ATheoryofContentandOtherEssays

JerryA.Fodor
ABradfordBook
TheMITPress
Cambridge,Massachusetts
London,England

Thirdprinting,1994
FirstMITPresspaperbackedition,1992
1990MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedinanyformbyanyelectronicormechanicalmeans(includingphotocopying,recording,orinformation
storageandretrieval)withoutpermissioninwritingfromthepublisher.
ThisbookwassetinPalatino
byDEKRCorporation
andprintedandbound
intheUnitedStatesofAmerica.
LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData
Fodor,JerryA.
Atheoryofcontentandotheressays/byJerryA.Fodor.
p.cm.
"ABradfordbook."
Includesbibliographicalreferences.
ISBN0262061309(HB),0262560690(PB)
1.Mind,Philosophyof.2.Content(Psychology)3.Functionalism
(Psychology)4.Semantics(Philosophy)I.Title.
BD418.3.F631990
128'.2dc20

8928523
CIP

Contents
vii

PrefaceandAcknowledgments

ix

Introduction
PARTI

Intentionality

Chapter1Fodor'sGuidetoMentalRepresentation

Chapter2Semantics,WisconsinStyle

31

Chapter3ATheoryofContent,I:TheProblem

51

Chapter4ATheoryofContent,II:TheTheory

89

Chapter5MakingMindMatterMore

137

Chapter6SubstitutionArgumentsandTheIndividuationofBeliefs
161
Chapter7ReviewofStephenSchiffer'sRemnantsofMeaning
177
PARTII

Modularity

Chapter8PrcisofModularityofMind

195

Chapter9WhyShouldtheMindBeModular?

207

Pagevi

Appendix

Chapter10ObservationReconsidered

231

AReplytoChurchland's"PerceptualPlasticityandTheoretical
Neutrality"

253

References

265

IndexofNames

269

Pagevii

PrefaceandAcknowledgments
Exceptfortheeponymousessay,allthepiecescollectedherehavebeenpublishedpreviously.ThoughI'vecorrectedsomeminorerrors,typosandthelike,I've
otherwiseleftthemintact.Insomecases,thelateressaysrejectideastowardwhichtheearlieroneswerepartial.(Anegregiousexampleisthetreatmentofteleological
approachestothenaturalizationofsemanticalrelationstheseareviewedwithoptimismin"Fodor'sGuide"and"Semantics,WisconsinStyle"butdenouncedin"A
TheoryofContentI.")Ithinkthere'sneverthelessasubstantialconsistencyfromchaptertochapterafairlyfixedsenseofwhatneedstobedonecomportswithan
evolvingaccountofhowtodoit.Since,anyhow,Idon'twriteforposterity,Idon'tfeelbadaboutchangingmymindinpublic.Posteritywill,nodoubt,haveproblems
ofitsownIamgladtosettleforaslightlybetterstorytotellthantheoneIhadlastweek.
"Fodor'sGuidetoMentalRepresentation"isreprintedfromMind,Spring1985,pp.5597,bythekindpermissionoftheOxfordUniversityPress."Semantics,
WisconsinStyle"isreprintedfromSynthese59,1984,pp.231250,copyrightKluwerAcademicPublishers,bythekindpermissionofthepublisher."MakingMind
MatterMore"isreprintedfromPhilosophicalTopicsLXVII.1,pp.5979,bythekindpermissionofPhilosophicalTopics."SubstitutionArgumentsandthe
IndividuationofBelief"isreprintedfromG.Boolos,ed.,1989,Method,ReasonandLanguage,Cambridge:theCambridgeUniversityPress,bythekindpermission
ofthepublisher."ReviewofStephenSchiffer'sRemnantsofMeaning''isreprintedfromPhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch50,2,bythekindpermission
ofPhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch."PrcisofModularityofMind"isreprintedfromTheBehavioralandBrainSciences8,1985,142bythekind
permissionofthepublisher,CambridgeUniversityPress."WhyShouldtheMindBeModular?"isreprintedfromA.George,ed.,ReflectionsonChomsky,1989,by
thekindpermissionofBasilBlackwell,Ltd."ObservationReconsidered"isreprintedfromPhilosophyofScience

Pageviii

51,1984,pp.2343,and"AReplytoChurchland's'PerceptualPlasticityandTheoreticalNeutrality"'isreprintedfromPhilosophyofScience55,1988,pp.188
198.BotharereprintedbythekindpermissionofPhilosophyofScience.
IshouldliketothankMr.MartinSchisselmanforhishelpinassemblingthemanuscript.

Pageix

Introduction
Withtheexceptionoftwoenjoyable,butessentiallydigressive,interludesofConnectionistbashing(seeFodorandPylyshyn,1988FodorandMcLaughlin,1989)the
essaysincludedhererepresentmymajorprofessionalpreoccupationsforthelastfiveorsixyears.Asthereaderwillseeataglance,theydivideintwo.Ontheone
hand,there'sabatchofmoreorlessphilosophicalpiecesonmentalrepresentationandthefoundationsofintentionalityand,ontheotherhand,there'sabatchofmore
orlesspsychologicalpiecesoncognitivearchitecture.Youmaywonderwhetherthesetopicshaveanythingincommonotherthanmyrecentinterestinboth.Ithought
thatabriefintroductorynoteonthatmightbeappropriate.
Hereisonewaythatthetwotopicsmightbetakentoconnect:agoalthattheoriesofcognitivearchitecturepursueistosaywhateverthereisthat'sgeneralaboutthe
characterofthecausalinteractionsthatcanoccuramongcognitivestates.Youmightthinkofsuchtheoriesastryingtoprovideataxonomyofthenomologically
possiblementalprocesses,wherea"nomologicallypossible"mentalprocessisonethat'scompatiblewithpsychologicallaw.Now,amongtheviewsofintentional
contentthathave,fromtimetotime,foundfavorinthephilosophicalcommunity,thereisthisfamiliar"functionalist"one:theintentionalcontentsofmentalstatesare
constitutedor,anyhow,constrainedbytheircausalinterrelations.So,accordingtosuchviews,part(ormaybeall)ofwhatitisforyourcurrentmentalstatetobea
thoughtthatsomecatshavewhiskersisitsbeingastatethathasadispositiontocauseyoutothinkthethoughtthatsomeanimalsdo.Itisthusintrinsictocatthoughts
thattheytendtocauseanimalthoughtssothissortofstorygoes.Suppose,forthemoment,thatthisistrue.Thenatheorythatsayswhatkindsofcausalrelations
amongmentalstatesarepossiblewould,ipsofacto,beatheoryofthe(orofoneofthe)determinantsofcontent.Functionalismproposesabridgefromcognitive
architecturetosemantics,toputthepointinanutshell.Givenfunctionalism,what

