Social Forces and Ideology in the Making of Pakistan

Author(s): Hamza Alavi

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 51 (Dec. 21-27, 2002), pp. 5119-5124
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4412987
Accessed: 11-03-2015 03:55 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Economic and Political
Weekly.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 202.185.81.13 on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 03:55:24 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Forces
and
Making of

Social

Ideology
Pakistan

in

the

Religious parties were implacably hostile to the Pakistan Movement. When, inaugurating
Pakistan's constituent assembly, Jinnah proclaimed Pakistan's secular ideology he
was voicing the established secular ideological position that the Muslim League had adhered
to throughoutits career. Futndanmentalist
Islamic ideology played no part in the origins of
Pakistan, although contemporaryideologues of Islamic fundamtentalism,including
academics, claim that it was Islamic ideology and slogans that created Pakistan and that
they therefore have the right to decide its future.
HAMZA ALA\VI

'anyof you will recallMohammad

Ali Jinnah's well known speech
that he gave when inaugurating
Pakistan's new constituent assembly. In
that speech he spelt out the secular vision
for the new country, which had inspired
him and others through the many decades
of struggle. He said:
You may belong to any religion or caste
or creed. That has nothing to do with the
business of the state. ... We are starting
withthisfundamentalprinciplethatwe are
all citizens and equal citizens of the state.
...We should keep that in front of us as
our ideal and you will find that in the
course of time Hindus will cease to be
Hindus and Muslims will cease to be
Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each
individual, but in the political sense, as
citizens of the state.
It was not until 1952 that Jinnah's
unworthy successors turned away from
that secular ideal and began to exploit the
worn out rhetoric of religion to restore
their failing political fortunes. They cried
out that 'Islam was in danger'! Coming
from them, that was an insincere, bogus
and empty slogan, when they had nothing
positive to offer to the people. Our tottering leadership believing mistakenly that
the slogan of Islam would be sufficient to
silence any opposition, resorted to that
stratagem.
At first they had not yet gone beyond
paying lip-service to the name of Islam.
In March 1949, the constituent assembly
adoptedthe 'Objectives Resolution' which
included a clause which said that: 'Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives,
in the individualandthe collective spheres,
in accord with the teachings and requireM

Economic and Political Weekly

mentsof Islamas setoutin theHolyQuran

andthe Sunna.'Thatwas not intended,as
yet,to signaladoptionof Islamicideology.
That was madequite clear in the speech
of LiaquatAli Khanwhen he movedthe
objectivesresolution.This was no more
than a formal nod in the direction of
religiousrhetoric,withoutactuallyrestricting the constitutionin any way. When
movingthe objectivesresolutionLiaquat
explicitly ruledout mullahideology. He
said: 'Sir, I just now said thatthe people
are the real recipients of power. This,
naturally,eliminatesany danger of the
establishmentof a theocracy'.That was
followed, in September1950 by the InterimReportof theBasicPrinciplesCommittee (BPC) which too said little about
Islamicideology.Indeed,GWChoudhury,
who was a committedIslamist,said that
it contained'verylittleif anyprovisionas
to the Islamiccharacterof the new constitution.The ulama,he continuedwere
most unhappyaboutthat.(Speechesand
Documentson the Constitutionof Pakistan, p 30)
However,beforethe BPC could move
on to prepareits finalreport,a majorevent
took place which shook the foundations
of the state of Pakistanto its roots. On
February21, 1952 the historic Bengali
languagemovementeruptedspontaneously
all overEastBengal,withgreatforce.For
severaldaysthewholeof EastBengalwas
in the hands of the languagemovement
committee.Surprisedat the unbelievable
success of the movement,its leadership
to takethemovementany
was unprepared
furtherforward.In a few daysit subsided.
But it remaineda majorpotentialchallenge. Ratherfoolishly Pakistan'sruling
elite, insteadof going some way to meet
Bengalidemands,thoughtthattheycould

isolatethe Bengalinationalistsby raising

religious slogans. Slogans of 'Islamic'
ideologyand'Islamic'identityweretaken
up to counterBengali anger. Insteadof
lookingattheunderlyingcausesof Bengali
discontent,they put forwardan argument
that we are all 'Muslimsand Pakistanis'
and thereforewe cannot be Bengalis or
Sindhisor Baluchor Pathan.This was an
ethnicredefinitionwhich had little to do
withreligiousvaluesas such.Itwasmerely
a bankruptpolitical argumentwhich led
only to disaster.
In responseto the Bengali movement,
therefore,the Final Reportof the BPC,
presentedon December 22, 1952, now
containeda largedose of 'Islamic'ideology. G W Choudhury,jumpedwithjoy
andwrote:'The seconddraftconstitution
(which was his namefor the final report
of the BPC) was noted for its elaborate
provisionsrelatingto theIslamiccharacter
of the proposedconstitution.'(ibid,p 31).
Liaquatand his cohort,when faced with
the challenge of regionalmovementsas
well as a crumblingparty,shoutedeven
more loudly that 'Islam was in danger'.
Nearly five years after partition,thus,
Islamic ideology was adoptedby our
mediocrerulers,whohadnothingpositive
to offerto the people.To makethisaboutturnmore credible,they decidedto give
the newfoundreligiousideologyan institutionalform.A boardof Talimat-i-Islamia
was set up and the senior ulamawhom
Liaquathad persuadedto find theirfortunes in Pakistan,were given jobs in it.
The board was not to have any real
was
powers.Pakistan'srulingbureaucracy
in no moodto sharepowerwithmullahs.
Therefore,the functionof the boardwas
only advisoryandthattoo on mattersspecifically referredto it. 'Advice' fromthe

December 21, 2002

This content downloaded from 202.185.81.13 on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 03:55:24 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

5119

boardwas notbindingon thegovernment.

