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European Derivatives
Jo~ao Amaro de Matos
Faculdade de Economia
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Campus de Campolide
1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal
Ana Lacerda
Department of Statistics
Columbia University
1255 Amsterdam Avenue
New York, NY 100027, USA
January 2, 2006
Abstract
We derive statistical arbitrage bounds for the buying and selling
price of European derivatives under incomplete markets. In this paper,
incompleteness is generated due to the fact that the market is dry, i.e.,
the underlying asset cannot be transacted at certain points in time. In
particular, we rene the notion of statistical arbitrage in order to extend the procedure for the case where dryness is random, i.e., at each
point in time the asset can be transacted with a given probability. We
analytically characterize several properties of the statistical arbitragefree interval, show that it is narrower than the super-replication interval and dominates somehow alternative intervals provided in the
literature. Moreover, we show that, for suciently incomplete markets, the statistical arbitrage interval contains the reservation price of
the derivative.
Introduction
option. If the price is outside this range, then a positive prot is attainable with probability one. Therefore, the equilibrium prices at which the
derivative is transacted should lie between those bounds.
Most of the times, however, these superreplicating bounds are trivial, in
the sense that they are too broad, not allowing a useful characterization of
equilibrium prices' vicinity. As an alternative, Bernardo and Ledoit (2000)
propose a utility-based approach, restricting the no-arbitrage condition to
rule out investment opportunities oering high gain-loss ratios, where gain
(loss) is the expected positive (negative) part of excess payo. In this way,
narrower bounds are obtained. Analogously, Cochrane and Saa-Requejo
(2000) also restrict the no-arbitrage condition by not allowing transactions of
\good deals", i.e. assets with very high Sharpe ratio. Following Hansen and
Jagannathan (1991), they show that this restriction imposes an upper bound
on the pricing kernel volatility and leads to narrower pricing implications
when markets are incomplete.
Given a set of pricing kernels compatible with the absence of arbitrage
opportunities, Cochrane and Saa-Requejo exclude pricing kernels implying
very high Sharpe ratios, whereas Bernardo and Ledoit exclude pricing kernels implying very high gain-loss ratios for a benchmark utility. Notice that,
for a dierent utility, Bernardo and Ledoit would exclude a dierent subset of
pricing kernels, for the same levels of acceptable gain-loss ratios. Also notice
that the interval designed by Cochrane and Saa-Requejo is not necessarily
arbitrage free, and therefore does not necessarily contain the equilibrium
price.
In order to avoid ad-hoc thresholds in either Sharpe or gain-loss ratios,
or to make some parametric assumptions about a benchmark pricing kernel,
as in Bernardo and Ledoit (2000), the work of Bondarenko (2003) introduces
the notion of statistical arbitrage opportunity, by imposing a weak assumption on a functional form of admissible pricing kernels, yielding narrower
pricing implications as compared to the superreplication bounds. A statistical arbitrage opportunity is characterized as a zero-cost trading strategy for
which (i) the expected payo is positive, and (ii) the conditional expected
payo in each nal state of the economy is nonnegative. Unlike a pure arbitrage opportunity, a statistical arbitrage opportunity may allow for negative
payos, provided that the average payo in each nal state is nonnegative.
In particular, ruling out statistical arbitrage opportunities imposes a novel
martingale-type restriction on the dynamics of securities prices. The important properties of the restriction are that it is model-free, in the sense that
it requires no parametric assumptions about the true equilibrium model,
and continues to hold when investors' beliefs are mistaken. Although Bon3
The Model
it
that each element in the union satises it1 2 It1
: Let - denote the set of
all paths on the event tree:
The payos of a European derivative, at each terminal node, will be denoted GiTT : At each node it; the stock price is given by Stit = U t+1it Dit 1 S0:
Moreover, at each node it; there is a number itt representing the number of
shares bought (or sold, if negative), and a number Bitt denoting the amount
invested (or borrowed, if negative) in the risk-free asset. Hence, at t there
t+1:
are t + 1 values of itt , composing a vector t (1t ; : : : ; t+1
t ) 2 R
Similarly, we construct the vector Bt (Bt1; : : : ; Btt+1) 2 Rt+1:
Denition 1 A trading strategy is a portfolio process t = ( t; Bt ) ; composed of t units of the risky asset and an amount Bt invested in the riskless
asset, such that the portfolio's cost is tSt + Bt for t = 0; 1; : : : T 1:
In order to nd the upper (lower) bound of the arbitrage-free range
of variation for the value of a European derivative we consider a nancial
institution that wishes to be fully hedged when selling (buying) that derivative. The objective of the institution is to minimize (maximize) the cost of
replicating the exercise value of the derivative at maturity. The value determined under such optimization procedure avoids what is known as arbitrage
opportunities, reecting the possibility of certain prots at zero cost.
This section is organized as follows. We rst characterize the upper
bound, and then the lower bound for the interval of no-arbitrage admissible prices. For each bound, we rst deal with the complete market case,
and then with the fully incomplete market case, nally introducing random
incompleteness.
2.1
The upper bound for the value of the European option is the maximum
value for which the derivative can be transacted, without allowing for arbitrage opportunities. This is the value of the cheapest portfolio that the
seller of the derivative can buy in order to completely hedge his position
against the exercise at maturity, without the need of additional nancing at
any rebalancing dates. Hence, for p = 1; the upper bound is Cu1; given by
Cu1 =
i
min
ft;Btgt=0;::::;T 1
0 S0 + B0
1 iT
1
subject to TT1
ST + RBTT1
GiTT ; with iT 1 2 ITiT1 and all iT 2 IT ;
it1
t1 it
and the self-nancing constraints it1
St + RBt1
itt Stit + Btit ; for all
it
it1 2 It1
; all it 2 It and all t 2 f0; :::; T 1g; where the constraints reect
the absence of arbitrage opportunities. This problem leads to the familiar
result
T
1 X T
R D j U R T j T +1j
1
Cu = T
GT
:
R j=0 j
U D
UD
Consider now the case where p = 0. In this case, the notion of a trading
strate#iT gy satisfying the self-nancing constraint is innocuous, since the
portfolio t cannot be rebalanced during the life of the option. Under the
absence of arbitrage opportunities, the upper bound for the value is Cu0
satisfying
Cu0 = min 0S0 + B0
f0 ;B0 g
1 XT +1
# i S iT ;
iT =1 T T
RT
For instance, if a call option with exercise K is considered, we have1
T
+
+
1
R DT T
U RT T
0
Cu = T
U S0 K +
D S0 K
:
R
U T DT
U T DT
S0 =
2.2
The lower bound for the value of an American derivative is the minimum
value for which the derivative can be transacted without allowing for arbitrage opportunities. This is the value of the most expensive portfolio that
the buyer of the option can sell in order to be fully hedged, and without the
need of additional nancing at rebalancing dates.
For p = 1, the lower bound for the value of the derivative under the
absence of arbitrage opportunities is thus Cl1 ; given by
Cl1 =
i
max
ft;Btgt=0;::::;T 1
0 S0 + B0
1 iT
1
subject to TT1
ST + RBTT1
GiTT , with iT 1 2 ITiT1 and all iT 2 IT ;
it1
t1 it
and the self-nancing constraints it1
St + RBt1
itt Stit + Btit ; for all
it
it1 2 It1
; all it 2 It and all t 2 f0; :::; T 1g; where the constraints reect
the absence of arbitrage opportunities This problem leads to the familiar
result
j
T j
T
1 X T
RD
U R
1
Cl = T
GTT +1j ;
(1)
R
j
U D
U D
j =0
subject to 0ST +RT B0 GiTT : As above, it follows that, for a set of positive
P
constants f#iT g ; with TiT+1
=1 #iT = 1; this bound is given by
Cu0 = min
#i T
subject to
S0 =
1 XT +1
#iT GiTT
T
i
=1
R
T
1 XT +1
#i S iT :
iT =1 T T
RT
!