Pagex

mentalprocessestherecanbepartlydetermineswhatthoughtsyoucanhave.
Isayyoumightsupposethis,butIdon't.Findingalternativestofunctionalistaccountsofmentalcontentisamajorconcerninthesestudies.Here'swhy:
Itakeitveryseriouslythatthereisnoprincipleddistinctionbetweenmattersofmeaningandmattersoffact.Quinewasrightyoucan'thaveananalytic/synthetic
distinction.Inthepresentcontext,thismeansthatyoucan'thaveaprincipleddistinctionbetweenthekindsofcausalrelationsamongmentalstatesthatdetermine
contentandthekindofcausalrelationsamongmentalstatesthatdon't.Theimmediateconsequenceisthatyoucan'thavefunctionalismwithoutholismifanyofthe
functionofamentalstatebearsonitscontent,thenallofitsfunctionbearsonitscontent.Butifalloffunctionbearsoncontent,thennotwomentalstatetokensever
havethesamecontentandtherecanbenosuchthingaspsychologicalexplanationbysubsumptionunderintentionallaw.
Sothestoryisthatifyoutakeitseriouslythatthereisnoanalytic/syntheticdistinction,thenthere'saprimafacieinferencefromfunctionalismtoholismandfromholism
toskepticismandthequestioniswhattodoaboutit.AsfarasIcantell,therearetwomaincamps:eitheryouaccepttheinferenceandlivewiththeskepticism,or
youtrytoblocktheinferencebytakingitlessthanabsolutelyseriouslythatthereisnoanalytic/syntheticdistinction.Thefirstkindofphilosophersays:"Well,very
strictlyspeakinginafirstclassconceptualsystem,andlikethatitreallyisn'ttruethatpeopleactoutoftheirbeliefsanddesires.Verystrictlyspeakingthere
can'tbeascientificintentionalpsychology,howevermuchbeliefdesireexplanationmaybeahumannecessityandhoweverwellitmayworkinpractice."Theother
kindofphilosophersays:"Iknow,ofcourse,thatyoucan'thaveafullblownanalyticsyntheticdistinctionbutperhapsyoucanhaveagraded,orrelativized,or
localized,orotherwisedenaturedanalytic/syntheticdistinction.Inwhichcase,functionalismdoesn'timplyholismandiscompatiblewithintentionalrealismafterall."
Butitseemstomethatnoneofthiswilldo.Ifitfollowsfromyoursemanticsthatverystrictlyspeakingnobodyhaseverthoughtthatperhapsitwasgoingtorain,
thenthereissomethingwrongwithyoursemantics.(Cf.G.E.Mooreonepistemologiesfromwhichitfollowsthatverystrictlyspeakingyoudon'tknowwhetheryou
havehands.)Andtheargumentsthatthereisnoanalytic/syntheticdistinctionareargumentsthatthereisnoanalytic/syntheticdistinctionnotevenalittleone.Quine's
point(utterlyconvincing,inmyview)isthatwhatpassforintuitionsofanalyticityareinfactintuitionsof

Pagexi

centralityandcentralityisanepistemicrelation,notasemanticalone.Thatistosay:afunctionalanalysiswhichwouldaccountforintuitionsofanalyticity,wouldn't
determinecontent.Itwouldn'tbeasemantictheory(evenifwehadonewhichwedon't).
ThesemanticalpartsofthisbookarelargelyabouthowtosquareintentionalrealismwithQuine'sbeingrightaboutanalytic/synthetic.Thewaytodoitistobe
relentlesslyatomisticaboutmeaning(whichmeans,ofcoursenotbeingafunctionalistaboutmeaningseeabove).What'sniceaboutinformationaltheoriesofmeaning
ispreciselythattheypointthewaytorelentlesssemanticatomism.Inthegeneralcase,theinformationthatasymbolcarriesisindependentofitcausalrelationsto
othersymbolsasymbolcansatisfytheconstraintsforcarryinginformationevenifitdoesn'tbelongtoalanguage.Informationaltheoriesofmeaninghavetheir
problems,tobesure,manyofwhichraisetheirheadsinthechaptersthatfollow.Butholismisnotamongtheproblemsthattheyhave.Informationalsemanticistscan
thereforeberobustlyrealistaboutcontentsomethingthatnootherkindofsemanticisthasthusfarfiguredouthowtobe.
Somuch,then,forwhatthetwopartsofthisbookdon'thaveincommontheyaren'tlinkedbyasemanticsthatmakescognitivearchitectureadeterminantof
intentionalcontent.
Infact,theunityisthematic.Justasaninformationalviewofsemantics,ofthesortdevelopedinpartI,offersthepossibilityofatomismaboutmeaning,soamodular
viewofcognitivearchitecture,ofthesortdevelopedinpartII,offersthepossibilityofatomismaboutperception.Semanticatomismistheideathatwhatyoumeanis
largelyindependentofwhatyoubelieveperceptualatomismistheideathatsotooiswhatyousee.
Theseideascometogetherinepistemologyinawaythatthelastessaysinthisvolumeonlybegintoexplore.Itis,perhaps,thecharacteristicstrategyof(serious)
philosophersinourtimetoappealtosemanticandpsychologicalholismtosupportepistemicrelativism.(Ourfrivolousphilosophersarriveatmuchthesame
conclusion,thoughbyworsearguments,orbynone).
Thus,ifwhatyoumeandependsonwhatyoubelieve,itmustbeafallacyofequivocationtosupposethatJones'theorycouldassertwhatSmith'stheorydenies.So
thetheoryJonesbelievesmustbecompatiblewiththetheorySmithbelieves.Betweencompatibletheoriesthereis,however,nothingtochoose.Thussemanticholism
leadstoincommensurabilityandincommensurabilityleadstorelativism.Oragain,ifwhatyouseeisdeterminedbywhatyoubelieve,thenscientistswithdifferent
theoriesseedifferentthingsevenwhentheyareinthesameexperimentalenvironment.Soexperimentalobser

Pagexii

vationsaretheoreticallybiased,notjustfromtimetotimebutinthenatureofthecase.Sounbiasedexperimentalobservationisn'twhatdecidesscientific
controversies.Somaybenothingthat'sunbiaseddoes.Thusholismaboutperceptionleadstoskepticismaboutobservation,andskepticismaboutobservationleadsto
relativismaboutconfirmation.Thisisallveryrough,tobesurebutIsupposethatthegeographyisfamiliar.
Ihaterelativism.Ithinkitaffrontsintellectualdignity.Iamappalledthatitisthoughttoberespectable.But,alas,neithermyhatingitnoritsaffrontingintellectualdignity
normybeingappalledthatitisthoughttoberespectableshowsthatrelativismisfalse.What'sneededtoshowthatitisfalseistotakeawaytheargumentsthat
purporttoshowthatitistrue.Theargument,parexcellence,thatpurportstoshowthatrelativismistrueisholism.Sothisbookisanattempttotakeawayholism.
Hateme,hatemydog.
Idonotthinkthatthisbookisasuccessfulattempttotakeawayholism.ButIdon'tthinkit'sanoutrightfailureeither.Quitegenerally,Idon'tthinkofphilosophyasa
kindofenterpriseinwhichthesoleoptionsareoutrightfailureorsuccess.WhatIhopefor,rather,isthis:Iwouldliketoconvinceyouthattheargumentsfor(semantic
andpsychological)holismreallyaren'tverysubstantialthatthereareseriousatomisticalternativestoeachthatthepossibilitiesforfurtherdevelopmentofsuch
alternativeslooksufficientlybrighttomeritourcarefulanddetailedattention.Everybodytakesholismforgrantedthesedays,butnot,Ithink,foranyverygood
reasonscertainlynotforanyverygoodreasonsthatthey'vemanagedtomakeexplicit.I'dliketochangeallthat.
That'swhatI'dlike.WhatI'llsettleforisjustconvincingyouthatholismmightnotbetrue(andthereforemustnotbeassumedinargumentsforrelativism).Then,
maybe,mynextbookwillconvinceyouthatholismreallymightnotbetrue.Andsoon.You'vegottostartsomewhere,Isupposeandeverybodytellsmeit'sthefirst
millionthat'sthehardone.

