Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 17

Application of Res-judicata on Arbitral Award

Arbitration as a Method of Dispute Resolution in India

As an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, the arbitration provides speedier settlement of
commercial disputes, whether domestic or international in character. In the wake of globalization
of trade and commerce and also for effective implementation of economic reforms in 1990s, a
new Arbitration Law based upon the Model Arbitration Law formulated by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) was passed by the Indian Parliament
repealing the earlier laws on the subject of arbitration. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, besides giving statutory recognition to the conciliation, provides for the constitution of the
arbitral tribunal to conduct the arbitral proceedings and making of the award in case of both the
domestic and international commercial arbitrations. The award made by the arbitral tribunal is
final and binding upon the parties and is enforceable as a decree of a Civil Court. An important
question pertinent in this regard is whether the doctrine of res judicata as enshrined under the
Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 is applicable to the final award of the arbitral tribunal, which is
not under a strict compulsion to follow the strict procedure stipulated in the Code of Civil
Procedure. This article is an endeavour to analyse the applicability of the rule of res judicata to
the arbitration awards in India.

1 | Page

Arbitration is in no way a modern concept, nevertheless it has been well thought-out on the more
systematic and scientific patterns, expressed in new clear and elaborative terms and providing
wide-ranging resolution in recent years than before. Though its genus can be traced back to the
elemental method of village panchayats widespread in primordial India, the complexities of trade
and commerce in the country and the cross-border trading with nationals of other countries
demanded more systematic approach acceptable to the parties to dispute in such commercial
transactions. Besides, the litigation process, which was quite dilatory and costly affair, parties
often resorted to alternative dispute resolution methods. The question of enforceability of the
decisions by such mechanisms, however, was a very unmanageable issue that compelled the
parties to knock the doors of the courts. The arbitration as a method of dispute settlement was
resorted to by the English merchants and traders. In India, the earlier laws relating to arbitration
were based on the English Arbitration Laws and the first statutory enactment on arbitration law
was the Indian Arbitration Act of 1899, which was not a complete code in itself and extended to
the matters that were not before a court of law for adjudication. Besides, the provisions relating
to arbitration could be found in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, which was repealed later on
by the Act of 1882 that was further replaced by Code of Civil Procedure of 1908. In 1940,
however, the law on arbitration was consolidated and redrafted on the pattern of the English
Arbitration Act of 1934. However, due to the globalization in the fields of trade and commerce,
the Arbitration Act of 1940 proved to be inadequate in meeting the requirements of both the
domestic and international commercial disputes. The Arbitration Act of 1940 was repealed by the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter, the Act). This Act marks the beginning of a
significant era in the history of legal and judicial reforms in India. Besides conciliation and the
matters connected to it, the Act aims to consolidate and amend the law relating to domestic
arbitration, international commercial arbitration and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. The
Act is in conformity with the Model Arbitration Law framed by the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), especially to address international commercial
disputes. The Act minimizes the supervisory role of the courts by allowing the appointment of
arbitrators and leaving all the contentious issues to be decided in arbitration in accordance with
the terms of the arbitration agreement between the parties.

2 | Page


Settlement of disputes through arbitration is a statutory right and where not prohibited by any
other law in force in India, it can be resorted to by the parties by entering into a contract
containing arbitration clause in it or by making a separate arbitration agreement in accordance
with Section 7 (2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. By the arbitration agreement,
which is either in the form of a contractual clause or as a separate agreement, the parties may
submit all or certain disputes that have arisen or may arise between them in respect of defined
legal relationship, whether contractual or not (Section 7(1) of the Act). On account of validity of
the arbitration agreement, thecannot intervene into matters of arbitration as they have been
prohibited under section 5 of the Act. Rather the courts are under an obligation to refer the
parties to arbitration in terms of their arbitration agreement under section 8 of the Act (Paranjape,
2011, p. 95- 96). Additionally, the court is under the duty to refer the parties to arbitration under
Section 8 of the Act where on one hand one of the parties has to the court for settlement of the
dispute despite the existence of the valid arbitration agreement with the other party to the
dispute, and the subject matter of action before the courts is the same as that of the arbitration
agreement, and on the other hand the other party before submitting his first statement on the
substance of the dispute, makes an application to the court for referring the matter to arbitration
(Kurlwal, 2011, p. 277). The word matter in Section 8 refers to the entire subject matter of
arbitration agreement and the court does not allow the division of the cause of action, that is, one
to be decided by the court and the other to be decided by way of arbitration, as was made clear
by the Supreme Court in the case of Sukanya Holding (P) Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya & another,
AIR 2003 SC 2252. Besides that the court cannot stay the arbitral proceedings and the same
terminates either with the final award of the arbitral tribunal or by an order of termination of the
arbitral proceedings made by the tribunal in pursuance of Sub-Section (2) of Section 32 of the

