors
from a variety of governmental and private organizations at different
levels of government who share a set of policy beliefs and seek to
realize them by influencing the behavior of multiple governmental
institutions over time. The concept of advocacy coalitions aggregates
most actors within a subsystem into a manageable number of beliefbased coalitions, whereas Heclo (1978) views individuals as largely
autonomous and thus risks overwhelming both himself and the reader
with an impossibly complex set of actors.
The data are probably clearest in the Tahoe case, where Sabatier
and Brasher (1993) used cluster analysis of several hundred testimonies
at a dozen hearings over 20 years to demonstrate that actors from a
wide variety of institutions tended to coalesce over time into two major
coalitions; one an Economic Development/Property Rights Coalition
composed of most elected officials and staff from local governments
and public utility districts in the Basin, local businessmen, leaders of
property rights groups, and several Nevada legislators from the Basin.
The opposing Environmental Coalition was composed of local and
statewide environmental groups, officials from several California and
Nevada pollution control agencies, several researchers, several California legislators from outside the Basin, and even a few representatives
from two local governments in the Basin. This case also demonstrated
how the Tahoe subsystem evolved over a decade or so from a vague
initial consensus in favor of some form of regional environmental
planning to two coalitions espousing quite different belief systems.
Mawhinny's (1993) analysis of educational conflict in Ontario
revealed a rather cohesive Francophone Rights Coalition composed of
national francophone interest groups, their local affiliates, local school
officials from francophone schools, and elected officials and political
parties from Quebec. In her view, the long-dominant Loyalist Coalition was less cohesive, and may in fact have been an alliance containing
traditional Anglophone conservatives, Scots, and English-speaking
Catholics. This case suggests that minority coalitions have a greater

187
incentive to remain cohesive in order to have any chance of gaining

power, while those in a long-dominant coalition may become less
cohesive over several decades.
The Brown and Stewart (1993) analysis of airline regulation revealed
three coalitions which remained remarkably stable over several decades: (i) a Pro-Regulation Coalition composed of the major airlines,
most airline unions, many smaller airports, and their Congressional
allies' (2) an Anti-Regulation Coalition composed of the smaller airlines, larger airports, most consumer groups, some economists, and
their Congressional allies; and (3) a Deregulation Coalition, which
probably didn't emerge until the late I96os and which was composed
largely of academic economists, Alfred Kahn (an economist who
became CAB chair in the mid-I970s), some consumer groups, and a
few critical members of Senator Kennedy's staff in the mid-1970s.
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was usually in the Pro-Regulation
Coalition, although it could be moved for a few years depending
upon Presidential appointments. Kahn moved it into the Deregulation
Coalition in the late 1970s.
B. DifferencesamongInterestGroups,Agencies,and Researchers
within Coalitions
The precision provided by the systematic analysis of testimonies at
Outer Continental Shelf leasing hearings, I969 - 1987, by JenkinsSmith and St. Clair (1993) suggests an important amendment to our
understanding of changes in the composition of advocacy coalitions
over time. The companies and industry trade groups most directly
involved in OCS development were always in the Pro-Leasing Coalition, while environmental groups were always in the Environmental
(anti-leasing) Coalition. The involved federal agencies - DOE, DOI,
EPA and the NOAA - were sandwiched between the competing
interest groups. Over the course of the policy debate, the federal
agencies - at least in their official pronouncements before Congressional committees - shifted between one coalition or the other
in response to exogenous political and economic events. DOI and
DOE were consistently closer to the pro-leasing side, however, while
NOAA and EPA tended to be closer to the environmental side. The
OCS case thus suggests a new hypothesis:
Hypothesis I0: Within a coalition, administrativeagencieswill usually advocate more moderatepositions than their interest group allies.
The Advocacy Coalition Framework assumes that most administrative
agencies have missions that usually make them part of a specific