PARTI
Intentionality
Ifthefoolwouldpersistinhisfolly,hewouldbecomewise.
WilliamBlake

Page3

Chapter1
Fodor'GuidetoMentalRepresentation:The
IntelligentAuntie'sVadeMecum
Itrainedforweeksandwewereallsotiredofontology,buttheredidn'tseemtobemuchelsetodo.Someofthechildrenstartedtosulkandpullthecat'stail.Itwas
goingtobeanawfulafternoonuntilUncleWilifredthoughtofMentalRepresentations(whichwasagamethatwehadn'tplayedforyears)andeverybodygotvery
excitedandwejumpedupanddownandwavedourhandsandalltalkedatonceandhadaperfectlylovelyromp.ButAuntiesaidthatshecouldn'tstandthenoise
andtherewouldbetearsbeforebedtimeifwedidn'tpleasecalmdown.
AuntieratherdisapprovesofwhatisgoingoninthePlayroom,andyoucan'tentirelyblameher.Tenorfifteenyearsofphilosophicaldiscussionofmental
representationhasproducedaconsiderableappearanceofdisorder.Everyconceivablepositionseemstohavebeenoccupied,alongwithsomewhoseconceivability
itispermissibletodoubt.Andeveryviewthatanyonehasmooted,someoneelsehasundertakentorefute.ThisdoesnotstrikeAuntieasconstructiveplay.Shesighs
forthedayswhenwellbroughtupphilosophersofmindkeptthemselvesoccupiedforhoursonendanalyzingtheirbehavioraldispositions.
Butthechaoticappearancesareactuallymisleading.Arathersurprisingamountofagreementhasemerged,ifnotaboutwho'swinning,atleastabouthowthegame
hastobeplayed.Infact,everybodyinvolvedconcurs,prettymuch,onwhattheoptionsare.Theydifferintheirhunchesaboutwhichoftheoptionsitwouldbe
profitabletoexercise.Theresultingnoiseisoftheseintuitionsclashing.Inthispaper,IwanttomakeasmuchoftheconsensusasIcanexplicitbothbywayof
reassuringAuntieandinordertoprovidenewparticipantswithaquickguidetothegame:Who'swhereandhowdidtheygetthere?Sinceit'sverynearlytruethat
youcanlocatealltheplayersbytheiranswerstoquiteasmallnumberofdiagnosticquestions,Ishallorganizethediscussionalongthoselines.Whatfollowsisashort
projectivetestofthesortthatselfabsorbedpersons

Page4

usetorevealtheirhithertounrecognizedproclivities.IhopeforagreatsuccessinCalifornia.
FirstQuestion:HowDoYouFeelaboutPropositionalAttitudes?
ThecontemporarydiscussionaboutmentalrepresentationisintimatelyandintricatelyinvolvedwiththequestionofRealismaboutpropositionalattitudes.Sinceagoal
ofthisessayistolocatetheissuesaboutmentalrepresentationwithrespecttootherquestionsinthephilosophyofmind,wecommencebysettingoutthisrelationin
severalofitsaspects.
Thenaturalhomeofthepropositionalattitudesisin"commonsense"(or"belief/desire")psychologicalexplanation.IfyouasktheManontheClaphamOmnibuswhat
preciselyheisdoingthere,hewilltellyouastoryalongthefollowinglines:"Iwantedtogethome(towork,toAuntie's)andIhavereasontobelievethatthereor
somewherenearitiswherethisomnibusisgoing.''Itis,inshort,untendentiousthatpeopleregularlyaccountfortheirvoluntarybehaviorbycitingbeliefsanddesires
thattheyentertainandthat,iftheirbehaviorischallenged,theyregularlydefenditbymaintainingtherationalityofthebeliefs("Becauseitsaysit'sgoingtoClapham")
andtheprobityofthedesires("Becauseit'snicevisitingAuntie").That,however,isprobablyasfarastheClaphamOmnibuswilltakeus.Whatcomesnextisa
philosophicalglossand,eventually,aphilosophicaltheory.
FirstPhilosophicalGloss:Whentheordinarychapsaysthathe'sdoingwhatheisbecausehehasthebeliefsanddesiresthathedoes,itisreasonabletoreadthe
'because'asacausal'because'whatever,exactly,acausal'because'maybe.Ataminimum,commonsenseseemstorequirebelief/desireexplanationstosupport
counterfactualsinwaysthatarefamiliarincausalexplanationatlarge:if,forexample,itistruethatPsmithdidAbecausehebelievedBanddesiredC,thenitmustbe
thatPsmithwouldnothavedoneAifeitherhehadnotbelievedBorhehadnotdesiredC.(Ceterisparibus,itgoeswithoutsaying.)Commonsensealsoprobably
takesitthatifPsmithdidAbecausehebelievedBanddesiredC,thenceterisparibusagainbelievingBanddesiringCiscausallysufficientfordoingA.
(However,commonsensedoesgetconfusedaboutthissincethoughbelievingBanddesiringCwaswhatcausedPsmithtodoAstillitiscommonsensethat
PsmithcouldhavebelievedBanddesiredCandnotdoneAhadhesodecided.Itisaquestionofsomeinterestwhethercommonsensecanhaveitbothways.)
Anyhow,to

Page5

afirstapproximationthecommonsenseviewisthatthereismentalcausation,andthatmentalcausesaresubsumedbycounterfactualsupportinggeneralizationsof
whichthepracticalsyllogismisperhapstheparadigm.
Closelyconnectedisthefollowing:Everyman'sviewseemstobethatpropositionalattitudescause(notonlybehaviorbutalso)otherpropositionalattitudes.Thoughts
causedesires(sothatthinkingaboutvisitingAuntiemakesonewantto)andperhapsalittlemoretendentiouslytheotherwayaroundaswell(sothatthewishis
oftenfathertothethought,accordingtothecommonsenseviewofmentalgenealogy).Intheparadigmmentalprocessviz.thinkingthoughtsgiverisetoone
anotherandeventuateinthefixationofbeliefs.ThatiswhatSherlockHolmeswassupposedtobesogoodat.
SecondPhilosophicalGloss:Commonsensehasitthatbeliefsanddesiresaresemanticallyevaluablethattheyhavesatisfactionconditions.Roughly,the
satisfactionconditionforabeliefisthestateofaffairsinvirtueofwhichthatbeliefistrueorfalseandthesatisfactionconditionforadesireisthestateofaffairsin
virtueofwhichthatdesireisfulfilledorfrustrated.Thus,'thatitcontinuestorain'makestruethebeliefthatitisrainingandfrustratesthedesirethattherainshouldstop.
Thiscouldstandalotmoresharpening,butitwilldoforthepurposesathand.
Itwillhaveoccurredtothereaderthatthereareotherwaysofglossingcommonsensebelief/desirepsychology.Andthat,evenifthiswayofglossingitisright,
commonsensebelief/desirepsychologymaybeinneedofemendation.Orcancellation.Quiteso,butmypurposeisn'ttodefendorcriticizeIjustwanttoestablisha
pointofreference.IproposetosaythatsomeoneisaRealistaboutpropositionalattitudesif(a)heholdsthattherearementalstateswhoseoccurrencesand
interactionscausebehavioranddoso,moreover,inwaysthatrespect(atleasttoanapproximation)thegeneralizationsofcommonsensebelief/desirepsychologyand
(b)heholdsthatthesesamecausallyefficaciousmentalstatesarealsosemanticallyevaluable.
Somuchforcommonsensepsychologicalexplanation.Theconnectionwithourtopicisthis:thefullblownRepresentationalTheoryofMind(hereinafterRTM,about
whichagreatdealpresently)purportstoexplainhowtherecouldbestatesthathavethesemanticalandcausalpropertiesthatpropositionalattitudesare
commonsensicallysupposedtohave.Ineffect,RTMproposesanaccountofwhatthepropositionalattitudesare.So,thefurtheryouarefromRealism