When the boarddid make suggestions,
brushedaside.
theywereunceremoniously
But the seniorulamaseemedto be happy
enoughwith theirwell paidjobs and atmullahssuch
tendantprestige.Recalcitrant
as MaulanaMaududifoundthemselvesin
jail. Suchnominalconcessionsto Islamic
ideologycontinuedundersuccessivegovernmentsuntil ZulfiqarAli Bhutto,with
hismisguidedpopulistpolicies,reactivated
the mullahswho, ironically,turnedout to
be his nemesis.GeneralZia, in turn,lacking all legitimacy,decidedfor his partto
exploit Islamto the hilt. Severaldecades
later,we arestill sufferingfromhis legacy
which even successive democratically
electedgovernmentshave failed to undo.
The unexpectedsuccesses of fundamentalistreligiouspartiesin the generalelections of 2002, testify to the fact that we
arereapingtheinevitablefruitof thepolicy
of placatingthem.
SweepingasideJinnah's clearstatement
about Pakistanideology, his successors
belatedlyredefinedit. In 1969 General
YahyaKhan'sminister,GeneralSherAli,
declaredthat'Islamicideology'was to be
'Pakistanideology'. This solution was
projectedbackwardsinto the past and
historians(in Pakistanand also abroad)
have takenup the task of justifyingthat
bogus claim. Textbookswere rewritten.
Todaywe areseparatedfromourpast by
half a centuryof lies. Even people with
a secularoutlook,have begunto wonder
whetherit was not religion,afterall, that
reallybroughtaboutthe creationof Pakistan.Someof themassumethattheremust
havebeen a mass movement.How can a
massmovementgetoff thegroundwithout
a powerfulreligiousideology drivingit.
What other explanationcould there be,
they ask. All this is mereconjecture.No
one has as yet examinedthe social forces
that were actually responsible for the
creationof Pakistan.Ourtruepasthasbeen
snatchedfromus andlies buriedwhereit
cannotbe found.We have to disinterit.
Let us thereforehave a look at it.
II

Moder IndianMuslimpoliticshad its

beginningsin the Muslimminorityprovinces of northernIndia,notablythe UP,
andBengal.In the Muslimmajorityareas
of westernIndia,thatnow formPakistan,
namely, the Punjab,Sindh, Baluchistan
and the NWFP,Muslimswere relatively
backwardand the urbanpopulationwas

5120

predominantlynon-Muslim. The educated

classes that were behind modern Indian
Muslim politics were absent in those areas.
It was in northern India, that modern
Indian Muslim politics were triggered off
by the new Anglo-vernacular language
policy that was introduced by the British
in the 19th century. It abolished the use
of Persian as the official language. Persian
was the language of the northern Indian,
Muslim Ashraf, the pre-colonial ruling
elite. Abolition of Persian as the official
language hit them hard. To qualify for
governmentjobs,they hadto taketo English
education. Hindu service castes, like
kayasthas, khatrisand Kashmiribrahmins
in northernIndia(or the baidyas, kayasthas
and brahmins in Bengal) took to English
education morerapidlyandcompeted more
successfully for jobs than the Muslim
Ashraf had previously monopolised.
Muslims began to lose their primacy.
In looking at the impact of colonial rule
on the Muslim Ashraf, we can divide them
into three categories, for they were affected differently. Firstly, there were the
landlords who were political allies of the
Britishfor which they were muchfavoured.
As a class they were the most loyal to the
raj. There were some exceptions though,
like the rajasof Mahmoodabad(father and
son) who were active in the Muslim League.
The second group of Muslim Ashraf were
the ulema, who were the hardesthit by the
new language policy. They lost out when
children who used to go to their madaris,
to learn Persian and Arabic, were now sent
to English teaching schools. The introduction of new statute law written in English,
took away legal roles which the ulama
performed by way of the application of
shari'a law in particularcases or issuing
fatawa on contentious issues or mediating
disputes. These functions atrophied. In
response, the ulama at first engaged in
militant campaigns against the British
(and the Sikh) and played a prominentrole
in the national revolt of 1857. They were
crushed brutally.After the revolt the ulama
retreatedinto their seminaries such as the
newly establisheddar-ul-uloomatDeoband
or the older Firangi Mahal, etc. As a class,
they did not re-enter the political arena
until they were drawn into the Khilafat
movement in 1918.
The most importantAshraf group, however, behind modern Indian Muslim politics, were the educated Ashraf who
depended mainly on careers in government employment. I have designated them
as the 'salariat', i e, those who aspire to