3 | Page


Unless, the parties determine the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in the course
of proceedings, Section 19 of the Arbitration Conciliation Act 1996 gives the discretion to the
arbitral tribunal to determine its rules of procedure, whereby it is not under an obligation to
follow the procedure contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or the Indian Evidence Act,
1872. Based upon such agreement between the parties or the determination of the arbitral
tribunal, the tribunal follows the procedure and resolves the dispute and makes either an interim
award, which is also the part of the award, and in the end gives a final award with mandate of the
arbitral tribunal comes to an end. After the termination of the proceedings of the arbitral tribunal,
the question which arises is whether the reference for the second time on the same dispute to
arbitration is barred by the principle of arbitration? It is true that the courts in India often
encounter the problem of application of doctrine of res judicata in an award made by the arbitral
tribunal. In order to find a solution to this problem, it is imperative to comprehend the concept of
res judicata and its application to a suit before the law court.
Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure embodies the doctrine of res judicata, which has a
wide application and extends to the arbitration awards besides litigation, since the award of the
arbitral tribunal has same applicability as the decree of a Civil Court. Section 11 of the Code of
Civil Procedure provides: No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and
substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the
same parties, or between


Alternative Dispute Resolution is an attempt to devise machinery which should be capable of
providing an alternative to the conventional methods of resolving disputes. In India the origin of
Alternative Dispute Resolution can be traced back to the interiors of rural India. Bodies such as
the Panchayat, a group of elders and influential persons in a village deciding the dispute between
villagers are not uncommon even today. Under the Principles of Muslim law in the Indian culture
the Kazi was the designated judicial officer who decided disputes between individuals. There are
many recorded instances where the kazi has decided a case beyond the law by getting the
disputants to agree to a solution that has been arrived at by conciliation, without actually giving
4 | Page

that colour to the decision. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is an attempt by
Parliament to take a holistic approach to alternative dispute resolution in India. It is an act
permitting the settlement of dispute either through Arbitration or through Conciliation.

The doctrine of res judicata can come into play in relation to international arbitration in a variety
of ways. In the context of a discussion devoted to Post-award issues, res judicata is relevant
only insofar as it relates to the effects of arbitral awards. In this connection, the issues that arise
are whether a given arbitral award has res judicata effect in the same arbitration (in which case
the question is that of the effects of partial or interim awards in subsequent phases of the same
arbitration), in other arbitrations (whether or not based on the same arbitration agreement) and in
proceedings before domestic courts. Other aspects of the doctrine which do not involve the
effects of awards, and are therefore beyond the scope of this discussion, are the res judicata
effects in arbitral or in domestic court proceedings of judgments of domestic courts which deal
with arbitration (for instance a finding of nullity or inapplicability of an arbitration agreement)
and the res judicata effects in arbitration proceedings of national judgments on issues of

Arbitration, a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), is a legal technique for the resolution
of disputes outside the courts, where the parties to a dispute refer it to one or more persons (the
"arbitrators", "arbiters" or "arbitral tribunal"), by whose decision (the "award") they agree to be
bound. It is a settlement technique in which a third party reviews the case and imposes a decision
that is legally binding for both sides. Other forms of ADR include mediation (a form of
settlement negotiation facilitated by a neutral third party) and non-binding resolution by experts.
Arbitration is often used for the resolution of commercial disputes, particularly in the context of
international commercial transactions. The use of arbitration is also frequently employed in
consumer and employment matters, where arbitration may be mandated by the terms of
employment or commercial contracts.

5 | Page

Arbitration can be either voluntary or mandatory (although mandatory arbitration can only come
from a statute or from a contract that is voluntarily entered into, where the parties agree to hold
all disputes to arbitration, without knowing, specifically, what disputes will ever occur) and can
be either binding or non-binding. Non-binding arbitration is, on the surface, similar to mediation.
However, the principal distinction is that whereas a mediator will try to help the parties find a
middle ground on which to compromise, the (non-binding) arbitrator remains totally removed
from the settlement process and will only give a determination of liability and, if appropriate, an
indication of the quantum of damages payable.