Page6

aboutpropositionalattitudes,thedimmertheviewofRTMthatyouarelikelytotake.
Quitealotofthephilosophicaldiscussionthat'srelevanttoRTM,therefore,concernsthestatusandprospectsofcommonsenseintentionalpsychology.More,
perhaps,thanisgenerallyrealized.Forexample,we'llseepresentlythatsomeofthephilosophicalworriesaboutRTMderivefromscepticismaboutthesemantical
propertiesofmentalrepresentations.Putnam,inparticular,hasbeenexplicitinquestioningwhethercoherentsensecouldbemadeofsuchproperties.(SeePutnam,
1986,1983.)Ihavemydoubtsabouttheseriousnessoftheseworries(seeFodor,1985)butthepresentpointisthattheyare,inanyevent,misdirectedasarguments
againstRTM.Ifthereissomethingwrongwithmeaning,whatthatshowsissomethingveryradical,viz.thatthereissomethingwrongwithpropositionalattitudes(a
moral,bytheway,thatQuine,Davidson,andStich,amongothers,havedrawnexplicitly).That,andnotRTM,issurelythegroundonwhichthisactionshouldbe
fought.
If,inshort,youthinkthatcommonsenseisjustplainwrongabouttheaetiologyofbehaviori.e.,thatthereisnothingthathasthecausalandsemanticpropertiesthat
commonsenseattributestotheattitudesthenthequestionsthatRTMpurportstoanswerdon'tsomuchasariseforyou.Youwon'tcaremuchwhattheattitudesare
ifyoutaketheviewthattherearen'tany.ManyphilosophersdotakethisviewandarethusunitedintheirindifferencetoRTM.AmongtheseAntiRealiststhereare,
however,interestingdifferencesinmotivationandtoneofvoice.Here,then,aresomewaysofnotbeingaRealistaboutbeliefsanddesires.
FirstAntiRealistOption:Youcouldtakenaninstrumentalistviewofintentionalexplanation.Youcouldholdthatthoughthereare,strictlyspeaking,nosuch
thingsasbeliefanddesires,stilltalkingasthoughthereweresomeoftenleadstoconfirmedbehavioralpredictions.Everymanisthereforelicensedtotalkthatwayto
adopt,asonesays,theintentionalstancesolongashedoesn'ttaketheontologicalcommitmentsofbelief/desirepsychologyliterally.(Navigatorstalkgeocentric
astronomyforconvenience,andnobodyholdsitagainstthemitgetsthemwheretheywanttogo.)Thegreatvirtueofinstrumentalismhereaselsewhereisthat
yougetallthegoodnessandsuffernoneofthepain:yougettousepropositionalattitudepsychologytomakebehavioralpredictionsyougetto'accept'allthe
intentionalexplanationsthatitisconvenienttoacceptbutyoudon'thavetoanswerhardquestionsaboutwhattheattitudesare.
Thereis,however,astandardobjectiontoinstrumentalism(again,

Page7

hereaselsewhere):it'shardtoexplainwhybelief/desirepsychologyworkssowellifbelief/desirepsychologyis,asamatteroffact,nottrue.Iproposetosteerclear,
throughoutthisessay,ofgeneralissuesinthephilosophyofscienceinparticularofissuesaboutthestatusofscientifictheoriesatlarge.ButasPutnam,Boydand
othershaveemphasizedthereissurelyapresumptiveinferencefromthepredictivesuccessesofatheorytoitstruthstillmoresowhen(unlikegeocentricastronomy)
itistheonlypredictivelysuccessfultheoryinthefield.It'snot,toputitmildly,obviouswhythispresumptionshouldn'tmilitateinfavorofaRealistasagainstan
instrumentalistconstrualofbelief/desireexplanations.
ThemostextensivelyworkedoutversionofinstrumentalismabouttheattitudesintherecentliteratureissurelyowingtoD.C.Dennett.(SeethepapersinDennett
(1978a),especiallytheessay"IntentionalSystems.")Dennettconfrontsthe'ifitisn'ttrue,whydoesitwork?'problem(Dennett,1981),butIfindhispositionobscure.
Here'showIthinkitgoes:(a)belief/desireexplanationsrestonverycomprehensiverationalityassumptionsit'sonlyfullyrationalsystemsthatsuchexplanationscould
beliterallytrueof.Theserationalityassumptionsare,however,generallycontrarytofactthat'swhyintentionalexplanationscan'tbebetterthaninstrumental.Onthe
otherhand,(b)intentionalexplanationsworkbecauseweapplythemonlytoevolutionarysuccessful(orother"designed")systemsandifthebehaviorofasystem
didn'tatleastapproximaterationalityitwouldn'tbeevolutionarilysuccessfulwhatitwouldbeisextinct.
Thereisalotaboutthisthat'sproblematic.Tobeginwith,it'sunclearwhethertherereallyisarationalityassumptionimplicitinintentionalexplanationandwhether,it
thereis,therationalityassumptionthat'srequiredissostrongastobecertainlyfalse.Dennettsaysin"IntentionalSystems"(Dennett,1978c)thatunlessweassume
rationality,wegetnobehavioralpredictionsoutofbelief/desirepsychologysincewithoutrationalityanybehavioriscompatiblewithanybeliefsanddesires.Clearly,
however,youdon'tneedtoassumemuchrationalityifallyouwantissomepredictivityperhapsyoudon'tneedtoassumemorerationalitythanorganismsactually
have.
Perhaps,inshort,therationalitythatDennettsaysthatnaturalselectionguaranteesisenoughtosupportliteral(notjustinstrumental)intentionalascription.Ata
minimum,thereseemstobeaclashbetweenDennett'sprinciples(a)and(b)sinceifitfollowsfromevolutionarytheorythatsuccessfulorganismsareprettyrational,
thenit'shardtoseehowattributionsofrationalitytosuccessfulorganismscanbeconstruedpurelyinstrumentally(asmerelya'stance'thatweadopttowardssystems
whosebehaviorweseektopredict).

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Finally,ifyouadmitthatit'samatteroffactthatsomeagentsarerationaltosomedegree,thenyouhavetofacethehardquestionofhowtheycanbe.Afterall,not
everythingthat's"designed"isrationaleventoadegree.Bricksaren't,forexampletheyhavethewrongkindofstructure.Thequestionwhatsortofstructureis
requiredforrationalitydoes,therefore,rathersuggestitselfandit'sveryunclearthatthatquestioncanbeansweredwithouttalkingaboutstructuresofbeliefsand
desiresintentionalpsychologyistheonlycandidatewehavesofarforatheoryofhowrationalityisachieved.ThissuggestswhatIthinkistruebutwon'targuefor
herethattherationalsystemsareaspeciesoftheintentionalonesratherthantheotherwayaround.Ifthatisso,thenitismisguidedtoappealtorationalityinthe
analysisofintentionalitysince,intheorderofexplanation,thelatteristhemorefundamentalnotion.Withwhatonethingandanother,itdoesseempossibletodoubt
thatacoherentinstrumentalismabouttheattitudesisgoingtobeforthcoming.
SecondAntiRealistOption:Youcouldtaketheviewthatbelief/desirepsychologyisjustplainfalseandskiptheinstrumentalisttrimmings.Onthiswayoftellingthe
AntiRealiststory,belief/desirepsychologyisincompetitionwithalternativeaccountsoftheaetiologyofbehaviorandshouldbejudgedinthesamewaythatthe
alternativesarebyitspredictivesuccesses,bytheplausibilityofitsontologicalcommitments,andbyitscoherencewiththerestofthescientificenterprise.Nodoubt
thepredictivesuccessesofbelief/desireexplanationsareprettyimpressiveespeciallywhentheyareallowedtomakefreeuseofceterisparibusclauses.Butwhen
judgedbythesecondandthirdcriteria,commonsensepsychologyprovestobeabadtheory'stagnantscience'isthepreferredepithet(seePaulChurchland,1981
Stich,1983).Whatweoughtthereforetodoisgetridofitandfindsomethingbetter.
Thereis,however,somedisagreementastowhatsomethingbetterwouldbelike.WhatmattershereishowyoufeelaboutFunctionalism.Solet'shavethatbeour
nextdiagnosticquestion.
(Iseverybodystillwithus?Incaseyou'renot,seethedecisiontreeinfigure1.1forthediscussionsofar.Auntie'smotto:aplaceforeverypersoneverypersoninhis
place.)
SecondQuestion:HowDoYouFeelaboutFunctionalism?
(Thisisatwicetoldtale,soI'llbequick.Foralongerreview,seeFodor,1981Fodor,1981C.)

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Figure1.1.
DecisionTree,stage1.