anddependon careersin salariedemployment,overwhelminglyin the government

in the absenceof a large enoughprivate
sector.Associatedwith the salariatwere
professionalssuchas lawyersanddoctors.
For themthe new languagepolicy meant
thatthey too had to have Englisheducation. Competingwith the Muslimsalariat
and professionalswere Hindus who aspired to similaremploymentin government or as professionals.Unfortunately,
given the communal(caste!)structureof
Indiansociety, Muslimand Hindumembersof the salariatandprofessionalswere
pittedagainsteachotherbecausetheirlives
and careerswere embeddedwithin rival
institutionalised
communities.Themutual
theMuslimandHindu
between
competition
salariatwasof nodirectconcernforthe vast
majorityof Muslimsor Hindus.Muslim
Ashrafwere preoccupiedwith questions
abouttheirown futureand ignoredpoor
Muslimsandtheirproblems.Forexample
large numbersof Muslim Julahaswere
goingthrougha profoundcrisisin the19th
century,becauseof competitionfrommill
made cloth, both importedand locally
producedinIndiantextilemills.TheAshraf
were unconcernedwith the problemsof
the very poor and sufferingJulahas.The
salariatand the professionalshad their
own specific intereststo pursue.CompetitionbetweenthesepetitbourgeoisMuslim andHindugroups,shapedthepolicies
of the All IndiaMuslimLeague,and the
Indian National Congress, respectively.
Theyusedconceptsof Indiannationalism
andMuslimnationalism,tolegitimisetheir
narrowclass demands.
There is a myth that Muslim Ashraf
were underprivileged
andbackward.That
idea comes from WilliamHunter'sbook
on Indian Musalmans, which is based on

easternBengaldata,whereMuslimswere
ButMuslimAshraf
trulyunderprivileged.
of northernIndiawereover-privileged.In
the UP, Muslimswere only about 12 per
cent of the population,a small minority.
Nevertheless,in 1857 MuslimAshrafof
UP held no less than64 percent of posts
in the subordinatejudicial and executive
services(positionsabove thatrankbeing
the domainof the white-man).However,
thosehighlyprivilegedMuslimAshrafwere
rapidlylosingthatlead.By 1886Muslims
heldonly45 percentof thoseposts,though
with a Muslimpopulationof only 12 per
cent,theywerestillveryprivileged.These
figuresshow thattheirlead was beingcut
down.SirSyedAhmadthereforeproposed
that there should be a 50-50 quotaeach

Economicand PoliticalWeekly December21, 2002

This content downloaded from 202.185.81.13 on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 03:55:24 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

for the two communities. Modem Indian

Muslimpolitics, in its origin, was therefore
quota politics and not a religious movement. English education was the key to
futureprosperity.The Aligarh movement
sought to propagate English education
amongstMuslims.Given SirSyed Ahmad's
lead Muslim educational societies began
to come up all over India, to teach English.
A new Anglo-vernacularculture, which
was relatively more oriented towards science and reason, began to evolve, though
often expressed in Indian idiom. It was the
culture of Muslim Ashraf salariat and
professional groups. It did not extend to
the poor, whetherMuslim or non-Muslim.
The culture of the Muslim poor tended to
be dominated by the mullahs. Sir Syed
Ahmad pioneered the cause of English
education and rational and scientific
thought amongst Indian Muslims. He was
concerned only with the future of Muslim
Ashraf; not with the future of all Muslims
inclusive of the poor. This is not widely
realised. Sir Syed Ahmad looked upon
'low born' people with aristocratic disdain. Commenting upon qualifications for
membership of the viceroy's legislative
council, for example, he expressed his
deeply rootedclass (caste?) prejudicewhen
he said that 'It is essential for the viceroy's
council to have members of high social
standing. Would our aristocracy like that
a man of low caste or insignificant origin,
though he may be a B A or an M A , and
have the requisite ability, be placed in a
position of authorityabove them and have
the power of making laws that affect their
lives and property?'
Political activity on behalf of the Muslim salariatand professionals emerged on
the public platform in 1906, when a
delegation of Muslim notables called on
Lord Minto the viceroy to lobby for the
English educated Muslim Ashraf. When
Nawab Mohsin ul-Mulk, who then headed
the Aligarh establishment, learntabout the
speech of Lord Morley, the secretary of
state for India, announcing plans for constitutional reforms in India, he at once set
about organising a delegation of Muslim
notables to put their proposals before tile
viceroy, setting out demands of the educated Muslim Ashraf. Francis Robinson,
summing up the result, writes: Lord Minto
'promised (them) ...nothing except
sympathy.' Indian nationalist as well as
communist historians have blown up the
significance of that meeting out of all proportion,claiming, in MaulanaMohammad
Ali's words, that this was a 'command