i88
coalition. Their mission is grounded in a statutory mandate and

reinforced by the professional affiliation of agency personnel and the
agency's need to provide benefits to the dominant coalition in their
subsystem (Meier, 1985; Knott and Miller, 1987). On the other hand,
the OCS leasing case and the recognition that most agencies have
multiple sovereigns (sources of money and legal authority) with somewhat different policy views suggests that agencies will generally take
less extreme positions than their interest group allies, particularly
those groups which are funded primarily from member contributions.
In their study of Tahoe land use, Sabatier et al (1987) also found
that administrative agencies tended to have more moderate views than
their interest group allies. In fact, the OCS case indicates that agencies
that are usually sympathetic to a given coalition can be moved to a
neutral position or even to switch sides - at least in their official
pronouncements - by major exogeneous events such as the arrival of
a new chief executive (President or governor) favorably inclined to
the opposing coalition, or by a major crisis. Note that a change in
official pronouncements does not mean that the agency has changed
coalitions. Official statements of political appointees may not reflect
the positions of powerful civil servants or the majority of street-level
bureaucrats. It should likewise be noted that different subunits within
a bureaucracy may belong to different coalitions; for excellent
examples, see Liroff (I986) and Eisner and Meier (I990).
The evidence presented in many of our cases - particularly airline
deregulation, California water policy, OCS leasing, and Lake Tahoe indicates that administrative agencies and university researchers are
often not policy neutral, but instead are active members of specific
coalitions.2 This should not be news (Friedson, 1971; Primack and
von Hippel, 1974; Mazur, I981; Knott and Miller, I987; Jenkins-
Smith, I990; Barkeand Jenkins-Smith,1993), but we are continually

surprised by the number of people who still subscribe to the textbook
portrait of neutral civil servants and researchers. The dominant role
orientations of agency officials do, however, vary by country (Aberbach
et al, 1981: 97). But even in European countries with a strong tradition
of elitist and supposedly policy-neutral civil servants, bureaucratic role
orientation also varies with political ideology (Ibid: 140) and professional training often guides agency behavior and creates de facto
alliances with external groups (Jordan and Richardson, I983; Sharpe,
I984; Laffin, I986; Rhodes, 1988). European countries have a very
long tradition of politically committed university faculty, especially on
the Left.
Cross-pressured by multiple principals, and uniquely subject to
frequent exogenous shocks (via new executive appointments following

189
electoral turnover), agencies tend to occupy more moderate and, at

least at the political appointee level, less consistent positions within
advocacy coalitions than their interest group applies.
Relations
C Intergovernmental
The Advocacy Coalition Framework explicitly assumes that most
coalitions include actors from multiple levels of government. First,
almost all national domestic programs rely heavily upon sub-national
governments for actual implementation (Van Horn, 1979; Rhodes,
I988; Scholtz et al, I99I); second, intergovernmental transfers constitute a significant percentage of most sub-national government budgets
(Wright, I988; Anton, I989); and, third, sub-national agencies form
a substantial percentage of the groups lobbying national legislatures
and agencies (Salisbury, 1984).
This has certainly been confirmed by the case studies analyzed
here. All except the FCC's development of television design standards
involved a significant intergovernmental dimension. In airline deregulation, local airports were important members of either the Pro or
the Anti-Regulation Coalitions (Brown and Stewart, 1993). On OCS
leasing, one of the major issues has been the distribution of authority
between federal and state and local governments, and state agencies
have been important participants in Congressional hearings (Heintz,
I988). California water policy is an intergovernmental thicket involving
hundreds of local water and irrigation districts; three federal agencies,
the Bureau of Reclamation, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and EPA;
and three major state agencies, the State Water Resources Control
Board, the Department of Water Resources, and the Department of
Fish and Game (Huntley, 1992; Munro, I993). Land use and water
quality planning in the Lake Tahoe Basin involves six local governments, several state agencies from Nevada and California, two federal
agencies (the Forest Service and EPA), and a bistate regional agency
(the TRPA) (Sabatier and Brasher, 1993). Finally, the Mawhinney
analysis of francophone education in Ontario indicates that it
(1993)
has been linked to both francophone rights in other provinces and to
the pivotal constitutional issue of Quebec separatism at the federal
level.
There is also evidence that, as predicted by the ACF, members of
a specific coalition will use a variety of institutions at different levels
of government in order to achieve their policy objectives. For example,
at Lake Tahoe the principal environmental group and its allies have
pursued the following strategies over the past thirty years (Sabatier
and Pelkey, Xggo):

