Environmental Ethics, Callicott and the

New Triangular Affair

Amy Claire Pearce

A thesis submitted to the School of Geography Planning and

Environmental Management of the University of Queensland for the
Degree of Bachelor of Environmental Management (Sustainable
Development)

July 2011

I hereby declare that the work presented here in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge, original and my
own work, except as acknowledged in the text, and that the material has not been submitted, either in whole
or in part, at this or any other university.

Amy Pearce

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank William Grey, for his philosophical counsel, David Neil, for his invaluable mentoring and
Bradd Witt, for his pragmatic guidance, for their efforts, support and understanding in supervising this thesis.
I also extend my thanks to Richie Coster, Ann Pearce and Chris McAuliffe for their support.
Finally, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my father, Bob Pearce, whose input and emotional support
made completing this project possible.

Abstract
The discipline of environmental ethics has a primary goal of achieving a unified ethic that provides moral
agents with a guide for interaction within the environment. Several normative theories were developed as
alternative approaches to the traditional anthropocentric view of nature, which was held to be unjust and
inadequate. In 1980, J. Baird Callicott released a paper called Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair in which
he conceptualised a triangular debate between the ethical theories of anthropocentrism,
nonanthropocentrism concerned with individuals (animal welfare and biocentrism) and
nonanthropocentrism concerned with nature as a whole and the biotic community, based on the principles
of ethical-holism (ecocentrism).
Recently, however, Nortons convergence hypothesis (that while theories may differ at base value level, they
nevertheless support the same environmental policy outcomes), as well as the meta-ethical issues
surrounding our valuing being inevitably anthropocentric, have gained considerable attention. This has led
some environmental ethicists and pragmatists to call for environmental ethics to abandon the concept of a
nonanthropocentric environmental ethic. The discourse trend has therefore been described as a shift from
strong anthropocentrism, to animal welfarism, to biocentrism, to ecocentrism, returning to an enlightened
(weak) anthropocentrism. It seems that Callicotts triangle has become somewhat of a Bermuda variety
environmental ethics is lost within it and unable to escape it.
The aim of this inquiry is to discover whether environmental ethics is progressing towards its goal of
grounding a unified environmental ethic and, if not, to recommend a framework that will refocus the
discipline onto the right track. I examine the calls for a return to anthropocentrism as a basis for
environmental ethics and find them to be unwarranted. Anthropocentrism as a normative theory is (still)
speciesist and should again be abandoned, whilst the question of inevitable anthropocentrism, along with
other ultimate value questions, should be left to the meta-ethical domain of philosophy.
I then examine the previous stage in the trend, ecocentrism. Moving back in the trend, I categorise six
versions and identify flaws in each, ranging from eco-fascism, combined-speciesism, relativism and
redundancy and go on to discover that the foundation of ethical-holism that all ecocentric theories are built
upon, is not plausible in itself. Furthermore, I find that Callicotts push for an ethically-holistic environmental
ethic stemmed from a misconception about the inability of individualistic environmental ethics to cater for
the protection of species, ecosystems and nature as a whole. These findings lead me to suggest that the
shortcomings of ecocentrism, combined with this misconception, have stalled the search for a unified
environmental ethic.
I propose a New Triangular Affair framework, made up of three areas upon which, in my view,
environmental ethics as a discipline should be focussed. One is concerned with issues of moral standing,
another with matters of relative moral significance and the last relates to the topic of choosing the morally
relevant timescale of concern. Adopting longer timescales of concern will result in employing more holistic
approaches when making environmental policy decisions. The concepts raised in each area are not new in
themselves; rather, it is the conceptual framework that is new and represents a shift from Callicotts
Triangular Affair, to one that offers better prospects for progress towards a unified environmental ethic.

Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1

The Relationship between Intrinsic Value and Moral Standing

Chapter 2: The Merits of Returning to Anthropocentrism

3
6

2.1

Inevitable Anthropocentrism: Separating Meta-Ethics from Environmental Ethics

2.2

Valuational Anthropocentrism: Reviewing the Need for an Environmental Ethic

10

2.2.1

14

2.3

The Speciesism Distinction: Human-Centrism (A1) and Person-Centrism (A2)

Against the Pragmatic Case for Returning to Anthropocentrism

Chapter 3: The Merits of Ecocentrism and Ethical-holism

3.1

3.2

3.3

17
19

Six Versions of Ecocentrism: An Analysis

21

3.1.1

Ecocentrism Version 1 (E1) and Version 2 (E2)

22

3.1.2

Ecocentrism Version 3 (E3) and Version 4 (E4)

26

3.1.3

Ecocentrism Version 5 (E5)

28

3.1.4

Ecocentrism Version 6 (E6)

30

The Plausibility of Ethical-Holism: Implications for Ecocentrism

32

3.2.1

Burdens of Conceptual Proof

32

3.2.2

Perspectives and Interests of Wholes - or Humans?

37

3.2.3

Philosophical Underpinnings Unpinned

39

Holism in Environmental Ethics: Practical Means or Ethical End?

Chapter 4: The New Triangular Affair: A Framework for Progress

41
46

4.1

Degree of Moral Extension (Size of Intrinsic Value Net)

47

4.2

Degree of Moral Significance (Magnitude of Differential Value)

48

4.3

Degree of Practical-holism (Timescale of Concern)

52

Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusion

57

References

60

List of Figures

Figure 1: The Trend of Environmental Ethics Discourse:

Figure 2: Forms of Anthropocentrism

Figure 3: Valuational Anthropocentrism

10

Figure 4: Total Economic Value According to Weak Anthropocentrism

11

Figure 5: Forms of Ecocentrism (Defined by Commitment to Ethical-holism):

22

Figure 6: Ecocentrism Version 1 (E1)

23

Figure 7: Biocentrism

31

Figure 8: Callicotts Triangular Affair and the New Triangular Affair Framework

46

Figure 9: Scales of Moral Extensionism and Timescale of Concern Displaying Maximum Positions

54

Chapter 1: Introduction
Environmental ethics is a discipline primarily concerned with questions of value and moral considerability in
the natural environment.1 An ethic that moves beyond the realms of anthropocentrism2 an environmental
ethic was called for3 and various nonanthropocentric theories have subsequently been generated.4 In 1980,
J. Baird Callicott published a paper called Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair in which he expressed his
concern over the individualistic, reductionist and atomistic form that these extensionist approaches were
taking.5
Animal welfarism, or sentientism,6 took on the task of expanding the moral circle to include animals. The
potential moral standing of trees7 became the next inquiry and the merits of a host of biocentric8 ethical
frameworks were being debated. However, all followed the traditionalist method of locating intrinsic value9 in
individuals and Callicott, influenced by Aldo Leopolds Land Ethic,10 was convinced that nothing less than a
holistic environmental ethic was needed, a sweeping philosophical overhaul that attributed moral
considerability directly to holistic natural entities such as ecosystems and the biotic community.11 Callicott
conceived a triangular debate, between moral humanists (anthropocentrists), humane moralists
(sentientists and biocentrists) and those true environmental ethicists, such as himself, that subscribed to
ethical-holism (ecocentrists).12
A dichotomous debate ensued between environmental individualism and environmental holism, focusing on
whether intrinsic value or moral standing could possibly be located in natural wholes and not just organisms.13
At the same time, the continued broadening and weakening of anthropocentrism through the growing
sustainable development paradigm, combined with the seemingly impossible task of finding a genuinely
nonanthropocentric ethic based in value completely removed from human interest, drove some
environmental pragmatists to question the overall need to look for intrinsic value outside of the human
world.14 This debate about the debate is leading back to a new anthropocentrism that acknowledges a much
broader range of human (and future human) interests, or even an adoption of poly-centric or multi-centric
approaches.15

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, environmental ethics is ...the discipline in philosophy that studies the moral relationship of
human beings to, and also the value and moral status of, the environment and its nonhuman contents. Andrew Brennan, and Yeuk-Sze Lo,
"Environmental Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/ethics-environmental/>
2
The concept of anthropocentrism will be examined in detail throughout this inquiry but can be briefly defined here as The view thatmoral standing
can be restricted to humanity alone or alternatively the related value-theory that none but human interests or concerns matter, in the sense of having
independent value Robin Attfield Environmental Ethics: An Overview for the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 9
3
Richard Routley (now Sylvan) is widely credited as being one of the first to make this call in his widely-referenced paper: Richard Routley, Is There a
Need for a New, an Environmental Ethic? Proceedings of the X11 World Congress of Philosophy, No. 1. Varna, Bulgaria, 1973, pp. 205-210.
4
These theories will be examined as they arise throughout this inquiry. A comprehensive overview can be found in Alasdair Cochranes article in the
Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (http://www.iep.utm.edu/envi-eth/)
5
J. Baird Callicott , Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair, Environmental Ethics, 2: no. 4, (1980), 311-338
6
Sentience refers to the capacity to feel suffering or enjoyment: anything that is not sentient cannot suffer or enjoy (Onora ONeill, Environmental
Values, Anthropocentrism and Speciesism, Environmental Values, 6 (1997), 130). Also Attfield, Environmental Ethics, 6
7
Stone, Christopher D. Should Trees Have Standing? : and other essays on law, morals, and the environment Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. : Oceana Publications,
c1996
8
Robin Attfield gave a talk on biocentrism at Cardiff University (www.smokewriting.co.uk/philosophycafe/attfield_200410.pdf)
9
Stenmark refers to these collectively as weak and strong but always with the emphasis on the individual. Mikael Stenmark , The Relevance of
Environmental Ethical Theories for Policy Making, Environmental Ethics, 24: no. 2 (2002), 138
10
Callicott makes it clear that a true environmental ethic should resemble the holism found in Leopolds Land Ethic: Environmental ethics then can be
defined ostensively by using Leopold's land ethic as the exemplary type. I do not mean to suggest that all environmental ethics should necessarily
conform to Leopold's paradigm, but the extent to which an ethical system resembles Leopold's land ethic might be used, for want of anything better, as
a criterion to measure the extent to which it is or is not of the environmental sort. (Callicott, Triangular Affair, 311)
11
Callicott J. Baird, In Defence Of The Land Ethic: Essays In Environmental Philosophy, (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1989), 3-4.
12
Callicott, Triangular Affair
13
J. Baird Callicott, The Case Against Moral Pluralism Environmental Ethics, 12: no.2, (1990), 106
14
Most of Nortons work makes this claim but see, Bryan G. Norton, Convergence, Noninstrumental Value and the Semantics of Love: Comment on
McShane, Environmental Values, 17 (2008): 514, in particular, the section: Against the Intrinsic Instrumental Distinction
15
Douglas J. Rabb, From Triangles to Tripods: Polycentrism in Environmental Ethics, Environmental Ethics, 14: no. 2, (1992) 177 183

2
The trend of environmental ethics discourse has therefore been broadly categorised by Callicott (and others),16
as a shift from strong anthropocentrism, to animal welfarism, to biocentrism, to ecocentrism, returning to an
enlightened (weak) anthropocentrism (Figure 1.)

Figure 1: The Trend of Environmental Ethics Discourse: Anthropocentrism1, or strong anthropocentrism, grants moral standing to humans only and
recognises a narrow and short-term set of human interests. Animal welfarism, or sentientism, grants moral standing to all creatures that feel pleasure
and pain (sentient beings). Biocentrism grants moral standing to all living individuals. Ecocentrism grants moral standing to natural holistic entities such
as ecosystems, either solely, or in conjunction with the moral standing of individuals. Anthropocentrism2 grants moral standing to humans only (or
holds that moral standing of nonhumans and nature is inevitably dependant on human interests) and recognises a broader and longer-term set of
human interests.

The discipline of environmental ethics has a primary goal of achieving a unified ethic that provides moral
agents17 (humans18) with a guide for interaction within the environment.19 The aim of this inquiry is to
discover whether environmental ethics is progressing towards its goal of grounding a unified environmental
ethic and, if not, to recommend a framework that will refocus the discipline onto the right track.
There is certainly evidence of frustration within the discipline regarding the lack of progress and the apparent
insurmountable differences between the seemingly mutually inconsistent schools of thought.20 It seems that
Callicotts triangle has become somewhat of a Bermuda variety environmental ethics is lost within it and
unable to escape it. While some environmental ethicists attempt to step around this problem by simply
ignoring the differences between competing claims and settling on a pluralistic approach,21 I instead take the
principal purpose of environmental ethics to be the process of ... searching for the Holy Grail of environmental
ethics the coherent, inclusive super-theory.22 This statement was made by none other than Callicott and,
while he has since seemed to shy away from the bold claim,23 I uphold it and use it in this inquiry as the
measure to assess whether the discipline is on the right track.
Clearly there is indeed a multitude of values and a diverse range of stakeholders to consider when it comes to
environmental decision-making. At the social and political levels, pluralism is to be expected. In my view, one
of the purposes of a unified environmental ethic should be to bring clarity to this process of sifting through
complex environmental issues. This super-theory would in fact have many purposes of its own - influencing
policy decisions and environmental education among the most important in terms of reshaping our attitudes
and behaviour towards nature and the Earth we rely upon.

Anthony Weston, Multicentrism: A Manifesto, Environmental Ethics, 26: no. 1, (2004), 25 - 40

16
J. Baird Callicott, The Pragmatic Power and Promise of Theoretical Environmental Ethics: Forging a New Discourse, Environmental Values, 11: (2002):
3-25 trend described and set out from pages 4 to 12. Robin Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983) trend set
out in Part 1: pages 1-87
17
A moral agent can be defined as an entity that possesses self-consciousness, a free will, a capability for understanding moral principles, and both the
intention and the physical capability to act according to given principles of duty Anthony J. Povilitis, On Assigning Rights to Animals and Nature,
Environmental Ethics, 2; no. 1 (1980): 67
18
Moral agents are generally seen as rational beings with the capacity to act autonomously. Dieterle makes the point that as long as they have that
capacity, humans are always moral agents, whereas, if nonhuman animals lack that capacity they are not ever moral agents. J.M. Dieterle,
Environmental Ethics, Spring 2010: Review of Marc Beckoff and Jessica Pierce, Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press (2009). xv., 97
19
an ethics dealing with mans relations to land and to the animals and plant that grow upon it. (Richard Routley, Is there a need for a new, an
environmental ethic? Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy, (September 17-22, Varna, Bulgaria), Sofia Press, 1975); An environmental
ethic is supposed to govern human relations with nonhuman natural entities, (Callicott, Elements of an Environmental Ethic: Moral Considerability and
the Biotic Community, Chapter 4 in Land Ethic, 63) Note: I have used within the environment instead of with the environment in order to avoid an
interpretation that humans are somehow artificial or not part of nature.
20
Christopher D. Stone, "Moral Pluralism and the Course of Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics, 1O: (1988): 139.
21
Ibid.
22
Callicott, Moral Pluralism
23
Callicott, Pragmatic Power: Callicott complains about Minteer thinking that he (Callicott) is still on a quest for a universal master principle, 21

3
In order to assess whether progress is being made I firstly give consideration to the most recent shift in the
discourse trend described by Callicott; that of a return to anthropocentrism, driven by the claims that our
valuing is inevitably anthropocentric, because humans are the only conceivers of value, as well as
reconsidering the need for a non-anthropocentric ethic, now that a broader notion of human interests is
acknowledged (Chapter 2). The findings suggest that the shift away from anthropocentrism in the first place
was on the right track and the move back towards it is unwarranted. A metaphorical step backwards is
therefore taken in the discourse trend described by Callicott, to the second-most recent theory and Callicotts
own school of thought - ecocentrism.
I categorise six versions of ecocentrism, all of which subscribe to the notion of ethical-holism, advocating the
intrinsic value or moral standing of ecological systems directly, rather than restricting moral considerability to
individuals (Chapter 3). Since Callicott himself acknowledges that he has been the most vocal of the
ecocentrists, analysis of his theory is given substantial treatment, showing his shift from the position of radical
holism in Triangular Affair, through to his more modern theory of layered social and ecological
communitarianism. Before examining the possibility of ecological wholes having direct moral standing, I
identify flaws in all six versions, varying from issues of eco-fascism, speciesism, relativism and redundancy.24
Sufficient grounds are found to justify an overall examination of the plausibility of ethical-holism (Chapter 4),
however the findings suggest that foundation of ethical-holism, that all ecocentric theories are built upon,
lacks merit. Therefore ecocentrism, Callicotts Triangular Affair and the continued debate between those
who subscribe to ethical individualism and ethical-holism in environmental ethics is holding back the discipline
from progressing towards a unified environmental ethic.
After finding cause to reject anthropocentrism and ecocentrism, I propose an ethically-individualistic, but
practically-holistic, framework made up of three areas within environmental ethics that I believe are relevant
to the task of finding a unified environmental ethic a New Triangular Affair for environmental ethicists
(Chapter 5). I suggest that, if progress is being made in these three areas, the discipline of environmental
ethics can be said to be back on the right track.

1.1

The Relationship between Intrinsic Value and Moral Standing

The terms intrinsic value and moral standing are very closely related within environmental ethics and are
quite often used interchangeably.25 As I will be using these terms throughout this inquiry it is important that
they are defined and the link between them established at the outset.
By describing things as having intrinsic value, I mean that they have a good of their own, and have moral
standing as such, and further that their flourishing and attaining their good is intrinsically valuable, valuable,
that is, because of its very nature26 and are independent of the interests of others.27 Intrinsic value is
therefore limited to entities whose good can be harmed or benefitted.28 What constitutes being a valid
candidate for being harmed and benefitted will be treated in more depth in Chapter 4.
Like most environmental ethics literature, I use this meaning of intrinsic value as one that can be contrasted
with instrumental value, which relates to the utility an entity provides as a means to other (intrinsically
valuable) ends.29 Whereas an entitys intrinsic value could be said to be a stand-alone property, its
instrumental value is: dependent on the existence of other entities and the functional relationships between

24

An understanding of these terms is not necessary until later in this inquiry, where they will be defined.
Rick ONeil, Intrinsic Value, Moral Standing, and Species, Environmental Ethics, 19, no. 1, (1997), 47
26
Ibid., 10
27
Attfield,Overview,10
28
Kenneth Goodpaster, On Being Morally Considerable, The Journal of Philosophy, 75: No. 6, (Jun., 1978), pp. 308-325
29
Attfield, Overview, 12
25

4
it and these entities.30 An entity can have both intrinsic and instrumental value (or be valued in both of these
ways), or only one or the other. As Callicott explains, it is perhaps easiest to understand intrinsic value
negatively, in that is constitutes what value remains when all instrumental value an entity provides as a means
to other ends is taken away.31
It is therefore clear why the concept of intrinsic value has become important in environmental ethics because,
if an entity cannot be said to have intrinsic value and it also provides no instrumental use to entities that do,
then there would be no reason to protect or conserve that entity and no wrong that could be done to it. 32
Consequently, whether or not an entity has intrinsic value is often used as the basis for assigning it moral
standing.33
Having moral standing implies that an entity merits respect and consideration when action is to be taken that
may benefit or harm it.34 Goodpaster uses the term moral significance to denote an entitiy that has been
considered and essentially passed the test of meeting requirements for moral standing, thereby giving it the
status of moral significance rather than mere moral considerability.35 For Goodpaster, standing and
significance are both relative terms, whereas considerability is concerned with whether or not something
deserves any consideration at all not the degree of consideration.
However, there are a few levels of subtlety in this area, and my use of terminology differs slightly (but
importantly) from Goodpaster. In this inquiry, moral considerability is the award granted to entities that have
met the criteria for moral standing and therefore the two can be read virtually interchangeably moral
standing is not a relative term. Moral significance, on the other hand, is used in a relative sense to describe
the value weightings given to entities that have moral standing but have competing interest claims.
Therefore, the concepts of intrinsic value and moral standing are, I hold, strongly linked. The former are the
basis for grounding the latter, although, not everyone agrees that all things that have intrinsic value are
candidates for moral standing. For example, works of art are frequently explained as having intrinsic value,
more than the aesthetic value they provide to those viewing it, without making the case that they have moral
standing.36 It may be fairly asked, if there are questions regarding the restriction of intrinsic value to entities
that have moral standing, then why not avoid the problem by simply using the term moral standing and not
intrinsic value? I continue to use both, speaking of intrinsic value or moral standing, because it is useful to
contrast instrumental with intrinsic value - to consider treating entities as a means or an end.
While I disagree that works of art should be valued more than instrumentally, this difference does not affect
the inquiry. If nature is argued to have intrinsic value without moral standing then, while I disagree that this is
correct and argue that it must hold either both or none, this is not troublesome in the context of what an
environmental ethic is designed to achieve.
An environmental ethic, like all normative ethics,37 should tell us about which entities are deserving of direct
obligation on behalf of moral agents, in other words, which entities ought to have moral standing. This moral
standing must be warranted and is grounded by showing that a given entity has intrinsic value, hence the
constant use of intrinsic value claims.38 An entity that has intrinsic value, but no moral standing, cannot be a
30

Eric Katz, Organism, Community and the Substitution Problem, Environmental Ethics, 7: no. 3, (1985), 249
Callicott. Pragmatic Power, 16
32
Aaron Simmons, Two Arguments against Biological Interests , Environmental Ethics 32, no. 3, (2010) , 231, 243
33
Darren Domsky, The Inadequacy of Callicotts Ecological Communitarianism, Environmental Ethics, 28, no. 4, (2006), 395
34
Goodpaster, Morally Considerable, 316
35
Ibid., 311
36
ONeil, Intrinsic Value, 46
37
Normative ethics, briefly, are theories of what ought to be done by agents of one kind or another, and of the related principles and criteria Attfield,
Overview, 13.
38
any general theory of normative ethics will need an account of which things have moral standing and which things have intrinsic value. Ibid.
31

5
recipient of direct moral obligation, so what is the point (within environmental ethics) of claiming that it has
intrinsic value at all? Moral standing is the issue of significance, intrinsic value the justification of moral
standing.
Now that these terms have been defined and links established, the inquiry into whether environmental ethics
is making progress towards a unified environmental ethic, can begin, starting with the most recent stage in the
discourse trend: the call for a return to anthropocentrism as a basis for an environmental ethic.

Chapter 2: The Merits of Returning to Anthropocentrism

An examination of the environmental ethics literature reveals two main forms of anthropocentrism within
environmental ethical theory: one that is focused on the intrinsic value of humans (or rather, the lack of
intrinsic value in nonhumans and nature), and one that is concerned with the wider philosophical issues
surrounding whether a truly nonanthropocentric ethic is possible. For the purpose of this inquiry, I have
adopted the labels valuational anthropocentrism and inevitable anthropocentrism, respectively.39
Philosophically, valuational anthropocentrism and its sub-groups, belong to the domain of normative ethics,
whereas issues relating to inevitable anthropocentrism belong to the wider realm of meta-ethics40(Figure 2).