performance'at thebehestof the viceroy,

as partof a policy of divide-and-rule.It
has now beenestablishedthatthis charge
has no truth in it. Amongst others the
IndianhistorianBimalPrasadhasrecently
unravelledthedetailsof thatstoryto prove
that this charge is not at all true. The
initiativefor the meeting came entirely
from Mohsin-ulMulk.
Laterinthesameyear,inDecember1906,
the Muslim League was founded when
MuslimleadersmetatDhakaattheinvitation of Nawab Salimullah.But the UP
Ashraf,led by Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulkof
Aligarh, hijackedthe new organisation
takingall the top posts and a majorityof
theworkingcommitteememberships.
The
League took up seculardemandsof the
western educatedMuslim professionals
andthesalariat.Attemptsto placetheissue
of Islamicideologyon theMuslimLeague
unsuccessagendawererareandinvariably
ful.Religiousideologyplayednopartin its
ideology. Not surprisingly,the mullahs
were hostile to the MuslimLeaguefrom
the outset.
Arguably,theearliestattemptto takeup
Islamic ideology, was made by Shibli
Nu'mani, who was committedto theocraticvalues.HeproposedthattheAligarh
syllabusshouldbeIslamised.Shibliwanted
to changethe syllabusawayfromEnglish
and modern sciences, towards Islamic
learningand the Arabic language.The
responseof the Muslimprofessionaland
salariatclasses to thatattemptis exemplified by theviews of SirRazaAli, a lawyer
who was a close and very influential
collaboratorof Sir Syed's successors,
Mohsinul-MulkandViqarul-Mulk,atthe
centreof the Aligarhestablishment.Raza
Ali attackedShibli'sproposalin anarticle
publishedin TheStatesman,of which he
offers an extractin his autobiography
RazaAli wrotethatthereis sometimes
a conflictbetweenreasonandsentiments.
But,he wrote,theconflictbetweenreason
and the sentimentsthatunderlieShibli's
proposalis greaterthansuchconflictabout
anyotherissue.Thememoryof theachievements of Cordova and Baghdad is as
enticingtoMuslimsasheramulet('taawiz')
is to a superstitiouswomanwho holds it
close to her heart.The truthis that it is
extremelydifficultnotto sympathisewith
suchfeelingsof Muslims.Butit is alsotrue
thatto deny realitythatis openandmanifest, would also be very foolish. The
proposalthat is now in front of us (i e,
Arabiceducation,as proposedby Shibli
HA)is, superficially,extremelyappealing.

However,we mustnotturnourfacesaway
from reality. ...The question before us is:

'Whatkindof educationdoesourcommunity wantand need?In my view the kind

of educationthatwe most need is education thatwouldbe most usefulin helping
us to deal with the affairsof this world
... which can help the coming generations

to earn their livelihood.' (AimalNama,

p 170).Thatwastheessenceofthe Muslim
Leagueideology.
Raza Ali warnedthat the need of the
IndianeducatedMuslimmiddleclass was
notthatof a hypotheticalreturnto original
Islamandthecreationof an'IslamicState',
to be ruledover by mullahs.Theirmost
urgentneed was the provisionof an educationthatwould help them in grappling
with the affairsof this world;education
thatwouldhelp theircominggenerations
to earntheir livelihood.He spelt out the
secularideology of Muslimnationalism,
clearly reiterating the interests of the
Muslimsalariatand professionalclasses.
Shiblihadto leave Aligarh,for it was not
a place where his theocraticideas could
flourish.
As fortheMuslimLeague,as it attracted
moreandmoresupport,therewasa parallel
shift in its class supportbase. Therewas
an increasedparticipationof men drawn
from more modest strataof society. Far
fewerof themwere now fromsubstantial
landed families. According to Francis
Robinson,the great majority(of them)
belongedto the class which occasionally
hada smallpittancein rentsfromlandbut,
generally,in orderto survive,hadto find
employmentin serviceor theprofessions.
Thatwas a less privilegedsection of the
MuslimAshraf.Amongstthemthe Muslim Leaguefoundits enduringclass base,
even thoughsalariatmembersfrombetter
off families,some landlordslike the Raja
of Mahmudabad,the father (not to be
confusedwithhisequallyactiveson,Amir
AhmadKhan)andsomebusinessmen,still
continuedto play a partin it.

III
Withthesechangesin its class base,the
centreof gravityof the Muslim League
shiftedawayfromtheAligarhconservatives
toarelativelymoreradicalleadership
based
on Lucknow(to which the Leagueoffice
was moved). By 1912 the energeticand
radicalWazirHasan,tookoveras general
secretary. A new phase began in the
politicalstyleof theLeagueanditsattitude
towardsthe Congress.Therewas a grow-

Economicand PoliticalWeekly December21, 2002

This content downloaded from 202.185.81.13 on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 03:55:24 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