Arbitration is a proceeding in which a dispute is resolved by an impartial adjudicator whose

decision the parties to the dispute have agreed, or legislation has decreed, will be final and
binding. Arbitration is not the same as:
# Judicial proceedings, although in some jurisdictions, court proceedings are sometimes referred
as arbitrations.
# Alternative dispute resolution (or ADR)
# Expert determination.
# Mediation.

Res Judicata: Whether Applicable in Arbitral Proceedings? :

Arbitration Agreement:
What amounts to an arbitration agreement and its essential requirements etc. have been dealt
with under Sec. 7. Some ticklish issues that arose and the judicial decisions thereon are
considered as:

6 | Page

(1). Arbitration agreement during the pendency of appeal- Section 8 if attracted?

During the pendency of an appeal before the Supreme Court of India all the parties entered into
an arbitration agreement to refer their disputes in appeal to a retired Judge of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court observed:

The question that arises for consideration is whether this Court in appeal can refer the parties to
Arbitrator under the new Act. Section 8 reads: A judicial authority before which an action is
brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shallrefer the parties to
The Supreme Court observed:
In our view, the phrase which is the subject of an arbitration agreement does not; in the context
necessarily require that the agreement must be already in existence before the action is brought
in the court. The phrase also connotes an arbitration agreement being brought into agreement
while action is pending.

According to Blacks Law Dictionary: The word is as follows:

This word, although normally referring to the present, often has a future meaning, but is not
synonymous with shall have been. It may have, however, a past signification, as in the sense of
has been. It was held that in the circumstances the appellate court can refer the matter to

Res Judicata:
Where a second reference was made, the dispute for the same having arisen after the first
reference, the second reference was held to be not barred by res judicata.

7 | Page

The issues which are yet to be answered:

The point of departure of the discussion is the existence of a broad consensus that arbitral
awards, like judgments of national courts, have res judicata effect. It is often even said that res
judicata is a general principle of law recognized by civilized nations within the meaning of
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice7. Important as this finding may be,
it is not particularly helpful because the consensus does not go much further.
Indeed, most of the crucial issues relevant for the solution of concrete problems remain open.
To list just the main questions that arise in this connection, there is uncertainty even as to the
legal basis of res judicata in relation to awards in international arbitration. There are then
fundamental questions as to the scope of the doctrine, and specifically the reach of the preclusive
(negative) and conclusive (positive) effects of an arbitral award, i.e. the extent to which it
prevents the relitigation of matters coming within the scope of an arbitration and the extent to
which the effects of the award can be relied upon in different contexts.
A further question is whether the res judicata effect of an award applies only to the dispositive
part of the award or also to the reasoning. Furthermore, does res judicata operate only when the
triple identity test often mentioned in this connection (same parties, cause of action and subject
matter) is satisfied? Does it cover all matters that could or should (by the exercise of due
diligence and good faith) have been raised before the court in support of the claims brought in
the earlier proceedings (this situation is sometimes referred to as the obligation of
concentration)? How does one assess which matters ought to have been pleaded in support of the
claims? Do awards on jurisdiction and interim or partial awards have res judicata effects? Who is
bound by the res judicata effect of an arbitral award? As of when is the award res judicata? Is the
effect conditional upon the award being, or having been declared, enforceable? Are there
situations where res judicata does not apply? Does res judicata operate across different legal
orders (e.g. can a judgment rendered under public international law or in an investment
arbitration be res judicata in a commercial arbitration or vice versa)? What are the consequences
of the failure to attribute the requisite res judicata effect to an arbitral award?