Itlooked,intheearly1960s,asthoughanybodywhowantedpsychologytobecompatiblewithaphysicalisticontologyhadachoicebetweensomeorotherkindof
behaviorismandsomeorotherkindofpropertyidentitytheory.Foravarietyofreasons,neitheroftheseoptionsseemedverysatisfactory(infact,theystilldon't)
soasmalltempestbrewedinthephilosophicalteapot.
Whatcameofitwasanewaccountofthetype/tokenrelationforpsychologicalstates:psychologicalstatetokensweretobeassignedtopsychologicalstatetypes
solelybyreferencetotheircausalrelationstoproximalstimuli('inputs'),toproximalresponses('outputs'),andtooneanother.Theadvertisingclaimedtwonotable
virtuesforthistheory:first,itwascompatiblewithphysicalisminthatitpermittedtokeningsofpsychologicalstatestobeidenticaltotokeningsofphysicalstates(and
thustoenjoywhatevercausalpropertiesphysicalstatesaresupposedtohave).Second,itpermittedtokensofoneandthesamepsychologicalstatetypetodiffer
arbitrarilyintheirphysicalkind.Thiscomfortedtheemergingintuitionthatthenaturaldomainforpsychologicaltheorymightbephysicallyheterogeneous,includinga
motleyofpeople,animals,Martians(always,inthephilosophicalliterature,assumedtobesiliconbased),andcomputingmachines.
Functionalism,soconstrued,wasgreetedwithaudiblejoybythenewbreedof'CognitiveScientists'andhasclearlybecomethereceivedontologicaldoctrineinthat
discipline.For,ifFunctionalismistrue,thenthereisplausiblyalevelofexplanationbetweencommonsensebelief/desirepsychology,ontheonehand,and
neurological(circuittheoreticgenerally'hardscience')explanationontheother.'CognitiveScientists'couldplausiblyformulatetheirenterpriseastheconstructionof
theoriespitchedatthatlevel.Moreover,itwaspos

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sibletotellareasonableandaestheticallygratifyingstoryabouttherelationsbetweenthelevels:commonsensebelief/desireexplanationsreducetoexplanations
articulatedintermsoffunctionalstates(atleastthetrueonesdo)because,accordingtoFunctionalism,beliefsanddesiresarefunctionalstates.And,foreach(true)
psychologicalexplanation,therewillbeacorrespondingstory,tobetoldinhardscienceterms,abouthowthefunctionalstatesthatitpostulatesare"realized"inthe
systemunderstudy.Manydifferenthardsciencestoriesmaycorrespondtooneandthesamefunctionalexplanationsince,aswesaw,thecriteriaforthetokeningof
functionalstatesabstractfromthephysicalcharacterofthetokens.(ThemostcarefulandconvincingFunctionalistmanifestosIknowareBlock,1980andCummins,
1983q.v.)
EnthusiasmforFunctionalismwas(is)not,however,universal.Forexample,viewedfromaneuroscientist'sperspective(orfromtheperspectiveofahardline"type
physicalist")Functionalismmayappeartobemerelyarationaleformakingdowithbadpsychology.Apicturemanyneuroscientistshaveisthat,iftherereallyare
beliefsanddesires(ormemories,orpercepts,ormentalimagesorwhateverelsethepsychologistmayhaveinhisgrabbag),itoughttobepossibleto"find"themin
thebrainwherewhatthatrequiresisthattwotokensofthesamepsychologicalkind(today'sdesiretovisitAuntie,say,andyesterday's)shouldcorrespondtotwo
tokensofthesameneurologicalkind(today'sfiringofneuron#535,say,andyesterday's).Patently,Functionalismrelaxesthatrequirementrelaxesit,indeed,tothe
pointofinvisibility.Functionalismjustisthedoctrinethatthepsychologist'stheoreticaltaxonomydoesn'tneedtolook"natural''fromthepointofviewofanylower
levelscience.Thisseemstosomeneuroscientists,andtosomeoftheirphilosopherfriends,likelettingpsychologistsgetawaywithmurder.(See,forexample,
Churchland,1981,whicharguesthatFunctionalismcouldhave"saved"alchemyifonlythealchemistshadbeendeviousenoughtodeviseit.)Thereis,foronce,
somethingtangibleatissuehere:whohastherighttheoreticalvocabularyforexplainingbehaviordetermineswhoshouldgetthegrants.
SomuchforFunctionalismexcepttoaddthatonecan,ofcourse,combineacceptingtheFunctionalistontologywithrejectingthereductionofbelief/desire
explanationstofunctionalones(forexample,becauseyouthinkthat,thoughsomeFunctionalistpsychologicalexplanationsaretrue,nocommonsensebelief/desire
psychologicalexplanationsare).Bearingthisprovisoinmind,wecanputsomemorepeopleintheirplaces:ifyouareAntiRealist(andantiinstrumentalist)about
belief/desirepsychologyandyouthinkthereisnoFunc

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tionallevelofexplanation,thenprobablyyouthinkthatbehavioralscienceis(or,anyhow,oughttobe)neuroscience.1(Afortiori,youwillbenopartisanofRTM,
whichis,ofcourse,wayoverontheothersideofthedecisiontree.)TheChurchlandsaretheparadigminhabitantsofthisniche.Ontheotherhand,ifyoucombine
eliminativistsentimentsaboutpropositionalattitudeswithenthusiasmforthefunctionalindividuationofmentalstates,thenyouanticipatetheeventualreplacementof
commonsensebelief/desireexplanationsbytheoriescouchedinthevocabularyofaFunctionalistpsychologyreplacementratherthanreduction.Youarethusledto
writebookswithsuchtitlesasFromFolkPsychologytoCognitiveScienceandarealmostcertainlyidenticaltoStevenStich.
OnemorewordaboutAntiRealism.Itmaystrikeyouasoddthat,whereasinstrumentalistsholdthatbelief/desirepsychologyworkssowellthatwecan'tdoanything
withoutit,eliminativistsholdthatitworkssobadly("stagnantscience"andallthat)thatwecan'tdoanythingwithit.Why,youmayask,don'ttheseAntiRealistsget
theiractstogether?
Thisisnot,however,arealparadox.Instrumentalistscanagreewithelminativiststhatforthepurposesofscientific/seriousexplanationtheattitudeshavetobe
dispensedwith.Andeliminativistscanagreewithinstrumentaliststhatforpracticalpurposes,theattitudesdoseemquiteindispensable.Infactandhere'sthepointI
wanttostressjustnowwhatlargelymotivatesAntiRealismissomethingdeeperthantheempiricalspeculationthatbelief/desireexplanationswon'tpanoutas
scienceit'sthesensethatthereissomethingintrinsicallywrongwiththeintentional.ThisissoimportantthatIproposetoleaveittotheveryend.
Nowfortheothersideofthedecisiontree.(Presentlywe'llgettoRTM.)
IfyouareaRealistaboutpropositionalattitudes,thenofcourseyouthinkthattherearebeliefsanddesires.Now,onthissideofthetreetooyougettodecide
whethertobeaFunctionalistornot.Ifyouarenot,thenyouareprobablyJohnSearle,andyoudropofftheedgeofthispaper.MyownviewisthatRTM,construed
asaspeciesofFunctionalistpsychology,offersthebestRealistaccountoftheattitudesthatiscurrentlyavailablebutthisviewistoputitmildlynotuniversally
shared.Therearephilosophers(manyofwhomlikeSearle,Dreyfus,andHaugelandaremoreorlessheavilyinvestedinPhenomenology)whoarehyperRealistabout
theattitudesbutdeeplyunenthusiasticaboutbothFunctionalismandRTM.Itisnotunusualforsuchtheoriststohold(a)thatthereisnocurrentlyavailable,satisfactory
answertothequestion'howcouldtherebe