5121

ing realisationin the MuslimLeaguethat

theywouldnotmakeanyheadwayagainst
theBritishcolonialrulewithoutestablishing a unitedfrontwiththeCongress.Calls
for Hindu-Muslimunity were therefore
reiterated.
TheMuslimLeaguelookedforsomeone
who could build bridges between the
Leagueandthe Congress.Jinnahwas the
obviouschoice.He hada highstandingin
the Indian National Congress and was
ideallyplacedto bringthetwo movements
together.In October 1913 when Wazir
HasanandMaulanaMohammadAli were
in Londonto see the secretaryof statefor
India (who, in the event, refusedto see
them!)they took the opportunityto meet
Jinnah.Thetwo persuadedhimtojoin the
MuslimLeagueand work for CongressLeagueUnity.Jinnahagreed,providedthat
his commitmentsto the Congresswould
remain.
JinnahworkedhardforCongress-League
unity,which was sealedby the Lucknow
pact adopted at a joint session of the
Congressandthe Leaguein 1916. Under
the pact, the Congress accepted some
Muslim demands, including their key
demandforseparateelectorates,a Muslim
demandwhichwas stronglysupportedby
Gokhale.Thepactalsospecifiedprovincewise weightage for Muslims. That was
Muslimminorityprovverycontroversial.
incesliketheUP,weregivenabiggershare
of seats than that provided under the
Morley-MintoReforms.That was at the
costof Muslimmajorityprovinces.Bengal
with a Muslimpopulationof 52 per cent
was given a shareof only 40 per cent of
seats. Punjabwith a Muslim population
of nearly55 per cent was given a share
of only 50 per cent of the seats. On the
otherhand,the UP with a Muslimpopulationof only 12percentwasgivena share
of no less than30 per cent. After all the
UPelitewererunningtheshow.Thisturned
out to be the most contentiousaspect of
the Lucknowpact.The Congressfor its
parthadconcededtheMuslimdemandfor
separate electorates because Muslims
believedthat they could not get elected
underjoint electorateseven in Muslim
majorityconstituencies,because of the
effects of propertyqualifications.Later,
however,thisturnedoutto be a sorepoint
witha newgenerationof Congressleaders.
Justifiedcriticismof the Lucknowpact
shouldnotmakeusunderestimate
itssignificance. It had succeededin bringingthe
CongressandtheMuslimLeaguetogether
on to a commonplatformto fight British

5122

imperialism.It was the Muslim League

andJinnahwho had initiatedthatbid for
unity and the Congressrespondedpositively. Jinnah was a unifier and not a
separationist,as generallysuggested.He
persisted in that difficult role, despite
setbacks,for a quarterof a centuryuntil
a pointwas reachedwhen,despiteall his
efforts, unity was no longer an option.
The LucknowPactwas not only about
Muslim demands. It also incorporated
shareddemandsof the Congressand the
Leaguevis-a-visthe colonialgovernment
againstwhich they would struggletogether.

Thus,forexample,thepactdemandedthat
inthelegislatures,electedmembersshould
be in a majority.It demandedthatin the
elected
provincesthereshouldbefour-fifths
membersand only one-fifth nominated,
and thatthe membersof councilsshould
be elected directlyby the people, on as
broada franchiseas possible and so on.
Thus contraryto popular opinion, the
Lucknowpact was not just about concessions to the Muslim League. It also
speltout the basison whichthe Congress
and the Muslim League could carrythe
anti-colonialfreedom struggle forward
together,as close allies. The significance
of the Lucknowpact was greaterthanis
generallysupposed.
Beforethe politicsof the Lucknowpact
could have a chance to unfold, it was
torpedoed.by the Khilafatmovementof
1918-24, in which the mullahswere the
mainforce. Until thenreligiousideology
was absentfrom IndianMuslimpolitics.
The religiousfocus of the Khilafatmovementbroughtaboutshifts in the Muslim
Leagueleadership.SecularistslikeJinnah
and WazirHasanwere drivenout of the
League and second rank leaders like
MaulanaShaukatAli movedintothe first
rank.It was MahatmaGandhi,however,
who was the true leaderof the Khilafat
movement- in his own words he had
become the dictatorof the movement.
aroundhim were fanaticalmullahslike
MaulanaAbdulBariof FirangiMahal.But
at every stage they asked Gandhito tell
themwhatto do. UnderGandhi'sleadership the Khilafat movement became a
powerfulmassmovement.Butit collapsed
soon becauseof its own internalcontradictions. Gandhi claimed that he had
madethe Khilafatmovementa meansof
establishing Hindu-Muslimunity. But
unlike the Lucknow pact, the Khilafat
movementtriggeredoff fiercecommunal
riotsinthe1920s.TheLucknowpactwhich
hadworkedforunitybetweentheMuslim

Leagueandthe Congress,was lost somewhere along the way.

It is quite truethatthe MuslimLeague
represented
only a smallMuslimelite.The
Muslimmasses,theworkersandpeasants,
werelargelyuntouchedby it.Themullahs,
who were behindthe Khilafatmovement,
did not voice the demandsof the Muslim
peasantand the workingclass either;its
methodsremainedrestrictedto elite negotiationsat the top.The mullahswerepetty
bourgeois radicals who representedthe
deadpastratherthanthe future,the direction towardswhich Muslimsalong with
the rest of Indianeededto go. The main
consequenceof the Khilafatmovement
was that it dealt a blow to the Muslim
Leaguefromwhichit did not recoverfor
morethana decade.Havingno truemass
base amongst the working masses, the
MuslimLeagueexisted duringthat time
only nominally,as a side-show for the
Khilafatists.
After the abolition of the Ottoman
Khilafatby theTurkishrepublicannationalists led by MustafaKemal,the Khilafat
movement,in spite of its mass base, becamea lost causein India.It did not leave
a permanent mark on Indian Muslim
politics, except that it had enabled the
mullahs to organise. Gandhi helped
hardlinerMuslim mullahs,the so-called
'DeobandiSunnis', to set up a political
organisation, namely the Jamiat-i-Ulama-