Figure 2: Forms of Anthropocentrism: The meta-ethical philosophical domain is shown at the broader level, with the normative domain existing within
it. Meta-ethics is concerned with questions such as how and why we value, and what sorts of values exist.41 Normative or applied ethics are ...the
study of relevant principles of value and of obligation and their bearing on action and policy. 42 The question of whether our valuing is inevitably
anthropocentric is therefore a meta-ethical one, whereas the view that only humans are intrinsically valuable and morally considerable is a normative
claim. Two types of normative valuational anthropocentrism have been categorised for this inquiry, with brief descriptions given the diagram key.
39

I have chosen the word inevitable for ease of recognition within the inquiry. Other terms used in the field with equivalent meaning are perspectival
(Christian Diehm, Minding Nature: Val Plumwood's Critique of Moral Extensionism, Environmental Ethics, 32: no.1, (2010): 15) which is perhaps a
more appropriate term but offers less clarity; and Greys covert anthropocentrism: "a covert reference to the human point of view, to our interests
and concerns" (p. 158) (William Grey, Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71, no. 4 (1993): 466) who also says
that anthropocentrism is natural and inevitable. (Ibid., 469)
I have adopted Gary Varners term valuational for the normative domain of anthropocentrism - a term that he not only contrasts with meta-ethical
issues but also against axiological anthropocentrism: Although my view is strongly nonanthropocentric insofar as I recognise the moral standing of all
living organisms, I argue that *it+ supports what I call axiological anthropocentrism: the view that a certain class of human interests are more
important than the interests of any (or at least almost every) nonhuman organism. I label my view axiological anthropocentrism to distinguish it from
views that deny nonhuman organisms all direct moral standing. Such views I label valuationally anthropocentric. (Gary E. Varner, In Natures
Interests? (New York Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 8)
40
Environmental ethics includes ... both normative value theories (the study of relevant principles of value and of obligation, and their bearing on
action and policy) and meta-ethics, the study of the basis and status of all such discourse.(Attfield, Overview, 15)
41
Attfield, Overview, 197
42
Ibid., 15

2.1 Inevitable Anthropocentrism: Separating Meta-Ethics from Environmental Ethics

The calls for a return to anthropocentrism within the discourse trend are typically driven by the claim that all
valuing is inevitably anthropocentric, or that there is no need for a nonanthropocentric ethic once a broad
enough range of human interests are taken into account. This section deals with the former claim.
The core points of contention in the debate surrounding inevitable anthropocentrism are not limited to the
discipline of environmental ethics, but are representative of wider philosophical problems.43 Inevitable
anthropocentrists would argue that not only are all notions of value anthropogenic, (in that the concepts are
created by humans), but that ultimately (and because of their anthropogenic origins), they can all be tied back
to human interests that we cannot escape anthropocentrism in our valuing.44 In the meta-ethical domain of
philosophy this question of ultimate value is represented with terms such as the valuee vs valuer or
subjective vs objective valuing problems, whether value is universal or local, and others.45 A detailed
treatment of these concepts cannot be addressed in this inquiry, but it is important to acknowledge what
impacts they may have on normative environmental ethics.
The normative theories that will be examined in this inquiry locate intrinsic value in nonhumans, natural
wholes or even non-living things, in order to justify the moral standing that is, or ought to be, granted to those
entities. If the inevitable anthropocentrist (or more broadly, any philosopher specialising in value theory) can
show that any intrinsic value placed in nonhumans is actually (covertly) a subjective, relative or extrinsic value
that we had not previously recognised, then I acknowledge that this may have implications for all nonanthropocentric ethical theories. For example, if inevitable anthropocentrism (at the meta-ethical level),
shows convincingly that being sentient isnt objectively intrinsically valuable (and is dependent on human
valuers, for example), then this may bring new issues to light for someone who adheres to an animal welfarist
ethic.
One might argue that their dog is intrinsically valuable, aside from any instrumental value they derive from his
existence. They might try to ground this value on the intrinsic-conferring-property of sentience - the dog can
feel pleasure and pain and this is their basis for establishing intrinsic value. They insist that, even if all usevalue the dog provides to them is taken away, that it has a claim to moral standing based on its sentience. If
an inevitable anthropocentrist proves that this is just an evolutionary trick that the owner is genetically predisposed to have compassion for sentient creatures, because throughout evolution it has benefited humans to
be compassionate, then this may cause some problems for the claim that the dog has truly objective intrinsic
value (and therefore a claim to moral standing). Even if they were to show that the owners valuing is
inevitably subjective, via theoretical philosophical reasoning, without the more evidential or empirical claim
about previously unknown evolutionary ties, the problem remains that, on the surface, it would seem that the
owner is in fact shown to be an anthropocentrist, rather than a nonanthropocentrist.
However, someone who (correctly or incorrectly) intuitively believes their dog has intrinsic value is, in my
view, different to someone who rejects the notion of the dog having intrinsic value in the first place. One
holds that the sentient creature has moral standing because of its intrinsic value and then may be shown that
this intrinsic value does not really exist in a universal sense; whereas the other never holds that the sentient
43

For example, Callicott states, The question of ultimate value is a very sticky one for environmental as well as for all ethics, (Callicott, Triangular
Affair, 325)
44
Attfield, Overview, 15. Attfield uses anthropogenic to describe how values are generated by humanity or generated by human judgements in
contrast with using anthropocentric as meaning deriving from human interests. In this context, he is using anthropogenic to represent the concept of
inevitable anthropocentrism, thereby hoping to distinguish it from anthropocentrism in the normal *normative+ sense. I agree (and will argue) that
the two concepts of inevitable anthropocentrism and valuational anthropocentrism are distinct, but I also see why William Grey suggests that inevitable
anthropocentrism is more than the trivial claim that our perspectives, values and judgements are necessarily human perspectives, values and
judgements (Grey, Deep Ecology, 463). His claim, that by being (anthropogenically) generated by humans, a set of values will inevitably be in some
way related to human interests, is what, in my view, should be debated about at the meta-ethical level.
45
Callicott, Pragmatic Power, 11

8
creature has intrinsic value or moral standing in the first place. A person holding the first viewpoint might look
for other ways of explaining that individuals claim to moral standing, without having to rely on intrinsic value;
whereas the second would not ever grant moral standing to nonhuman individuals. In my view, the difference
between anthro-animal-welfarism and valuational anthropocentrism is an important one.
So, even if valuing is inevitably anthropocentric, related somehow not just to our perspectives (including those
conditioned by our culture) but in some way shape or form, to our human interests, a covertly anthropocentric
ethic with a nonanthropocentric outlook is still an important and distinct step away from conventional
valuational anthropocentrism (anthropocentrism with an anthropocentric outlook). As Attfield puts it, even
those who endorse the anthropogenic argument need not be anthropocentrists (in the normal sense).46 At
best, I would label it anthro-animal-welfarism rather than just pool it in with anthropocentrism. Some
inevitable anthropocentrists, such as William Grey, do not develop and disclose this important distinction.47
While it may be true that, as Grey says, ...a genuinely non-anthropocentric view delivers only confusion,48 so
too does philosophy itself offer confusion when environmental philosophers fail to take extra care to avoid
ambiguity in terminology with respect to distinguishing between different domains of philosophical inquiry.49
It would be clearer to say that all value-theory, including environmental ethical theories, are inevitably
subjective, or valuer-dependent, without using the term anthropocentric. The point that should be being
made is that any value system created by humans will be influenced by the human perspective - by our
epistemic location in the universe. If humans are removed from Earth, so too is the value that we conceive (if
you adhere to this side of the meta-ethical debate50). However, it would be an equally valid expression of this
point to say, hypothetically, that what value a seal finds in the world is dependent on the perspective of the
seal, and if all seals were removed, all values determined by seals disappear. The reason this sounds
problematic is because humans are held to be the only valuers and the only moral agents.51 But even so, if
a hypothetical example can be made about other valuers (such as seals, or rational beings we might not yet
know about - intelligent aliens, for example), facing the same challenge of inevitable or subjective value, then
it would be safer to use more neutral terms like inevitable valuer-centrism or inevitable value-subjectivism,
for example, leaving out the anthro part.

46

Attfield uses anthropogenic to describe how values are generated by humanity or generated by human judgements in contrast with using
anthropocentric as meaning deriving from human interests. In this context, he is using anthropogenic to represent the concept of inevitable
anthropocentrism, thereby hoping to distinguish it from anthropocentrism in the normal *normative+ sense. (Attfield, Overview, 14-15) I agree (and
will argue) that the two concepts of inevitable anthropocentrism and valuational anthropocentrism are distinct, but I also see why William Grey suggests
that inevitable anthropocentrism is more than the trivial claim that our perspectives, values and judgements are necessarily human perspectives, values
and judgements. (Grey, Deep Ecology, 463) His claim, that by being (anthropogenically) generated by humans, a set of values will inevitably be in
some way related to human interests, is what, in my view, should be debated about at the meta-ethical level.
47
For example, Greys failure to clearly separate discussion of normative and meta-ethical value theories led to Val Plumwood mistaking Grey to be an
anthropocentrist even at the normative level. Plumwood presented Greys argument as follows, 1. To avoid *abandon+ anthrocentrism one must
eschew human locations or bearings (i.e., refrain from interpreting the world in terms of human experience and values). 2. However, this is impossible
(stepping outside the scale of human scale judgement provides no basis for organising preferences). 3. Therefore anthropocentrism is unavoidable, and;
4. Therefore only human interests are morally considerable) (Val Plumwood,Androcentrism and Anthrocentrism, Ethics and the Environment, 1
(1996): 126). Grey complains that the last point does not follow from the rest and that he is happy to be labelled an anti-anthrocentrist, according to
Plumwoods articulation of this position (Grey, Environmental Value and Anthropocentrism, Ethics and the Environment 3: no 1,(1998), 99). I believe
this sort of misrepresentation would not have occurred if Grey, along with other inevitable anthropocentrists, explicitly stated that their discussion is
meta-ethical and perhaps also state their stance on anthropocentrism at the normative level to avoid any doubt.
48
Grey, Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: no 4, December 1993, 466
49
In the footnotes of the introduction, I provided the following definition of anthropocentrism drawn from Attfield: The view thatmoral standing
can be restricted to humanity alone or alternatively the related value-theory that none but human interests or concerns matter, in the sense of
having independent value (Footnote 2, emphasis added) I suggest that in an academic branch such as philosophy that is normally extremely jargonrich, it seems strange that the same term is so commonly accepted as representing both the above concepts, when it is also accepted that they are
indeed (importantly) different.
50
Attfield points out that this argument itself *inevitable anthropocentrism+ is highly suspect, implying as it does that if human valuers had never
evolved there would have been nothing bad about the pain of sentient animals, because there would have been no human valuers to confer on pain its
badness or disvalue (Attfield, Overview, 15)
51
J.M Dieterle, review of Wild Justice, 97

9
For example, by using the terms subjective value and valuing subjects, Callicott avoids the issue of whether
such subjects are necessarily human and thereby any direct link to anthropocentrism.52 Of course, we are
talking about values conceived of by humans in environmental ethics and so those that use the term inevitable
anthropocentrism are correct in context. Therefore these claims, if worthy, will have an impact on
environmental ethical frameworks, as acknowledged earlier. However, I take issue with the underlying
implication that unless one is very careful to dissect the terminology, then if a normative nonanthropocentric
theory can be shown to be inevitably anthropocentric at the meta-ethical level, it can be pooled in with and
assumed to have no important distinction from standard valuational anthropocentrism that grants moral
standing only to human beings.
While concepts from the environmental ethics discipline should generate new questions for meta-ethical value
theory, this does not have to go both ways. Philosophers may, of course, take interest in a variety of domains.
However, focusing on meta-ethical issues for environmental ethicists, in my view, detracts from the important
and central task of contributing to the normative level debate.
Environmental ethics should be concerned with which entities have direct moral standing that entails
obligation on behalf of moral agents. That direct moral standing must be justified by showing that the entity
is an end in and of itself with a good of its own. Using the term intrinsic value to explain that a nonhuman
entity is an end in itself is no more problematic than using the term intrinsic value to explain that one human is
an end in his or herself, according to another human it is not introducing a new problem of the possibility of
objective values.53 Whether the entity in question objectively possesses intrinsic value, is valued intrinsically
by the valuer, or has inherent54 (rather than intrinsic) value, should not be key questions specifically
answerable by environmental ethicists. The point is that all of those methods can be used to contrast against
instrumental, indirect, or derivative value. As Plumwood points out, the more pertinent question is: which are
the means to other ends and which are the ends deserving of direct moral standing?55
While my view is that the question of whether we can or cannot escape the human perspective in our valuing
should be treated separately in the domain of meta-ethics, environmental ethicists should still have to show
how something they claim to be intrinsically valuable has a good that is, according to our best and most
impartial judgement, independent of human benefits or interests. When we try to explain what is intrinsically
valuable to an entity, these features should be defendable against the charge that the reason for choosing
them is that those features are beneficial to the interests of humans. I return to this issue as it arises in the
next chapter.
The point relevant to this chapter is my claim that the blending of normative questions with meta-ethical
issues of ultimate value adds unnecessary complexity to the task of finding a unified environmental ethic,
which I have argued is the central purpose of the discipline. Therefore I argue that calls within environmental
ethics to return to anthropocentrism, because our valuing is inevitably anthropocentric, are unwarranted and
off-track.

52

J. Baird Callicott, Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics, Environmental Ethics, 7: no. 3, ( 1985): 263)
Val Plumwood, Ethics and Instrumentalism: A Response to Janna Thompson, Environmental Ethics, 13, no. 2, (1991): 142
54
Callicott draws a distinction between intrinsic and inherent value as follows, Let something be said to possess intrinsic value, on the one hand, if its
value is objective and independent of all valuing consciousness. On the other, let something be said to possess inherent value, if (while its value is not
independent of all valuing consciousness) it is valued for itself and not only and merely because it serves as a means to satisfy the desires, further the
interests, or occasion the preferred experiences of the valuers. (Ibid., 262) He goes on to contrast both against instrumental value. My point is that the
difference between intrinsic and inherent value is a meta-ethical question and has implication for, but should not be treated within, environmental
ethics. Where I have used intrinsic value throughout this inquiry, inherent value can be substituted without objection from me.
55
Plumwood, Ethics and Instrumentalism, 142
53

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2.2 Valuational Anthropocentrism: Reviewing the Need for an Environmental Ethic

In order to make a robust assessment of the merits of returning to an anthropocentric environmental ethic, we
need to re-examine it as a normative theory the realm of valuational anthropocentrism the view that
moral standing is restricted to humans. From here on in the inquiry, the meta-ethical issue of valuing from the
human perspective will continue to be labelled using its full title inevitable anthropocentrism whereas
anthropocentrism used alone will refer to valuational anthropocentrism.
According to anthropocentrism, only humans have a direct claim to moral standing. 56 Other entities, living
individuals, systems and non-living things, are only valuable if they have an instrumental use to humans. If
something that is not human is damaged, there may be a moral wrong to another human, if the damage
causes a decrease in the value of that things instrumental use, but there is no moral wrong done to that
thing.57 The nonhuman world is a resource a means to human ends.58 Humans lie within the intrinsic value
net and everything else exists in the net of potential instrumental value (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Valuational Anthropocentrism: Nets Marking the Boundary Intrinsic Value and Moral Standing: According to Human-centrism (A1), members
of the human species are intrinsically valuable and granted moral standing, whereas for Person-Centrism (A2), individuals who meet the criteria of
being a person (such as displaying the properties of cognition or reason), are intrinsically valuable and granted moral standing. Everything else,
including other living individuals, natural systems and inorganic things, do not have intrinsic value or moral standing. Entities without direct moral
standing may (or may not) be instrumentally valuable to humans or persons.

Aside from inevitable anthropocentrism, the other main driver behind the trend back to anthropocentrism is
that it is simply not as bad as previously thought and just needed some revising. As Grey puts it,
We need to reject not anthropocentrism, but a particularly short term and narrow conception of
human interests and concerns. Whats wrong with shallow *anthropocentric+ views is not their
concern about the well-being of humans, but that they do not really consider enough in what that
56

This is the first part of Attfields definition (normative), not the second (meta-ethical) part (see footnote 2)
Cochrane, Encyclopedia of Philosophy Section 1b
58
Anthropocentrism, as I understand it, is the view that the nonhuman world has value only because, and insofar as, it directly or indirectly serves
human interests. Katie McShane, Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism: Why Should We Care?, Environmental Values, 16 (2007): 170
57

11
well-being consists. We need to develop an enriched, fortified anthropocentric notion of human
interest to replace the dominant short-term, sectional and self-regarding conception.59
Weak anthropocentrism, the Brundtland Report60 and the sustainable development paradigm provides the
necessary revision, acknowledging, at least in theory, a much longer-term and broader range of human
interests. Consequently, there is a wealth of literature61 within the environmental ethics discipline devoted to
environmental pragmatism and the lack of need for a nonanthropocentric ethic. Much of this literature
centres around Bryan Nortons Convergence Hypothesis, which claims that, environmentalists are evolving
toward a consensus in policy even though they remain divided regarding basic values.62
If the interests of humans is taken to include a whole range of use and non-use (instrumental) benefits,
ranging from consumptive through to recreational through to option, bequest or knowledge of existence
values (Figure 4), then we already have moral obligation not to degrade nature, even if this obligation is to
humans and not to nature itself. We can be environmentalists without being non-anthropocentrists and this
is especially true if we take the interest of future human generations into our moral considerations.

Figure 4: Total Economic Value According to Weak Anthropocentrism: The diagram shows an extension of instrumental values according to weak
anthropocentrism. The values are based on an enlightened and broader notion of human interests that takes the interests of current and future human
generations into account. Environmental pragmatists claim that the goals of the environmental agenda can be met by relying on a broad understanding
of instrumental values provided to humans by the natural environment, without having to meet the challenges of grounding intrinsic value in nature.63

Environmental pragmatists tend to be long-term vision (weak) anthropocentrists, who do not consider the
notion of intrinsic value in nature to be either valid (in the case of the inevitable anthropocentrists) or
important (in the case of those who follow Nortons convergence hypothesis). Pragmatists complain that their
views are not accepted in the environmental ethics discipline, as it seems that adherence to some form of
nonanthropocentrism is a prerequisite for valid theory.64

59

Grey, Anthropocentrism, 473

Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, Transmitted to the General Assembly as an Annex to
document A/42/427 - Development and International Co-operation: Environment, http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm
61
For pro-pragmatic views: Norton, Weston, Light et al., in Ben A. Minteer, Robert E. Manning Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics: Democracy,
Pluralism, and the Management of Nature, Environmental Ethics, 21, no. 2, (1999): 192.
For anti-pragmatic views see Holmes Rolston III, Converging versus Reconstituting Environmental Ethics in Nature in Common?:Environmental Ethics
and the Contested Foundations of Environmental Policy: Minter, Ben A (ed) pp. 97-117, Temple University Press 2009; Callicott, Pragmatic Power;
Lars Samuelsson, Environmental Pragmatism and Environmental Philosophy: A Bad Marriage!, Environmental Ethics,32: no 4 (2010);
62
Bryan G. Norton, Toward Unity among Environmentalists (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1991): 86
63
Dr Isaac Boateng, Spatial Planning in Coastal Regions: Facing the Impact of Climate Change , Fig Publication no 55, The International Federation of
Surveyors (FIG), November 2010 Copenhagen, Denmark http://www.fig.net/pub/figpub/pub55/figpub55.htm
60

12
I do not hold the position that anthropocentrism cannot support an environmental ethic, although it can only
support what Regan labels an ethic for the use of environment rather than an ethic of the environment.65 In
other words, nature is a resource for human use and an environmental ethic is needed to guide us towards
better management practices for the sake of current and future human generations.
However, unlike most environmental ethicists who automatically reject an anthropocentric-based
environmental ethic because it is a mere management ethic, I would argue that there is nothing at all wrong
with an environmental ethic that treats all of nature as a means, as long as humans are indeed the only
intrinsically valuable ends deserving of moral standing. Of course, justifying that this is the case involves
having to give detailed consideration to whether nonhuman entities deserve moral standing. However the
pragmatist convergence position is that we ought to give up worrying about whether any nonhuman entities
are intrinsically valuable, because they will be protected anyway for the sake of our interests. My objection to
this is two-fold:
1) I am convinced by those who demonstrate that there is a strong case against the theory of
convergence of policy outcomes stemming from different environmental-ethical foundations and cite
examples of where divergences would occur66 and,
2) I take a non-consequentialist stance.67 So, like other environmental philosophers who base moral
judgements on motives rather than outcome, it matters morally which environmental-ethical
framework foundations a policy outcome has stemmed from, at least as much or even more-so than
the outcome of the policy and any or all instances of convergences of outcome.68
If there are any nonhuman entities that ought to have moral standing, then, if the convergence hypothesis is
false, these entities would receive differential treatment to humans under the principles of anthropocentrism.
In fact, even if we (for now) assume that the theory of convergence is plausible that the same environmental
outcomes will be achieved regardless of whether we value nonhuman entities for their own sake or for ours
then they have still received differential treatment, because they have not been granted the same moral
consideration as humans receive under the principles of anthropocentrism. Therefore it is important to know
whether this differential treatment and more generally anthropocentrism, is morally justifiable.
In examining why humans are seen to be the only intrinsically valuable entities, two lines of reasoning emerge
(A1 and A2, in Figure 2).69 Importantly, these two lines of reasoning are incompatible with each other and one
of these lines of reasoning, in my view, is not actually anthropocentric at all.