8 | Page

Must, or can, res judicata of an award be raised by arbitrators of their own motion?
The answers to most of these questions are far from settled.
The shortcomings of domestic law:
A possible starting point in the quest for the solutions to the issues pointed to above is Obviously
domestic law. And indeed, as will be discussed below, domestic courts and arbitral tribunals
often do resort to domestic law to deal with the problem. However, national laws are not
necessarily helpful nor do they provide the ideal solution. This is because, firstly, not all national
laws deal explicitly with the effect of arbitral awards and, moreover, those that do, do so in fairly
general terms. They usually do not go much beyond the proposition that arbitral awards have res
judicata effects or that arbitral awards have the same effects as court judgments. Similar, but
equally rather unhelpful, statements about the binding effect of awards appear in the rules of
certain arbitral institutions. Most national laws contain fairly elaborate statutory or other rules on
this problem. The trouble is that they relate almost exclusively to the effects of the judgments of
the courts of the forum, and not of arbitral awards and are therefore not necessarily particularly
suitable when it comes to assessing the effect of arbitral awards. This is because an award differs
considerably from a judgment, since the authority of the former stems in the first instance from
the autonomy of the parties, whilst the latter is determined directly, and exclusively, by the law

The complexity increases when it comes to the effects of arbitral awards in international
situations, where to the extent that an analogy can be drawn between arbitration and court
judgments the analogy is with the effects of foreign judgments. Now, the rules governing the
res judicata effect of foreign judgments are far from well settled.

To all this must be added that, in any event, the approaches of individual national legal systems
differ considerably from one another. At the risk of serious generalization, continental legal
systems tend to adopt a more formalistic approach, which essentially limits res judicata to the
dispositive part of the decision and sets considerable emphasis on the triple identity test.
Common law systems, on the other hand, follow a more open and pragmatic approach which
9 | Page

extends the res judicata to cover not only claim preclusion (or cause of action estoppel) but also
issue preclusion (or issue estoppel). Even legal systems belonging to the same family can
provide for significantly divergent results.
This poses a dual problem. On the one hand, even were it appropriate to rely on principles
governing the res judicata effects of court judgments, the diverging approaches of national laws
make it difficult to identify significant common principles, beyond very general concepts, and
consequently to derive from those systems any meaningful principles having universal validity.
Consequently, applying one law rather than another may lead to dissimilar results, which is a
questionable outcome when dealing with arbitration and with its effects that should ideally
always be assessed in the same way.
Relying on national law often raises another equally intractable problem, viz. identifying
appropriate conflict of laws rules to determine which national law governs the res judicata effects
of an award. There are, in fact, no generally accepted conflict rules on the subject. As recalled
above, even in relation to the res judicata effect of foreign judgments the conflict principles are
not settled. When it comes to determining the res judicata effect of an arbitral award, several
different laws could conceivably be relevant. Among the ones that spring to mind are (i) the lex
arbitri of the award whose effects are invoked; (ii) the lex arbitri of the second arbitration or the
lex fori of the court, depending on whether the award is invoked in arbitration or before a State
court; (iii) the substantive law governing the rights at issue.
None of these solutions unquestionably recommends itself over the others, nor are any
particularly satisfactory. Even the one which relies on the lex arbitri has significant drawbacks.
Of course the seat is an important connecting factor in arbitration, principally because its courts
have supervisory jurisdiction and jurisdiction on the validity of the award. However, in
international arbitration the links to the seat are often rather weak and random, as a result of
which the claim of its law to govern matters relating to the arbitration is often fairly arbitrary.

In any event, to the extent that it makes sense to refer to it, the law of the seat is more suitable to
govern issues concerning the functioning of the arbitration. Notwithstanding that in national
10 | P a g e

legal systems it is often considered an issue of procedure, in the international context the force of
res judicata of the award is a matter that pertains to the conceptual framework and underpinnings
of arbitration and which, as will be mentioned below, is affected by the international obligations
of States in relation to the effects of awards. Moreover, relying on the law of the seat of the
arbitration may lead to unpredictable results, since the rules applying to the res judicata effect of
the award are not usually amongst the questions that parties consider when choosing the seat.
Finally, it is debatable whether, if reference is had to the lex arbitri, this should be to the one of
the first or of the second arbitration, when the question is whether an award can have res judicata
effects in arbitration.

No given law, including the lex arbitri, thus has a particularly strong claim to govern the matter.
In any event, the trend in international arbitration is in the direction of moving away from too
much reliance on conflicts of laws approach in the identification of the solutions to key problems
affecting the structure, the nature and the functioning of the arbitration, as is clearly the one of
the effects of an award. In this respect the situation is unlike the one prevailing in relation to the
merits of the dispute, for which the tendency is for the most part to apply national law following
a conflicts of law approach, albeit not necessarily the same one that would be applied by national
courts. The conflict of laws problem does not always have the same relevance from a practical
point of view. If the transnational nature of the arbitration is not very pronounced, or simply
when the arbitration is closely related to a single legal system or to legal systems which share
common approaches and concepts, the need to engage in a sophisticated analysis to identify the
law which should govern the issue may be less pressing. This still leaves open the problem that,
not being arbitration-specific, the national rules which are applied are not ideally suited to this
institution and that different awards may be treated differently depending on the law applied to
assess their effects.