T U T (i+1) D i+1
T i i
+
1
R
Cl0 =
U
D S0 K
(2)
T
T
i
i
T
(i+1)
i+1
R
U
D U
D
T i1 i+1
+
1
U T i Di RT
+ T
U
D
S
K
:
0
R
U T iDi U T (i+1) Di+1
where i is dened as the unique integer satisfying U n(i+1) D i+1 < Rn <
U niD i, and 0 i n 1:
2.3
tj it
tj
tj
St + Rj Btj
itt Stit + Bitt ;
it
for all itj 2 Itj
; all it 2 It and all t 2 f0; :::; T 1g:
min
ft ;Btgt=0;:::;T 1
0S0 + B0
where t ; Bt 2 R t+1 ; t = 0; :::; T 1; subject to the superreplicating conditions itt STiT + RT t Btit GiTT ; with it 2 ItiT and all iT 2 IT ; and the selfitj it
itj
it
nancing constraints tj
St + R jBtj
itt Stit + Btit for all itj 2 Itj
;
all it 2 It and all t 2 f0; :::; T 1g :
On the other hand, the lower bound Clp solves the following problem:
2
Clp =
max
ft ;Btgt=0;:::;T 1
0S0 + B0
This happens since, in order to have an arbitrage opportunity, we must ensure that,
whether market exists or not at each time t 2 f1; :::; T 1g ; the agent will never lose
wealth. Therefore, the optimization problem cannot depend on p:
Consider the economy described in the previous section. Let Tp = f1; :::; T 1g
denote the set of points in time. At each of these points there is market with
probability p; and there is no market with probability 1 p: The existence
(or not) of the market at time t corresponds to the realization of a random
variable yt that assumes the value 0 (when there is no market) and 1 (when
there is market). This random variable is dened for all t 2 Tp and it is
assumed to be independent of the ordinary source of uncertainty that generates the price process. We can therefore talk about a market existence
process. In order to construct one such process, let us start with the state
space. Let #(Tp) denote the number of points in Tp : At each of these points,
market may either exist or not exist, leading to 2#(Tp ) possible states of
nature. We then have the collection of possible states of nature denoted by
^ = fvi g
; each vi corresponding to a distinct state. Moreover,
i=1;:::;2#( Tp )
let F^ = F^1 ; : : : ; F^T 1 ; where F^t is the -algebra generated by the random
variable yt . Let p y be the probability associated with the random variable
yt : For all t 2 Tp; we have py (yt = 1) = p and py (yt = 0) = 1 p:
3.1
^ t ! t; : : : ; t0 1
xt;t0 : -
0
pxt;t0 xt;t0 = t = (1 p)t t1 :
0
pxt;t0 xt;t0 = s = p (1 p)t s1 :
0
0
pxt;t0 xt;t0 = s = (1 p)t t1 +
p (1 p)t s1 = 1;
s=t
s=t
10
as it should.
Consider a given trading strategy (t ; Bt)t=0;::: ;T ; where (t ; Bt)
it
( t ; Btit )it 2It is a (t + 1)dimensional vector. Consider a given path w
and (is )s2ft;::: ;T g w. Suppose that the agent is at a given node it; where
rebalancing is possible. As there is uncertainty about the existence of market at the future points in time, there is also uncertainty about the portfolio
that the agent will
the portfolio
at
be holding
at a future node it0 : In
fact,
i 01
i 0 1
it+1
it+1
i
i
it0 may be any of tt ; Bt t ; t+1
; B t+1
; : : : ; or tt0 1
; Btt01
; where
(is )s2ft;::: ;t0 1g w:
Clearly, the expected value of a given trading strategy at node it0 , given
that we are at node it ; is
i X
i
px 0 h
h is i
0
t0s is
Eit t;t ixx Sti0 + Rt xBixx =
p
x
0 = s
S
B
;
0 +R
x
0
t;t
s
t
s
0
t;t
s=t;::: ;t 1
3.2
t+j iT
t+j
t+j
ST + RT tj Bt+j
0
t+j
t+j
t+j
t+j
itt St+j
+ Rj t Btit t+j
St+j
+ Bt+j
;
it+1
it+1 it+1
it+1
itt St+1
+ RBtit t+1
St+1 + Bt+1
0
it+1
it+1
it
it
ther have the portfolio t ; Bt or the portfolio t+1
; Bt+1
: Under the
concept of statistical arbitrage, we want to ensure that, in expected value,
we are not going to lose at node it+2: Hence, the self-nancing condition
becomes
X
it+2
it+2 t+2
it+2
pxt;t+2 (xt;t+2 = s) iss St+2
+ Rt+2s Bsis t+2
St+2 + Bt+2
s=t;t+1
More generally, for any t at which transaction occurs and t < t0 < T; the
statistical self-nancing condition becomes
i
px 0 h
0
i
i
i
i
Eit t;t ixx St0t0 + Rt xBxix tt00 St0t0 + Bt0t0
4
This notion of Arbitrage Opportunity is in the spirit of Bondarenko (2003). In his
denition 2, a Statistical Arbitrage Opportunity (SAO) is dened as a zero-cost trading
strategy with a payo ZT = Z (FT ), such that
12
px 0 h
0
i
i
i
Eit t;t ixxt;t0 Sti0 + Rt xB ixxt;t0 tt00 St0t0 + B tt0 0 0
3.3
Augmented measures
t=0 it
(iT ;T );m
q(i
= 1;
t ;t)
T
1
X
n
on
o
i
t=0
it :it2ItT
m2- +
it ;i
1
STT1
=
with
1
Rn
(i ;T );m
(iTt ;t)
(i ;T );m iT
ST
(iTt;t)
(i ;T );m
n
o
i
iT :iT 12ITT1
and
iT :iT 1 2ITT1
(i ;T );m iT
ST ;
q(itT;t)
(iTt;t)
T 1
1X
=
p x (xt;T = T 1)
t=0 t;T
n
X
i
=1
it :it2It T 1
(i ;T );m
on
o
m2-+
i ;i :iT 12m
q(iTt;t)
t T
where
=
T
1
X
t=0
pxt;T (xt;T = T 1)
i
iT :iT 1 2ITT1
14
on
i
it:it 2ItT 1
on
m2- +
i ;i
t T
o
:iT 1 2m
(i ;T );m
q(itT;t)
n
o
(i 0 ;t0 );m
(iii) there exists (itt;t)
;for all it0 2 It0 ; it 2 It ; m 2 -+
it ;iT and
0
t > t for all t = 0; : : : ; T 1 such that, for all 0 < k < T;
X
X 1
1
(it0 ;t0 );m it0
T ;T );m iT
Skik = T k
(i
S
+
St0 ;
0 k "(it;t)
(i
;t)
T
t
t
R
R
n
o
0
i
t >k
iT :ik 2IkT
where
and
(i ;T );m
(iTt ;t)
(i
;t0);m
"(itt0;t)
i
iT :ik 2IkT
(i ;T );m
(iTt;t)
(i ;t0 );m
"(itt0;t)
X
1X
n
o
=
pxt;T (xt;T = k)
i
it:it 2It k n
t=0
k
X
n
o
i
t=0
iT :ik 2IkT
XX
t0 >k t<k
(i ;T );m
o
m2-+
i ;i :ik 2m
X
1X
n
o
=
pxt;t0 xt;t0 = k
i
it:it 2Itk n
pxt;T (xt;T = k)
X
n
p xt;t0 xt;t0 = k
n
o
i
it :it 2It k n
i
it :it2Itk
(itt0;t)
q(iTt;t)
(i ;t0 );m
t t
m2-+
i t;i T
q(iTt;t)
t T
o
m2-+
i ;i :ik 2m
t<k
with
=1
t0 >k
n
o
m2-+
i ;i :ik 2m
(i ;T );m
o
:ik 2m
(i 0 ;t0);m
(itt;t)
t t
Main Results
4.1
4.1.1
min
ft ;Bt gt=0;:::;T 1
15
0S0 + B0
where
t ; Bt 2 Rt+1; t = 0; :::; T 1
subject to the conditions of a positive expected payo
px
Eit t;T ixx STi + RT xBxix GiTT ;
px 0 h
0
i
i
i
Eit t;t ixxSti0 + R t xBxix tt0 0 Stt0 0 + Btt0 0 0
for any it 2 It ; t0 > t, t 2 f0; 1; : : : ; T 2g and t0 2 f1; : : : ; T 1g 6:
Example 9 Illustration of the optimization problem with T = 3. The evolution of the price underlying asset can be represented by the tree in gure
1.
t=0
t=1
t=2
t=3
min
ft;Btgt=0;:::;2
0 S0 + B0
where
f0; B0g = f(0 ; B0 )g
1 1 2 2
f1; B1g =
;B ; ; B
11 11 12 12 3 3
f2; B2g =
2; B2 ; 2; B2 ; 2; B2
5
For each it there are 2(T t) paths,
and as a result, 2(T t) (t + 1) restrictions at time t.