64

In general, the field has provided a critique of instrumental human-based arguments for environmental policies, and has attempted the development
of a nonanthropocentric ethic or value theory which will account for a direct moral consideration of nature. Eric Katz and Lauren Oechsli, Moving
beyond Anthropocentrism: Environmental Ethics, Development, and the Amazon Environmental Ethics, 15: no. 1, (1993), 49
65
Tom Regan, The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic., Environmental Ethics, 3 (1992): 20
66
Holmes Rolston expresses his view that it is probably a pointless exercise to draw Nortons attention to endless, and even more extreme, examples
showing where his convergence hypothesis may run into difficulties. As he says, Given his convictions about how anthropocentrism can be enlightened,
stretched, wolves to spiders, I fear that it might become pointless to offer Norton any more examples of direct caring for nature; he is going to cut all
the evidence to fit his paradigm. (Rolston, Converging, 100-101) Rolston continues this line of reasoning by arguing (rightly) that most instances of
convergence between non-anthropocentrism and broad, long-visioned or weak anthropocentrism can be put down to the non-anthropocentrists
enlightening the anthropocentrists to the issue and then the anthropocentric theory being weakened further to accommodate the new issue, again
implying that anthropocentrism alone would never have recognised the problem in the first place
67
Consequentialism means that ...whether an action or policy is right or wrong is determined solely by its results, its consequences. (John ONeill, Alan
Holland and Andrew Light, Environmental Values, New York: Routledge (2008): 6) Outcome-focused views are limited and inadequate from where I
stand, because they rely on the assumption that we have conceived of every example and also that things will not change. For the same reason in this
inquiry, I do not accept suggestions that it is redundant or unnecessary to reason as if an entity has its own interests if its interests will somehow be
protected by the interests of other entities. If we conceived at the time that the interests of slave owners would always outweigh the interests of the
slaves, then we would have had, on the consequentialist account, no reason to inquire as to whether there are any wrongs being committed against the
slave.
68
James Hughes, Saving Human Rights from the Human Racists, Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, Posted March 27 2006, Originally
published June 10, 2003. http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/551/
69
That is, at the level of ethical theory and normative ethics - the level where we are not interested in the concept of whether intrinsic value can in
theory exist, objectively, or subjectively; but rather where it exists and where it does not exist. For purposes of clarity - there are two forms of

13
The split between the two groups is marked by their definition of what is valuable about or in humans and is
quite succinctly described by Hughes as the clash of rights paradigms in the transhuman era.70 In his
article, Saving Human Rights from the Human Racists, Hughes discusses how rights, as set down in the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), can be shown to be grounded in persons or humans,
depending on the interpretation. Grounding rights in humans instead of persons is a position he labels
human-racism.71 Favouring the liberal democratic interpretation of rights72 in which, traditionally, the
rationale for rights was that it encouraged the fullest potentials of individual personalities, Hughes points out
that,
Since the only minds that were ever considered [to be relevant] by democratic theorists were those of
human beings, this tradition became subsumed within human-racism, which could appeal to religious
beliefs about the soul and the divine intention for human beings.73
After noting this convergence of humans and persons at the time of the creating the UDHR, he then goes on to
clarify how rights should be interpreted according to liberal democratic theory,
In liberal democracys personhood tradition rights are for persons, not humans, and not all humans
are persons nor are all persons necessarily human. As the UDHR says, Everyone is entitled to all the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status to which we need now add, species.
Hughes sees the aim of the rights movement in the transhuman era as being to ...free the rights regime from
the human racists and social constructionists, and make it clearly a movement for the rights of persons.74 This
human-racism is analogous with the concept of speciesism,75 first coined by Ryder76 and more famously
developed by Peter Singer.77 Both Singer and Hughes hold strong objections to the notion that humans as a
species are morally more significant than others. The point for now is that there is one group of
anthropocentrists whose common tie is that they value humans in part or solely because they belong to the
human species. This means they are entitled to superior, or exclusive, moral standing and a different group
that grants moral standing to the humans based on their personhood characteristics, rather than their species.
In order to be clear about which group of anthropocentrists I am discussing, the labels human-centrism and
person-centrism will be adopted to distinguish these theories. Anthropocentrism is better sounding than
either of these labels, and perhaps if environmental ethicists begin to truly distinguish some anthropocentric
theories from others that are not strictly anthropocentric, then the label should be re-adopted. However,
because each theory is to be separately tested against the charge of speciesism in the following section, the
terms human-centrism and person-centrism will be kept for clarity.
anthropocentrism spreading over the meta-ethical (perspectival) and normative (valuational) levels but the point of interest here is that there are also
two forms of anthropocentrism within the normative (valuational) level.
70
During a recent debate between Greg Stock and George Annas at Yale University, Annas insisted that the human species needed protecting from
human enhancement. This is why, he says, he is proposing an international treaty to make cloning and inheritable genetic modifications crimes against
humanity. Stock, in turn, says he doesnt care about the species, in the abstract; he cares about people. Hughes, Saving Human Rights
71
Ibid.
72
He examines two other interpretations. The natural rights interpretation, based on self-evident moral truths provided by God-given or alternative
secular natural law, which he dismisses based on the naturalistic fallacy: natural rights provides little practical guidance since everyone sees different
self-evident truths emerging from the same facts. Secondly the evolving social contract or social constructionist interpretation, based on the notion
that ...rights are whatever people decide they should be, and for whomever we decide they should be... They are historically specific agreements about
what a good society would ideally guarantee... which he also dismisses based on the arbitrariness of human convention *which] weakens the purely
social constructionist case for rights. Ibid.
73
Ibid.
74
Ibid.
75
Also analogous with human-chauvinism, used by (include references), but one negative term (speciesism) will suffice for this project.
76
Richard Ryder, "Speciesism" New Scientist (1971) (0262-4079), 134 (1824), p. 52.
77
Peter Singer, Neither human nor natural: ethics and feral animals, Reproduction, Fertility and Development, (1997) 9: 159

14

2.2.1 The Speciesism Distinction: Human-Centrism (A1) and Person-Centrism (A2)

In an in-depth account of speciesism, Horta offers the following three alternate definitions,
(S1) Speciesism1 is the unjustified disadvantageous consideration or treatment of those who are not
classified as belonging to one or more particular species.
(S2) Speciesism2 is the unjustified disadvantageous consideration or treatment of those who are not
classified as belonging to one or more particular species for reasons that do not have to do with the
individual capacities they have.
(S3) Speciesism3 is the unjustified disadvantageous consideration or treatment of those that are not
classified as belonging to one or more particular species on the basis of species membership alone.78
(S3) is the strictest of the definitions in the sense that a theory is not speciesist unless it specifically lists species
membership as the basis for differential treatment. Accordingly, avoiding the charge of speciesism is easiest if
definition (S3) is adopted. If a theory fails the test of (S3) it automatically fails the tests of the other definitions.
(S1) is the least strict in the sense that it triggers the charge of speciesism even if species membership is not
actually listed as the basis for differential treatment (this will be explained in further detail below).
Accordingly, avoiding the charge of speciesism is hardest if definition (S1) is adopted. The distinction between
(S2) and (S3) is subtle and based on a difference that is unrelated to this inquiry.79 In any case, because (S1) and
(S3) (the least and most strict definitions) are all that is required to test the theories against the charge of
speciesism, (S2) is ignored from this point on.
Human-centrism certainly lists species membership as a basis for differential treatment this differential
treatment (at least in terms of consideration of interests) is required by the very definition of the theory.
Importantly, though, human-centrism is only speciesist if the disadvantageous consideration or treatment of
nonhumans is unjustified. If human-centrists can justify the differential treatment, then it is not speciesism.80
However, Horta cautions that to provide sound justification means more than merely making an argument for
it.81
It is therefore the obvious lack of justification provided by human-centrism that leads me to identify it as a
speciesist position and consequently reject it as a theory. Either there are no defence arguments given at
all,82 or they tend to be based around traits that cannot be verified, such as the possession of a soul, or that
they are members of the chosen species created in Gods image.83 The claim that humans (and humans
alone) possess an intrinsically-valuable soul is clearly controversial and does little to settle the issue of whether
there are other forms of intrinsic value that exist in non-humans and nature generally.
A retort may also be made that by human-centrists that their differential treatment is not unjustified, because
it is natural to show preference towards ones own species over others. If all other species are speciesist, then
what is wrong with speciesism? However, differential treatment can only be classed as unjustified if it is the
result of a conscious decision by a moral agent. Therefore other species are not speciesist, even if they do
show preference to their own kind. The fact that we are aware of our differential treatment, as moral agents,
means that we must work harder to show why that differential treatment is justifiable. If a position is shown
to be speciesist, then, it is not simply an observation, but rather grounds for its rejection.
78

Oscar Horta, What is Speciesism? Journal Of Agricultural & Environmental Ethics, (2010) 23: 3, 244-245
As Horta explains, the very argument that might have led some to reject (S1) in favor of (S2) would drive them to abandon (S2) and adopt (S3).
80
If, like Horta, speciesism is taken to infer a negative or morally unjustified position. Horta states that, The term anthropocentrism should be clearly
distinguishable from speciesism. These two words are not synonyms. (Ibid., 258)
81
Ibid., 247
82
Horta calls this definitional defenses of speciesism (Ibid., 253)
83
Ibid., 253; Hourdequin and Wong, A Relational Approach To Environmental Ethics, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 32:1 (March 2005) 20
79

15
Human-centrism, which grants moral standing on the basis of species membership fails the test of (S3) the
easiest test to pass. Therefore, even if the convergence hypothesis holds and the only differential treatment
given is with respect to which entities interests are given consideration, human-centrism cannot support a
morally sound environmental ethics framework.
Speciesism can be detected even in pluralistic approaches that try to accommodate, for example, sentience, as
a morally significant value, in combination with the value of being human. If human interests are favoured at
any point simply because they are interests of members of the human species, then this is combined
speciesism.84
However, if human interests happen to be the most (or only) morally significant interests and this can be
justified by arguments that truly do not relate to species membership, then this would not be classed as
speciesism according to (S3). It would also follow that this sort of theory would not truly be human-centrism or
anthropocentrism, but rather something else person-centrism.
As shown by Hughes, a distinction can be drawn between those who value humans because of the species
they belong to, and those who value humans because of properties they exhibit, possess, hold or contain 85
which qualifies them as persons. According to person-centrists, only persons should have rights or moral
standing, with all non-persons being valued only instrumentally depending on their use-value to intrinsically
valuable persons. The intrinsic-value-conferring property86 is not membership of the species, but rather
other properties commonly rationality or reason, sentience, cognition, consciousness and other similar
mental state functions.
Whereas there may have been convergence between these two groups at the outset of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, (in that only humans were thought to possess intrinsic-value-conferringproperties and therefore moral standing at the time), this was never the case at the base value theory level.
The person-centric theory was always importantly more adaptable and fluid than the human-centred theory,
because regardless of what results empirical studies may find (for example in finding that some apes truly do
reason in the same way that humans do87), the human-centrist can only consistently hold that human beings
ought to have moral standing. Hughes concentrates on these distinctions as well as the clashes that appear in
the realm of human genetic engineering and artificially intelligent beings,88 where the human-centrists would
(if being consistent with their theory) deny moral standing, whereas the person-centrists might extend moral
standing, if these individuals met their criteria of what constitutes a person.
According to (S3), then, person-centrism is not speciesist, as it does not actually specify species membership as
one of, or the only, criterion for moral standing. However, it might be revealed as speciesist using the less
strict definition, and therefore the harder test of, (S1):

84

Horta labels this a combined speciesist position See Simple and Combined Speciesist Positions, Ibid., 254
Hughes, Saving Human Rights
This term is used widely within environmental ethics. For example see Callicott, Pragmatic Power, 5; William Fitzpatrick, Valuing Nature NonInstrumentally, The Journal of Value Inquiry, 38: 3 (2004): 319
87
See the research by Michael Tomasello and Esther Hermann Ape and Human Cognition: Whats the Difference?, Current Directions in Psychological
Science 2010 19: 3
88
In the transhuman era, however, the right to control our own body and mind is running smack up against human racism and natural law. People such
as George Annas, and a range of bio-Luddite forces from the Catholic Church to the deep ecology movement, are aligning to assert that peoples use of
technologies of human enhancement on their own body and mind is not a right, but a violation of human rights and dignity. Bans on the right to
cloning and inheritable genetic self-modification have been written into international treaties and national laws. According to the opponents of genetic
enhancement, people will violate the rights of their children and the dignity of the human race if they eliminate a genetic propensity for cancer or
increase their capacity for memory, and then have children. The human racists also believe that any nonhuman intelligences created by technology
whether a post-human, enhanced animal or machine mindwould be rights-less abominations. Sadly this line of argument is itself the most profound
offense to human rights tradition (Hughes, Saving Human Rights)
85
86

16
(S1) Speciesism1 is the unjustified disadvantageous consideration or treatment of those who are not
classified as belonging to one or more particular species.
Horta acknowledges that (S3) is sound, but that there are pragmatic reasons in favour of (S1) that outweigh
it. He goes on to show that according to (S3) if we apply the same principle to racism, a person would not be
racist if they discriminated against people who lack the property of white skin, simply because they do not (or
claim not) to care about the particular race itself. According to this principle the treatment will certainly be
disadvantageous, and it may be unjustified, but it will not be an instance of speciesism but something else.
He then dismisses (S3) because there are reasons not to try to restrict the meaning of speciesism, racism, or
sexism to denote only those discriminations based on species, ethnic, or sex group belonging alone, without
any further reason being considered.
These reasons are mainly that racism and sexism are normally used to be mean something wider than this, and
hence, if we accepted (S3) we would have to change the meanings of *racism and sexism+ today. Personally, I
am not convinced by this dismissal of (S3), but I can agree that it is not simply enough for a person-centrist to
arbitrarily choose a property that they know is only located in humans in order to automatically exempt
themselves from speciesism, simply because they no longer list membership of the species in their criteria.
There are two points here that, I argue, save person-centrism from speciesism:
1) There is no property that humans hold (other than the possibility of a soul or similar human-centrist
concepts), that exist in all humans and no non-humans,89 so it would be impossible for a personcentrist to succumb to this error. This is sometimes called the argument from marginal cases, by
showing that infants, elderly or disabled humans may not meet the criteria for moral standing if too
strict, whereas if the criteria is relaxed, at least some animals will meet them and qualify for moral
standing.90
2) Secondly, there are good philosophical grounds to show that some of the properties that happen to
exist predominantly only in humans, such as reason, or having interests in ground projects91 are
genuinely more morally significant than other properties and interests,92 independent of the species
involved, and therefore the differential moral treatment they advocate is not unjustifiable as per the
definition of speciesism.
I draw the conclusion then, that human-centrism (A1) entails speciesism whereas person-centrism (A2) does
not. It is also not entirely appropriate to label this group (A2) as anthropocentrists, even if at any point in
time, past present or future, humans happen to be the only beings that meet their criteria of a person. Using
the label anthropocentrism to cover the underlying concepts from both the groups I have classified, because of
a near total, or total, convergence of outcomes only serves to create more ambiguity. This is especially the
case when non-anthropocentrists make claims that anthropocentrism is analogous with speciesism,93 when
clearly this charge cannot accurately be made against person-centrists who truly94 care not about the species
but about other properties.
Furthermore, person-centrists should be challenged to show why the properties they hold to be important
should mark the boundary of intrinsic value, instead of being extended to beings that possess the properties of
89

Singer, 2009, p.574. Horta prefers to call this the argument from species overlap, to avoid the possibility of the word marginal being taken to mean
less human (Horta, Speciesism, 263)
90
Horta, Ibid., 262
91
Varner, In Natures Interests?: 89.
92
Ibid., 8
93
Hence there is no justifiable basis for drawing the boundary of value around our own species. To do so is to give preference to the interests of
members of ones own species, simply because they are members of ones own speciesand this is speciesism (Singer, Neither Human nor Natural:
Ethics and Feral Animals Reproduction, Fertility and Development, CSIRO, 9: 159 (1997))
94
I use truly to affirm once again that a property cannot simply be listed in order to mask underlying bias towards the human species.

17
sentience (without reason), life (without sentience), or even why moral standing should be limited to
individuals rather than systems. These challenges need to be set against the narrow choice of properties
adopted by person-centrists, not against the outcome that humans might be the only ones who possess those
properties. The charge of speciesism should be made against the human-centrists and based on other grounds
in terms of their listing human species membership as the criterion for moral standing.
Anthropocentrism should be reclassified so that person-centrists no longer belong to this theory. Once personcentrism is removed from anthropocentric theory, only human-centrism (speciesism) and, at another
philosophical level altogether, inevitable anthropocentrism, remain under the umbrella of anthropocentrism.

2.3 Against the Pragmatic Case for Returning to Anthropocentrism

Given that Nortons convergence hypothesis, which currently forms the basis of so much in environmental
pragmatism, had the aim of unifying environmentalists,95 it is somewhat ironic that I argue that it, along with
other renewed calls for anthropocentrism, takes environmental ethics off the right track.
The common denominator standpoint of environmental pragmatists is that environmental philosophers
should give up on the notion of intrinsic value in nature, because this ongoing debate has had an alleged lack
of influence on environmental policy. Pragmatists would rather see tangible environmental outcomes, not
endless theoretical debate.96 I object to their standpoint because:
1) I agree with those that contend that environmental ethics and philosophy has indeed had an effect on
policy;97 and those that say that even if it hasnt had much of an effect yet, it does not follow that we
should simply give up,98
2) I agree with the view that an environmental pragmatist position is not a truly philosophical position99
and that theoretical environmental ethics debates are necessary in their own right, regardless of
whether they have any practical impact.100
However if theoretical debate about intrinsic value in nature has been (to date) ineffective in driving policy
outcomes, then what outcomes will possibly be achieved by filling environmental ethics journals with a
replacement debate about the debate?
On the one side, pragmatists are occupied with proving how environmental outcomes can be achieved without
having to resort to appeals to intrinsic value, focusing their attention on theoretical inquiry to convince
philosophers that their arguments are valid, instead of practicing what they preach and getting on with the job
of helping to influence environmental policy. On the other side, those who disagree with the convergence
hypothesis are distracted from the task of debating which entities should be morally considerable and instead

95

Brian Norton, Biodiversity and environmental values: in search of a universal earth ethic, Biodiversity and Conservation (2000), 9: 1030
Callicott, Pragmatic Power, 12
Callicott, Pragmatic Power, 13; There is plenty of evidence to suggest that belief in intrinsic values in natire is playing an increasingly prominent
role in the formation of environmental attitudes and policies worldwide. Philosophical debate about intrinsic value clearly remains as pertinent as ever.
(Christopher J. Preston, Epistemology and Intrinsic Values: Norton and Callicotts Critiques of Rolston, Environmental Ethics, 20: 411)
98
Samuelsson replies to the pragmatists position about environmental ethics and philosophy thus: Let us for the moment, suppose, for the sake of
argument, that pragmatists are right that theoretical debates, such as those about intrinsic value in nature, are hindering the ability of the
environmental movement to forge agreement on basic policy imperatives. Does it follow that philosophers should not participate in such debates? It
certainly does not. (Samuelsson, Bad Marriage, 409); Katie McShane, Why Environmental Ethics Shouldnt Give Up on Intrinsic Value,
Environmental Ethics, 29: no.1, (2007): 45-46;
99
Ibid., 405 and 408
100
The question of whether nature has intrinsic value is philosophically interesting in its own right, and there is every reason to pursue it even if doing
so would put some hindrances in the way of policy-forming environmentalists- they will simply have to face up to the challenge of overcoming these
hindrances (and perhaps there is something useful to be gained on the way). (Samuelsson,Bad Marriage!, 412)
96
97

18
must focus their attention on showing how policy outcomes stemming from different base-value theories
would be different.
Were the points of Callicotts Triangle Affair not challenged enough by the issues of reconciling conflicting
theories, without having to band together to defend the need for environmental philosophy in the first place?
To continue to engage with theoretical discussions of the merits (or lack thereof) of environmental
pragmatism, is to continue to take a step away from, not towards, achieving more tangible and frequent policy
outcomes which again is only one of the purposes of environmental ethics. Consensus should be strived for,
not simply at the level of policy outcomes, but at the level of ethical foundations. At the foundational level of
anthropocentric theory, what is important is why humans alone should be considered intrinsically valuable and
whether differential treatment for the human species can be morally justified.
...[S]ome philosophers have wanted us to move beyond discussions of intrinsic value and get on with
saving the world. However, deep questions about the nature of value do not disappear upon
command. It is the job of moral philosophers to address such questions. While moral philosophy can
contribute to clear-headed activism, it is not the same thing, and should not be confused with it.
Discussions of intrinsic value are not going to go away.101
I can now, therefore, conclude that there is no merit in returning to anthropocentrism to ground an
environmental ethic. The two main justifications for the renewed support for anthropocentrism relate to the
concepts of inevitably anthropocentric valuing and the lack of need for a nonanthropocentric ethic due to the
convergence hypothesis within the theory of environmental pragmatism. I have argued that:

Inevitable anthropocentrism is an issue relevant to meta-ethics but not to the central task of
environmental ethics;
Anthropocentrism affords differential treatment between humans and nonhuman entities, even if the
convergence hypothesis holds and the outcomes of environmental policy are the same, because
human interests have been taken into moral consideration whereas the interests of nonhuman
entities have not; and
This differential treatment, if based on species membership, is unjustifiable and therefore speciesist.

Therefore, regardless of how enlightened, long-sighted, weakened or broadened anthropocentrism becomes,

it is not a theory that can be morally justified and should be rejected. In the discourse trend (Figure 1), before
anthropocentrism2 (inevitable anthropocentrism and pragmatism), came ecocentrism (defined by
commitment to ethical-holism), which is the focus of the next chapter in this inquiry.

101

Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment: An Introduction, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.75

19

Chapter 3: The Merits of Ecocentrism and Ethical-holism

The two principal environmental ethical theories that can be considered non-anthropocentric are biocentrism
and ecocentrism.102 The distinction between biocentrism and ecocentrism is fairly well understood within the
journals devoted to environmental philosophy,103 but elsewhere ill-defined, due mostly to the fact that both
terms are used interchangeably to contrast against anthropocentrism.104 Despite this confusion, it is possible
to draw a clear distinction between biocentrism and ecocentrism which both sides would agree with, and that
distinction drives the definitions adopted for this inquiry. We can be confident that the definitions are not
skewed to make either look more reasonable than the other, because they are drawn primarily from the
writings of Attfield (a self-proclaimed biocentrist) and Callicott (a self-proclaimed ecocentrist).
These are some of the types of distinction that Attfield has made:
Characteristically, biocentrists locate moral standing in individual creatures rather than, as holists do,
in systems, respecting systems because of the lives (or the flourishing lives) that they protect or make
possible rather than for themselves...105
[Others have] attributed intrinsic value to ecosystems, and this kind of stance is usually rejected by
biocentrists and is called ecocentrism instead...106
Ecocentrists... maintain that ecosystems have a good independent of that of their component
individuals, and as such have their own moral standing... While some ecocentrists suggest that systems
(and possibly species) alone have intrinsic value (an unqualified holist position), others hold that the
intrinsic value of systems and of species coexists with that of individual creatures107
Some distinctions made by Callicott include:
To reach out and touch all living beings with moral considerability, several theorists proposed having
interests as a plausible and defensible intrinsic-value-conferring property... A living being a tree for
example can have interests in the absence of consciousness...108
The main problem, theoretically speaking, with biocentrism as this modified or expanded Kantian
approach to nonanthropocentric environmental ethics has come to be called is that it seems to stop
with individual organisms...109
[Some] philosophers, among whom I count myself, have been called ecocentrists since we have
advocated a shift in the locus of intrinsic value from individuals (whether individual human beings or
individual higher lower animals) to terrestrial nature the ecosystem as a whole.110

102

Sentientism (or animal welfarism) is distinct from biocentrism, but the point of distinction is not relevant to this chapter, and in any case would be
covered more closely by the principles of biocentrism than ecocentrism, as it is focused on the moral considerability of individuals that display a given
property. With animal welfarism, that property is sentience, and with biocentrism, that property is related to living, or having an individual biological
function, or telos. (J. Baird Callicott, Back Together Again) Environmental Values, 7: (1998): 464. Sentientism can be seen as a half way point between
anthropocentrism and biocentrism, but does not constitute an entire point of the triangle, like anthro, bio and ecocentrism do.
103
I say fairly well, because you can find many instances still of them being used interchangeable in the literature against anthropocentrism, and
Callicott (clearly not a biocentrist as we now understand it) uses the term biocentric rather than ecocentric in Triangular Affair, even though the
concepts he discusses clearly relate to ecocentrism rather than biocentrism. If there is ambiguity within the journals that focus on these terms and their
differences, then it is no wonder that the wider community use them interchangeably.
104
Consequently, biocentrism, focused on individual living organisms as the centre of moral concern, is often used to intrinsically enfranchise more than
it does (for example, species and ecosystems) and ecocentrism is sometimes taken to be concerned primarily with nonhuman individuals, without
mention of natural wholes or biotic communities.
105
Attfield, biocentrism talk, 1
106
Ibid.
107
Attfield, Overview, 11
108
Callicott, Pragmatic Power, 7
109
Ibid., 8

20
So the fundamental difference between biocentrism and ecocentrism will be taken here as a denial of, or
prerequisite commitment to, ethical-holism, respectively.
Nelson notes that, The central popular tenant of holismis that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
Holists believe that there are certain properties or qualities that emerge at the level of the collective which
do not attach merely to a collection of constituent individuals.111
Contrary to Benthams doctrine112 ethical-holists hold that the interests or the welfare of a community as
such is not reducible to the aggregate [interests or] welfare of its members.113
Ecocentrism is therefore defined as a theory that in some way grants moral considerability to natural holistic
entities or systems directly. Ecocentrism takes knowledge of ecological wholes and attempts to combine this
with the philosophical foundations of ethical-holism in order to ground a normative nonanthropocentric
environmental ethic.114
Biocentrists object to this, as pointed out by Attfield:
Ecocentrism is held to take systemic factors more seriously than rival views. However, biocentrists
and others can recognize that systems shape the development of life and of evolution in a causal
manner, without recognizing either that these systems have an identifiable good of their own or that
they should be given consideration over and above their living members... [B]iocentrists maintain,
*that+ it is unnecessary to reason as if the health of... systems mattered independently.115
Whether it is a question of being, as Attfield mentions, unnecessary and therefore somewhat redundant, or a
question of whether it has any substance o validity, depends on whether one takes a consequentialist stance
or not.116 I do not, and therefore will need to examine how holistic entities might possibly matter
independently as ends in and of themselves (i.e. as intrinsically-valuable beneficiaries of direct moral
standing).
However, the literature concerning the pros and cons of ecocentrism is not solely devoted to the issue of
whether and how wholes can be said to have moral standing. Other relevant issues relate to what implications
would arise if we were to grant moral standing to ecosystems and other natural holistic entities.
Therefore this chapter is split into three sections. The first introduces the various versions of ecocentrism,
considers the issues regarding each, and then presents my findings as to whether they ought, in my view, to be
accepted or rejected. The second deals with the more conceptual issue of granting moral standing to wholes
and the substance of ethical-holism generally, and then the findings of my assessment as to whether
ecocentrism, based in ethical-holism, can support a valid environmental ethic. Finally, I assess whether
Callicotts original concern about the inadequacy of individualistic environmental ethics to account for and to
protect natural wholes was sufficient to warrant his call for the ethical overhaul required by the adoption of
ethical-holism, so that I can draw a conclusion as to whether ecocentrism and discussions of ethical-holism
have led environmental ethics down the right or wrong track.