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thingsthatsatisfytheconstraintsthatcommonsenseplacesupontheattitudes?'and(b)thatfindingananswertothisquestionis,inanyevent,notthephilosopher's
job.(Maybeitisthepsychologist'sjob,ortheneuroscientist's.SeeDreyfus,1979Haugeland,1971Searle,1981.)
Forhowthedecisiontreelooksnow,seefigure12.
Ifyouthinkthattherearebeliefsanddesires,andyouthinkthattheyarefunctionalstates,thenyougettoanswerthefollowingdiagnosticquestion:
ThirdQuestion:ArePropositionalAttitudesMonadicFunctionalStates?
Thismaystrikeyouasasillyquestion.For,youmaysay,sincepropositionalattitudesarebydefinitionrelationstopropositions,itfollowsthatpropositionalattitudes
arebydefinitionnotmonadic.Apropositionalattitudeis,toafirstapproximation,apairofapropositionandasetofintentionalsystems,viz.,thesetofintentional
systemswhichbearthatattitudetothatproposition.
Thatwouldseemtobereasonableenough.Butthecurrent(Naturalistic)consensusisthatifyou'vegonethisfaryouwillhavetogofurther.Somethinghastobesaid
abouttheplaceofthesemanticandtheintentionalinthenaturalorderitwon'tdotohaveunexplicated"relationstopropositions"atthefoundationsofthephilosophy
ofmind.
Justwhyitwon'tdopreciselywhatphysicalistorNaturalistscruplesitwouldoutrageis,tobesure,notveryclear.Presumablytheissueisn'tNominalism,forwhy
raisethatissuehereifphysicistshavenumberstoplaywith,whyshouldn'tpsychologistshavepropositions?Anditcan'tbeworriesaboutindividuationsince
distinguishingpropositionsissurelynoharderthandistinguishing

Figure1.2
DecisionTree,stage2

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propositionalattitudesand,forbetterorworse,we'recommittedtothelatteronthissideofthedecisiontree.AmoreplausiblescrupleoneIaminclinedtotake
seriouslyobjectstounreducedepistemicrelationslikegraspingpropositions.Onereallydoesn'twantpsychologytopresupposeanyofthosefirstbecause
epistemicrelationsarepreeminentlywhatpsychologyissupposedtoexplain,andsecondforfearof"ontologicaldanglers."It'snotthattherearen'tpropositions,and
it'snotthattherearen'tgraspingsofthemit'sratherthatgraspingsofpropositionsaren'tplausiblecandidatesforultimatestuff.Ifthey'rereal,theymustbereally
somethingelse.
Anyhow,onemightaswellsingthesongsoneknows.Thereisareductivestorytotellaboutwhatitisforanattitudetohaveapropositionasitsobject.So,
metaphysicalissuestooneside,whynottellit?
Thestorygoesasfollows.Propositionalattitudesaremonadic,functionalstatesoforganisms.Functionalstates,youwillrecall,aretypeindividuatedbyreferenceto
their(actualandpotential)causalrelationsyouknoweverythingthatisessentialaboutafunctionalstatewhenyouknowwhichcausalgeneralizationssubsumeit.
Since,inthepsychologicalcase,thegeneralizationsthatcountfortypeindividuationaretheonesthatrelatementalstatestooneanother,acensusofmentalstates
wouldimplyanetworkofcausalinterrelations.Tospecifysuchanetworkwouldbetoconstrainthenomologicallypossiblementalhistoriesofanorganismthe
networkforagivenorganismwouldexhibitthepossiblepatternsofcausalinteractionamongitsmentalstates(insofar,asleast,assuchpatternsofinteractionare
relevanttothetypeindividuationofthestates).Ofnecessity,theactuallifeoftheorganismwouldappearasapaththroughthisnetwork.
GiventheFunctionalistassuranceofindividuationbycausalrole,wecanassumethateachmentalstatecanbeidentifiedwithanodeinsuchanetwork:foreachmental
statethereisacorrespondingcausalroleandforeachcausalrolethereisacorrespondingnode.(Toputthesamepointslightlydifferently,eachmentalstatecanbe
associatedwithaformulae.g.,aRamseysentence,seeBlock,1980thatuniquelydeterminesitslocationinthenetworkbyspecifyingitspotentialitiesforcausal
interactionwitheachoftheothermentalstates.)Notice,however,thatwhilethisgivesaFunctionalistsensetotheindividuationofpropositionalattitudes,itdoesnot,
inandofitself,saywhatitisforapropositionalattitudetohavethepropositionalcontentthatithas.Thepresentproposalistoremedythisdefectbyreducingthe
notionofpropositionalcontenttothenotionofcausalrole.

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Sofar,wehaveanetworkofmentalstatesdefinedbytheircausalinterrelations.Butnoticethatthereisalsoanetworkgeneratedbytheinferentialrelationsthathold
amongpropositionsanditisplausiblethatitsinferentialrelationsareamongthepropertiesthateachpropositionhasessentially.Thus,itispresumablya
noncontingentpropertyofthepropositionthatAuntieisshorterthanUncleWilifredthatitentailsthepropositionthatUncleWilifredistallerthanAuntie.Anditis
surelyanoncontingentpropertyofthepropositionthatP&QthatitentailsthepropositionthatPandthepropositionthatQ.Itmayalsobethatthereareevidential
relationsthatare,intherelevantsense,noncontingentforexample,itmaybeconstitutiveofthepropositionthatmanyoftheG'sareFthatitis,ceterisparibus,
evidenceforthepropositionthatalloftheG'sareF.Ifitbeso,thensobeit.
Thebasicideaisthat,giventhetwonetworksthecausalandtheinferentialwecanestablishpartialisomorphismsbetweenthem.Undersuchanisomorphism,the
causalroleofapropositionalattitudemirrorsthesemanticroleofthepropositionthatisitsobject.So,forexample,thereisthepropositionthatJohnleftand
Maryweptanditispartiallyconstitutiveofthispropositionthatithasthefollowingsemanticrelations:itentailsthepropositionthatJohnleftitentailstheproposition
thatMaryweptitisentailedbythepairofpropositions{Johnleft,Marywept}itentailsthepropositionthatsomebodydidsomethingitentailsthepropositionthat
Johndidsomethingitentailsthepropositionthateitherit'srainingorJohnleftandMarywept...andsoforth.Likewisethereare,amongthepotentialepisodesinan
organism'smentallife,stateswhichwemaywishtoconstrueas:(S1)havingthebeliefthatJohnleftandMarywept(S2)havingthebeliefthatJohnleft(S3)havingthe
beliefthatMarywept(S4)havingthebeliefthatsomebodydidsomething(S5)havingthebeliefthateitherit'srainingorJohnleftandMarywept...andsoforth.The
crucialpointisthatitconstrainstheassignmentofpropositionalcontentstothesementalstatesthatthelatterexhibitanappropriatepatternofcausalrelations.In
particular,itmustbetrue(ifonlyunderidealization)thatbeinginS1tendstocausetheorganismtobeinS2andS3thatbeinginS1tendstocausetheorganismtobein
S4thatbeing(simultaneously)instatesS2,S3)tendsverystrongly,onesupposestocausetheorganismtobeinstateS1,thatbeinginstateS1tendstocausethe
organismtobeinstateS5(asdoesbeinginstateS6,viz.thestateofbelievingthatit'sraining).Andsoforth.
Inshort,wecanmakenonarbitraryassignmentsofpropositionsastheobjectsofpropositionalattitudesbecausethereisthisiso