Igo
(i) They supported the use of federal and state funds to help sewer the
Basin in the I96os.
(2) When land use issues becamecritical, they supportedthe creationof the
bistate Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency (TRPA) in I967-70.
(3) When the TRPA approvedseveralmajorcasinos, they first sued in both
federal and state courts and then promoted the interventionof California
land use, water quality, and air quality agencies in the Basin in an effort
to slow development.
(4) In order to put pressureon Nevada to renegotiatethe TRPA Compact
in the late 1970s, they convinced a sympatheticCongressmanto sponsor
legislation establishinga National Scenic Area in the Basin.
(5) When stringent environmentalcontrols were put into place starting in
I980, the environmentalcoalition has sponsoredbuyout programsby both
federal and state agencies in order to ease the burden on propertyowners.
One could cite an equally varied set of counter-strategies used by

members of the opposing Economic Development Coalition involving
institutions at all levels of government.
On the other hand, Mawhinney's (I993) analysis of educational
policy in Ontario indicates that every actor should not be thrown
into an undifferentiated, multi-level subsystem. Different levels of
government are semi-autonomous, and coalitions spend a great deal
of time trying to restrict authority to the level at which they have a
comparative advantage (Schattschneider, I960). In the francophone
case, for example, the Loyalist Coalition tried to keep education a
purely provincial matter while the Francophone Coalition sought to
expand the scope of the conflict by linking it to Quebec separatism.
Ultimately, the federal government under Pierre Trudeau agreed with
the Francophones that keeping Quebec in the country would require
a new Charter of Rights and Freedoms providing educational rights
for linguistic minorities in Ontario and other provinces. This was, of
course, very similar to the history of school deregulation in the United
States: racial minorities expanded the scope of the conflict from the
states to the federal government and were eventually rewarded when
the Supreme Court ruled Brown v. Board of Education that statesupported segregated schools violated the Constitution (Stewart, l99I).
In intergovernmental relations, the strength of the jurisdictional
dividing lines is essentially an empiricalquestion. In cases of national
preemption, such as the regulation of television and radio broadcasts,
there is basically a single national subsystem. In cases of traditional
local autonomy such as the regulation of private land use, subsystems
tend to be organized around particular local governments. Minority
coalitions at the local level always have the option of trying to
involve state and/or national officials. This means, however, revision
is required in Hypothesis 4 that the policy core of a governmental

9I
program will not be significantly revised as long as the subsystem

advocacy coalition which instituted a policy remains in power. In the
Ontario case, for example, several policy core attributes of education
were changed by the federal government even though the Loyalist
Coalition remained in power in the province of Ontario. We thus
suggest the following:
Hypothesis4 (Revised):The Policy Core (basic attributes)of a governmental
programin a specificjurisdictionwill not be significantlyrevised as long as
the subsystem advocacy coalition which initiated the program remains in
powerwithin thatjurisdiction- exceptwhenthechangeis imposedby a hierarchically
superiorjurisdiction.
In such cases of hierarchically imposed reform, the literature on the

implementation of school desegregation and other reforms indicates
that the ability of hierarchically superior jurisdictions to alter not just
the letter of the law but the behavior of governmental officials within
the subsystem - in the absence of a change in the dominant coalition
within the subsystem - is exceedingly difficult, but not impossible
(Rodgers and Bullock, I976; Mazmanian and Sabatier, I989).
D. The Role of Policy-Oriented Learning in Policy Change
The advocacy coalition framework outlines a general argument and