110

Callicott, Land Ethic, 3

Michael P. Nelson, Teaching holism in Environmental Ethics, Environmental Ethics, 32: 1 (2010), 40
112
The community is a fictitious body composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the
community then is, what?-the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it cited in Callicott, Triangular Affair, 323
113
See Varner, Natures Interests?, 12
114
Ecocentrism represents a one element subset of nonanthropocentrism *that+ values ecosystems as wholes and defines value in terms of the wellbeing and flourishing of these ecosystems. Ceteris paribus, it tends not to differentiate between the relative value of an ecosystems diverse
constituents.
115
Attfield. Overview, 11
116
Attfield labels his own view as biocentric consequentialism (Attfield, Overview, 43)
111

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3.1

Six Versions of Ecocentrism: An Analysis

I have categorised six theories, which I believe encompasses all of ecocentrism, to be evaluated in this section
for ease, labelled E1 through to E6. The philosophy of Deep Ecology is sometimes labelled as ecocentric
theory,117 but will not be classed as such nor examined in this inquiry. I agree with the categorisation given by
Cochrane, that all versions of radical ecology (including deep ecology) are better described as political
movements or ideologies, rather than normative environmental ethics theory.118 Even if conceived as an ethic,
it is better understood as an umbrella term for all non-anthropocentric theories collectively, rather than just
ecocentrism or ethical-holism.
The ideas driving E1 to E6, and the boundaries and differences between them, are based upon both literature
research and my reasoning as to how many possible versions there could conceivably be. If we are talking
about wholes and individuals then (on the surface at least) there seem to be a limited number of
combinations in terms of the location of intrinsic value. If for present purposes we can imagine intrinsic value
as being something that can be possessed, then either:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Neither wholes nor individuals possess it

The individuals possess it and the whole does not
The whole possesses it and the individuals do not
Both possess it but the whole is more significant than individuals
Both possess it but the individuals are more significant than the whole
Both possess it and neither the individuals or the whole are more significant than the other

There is no need to consider the first (akin to pragmatism) and second (akin to biocentrism) in an analysis of
ecocentrism, because we have defined ecocentrism as having a commitment to the notion of ethical-holism
that natural wholes can and do have intrinsic value. So position c) and d) above will account for E1 and E2.
Position e) is barely ecocentric as it favours individuals, but does support the notion of ethical-holism and is
considered last (E6). Position f) (moral pluralism) is considered second last (E5).
What, then, are E3 and E4 possibly going to be about? Callicotts own (post Triangular Affair) theory does not
fit neatly into any of the above, because an added layer of complexity must be included that allows for
humans, among the other individuals, to be given different treatment and priority. So E3 and E4 can be
roughly described as:
g) The whole possesses it and the individuals do not, except in the case of humans, that do
possess it
h) Both possess it but the whole is more significant than individuals, except in the case of
humans, who possess more of it
Of course, this is far too simplistic, but serves to explain how the six theories were conceptualised for the
project. As we will see, Callicotts theory has shifted over time far enough to change categories, as would be
the case with other ecocentric theorists (and all philosophers, for that matter). Therefore it is more robust to
examine all conceivable options, rather than just those that relate to issues frequently discussed in the
literature.

117
118

Brian K. Steverson, Ecocentrism and Ecological Modeling; Environmental Ethics, 16: 72

Cochrane, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Section 2a

22

Figure 5: Forms of Ecocentrism (Defined by Commitment to Ethical-holism): The meta-ethical philosophical domain is shown at the broader level, with
the normative domain existing within it. Meta-ethics is concerned with questions such as how and why we value, and what sorts of values exist. 119
Normative or applied ethics are ...the study of relevant principles of value and of obligation and their bearing on action and policy. 120 Whether our
valuing is inevitably anthropocentric is still relevant in influencing ecocentrism and is therefore still shown at the broader level in the diagram, whereas
ecocentrism is another type of normative ethic and its various theories are defined by their shared commitment to the notion of ethical-holism, which
relates to the view that intrinsic value should be located in holistic entities, such as communities, societies and natural systems. Six versions of
ecocentrism have been categorised for this inquiry, with brief descriptions given in the diagram key.

3.1.1 Ecocentrism Version 1 (E1) and Version 2 (E2):

E1, (Monistic Ethical-Holism, or Radical-Holism) is perhaps the easiest account of ethical-holism to describe,
as it is the simplest - without any exceptions for humans or any instance of moral pluralism, which is why I am
examining it as the first version (in contrast to it being examined first because it is a better or worse theory,
as this remains to be tested).
Because it is a monistic121 ethic, it is able to be expressed diagrammatically in the same way as valuational
anthropocentrism in the previous chapter, by showing a net of intrinsic value and moral standing surrounded
by one that is lacking direct moral standing.

119

Attfield, Overview, 197

Ibid., 15
121
As opposed to moral pluralism, monism is defined by the Collins English Dictionary as, the attempt to explain anything in terms of one principle
only.
120

23

Figure 6: Ecocentrism Version 1 (E1): Nets Marking the Boundary Intrinsic Value and Moral Standing: According to Ecocentrism Version 1 (E1) or Radical
Holism, natural wholes such as species, biotic communities, ecosystems and the biosphere or Earth as a whole are intrinsically valuable and granted
moral standing. Everything else, including humans and other living individuals, and inorganic things, derive their value depending on their relative
contribution to the good of the whole (instrumental) and do not have intrinsic value or moral standing.

Callicott, in his Triangular Affair paper, explains the basics of the ecocentrist (ethical holist) position in terms
of the land ethic, adopted from Aldo Leopolds seminal and influential work, A Sand County Almanac:
The land ethic manifestly does not accord equal moral worth to each and every member of the biotic
community; the moral worth of individuals (including, n.b., human individuals) is relative, to be
assessed in accordance with the particular relation of each to the collective entity which Leopold
called "land." 122
In this light, individuals are only valuable in the way that they perform niches and supporting roles for other
natural holistic entities, such as species, biotic communities, ecosystems (including non-living components
such as rivers, soil and air), right up to the level of the entire biosphere, or Gaia.
While ecocentrists often write as if individuals do have intrinsic value and moral standing, this tends to be
dependent on (or relative to) their playing their part in the natural ecosystem and so this intrinsic value is
indirect, if intrinsic at all. It is more accurate to say that individuals, according to this ethic, are members
with instrumental value to the holistic entity in question, with that whole being described as the only entity
that has independent or intrinsic value, entailing direct moral standing. Callicott, in 1980 starts out with a
position that is similar to the above account:

122

Callicott, Triangular Affair, 327. Note that Callicott refers to members of the biotic community here and in most instances in his work, whereas, as
he notes, Leopold used the term land to represent a holistic entity. The point being assessed in this thesis (about relative worth being assessed in
terms of a whole) is relevant regardless of which holistic entity the author happens to mention, be it species as species, human communities, biotic
communities and onwards.

24
...by reference to a single good, competing individual claims may be adjudicated and relative values
and priorities assigned to the myriad components of the biotic community123
Without yet examining whether holistic entities such as ecosystems can be said to have intrinsic value or
warrant moral standing, E1: Monistic-Ethical-Holism, or as it is also known radical holism, can be rejected on
other grounds namely, its repugnant eco-fascism124 or misanthropy.125
This issue of misanthropy is discussed at length in environmental ethics discourse,126 however Attfield perhaps
best and most succinctly sums it up in a bold and attention grabbing claim, that according to this theory,
lying, murder, cheating and stealing become in most cases morally neutral, and sometimes actually right.127
Similarly, the concept of eco-fascism is most clearly described in terms perverse outcomes for humans that
would otherwise have been protected by their independent intrinsic value and moral standing, because
concepts of moral rights and obligations have been most thoroughly developed in the case of human
individuals. However if we can speak of non-human individuals as having moral standing or rights as such,
then eco-fascism could also be discussed in terms of perverse outcomes for nonhuman individuals. In short,
while misanthropy generally relates to the issue of outcomes that are perverse for humans, eco-fascism
implies favouring ecosystems and other natural holistic entities in a way that is unjustifiable because it
diminishes or abolishes individual (usually human) rights to moral consideration.
Radical ethical-holism would deny that individuals, including humans, have a claim to moral standing if they no
longer serve a purpose in the biotic community, or when they have no instrumental value, or can no longer be
utilised as a means to serve the good of the ends, which in this case is the natural system.
Callicott admits as much in his Triangular Affair paper:
The biospheric perspective does not exempt Homo sapiens from moral evaluation in relation to the
well-being of the community of nature taken as a whole. The preciousness of individual deer, as of any
other specimen, is inversely proportional to the population of 'the species. Environmentalists,
however reluctantly and painfully, do not omit to apply the same logic to their own kind... The extent
of misanthropy in modern environmentalism thus may be taken as a measure of the degree to which it
is [eco]centric... The land ethic manifestly does not accord equal moral worth to each and every
member of the biotic community; the moral worth of individuals (including, n.b., human individuals) is
relative, to be assessed in accordance with the particular relation of each to the collective entity which
Leopold called "land".128
So, to use a different example to Attfields: A holistic or ecological examination of the global human
population tells us that we are very overpopulated and that the Earths carrying capacity cannot sustain us. If
this potential destabilisation of the ecosystem is seen as a problem for the ecosystem itself and there are no
123

Ibid., 338. Callicott offers Leopolds maxim as a measure of whether an action is good, A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,
stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise (Aldo Leopold, The Land Ethic, in A Sand County Almanac (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1949): 224-25)
124
While Murray Bookchin (Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology, Green Perspectives, 4 & 5 (1987): 1-23), is credited with coining the term ecofascism, Regan was the first to employ it against ecocentrism in particular. Regan actually used environmental fascism (Tom Regan, The Case for
Animal Rights, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 362), However in this inquiry I will continue to use the term eco-fascism.
125
Misanthropy is a hatred and disgust of humans, particularly of a group of humans (Lisa Gerber, What is so bad about misanthropy?, Environmental
Ethics, 24: no. 1, (2002), 41. Misanthropy is also a challenge for other theories such as Regans egalitarian animal rights theory, where he discusses the
issue of a crowded lifeboat situation, where he is faced with sacrificing a dog or a human of the same weight the problem being that the theory would
seem to permit either choice as morally equivalent and this is a perverse outcome for humans.
126
Richard A. Watson, Misanthropy, Humanity, and the Eco-Warriors, Environmental Ethics, 14: no. 1, (1992): 95; Andrew Linzey, On Misanthropy,
The Animals Agenda, 21: no. 1, (2001): 21; Damon Darlin, The Age of Misanthropy, Forbes, 158: 15, (1996): 37
127
Robin Attfield, Aldo Leopold: A Brief Appraisal, Department of Philosophy, Oregon State University, Reflections Special Issue 3, August 1998
128
Callicott, Triangular Affair, 326. Callicott actually uses the term biocentric in discussing misanthropy, but the theory he is discussing is in the
context of this project not aligned with biocentrism and instead relates to ecocentrism. At the time of writing Triangular Affair he did not draw
distinctions between the terms biocentrism and ecocentrism. (Emphasis added.)

25
other considerations, it would not matter how this is done for example by means of making choices to have
less children or by culling humans presently alive. This position is therefore eco-fascist.
Does that make it invalid? For most, including Callicott himself, it is enough to reject at the very least this
version of, ecocentrism or ethical-holism.129 The eco-fascist implications of one of the examples used130 in the
Triangular Affair article is what Callicott himself sees as one of the main regrettable features of the infamous
essay.131
However, while at the practical level this theory struggles because it is certainly hard to imagine mainstream
society ever accepting an ethic that completely removes human rights, it cannot be too quickly dismissed,
because some do not see eco-fascism as a problem at all. Consider the global human suicide movement132 or
some of the principles put forward by Dave Foreman and Earth First,133 or some of the more fundamentalist
elements of the deep ecology social and political movement.134 These are obvious and proudly radical
positions that accept the misanthropic implications of their ethical theory.
In the previous chapter, I explained the need to show, not simply that a theory is speciesist, but why it is
unacceptable to hold a speciesist position. Similarly, a position that knowingly accepts and adheres to
misanthropic implications requires more attention than simply being rejected because of eco-fascism. In
terms of comparing this version, E1 Radical Holism, to other versions of ethical-holism I have more respect
for it at the theoretical level than the others in that it is quite clear, monistic and does not include exceptions
for humans. This is interesting, as it seems to be the one most quickly dismissed by environmental
philosophers, even those committed to holism. Rolston seems to agree that misanthropy is preferable to
speciesism:
*I have+ been taken to task by Attfield and Brennan for arguing that we ought sometimes to save
nature rather than feed people.... I run the risk of being misanthropic; that is better than to risk being
an arrogant humanist. And I welcome continuing debate about how, in these dilemmas, to be most
humane.135
However, while the issue of misanthropy is confined to humans and we may knowingly agree to waive our
rights, if we adopt radical holism we also subject nonhumans to the status of having no intrinsic value
independent of the natural wholes they exist within. It is unfair of us to decide on behalf of nonhuman
individuals they (along with us) have no moral standing. For this further reason, I reject E1 because of its ecofascist implications for both human and nonhuman individuals.
As for E2 (Pluralistic Ethical-Holism that provides for independent intrinsic value and moral standing for
individuals as well as wholes, but always shows preference to wholes); I am more accepting of this type of
moral pluralism that provides clarity with regards to preferences in cases of clashes of interests than I am
of other kinds of moral pluralism that do not, such as we will see in E5. It is not my intent to provide a critique

129

What is wrong with this alternative categorical imperative is, of course, that it permits (i.e., does not exclude) misanthropy. (Rabb, from Tripods,
179 ) Callicott dismisses it in his Case Against Moral Pluralism paper (page 103)
130
Callicott argues that the biocentric or biospheric perspective *for our purposes this is ecocentric or ecocentric perspective] does not exempt Homo
sapiens from moral evaluation in relation to the well-being of the community of nature taken as a whole.4 Indeed he goes on to state explicitly that
The extent of misanthropy in modern environmentalism thus may be taken as a measure of the degree to which it is biocentric.5 Callicott cites, if not
with approval at least without disapproval, Edward Abbeys controversial claim that he would rather shoot a man than a snake."... What Callicott seems
to be recommending is nothing more nor less than a violation of Kants categorical imperative, treating human beings simply as a means. - Rabb
131
Callicott, The Case Against Moral Pluralism, 103.
132
Kochi and Ordan present such a position In An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity (Tarak Cochi and Noam Ordan, Borderlands E-Journal,
7: 3 2008 http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol7no3_2008/kochiordan_argument.pdf
133
The origins and history of the Earth First movement are traced in, Society: environment: Grey green: Jake Bowers and Jason Torrance look back on
10 years of Earth First! - and ahead to uncertainty Jake Bowers and Jason Torrance. The Guardian *London (UK)] 02 May 2001: .8.
134
See Bill Devall, Deep ecology and radical environmentalism, Society and Natural Resources, 4: no 3 (1991), 247-258
135
Rolston, Saving Nature, Feeding People, and the Foundations of Ethics, Environmental Values,7: (1998): 356

26
of moral pluralism (and monism) in here and, in any case, E2 can be rejected without this. To put it shortly, E2
suffers from eco-fascist implications in the same way as E1.
Depending on how it is interpreted, these shortcomings may be of the same degree or a lesser degree, but still
remain. If the interests of wholes take precedence but not but individuals have some lesser standing, then
outcomes or consequences that are inevitably going to be eco-fascist may be less severe instances of ecofascism than with E1. For example, if it is in the interests of nature to eliminate the human race, E1 might
permit a policy that requires active global suicide, whereas E2 might reject this policy in favour of a policy that
bans any further reproduction. Although because E2 still favours the whole it requires us to reject any weaker
compromise proposals put forward that allow humans to continue to reproduce, say to a lesser degree.
Therefore both are misanthropic and eco-fascist, but one is more severe than the other. However, saying a
theory is less racist, sexist or speciesist does not exempt it from these negative traits and the same can be
said for eco-fascism. So E2 can be rejected for the same reasons as E1, without having to discuss the issues of
moral pluralism.

3.1.2 Ecocentrism Version 3 (E3) and Version 4 (E4):

So how do ecocentrists avoid the charge of eco-fascism? Adopt a theory (E3) that holds that:
1)

Ecosystems (and other natural wholes) have intrinsic value (or are intrinsically valuable) and therefore
ought to have direct moral standing
2) Natural individual living organisms have only instrumental value, or derive their intrinsic value only in
terms of their place within the whole, with the exception of,
3) Humans, whose interests cannot be overridden by those of the whole, because humans also have
independent intrinsic value (or are intrinsically valuable as distinct from their relationship to the
ecosystem or biotic community)
However, if this loophole moral standing is attributed to humans based on their species membership
without adequate justification, then this position (and therefore this theory) would be speciesist.136 As for E4:
a pluralistic version of the above account, that holds that both individuals and systems have intrinsic value, but
that the interests of the system are more morally significant than those of the individual except in the case of
humans - this is still a speciesist position if the differential treatment is not justified (in the same way that E2
was still eco-fascist, even if in some circumstances not as severely as E1).
So to avoid both eco-fascism and speciesism, an ecocentric theory must simply provide an exception that
protects human interests against the interests of the whole and also provide that the differential treatment
given by the human exception be morally justifiable. A lot to ask - but according to Callicott, this is achievable.
While his earlier papers follow the line of E1 or perhaps E2, Attfield notes that Callicotts subsequent theory
can be better described as a social ethic and is strikingly conventional when compared with his former
views.137 In response to the charge of eco-fascism by Regan138 and after being convinced by the arguments of
Midgley about animals and their historical place alongside humans in society,139 Callicott deepens his
communitarian approach to account for several different levels of kinship and community (rather than the
biotic community being the only morally valuable whole) and provides that obligations arising within closer

136

Refer to the definitions of speciesism adopted for this inquiry S3 (Section 2.2.1) this is an instance of Hortas combined speciesism in that one
premise amongst the theory is speciesist therefore the whole theory is.
137
Attfield, Ethics of Environmental Concern (2nd edition), xv
138
Regan, Animal Rights, 362
139
Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, Athens : University of Georgia Press, (1984)

27
(kinship) relationships such as family should come before obligations to broader communities such as human
society and in turn, the biotic community.140
According to Attfields interpretation, Callicotts theory would not require someone to impoverish their own
children to prevent starvation of those in another continent (an example previously devised by Singer, who
argues in favour of such action141). Callicotts theory would then on the same basis of kinship and community
require that preventing human starvation takes precedence over environmental obligations.142 However, as
Attfield goes on to point out, Callicotts theory,
...suffers from failure to explain why conventional beliefs about obligation should be accepted as
definitive. (What is so morally special about family ties as to justify letting strangers starve?).143
In the same turn it can be asked, what is so morally special about ties within the human species to justify
favouring human interests above the interests of the ecosystem or whole communities when nonhuman
individuals are denied this advantage?
Leaving the question of whether these communities, as holistic entities, can be said to have intrinsic value
aside for now, the case must be made by Callicott that the preferential treatment given to the human
community over other individuals and communities is morally justifiable, in order to avoid being a speciesist
position. My view is that he does not in fact succeed in making this case and that E3 and E4 are indeed
speciesist theories. As Attfield concludes, Callicott ...supplies no rational basis either for indentifying the
nature and limits of our various obligations or for determining priorities among them.144
It is one thing to say that individuals have no value aside from the instrumental value they accrue in their role
as a means to serve the end (the natural whole); whilst this has eco-fascist implications, at least they are
evenly spread without discrimination based on species membership. E3 and E4 require that nonhuman
individuals have no direct moral standing, whereas humans are allowed a different set of rules, simply because
they have a closer genetic relationship.
Horta identifies that this differential treatment appears a clear instance of speciesism and attempts to
explain why the intrinsic value of nonhuman individuals is commonly disregarded:
...[N]onhuman animals are usually considered not as individuals but as mere live exemplifications of a
species (because of widespread speciesist attitudes). Hence individuals are frequently identified with
the species they belong to. But just as the group of all triangles does not have the properties that
triangles themselves have, the interests of an individual cannot be said to be the interests of his or her
species.145
Attfields bold statement about lying, murder and cheating sounds shocking because it refers to an
indifference to human rights, so ecocentrists must find moral exemptions for humans to avoid the charge of
eco-fascism. But what about other creatures? Take Australias cane-toad epidemic as an example. It is widely
accepted that the cane toad population must be significantly brought down or completely eliminated from the
system it is adversely impacting upon. Sometimes, their pest status is used to justify their maltreatment (for
example by using them as golf balls in backyard games). It is instructive to consider what ecocentrism has to
say about this practice.