11 | P a g e

The approach of national courts:

Having seen the drawbacks of the application of national law to govern the res judicata effects of
international awards, one can examine more closely the attitude of national courts and of arbitral
tribunals. Those attitudes may not necessarily be the same, even though that might be
undesirable or not entirely satisfactory. Ideally the effects, in particular from the perspective of
res judicata, of an international arbitral award should remain the same, regardless of whether
they are considered by a State court or by another arbitral tribunal. National courts will more
often than not be tempted to assess the res judicata effects of awards simply applying rules
mirroring those of their own legal system that govern the res judicata of domestic judgments.

This approach is probably not justified even for domestic awards, due to the difference between
arbitral awards and domestic judgments. The reference by national courts to concepts of
domestic law, including their own, is questionable, and particularly unsatisfactory, when it comes
to international arbitration. This solution appears even more questionable if one considers that in
this context there is an international source, i.e. the New York Convention that plays a paramount
role. Although the Convention does not address res judicata directly or expressly, the obligation
for States to recognize arbitral awards as binding .

Since the obligation derives from an international convention, regard must be had in its
application to the principles of construction of international treaties laid down by the 1969
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties which postulates that regard must be had, inter alia, to
the object and purpose of the treaty (Article 31, para. 1). These considerations militate in
favour of an autonomous and relatively broad approach to res judicata in relation to arbitral
awards even before national courts, which would seem to go beyond the narrow and formalistic
notions that traditionally apply in continental systems. In other words, the international
framework aimed to ensure the effects and the circulation of arbitral awards requires municipal
courts to focus on the effet utile, and therefore on the proper functioning of the mechanism,
primarily having due regard to the underlying assumptions of the parties agreement to arbitrate.
Admittedly even this only provides general guidance and does not directly resolve the question
12 | P a g e

of how res judicata effects are to be gauged in specific situations. A broad notion of the res
judicata effects of arbitral awards has been adopted by the French courts, independently of the
New York Convention, in a recent case that upheld the obligation of concentration.

Approach of arbitral tribunals:

The possible approaches:
Although not directly bound by the New York Convention, it would seem natural that arbitral
tribunals adopt an approach which is at least in part different from that of domestic courts.
One reason is that it is more in the nature of arbitrators to attribute paramount importance to the
will of the parties, given that this is the primary source of arbitration, rather than to abstract rules
on the effects of judicial decisions. In so doing they may consider the purported, or even the
actual, intention both of the parties to the first arbitration as to the effects of the outcome of that
arbitration, as well as of the parties to the second arbitration as to the effects of the first award
within that arbitration.
Another reason for the likely difference in approach of international arbitrators compared to
national judges is the fact that, while the latter are immersed in the perspective of their lex fori,
arbitrators, who have no lex fori, may find it appropriate to shy away from a rigid application of
national law in matters having to do with the functioning and with the structure and essence of
arbitration, as opposed to pure issues of merits. As indicated above, in those matters arbitrators
are generally more inclined to apply a flexible and substance-oriented approach which does not
give prominent weight to formalities often typical of national law. There is a further factor that
may influence the attitude of arbitrators confronted with res judicata issues, allowing them to
shift away from a strict application of domestic notions and to develop more pragmatic and
issue-oriented solutions. Since the application of the principle is irrefutably a question of law, the
scope for court review of the way in which the arbitrators have dealt with the issue in the award
at the annulment and enforcement stage is fairly limited.