several hypotheses concerning the role that technical information and
formal policy analysis play in policy-oriented learning and, in turn,
in policy change.
Several of the cases support the ACF's argument that technical
information and formal policy analysis are generally used in an advocacy fashion, i.e. to buttress and support a predetermined position.
They also seem to support Hypothesis 5 that policy analysis and the
policy-oriented learning it engenders will not by itself lead to changes
in the policy core of a coalition or public policy. Finally, they provide
some support for Hypotheses 6-9 that learning across coalitions is
more likely when an intermediate level of conflict is involved, when
the issues are analytically tractable, and when a professional forum
is utilised.
technical information played a critical
According to Barke (I993),
role in the Federal Communication Commission's ability to develop
uniform design standards for monochrome and color television sets in
the decades following World War II. This was facilitated by the
analytical tractability of the topic (Hypotheses 7-8), by the presence
of a classic professional forum (Hypothesis 9), and by an intermediate
level of conflict (Hypothesis 6). The stakes were sufficiently high

192
involving millions of dollars invested in competing technologies, to

encourage the various companies to spend substantial sums doing the
technical studies. On the other hand, this was not a conflict involving
the policy core: everyone acknowledged financial self-interest as a
legitimate goal and wanted the industry to come up with a uniform
standard which would be sanctioned by the FCC. There was no
alternative coalition arguing that color television represented a threat
to consumer safety or to the moral fiber of the nation.
Likewise, the Brown and Stewart (1993) analysis of airline deregulation clearly stressed the importance of the evidence developed by
economists in the 1950-70
period concerning the inefficiencies of entry
and fare restrictions set by the CAB. In Brown and Stewart's view,
however, the economists' evidence was not sufficient to produce a
change in the policy core from entry/fare regulation to deregulation.
Consistent with Hypothesis 5, major policy revision also required
several changes exogenous to the subsystem, including public concern
with inflation and the inefficiencies of regulation in general. These
were trumpeted by Presidents Ford and Carter, who in turn appointed
proponents of deregulation, notably Alfred Kahn, to the CAB. Kahn
then used ambiguities in the CAB's existing statutory mandate to
push deregulation wherever possible. This change so destabilized
major carriers such as United Airlines that they agreed to changes
in the law. Passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, a clear
change in the policy core, was also facilitated by political compromises
mitigating its adverse impacts on employee unions.
The Tahoe case likewise provides evidence of the use of technical
information, consistent with Hypothesis 3 of the ACF. The accumulation of scientific evidence indicating that erosion from development
had adverse effects on water quality was readily accepted by environmental groups and state/federal pollution control agencies but not by
most business owners, property rights advocates, and local government
officials. The most plausible interpretation is that these findings were
consistent with the policy core of the former coalition but threatened
the latter's adherence to economic development and property rights
(Sabatier and Brasher, 1993). In a high conflict situation such as
Tahoe, combatants tend to assume a siege mentality in which all
evidence put forth by opponents is highly suspect (Sabatier et al,
1987; Jenkins-Smith, I990).
On the other hand, the CAB case and the analysis of OCS leasing
by Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair suggest a new hypothesis concerning
policy-oriented learning:
Hypothesis il: Even when the accumulationof technical informationdoes
not change the views of the opposing coalition, it can have important impacts

on policy, at least in the short term, by alteringthe views of policy brokers
or other importantgovernmentalofficials.
In the case of OCS leasing, millions of dollars spent on environmental
impact studies during the I970S had little effect on the beliefs of
either oil companies or environmental groups (similar conclusions
were reached by Heintz, I988). But these studies apparently helped
convince Cecil Andrus, Secretary of the Interior under the Carter
Administration, that improvements in drilling techniques meant that
drilling posed far fewer environmental risks than he had previously
believed. Combined with the exogeneous shock from the 1979 oil
crisis, this led him to propose a greatly accelerated OCS leasing
program in I980. In general, when the policy dispute is characterized
by high technical complexity and intense political conflict, senior
agency officials, and legislative committee staff, can play a critical
role (Gormley, I987). Any learning they do may well have a significant
impact on public policy within the subsystem, even if the same
information is rejected by one of the competing coalitions. On the
other hand, learning by such critical individuals will have a lasting
impact on policy only if they are able to implement their views in
time.
E. ChangesExogenousto the Policy Subsystem