140

Robin Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern 2nd ed., University of Georgia Press (1991): xv
Peter Singer, The Singer Solution to World Poverty New York Times September 5, 1999
142
Attfield, Environmental Concern 2nd ed., xv
143
Ibid., xv- xvi
144
Ibid., xvi
145
Horta, Speciesism, 250
141

28
The ecocentrist (or ethical holist) values the ecosystem intrinsically and does not hold that the toads have any
instrumental value to the system (because they are unnatural, exotic, alien, pest146). If we take the position of
E1 or E3 - nor did they ever have independent intrinsic value or claim to direct moral standing as distinct from
their relationship to the whole. It is not true that ecocentrism would require toads to be culled in ways that
cause suffering or allow that this is morally sound; simply that a consistent account of E1 and E3 would be
silent on this point. As Callicott himself points out, pain is natural and therefore not evil147 - sentience does
not enter into consideration in determining the morally right outcome. E1 would also be silent on this point in
the case of culling humans that involved undue suffering, but E3 would not even support a cull of humans, let
alone one that involves suffering.
Under E2 and E4, the toads may have their own intrinsic value but their interests should always be overridden
by those of the whole. Hence they would both require the cull of toads but would not permit a means that
involves undue suffering. E2 would permit the culling of humans but only in a humane way whereas E4 would
not ever require the culling of humans, irrespective of the means. The differential treatment of toads and
humans only appears within E3 and E4 and the question now is whether such differential treatment can be
justified.
E1 and E2 were already rejected in the previous section. However, they nevertheless do not fail this
speciesism test.
In the case of E3, it is hard to see how it could ever be justified that nonhumans should be subjected to not
only disadvantageous treatment regarding their culling but also complete indifference as to the way in which it
is carried out. Why should sentience in humans matter if sentience in nonhumans is not relevant?
As for E4, it may be that culling nonhuman individuals without undue suffering for the good of the ecosystem
while at the same time allowing that humans should never be culled for this reason, is a differential treatment
that could be morally justified without succumbing to speciesism. However something would have to be said
about what in particular makes a human individuals interests more morally significant than a toads interests.
Neither E3 or E4 provide this justification, because Callicott simply offers that, as a matter of fact, humans
have more obligations to other humans than they do to the rest of the biotic community.
So the hybrid versions E3 and E4 that provide loopholes for the human race meet Hortas definition of
combined-speciesist positions and therefore rejected. If the answer to this speciesism is to bounce back to E1
or E2 and demand that humans be treated as nothing more than plain members and citizens of the biotic
community,148 then we return to the problem of eco-fascism. We must move on in our search for a valid
ecocentric ethic.

3.1.3 Ecocentrism Version 5 (E5):

What about strict moral pluralism? I use strict to distinguish this group from E2 and E4, which could also be
considered versions of pluralism, due to the combination of individualistic and holistic moral standing or
intrinsic value, according to the following definition adopted by Peter Wenz:

146

It is also probable that ecological science, with its (neutrally) holistic focus, categorised the toad as a pest species, which may go some way in
explaining why each individual is sometimes treated as a pest in itself, with no morally relevant interests. I am not of course suggesting that this
categorisation was wrong.
147
Callicott, Triangular Affair, 333. I return to this issue in section 4.2
148
Leopold, Sand County Almanac

29
A theory is pluralistic when it contains a variety of principles that cannot be reduced to or derived
from a single master-principle.149
However, as Attfield points out in discussing Wenzs account of pluralism:
Wenz, however, urges the modifying or blending of a variety of conflicting principles of justice, and
may thus be in favour of reconciling and prioritising principles in such a way as to tacitly endorse after
all what he appears to oppose, a monistic normative system150
I favour this interpretation and consider that E2 and E4 are, while pluralistic in some ways, both examples of
monistic normative systems, because of their clear set of priorities amongst conflicting principles. And so it is
E5, the theory that attributes intrinsic value to all individuals and systems with no set guiding principles to
manage competing interest claims, that I consider as a case of actual moral pluralism amongst the ecocentric
theories being examined here.
Clearly, this is not the only version of moral pluralism within environmental ethics discipline overall,151 and
moral pluralism itself is indeed not an issue confined to environmental ethics. It is beyond the scope of this
inquiry to cover its merits and problems exhaustively. Even a brief account of moral pluralism in
environmental ethics cannot take place without turning again to Callicott and his widely-cited work, The Case
Against Moral Pluralism152:
...*O+ne begins to wonder why our best, most systematic, and thoroughgoing environmental
philosophers cling to moral monism... Taylor and Rolston have mounted veritably epic efforts to save
the philosophical integrities of their respective systems. Taylor will save his biocentrism at the cost of
patent sophistries... and Rolston can save his only by resorting to ambiguity and courting equivocation.
Why? Why don't we all just become merry moral pluralists?
In response, Callicott offers a variety of defences for moral monism, mainly centred on pluralisms problems of
relativism, nihilism and lack of rational guidance in situations where principles clash and require contradictory
outcomes.153
While I do not take such a strong monistic stance as Callicott to require that all principles arising from a
normative ethic must come from a single version of meta-ethics154 (which might count out E2 and E4), I do

149

Peter Wenz, Environmental Justice Albany: State University of New York Press, (1988), 310
Attfield, 2nd ed., intro p xii
151
For example other forms of moral pluralism in environmental ethics attempt to be multicentric as Weston would have it - anthro, bio and
ecocentric all at the same time. E5 is not the same as this version it is not adopting several centrisms but a simultaneous individualistic and holistic
ethical foundations.
152
Callicott, Moral Pluralism, 109
153
Callicott highlights the problem of conflicting independent principles using Wenzs observation that, Without a single master principle in the
background, what is to be done ... when one of the independent principles in the pluralistic theory requires a course of action different from and
incompatible with the course of action required by one of the other independent principles ... ? In this kind of situation, the theory yields either no
recommended course of action or contradictory recommendations. Wenz, Environmental Justice, 313 in Callicott, Moral Pluralism, 109
Consistency is not just a shrine before which philosophers worship. There is a reason for wanting consistency, insured by organization around or
derivation from a "master principle," among one's practical precepts. Attempting to act upon inconsistent or mutually contradictory ethical principles
results in frustration of action altogether or in actions that are either incoherent or mutually canceling.
Moral pluralism fails to specify what to do when two or more of its theories indicate inconsistent practical imperatives.
Grant skepticism the freest rein. Must we, therefore, accede to nihilism and relativism, as the deconstructive postmodernists seem to think? Not
necessarily, I would argue. Though we may not hope to marry Truth to Reality, we may hope to find an intellectual construct that comprehends and
systematizes more of our experience and does so more coherently than any other.
154
Callicott protests that Moral pluralism, in short, implies metaphysical musical chairs. I think, however, that we human beings deeply need and
mightily strive for consistency, coherency, and closure in our personal and shared outlook on the world and on ourselves in relation to the world and to
one another. Stone is skeptical that Truth, with a capital T, may be had in matters metaphysical. I am no more sanguine than he, but I do think that we
can expect to generate comprehensive conceptual systems that fully embrace our ever-growing body of empirical knowledge, scientific theory, and selfdiscovery.
150

30
believe that principles need to be prioritised and, like Callicott, cannot accept that moral pluralism is distinct
from anything goes relativism155 or postmodernism.156
In my view, the most powerful point made in Callicotts work, is that pluralism tends to appear when achieving
consensus simply seems a lost cause, and counters:
Why must we resort to negotiation between intractable parties when hope of agreement remains?
Why not listen to one another... and be open to persuasion?157
Attfield also supports Callicotts objection to pluralism and adds that,
*S+uch views are liable to generate hopelessly contradictory decisions. They also undermine any
serious possibility of consistency on the part of the agents who adhere to such position. It might be
added that (at least in the form which accepts the equal validity of diverse perspectives) they are all
self-undermining; everyone who accepts such pluralism would have to grant that there could be an
equally valid perspective which requires rejecting it... Further, as Callicott goes on to point out, since
pluralism offers no rational basis for resolving ethical conflicts, its adherents are likely, when pressed,
to resort to the principle most in line with self-interest.158
On this account, a proponent of E5 would be likely to resort one of either E2 or E4, (if they tend to favour the
principles of ethical-holism over individualistic ethics), or they might opt for a version altogether different from
the ones we have considered in this chapter, (if they favour (even nonhuman) individuals over holistic entities
in cases of clashes of interest). This is the next and last version to be considered (E6).
While I agree that its important not to create unnecessary division and to polarise arguments, I do believe that
we get no closer to achieving consensus or agreement by ignoring the differences and focusing only on winwin scenarios all the time only closer to ambiguity and inaction (or inconsistent action). This willingness to
simply give up on the possibility of persuasion and the pessimistic attitude that implies that we will never find
a theory that accounts for our variety of viewpoints is, in essence, my problem with moral pluralism and the
overarching reason for rejecting E5.

3.1.4 Ecocentrism Version 6 (E6):

E6 is the theory that advocates ethical-holism in providing for direct moral standing to natural wholes, but
holds that the intrinsic value of individuals is more significant, or that the interests of individuals (including
nonhumans) should, other things being equal, always supersede the moral standing of natural wholes. Like E2,
E4 and E5, it is pluralistic, granting moral standing to individuals and to wholes on different grounds, but unlike
E5 (and like E2 and E4) it sets out a clear guideline in terms of where preferences lie.
Firstly, it may be asked whether this is an ecocentric theory, given that the eco or the whole does not seem
to be the centre of moral concern. However, ecocentric theories were defined in this inquiry as those that
adhere to the notion of ethical-holism that holistic entities and natural wholes either have morally relevant
interests or properties that exist separate to the sum of the collective interests of its members. Someone who

155

I am uncomfortable with the implications of relativism in this caseif everything can be seen from both a reductionist and a holist perspective, and
if both points of view are equally legitimate and self-confirming, how can anyone argue that we should have a holistic (or reductionistic) metaphysics or
ethics? (Nelson, Teaching Holism, 47).
156
Absent such a comprehensive model to focus and order our competing moral concerns, we are left with kaleidoscopic and random, albeit enriched,
moral lives-individually. Collectively, socially, we are left with irreconcilable fractional disputes. Stone's happy-go-Iucky moral pluralism, culturally
generalized and interpreted, is allied with-if not equivalent to-deconstructive postmodernism. Absent a comprehensive and culturally shared new myth,
we are left with plural points of view, perspectives, multiple outlooks-each of which has an equal claim on "truth."(Callicott, Moral Pluralism, 116)
157
Ibid., 119
158
Attfield, Overview, xii

31
denies this concept of ethical-holism is not an ecocentrist, but proponents of E6 do adhere to ethical-holism as
part of their pluralistic environmental ethic.
E6 is not eco-fascist like E1 and E2, not speciesist like E3 and E4 and does not suffer from relativism like E5. 159
So does E6 suffer any other shortcoming that means it must be rejected before the general inquiry into the
overall plausibility of ethical-holism really begins?
From a consequentialist perspective, E6 is entirely redundant. A biocentric theory, that finds intrinsic value in
all living things (and future beings) as well as instrumental value in the natural systems that support them
(Figure 7), would deliver the same outcomes. If all living individuals are granted direct moral standing that is
more significant than that of the system it exists within, then policies will look the same whether or not the
system itself is considered intrinsically valuable.160

Figure 7: Biocentrism: Nets Marking the Boundary of Intrinsic Value and Moral Standing : According to Biocentrism, living individuals who have
interests and display goal-directed activity are intrinsically valuable and granted moral standing. Everything else, including natural wholes and inorganic
things, do not have intrinsic value or moral standing. Entities without direct moral standing may (or may not) be instrumentally valuable to some or all
living individuals.

A complaint put to Nortons convergence hypothesis and used make a contrary claim regarding divergence, is
that differences in the location of intrinsic value between theories will influence what proponents of those

159

Because it grants standing to individuals and wholes on different ethical foundations, it may still be unfavourable to strict moral monists who do not
recognise more than one metaphysical framework as a foundation for an environmental ethic, but the clear guiding principles that govern clashes of
interest between individuals and wholes means it is still overall a monistic normative system.
160
Domsky points out a similar issue in discussing the possibility of patching holes he finds in Callicotts communitarianism (a version of ethical-holism):
The problem is that any criterion that will work as a supplement will work too well. For instance, if we add on conation as a third disjunct, and allot
moral standing not just to kin and community but to entities that exhibit interests, wills, or goods of their own... there will be no way to stop conation
from entirely replacing kinship and community as normative criteria. Because conation applies to everything that kinship and community do and more
besides, the latter would be rendered practically superfluous. Compared to conation, kinship and community would be less reliable and always
redundant, and so they would cease to play any useful or distinctive normative role. It would always be simpler, and more to the point, to focus on
conation alone. Thus, supplementing communitarianism is effectively impossible. Once supplemented, the original criteria will simply atrophy.
(Domsky, Callicotts Communitarianism, 411).

32
ethics perceive as problems in the first place. Thus, an anthropocentrist is unlikely to recognise situations as
problems that some non-anthropocentrists would readily accept as problems that we ought to act upon.161
As stated in the first chapter, I agree that anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric ethics will not always
converge at the policy level. However, the difference between E6 and biocentric individualism is far more
subtle. Rather than relying on an ever expanding concept of what is in the interests of human beings to
deliver convergence, in both of these theories, each and every living individual has intrinsic value and moral
standing. In both theories, natural wholes, species, biotic communities and other holistic entities are highly
valuable. In E6, the whole has intrinsic value, but for biocentric individualism, it cannot, because wholes
cannot be said to have interests, intrinsic value, or direct moral standing. However, in both theories, on the
intrinsic scale, the individual always trumps the whole anyway and therefore convergence at the policy level is
inevitable. Hence, from a consequentialist perspective, E6 is not necessary and is redundant.
However a non-consequentialist will find little comfort in talk of convergence. Practical irrelevance or
redundancy should not come into the question of what has intrinsic value and on what grounds. So for the
non-consequentialist, what matters is whether the holistic entities do or do not have intrinsic value, regardless
of what course of action comes about as a result of the answer. And because E6 suffers no obvious
shortcoming like E 1-5, I will now consider the validity of ethical-holism. If ethical-holism holds, then E6 is a
valid ecocentric theory, but still redundant from a consequentialist perspective when compared to biocentric
individualism.

3.2

The Plausibility of Ethical-holism: Implications for Ecocentrism

Our scientific knowledge of the interdependencies and functions at the natural systems level (often derived
from the branch of systems ecology), can be utilised in two ways. Either it is a means a tool that we can use
to most effectively manage our interactions with the environment for the sake of intrinsically valuable ends
that rely upon the functionality of nature as a whole (practical-holism). Or it is this (a means), as well as a
foundation for (ecocentric) ethical-holism, because the intrinsically valuable ends that rely upon the
functionality of nature as a whole, include the wholes themselves. This section examines the plausibility of
granting moral standing directly to wholes, focusing predominantly on the evidence put forward by Callicott
within his ethically-holistic theory of social and ecological communitarianism. The first sub-section examines
the conceptual proof for ethical-holism, the second revisits the issue of inevitable anthropocentrism as a
special case problem for ethical-holism and the third analyses its philosophical foundations.

3.2.1

Burdens of Conceptual Proof

As Varner, once himself an ethical-holist, came to realise, ...ethical-holists bear a large burden of ethical and
conceptual proof.162 By ethical burden, he refers predominantly to the problem of eco-fascism described in
the previous chapter, and by conceptual proof he means that:
Ethical-holists must either (1) explain how a very different kind of entity an ecosystem can have
interests or (2) defend a different basis for the ascription of intrinsic value and show that ecosystems
meet this criterion... I do not think that any available approach adequately meets these burdens.163
161

Attfield, Overview, 13
Varner, Natures Interests?, 11
163
Ibid., 11
162

33
In Triangular Affair, Callicott describes two ways in which ecological wholes are described metaphorically in
the science of ecology: the third-order organic whole and the biotic community.164
By third-order, Callicott means:
Ordinary organic bodies have articulated and discernible parts (limbs, various organs, myriad cells);
yet, because of the character of the network of relations among those parts, they form in a perfectly
familiar sense a second-order whole. Ecology makes it possible to see land, similarly, as a unified
system of integrally related parts, as, so to speak, a third-order organic whole.
By biotic community, Callicott means:
The various parts of the "biotic community" (individual animals and plants) depend upon one another
economically so that the system as such acquires distinct characteristics of its own. Just as it is possible
to characterize and define collectively peasant societies, agrarian communities, industrial complexes,
capitalist, communist, and socialist economic systems, and so on, ecology characterizes and defines
various biomes as desert, savanna, wetland, tundra, wood land, etc., communities, each with its
particular "professions," "roles," or "niches."165
Callicott is sometimes criticised for not accurately depicting the science of ecology.166 The atomism versus
holism debate within ecological science itself is not at all settled, and this is very problematic for ecocentrists,
as Steverson points out:
This debate has dramatic consequences for ecocentrism. If it turns out that the individualistic
perspective is correct, then ecocentrism will be stripped of its ontological foundation. If there are no
inherent, ecological structures to which humans can essentially belong, then claims that such
membership entails alterations in humanitys treatment of the nonhuman natural world are moot.
Calls for such alterations would then have to be grounded in atomistic perspectives, or in some type of
nonecological holism. On the other hand, if ecological holism is tenable, then the possibility remains
that ecocentrism is viable.167
However, Callicott is not as out-of-touch with ecology as he is sometimes made out to be. In Aldo Leopolds
Metaphor, Callicott admits to the problem of drawing the philosophy of ecocentrism from the science of
ecology, due to the science itself constantly changing. Most notably, he acknowledges recent developments
including:
... the impeachment of the diversity-stability hypothesis, the evaporation of the wilderness idea, the
diminishing credibility of the Clementsian holistic paradigm and the corresponding ascendency of the
Gleasonian individualistic paradigm in theoretical ecology, the impeachment of the community
succession-to-climax model and even the typological community, and the emphasis, in general, on
change rather than continuity.168
However, there is a saving grace for ecocentrism, proclaims Callicott: The concept of ecosystem health to the
rescue!169

164

Callicott, Triangular Affair, 321-322

Ibid., 322. Emphasis in original
166
As Domsky puts it, ...it seems *Callicott+ must ignore all science before 1927 and after 1935 (Domsky, Callicotts Communitarianism, 402)
167
Steverson, Ecocentrism and Ecological Modeling, 78
168
J.Baird Callicott, Aldo Leopold's Metaphor, in Robert Costanza, Bryan Norton, and Ben Haskell, eds., Ecosystem Health: New Goals for Environmental
Management (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1992): 42-56
169
Callicott, Aldo Leopolds Metaphor, 47
165

34
The first of Varners conceptual proof challenges to ethical-holists listed at the outset of this section is to
show that ecosystems have interests. In Chapter 1 (section 1.1), the link between intrinsic value and moral
standing was introduced. A little more detail is now required to establish what it means to have moral
standing and how this relates to having interests. Influenced by Varner,170 Attfield,171 Goodpaster,172
Plumwood173 and Cahen,174 my view is that:
1) To have moral standing is to have an entitlement to moral considerability, and at times moral
obligation, from moral agents
2) The potential to be benefited or harmed, or to be in a better or worse state independently of
others interests, is a requirement for being a candidate for moral standing
3) To have interests or to take an interest is a requirement to having the potential for benefited or
harmed (although interests can be more or less morally significant)
4) The potential to have an interest requires, at bare minimum, genuine goal-directedness
Callicott certainly argues that ecosystems (and other natural wholes) warrant our moral consideration,175 but
the concept of ecosystem health fails from there onwards. Callicott draws one very fundamental, not to say
essential, characteristic that ecosystems and organisms share in common - their capacity for self-renewal, or
autopoesis.176 This single capacity is relied upon to ground the concept of ecosystem health and the notion
of having interests.
However as Varner quickly points out so does a sand heap share this capacity, the implication being that
we need to know more about what is being renewed before we can say that the capacity for self-renewal is
morally significant.177 Clearly, while a sand dune is autopoetic, and can also be the object of our aesthetic
appreciation, it cannot be said to have a state of health, or an interest that can be benefited or harmed. What
is the distinction then between being simply autopoetic or being autopoetic with interests (and therefore
moral standing)?
I am convinced by Cahen, who contends that, while ecosystems (and sand dunes) can definitely have a goaldirected look, this is not necessarily genuine,
... *W+e ought to recognize a distinction between goals and behavioural byproducts. A defensible
conception of goal-directedness must distinguish true goals from outcomes that a system achieves
incidentally. Ecosystem resilience and stability look like goals, but this appearance may deceive us. An
ecosystem property such as stability might turn out to be just a byproduct, the incidental result of
individual activities aimed exclusively at the individuals own goals.178
There are probably plenty of examples in ecological science literature and within environmental ethics, of
natural wholes, (such as species, biotic communities or populations, ecosystems and the biosphere as a
whole), that seem to display instances of goal-directed activity. However, the question of whether superorganisms exist in nature is empirical. Even if evidence is gathered to show that a species, for example, is not
just a kind or taxonomic type but literally can be said to be an organism, or if Lovelocks Gaia Hypothesis
proves that the biosphere is one big individual then it is simply another individual to be considered within
170

Varner, Natures interests?