P 1
The total number of restrictions is Tt=0
2 (T t)(t + 1):
PT 1
P
6
t0t
t0t
For each it there are t0=t+1 2
: Hence, for each t there are (t + 1) Tt01
:
=t+1 2
PT 2
PT 1
0
t t
Hence, there are t=0 (t + 1) t0 =t+1 2
restrictions.
16
for all i3 2 I3; i2 2 I2 and i1 2 I1 such that i2 2 I2i3 : and i1 2 I1i2 ; i.e., i1 ; i2
and i3 belong to the same path (these are 8 constraints) and
i
h
i
2
h
p + p (1 p) i22 S3i3 + RBi22 + p (1 p) i11 S3i3 + R2B1i1 +
h
i
+(1 p)2 0S3i3 + R3B2i2 Gi33
for all i3 2 I3; i2 2 I2 and i1 2 I1 such that i2 2 I2i3 : and i1 2 I1i2 ; i.e., i1;
i2 and i3 belong to the same path (these are 8 constraints). Moreover, the
self-nancing constraints must also be considered
0 S1i1 + RB0 i11 S1i1 + B1i1
for any i1 2 I1 (2 constraints),
h
i
h
i
(1 p) 0S2i2 + R2B2i2 + p i11 S2i2 + RB1i1 i22 S2i2 + B2i2
for any i2 2 I2 and i1 2 I1 such that i1 2 I1i2 ; i.e., i1;and i2 belong to the
same path (these are 4 constraints) and, nally,
i11 S2i2 + RB1i1 i22 S2i2 + B2i2
for any i2 2 I2 and i1 2 I1 such that i1 2 I1i2 ; i.e., i1;and i2 belong to the
same path (these are 4 constraints).
4.1.2
Solution
2. Cu Cu1:
t ; Bt
Proof. Consider the trading strategy
that solves
t=0;::: ;T 1
the maximization problem that characterizes the upper bound for a
p 2 (0; 1) : This is an admissible strategy for the case p = 1, because
it is self-nancing, i.e.,
it1
t1 it
it1
St + RBt1
itt Sitt + Btit ;
1 iT
1
TT1
ST + RBTT1
GiTT :
18
4.2
The organization of this section is analogous to the section for the upper
bound.
4.2.1
The Problem
max
ft;Btgt=0;:::;T 1
0S0 + B0
where
t ; Bt 2 Rt+1; t = 0; :::; T 1
subject to the conditions of a positive expected payo
px
Eit t;T ixx STi + RT xBxix GiTT ;
px 0 h
0
i
i
i
Eit t;t ixxSti0 + R t xBxix tt0 0 Stt0 0 + Btt0 0 0
for any it 2 It ; t0 > t, t 2 f0; 1; : : : ; T 2g and t0 2 f1; : : : ; T 1g 8:
As in the upper bound case, for each i t there are 2(T t) paths,
as a result,
P and
1 (T t)
2
(t + 1) restrictions at time t. The total number of restrictions is Tt=0
2
(t + 1):
P
8
t0t
As in the upper bound case, for each it there are Tt01
: Hence, for each t
=t+1 2
P
P 2
P
t0 t
t0t
there are (t + 1) Tt01
: Hence, there are Tt=0
(t + 1) Tt01
restrictions.
=t+1 2
=t+1 2
7
(T t)
19
4.2.2
Solution
In this section we show that the price for which any agent is indierent between transacting or not transacting the derivative, to be called the reservation price of the derivative, is contained within the statistical arbitrage
bounds derived above.
Let ut (:) denote a utility function representing the preferences of an
agent at time t. The argument of the utility function is assumed to be the
consumption at time t. Let y be the initial endowment of the
agent, and Zt
it
denote the vector of consumption at time t; i.e., Zt = Zt
: Let be
it 2It
20
and that derivative has a payo at maturity given GiTT , the maximum utility
that he or she can attain is
XT
usell (C; p) =
sup
EG;P
t ut (Zt )
0
t=0
ft;Btgt=0;:::;T 1
subject to
Ztit
Z0 + 0 S0 + B0 C + y
i
it
it
tj it
tj
+ itt Stit + Bitt tj
St + R jB tj
i
iT
iT
j iT
j
ZTiT TTj
ST + Rj BTTj
GiTT
G;P
sup
ft ;Bt gt=0; :::;T 1
E0G;P
XT
t=0
t ut (Zt )
subject to
Z0 + 0S0 + B0 y
i
it
it
tj it
tj
Ztit + itt Stit + Bitt tj
St + R jB tj
iT
iT
j iT
j
ZTiT TTj
ST + Rj BTTj
Lemma 14 In the case of random dryness, there is p > 0 such that, for
all p < p; the utility attained selling the derivative by Cu, is larger than the
utility attained if the derivative is not included in the portfolio.
usell (Cu; p) u (p) :
Proof. Let, for a given p; f t; Bt gt=0;:::;T 1 denote the solution of the
utility maximization problem with no derivative and fut; Btug t=0;:::;T 1 denote the solution of the minimization problem that must be solved to nd
the upper bound if statistical
arbitrage
opportunities are considered (see
sell
section 4.1). Moreover, let sell
;
B
denote an admissible sot
t
t=0;:::;T 1
lution of the utility maximization problem when the agent sells one unit of
21
the derivative. Now, consider the limit case, when p approaches zero. In
that case, the portfolio
n
o
sell
sell
;
B
ft + ut; Bt + Btugt=0;:::;T 1
t
t
t=0;:::;T 1
As C = Cu = u0 S0 + B0; the portfolio fut; B utg t=1;::: ;T 1 is an admissible solution of the utility maximization problem when one unit of the
9
derivative is being sold.
Moreover,
sell
it guarantees a positive expected utility.
sell
Hence, the portfolio t ; Bt
is also admissible solution for the
t=0;:::;T 1
optimization problem, when one unit of the derivative is being sold, which
guarantees a higher payo than the portfolio ft ; Bt gt=0;:::;T 1 : Hence,
usell (Cu; 0) u (0) :
Continuity on p of both usell and u ensure the result.
sup
ft ;Bt gt=0;:: :;T 1
XT
t=1
tut (Zt ) ;
22
ft;Btgt=0;:::;T 1
subject to
Z0 + 0S0 + B0 C + y
i
it
it
tj it
tj
Ztit + itt Stit + Bitt tj
St + R jB tj
i
iT
iT
j iT
j
ZTiT TTj
ST + Rj BTTj
+ GiTT
Lemma 17 In the case of random dryness, there is p > 0 such that, for
all p < p ; the utility attained buying the derivative by Cl , is larger than the
utility attained if the derivative is not included in the portfolio.
ubuy (Cl ; p) u (p) :
Proof. The proof is analogous to the one in proposition 14
Let Rl denote the reservation selling price, i.e., the price such that
u (p) = ubuy (Rl ; p).
Theorem 18 For all p < p we have Rl Clp :
Proof. The proof is analogous to the one presented in theorem (16).
However, in this case the utility is a decreasing function of C; and we obtain
ubuy (Cl ; p) u (p) ) Rl Cl :
Several illustrations are presented in section 7.
fmg
10
In this example, the reservation price for an agent who is buying the derivative coincides with that of an agent who is selling it.