Hypothesis 5 of the ACF argues that changes in the policy core
attributes of public policy within a subsystem will not come about
solely because of activities internal to the subsystem, instead requiring
some exogenous shock which alters the resources and opportunities
of various coalitions.
The evidence presented in the cases reviewed here generally supports
this hypothesis. The clearest example was the influence of Quebec
separatism on francophone education in Ontario contributing to passage of the Federal Bill of Rights and Constitution Act (Mawhinney,
One could also cite the role of inflation and the 1974 and
1993).
1976 changes in Presidential Administration on the radical change
represented by the I978 Airline Deregulation Act (Brown and Stewart,
1993).
On a somewhat lesser scale, California water policy changed
from a clearly dominant Development Coalition in the I960S and
early 1970S to essentially -a stalemate by the end of that decade, in
large part because of the 1974 election of Jerry Brown as Governor
and the rise of oil prices and pumping costs following the 1973-74
Finally, the 1979 Iranian
and 1979-80 oil crises (Munro, 1993).
Revolution and subsequent oil crises provided substantial impetus

194
and Paul A. Sabatier

Hank C. Jenkins-Smith
to changes in the Carter Administration's policy on OCS leasing

(Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair, 1993).
On the other hand, the cases suggest two clarifications in the role
of exogenous events on policy change. First, both Brown and Stewart
and Mawhinney (I993) argue that exogenous events by them(I993)
selves do not directly and unambiguously alter the resources and
opportunities of subsystem actors. Instead, such events are interpreted
by subsystem actors and then exploited with greater or lesser skill.
Francophone school interests, for example, were particularly adept at
exploiting and fanning the flames of Quebec separatism in order to
achieve their policy objective. Thus Hypothesis 5 needs to be revised:
Hypothesis 5 (Revised):
Changingthe policy core attributesof a government
action program requires both(a) significant perturbationsexternal to the
subsystem(e.g. changesin socio-economicconditions,system-widegoverning
coalitions,or policy outputsfromother subsystems)and(b) exploitation
of those
opportunities
by the heretofore
minoritycoalitionwithin the subsystem.
The revised hypothesis makes it clear that, while external events

provide opportunities to make changes in the policy core of governmental programs, those opportunities must be interpreted and
exploited by the minority coalition if change is to be realized. Conversely, the majority coalition will seek to dampen the effects of such
opportunities by, for example, suggesting the need for further research,
confining change to small experimental projects, or diverting attention
to other issues.
Second, the ACF as presented in Sabatier (I988) accorded little
attention to elections - except to note that a change in the system-wide
governing coalition is one of the set of exogenous forces necessary for
changes in the policy core within a subsystem. This is essentially what
Burnham (1970) and other voting scholars have termed a 'realigning
election'. The basic argument concerning the need for system-wide
changes in a governing coalition as one of a set of necessary conditions
for substantial change in the policy core within a subsystem still
appears valid. In United States air pollution policy, for example, even
the 1980 election which replaced the pro-environment Carter with
anti-regulation Reagan in the White House created in the Senate the
first Republican majority since the 1950s, was not sufficient to produce
change in the policy core of federal air pollution policy. Members of
the environmental coalition still controlled the House floor and the
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. They were able
to block Reagan's attempts to amend the Clean Air Act in I98I and
then negated his attempts to use political appointees and budgetary
cuts to accomplish his objectives by publicizing the Burford-Lavelle
scandals (Cook and Wood, I989; Cohen, 1992).