Attfield, Overview
172
Goodpaster, Morally Considerable
173
Val Plumwood ,Ethics and Instrumentalism: A Response to Janna Thompson, Environmental Ethics, 13, no. 2, (1991) 147
174
Cahen Against the Moral Considerability of Ecosystems Environmental Values, 10: no. 3, (1988), 195 - 216
175
Callicott again refers to the Land Ethic: One fundamental and novel feature of the Leopold land ethic, therefore, is the extension of direct ethical
considerability from people to nonhuman natural entities. (Callicott, Triangular Affair, 312)
176
Callicott, Aldo Leopolds Metaphor, 51
177
Varner, Natures interests?, 18
178
Cahen Against Considerability Ecosystems, 204
171

35
the moral framework. As Varner says, ...if ecosystems literally were organisms, then we could plausibly speak
of conditions being better and worse for them... [W]e could do this without attributing psychological states to
them.179
However, if (according to some approaches) a trees interests are considered to be less morally significant than
those of sentient organisms (because its lack of psychological state means it can only have an interest in its
biological goals, without taking an interest in them180), then a newly discovered super-organism would at best
still only achieve the same rank on the intrinsic ladder as a mere tree. Surely this minimal level of direct moral
standing is not enough to account for what environmentalists most care about as Callicott would have it181
because even trivial human interests would, on most accounts, trump the non-sentient interests of this thirdorder organism. Callicott clearly wants the direct moral standing to be more significant:
If the concept of ecosystem health turns out to be plausible and persuasive and if its norms and
indices can be specified, the cause of biological conservation may be bolstered.182
Allowing that the whole is indeed greater than the sum of its parts, the concept of the third-order whole can,
as Katz points out, more easily fall prey to the fallacy of eco-fascism. This is due to the notion that parts of a
whole (such as a persons liver) cannot meaningfully be said to have intrinsic value in addition to the whole
only instrumental value through their function and utility,183 which we have seen is E1 or radical holism,
rejected because of its eco-fascist implications.
Similar problems of linguistics in holism have been picked up by Nelson, who highlights the difference between
using metaphors of the ecological web, with no discernable joins (individuals or members) versus the idea of
the net of ecology, showing the interdependence of the parts of the net, but showing that there are
individually recognisable nodes or knots in the net that represent intrinsically valuable beings or members of
the whole.184
Katz therefore prefers the ecological communitarian model for ethical-holism, where the whole is perceived as
a community of interdependent members, who can nevertheless still be said to have their own interests and
autonomy separate to those that relate to their function and utility to the whole, likening ecological
communities to university communities or other holistic social entities.185
Importantly though, while Callicott also leans more towards the communitarian approach,186 he stresses that
the well-being of the community per se must not be assessed reductively, in terms of the well-being of its
individual members.187
Bentham's view of the "interests of the community" was bluntly reductive. With his characteristic
bluster, Bentham wrote, "The community is a fictitious body composed of the individual persons who
are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then is, what? the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it.188

179

Varner, Natures Interests, 16

Ibid., 55
181
Callicott. Pragmatic Power, 8
182
Callicott, Aldo Leopolds Metaphor, 44
183
Katz, Substitution Problem", 245
184
Nelson, Teaching Holism, 45
185
Katz, Substitution Problem, 246
186
And in my own case, I have settled on a communitarian philosophy and a theory in which multiple *that is, plural+ duties and obligations are
generated by community membership and grounded in a variety of distinctly moral sentiments Callicott, Silencing Philosophers: Minteer and the
Foundations of Anti-foundationalism, Environmental Values, 8 (1999): 502
187
Varner, Natures Interests, 16
188
Callicott, Triangular Affair, 323 (Callicotts emphasis)
180

36
Within his ecological communitarian version of ethical-holism, Callicott draws from Darwin and Leopold and
employs kinship and community as the criteria for moral standing.189 Showing that the biosphere is in fact
one large biotic community does seem very inclusive, however it is precisely the exclusionism of Callicotts
ecological holism that Domsky highlights as its fatal flaw.190
Using The Aliens Argument, Domsky sets out the thought experiment that aliens, especially coincidentally
similar or familiar ones, would clearly and obviously qualify for moral standing, but that because they would
not be our genetic kin or even part of our biotic community Callicotts theory, based on the properties of
kinship and community - would not afford them this standing.
The important point made by Domsky regarding his thought experiment is that, while we may never encounter
such aliens, the very process of considering how we would react to them highlights the arbitrariness of
choosing the properties of kinship and community which, ...when very carefully isolated from all others, have
absolutely no relevance to our actual moral judgements.191 According to Callicotts subjective account192 of
intrinsic value (and moral standing),
Indeed, it is logically possible to value intrinsically anything under the sun an old worn out shoe, for
example. But most of us value things intrinsically when we perceive them to be part of a community
to which we also belong, because we are evolved to do so.193
We may feel closer to kin and community because we are evolved to do so, but the properties of kinship and
community are mere correlates to other properties that are actually morally relevant. Domsky employs
another thought experiment about vegetarians to show why Callicotts theory should be abandoned:
*Consider the example of+ vegetarians who live by the credo of never eating anything with a face.
When such vegetarians discover that octopi, though faceless, are very intelligent and capable of
suffering, they quickly replace their inadequate credo, not because their moral convictions have
changed but because their convictions have been made more clear and less tacit... Once vegetarians
realize that this criterion is unacceptably exclusive, they drop it entirely, not because it is practically
impossible to supplement it instead (though surely it is practically impossible), but because the
vegetarians in question realize that having a face was never morally relevant in the first place.194
In other words, while we may very well be able to conceive of a broader notion of kin and grasp that we have
interdependencies within a biological community, this in itself does not have to have anything at all to do
with what we consider relevant to moral standing.
In any case, while Callicott challenges Rolston and other objective theorists by unveiling the cryptosubjectivity in their valuing, I cannot see how Callicott escapes the opposite problem of crypto-objectivity of
his supposedly subjective theory, when he bases the criteria for moral standing on the properties of kinship
and community. This brings us back to the issue of objective versus subjective valuing. At the beginning of
this chapter the normative realm of ecocentrism was still shown within the broader meta-ethical level (Figure
5), where the issue of inevitably anthropocentric valuing arises.

189

Callicott, Moral Pluralism, 122-123; Domsky, Callicotts Communitarianism, 395

Domsky, Callcotts Communitarianism, 403
191
Ibid., 405
192
It is my view that there can be no value apart from an evaluator, that all value is as it were in the eye of the beholder. The value that is attributed to
the ecosystem, therefore, is humanly dependent or (allowing that other living things may take a certain delight in the weIl-being of the whole of things,
or that the gods may) at least dependent upon some variety of morally and aesthetically sensitive consciousness. (Callicott, Triangular Affair, 325).
193
Callicott, Pragmatic Power, 10
194
Domsky, Callicotts Communitarianism, 410
190

37
3.2.2

The Perspectives and Interests of Wholes - or Humans?

In the previous chapter I argued that the debate between proponents of objective and subjective value and
whether or not we can truly remove ourselves from the human-centred (or more appropriately, valuercentred) perspective, should be left to meta-ethics. That these meta-ethical questions will involve discussions
about nonhuman as well as human entities, should not mean they must be addressed by environmental
ethicists specifically, as opposed to philosophers more generally. My point here is not that it is any less
plausible to say that an ecosystem is intrinsically valuable in a truly objective sense than it is for a sentient
being or a human being for that matter, but that it is harder for us to be impartial in speaking of what is
actually intrinsically valuable for an ecosystem than for things closer to us.
With respect to intrinsic value in natural wholes, we are not just claiming that entities such as ecosystems have
a good of their own, independent of our values, but that, as individuals, (conscious and rational ones at that)
we can somehow correctly determine what is good for a system (a non-conscious and non-rational one at
that). If ecosystems have a good of their own and a state to be preferred, how are we supposed to know what
that is? Although we may try to reason from the standpoint of the universe, it is harder not to conflate the
features that are supposedly intrinsically good for the ecosystem with those that are instrumentally in our own
interests.
For example, I may argue that the avoidance of pain for a sentient being is intrinsically good for that being in
and of itself, or that the non-crushed state of existence for a rock is an intrinsically good state for that rock to
be in, without furthering my interests whatsoever. However, while I cannot absolutely say that either the
sentient being or rock objectively possesses intrinsic value that I discover, rather than project, without turning
to meta-ethics, I can nevertheless more easily defend that in the former example, the good is unrelated to
the furthering of my interests than in the latter. This is because in the latter I must make a more arbitrary
judgement about what is the most preferred state for a rock, and the more arbitrary this judgement has to be,
the more susceptible it is to being confused with and influenced by whichever rock state suits or furthers my
own interests.
Attempting to remove human and nonhuman individuals interests from the equation, we are then left with
the choice along the cosmic timescale of which types of ecosystems are objectively valuable and worth
preserving. Which would be the most preferable state of Gaia195 - Ice age, Precambrian? Why not a future
state?196 In discussing the conservation of U.S. national parks, Varner provides examples of the practical
irony197 involving time-scale difficulties associated with trying to decide on the preferable state for an
ecosystem to be in,
The baseline, pre-Columbian ecosystems against which we measure the naturalness of the result
were themselves the result of extensive human manipulation *T+oday, in most cases, to achieve a
result that is more natural in the sense of more closely approximating pre-Columbian conditions, we
must use the kind of consciously calculated techniques that ensure the intended result is highly
artifactual and thus highly unnatural in origins.198

195

The Gaia hypothesis holds that Earths organisms and their inorganic surroundings on Earth are closely integrated, forming a single and selfregulating complex system through which the conditions for life are maintained on the planet. It was first developed by James Lovelock in his book,
Gaia. A New Look at Life on Earth, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1979).
196
Callicott, Land Ethic, 142; An austerely ecocentric or biocentric perspective delivers no determinant answers as to which of the abundant and
wonderfully various unfolding planetary biotas should be preferred. (Grey, Deep Ecology, 470)
197
...*T+he practical irony that, in most places today, to achieve a landscape that is more natural in result (that more closely approximates
presettlement conditions), techniques must be used that ensure the landscape is more unnatural in genesis (which make it more artifactual) (Varner,
Natures Interests?, 126).
198
Varner, In Nature Interests?, 126-127

38
So, accounts of correctly describing objective value in natural wholes requires a much more significant leap
away from ourselves and suffer particularly badly from inevitable anthropocentrism in my opinion in a
more significant way that other nonanthropocentric theories.
Because of his subjectivist meta-ethical view of value, Callicott accepts inevitable anthropocentrism and
rejects what he calls holistic rationalism, or attempting to consider from the standpoint of the universe, along
the cosmic timescale discussed above. He can see problems in trying to save particular species or ecosystem
states from this holistic rational point of view and therefore finds it to be incompatible with environmentalist
goals.
With friends like the holistic rationalists, species preservation needs no enemies.199
However, in accepting this inevitable anthropocentrism, it is harder to defend that what we find valuable in
natural wholes is not simply our instrumental benefits. Callicott himself flags this issue in Triangular Affair,
Some suspicion may arise at this point that the land ethic is ultimately grounded in human interests,
not in those of nonhuman natural entities. Just as we might prefer a sound and attractive house to one
in the opposite condition so the "goodness" of a whole, stable, and beautiful environment seems
rather to be of the instrumental, not the autochthonous, variety. The question of ultimate value is a
very sticky one for environmental as well as for all ethics and cannot be fully addressed here.200
In terms of ultimate value questions, I certainly agree with Callicott in his efforts to separate these issues.
However, we can have more confidence about making correct claims of objective intrinsic value, independent
from our selfish interests, in things that are nevertheless close to us and what we know, than we can about
concepts that are more abstract and further removed from us.
In my view, ecocentrists are misguided in their concerns that valuing natural wholes instrumentally is
somehow not enough. Much of the debate comes down to differences in the notion of what intrinsic,
inherent and instrumental values, as well as moral standing, moral considerability, and having or taking an
interest, truly entails. I do look upon the way the Amazon functions with a sense of what can best be
described as awe and can understand why it might seem inadequate to try to ground this in my own
interests, or even the interests of each and every individual living within that system. It may be that, even if
instrumental value is stretched to its widest points of non-consumptive (for example, recreational, spiritual) or
non-use (for example, existence, bequest, option) values, ecological systems do still seem to have some sort of
a value other than instrumental. After all, to be in awe of something means there must be something
valuable to be in awe about. However, if intrinsic or inherent value is taken to infer direct moral standing or
consideration, then I cannot hold that systems can have this type of value. The feeling of awe has nothing to
do with moral obligation in terms of the system being able to be directly benefited or harmed.
So valuing ecological wholes as ethical ends has so far failed both in terms of the organic model (because
autopoesis is not enough to trigger moral standing), as well as in terms of the community model (because it
relies on properties that have no relevance to moral standing), and also because, even if natural wholes can
have an intrinsic good of their own, we are unlikely to be able to remove our interests from evaluations of
what is good for them.
Yet Callicott has not waivered from his ecological communitarianism and insists that valuing wholes for the
sake of wholes themselves is possible. On what basis does he stand by the notion of ethical-holism to ground
his ecocentric ethics?
199
200

Callicott, Land Ethic, 142

Callicott, Triangular Affair, 325

39

3.2.3 Philosophical Underpinnings Unpinned

Respect for wholes, for the community as such and its various subsystems, is a theoretical possibility
for the land ethic because it is conceptually and historically related to the Humean-Darwinian moral
philosophy. Both individual members of society and the community as such, the social whole
(together with its component divisions), are the objects of certain special, naturally selected moral
sentiments... We may value our community per se, for the sake of itself, just as we may value our
children for the sake of themselves. Wholes may thus have intrinsic value no less problematically than
individuals.201
This is not a rare quote. In nearly all of his works, Callicott goes to great lengths to stress the validity of
ethical-holism due to its historical and philosophical roots. However, even the philosophers that Callicott sees
as setting the foundations for his holistic communitarianism, may not be as committed to holism as he
purports.
Both Carter202 and Lo203 have devoted entire publications to the task of showing that Callicotts interpretation
of Humes public interest is entirely wrong that Hume can more appropriately be seen as a reductionist,
whose philosophical accounts do not support ethical-holism. I am convinced by Los account, which
concludes:
...*I+n the Treatise when Hume talks about a regard to public interest he means nothing more than a
concern for the interests of members of the public. Pace Callicott, a holism which suggests respect for
the community as such, in addition to respect for its members severally is clearly foreign to, and
arguably incompatible with, Humes philosophy... 204
[W]e may, loosely speaking, have Humean sympathy with a community. But if so, it is not something in
addition to, but rather reducible to, the Humean sympathy with its individual members... 205
Callicotts holism, which suggests that we care for our communities per se, over and above their
individual members, is essentially anti-reductionist and therefore un-Humean. 206
Yet again, Callicott tries to describe Darwin as a supporter of holism by pointing to his account of the good of
the tribe as contributing to its collective fitness, leading to ever expanding communities based on the
naturally selected properties of kinship and community (the biotic community being the new community yet
to be acknowledged).207 This is again dismissed by Varner,
Notice that, in the passage quoted by Callicott, Darwin draws a distinction between the welfare of
the tribe and that of an individual member, not between the welfare of the tribe and the
welfare of its individual members. Nothing in the section from which Callicott quotes implies that,
according to Darwin, a community as such as a welfare that is not somehow reducible to the welfare
of its individual members.208

201

Callicott, Land Ethic, 12

Alan Carter, Humean Nature, Environmental Values, 9: no. 1, (February 2000), 8-9
203
Y.S. Lo, Non-Humean Holism, Un-Humean Holism, Environmental Values 10 (2001): 118-119
204
Lo, Non-Humean, 120
205
Ibid., 122
206
Ibid., 123
207
Callicott Land Ethic, 80
208
Varner, Natures Interests?, 15
202

40
Varner provides similar explanations for Hume and Smith and concludes that ...pace Callicott, there seems to
be no historical antecedent of holism in the writings of Hume, Smith or Darwin.209
I do not understand why Callicott is in the first place so defensive of his ecocentric ethic that he must find
credentials in others, not seemingly just to support them, but to justify their validity, and in the second place, I
cannot see how the examples that Callicott provides prove that the philosophers he is fond of identifying as
holists actually fit that description and, in a broader sense, how the enterprise of ethical-holism has any real
philosophical substance. Varner, among others,210 would instead have it that in all instances the community,
organic body or other type of whole can be explained as a short-hand211 or metaphorical way to describe
the interests of morally considerable individuals that make up that whole.
Recall the cane-toad case discussed in section 3.1.2; both the biocentrist and the ecocentrist (and probably the
anthropocentrist) agree that the cane toad population must be brought down or completely eliminated from
the system it is adversely impacting upon. However, the biocentrist is doing this as a trade-off of interests212
and holds that intrinsic value is ...carried by individual living creatures or their states, as defined by Attfield,
while systems are valued instrumentally and have extrinsic, derivative or indirect value.213 So in this example,
the cane toad epidemic is diminishing the utility of the ecosystem for other intrinsically valuable current and
future individuals that depend on the ecosystem.
At no point does the biocentrist have to hold that the individual toad does not have interests, intrinsic value or
independent moral standing, only that those interests must in this case be overridden and then, not for the
whole as an end in itself, but rather for the whole for the sake of the other individuals it supports.
However, on many peoples understanding of environmental ethics, biocentrists would reject a policy to cull
cane toads outright, because they hold that the cane toad, as a living individual, has moral standing, whereas
the ecosystem does not. It is this sort of misconception - that individualistic environmental ethics cannot meet
environmentalist goals - which leads many to adopt an ecocentrist stance. In the final section of this chapter,
I make the case that ethical-holism and ecocentrism have come about due to this misconception and have
therefore taken environmental ethics off-track.

209

Ibid., 16. It is noteworthy that, similarly, an examination of Callicotts reliance on Platos work to support ethical-holism shows problems. In
Triangular Affair, Callicott asserts: There is, however, a classical Western ethic, with the best philosophical credentials, which assumes a similar
holistic posture (with respect to the social moral sphere)... In the Republic, Plato, in the very name of virtue and justice, is notorious for, among other
things, requiring infanticide for a child whose only offense was being born without the sanction of the state... Plato, indeed, seems to regard individual
human life and certainly human pain and suffering with complete indifference. On the other hand, he shrinks from nothing so long as it seems to him to
be in the interest of the community... When challenged with the complaint that he is ignoring individual human happiness (and the happiness of those
belonging to the most privileged class at that), he replies that it is the well-being of the community as a whole, not that of any person or special class at
which his legislation aims... Given these formal similarities to Plato's moral philosophy, we may conclude that the land ethic - with its holistic good and
its assignment of differential values to the several parts of the environment irrespective of their intelligence, sensibility, degree of complexity, or any
other characteristic discernible in the parts considered separately-is somewhat foreign to modem systems of ethical philosophy, but perfectly familiar in
the broader context of classical Western ethical philosophy. If, therefore, Plato's system of public and private justice is properly an "ethical" system,
then so is the land ethic in relation to environmental virtue and excellence. Without examining his work in detail, it would seem, in my view, that
Platos notorious requirements could also be explained in reductionist terms. Shocking and unacceptable requirements they may be either way, it
could be argued that it is not that it Plato was completely indifferent to the pain and suffering of individuals, only that the collective interests of those
who could benefit from a certain way of life, simply outweighed the interests of the individuals his policies targeted that their interests (valid as they
are), should be sacrificed for the good of the community, with the community being nothing more than the aggregate sum of the interests of its
individual members? If Plato indeed subscribed to ethical-holism, then the parts that Callicott has relied upon do not present an account of holism that
cannot also be explained in reductionist terms.
210
Attfield, Overview, 10
211
Varner, Natures Interests?, 14
212
However, because the interests of the individual do matter, it matters how the action is carried out. If the action can only be carried out in a way
that brings great suffering to each individual cane toad (for example, if each and every toad is treated as a backyard golf ball or burned with acid and so
on), then it is theoretically feasible that the balance may tip and the outcome change to favour the cane toads over the interests of others. Although it is
hard to imagine a situation where enough pain could be generated for this to possibly occur in reality. In order to minimise suffering, the action of
culling the toads would have to be done in the most humane way possible, within reason. If the financial resources poured into the project of
humanely killing toads took funds away from other projects that resulted in more suffering overall, then this would be unreasonable.
213
Attfield, Overview, 10

41

3.3

Holism in Environmental Ethics: Practical Means or Ethical End?

Although I have found that ethical-holism and ecocentrism is theoretically invalid, it does not automatically
follow that environmental ethics has been taken down the wrong track as a result. In order to make that
claim, some evidence must be shown that discussions surrounding the concepts of ecocentrism and ethicalholism make up a substantial proportion of environmental ethics discourse and that the arguments for
beginning such discussions came from misguided or inadequate reasoning.
Nelson, in his paper Teaching Holism in Environmental Ethics, notes the strong correlation between ecology
students who are taught that reductionism is not adequate for the scientific study of nature and that instead it
should be examined holistically, and their automatic adoption of ethical-holism and rejection of individualism
between competing environmental ethical theories.214 While Nelson himself is not against holism, he does
argue that the ...call for holism in environmental ethics, and environmental thinking is surely widespread.
One might suggest that according to the majority of environmental ethicists... environmental ethics is an
inherently holistic pursuit.215
Domsky provides further evidence of the tendency in environmental philosophy to favour holism...
On its face, Callicotts ecological communitarianism... has obvious appeal... [I]t grounds moral
standing not just for individual organisms but for ecological wholes such as ecosystems and species
qua species as well. For environmental philosophers, features like these sell themselves.216
Why are these features attractive to environmental philosophers? Varner, now a biocentric individualist,
points out that also he was initially drawn to ecocentrism because he, ...like many environmental activists and
environmental philosophers, assumed that an ethical argument for pursuing the goals on the environmentalist
agenda would have to come from some version of holism.217 He also says that ...ethical-holism is extremely
popular I would say virtually hegemonic among self-professed environmentalists and environmental
philosophers.218
This view is supported by Minteer and Collins,219 who object that a commitment to ethical-holism has become
one of the key features of environmental ethics. They note that ... the fields general dismissal of moral
arguments focused on the welfare and/or interests of individual nonhuman animals as clearly having been
nfluenced by Callicott,220 and that despite ...some notable attempts to reunite animal and environmental
ethics... animal ethics concerns are still seen as antagonistic to environmental ethics by many in the field.221
Most relevant to this inquiry is their confirmation that ethical-holism takes up a substantial proportion of the
field at the cost of other theories,
Similarly, since most environmental ethicists are holists regarding natural value (i.e., intrinsic value
resides in or is attributed to biological collectives and/or ecological systems and processes, rather than
214

There comes a point during the semester when one brave student finally voices this perceived discord between contemporary biological or
ecological science and traditional ethical approaches by suggesting that traditional and most applied ethics just dont seem to be very holistic.
(Nelson, Teaching Holism, 34).
215
Ibid.
216
Domsky, Callicotts Communitarianism, 396
217
Varner, Natures Interests?, 7
218
Ibid., 11
219
Minteer, Ben A and Collins, James P, From Environmental to Ecological Ethics: Toward a Practical Ethics for Ecologists and Conservationists, Science
and Engineering Ethics, 14: no. 4 (2008), 483 501
220
While many observers outside these professions might assume that a concern for animal well-being is quite naturally a part of the discourse of
environmental ethics, there is in fact a longstanding philosophical and policy rift between animal and environmental ethics. This split appeared in the
early 1980s when environmental ethicists like J. Baird Callicott argued that true environmentalists could not be animal rights supporters since the
moral individualism of the latter (i.e., a preference for the interests of individual sentient or self-aware beings) was orthogonal to a holistic, ecological
environmental ethic that accounted for the value or good of ecosystems and complex wholes (including both living and nonliving elements) Ibid., 488.
221
Ibid., 489