i-Hind which implacably opposed the

Muslim League and its leadership.The
BarelviSunnis,moresuperstitious
butalso
moretolerant,playednopartintheKhilafat
movementbecausetheydidnotacceptthe
legitimacyof the OttomanKhalifa,on the
groundthathe wasnotdescendedfromthe
Quraysh.Itmightbe notedthatin addition
to the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, two other

extremely dogmatic religious political

organisationsof mullahswereto emerge,
theJamaatnamely,theMajlis-i-Ahrarand
i-lslami. They were all bitterlyopposed
the Muslim League and its westernised
leadership, and eventually they also
opposedthe demand for Pakistan with
unabatedvehemence.
These religiouspartieswere unableto
generateenoughsupportto allow themto
stop the Muslim League. Some Muslim
Leaguers,like the Ali Brothersand even
Jinnah'sward,theyoungRajaAmirAhmad
Khan of Mahmudabad(the son) did
succumbfor a time to Islamic ideology.
But, as he told me, that was a passing
phase. He realisedsoon that this fundamentalistideology was a delusion.Like-

Economicand PoliticalWeekly December21, 2002

This content downloaded from 202.185.81.13 on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 03:55:24 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

wise,theAli Brothersandotherslikethem
too returnedto the secularist Muslim
League.The Khilafatinterludedid not
converttheMuslimLeagueintoa religious
ideologicalmovement.It was only on the
eveof independence
thatLiaquatAli Khan
was able to induce a few Ulama of the
Jamiat-i-Ulanla-i-Hind,

to migrate to

Pakistanin thehopethatin a Muslimstate

theymightfarebetterthanin HinduIndia.
They formed the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam.

They had little influenceon state power

untilthe adventof the regimeof General
Zia.All thatwhile,thePakistanmovement
remaineda secularmovementof Muslims,
not a movementof Islam.
However,by the time secularistslike
Jinnah,who had left the MuslimLeague
at the time of the Khilafat movement,
rejoinedit,itwasachangedMuslimLeague
inaradicallychangedpolitical(andconstitutional)context.As a result,thecentreof
gravityhadshiftedfromMuslimminority
provinceslike UP andits salariatbase, to
Muslimmajorityprovincesandtheirdominatingfeudallandedmagnates.Thathappened becauseof the implementationof
the Montague-Chelmsford
reformsunder
thegovernment
of Indiaactof 1919.Under
thatact, limitedpowerwas transferred
to
Indianministers,at the provinciallevel,
over certaindepartmentsof the government.Thatinjecteda new logic in Indian
politics.Fromthenon distributionof state
patronageby Indianministersbegan to
playa partin buildinguppoliticalsupport.
Muslimsof theUPandMuslimminority
provincesand their salariatand professionals, who were the MuslimLeague's
main power-base,being a minorityand
unableto forma government,were now
outof thegame.NordidtheMuslimLeague
securethe supportof the feudalmagnates
Theyhadtheirownpolitics.
automatically.
The MuslimLeague continuedon their
supportbut it was now a shadow of its
formerself.
In the Punjab,Muslimfeudals,in alliancewithHinduandSikhfeudalsandthe
jat biraderiof East Punjab(led by Sir
ChhotuRam) ruled the roost underthe
bannerof the unionistparty,which was
presidedoverby SirFazliHusainwho was
not a feudal but who understood the
needsof feudals better than they could
themselves.Along with their clear class
interestsas landedmagnates,the unionist
ideologyincludedPunjabiyat,i e, Punjabi
nationalism.They were wary of more
radicalpolitics impingingon them from
otherpartsof India.Theunionistsbelieved
Economic and Political Weekly

thatthe Britishwouldruleover Indiafor

ever. Theiraims thereforewere narrowly
focused on governingand exploitingthe
Punjab and insulating it from outside
influenceswhilethegoingwasgoodunder
the British.As the prospectsof independence (underCongressrule)appearedon
the agendathey optedfor an independent
Punjab,withintheBritishCommonwealth.
Chief minister Sikandar Hayat, Fazli
Husain's successor, even tried to get
Churchill'ssupportfor an independent
Punjabwithintheempire.But,intheevent,
that projectwas not taken up.
Fazli Husain successfullydivided the
Punjabimiddleclassintotworivalgroups,
urbanand rural.The salariatand professionalsof ruralorigin,whoenjoyedfeudal
patronage,got priorityand preference.
UrbanMuslims,on the otherhand,were
a deprived minority in unionist ruled
Punjab.Beingbitteraboutsocialinjustice,
manyof themrespondedto thehotrhetoric
of the fundamentalist
religiousgroup,the
The MuslimLeaguewas
Majlis-i-Ahrar.
weak and ineffectiveand too dependent
on the unionists,to be able to give them
an independentlead.The Punjabifeudals,
especially,SirFazliHusain,sawtheMuslim
Leaguenot as a seriousrival who might
possiblythreatentheirholdoverpowerin
the province.They toleratedit, and even
patronisedit andcertainlyusedit for their
purposeswhen the occasion requiredit.
SikandarHayat thereforeeven entered
into a pact with Jinnah.