Page15

morphismbetweenthenetworkgeneratedbythesemanticrelationsamongpropositionsandthenetworkgeneratedbythecausalrelationsamongmentalstates.The
assignmentisnonarbitrarypreciselyinthatitisconstrainedtopreservetheisomorphism.Andbecausetheisomorphismisperfectlyobjective(whichisnot,however,
tosaythatitisperfectlyuniqueseebelow),knowingwhatpropositiongetsassignedtoamentalstatewhattheobjectofanattitudeisisknowingsomethinguseful.
For,withinthelimitsoftheoperativeidealization,youcandeducethecausalconsequencesofbeinginamentalstatefromthesemanticrelationsofits
propositionalobject.ToknowthatJohnthinksthatMaryweptistoknowthatit'shighlyprobablethathethinksthatsomebodywept.ToknowthatSamthinksthat
itisrainingistoknowthatit'shighlyprobablethathethinksthateitheritisrainingorthatJohnleftandMarywept.ToknowthatSamthinksthatit'srainingandthat
Samthinksthatifit'srainingitiswelltocarryanumbrellaistobefaralongthewaytopredictingapieceofSam'sbehavior.
Itmaybe,accordingtothepresentstory,thatpreservingisomorphismbetweenthecausalandthesemanticnetworksisallthatthereistotheassignmentofcontents
tomentalstatesthatnothingconstrainstheattributionofpropositionalobjectstopropositionalattitudesexcepttherequirementthatisomorphismbepreserved.But
oneneednotholdthatthatisso.Onthecontrary,manyperhapsmostphilosopherswholiketheisomorphismstoryareattractedbysocalled'twofactor'
theories,accordingtowhichwhatdeterminesthesemanticsofanattitudeisnotjustitsfunctionalrolebutalsoitscausalconnectionstoobjects'intheworld'.(Thisis,
notice,stillaspeciesoffunctionalismsinceit'sstillcausalrolealonethatcountsforthetypeindividuationofmentalstatesbuttwofactortheoriesacknowledgeas
semanticallyrelevant'external'causalrelations,relationsbetween,forexample,statesoftheorganismanddistalstimuli.Itisthesemindtoworldcausalrelationsthat
aresupposedtodeterminethedenotationalsemanticsofanattitude:whatit'saboutandwhatitstruthconditionsare.)Thereareseriousissuesinthisarea,butforour
purposesweare,afterall,justsightseeingwecangroupthetwofactortheoristswiththepurefunctionalrolesemanticists.
ThestoryI'vejusttoldyouis,Ithink,thestandardcurrentconstrualofRealismaboutpropositionalattitudes.2Ipropose,therefore,tocallitStandardRealism(SRfor
convenience).Asmustbeapparent,SRisacompoundoftwodoctrines:aclaimaboutthe'internal'structureofattitudes(viz.,thattheyaremonadicfunctionalstates)
andaclaimaboutthesourceoftheirsemanticalproperties(viz.,that

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someorallofsuchpropertiesarisefromisomorphismsbetweenthecausalroleofmentalstatesandtheimplicationalstructureofpropositions).Now,thoughtheyare
usuallyheldtogether,itseemsclearthattheseclaimsareorthogonal.Onecouldoptformonadicmentalstateswithoutfunctionalrolesemanticsoronecouldoptfor
functionalrolesemanticstogetherwithsomenonmonadicaccountofthepolyadicityoftheattitudes.MyownviewisthatSRshouldberejectedwholesale:thatitis
wrongaboutboththestructureandthesemanticsoftheattitudes.Butsuchistheconfusionandperversityofmycolleaguesthisviewiswidelythoughttobe
eccentric.ThestandardRealisticalternativetoStandardRealismholdsthatSRisrightaboutfunctionalsemanticsbutwrongaboutmonadicity.Iproposetodivide
theseissues:monadicityfirst,semanticsattheend.
If,inthepresentintellectualatmosphere,youareRealistandFunctionalistabouttheattitudes,butyoudon'tthinkthattheattitudesaremonadicfunctionalstates,then
probablyyouthinkthattohaveabelieforadesireorwhateveristoberelatedinacertainwaytoaMentalRepresentation.Accordingtothecanonical
formulationofthisview:foranyorganism0andforanypropositionP,thereisarelationRandamentalrepresentationMPsuchthat:MPmeansthat(expressesthe
propositionthat)PandObelievesthatPiffObearsRtoMP.(Andsimilarly,RdesiresthatPiffObearssomedifferentrelation,R',toMP.Andsoforth.For
elaboration,seeFodor,1975,1978Field,1978.)Thisis,ofcourse,thedoctrineI'vebeencallingfullblownRTM.Sowecome,atlast,tothebottomofthedecision
tree.(Seefigure1.3.)
AscomparedwithSR,RTMassumestheheavierburdenofontologicalcommitment.ItquantifiesnotjustoversuchmentalstatesasbelievingthatPanddesiringthat
Qbutalsoovermentalrepresentationssymbolsina"languageofthought."TheburdenofproofisthusonRTM.(Auntieholdsthatitdoesn'tmatterwhohasthe
burdenofproofbecausethechoicebetweenSRandRTMisn'taphilosophicalissue.ButIdon'tknowhowshetells.Orwhyshecares.)Therearetwosortsof
considerationsthat,inmyview,arguepersuasivelyforRTM.IthinktheyaretheimplicitsourcesoftheCognitiveSciencecommunity'scommitmenttothemental
representationconstruct.
FirstArgumentforRTM:ProductivityandConstituency
Thecollectionofstatesofmindisproductive:forexample,thethoughtsthatoneactuallyentertainsinthecourseofamentallifecomprisearelativelyunsystematic
subsetdrawnfromavastlylarger

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Figure1.3.
DecisionTree,stage3.

varietyofthoughtsthatonecouldhaveentertainedhadanoccasionforthemarisen.Forexample,ithasprobablyneveroccurredtoyoubeforethatnograssgrowson
kangaroos.But,onceyourattentionisdrawntothepoint,it'sanideathatyouarequitecapableofentertaining,onewhich,infact,youareprobablyinclinedto
endorse.Atheoryoftheattitudesoughttoaccountforthisproductivityitoughttomakeclearwhatitisaboutbeliefsanddesiresinvirtueofwhichtheyconstitute
openendedfamilies.
NoticethatNaturalismprecludessaying'therearearbitrarilymanypropositionalattitudesbecausethereareinfinitelymanypropositions'andleavingitatthat.The
problemaboutproductivityisthattherearearbitrarilymanypropositionalattitudesthatonecanhave.Sincerelationsbetweenorganismsandpropositionsaren'ttobe
takenasprimitive,oneisgoingtohavetosaywhatitisaboutorganicstateslikebelievinganddesiringthatallowsthemtobe(roughly)asdifferentiatedasthe
propositionsare.If,forexample,youthinkthat

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attitudesaremappedtopropositionsinvirtueoftheircausalroles(seeabove),thenyouhavetosaywhatitisabouttheattitudesthataccountsfortheproductivityof
thesetofcausalroles.
Anaturalsuggestionisthattheproductivityofthoughtsisliketheproductivityofnaturallanguages,i.e.,thatthereareindefinitelymanythoughtstoentertainformuch
thesamereasonthatthereareindefinitelymanysentencestoutter.Fine,buthowdonaturallanguagesmanagetobeproductive?Heretheoutlinesofananswerare
familiar.Toafirstapproximation,eachsentencecanbeidentifiedwithacertainsequenceofsubsententialconstituents.Differentsentencescorrespondtodifferent
waysofarrangingthesesubsententialconstituentsnewsentencescorrespondtonewwaysofarrangingthem.Andthemeaningofasentencethepropositionit
expressesisdetermined,inaregularway,byitsconstituentstructure.
Theconstituentsofsentencesare,say,wordsandphrases.Whataretheconstituentsofpropositionalattitudes?Anaturalanswerwouldbe:otherpropositional
attitudes.Since,forexample,youcan'tbelievethatPandQwithoutbelievingthatPandbelievingthatQ,wecouldtaketheformerstatetobeacomplexofwhichthe
latteraretherelatively(orperhapsabsolutely)simpleparts.Butamoment'sconsiderationmakesitclearthatthiswon'tworkwithanygenerality:believingthatPorQ
doesn'trequireeitherbelievingthatPorbelievingthatQ,andneitherdoesbelievingthatifPthenQ.Itlooksasthoughwewantpropositionalattitudestobebuiltout
ofsomething,butnotoutofotherpropositionalattitudes.
There'saninterestinganalogytothecaseofspeechacts(oneofmanysuchseeVendler,1972).Thereareindefinitelymanydistinctassertions(i.e.,thereare
indefinitelymanypropositionsthatonecanassert)andthoughyoucan'tassertthatPandQwithoutassertingthatPandassertingthatQ,thedisjunctiveassertion,P
orQ,doesnotimplytheassertionofeitherofthedisjuncts,andthehypotheticalassertion,ifPthenQ,doesnotimplytheassertionofitsantecedentoritsconsequent.
Sohowdoyouworktheconstituencyrelationforassertions?
Answer:youtakeadvantageofthefactthatmakinganassertioninvolvesusingsymbols(typicallyitinvolvesutteringsymbols)theconstituencyrelationisdefinedfor
thesymbolsthatassertionsaremadebyusing.So,inparticular,thestandard(Englishlanguage)vehicleformakingtheassertionthateitherJohnleftorMaryweptis
theformofwords'eitherJohnleftorMarywept'and,notice,thiscomplexlinguisticexpressionis,literally,aconstructoutofthesimplerlinguisticexpressions'John
left'and'Marywept'.YoucanassertthatPorQwithoutassertingthatPorassertingthatQ,butyoucan't