On the other hand, elections which change critical actors, but not an
entire systemwide governing coalition, can still inaugurate important
changes in subsystem policies and, if combined with other factors,
even changes in the policy core of governmental programs. This is
particularly true of elections involving a chief executive with substantial appointment powers (Wood and Waterman, i99i). While most
political appointees probably raise barely a ripple within a subsystem
(Heclo, 1977), those who combine extensive knowledge of a subsystem
with technical and political skill can produce waves of some magnitude. Examples from the cases summarized here include President
Carter's appointments of Alfred Kahn as CAB Chair (airline
deregulation) and Cecil Andrus as Secretary of Interior (OCS leasing
policy), as well as Governor Brown's appointment of Ron Robie as
Director of the California Department of Water Resources (California
water policy). Kahn helped facilitate a change in the policy core of
airline regulation, while Andrus and Robie helped make less important, but still very significant, changes within their respective subsystems. Similarly, legislative elections which lead to changes in the
chairs of critical congressional committees can have very important
impacts on a subsystem even if there is no realigning election. For
example, the series of legislative elections in the early i960s which
resulted in the appointment of Sen. Edmund Muskie as chair of the
U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution led over the
next decade - in conjunction with the general growth of the environmental movement - to changes in the policy cores of federal air and
water pollution control policy (Davies, I970; Ingram,1978).

F. Beliefs vs. Interests:Does ImportanceVaiy by Typeof Coalition?
As described in Hypotheses 1-3, the ACF holds that common beliefs
rather than common interests constitute the fundamental glue holding
coalitions together. The two tend to covary, however, and disentangling them raises different methodological and theoretical issues.
Nevertheless, systematic analysis of the OCS case provides some
support for the argument that the relative importance of abstract
beliefs versus 'bottom line' self-interest may vary across types of
subsystem actors. The ACF holds that more general and abstract
policy core beliefs would be more resistant to change than the secondary aspects (Hypothesis 3). However, Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair
(I993) showed that the relative propensity of group representatives
to change stated beliefs varied systematically by type of group. Purposive groups (e.g., environmental groups) showed relatively little tendency to change stated positions regarding any of the beliefs measured.

I 96
Material interest groups (including trade associations and businesses

involved in OCS development), however, were just as resistant as
purposive groups to change their positions on the 'bottom line' issue
of the speed and breadth of OSC leasing, but much more likely to
change regarding the issues of the extent and severity of OCS regulations and the level of involvement of state and local governments
in shaping OCS policy.
There are at least two ways to view these findings. According to
one interpretation, the hierarchical structure of beliefs may adequately
describe representatives of purposive organizations, but not material
interest groups. Instead, material groups may operate on the basis of
an inverted hierarchy in which commitment to material self-interest
(profit) is primordial, with more abstract policy core beliefs (for
instance, commitment to local vs. national control) being adjusted
when necessary. The rationale for this distinction comes from the
application of exchange theory and principal/agent concepts to interest
groups (Salisbury, I969; Moe, 1980; 1984). Because purposive groups
rely on members' commitment to a broad platform of policy positions,
typically based on a specific ideology, they are very reluctant to
change any part of that belief system. On the other hand, members
of material groups are preoccupied with bottom line material benefits
and willing to allow group leaders to say almost anything to obtain
them. If so, we would expect the stated beliefs of representatives of
material groups to be more fluid than those of purposive groups and
more conducive to the formation of 'coalitions of convenience' containing members with very different beliefs.
An alternative interpretation would argue that profit (or market
share or return to shareholders) is the principal, publicly acknowledged
goal of broad scope of the petroleum companies and other material
groups, and thus part of their policy core. In OCS policy, the extent
of leasing is usually a means for profit. By this interpretation, the
fundamental value priorities in the policy core that operate across the
entire subsystem are still the most stable aspect of a group's belief
system. Belief systems are still hierarchically organized. Instead of
abstract beliefs constraining more specific ones, it is fundamental goals
operating across the entire subsystem that constrain implementing
devices and perceptions of system states and causal relationships which
are narrower in scope. Thus the basic argument of Hypothesis 3 can
be maintained; all that is jettisoned is the assumption borrowed from
Converse (I964) and Peffley and Hurwitz (1985) that abstractbeliefs
constrain specific ones. Instead, it is basic goals of wide scope that
constrain secondary beliefs of narrower scope.