IV
It was notuntilthemid-1940s,whenthe
approachof independencebeganto look
like a reality,thatthe landedmagnatesof
Punjabrealised,firstly,thattheywouldnot
be givenanindependentPunjabwithinthe
Commonwealth, which they wanted.
Secondlytheysawa mortaldangerto their
survivalas a class, if independencewere
to come to the Punjabunderthe Indian
NationalCongress.TheCongresswasfully
committedto land reform,on which a
committee,presidedover PanditNehru
himself,hadbeenworkingforsomeyears.
Forthe survivalof theirclass, the Punjabi
feudalsreckonedthatPakistanunderthe
MuslimLeaguewasa workablealternative
for them,the moreso becausethey knew
thatif they'joined'theLeague,theywould,
in effect, 'takeit over'.Theywouldcontrol
it. MianMumtazDaulatanawas amongst
thefirsttosee thisandhejoinedtheMuslim
Leaguein 1943. By 1945 virtuallyall of

theMuslimlandedmagnatesof thePunjab
hadjoinedit, exceptfora smallmisguided
rumpunderKhizrHayatKhan.Theyhung
on to thedreamsof an independentPunjab
in the BritishCommonwealthwhich the
Britishwere not going to give them.The
situationin Sindh was similarto that of
the Punjab.So by the time thatindependence came, the feudal landedmagnates
of Punjaband Sindh had takenover the
MuslimLeague.No ideologyexcepttheir
concernfor self-preservation
was needed
to drawthemto the League.The peasants
whomtheydominatedcompletelyneeded
no ideology to make them vote as their
landlordinstructedthem to do.
The Pakistanmovement,thus,was not
drivenby any religious ideology andexcept

for EastBengal,therewas no massmovement as such to go with it. Manypirs in

Punjaband Sindh were amongthe great
landedmagnateswho optedfor Pakistan.
At theirbehesttheir'mureeds'celebrated
the ideaof Pakistanwithgusto.Fromthis
a false impressionhasbeentakenby some
scholarsthat it was the idea of Pakistan
which had motivatedthem, whereas in
truthwhatthey were celebratingwas the
joy of theirpir,whenhejoinedtheLeague
andtherebyavertedthethreatof Congress
land reforms.
'Islamic'ideology was indeedinvoked
inthePunjabbutnotbytheMuslimLeague.
It was invokedby the hardlinerMajlis-iAhrar,whichbitterlyopposedtheMuslim
League, tooth and nail, denouncingits
leadersas kaffirs.It was the only 'mass'
movement in the Punjab that made its

appealin the name of Islam and with it

opposedthe Pakistanidea.The mainbase
of the Majlis-i-Ahrarwas amongst the
urbanpettybourgeoisie,the lowermiddle
class, which had been neglectedbecause
of the anti-urbanpolicy of the unionist
party with whom the Muslim League had

collaborated.
It was only in Bengal that the Muslim
Leagueled a genuinemass movement,in
the 1945 elections; but that was not a
religiousmovement.Untiltheelectionsof
1937theBengalMuslimLeaguewasunder
thecontrolof theDhakaNawabfamilyand
a small coterie aroundit - the Bengali
feudals. They were challenged by the
KrishakProjaParty,led by Fazlul Haq,
whosepoliticalbasewas amongstthewell
off peasantry.The final vote in the 1937
electionwasevenlydividedbetweenthem
and they formeda coalitiongovernment.
In 1943 the greatBengalfaminekilled
three and a half million Bengali poor

December 21, 2002

This content downloaded from 202.185.81.13 on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 03:55:24 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

5123

peasantswho hadno reservesto fall back

on whenthefaminehit.Thepeasantswere
soon on the warpath.Their movement
known as the Tebhagamovement,was
mobilisedby the communistled All India
Kisan Sabha. It was against that background,whentheBengalpeasanthadbeen
aroused,thatthe 1945electionswereheld.
In 1943 a remarkableman named Abul
Hashimwas elected as the generalsecretary of the Bengal Provincial Muslim
League.He professeda confusedmixture
of socialismand Islam.He took over the
taskof organisingsupportfor the Muslim
League, with the help of the Tebhaga
activistsas his localcadres.Pushingaside
the Dacca Nawabfamily and otherelite
leaders who had so far controlled the
BengalProvincialMuslimLeague,Abul
Hashim organised the Muslim League
election campaignin which he focused
on the concrete needs and economic
demandsof the small peasants. If that
mass movementwas drivenby an ideology, it was not religious ideology. He
mobilisedthe peasantrybehindthe Muslim League by giving class slogans and
not religious slogans.
Religiousideologythereforeplayedno
part in the 1945 election campaign in
Bengal. It turnedalmost entirelyon the
economicdemandsof theBengalpeasant;
the genius of Abul Hashimand his colleagues of the All India Kisan Sabha,
preventedtheir movementfrom degeneratingintocommunalslogansthatit could
havehappenedall too easily. The Bengal
peasants (who were overwhelmingly
Muslim)dependedverylargelyonjute as
a cash crop and were therebyenmeshed
in the globalised cash economy. Their
immediateconflict was with tradersand
moneylenders,who all happenedto be
Hindu,Abul Hashimtook up both these
issuesbutas purelyeconomicclass issues,
withoutallowingthemto turninto communalconflict.He promisedthe peasants
thatthefuturePakistangovernmentwould
be theirgovernment,a peasantraj. That
governmentwouldscaledowntheirdebts
andtakestepsto preventthe tradersfrom
manipulating
pricesagainsttheirinterests.
Thepeasantswerealsopromisedabolition
of zamindari.The Bengalpeasantrywas
led to believe thatPakistanwas going to
be ruled by the peasants.If an ideology
therewas, it was a peasantideology.That
was the oppositeof the feudaldominated
PunjabandSindh.Due to AbulHashim's
successfulcampaignthe BengalMuslim
Leaguesecured114seatsin theprovincial