42
individuals), the field has also tended to downplay concerns regarding the treatment of individual
nonsentient organisms such as plants. Such views, often termed biocentric ethics (as opposed to
more holistic ecocentric positions), do enjoy an impressive pedigree in the field... Still, it is true that
biocentric individualism remains a minority ethical stance in environmental ethics... [M]any (if not
most) environmental philosophers display an almost dogmatic adherence to environmental holism,
rejecting individualistic approaches out of hand.222
Ecocentrists, Callicott in particular, have pushed the idea that extensionist or individualistic approaches to
environmental ethics must be seen as inadequate or less encompassing, less inclusive; whereas the idea of
seeing the community (including the ecological one) as the locus of moral standing seems more holistic, and
therefore more enlightened and more inclusive than traditional ethics. Callicott labelled his ecologically
enlightened and ethically-holistic view as environmental ethics in his Triangular Affair, with other theories
that do not commit to ethical-holism being labelled human moralists (or animal liberation) and moral
humanists (or anthropocentrism).223
What was it precisely about this group of extensionist or individualistic theories, based on widening the net of
individuals as we grow to understand their moral standing, that worried Callicott and drove him to write
Triangular Affair and adopt a theory of holism? He later tried to describe in his own words why he wrote the
divisive piece he now regrets:
...*E+xtensionism seemed, at the beginning of the eighties, poised to completely take over
environmental ethics. The debate appeared to me to have become increasingly polar - between the
anthropocentrists (the "moral humanists" as I called them) and the liberationists (the "humane
moralists"). I wanted to attract attention to what then seemed to me to be the neglected third party
to the controversy, the more radical ecocentric point of view, classically championed by Aldo
Leopold.224
While Callicott has since conceded that animal liberation can be classed as an environmental ethic,225 he
nevertheless continues to the present day to write in a way that seems to distinguish ecocentrists (with a
commitment to ethical-holism) as proper environmentalists, and animal welfare or rights activists and even
biocentric individualists as distinct from this. He continues to make the assumption that, if one believes that
moral standing turns on sentience, that person will clearly not be concerned with issues such as species
preservation of non-sentient beings, or indeed with the ecosystem at large. He makes the same sort of
criticisms against biocentrism in that, while he finds this theory to be more ecologically enlightened than
sentientism, he again takes on the role of spokesperson for all environmentalists by saying,
...*B+iocentrism too narrowly distributes intrinsic value in nature because it does not provide moral
considerability for what environmentalists most care about. Frankly, environmentalists do not much
care about the welfare of each and every shrub, bug, and grub. We care, rather, about preserving
species of organisms, populations within species, genes within populations in a word we care about
preserving biodiversity. We care about preserving communities of organisms and ecosystems. We also
care about air and water quality, soil stability, and the integrity of Earths stratospheric ozone

222

Minteer and Collins, Environmental and Ecological Ethics, 489

... environmental ethics locates ultimate value in the "biotic community" and assigns differential moral value to the constitutive individuals relatively
to that standard. This is perhaps the most fundamental theoretical difference between environmental ethics and the ethics of animal liberation.
Callicott, Triangle Affair, 318.
224
Callicott, Land Ethic, 6
225
Callicott. Moral Pluralism, 103
223

43
membrane. None of these things appear to have interests, goods of their own, ends, purposes, or
goals, and thus none has intrinsic value, on this account.226
Not only does this generalise what environmentalists care about, it also cements the implication that any
ethic that locates intrinsic value and moral standing in individuals rather than (jointly or solely) in natural
wholes, will not cater for the protection of nature as a whole. It is, in my view, this aspect of ethical-holism
that shows that is most objectionable. If Callicott were to take the view that environmentalists are most
concerned with species and natural wholes in their day to day lives, there would be much less to object to. But
arguing that they actually care about or care for the holistic entities themselves, or that they dont care or care
less about the individuals these systems support, is a step in the wrong direction and in my view has been the
pivotal point in taking the environmental ethics discipline off track.
Practical-holists or to put it another way, all that acknowledge the importance of systems ecology, should
agree that communities, including biotic ones, exist as collectives of interdependent members, and that there
are properties that become more apparent or visible when considering the whole that are not immediately
apparent when considering only one individuals interests. Therefore, an environmental management
framework that is not holistic in nature will miss important problems not seen or noticed at the individual
level. In supporting practical-holism and criticising ethical-holism, Varner asserts that:
I agree that, in developing sound environmental policy, we must focus attention on ecosystems taken
as wholes. But this does not imply that we must take ecosystems themselves to be morally
considerable. Taking a systems approach to environmental management does not commit one to
direct moral consideration for the system as such any more than adopting a systems approach to
business management commits one to direct moral consideration of the business as such. A business
manager may believe both that ultimately it is only individual wealth that matters and that a business
is valuable only as a means to the end of producing individual wealth and yet still recognise the
necessity for managing the business holistically or as a system.227
Note also that we also talk of the health of the economy in much the same way we talk about the health of
ecosystems such that they have interests and a better or worse state of being.228 It seems that one of the
downfalls of systems thinking, necessary as it may be, is that metaphors become engrained to the point of
confusion. I am not, of course, arguing that Callicott, Rolston or other ethical-holists are confused, but I do
believe that without undertaking an in-depth analysis of ethical-holism, many mistakenly adhere to it without
understanding its perverse consequences. This is particularly true in the cases of E3 and E4 which seem, on
the surface, to provide a logical way to keep an ethic that is both holistic and without the misanthropic
concerns of radical holism. Without detailed treatment, it may be hard to detect that this is a combinedspeciesist position that is unjustified and should be rejected.
The reason ecocentrism and ethical-holism took environmental ethics off track is because it stemmed from a
misguided position. Callicott argues that individualistic environmental ethics are unable to meet the objectives
of the environmental movement and should therefore be rejected. However, Callicott seems to have blurred
the lines; the question of what entities deserve moral standing is a different question to how can this ethic
meet the policy objectives of the environmentalist agenda and should be considered separately.
226

Callicott, Pragmatic power, 8 (Emphasis added)

Varner, Natures Interests?, 10-11
228
James D. Proctor and Brendon M. H. Larson, Ecology, Complexity and Metaphor, BioScience, 55: 12 (2005): 1065
It is worth mentioning that question of whether natural holistic entities can be benefited or harmed is not limited to entire ecosystems or biotic
community, but also at the species level. Horta comments, Speciesism is not suffered by species as such, but by their individual members. There is a
common confusion regarding this point. In most cases, this is probably due only to linguistic expression. (Horta, Speciesism, 250) For discussion of
whether species can be said to have interests, see (Frank Chessa, Endangered Species and the Right to Die, Environmental Ethics 27: no. 1, (2005), 30)
227

44
Richard Sylvan (formally Routley) introduced a thought experiment called the last man argument - that our
intuitions tell us that a sole surviving human would be wrong to recklessly destroy the environment around
him.229 The example is put forward to show that there are some possible wrongs a moral agent can do that
are in no way traceable to human interests, both of current and future humans, no matter how broadly we
conceive of our interests. It is certainly a strong and compelling argument against anthropocentrism.
However, my reasons for rejecting anthropocentrism as a theory have nothing at all to do with whether or not
the theory is compatible with the goals of the environmentalist agenda. If humans (or persons) were the only
individuals with moral standing, then anthropocentrism, of some form, would be the appropriate base for
environmental ethics, regardless of the challenges it faces. The past and present inability of the human
population to control ourselves and stop destroying the environment we live in is, certainly, of grave concern,
but would not lead me to reject anthropocentrism if I believed that only humans are intrinsically valuable.
However, ecocentrists seem to simply start with the policy goals and try to ground an environmental ethic that
supports those goals directly. But we end up begging the question: why do we want the policy outcomes?
Because nature is intrinsically valuable. Why is nature intrinsically valuable? Because we want the policy
outcomes - instrumental value has not done the job of protecting nature from selfish human chauvinism, to
date, so what better way to correct this than to ascribe intrinsic value to nature itself?
In her widely cited article, Why Do Species Matter?, Russow makes a brilliant case against the logic of
employing environmental stewardship (anthropocentric) theory for the goal of species protection and
preservation and arbitrarily assigning intrinsic value to species,
The main objection to [the] appeal to our role as stewards or caretakers is that it begs the question.
The job of a custodian is to protect that which is deserving of protection, that which has some value or
worth. But the issue before us now is precisely whether species have value, and why. If we justify our
obligation of stewardship by reference to the value of that which is cared for, we cannot also explain
the value by pointing to the duties of stewardship... and in order to lend plausibility to the whole
enterprise, it would seem necessary to consider first the justification for ascribing value to whichever
groups have such value. If intrinsic value does not spring from anything, if it becomes merely another
way of saying that we should protect species, we are going around in circles, without explaining
anything.230
That we humans have not yet recognised how instrumentally important the interdependence of nature is to us
and the other occupants of this Earth, is as alarming to me, as an environmental management student and an
environmentalist, as to anyone else. The answer to the problem of poorly recognised instrumental value
provided by and found in nature cannot be remedied by arbitrarily attributing another type of value that
would seem to allow for stronger obligations on our part. Of course, some of the arguments in favour of
intrinsic value in natural wholes are not altogether arbitrary and may seem plausible before closer
examination but we should be suspicious, from the start, of any ethic that has simply been cut to shape to
meet a predetermined outcome.
Environmentalists can agree that practical-holism is the best means to achieve the best outcomes for the most
individuals. Environmental ethicists must decide to what degree that practical-holism should be employed and
over what timescale. Focus on this issue of the degree of practical-holism in environmental ethics is a lot more
imperative, in my view, than the issue of the possibility and plausibility of ethical-holism and direct moral
considerability for holistic entities. I argue that Callicott would have been better to direct the debate and his
229
230

Routley, Is There a Need?, 2

Lilly-Marlene Russow, Why Do Species Matter, Inquiry, 3: (Summer, 1981): 106

45
interpretations of Leopolds land ethic towards this issue of the degree of practical-holism, rather than ethicalholism.
Ecocentrism as an overall normative theory is based on a foundation of ethical-holism that cannot be validated
and therefore do not meet Varners conceptual burdens described at the start of this section. Even if moral
standing for natural wholes is in fact plausible, each of the six versions of ecocentrism suffer drawbacks in their
own right that mean that Varners ethical burdens are not successfully avoided either. Ecocentrism is
therefore, on this account and in my view, a flawed theory that cannot support an environmental (or any
other) ethic.
Furthermore, reason that drove Callicott and others to adopt this position rose out of unwarranted concerns
surrounding the inadequacy of individualistic ethics to take account of the sorts of holistic issues
environmentalists appear to be concerned about. These concerns were misguided (and therefore steered the
discipline off-track) because individualistic ethics can be holistic in practice as long as they are concerned with
a longer-term timescale. In the next chapter, I show how this is possible, by separating the issues of moral
standing, moral significance and timescale of concern. I also make the case that environmental ethicists should
focus on, but not conflate, these three areas and understand their true differences, in order to move the
discipline back onto the right track in the search for a unified environmental ethic.

46

Chapter 4: The New Triangular Affair: A Framework for Progress

The New Triangular Affair framework (Figure 8) is made up of three areas upon which, in my view,
environmental ethics as a discipline should be focused. The concepts raised in each area are not new in
themselves; rather, it is the conceptual framework that is new and represents a shift from Callicotts
Triangular Affair between anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism (or ethical-holism). Rather than
each point of the triangle representing a defined normative theory relating to what is and what is not
intrinsically valuable, the points of the new triangle each represents a key area that should be addressed by
environmental ethicists in order to develop a valid environmental ethic. Each area has an associated scale of
possible positions to take and therefore the New Triangular Affair can best be conceived of as a framework
for the development of an environmental ethic, rather than an ethic itself.
Rather than examining the merits of various positions along each of the scales and trying to advocate a
particular view about where the optimum point is within each, this chapter instead serves as more of a call to
action in terms of future research.

Figure 8: Callicotts231 Triangular Affair (Left) and the New Triangular Affair Framework (Right)

231

In Triangular Affair the triangle was actually depicted as moral humanists (who symbolize anthropocentrism), humane moralists (animalliberationists) and the land ethic and ethical-holism (both symbolize ecocentrism). Use of terminology has changed over time, however even at the
time, Callicott wrote at length about the trend expanding from animals to all living individuals, seeing these theories as one extensionist group to be
contrasted with his holistic agenda.

47

The framework is pragmatic in the sense that it seeks to exclude some theories and then achieve consensus
among the remaining possibilities, in order to move on towards achieving a greater influence on practical
decision making within environmental policy. However the framework is not pragmatic in the same sense as
the theory of environmental pragmatism, which calls for environmental philosophers to give up on the
intrinsic value debate in order to focus immediately on the areas that can be agreed upon at the policy level.
While environmental goals should be strived for in the meantime, a clear and compelling environmental ethic
(once achieved) would help refine and realign the goals that are to be strived for, so the framework is very
much about continuing, rather than abandoning, the debate between competing theories.

4.1

Degree of Moral Extension (Size of Intrinsic Value Net)

I have argued against speciesism and ethical-holism in the preceding chapters. The result is an environmental
ethics framework which excludes most anthropocentric and ecocentric theory.
At the fringes, the human-centrism subgroup within anthropocentrism that is based on a species distinction
that is morally justifiable might be included, as it would not be deemed as speciesist (although I cannot
imagine a justifiable reason for this distinction). Of the ecocentric theories I have categorized, E6 would be
permissible if the holistic entity in question could be shown to have morally relevant biological interests and is
itself granted standing as an individual like other non-sentient organisms such as trees (although such a case
has not been adequately proven, to date).
What other theories are included in this framework?
Person-centrists (the other sub-group of
anthropocentrism that locates value in higher order interests such as rationality or consciousness), sentientists
(animal welfarists / rights advocates), through to biocentrists all share a common ground that grants them
admission to the framework as theories to be considered.
1) They are all theories of environmental individualism; that is, the net of intrinsic value and moral
standing will be made up of individual organisms232 of some kind, to which moral agents have
obligations
2) Their criteria for intrinsic value or moral standing are all based on properties that can be
objectively described in terms of interests and desires that are in some way related to that
organisms goal-directedness.
Essentially this is a scale of moral extensionism in the traditional sense. It is based upon properties or
interests that we can perceive and recognise233 as morally worthy within ourselves and, by principle of
parity,234 if we recognise these attributes in others we must grant them the same moral standing with respect
to that attribute. The question of which properties are morally relevant and where the boundary of intrinsic
value ends forms the first of the three fundamental questions for environmental ethicists.
The scale ranges from narrow to broad, with narrow representing the net of moral subjects that exhibit reason
or rationality, and broad representing the net of moral subjects that have some form of (unconscious)
biological interest or goal-directedness.

232

Organisms as a word not entirely accurate for if an artefact such as a robot was found to have whichever interests are found to trigger moral
standing, it would also be included. Also organism should be taken to have the potential to be read as super-organism, if super-organisms are found
that meet the relevant interest criteria.
233
Which is where it is of course in some way inevitably anthropocentric at the meta-ethical level
234
...the principle of parity that like cases should be treated alike (John Nolt, The Move From Good to Ought in Environmental Ethics, Environmental
Ethics, 28: 363).

48
The net can be widened in two ways;
1) Either a new property is accepted additionally as an intrinsic-value-conferring property, with the
previously accepted property still held to be relevant (such as widening to all sentient beings, but
still holding that cognition as a property is value-conferring in itself); or
2) A new property is accepted in place of previously accepted properties, as the revised (and only)
intrinsic-value-conferring property (for example, holding that sentience is the only criteria for
moral standing and that reason or cognition is no longer relevant).
Hence, at the broadest range, one group would recognise the property of life or goal-directedness as the only
relevant property, while another group will have accepted a range of states into a plural mix of valueconferring properties.
The task, therefore, is to examine each property in its own right and reach consensus as to whether or not it
triggers moral standing, and why. This task has not been ignored, but has been disrupted and distracted by
the alluring calls of ethical-holism and, more recently, environmental pragmatism.235
I do not yet take a strong position on where the boundary of moral standing should extend to, although I find
it hard to accept a theory that denies (at least) sentient creatures any kind of moral standing or
acknowledgement of intrinsic value. I am convinced by the argument (particularly Varners) supporting the
idea that living individuals (that display goal-directedness) can be said to have interests and therefore are
morally considerable in some way. Although I have intuitive concerns about the challenges faced by biocentric
theories in determining what counts as an individual.236
However, making a case of how far the moral net should extend, which properties are intrinsically valuable
and what counts as an individual is not the point of this inquiry. What is important is to convince
environmental ethicists that it is a worthy question, deserving of detailed attention. What does need to be
emphasised here is that the question of whether a property is intrinsic-value-conferring should be an entirely
independent question to that of moral significance and the relative importance of interests. This is the
subject of the scale of differential value, to be examined next.

4.2

Degree of Moral Significance (Magnitude of Differential Value)

The second area of relevance for environmental ethicists is to decide upon the principles that guide moral
agents in cases of clashes of interest between individuals with moral standing. I do not intend to give any
detailed treatment to each of the common proposals for tackling this issue. Questions of moral significance
and what trumps what when it comes to competing interest claims are certainly not ignored within
environmental ethics and in fact crop up frequently in the literature. Instead, I intend to make the point in this
section that this literature is worthwhile and the substantial devotion to it justifiable and on the right track.
Firstly, though, I will at least describe the basics of the main schools of thought.
An egalitarian account of moral significance attempts to give equal treatment, or consideration, to all
individuals with moral standing. Paul Taylors biocentric egalitarianism,237 which attempts to assign equal
respect and consideration (but not necessarily equal treatment), to all teleological centres of life, is the most
well-known example of this approach. The intrinsic-value-conferring property acknowledged in that instance is
monistically life and therefore there is no basis for assigning greater moral significance to a human over a

235

See section 5.2 for discussion about the pragmatist influence on considerations about the moral standing of micro-organisms.
For example, colonial animals and super-organisms
237
Paul W. Taylor, Respect For Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (1986)
236

49
plant which possesses the same property of living. Many have criticised the impracticability of Taylors ethic
and the inadequacy of and flaws within his principles offered to deal with competing claims.238
Similarly, a strict sentientist, who does not acknowledge any other intrinsic-value-conferring properties, must
also be egalitarian in principle, by not showing preference to any one sentient creature over another (if their
sentience or capacity to feel pleasure and pain is equal), regardless of species. The life-boat thought
experiment, where a choice must be made between sacrificing either a dog or a man overboard in order to
save the remaining individuals, is a widely used example of the moral challenge faced by monistically
attributing intrinsic value to sentience alone.
An egalitarian theory does not necessarily have to be monistic, however. It could acknowledge more than one
intrinsic-value-conferring property sentience and reason, for example as the basis for moral standing, but
would have to hold that these properties generate equal moral significance and attempt to resolve even more
complex instances of competing interest claims.
Egalitarian approaches minimise their risk of committing speciesism, but in doing so quite often increase their
risk of incoherence. On the other hand, inegalitarian (also known as hierarchical) approaches, seem more
plausible, but must take great care to justify how intrinsic value is distributed differentially without relying on
the basis of species membership (thereby committing speciesism). Suspicion arises when seemingly neutral
inquiries into moral significance happen to result in a rather conventional hierarchy, leaving us humans at
the top of the pyramid where we have always been.239
Varners hierarchical biocentric individualism240 and Goodpasters differential biocentrism241 are well known
inegalitarian theories. Attfields theory of biocentric consequentialism is also hierarchical, however Attfield
argues that his view, along with others mentioned above, is not necessarily inegalitarian, because each
individual was given equal moral consideration at the outset before it was found that some properties are
more morally significant than others.242 In any case they will be categorised as inegalitarian here because we
are referring specifically to relative moral significance, not moral standing.
Varner admits that while his view is not valuationally anthropocentric in that it does not deny nonhuman
organisms moral standing, it can nevertheless be described as axiologically anthropocentric because it
supports the principle that a certain class of human interests are more important than the interests of any (or
at least almost every) nonhuman organism.243 However, the basis for giving priority to these special human
interests (which he labels ground projects244) is not at all based on species membership. I think Varner too
easily admits that the view is (in any way) anthropocentric, because his theory would in fact grant this highest
moral significance to any being (of any species) that, because it has the capacity to reason, has ground project
level interests.
It would be more appropriate to say that Varners view is axiologically person-centric, which I have argued is
not anthropocentrism, in Chapter 2. It is the intrinsically valuable properties, states or capacities that
individuals display that warrants their moral standing, not which species they belong to. For Varner, even
simply living is not automatically enough to trigger moral standing and he therefore explains that calling his
238

For example, see Gene Spitler, Justifying a Respect for Nature, Environmental Ethics, 4: no. 3, (1982): 255 260
Callicott, Pragmatic Power, 9
240
Varner, Natures Interests?
241
Goodpaster, Morally Considerable
242
My theory of biocentric consequentialism is... shown not to be significantly inegalitarian, despite not advocating treating all creatures equally... Since
some creatures lack capacities (such as the capacity to vote) and related interests held by others, they cannot and should not be considered or treated
equally at polling stations. The egalitarian biocentric view that every creature counts alike (person, penguin or plant) ignores important differences of
capacity and thus of interest (Robin Attfield, Biocentric Consequentialism and Value-Pluralism: A Response to Alan Carter, Utilitas, 17: 85).
243
Varner, Natures Interests?, 8
244
Ibid.
239

50
view biocentric is slightly inaccurate, because he does in fact recognise the possibility of sufficiently complex
artefacts having interests, if they meet the functional criteria for having desires.245 In the same way I say that
it is not at all anthropocentric or speciesist in the strict sense.
Like all person-centric theories, however, Varner must justify why he chooses an interest that happens to be
predominantly found in humans, (ground projects) as being the most morally significant interest in a way that
shows no evidence of speciesism. The several chapters he devotes to empirically and methodologically
examining these properties (such as the presence and sizes of prefrontal cortex in various organisms) provides
at least a partial defence to the sort of charge that Polivitis makes against others, that this approach simply
assumes and holds preemininent those evolutionary features that appear to be unique to Homo sapiens246
The scale associated with the degree of moral significance is therefore shown differently to the other two
scales. The choice between egalitarianism and hierarchical should be seen as an either/or situation: hence
egalitarianism is represented with nil magnitude of differential value on the left whereas, among hierarchical
stances, there is a continuum, ranging from those theories that maintain that there is a small magnitude of
differential value between entities, up to those holding that the magnitude of difference can be large.
I have not yet formed a strong preference between egalitarian or hierarchical approaches, although my
intuition leans towards the type of hierarchical stance suggested by Varner.247 My more immediate concern is
once again to show that this is an area of high importance within environmental ethics and to argue strongly
for environmental ethicists to recognise that there is a fundamental difference between moral standing and
the relative moral significance of individuals that have a claim to that moral standing. Unfortunately, some
blur the lines and allow their preconceived assumptions about an entitys significance to affect the question of
whether it has intrinsic value or moral standing.
A careful examination of moral consideration of individuals and intrinsic-value-conferring properties involves
having to consider the possible welfare of common bugs, parasites and microbes. This leaves some
environmental philosophers feeling frustrated, as demonstrated in Davions article Itch Scratching, Patio
Building and Pesky Flies: Biocentric Individualism Revisited,248 when having to consider whether
microorganisms have intrinsic value, even if it is always the case that our trivial interests outweigh that
standing. This frustration is evident in the following example, regarding situations when we scratch an itch
on our arm and kill microorganisms in the process:
...*I+f we are concerned that our focus not be too far removed from most peoples intuitions or
concerns, then we should consider the examples discussed... that are common in the field of
environmental ethics. These troubling examples include the morality of swatting pesky flies, mowing
the lawn, building patios, and finally itch scratching. Even I, who enjoy a good romp through the
theoretical jungle, have a hard time focusing on the morality of itch scratching. I fear that most people
would feel equally silly focusing on the moral status of pesky flies, lawn mowing, or patio building... I
would argue such issues [as whether and how to genetically modify food] are a better focus.
Otherwise, we are in danger of simple irrelevance249
If environmental philosophy is to have an impact on environmental policy, it should be by providing a coherent
account of what is and isnt intrinsically and instrumentally valuable, being clear on what the distinction
between these values is, and the implication that this should have on policy. If we have a clear understanding
245

Ibid., 10
Anthony J. Povilitis , On Assigning Rights: 67
247
However, I have reservations about holding that the capacity for ground projects leads to the most significant moral standing, when this would seem
to mean that the mentally ill, for example, may have less significant moral standing than rational humans.
248
Victoria Davion, Itch Scratching, Patio Building and Pesky Flies: Biocentric Individualism Revisited, Environmental Ethics, 28: no. 2, (2006), 115 - 128
249
Ibid., 126
246

51
of which beings are intrinsically valuable and why, as well as an account of their moral significance relative to
other entities, then we can use this clarity to help shed light on other, more pressing and practical issues
such as whether and how to genetically modify foods. Abandoning the efforts and confusing the types of
values250 probably serves to make environmental philosophy more, not less, irrelevant and delays the potential
impact a coherent environmental ethic would have at the policy level. Davion, like other pragmatists who are
too quick to abandon these types of inquiries, ends up making matter of fact claims that confuse the notions
of intrinsic and instrumental value,
Would it be better not to scratch it if it is only a very slight itch? Would it remain morally better to
refrain from scratching unless scratching was somehow helpful to a persons overall health? Does it
matter? Is this really an important and serious moral question? In my view, common-sense morality
and the average persons intuitions clearly indicate that the microorganisms involved do not have
intrinsic value at all... If one doesnt have to consider the moral value of certain beings at all in
deciding what to do, then I say that they have no value... I dont hold the position that every cancer
cell has intrinsic moral value, I am virtually certain that most people dont. In fact, I believe that those
who say they do hold it, but that it can always be trumped, are basically deluding themselves.251
My view is that these are important and serious moral questions. Davions account suggests that if something
is instrumentally of negative value (detrimental) to us, that it must be the case that it has no intrinsic value or
good of its own, and that if its moral significance is negligible, then it has no moral standing. I disagree on both
counts and have no hesitation to proclaim that, if I can be persuaded that the property of being alive is
intrinsically valuable, then I will also hold that cancer cells have intrinsic value and thereby moral standing. I
will of course agree with the indisputable claim that cancer cells are instrumentally harmful to me. On the
other hand, I can coherently hold that the bacteria sharing a symbiotic relationship with me in my gut, have
the same moral standing and even the same moral significance as other bacteria that cause me illness.
If I take an egalitarian stance of moral significance, I can rely on the principle of self-defence to justify my
human interests outweighing those of the cancer cells and those of the illness causing bacteria, but not the gut
bacteria (which is fine by me, as they provide instrumental benefits to me). If I take a hierarchical stance, I can
claim that the interests of cancer cells and both types of bacteria are genuinely far less morally significant than
my own in order to justify my overriding of their moral standing (however I would have no desire to in the case
of the gut bacteria).
It is understandable that those interested in saving nature are troubled by the prospect of using precious time
to consider the potential basis for moral standing of cells, bacteria and other seemingly insignificant
organisms. There are indeed questions in this area that seem futile, irrelevant to mainstream environmental
issues, or to generate an overwhelming sense of hopelessness. For example, it is one thing to show that the
semi-basic or even trivial interests of a human being are more significant than those of a tree, but if each tree
counts as one individual, how many trees interests must be at stake before trumping the interests of a single
human being? How many billions of bacteria tip the scales against one dog? The impracticality of egalitarian
principles is often used by opponents as the basis for criticizing them, but in my opinion those who take a
hierarchical position have been let off easy by focusing more on the order of their hierarchy of moral
significance and less on the magnitude of differential value which leads to just as many (if not more) complex
implementation issues.