24
subject to
S0 = E [mS2] ; m 0; (m)
h
;
R2
where S0 is the initial price of the risky asset, and S2 is the price of the risky
asset at time t = 211: The upper bound is
subject to
p = E [mS2] ; m 0; (m)
h
:
R2
25
E (~
z +)
E z~+ z~ = 0 ,
= 1:
E (~
z )
This last equality characterizes the benchmark pricing kernel for a given
utility.
Notice that the fair price constructed in this way coincides with our
larger than
denition of the reservation price. Therefore, by choosing L
one, the interval built by Bernardo and Ledoit contains by construction the
reservation price of the benchmark agent.
can be chosen such that
On the other hand, the arbitrary threshold L
their interval is contained in the statistical arbitrage-free interval.
The disadvantages, however, are clear. First, the threshold is ad-hoc,
just as in the case of Cochrane and Saa-Requejo; second, the constructed
interval depends on the benchmark investor; and nally, the only reservation
price that is contained for sure in that interval, is the reservation price of
the benchmark investor. In other words, we cannot guarantee that the
reservation price of an arbitrary agent, dierent from the benchmark, is
contained in that interval.
7
7.1
Numerical Examples
Upper and Lower Bounds
sections.
Using numerical examples we can conclude that, for a call option,
Cu pCu1 + (1 p)Cu0:
If the Call Option is sold by the expected value of the call, regarding the
existence (or not) of market, there will be an arbitrage opportunity in statistical terms. The reason is that the agent that sells the call option can
buy a hedging portfolio (in a statistical sense) by an amount smaller than
the expected value of the call option. As a result, there is an arbitrage opportunity, because he is receiving more for the call option than is paying for
the hedging portfolio.
40
Upper
Lower
39
38
37
36
35
34
33
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
p
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Figure 2: The Upper and Lower Bounds for a European Call Option with
dierent value of p in a two period model, with U = 1:2, R = 1:1, D = 0:8;
S0 = 100 and K = 80:
However, in what concerns the lower bound, it is not possible to conclude
whether Cl pCl1 +(1p)Cl0 or Cl pCl1 +(1p)Cl0: That depends on the
value of the parameters. Although in the two-period simulation in Figure 2
we seem to have the former case, the three period example in Figure 3 seems
to suggest the latter, since the lower bound behaves as a concave function
of p for most of its domain.
27
50
Upper Bound
Lower Bound
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
p
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Figure 3: The Upper and Lower Bounds for a European Call Option with
dierent value of p in a three period model, with U = 1:3, R = 1, D = 0:6;
S0 = 100 and K = 100:
Finally, we may use Figure 4 to illustrate several features.
The Upper and Lower bounds of an European Call Option for dierent
values of p and K (K = 80, K = 100, K = 120, K = 140 e K = 160) in a
three period model, with U = 1:2; R = 1:1; D = 0:8 and S = 100.
First, let us regard the situations in this Figure that are related to pure
arbitrage. This includes the value of the derivative under perfectly liquid
(p = 1) and perfectly illiquid (p = 0) markets. In the former case, the
unique value of the derivative clearly decreases with the exercise price K; as
it should. In the latter, both the upper bound Cu0 and the lower bound Cl0
also decrease with K: More curiously, however, the spread Cu0 Cl0 has a
non-monotonic behaviour. Obviously this dierence is null for K less than
the inmum value of the stock at maturity and must go to zero as the strike
approaches the supremum of the stock's possible values at maturity. In the
middle of this range it attains a maximum. In our numerical example we
observe that the maximum value of the spread is attained for K close to
120.
28
50
45
K=80
40
35
K=100
30
25
20
K=120
15
K=140
10
K=160
5
0
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
p
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Figure 4: The Upper and Lower bounds of an European Call Option for
dierent values of p and K (K = 80, K = 100, K = 120, K = 140 e
K = 160) in a three period model, with U = 1:2; R = 1:1; D = 0:8 and
S = 100.
Regarding the statistical arbitrage domain when p 2 (0; 1) ; we notice
that all the above remarks remain true. Figure 4 also suggests that, for any
given p; the spread attains its maximum for the same value of K as before.
Notice that the spread Cu Cl decreases with p for xed strike K converging
to zero as p ! 1: Hence, although somehow dierent from the traditional
denition of arbitrage, the notion of statistical arbitrage seems to provide a
very nice bridge, for 0 < p < 1, between the two extreme cases above (p = 0
and p = 1), where the original concept of arbitrage makes sense. This is
illustrated in a more direct way in Figure 5.
A third issue driven by Figure 4 is that coexisting derivatives may restrict
more the no-arbitrage interval. As an example, suppose that derivatives
with K = 120 and K = 140 coexist. When p = 0, the upper bound for
K = 140 is above the lower bound when K = 120. In order to avoid arbitrage
opportunities, the equilibrium selling price of the K = 120 derivative has to
be above the equilibrium buying price of the K = 140 derivative. Otherwise
29
16
14
p=0
12
Cu-Cl
10
8
6
4
2
0
p=1
-2
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
7.2
30
Utility Value
75
70
65
60
55
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
p
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
50
Reservation Selling Price
Reservation Buying Price
Upper Bound
Lower Bound
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
p
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Figure 7: Statistical Arbitrage free bounds and reservation prices for the
following parameters: U = 1:3, D = 0:6, R = 1, S0 = 100, K = 100,
= 1=r, q = 0:5, y = 40 and T = 3.
32
Conclusion
33
References
[1] Amaro de Matos, J. and P. Ant~ao, 2001, \Super-Replicating Bounds
on European Option Prices when the Underlying Asset is Illiquid",
Economics Bulletin, 7, 1-7.
[2] Bernardo, A. and Ledoit, O., 2000, Gain, Loss, and Asset Pricing,
Journal of Political Economy, 108, 1, 144-172.
[3] Bondarenko, O., 2003, Statistical Arbitrage and Securities Prices, Review of Financial Studies, 16, 875-919.
[4] Cochrane, J. and Saa-Requejo, J., 2000, Beyond Arbitrage: Good-Deal
Asset Price Bounds in Incomplete Markets, Journal of Political Economy, 108, 1, 79-119.
[5] Edirisinghe, C., V. Naik and R. Uppal, 1993, Optimal Replication of
Options with Transaction Costs and Trading Restrictions, Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28, 117-138.
[6] El Karoui, N. and M.C. Quenez, 1991, Programation Dynamique et
evaluation des actifs contingents en marche incomplet, Comptes Rendues de l' Academy des Sciences de Paris, Serie I, 313, 851-854
[7] El Karoui, N. and M.C. Quenez, 1995, Dynamic programming and
pricing of contingent claims in an incomplete market, SIAM Journal of
Control and Optimization, 33, 29-66.
[8] Hansen. L.P. and R. Jagannathan. Implications of Security Market Data
for Models of Dynamic Economies. Journal of Political Economy, 99,
225-262, 1991.
[9] Karatzas, I. and S. G. Kou, 1996, On the Pricing of Contingent Claims
with Constrained Portfolios, Annals of Applied Probability, 6, 321-369.
[10] Longsta, F., 1995, How Much Can Marketability Aect Security Values?, The Journal of Finance, 50, 1767{1774.
[11] Longsta, F., 2001, Optimal Portfolio Choice and the Valuation of Illiquid Securities, Review of Financial Studies, 14, 407-431.
[12] Longsta, F., 2004, The Flight-to-Liquidity Premium in U.S. Treasury
Bond Prices, Journal of Business, 77, 3.
[13] Mas-Colell, A., Whiston, M. and Green, J., 1995, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press.
34
A
A.1
T
Proof. For any given path m 2 -+
be the dual variable
it;iT let (it ;t)
associated with the superreplication constraint
hX
ii
h is i
px
t0s is
Eit t;T
p
x
0
=
s
S
+
R
B
GiTT
0
x t;t0
t;t
s t
s
0
s=t;::: ;t 1
t0
reach iT : For any given path m 2 -+
be the dual variable
it ;it0 let (it ;t)
associated with the self-nancing constraints
i
px 0 h
0
i
i
i
Eit t;t ixxt;t0 Sti0 + Rt xBxixt;t0 tt00 St0t0 + B tt0 0 0:
Considering ntt0 be the number of nodes that are predecessors of node it0 at
time t we have
i
ntt0 = min t0 (it0 1) ; it0 1; t0 t + 1
T
+1
X
iT GiTT
j=1
where iT is the sum of the dual variables associated with the positive expected payo constraints that have the right member equal to GiTT ; i.e.,
iT =
T
1
X
35
t T
T ;T );m iT
(i
ST
(it ;t)
P
P
(iT ;T );m iT
px0;T (x0;T = 0)
+
S
+ (1;1)
S 1 + (2;1)
S2
iT 2IT
m2T
(i0 ;0)
(i0;0) 1
(i0;0) 1
i 0 ;iT
PT 1 Qt1
t=2
j=1 py (yj = 0)
Pn
it :i0 2I0t
i 0;i T
PT 1 Qt1
t=2
j=1 p y (y j
0) Rt
Pn
m2- +
i0 ;it
t ;t);m it
(i
St
(i0 ;0)
= S0
(1;1)
(2;1)
iiT0 ;m + R (i0;0) + (i0 ;0)
i
it :i02I0t
m2-+
i ;i
0 t
t ;t);m
(i
(i0 ;0)
=1
i1 ;iT
::::
P
P
P
(i ;T );m
pxt;T (xt;T = k) n i :i 2I ik o nm2-+ :i 2mo ni :i 2I iT o (iTt;t) SiTT =
t t
k
T
k
t
i
;i
k
t T
Pk
Pn
Pn
Pn
(iT ;T );m iT
o
o
o
(it;t) ST
i
i
t=0 px t;T (xt;T = k)
m2-+ :i 2m
i :i 2I k
i :i 2I T
i t;i T
Pn
P P
Pn
(it0 ;t0 );m it0
o
o
(it ;t) St0
i
t<k
t0 >k pxt;t0 xt;t0 = k
it:it 2It k
m2- +
it ;it:ik 2m
P P
(i ;k);m
t<k ni :i 2I ik o (ikt;t) Skik = 0:
t t
36
Pk
Pn
Pn
Pn
(iT ;T );m iT
o
o
o
(it;t) ST +
i
i
t=0 px t;T (xt;T = k)
iT :ik 2IkT
it :it 2It k
m2-+
it ;iT :ik 2m
P
P P
Pn
(it0 ;t0);m it0
n
o
o
(it ;t) St0 +
i
t<k
t 0>k pxt;t0 xt;t0 = k
it :it2Itk
m2-+
it ;it:ik 2m
P P
(i ;k);m
t<k ni :i 2Iik o (ikt;t) Skik = 0
t
Pk
Pn
Pn
Pn
(iT ;T );m T k
o
o
o
(it;t) R
+
i
i
t=0 px t;T (xt;T = k)
it:it2Itk
m2-+
iT :ik 2IkT
i t;i T :ik 2m
P P
Pn
Pn
0
o
o (it0 ;t );m Rt0t
ik
+
t<k
t0>k px t;t0 x t;t0 = k
(i
;t)
t
it :it2It
m2-i ;i :ik 2m
t t
P Pn
(ik ;k);m
o
t<k
=
0
i k (i ;t)
i :i 2I
t
t t
PT 1
Pn
Pn
Pn
(iT ;T );m iT
o
o
o
(it ;t) ST +
i
i
t=0 px t;T (xt;T = T 1)
iT :iT 12ITT1
it :it2ItT 1
m2-+
i t;i T :iT 1 2m
P
Pn
(iT 1 ;T 1);m iT 1
t<T 1
iT 1 o
ST 1 = 0
(it;t)
it:it 2It
PT 1
Pn
Pn
Pn
o
o (iT ;T );m R +
o
p
(x
=
T
1)
i
i
x t;T
t;T
t=0
(it ;t)
iT :iT 12ITT1
m2-+
it :it2ItT 1
i t;i T :iT 1 2m
P
Pn
o (iT 1 ;T 1);m = 0
t<T 1
iT 1
(it;t)
it:it2It
The left member of each constraint is a linear combination of the variables of the dual problem. The right member is equal to S0 and 1 for the
dual constraints associated with the variables 0 and B0 ,respectively: For
the remaining constraints the right member is equal to zero. First, let us
consider only the constraints associated with primal variables 's. For a
given iT the terms involving in the dual constraints regarding ik is
X
X
T ;T );m iT
pxt;T (xt;T = k)
(i
ST
(it;t)
n
it:it 2It k
on
o
m2-+
i ; i :ik 2m
37
t T
As,
T
1
X
pxt;T (xt;T = k) = 1;
k=t
summing for all k t, the term associated with STiT that is multiplying by
pxt;T (xt;T = :) is
X
X
(i ;T );m
(iTt;t) STiT
n
o
fit :it 2It g m2-+
i t;i
T
t=0 fit:it2Itg
m2- +
it ;i
T
1
X
STiT
(i ;T );m iT
ST
(iTt ;t)
is
t T
(i ;T );m iT
ST
(iTt ;t)
= S0
(its;s) Stit
s<t
n
o
i
is:is 2Ist
{z
}
from the constraint it
t1 X
t1
X
X
6
6p xk; t (xk;t = s)
4
n
k=0 s=k
ik :ik 2Ikt
on
o
m2-+
i ;i :is 2m
k t
7
t;t);m it 7
(i
S
t
(i ;k)
5
k
{z
summing up all the constraints ik ; with ik 2 Ikit
38
3
}
As,
t1
X
p xk;t (xk;t = s) = 1
s=k
the above equations sum up to zero. Summing up over all Stit a zero will
also be obtained. Hence, if all dual constraints that concern Stit are summed
up, the following relation is obtained:
S0 =
T
1
X
n
o
fiT :iT 2IT g t=0 fit:it 2It g m2-+
i t;i
(i ;T );m iT
ST
(iTt;t)
(4)
Now, proceeding in a similar way but considering the dual constraints associated with Bs: Because the right member of the constraints is equal to 0,
excepting the one associated B0; we multiply each constraint by a constant.