5124

assemblyas againsta totalof 121Muslim

seats. Religiousideology played no part
in this, not even by way of rhetoric.But,
in the end, the peasantswere cheated,as
they always are. Abul Hashim having
servedtheirpurpose,thepowerfulDacca
Nawab group had little difficulty in
manoeuvring him out of the way; in
February1947 when he was sent on indefinite leave to his native village in
Burdwan.The Bengali Muslim feudals
were back in the saddle- that is a long
story and sad story by itself.
The final result,as we can see, was a
Pakistandominatedby feudals (both of
West Pakistanand also of East Bengal)
associatedwitha rulingbureaucracy.
The
ruling group was soon joined by an all
powerfulmilitary.InthePunjabandSindh
the feudalswon andimposedtheirfeudal
values on us for decades.In Bengal, despitetheoverwhelmingpopularvictory,it
wastheBengaliMuslimfeudalswhowere
backin powerat the timeof the partition.
Atthetimewhenit wascreated,Pakistan's
problemwasnotthatof religiousideology
but, rather,that of feudal domination..
claimsof the
Contrarytothepresent-day
mullahs,the MuslimLeaguehad consisa secularstancethroughtentlymaintained
out its careerexceptfor the briefKhilafat
interlude.Therehad been some attempts
to bringIslamicideologyon to theMuslim
Leagueplatform.But suchattemptswere
rareandtheywereinvariablydefeated.For
brevity,to give only one example,one of
the rare attemptsto bring the issue of
Islamicideology on to the agendaof the
All IndiaMuslimLeaguehas been documented by SharifuddinPirzada in his
collectionof MuslimLeaguedocuments.
At theAIMLsessionin Delhiin 1943,one
Abdul Hameed Kazi canvassedsupport
for a resolutionthathe proposedto table,
to committhe MuslimLeagueto Islamic
ideology and the creationof an Islamic
state.Immediatelytherewaspressurefrom
everyonethatforced Kazito abandonhis
idea. It was such widespreadopposition
in the MuslimLeagueto the ideology of
the religious parties that marginalised
religious fanaticswho were bitterlyopposedto theAll IndiaMuslimLeagueand
its leadershipand,eventually,to the idea
of the Pakistan.
Religiouspartieswere, as I have said,
implacablyhostile to the Pakistanmovement.In Punjaband Sindh,the powerof
the feudal landed magnates was itself
sufficientto line up supportin the 1945
elections and no mass movement was

needed; nor did any mass movement

actuallyarise.Anyonewho has lived in a
Punjab village for an extended period
wouldrealise this. In East Bengal there
was indeed a powerfulmass movement,
as I havesaid.It was led by the legendary
HashimKhan,with the help of cadresof
the Tebhaga movement.Their slogans,
however, were explicitly secular.There
were indeed occasionalpopulardemonstrationsin towns.The sloganswouldbe
cast in termsof demandsof Muslimsand
not in termsof Islam, thoughat times a
rarevoice speakingin the nameof Islam
mightjoin in. But thatwouldnot makeit
anIslamic'mass'movement.Negotiations
with the Congressand the Britishwere
settled throughnegotiationsat the top.
When Jinnah proclaimed Pakistan's
secularideologyhe wasvoicingtheestablishedsecularideologicalpositionthatthe
MuslimLeaguehadadheredto throughout
its career.FundamentalistIslamic ideology played no part in the origins of
Pakistan,although contemporaryideoincludloguesof Islamicfundamentalism
ing academics,claim that it was Islamic
ideology and slogans that createdPakistanandthattheythereforehavethe right
to decide its future.BE
Addressfor correspondence:

halavi@cyber.net.pk
[This paper is based on the author's Professor
KarrarHussain Memorial Lecture delivered on
November 2, 2002.]

THECHALLENGESOF
PARENTING
Implicationsof Maternal
Employmentfor Psychological
Developmentof the Child

Kiran Mathur
The book reports an empirical
between
study of relationship
and personality
employment
of
of children
development
and unemployed
employed
mothers.
Rs. 350
2001
255pp.
Concept Publishing Company
A/15-16, Commercial Block,
Mohan Garden, New Delhi-59
Ph.5351460,5351794

Fax:091-11-5357103

Email : publishing@conceptpub.com

Economicand PoliticalWeekly December21, 2002

This content downloaded from 202.185.81.13 on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 03:55:24 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions