TURKS AND ARABS

Tarek Osman
September 17, 2014

The United States, supported by several European countries, is trying to build an alliance to confront the
jihadist group, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The success of that alliance, and of any chance to
address the chaos unfolding in the eastern Mediterranean, rests on the cooperation of the two powers
with direct stakes in the region and the ability to influence events on the ground: on one side, Turkey; on
the other, the alliance emerging between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt.
The Arab-Turkish relationship has been fraught for centuries, and often the personal has blurred with the
public. Now, Turkish positioning in the region seems opposed to the alliance between these three
countries. This informal coalition is trying to preserve the regional order of the last four decades, which
they see as under attack from various forces including political Islam. Turkeys ruling party, the Islamist
AKP,
is
sympathetic
to
the
leading
forces
of
that
trend.
Turkeys relationship with these three influential Arab countries is likely to remain stressed, especially
with the election of Recep Tayyip Erdoan as president of the republic and the elevation of
AhmetDavutolu, Turkeys former foreign minister and a key architect of its regional strategy, to prime
minister.
The two sides have conflicting understandings of what the Arab uprisings of the past three years have
heralded. Turkeys leaders see the uprisings as revolutions against corrupt, autocratic regimes; reformists
spearheaded the revolts, and therefore must be supported. The leaders of the influential Arab countries
regard the changes that these uprisings have unleashed as perils to the social fabric, identities, and
national security of their countries. They believe that by thwarting this wave of change, they have saved
their
countries
from
the
chaos
currently
raging
across
the
region.
In particular, the two sides also see political Islam differently. Turkeys AKP represents a type of modern
Islamism that evolved within the confines of the highly secular Kamalist Turkish state. Drawing on the
experience of Turkish Islamists, the AKP was careful to strike a balance between widening and deepening
its support in Turkeys pious and conservative Anatolian hinterland as well as the lower middle class
neighborhoods of the countrys sprawling citiesall while not ruffling the sensitivities of the secular
middle and upper-middle classes. The AKPs strategy was successful in using Islam as an overarching
cultural and social frame of reference; religious orientation was not used as a political doctrine, restriction
on
economic
activities,
or
as
a
social
identity.
In several Arab countries, most notably Egypt, forces of political Islam have antagonized wide segments of
their societies by imposing their version of Islamism on political, economic, and social life. And when they
came to powersuch as during former President Mohammed Morsis year in powerIslamists were not
savvy enough to realize that enforcing an overly religious rhetoric and worldview on their societies would
trigger
a
tsunami
of
anger,
even
from
pious
social
groups.
These subtle but crucial differences between the Turkish and Arab experiences were lost amid the
tumultuous developments that took place in the Arab world in the last two years. Turkish leaders did not
appreciate the gravity of the mistake that some Arab Islamists have committed. And influential Arab
regimes did not comprehend the prism from which Turkey saw the developments in their countries.
Local frustrations exacerbate this tension. Turkeys foreign policy in the region was based on zero
problems with its neighbors, economic and cultural expansion in the Arab world, and its gradual
emergence as a political and economic role model for the Arab world. This policy was not only supposed
to compensate for Turkeys painfully slow progress in the European Union accession process; it was a
strategic reorientation of the countrys place in the world. But in the last three years, and with the

exception of the immense success that Turkish drama has achieved in the Arab world, all of these
objectives have failed. And there is a sense, prevalent within the AKPs leading circles, that Arab antipathy
toward a leading Turkish role in the region contributed to this failure. On the other side, the Arabs
recognize that they confront extremely difficult challengessocio-economic in Egypt, demographic in the
UAE, and political and dynastic in Saudi Arabiathat pose colossal dangers to their countries. To Arab
leaders, Turkeys support for forces that they deem perilous and that are bent on affecting a major
transformation in the Arab world is a challenge from a large and powerful counterpart.
And then there are personal perceptions. Turkeys AKP leaders see themselves as experienced politicians
who have built their credibility from the bottom up through successes at local, municipal, and national
elections. They regard the Gulfs dynastic political system, and the decisive role that the military
establishments play in different Arab countries, as the antithesis of their experience. Whether dictated by
royal palaces or national security councils, top-down politics reminds Turkish Islamists of 1980s Turkey
under General Kenan Evren, a period in which the Islamists were aggressively excluded from politics.
From the perspective of the Egyptian and Gulf leaders, the AKPs Turkey has been trying, for almost a
decade, to build a modern version of the Ottoman Empire, in which Istanbul has direct political,
economic, and cultural influence over North Africa, parts of the eastern Mediterranean, and gradually the
Gulf. This evokes old, entrenched, and for most Arabs, distasteful memories of Turkish rule in the Arab
world.
Misunderstanding ultimately leads to aversion. When the stakes are high, aversion leads to conflict. There
will not be a military confrontation between Turkey and the large Arab countries. But the more the
interests of both sides diverge, the higher the likelihood that a regional cold war would commence. This
could result in several low-intensity wars, fought through proxies. We are already witnessing
confrontations, in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and to a lesser extent Lebanon, in which fighting groups seek the
favor of different regional powers. A rise in the tension between, on one side, Istanbul, and on the other
Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi, could significantly fuel these confrontations, and waste a lot of resources.
Aversion takes a long time to change. But geopolitics was never about personal tastes. Emerging threats
compel the Arabs and Turks to cooperate. The eastern Mediterranean, the region that separates Turkey
from North Africa and the Gulf, is undergoing a transformation unprecedented since the end of World
War One and the Sykes-Picot agreement that created its countries. This transformation has given rise to a
state of fluidity in which disruptive forces (such as the Islamic State), sectarian powers (such as hardliner
Sunni and Shiite groups), and political adventurers (of which there are many in the eastern
Mediterranean) are trying to carve for themselves areas of influence. These forces are wilfully
dismembering
the
eastern
Mediterranean.
Not only will countries slowly but certainly divide along sectarian and ethnic lines; there will increasingly
be major demographic shifts. For example, the communities that reside in the plains extending from
eastern Syria to western Iraq are gradually moving to refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, and
to shantytowns surrounding Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Istanbul, and Tripoli. Major infrastructure projects
especially water, energy, and transportation projectswill be acutely disrupted. The eastern
Mediterranean, as a market, will be decimated. And the rise in jihadism and sectarianism will resonate
with
local
fissures
in
Turkey,
North
Africa,
and
the
Gulf.
And then there is international intervention. These perils and shifts are already drawing in the U.S., and
to a lesser extent Europe, to try to douse these dangers and mould the regions future. And as we have
seen from previous foreign interventions, when the going inevitably gets tough, the international powers
will withdraw, leaving the countries of the region to confront the consequences.
Experience in the last three years, especially in Iraq, Libya, and Syria, have made it amply clear that
flaring situations could not be controlled. Known and unknown unknowns materialize, steer events in
different directions, and disrupt carefully devised plans. Fighting groups divide, turn against old allies,
and rarely obey the directions of their foreign masters. As such, Turkey and the influential Arab countries
should avoid the temptation of fighting proxy-wars through pawns on the ground. They should work

together now, rather than wait to live with the ghosts of the ruins that will be left from the coming
destruction.