The constraint associated with the variable Bik is multiplied by Rk : Then,
all the constraints associated with Bs are summed up, and
X
where
T
1
X
n
o
fiT :iT 2IT g t=0 fit :it2It g m2-+
i ;i
(i ;T );m
q(itT;t)
T ;T );m
q(i
=1
(it;t)
t T
(i ;T );m
= R T t (iTt;t)
Denoting,
q iT =
T
1
X
t T
(i ;T );m iT
q T
ST
o (it ;t)
1
RT
qiT SiTT
q iT = 1
39
A.2
Proof. As the problem sketched in the example of section to obtain the upper bound is a linear programming problem, considering Stit = U t(it1) Dit 1 ;
its dual is written as follows:
(1;3)
(1;3)
(1;3)
min (i ;T );m ( (i 0 ;t0);m) (0;0) + (1;1) + (1;2) G13
T
; t
+
(it ;t)
(i t;t)
(2;3);1
(0;0) +
(2;3);3
(0;0)
(2;3);3
(0;0)
(2;3);1
+ (1;1)
(2;3);2
+ (1;1)
(2;3)
+ (2;1)
(2;3)
+ (1;2)
(2;3)
(2;2)
G23
(3;3);1
(3;3);2
(3;3);3
(3;3)
(3;3);1
(3;3);2
(3;3)
(3;3)
+ (0;0) + (0;0) + (0;0) + (1;1) + (2;1) + (2;1) + (2;2) + (3;2) G33
(4;3)
(4;3)
(4;3)
+ (0;0) + (2;1) + (3;2) G43
(iTt;t)
0;
(itt0;t)
0;
for all it 2 It t0 ; it0 2 It0 and t0 = 0; 1 and 2; and subject to twelve equality
constraints, each one associated with a variable of the primal problem. The
constraint associated with 0 is given by
"
#
P
P
(1 p)2 (1;3)
S1 +
(2;3);m
S32 +
(3;3);m
S33 + (4;3)
S4
(0;0) 3
(0;0)
(0;0)
(0;0) 3
m=1;2;3
(1;1)
m=1;2;3
(5)
(2;1)
i
(1;2)
(2;2);1
(2;2);2
(3;2)
+ (1 p) (0;0) S21 + (0;0) + (0;0) S32 + (0;0) S23 = S0
m=1;2;3
(3;3);m
(0;0)
(4;3)
(0;0)
h
i
(1;1)
(2;1)
(1;2)
(2;2);1
(1;2);2
(3;2)
+R (0;0) + (0;0) + (1 p) R2 (0;0) + (0;0) + (0;0) + (0;0) = 1
(6)
40
+p (1 p)
"
(1;3)
(0;0) S13
m=1;2
(2;3);m
(0;0) S23
(3;3);1
(0;0) S33
(7)
h
i
(1;1)
(1;2)
(2;2);1
(1;2)
(2;2)
(0;0) S11 + p (0;0) S21 + (0;0) S22 + (1;1) S21 + (1;1) S22 = 0
+p (1 p) R2
"
(1;3)
(0;0)
m=1;2
(2;3);m
(0;0)
(3;3);1
+ (0;0)
(8)
h
i
h
i
(1;1)
(1;2)
(2;2);1
(1;2)
(2;2)
(0;0) + pR (0;0) + (0;0) + R (1;1) + (1;1) = 0
+p (1 p)
"
(2;3);3
(0;0) S32
m=2;3
(3;3);m
(0;0) S33
(4;3)
+ (0;0) S43
h
i
(2;1)
(2;2);2
(3;2)
(2;2)
(3;2)
(0;0) S12 + p (0;0) S22 + (0;0) S23 + (2;1) S22 + (2;1) S23 = 0
41
(9)
+p (1 p) R2
"
(2;3);3
(0;0)
m=2;3
(3;3);m
(0;0)
(4;3)
+ (0;0)
(10)
h
i
h
i
(2;1)
(2;2);2
(3;2)
(2;2)
(3;2)
(0;0) + pR (0;0) + (0;0) + R (2;1) + (2;1) = 0
(1;3)
(0;0) U 3S0 +
(2;3);1
(0;0) U 2DS0
(1;2)
(0;0) U 2S0
(1;2);1
(1;1) U 2S0
h
i
(2;3);1
+pR (1;3)
+
(1;2);1
(1;2)
=0
(0;0)
(0;0)
(0;0)
(1;1)
(11)
=0
(12)
i
(2;3)
(3;3)
(2;3);2
(2;3)
(3;3)
(3;3);1
(2;2) S32 + (2;2) S33 + p (1;1) + (2;1) S32 + (1;1) + (2;1) S33
+p
i
(2;3);2
(2;3);3
(3;3);1
(3;3);2
(0;0) + (0;0) S32 + (0;0) + (0;0) S33
h
i
h
i
(2;2);2
2 (2;2) + (2;2) S 2 = 0
(2;2);1
+
S
2
2
(0;0)
(0;0)
(1;1)
(2;1)
(13)
+
pR
(2;2)
(2;2)
(1;1)
(2;1)
(1;1)
(2;1)
h
i
(2;3);2
(2;3);3
(3;3);1
(3;3);2
+pR (0;0) + (0;0) + (0;0) + (0;0)
h
i h
i
(2;2);1
(2;2);2
(2;2)
(2;2)
(0;0) + (0;0) (1;1) + (2;1) = 0
42
(14)
(15)
(16)
h
i
2S + (4;3) D3S
+p (3;3);3
UD
(3;2)
D 2S0 (3;2)
D 2S0 = 0
0
0
(0;0)
(0;0)
(0;0)
(1;1)
h
i
(3;3);3
(4;3)
(3;2)
(3;2)
+pR (0;0) + (0;0) (0;0) (1;1) = 0
(1;3)
(1;3)
S0 = (1;3)
+
S13 +
(0;0)
(1;1)
(1;2)
+
m=1;2;3
m=1;2;3
(2;3);m
(0;0)
(3;3);m
(0;0)
m=1;2
(2;3);m
(1;1)
(3;3)
+ (1;1) +
+ (2;3)
(2;1)
m=1;2
(3;3);m
(2;1)
(2;3)
(1;2)
(3;3)
(2;3)
(2;2)
(3;3)
S32
(17)
(4;3)
(4;3)
(4;3)
+ (0;0) + (2;1) + (3;2) S34
Multiplying equations (8) and (10) by R and equations (12), (14) and
(15) by R 2 and then summing up with equation (6) we obtain
P
P
(1;3)
(2;3);m
(3;3);m
(4;3)
(0;0) +
(0;0) +
(0;0) + (0;0) +
m=1;2;3
m=1;2;3
P (2;3);m
P (3;3);m
(1;3)
(3;3)
(2;3)
(4;3)
(1;1) +
(1;1) + (1;1) + (2;1) +
(2;1) + (2;1) +
m=1;2
(1;3)
+(1;2) +
(2;3)
(1;2)
(2;3)
(2;2)
(3;3)
+ (2;2)
m=1;2
(3;3)
(4;3)
+ (3;2) + (3;2)
Hence, denoting
(i 0 ;t0 )
(i 0 ;t 0)
43
1
R3
and
(1;3)
(1;3)
q1 = q(1;3)
+ q(1;1)
+ q(1;2)
(0;0)
P
(2;3);m
(2;3);m
(2;3)
(2;3)
(2;3)
q2 =
q(0;0) +
q(1;1) + q(2;1) + q(1;2) + q(2;2)
m=1;2;3
m=1;2
P (3;3);m
P (3;3);m
(3;3)
(3;3)
(3;3)
q3 =
q(0;0) + q(1;1) +
q(2;1) + q(2;2) + q(3;2)
m=1;2;3
m=1;2
(4;3)
(4;3)
q4 = q(4;3)
(0;0) + q(2;1) + q(3;2)
1
R3
(1;3)
=
(1;2)
(2;3)
(1;2) =
(1;3)
(1;3)
(1;3)
(1; 3)
(1;3)
(1;3)
(2;3)
(2;3);1
(2;3);1
(2;3)
(2;3);1
(2; 3);1
(1;2) +p(1;1) +p(0; 0)
(1;3)
(1;3)
(1;3)
(2;3)
(2;3);1
(2;3);1
(1;2)+p(1;1)+p(0;0) +(1;2)+p(1;1) +p(0;0)
(2;3)
(2;3)
(2;2)
(3;3)
(2;2) =
(2;3)
+p (2;3);2
+(2;3)
+(2;3);2
+(2;3);3
(2;2)
(1;1)
(2;1)
(0;0)
(0;0)
(2;3)
+p (2;3);2
+(2;3)
+(2;3);2
+(2;3);3
+(3;3)
+p (3;3)
+(3;3);1
+(3;3);1
+(3;3);2
(2;2)
(1;1)
(2;1)
(0;0)
(0;0)
(2;2)
(1;1)
(2;1)
(0;0)
(0;0)
(3;3)
+p (3;3)
+(3;3);1
+(3;3);1
+(3;3);2
(2;2)
(1;1)
(2;1)
(0;0)
(0;0)
(2;3)
+p (2;3);2