I 97
III The ACF: An Assessment to Date
Table 2 summarizes our assessment of the implications of the six

cases for the explicit hypotheses of the advocacy coalition framework.
The cases generally support the ACF, except for the Barke (i993)
analysis of the FCC is silent on many of the items because it focused
on the relatively narrow topic of policy-oriented learning within the
agency rather than a broader analysis of policy change in
telecommunications.
Scholars are interested in understanding the world. This requires
conceptual frameworks or paradigms to help tell them what is likely
to be importantand what can be ignored. (Kuhn, 1970; Brown, I977;

Lakatos, 1978). It is time for a paradigm shift in the way that political
scientists view the policy process. The stages heuristic has outlived
its usefulness. It has been subjected to telling criticisms by 'bottom
up' implementation scholars (Berman, I978; Barrett and Fudge, I98I;
Hjern and Porter, I98I; Sabatier, I986; Nakamura, 1987). Moreover,
it has severe conceptual limitations, the most important of which is
that it does not specify a limited set of coherent causal forces that
move the process within and across stages.
Among several candidate frameworks to replace the stages heuristic
(see Sabatier, I99I), we find the advocacy coalition framework to be
particularly appealing. For one thing, it appears to meet the requirements of a viable causal theory (Lave and March, 1975):
(i) It has twoprimagy
forcesof causalchange:
(a) the values of coalitionmembers
and (b) exogenous shocks to the subsystem.
In fact, several of the proposed hypotheses have
(2) It is testable/falsifiable.
had to be revised as a result of the cases.
andfertile, i.e. it produces a relatively large
(3) It is relatively
parsimonious
numberof interestingpredictionsper assumption(although this is certainly
subject to contention).
results.
(4) It may produce some surprising
(5) It has the potential for contributingto a better world by helping policy
activists understanda very complexprocessand by showing how individuals
with solid informationcan make a differenceover time.
In addition, the cases presented here and elsewhere (Heintz, I988;
Weyent, I988; Lester and Hamilton, I988; Davis and Davis, I988;
Jenkins-Smith, I990; I99I; Stewart, I99I; Asmerom et al, I992; van
Muijen, I993) indicate that the ACF can usefully be applied to a
wide variety of policy domains and political systems. All except perand van Nuijen (1993) have found the evidence
haps Stewart (i99i)
to be generally supportive of the framework.

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200
The ACF still needs to be fleshed out conceptually in several critical

areas, most notably the range of 'guidance instruments' available and
the factors affecting their use (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 227230).
Several scholars have begun to deal both conceptually and
empirically with coalition behavior, i.e. the extent to which people
with similar beliefs interact with each other and the factors which
encourage and impede such interaction (Gustilo and Sabatier, 1992;
Schlager, 1994). In conclusion, the advocacy coalition framework represents a long-term research program in the sense described by Lakatos
(1978).
NOTES
I.
2.
With the exception of the co-authors (Anne Brasher and Gil St. Clair) of our two chapters,
none of the chapter authors are our graduate students or otherwise indebted to us. All of
the chapters contain both praise and criticisms of the ACF, and have resulted in several
revisions of the framework.
Neutrality here does not refer to the absence of political party affiliation but rather to the
absence of substantive policy preferences in the agency's public domain. The traditional
wisdom views Britain as the paradigm of a neutral civil service. But the script from a i992
BBC episode of 'Yes, Minister', entitled 'The Bed of Nails', reveals a deft skepticism regarding
that portrait:
Minister: All these cabinet undersecretaries, they're civil servants. They're supposedly part
of the Government, but they behave like counsel, briefed by various transport interests, to
defeat the Government.
Civil Servant: That's how the civil service works in practice. Each department is controlled
by the people it's supposed to be controlling. . . Energy lobbies for the oil companies, Defense
lobbies for the aerospace industry, the Home Office lobbies for the police...
Granted, this is satire, but there are obviously people in Britain who do not accept the
image of neutral civil servants. Our experience with English countryside planners indicates
that they have a very coherent ideology and are, in fact, far less policy-neutral than their
French counterparts (Sabatier and Wertheimer, 1993).
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