13 | P a g e

This does not mean that arbitrators are free to disregard the principle altogether or to apply it
arbitrarily. Nevertheless, given that in most legal systems the application of legal principles by
the arbitrators is not a ground for review of the award, the application of the principle of res
judicata can attract the sanction of setting aside or refusal of enforcement only if it falls within
one of the few possibly relevant grounds. The most obvious one is public policy. However, even
if it is held that res judicata is one of the tenets of public policy, as is certainly arguable, it is
probably only the unjustified or idiosyncratic disregard of the principle that could fall foul of
public policy. The other conceivable grounds to fault the application of res judicata are the
violation of the arbitrators mission and due process, but these too will be available only in
exceptional circumstances.
The upshot is that seldom will it be possible to contest a given application of the doctrine,
whether broad or restrictive, provided it is reasonably argued. This means that arbitrators in
practice have a considerable leeway to apply the principle as they see fit in light of the
circumstances, and in keeping with broader principles relevant to the nature of arbitration, and
without undue deference to national conceptions. Empirical evidence shows that arbitrators
frequently refer to the applicability of res judicata axiomatically, without engaging in particularly
elaborate discussions on the underpinnings and on the scope of the doctrine.
An authoritative survey of arbitral case-law bears out that such a case-by-case and pragmatic
approach is followed also with regard to the res judicata effects of previous awards, which, as
mentioned above, is precisely a matter that pertains to the conception of arbitration as an
international dispute settlement instrument. In many of the awards discussed in the survey, even
when arbitrators state their need to rely on principles of national law, this sometimes appears like
lip service to a traditional conception. Some arbitral jurisprudence displays a constructive and
non-formalistic approach to the issue, placing considerable emphasis on principles such as good
faith, party autonomy and the scope and effects of the arbitration agreement, consistency and
non-contradiction, estoppel, concentration of issues and claims, expectations of the parties, effet
utile, efficiency and procedural economy and prohibition of procedural abuse. Thus, even when
the issue is debated in a framework of continental legal systems there is a tendency to follow an
approach which recognizes a fairly broad scope to the doctrine of res arbitrate. As always with
arbitral practice, it is difficult to know exactly how widespread any particular approach is and
14 | P a g e

whether one may be in the presence of a significant uniformity or trend. Also with regard to the
present topic one may suspect that there is a considerable variety of solutions. It is for example
probably fair to assume that the extent to which arbitrators will be prompted to depart from a
strict construction of res judicata according to the conceptions of a given national law may also
be a function of the degree of trans nationality of the arbitration and of the underlying dispute.
Applicability of Res Judicata: Supreme Court of India decision vis--vis Issue before
London Court:
The Delhi High Court (Delhi HC) in the instant case of Union of India (Plaintiff) v.
Videocon Industries Limited (Defendant) granted an anti-suit injunction in favour of the
Plaintiff, passing an order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant from pursuing the
claim before Commercial Court, London. The Delhi HC held that re-initiation of proceedings
before the London Courts was oppressive and abuse of the process of law and in violation of the
doctrine of res judicata and issue estoppel.

15 | P a g e

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 governs arbitration, whether domestic or
international commercial arbitrations, and is in compliance with Model Arbitration Law framed
by the UNCITRAL. In all the cases of domestic arbitration and also where the seat of arbitral
tribunal is in India in case of the international commercial arbitration, the doctrine of res
judicata, which is a codified principle under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908,
would apply. Its application to arbitration bars the further reference to arbitration on the same
dispute. Where all the disputes referred to arbitration are decided, then no second award can be
made again on the ground that an arbitration agreement to refer the dispute to arbitration still
exists between the parties. The same is not permissible where all the disputes have been decided
as the arbitration agreement merges with the final award. However, where some of the matters
were not raised earlier, the doctrine of constructive res judicata would have no application, as the
law governing arbitration is based upon a mutual contract between the parties to refer the dispute
to arbitration, the same cannot be barred by the doctrine of constructive res judicata. The doctrine
of res judicata also has no application to the interim awards made by the arbitral tribunal, but
have application only to the final award.

16 | P a g e

1. Section 11. Civil Procedure Code 1908. (2012, August 10).Retrieved from Vakil No 1. com.
Retrieved from: www.vakilno1.com. | 2.
Law- in- Perspective. Constructive Res judicata: The law re-visited. (2012,June10) Retrieved
from: http://legalperspectives.blogspot.
in/2010/03/constructive-res-judicata-law-revisited.html | 3. Kurlwal, Dr. Anupam, (1st ed.).
(2011). An Introduction to Alternative Dispute
Resolution System (ADR). Allahabad: Central Law Agency. | 4. Paranjape, Dr. N.V., (4th ed.).
(2011). Law relating to Arbitration and Conciliation in India. Allahabad:
Central Law Agency. | 5. Wong, Jarrod (2005).Court or Arbitrator-Who Decides Whether Res
Judicata Bars Subsequent Arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act?
Santa Clara Law Review, Vol. 46. |

17 | P a g e