+(2;3)
+(2;3);2
+(2;3);3
+(3;3)
+p (3;3)
+(3;3);1
+(3;3);1
+(3;3);2
(2;2)
(1;1)
(2;1)
(0;0)
(0;0)
(2;2)
(1;1)
(2;1)
(0;0)
(0;0)
(2;3)
(3;3)
i
1 h (3;3) 3
4
(3;2) S3 + (4;3)
S
(3;2) 3
R
44
where
(3;3)
(3;2)
(3;3)
(3;3);2
(3;3);3
(3;2) +p (2;1) +(0;0)
(3;3)
(3;3);2
(3;3);3
(4;3)
(4;3)
(4;3)
(3;2)+p (2;1) +(0;0) +(3;2) +p (2;1) +(0;0)
(4;3)
(4;3)
(4;3)
(3;2) +p (2;1) +(0;0)
(3;3)
(3;3);2
(3;3);3
(4;3)
(4;3)
(4;3)
(3;2)+p (2;1) +(0;0) +(3;2) +p (2;1) +(0;0)
(4;3)
=
(3;2)
with (3;3)
+ (4;3)
= 1:
(3;2)
(3;2)
Moreover, using equations (7), (8), (9) and (10) we have
i 1h
i
1 h (1;3)
(2;3)
(3;3)
(1;2)
(2;2)
S11 = 2 (1;1) S31 + (1;1) S23 + (1;1) S33 +
"(1;1) S12 + "(1;1) S22
R
R
where
(2;3)
(1;1)
(1;2)
h
i
(1;3)
(1;3)
R2 (1p)(1;1) +p(1p)(0;0)
=
#
P
P
(2;3); m
(2;3);m
(1p)
(1;1) +p(1p)
(0;0)
(1;3)
(1;1)
"
R2
"(1;1) =
m=1;2
m=1;2
h
i
(3;3)
(3;3);1
R2 (1p)(1;1) +p(1p)(0;0)
(3;3)
(1;1) =
h
i
h
i
(1;2)
R p(1;2)
+
R p(2;2);1
+(2;2)
(2;2)
(0;0)
(1;1)
(0;0)
(1;1)
; "(1;1) =
h
i
(1;3)
= R2 (1 p) (1;3)
+
p
(1
p)
(1;1)
(0;0)
2
3
X (2;3);m
X (2;3);m
+R2 4(1 p)
(1;1) + p (1 p)
(0;0) 5
m=1;2
and
S21 =
m=1;2
h
i
h
i
(3;3)
(3;3);1
(1;2)
(1;2)
(2;2);1
(2;2)
+R2 (1 p)(1;1) + p(1 p)(0;0) + R p(0;0) + (1;1) + p(0;0) + (1;1)
i 1 h
i
1 h (1;3) 2
(2;3) 3
(3;3) 4
(1;2) 2
(2;2) 3
S
+
S
+
S
+
"
S
+
"
S
, with
3
3
3
2
2
(2;1)
(2;1)
(2;1)
R2 (2;1)
R (2;1)
(2;3)
h
i
R2 (1p)(2;3);3
+p(1p)(2;3);3
(1;3)
(1;1)
(0;0)
(2;1) =
"
#
P
P
(3;3); m
2
R (1p)
(1;1) +p(1p)
(3;3);m
(0;0)
m=1;2
(2;1) =
(3;3)
h
i
(2;2);2
(2;2)
R p(0;0) +(2;1)
,
(2;1) =
"(1;2)
(2;1)
m=2;3
h
i
R2 (1p)(4;3)
+p(4;3)
(1p)
(1;1)
(0;0)
45
"(2;2)
(2;1)
h
i
(3;2)
(3;2)
R p (0;0) +(2;1)
h
i
(2;3);3
(2;3);3
= R2 (1 p) (1;1) + p(1 p) (0;0)
2
3
X
X
5+
+R2 4(1 p)
(3;3);m
+ p (1 p)
(3;3);m
(1;1)
(0;0)
m=1;2
m=2;3
h
i
h
i
(4;3)
(4;3)
(2;2);2
(2;2)
(3;2)
(3;2)
+R2 (1 p) (1;1) + p(0;0) (1 p) + R p(0;0) + (2;1) + p(0;0) + (2;1) :
A.3
For T = 2 the problem that must be solved to nd the upper bound of the
arbitrage free range of variation is the following
Cu =
min
0 S0 + B0
f0 ;B0 ;11;B11 ;21 ;B21 g
p 21 D2 S0 + RB21 + (1 p) 0D 2S0 + R2 B0
1U S0 + RB11
1
1U DS0 + RB11
2
1U DS0 + RB12
2 2
1D S0 + RB12
and self-nancing,
U 2S0 K
(U DS0 K)+
(U DS0 K)+
+
D 2S0 K (19)
+
(UDS0 K)+
+
(UDS0 K)
2
+
D S0 K
46
2
+
U S0 K (18)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
i
(1;2)
+(0;0) U 2S0 K p 11U 2S0 + RB11 (1 p) 0U 2 S0 + R2B0 +
(2;2);1
+(0;0) (U DS0 K)+ p 11U DS0 + RB11 (1 p) 0U DS0 + R2 B0
(2;2);2
+(0;0) (U DS0 K)+ p 21U DS0 + RB12 (1 p) 0D 2S0 + R2B0
h
+
i
(3;2)
+(0;0) D 2S0 K p 21D 2S0 + RB12 (1 p) 0 D2 S0 + R2B0
1
1
+(2;1)
U
S
+
B
US
RB
0
0
0
0
1
1
(0;0)
(1;1)
+(0;0) 21DS0 + B21 (0DS0 + RB0)
h
+
i
(1;2)
+(1;1) U 2S0 K 11U 2S0 + RB 11
(2;2)
+(1;1) (U DS0 K)+ 11 UDS0 + RB11
+(2;2)
(U DS0 K)+ 21 UDS0 + RB12
(2;1)
h
i
+ 2 2
2
2
+(3;2)
D
S
D
S
+
RB
0
0
1
1
(2;1)
The solution is characterized by
(2;2);1
= (2;2);2
= (1;2)
= (3;2)
=0
(0;0)
(0;0)
(1;1)
(2;1)
and
(1;2)
(3;2)
(2;1)
(1;1)
(2;2)
(2;2)
47
0 =
U 2S0 K
i
+ h
(U R) (R D) + p (R D)2
S0
i
2
+ h
D S0 K
(U R) (R D) + p (R U )2
(24)
S0
2DR + 2RU + D2 U 2
S0
p (U DS0 K)
B0 =
+
+
i
2
+ h 2
U S0 K
D (U R) (R D) + pU D (R D)2
R2
i
2
+ h 2
D S0 K
U (U R) (R D) + pU D (R U )2
+
pR (U DS0 K)
R 2
2DU 2 + RU 2 RD 2 + 2D 2U
R2
where
= U 2 (U R) (R D) p R2 + 4RD DU
D2 (U R) (R D) p R 2 UD + 4RU
+ i
1 h
Cu = 0S0 + B0 = 2 q1 U 2S0 K + q2 (U DS0 K)+ + q3 D2S0 K
R
with
q1
q2
q3
(U R) (R D) R2 D 2 + p(R D)2 R 2 UD
=
(R D)2 U 2 R2 + (R U)2 R2 D 2
= p
2 2
(U R) (R D) U R + p(R U)2 UD R2
=
48
A.4
A.4.1
Property 3
1. Proof. Let the set of admissible solutions that characterize the upper
bound for the case p 2 (0; 1) be denoted by A (p) ;where A (p) is a
correspondence such that
A (p) : [0; 1] ! Rt(t+1) :
p!1
p!0
0 =
S0 [U 2 D2]
+
U 2 D2 S0 K D2 U 2 S0 K
B0 =
R2 (U 2 D 2)
13
49
then,
lim Cup = 0S0 + B0
2
+
+
1
R D2 2
U R2 2
=
U S0 K +
D S0 K
;
R2
U 2 D2
U 2 D2
p!0
i.e., limp!0 Cup = Cu0: On the other hand, when p ! 1, which means that
there is no illiquidity, the optimal values of 0 and B0 in expression (24)
converge to
2
+
+
U S0 K (R D) D 2S0 K (U R) + (U DS0 K)+ (U 2R + D)
0 =
S0R (U D)2
+
+
D (R D) 2
U (U R) 2
U
S
K
+
D
S
K
0
0
2
2
R2 (U D)
R2 (U D)
[D (U R) + U (R D)]
+
(U DS0 K)+
R2 (U D)2
B0 =
then,
lim Cup = 0S0 + B0
p!0
2
+
1 X 2
R D j U R 2j j T j
U D
S0 K ;
2
R
j
U D
U D
j=0
Property 4
;B
iT 1 T
iT 1
T
for t = T 2
i SiT + R2B
i
i SiT + RB
i
(1 p)
+
p
GiTT ;
T 2 T
T 2
T 1 T
T 1
50
(1 p) iT 2 ST + R B iT 2 GT + p iT 1 ST + RBiT 1 GT 0;
for t = T 3
SiT + R3 B