250

Callicott, for example, seems to ignore that the basis for according respect is intrinsic value and not the type of instrumental value that he attributes
to some bacteria. He claims that ethical-holists would be: inclined to establish value distinctions not on the basis of higher and lower orders of being,
but on the basis of the importance of organisms, minerals, and so on to the biotic community. Some bacteria, for example, may be of greater value to
the health or economy of nature than dogs, and thus command more respect (Callicott, Triangular Affair, 319).
251
Davion, Patio Building, Itch Scratching, 120

52
Another issue that this section has highlighted is that it is not simply questions of intrinsic value and moral
significance that affect our decision making in interest trade-off situations, but clearly instrumental value as
well. If I cut down a tree, I not only have to consider the intrinsic value and moral significance of that tree (if
biological interests are morally relevant), but also the indirect impact I have on other intrinsically valuable ends
that derive instrumental value from that tree. These sorts of ponderings lead Callicott to object that,
...when every living thing is extended moral considerability, then the practicability quotient
approaches zero; a point of moral overload is reached and the whole enterprise of ethics threatens to
collapse into absurdity.252
However, practically challenging as these questions are, they do not invalidate the theory of environmental
individualism, and certainly the fact that there are challenges is in no way a logical reason to adopt a position
of speciesism or ethical-holism.
It is conceivable that we could at least make our best estimate of the morally right action to take in a given
situation if we know which entities are intrinsically valuable ends in themselves with moral standing, their
relative moral significance, and the sorts of instrumental value they provide functionally as a means to other
intrinsically valuable entities. However, the instrumental value aspect of this calculation means that the
outcome is entirely influenced by and dependent upon the concept of time. If we take the next week as our
focus, then an illness causing bacteria will have the same intrinsic value and moral significance as they would if
we took the next decade into consideration.
Importantly, the instrumental value would change where, in the former instance the bacteria would have
negative instrumental value, in the latter it may be neutral or positive, because of the benefit the bacteria
provided in strengthening my immune system. The present illness is the lesser of two evils253 when
compared to the potentially more serious illness that may arise, if the initial illness was not to occur. It follows
that, if we take into account the way in which time changes a situation, our view concerning which actions are
morally right should also change. This is the focal point of the third and final scale within the New Triangular
Affair framework.

4.3

Degree of Practical-holism (Timescale of Concern)

If we can imagine an intrinsic value ladder determined by the degree of differential value, then practicalholism essentially relates to the other ladder of instrumental value. While obviously more complex (in that
systems and inanimate objects are all instrumental to whichever individuals are morally considerable and do
not fit neatly into an ordered ladder type formation), it can be seen that somethings instrumental value
cannot be understood without first knowing which ends they serve (which individuals have moral standing)
but also knowledge of what temporal scale is appropriate. A rivers instrumental use values will therefore be
described differently depending on the length of time, and the number of future individuals, being considered.
The longer the timescale, the more holistically we must manage the environment, even if this means making
decisions that are at the cost of many individuals interests in the present day.
The difference between those who align with the sorts of goals Callicott mentions as common to all
environmentalists and those that do not can be explained, not by which entities they believe to be morally

252

J. Baird Callicott, The Search for an Environmental Ethic, in Tom Regan, ed., Matters of Life and Death, 2d ed. (New York: Random House, 1986), pp.
40203, cited in Jason Kawall, Reverence for Life, Environmental Ethics, 25: (2003): 343
253
In his Triangular Affair, Callicott declares that pain is not at all an evil thing and biologically is usually a good thing, as it serves as a warning system
to protect us from further harm. Callicott here misses the important aspect of time and the lesser of two evils concept.

53
considerable, not by the relative significance they grant to different entities, but by the third question of
whether they are concerned with shorter or longer-term timescales when making decisions that involve tradeoffs254 of interests. We can say that, once we know which interest related properties are intrinsic-valueconferring and hence which individuals are morally considerable, then unless in the foreseeable future we
know these individuals will have no offspring, an environmentalist cannot take a short-term view of the world
that fails to consider the implications of our actions on natural systems. So Callicotts early charge against
short-term animal welfarists (or liberationists, as he called them) is right.
A more important consideration is why such criticism would be right. The reason is not because they are
concerned with the wrong things. For example, while Callicott would describe it as follows...
1) Environmentalists care about species, ecosystems and other natural holistic entities
2) Individualistic environmental ethics (anthropocentrism, animal-welfarism, biocentrism) only locate
intrinsic value in / grant moral standing to, individuals, not natural wholes
3) Therefore, individualistic environmental ethics are objectionable inadequate
...the more appropriate reason for criticism becomes apparent by keeping the issues of moral standing and
timescale of concern separate and not oversimplifying the problem:
1) Moral agents should be concerned to protect the interests of entities that are intrinsically valuable
ends with moral standing
2) In inevitable trade-off situations, it is better to sacrifice less significant interests than more, and to
sacrifice fewer interests than more
3) An ecologically enlightened perspective tells us that, generally speaking, any short-term disruption
that jeopardises the viability of ecosystems and natural wholes, will lead to a greater
dissatisfaction of interests compared with the satisfactions fulfilled for the immediate beneficiaries
of the disruption
4) There is no evidence (for example, impending planetary doom) to justify the need to scale down
our temporal outlook to the point where ecosystem viability is not a factor when making trade-off
decisions
5) Therefore, viewpoints of those who focus on short-term issues, (such as rescuing natural prey
from natural predator), are objectionable, inadequate and inconsistent with environmental ethics
We are right to criticise ethical theories that would drive policy suggestions that impede on the functional
utility of natural systems for the short-term gain of some individuals, human or otherwise. Being an
environmentalist has less to do with the intrinsic value net size, but a commitment to taking a longer-term and
broader view, informed by ecological science, to protect whichever interests are of concern, be they human,
animal or all living organisms interests. So, an animal welfarist who is concerned with a longer timescale, will
also scoff at suggestions of intervening with nature, because as environmentalists they understand that these
are not good decisions, knowing as they do that upsetting the balance of the ecosystem will cause more
suffering to sentient creatures overall and over time. My objection to Callicott is in his painting of all
sentientists as holding a short-term view.255 The question of what is the appropriate timescale of concern

254

This should not be read as automatically inferring a utilitarian style trade-off. A treatment of the differences between deonotological and utilitarian
accounts is beyond the scope of this inquiry, however see Regan, The Case for Animal Rights and the mini-ride and worse-off principles.
255
It needs to be noted that I am not trying to single out Callicott here as the sole cause of this misconception. The statements of leading animal
welfarists (Singer) and animal rights advocates (Regan) have not at all helped the situation by arguing that their theories would never support initiatives
such as therapeutic hunting. However, Callicott should have examined sentientist theories to their full extent to discover their potential, instead of
taking these statements at face value as grounds to dismiss the theories. Varner, for example, devotes a whole chapter in his book In Natures
Interests? to showing how, contrary to their claims, both Singer and Regans theoretical principles do in fact support therapeutic hunting and other
objectionable practices.

54
should be distinct from the question of which properties or states are intrinsically valuable. Thus at the
maximum points of each, one could uphold an ethic that represents one of four combinations (Figure 9).

Figure 9: Scales of Moral Extensionism and Timescale of Concern Displaying Maximum Positions: Point A represents a viewpoint showing direct
concern for only humans, only now and is best described in terms of strong anthropocentrism. Point B is concerned for only humans, now and into
the future and can also be labelled as weak anthropocentrism (most sustainable development theory fits this description). Point C represents a concern
for all living individuals, only now (we might call this strong biocentrism), and Point D is interested in all living individuals, now and into the future (or
weak biocentrism).

Points B and D would require an adoption of practical-holism within environmental management, informed by
the science of ecology. However, while these longer-term viewpoints are generally seen as more align with
the environmentalist position, points A and C (as well as the in-between position of only sentient creatures,
only now), could also be defended as being environmentalist positions under certain extreme circumstances.
Suppose that the world is to end in less than a decade and we are aware of this situation and helpless to stop
it (the Sun will explode, an impending planetary collision, for example). Suppose also that there is an action
we can take that is beneficial to all morally considerable individuals in the time they have left to live (be they
rational creatures, sentient creatures or all living individuals, depending on the outcome of the previous
question of moral extension). However, this action involves polluting the atmosphere in such a way that
would guarantee failure of all the Earths ecosystems. Such an action, if not for the external impending doom,
would mean the end of life on Earth after, say, a couple of decades.
Aside from the standard issues of not taking the action in case for some reason the situation does not
eventuate (precautionary principles), there would be no reason to avoid taking the action of sacrificing the
functionality of the ecosystems in return for short-term benefit to the individuals of concern.

55
While this hypothetical situation is unlikely to eventuate, like Domskys alien thought experiment it serves to
show where our moral intuitions lie. By removing the need to consider an ecosystems instrumental value and
our dependence on it, the values that remain (for example appreciation of aesthetic beauty and of autopoetic
displays) could not be justifiably prioritised over the interests of morally considerable individuals that have
interests, goals, wills of their own. If the timescale of concern comes down to the present day, the grubs,
shrubs and bugs that Callicott scorns would rightfully become the concerns of environmentalists over, say, soil
stability and water quality. That is to say, if grubs, bugs and shrubs are shown to deserve moral standing;
which can only be known if we keep the question of environmental policy goals and practical-holism distinct
from the inquiry into which entities and which properties are morally considerable.
A practical-holist is someone with an ecologically enlightened perspective and, as the timescale of concern
increases, so does the extent of practical-holism employed. But how long should the timescale of concern be,
and how much of a practically-holistic perspective do we need to take? This is a difficult question to answer
and not within the present scope. Nevertheless, the cosmic end of the timescale of concern can be fairly well
dismissed with, as Grey puts it, ...the help of a little covert anthropocentrism.256 We cannot reason from the
standpoint of the universe, so whilst we might recognise that future individuals will exist and depend on
natural wholes (and therefore take a holistic perspective for environmental management), we cannot and do
not need to take into account the indefinite future.
However, there is clearly a large range in-between the two extremes of here and now and cosmic and there
are many important environmental ethics questions to be answered within the timescale of concern realm.257
For example:
Should we be protecting ourselves and the individuals that currently inhabit our planet from the next
glacial period? When natural climate change occurs (as opposed to the current situation), should we
act to stop it?
o
o

If the answer is yes, is that because we have dismissed this timescale on the same inevitable
anthropocentrism basis mentioned above, or,
if the timescale is valid, have we considered the various life forms that might emerge in the
new climate and determined that collectively their interests do not outweigh the (perhaps
more significant) interests of human beings?

The relevant claim is that environmental ethicists must bring it to into key focus and that the energy Callicott
has spent defending ethical-holism to ground ecocentrism would have been better spent advocating practicalholism over a long reaching time-scale of concern. It is not that these issues are completely ignored within
environmental ethics, but seem to be slightly overshadowed by the debate about the possibility of ethicalholism.
While the questions are distinct in some ways, it is probable that in order to know how far to take practicalholism - in order to know how long and how broadly to look we may need to know which present and future
individuals are morally considerable. We will also have to have considered Derek Parfits non-identity
problem258 with respect to future individuals, but this is well beyond the scope of this inquiry.259 What is
256

Grey, Deep Ecology, 466

Some other examples might include: What sort of a discount factor should apply to the interests of future individuals? Does this again depend on
which individuals we are talking about and how long their average lifespan is? For example, when we talk about future generations are they measured
in human life-spans? On what basis do we look backwards in time and decide on converting ecosystems back to the time of pre-settlement days? Why
is a forest influenced by the indigenous population more natural than the post-settlement forest? Why are we trying to freeze time into a certain
picture of natural, when nature is dynamic, not static? There are of course, many more than these.
258
The problems that Parfit identifies concern the effect of present policy choices on future individuals: It is in fact true of everyone that, if he had not
been conceived within a month of the time when he was conceived, he would never have existed. Because this is true, we can easily affect the identities
of future people, or who the people are who will later live. If a choice between two social policies will affect the standard of living or the quality of life
257

56
important is that the questions are kept distinct enough so as to avoid the misconception spread by Callicott
and other holists, that individualist ethics, from anthropocentrism through to sentientism through to
biocentrism, are automatically interested only in the short-term timescale of concern. Equally important is
that while the size of the intrinsic value net may conceivably (but not inevitably) have an influence on the
timescale of concern or degree of practical-holism employed, the reverse should not be true. Which
properties or entities are intrinsically valuable should not be determined by a pre-conceived timescale
requiring a particular degree of practical-holism. While the cosmic and present day timescales can reasonably
be put aside, it is clear that the issues of practical-holism and relevant timescale of concern require a great
deal more treatment within the environmental ethics discipline. Focus on this issue, along with matters of
moral standing and moral significance, will offer better prospects for progress towards a unified environmental
ethic.

for about a century, it will affect the details of all the lives that, in our community, are later lived. As a result, some of those who later live will owe their
existence to our choice of one of these two policies. After one or two centuries, this will be true of everyone in our community (Derek Parfit, The NonIdentity Problem, 16: Reasons and Persons. Print publication date: 1986, Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003).
259
See Attfield, Environmental Concern Part 2 for a general treatment of this issue.

57

Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusion

The aim of this inquiry was to discover whether environmental ethics is progressing towards its goal of
grounding a unified environmental ethic and, if not, to recommend a framework that will refocus the discipline
onto the right track. Tracing back through the discourse trend categorised by Callicott, I argued that progress
should be measured against the level of progress towards the end goal, and that the end goal should be a
unified ethical theory that guides human interaction within the environment. At the outset, multi-centric
approaches that may seem to offer unified solutions, by simply ignoring fundamental differences between the
theories, were rejected.
However, while pluralistic approaches that provide no guidance for action should be avoided, the other more
modern issues in environmental ethics those of inevitably anthropocentric valuing and reconsidering the
need for a non-anthropocentric ethic required more attention. In order to assess whether progress is being
made I firstly gave consideration to these issues (Chapter 2) and found that we can escape the problem of our
valuing being inevitably anthropocentric by leaving such questions of ultimate value to the domain of metaethics, while continuing to strive for consensus at the level of normative ethics.
At this level, I found that there is (still) a need to extend beyond the limits of anthropocentrism, even if the
longest range of interests are now taken into account, because anthropocentrism that attributes moral
considerability to humans alone is still speciesist, even if at times the convergence hypothesis may hold true
and the same outcomes happen to be achieved for nonhumans and natural wholes. Therefore, the modern
shift (back) to anthropocentrism in the discipline has taken environmental ethics off track.
In Chapter 3, I categorised and criticised six versions of ecocentrism. I argued that the first and second radical
versions, which hold that the value of natural wholes subsume the interests of individuals, including humans,
should be rejected due to their ecofascist implications, although I have more respect for these versions than
the others. Versions 3 and 4 (Callicotts) were shown to be combined-speciesist positions, allowing for moral
standing for individual humans based unjustifiably on their species membership. Version 5, a theory of strict
moral pluralism that provides moral standing to individuals and natural wholes equally was dismissed because
of its lack of preferences to guide cases where alternative outcomes clash. Finally, Version 6, that advocates
ethical-holism but holds that the intrinsic value of individuals trumps that of wholes, was found to be
redundant because of its convergence with biocentrism.
However, influence on policy should only be seen as one of, rather than the only, purpose of environmental
ethics. Therefore, from a theoretical perspective, the plausibility of ethical-holism still required investigation.
In any case, if moral standing for natural wholes could have been validated, then the right track for
environmental ethics would be to work within the realms of ecocentrism and find solutions to the problems of
eco-fascism, speciesism, relativism or redundancy that have been raised. The treatment of natural wholes as
ethical ends in themselves was therefore considered in more detail (Chapter 4). Once again, I concentrated
primarily on Callicotts own theory of social and ecological communitarianism by investigating the potential
moral standing of the biotic community, and the concept of natural entities such as ecosystems being
conceived as third-order-wholes that have morally relevant interests (such as ecosystem health) in a similar
way to second-order-wholes (such as an individual human body).
The inquiry revealed that ethical-holism, at least in terms of grounding an environmental ethic, could not be
validated. This adds strength to the case against all the versions of ecocentrism, because if any counter
arguments can be made regarding a particular version, the theory would still be left flawed due to the
invalidity of ethical-holism, which falls short in several ways.

58
First, the only objective interest put forward by Callicott that can plausibly be considered for natural wholes is
based on a property (autopoesis) that is in itself not deserving of moral considerability and even if it was,
would not be significant enough to warrant the sort of standing that ecocentrists would have us grant to
natural wholes. Second, Callicotts communitarianism employs criteria for moral standing (kinship and
community) that were shown to be far removed from our actual moral judgements and therefore excludes
entities that should qualify for moral standing. Third, the philosophical foundations (in particular, Darwin and
Hume) that Callicott draws on to prove the validity of other types of ethical-holism as a platform for the moral
standing of natural wholes, were found to be not conclusively holistic, in that their theories can also be
explained in reductionist terms.
After finding no role for ethical-holism in environmental ethics, I concluded the chapter by considering the
primary reason it was called for in the first place by Callicott and other ecocentrists; namely, the inadequacy of
individualist ethics to recognise the important interdependencies between organisms and to cater for the
protection of nature as a whole. This concern is understandable, however it is not related to the question of
which entities can be said to have intrinsic value or moral standing, but rather a different question altogether.
There is, therefore, merit to the pragmatists call to end the continued debate about finding intrinsic value or
grounding moral standing in nature as a whole. However, this does not mean that all non-anthropocentric
theory is to be abandoned. Ecocentrism, and in particular Callicotts Triangular Affair, has led to a debate
about ethical-holism that has taken environmental ethics off track. I proposed a framework made up of three
key points of concern for environmental ethicists. Although they are not new in themselves, they have been
neglected as a result of the focus on the debates surrounding ecocentrism and more recently, enlightened
anthropocentrism or pragmatism (Chapter 5).
The question of which entities are morally considerable is open; however the entities are individuals and the
any boundary of moral considerability cannot be made on the basis of species membership. Among those
individuals that are found to be intrinsically valuable ends in themselves, there are questions regarding their
moral significance relative to each other, and these debates between egalitarian and hierarchical positions
form the second area. Perhaps most importantly, I suggested that the concern Callicott has, about the need
to acknowledge the interdependency within ecological systems and to protect nature as a whole, is relevant not to the first area of which entities are morally considerable, but instead to the length of time which we
should extend our moral considerability. The longer the timescale of concern, the more holistic our approach
should be to environmental policy, and this is a matter of employing practical, rather than ethical, holism.
It is important to note that this inquiry arrived at environmental individualism largely by a process of
elimination. However this does not mean that environmental individualism is without its own challenges. In
fact, the whole point of the New Triangular Affair framework is to highlight three key areas to be addressed
in the attempt to achieve a unified environmental ethic and there are numerous unresolved issues within each
of those areas. The New Triangular Affair, then, is currently sound in principle, tenuous in practice, but
promising in potential, because it brings the discipline closer to reaching consensus on a unified environmental
ethic. As discussed in the introduction to this inquiry, this unified environmental ethic would help influence
environmental policy and could shape the way society formulates the environmental education curriculum.
However, these practical implications are not themselves the sole purpose of environmental ethics. Whereas
the purpose of the environmental ethics discipline might be to generate consensus amongst philosophers for
an environmental ethical (theoretical) framework, it is more suitably one of the purposes of the environmental
movement overall to decide how to best utilise it in order to help us more expediently and more swiftly deal
with the ever-growing environmental crisis .

59
The framework sets the discipline back on the right track to deliver an environmental ethic that indeed
provides moral agents with a guide to moral interaction within the environment. An environmental ethic that
tells us which individuals we are required to extend moral consideration and to what degree and finally what
period of time we should consider in managing our impact on ecological systems, is still very much in need.

60

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