SiT + R 2B
(1 p)2
+
p
(1
p)
iT 3 T
iT 3
iT 2 T
iT 2 +
iT
S iT + RB
+ p (1 p) + p2
iT 1 T
iT 1 GT ;
which can be rewritten as
h
i
h
i
S iT + R3B GiT + p
S iT + RB
G iT
(1 p)2
iT 3 T
iT 1 T
iT 1
T
T
h iT 3
i
iT
iT
+p(1 p) iT 2 ST + R B iT 2 GT 0;
More generally, for t
Eit
Property 5
The upper bound of the ask price in a complete market can be written as
2
+
+ i
1 h
liq
+
liq 2
Cu1 = 2 liq
U
S
K
+
(UDS
K)
+
D
S
K
0
0
0
1
2
3
R
51
with
(R D)2
(U D)2
(R D) (U R)
=
(U D)2
(U R)2
=
(U D)2
liq
=
1
liq
1
liq
1
and the upper bound of the ask price in an illiquid market can be written
as
2
+
+i
1 h
illiq 2
Cu0 = 2 illiq
U
S
K
+
D
S
K
0
0
1
3
R
with
R2 D2
U 2 D2
U 2 R2
=
U 2 D2
illiq
=
1
illiq
3
Hence, the upper bound for the ask price in a random dry market can
be written
Cup = Cu1 + (1 ) Cu0
(25)
with
R(UD)2
(U R)(U+D)(RD)
= p
1+ p
1 =
1+ p
R(U D)2
(UR)(U+D)(RD)
1 p
R(U D) 2
(U R)(U +D)(RD)
i
1
i
1
R (U D)2 (R + D) (U R) (U + D) R2 D2
@
=n
h
io2 0
@p
(U R) (U + D) (R2 D 2) + p (R D)2 U (R + D) + (U R)2 D (R + D)
52
Cu0
@ 1 @ 0
C
C
@p u @p u
@ 1
=
Cu Cu0 0:
@p
=
Taking the second derivative we can also conclude that Cup is a convex function with respect to p;
@2Cup
@p 2
as
@ 2 1 @ 2 0
C
C
@p2 u @p2 u
@ 2 1
=
Cu Cu0
2
@p
=
@ 2
0
@p2
we have
@ 2Cup
0:
@p2
Alternative proof: After some algebra we obtain that following relation
between ; in equation (25) and p:
>p
So, as
C0ask liq C0ask illiq 0
we obtain,
B.1
Proof of theorem 12
Proof. The problem that must be solved in order to nd the upper bound of
the range of variation of the arbitrage-free value of an European derivative
is a linear programming problem. Its dual problem is
max
i T
T
+1
X
iT GiTT
j=1
where iT is the sum of the dual variables associated with the positive expected payo constraints that have the right member equal to GiTT , i.e.,
iT =
T
1
X
n
o
t=0 fit:it 2Itg m2-+
i ;i
T ;T );m iT
(i
ST
(it ;t)
t T
B.2
For T = 2 the problem that must be solved to nd the lower bound of the
arbitrage free range of variation is the following
Cl =
max
0S0 + B0
f0;B0;11 ;B11;21;B12g
p 21 D2 S0 + RB21 + (1 p) 0D 2S0 + R2 B0
54
2
+
U S0 K
(U DS0 K)+
(U DS0 K)+
+
D 2S0 K
1U S0 + RB11
1
1U DS0 + RB11
2
1U DS0 + RB12
2 2
1D S0 + RB12
and self-nancing,
U 2S0 K
(UDS0 K)+
(UDS0 K)+
2
+
D S0 K
i
(1;2)
+(0;0) U 2S0 K p 11U 2S0 + RB11 (1 p) 0U 2 S0 + R2B0 +
+(2;2);1
(U DS0 K)+ p 11U DS0 + RB11 (1 p) 0U DS0 + R2 B0
(0;0)
+(2;2);2
(U DS0 K)+ p 21U DS0 + RB12 (1 p) 0D 2S0 + R2B0
(0;0)
h
+
2 2
i
2
2
2
2
+(3;2)
D
S
D
S
+
RB
(1
p)
D
S
+
R
B
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
(0;0)
(2;1)
+(0;0) 11U S0 + B11 0US0 RB0
2
+(1;1)
1DS0 + B21 (0DS0 + RB0)
(0;0)
h
i
+ 1 2
2
1
+(1;2)
U
S
U
S
+
RB
0
0
1
1
(1;1)
(2;2)
+(1;1) (U DS0 K)+ 11 UDS0 + RB11
(2;2)
+(2;1) (U DS0 K)+ 21 UDS0 + RB12
h
+
i
(3;2)
+(2;1) D 2S0 K 21D 2S0 + RB12
The constraints that are binding depend on the value of the parameters.
U DR2
2
First, if R2 UD < 0 and p > UDR
2 +R(UD) or R U D > 0 and p >
R2U D
R2U D+R(U D)
(3;2)
(2;2)
(2;2)
55
and
(2;2);1
; (2;2);2
; (2;1)
; (1;1) ; (1;2) ; (3;2) 0:
(0;0)
(0;0)
(0;0) (0;0) (1;1) (2;1)
2
U DR
Second, if R 2 UD < 0 and p < UDR
2 +R(U D) the optimal solution of the
dual problem is characterized by
(1;2)
(2;2);1
(1;2)
(2;2)
(1;1)
UD
Finally, if R2 UD > 0 and p < R2URD+R(U
D) the optimal solution of the
dual problem is characterized by
(2;2);2
(3;2)
(2;2)
(3;2)
(2;1)
+
Cl = q1 U 2S0 K + q2 [UDS0 K]+ + q3 U 2S0 K
(26)
with
q
q2 =
q3 =
(R D)2 U D R2 + p (U R) (R D) D2 R2
h
i
R2 (U R)2 (D 2 UD) + (R D)2 (U D D 2) + p (U R) (R D) (D 2 U 2)
(U R)2 D2 R2 + (R D)2 R2 U 2
h
i
R2 (U R)2 (D 2 UD) + (R D)2 (U D D 2) + p (U R) (R D) (D 2 U 2)
(U R)2 R2 UD + p (U R) (R D) R2 U 2
h
i
R2 (U R)2 (D 2 UD) + (R D)2 (U D D 2) + p (U R) (R D) (D 2 U 2)
UDR2
or
U DR2+R(U D)
+
1
R D2
UD R 2 2
+
Cl = 2
[U DS0 K] +
D S0 K
R D (U D)
D (U D)
56
(27)
U DR2
U DR2 +R(U D)
and
+
1 R 2 UD 2
U 2 R2
+
Cl = 2
U S0 K +
[UDS0 K]
R U (U D)
U (U D)
B.3
(28)
R2U D
R2U D+R(U D) :
Example on Property 3
(R D)2 U D R2 + (U R) (R D) D2 R2
lim q1 =
p!1
R2 (U R)2 (D 2 UD) + R2 (R D)2 (U D U 2 ) + R2 (U R) (R D) (D2 U 2
(R D)2
=
R2 (U D)2
lim q2
p!1
lim q3
p!1
(U R)2 D 2 R2 + (R D)2 R2 U 2
=
R2 (U R)2 (D 2 UD) + R2 (R D)2 (U D D2 ) + R2 (U R) (R D) (D2 U 2
(R D) (U R)
= 2
R2 (U D)2
(U R)2 R2 U D + (U R) (R D) R 2 U 2
=
R2 (U R)2 (D 2 UD) + R2 (R D)2 (U D D2 ) + R2 (U R) (R D) (D2 U 2
(U R)2
R2 (U D)2
then,
lim Cl =
p!0
+
(R D)2 2
(R D) (U R)
U
S
K
+2
[UDS0 K]+
0
2
2
2
2
R (U D)
R (U D)
2
+
(U R)
2
+
2 U S0 K
2
R (U D)
57