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uttertheformofwords'PorQ'withoututteringtheformofwords'P'andtheformofwords'Q'.
Themoralfortreatmentsoftheattitudeswouldseemtobestraightforward:solvetheproductivityproblemfortheattitudesbyappealingtoconstituency.Solvethe
constituencyproblemfortheattitudesinthesamewaythatyousolveitforspeechacts:tokeninganattitudeinvolvestokeningasymbol,justastokeninganassertion
does.Whatkindofsymboldoyouhavetotokentotokenanattitude?Amentalrepresentation,ofcourse.HenceRTM.(Auntiesaysthatitiscrudeandpreposterous
andunbiologicaltosupposethatpeoplehavesentencesintheirheads.Auntiealwaystalkslikethatwhenshehasn'tgotanyarguments.)
SecondArgumentforRTM:MentalProcesses
Itispossibletodoubtwhether,asfunctionalroletheoriesofmeaningwouldhaveit,thepropositionalcontentsofmentalstatesarereducibleto,ordeterminedby,or
epiphenomenaof,theircausalroles.Butwhatcan'tbedoubtedisthis:thecausalrolesofmentalstatestypicallycloselyparalleltheimplicationalstructuresoftheir
propositionalobjectsandthepredictivesuccessesofpropositionalattitudepsychologyroutinelyexploitthesymmetriesthusengendered.IfweknowthatPsmith
believesthatPQandweknowthathebelievesthatP,thenwegenerallyexpecthimtoinferthatQandtoactaccordingtohisinference.Whydoweexpectthis?
Well,becausewebelievethebusinessaboutPsmithtobeaninstanceofatrueandcounterfactualsupportinggeneralizationaccordingtowhichbelievingPand
believingPQiscausallysufficientforinferringQ,ceterisparibus.Butthen,whatisitaboutthemechanismsofthinkinginvirtueofwhichsuchgeneralizations
hold?What,inparticular,couldbelievingandinferringbe,suchthatthinkingthepremisesofavalidinferenceleads,sooftenandsoreliably,tothinkingitsconclusion?
ItwasascandalofmidcenturyAngloAmericanphilosophyofmindthatthoughitworriedalotaboutthenatureofmentalstates(liketheattitudes)itquitegenerally
didn'tworrymuchaboutthenatureofmentalprocesses(likethinking).Thisisn't,inretrospect,verysurprisinggiventhebehaviorismthatwaswidelyprevalent.Mental
processesarecausalsequencesofmentalstatesifyou'reeliminativistabouttheattitudesyou'rehardlylikelytobeRealistabouttheircausalconsequences.In
particular,you'rehardlylikelytobeRealistabouttheircausalinteractions.Itnowseemsclearenough,however,thatourtheoryofthestructureoftheattitudesmust
accommodateatheoryofthinkingandthatitisapreeminentconstraint

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onthelatterthatitprovideamechanismforsymmetrybetweentheinferentialrolesofthoughtsandtheircausalroles.
Thisisn't,byanymeans,allthateasyforatheoryofthinkingtodo.Notice,forexample,thatthephilosophyofmindassumedintraditionalBritishEmpiricismwas
RealistabouttheattitudesandacceptedaformofRTM.(Veryroughly,theattitudeswereconstruedasrelationstomentalimages,thelatterbeingendowedwith
semanticpropertiesinvirtueofwhattheyresembledandwithcausalpropertiesinvirtueoftheirassociations.Mentalstateswereproductivebecausecompleximages
canbeconstructedoutofsimpleones.)Butpreciselybecausethemechanismsofmentalcausationwereassumedtobeassociationistic(andtheconditionsfor
associationtoinvolvepreeminentlyspatiotemporalpropinquity),theEmpiricistshadnogoodwayofconnectingthecontentsofathoughtwiththeeffectsof
entertainingit.Theythereforenevergotclosetoaplausibletheoryofthinking,andneitherdidtheassociationisticpsychologythatfollowedintheirfootsteps.
Whatassociationismmissedtoputitmoreexactlywasthesimilaritybetweentrainsofthoughtsandarguments.Here,foranexample,isSherlockHolmesdoing
histhingattheendof''TheSpeckledBand":
Iinstantlyreconsideredmypositionwhen...itbecamecleartomethatwhateverdangerthreatenedanoccupantoftheroomcouldnotcomeeitherfromthewindoworthedoor.
Myattentionwasspeedilydrawn,asIhavealreadyremarkedtoyou,tothisventilator,andtothebellropewhichhungdowntothebed.Thediscoverythatthiswasadummy,
andthatthebedwasclampedtothefloor,instantlygaverisetothesuspicionthattheropewasthereasabridgeforsomethingpassingthroughthehole,andcomingtothebed.
Theideaofasnakeinstantlyoccurredtome,andwhenIcoupleditwithmyknowledgethattheDoctorwasfurnishedwithasupplyofthecreaturesfromIndiaIfeltthatIwas
probablyontherighttrack...

Thepassagepurportstobeabitofreconstructivepsychology,acapsulehistoryofthesequenceofmentalepisodeswhichbroughtHolmesfirsttosuspect,thento
believe,thattheDoctordiditwithhispetsnake.Now,backwhenAuntiewasagirlandreasonsweren'tallowedtobecauses,philosopherswereunabletobelieve
thatsuchanaetiologycouldbeliterallytrue.Iassume,however,thatliberationhassetinbynowwehavenophilosophicallyimpressivereasontodoubtthatHolmes's
trainofthoughtswentprettymuchthewaythathesaysitdid.

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Whatisthereforeinteresting,forourpurposes,isthatHolmes'sstoryisn'tjustreconstructivepsychology.Itdoesadoubledutysinceitalsoservestoassemble
premisesforaplausibleinferencetotheconclusionthatthedoctordiditwiththesnake.("Asnakecouldhavecrawledthroughtheventilatorandslithereddownthe
bellrope,""theDoctorwasknowntokeepasupplyofsnakesinhissnuffbox,"andsoforth.)Becausethistrainofthoughtsistantamounttoanargument,Holmes
expectsWatsontobeconvincedbytheconsiderationsthat,whentheyoccurredtohim,causedHolmes'sownconviction.(Comparethesortofmentalhistorythat
goes,"Well,Iwenttobedandsleptonit,andwhenIwokeupinthemorningIfoundthattheproblemhadsolveditself."Orthesortthatgoes,"Bellropesalways
makemethinkofsnakes,andsnakesmakemethinkofsnakeoil,andsnakeoilmakesmethinkofdoctorssowhenIsawthebellropeitpoppedintomyheadthat
theDoctorandasnakemighthavedoneitbetweenthem."That'smentalcausationperhapsbutit'snotthinking.)
WhatconnectsthecausalhistoryaspectofHolmes'sstorywithitsplausibleinferenceaspectispreciselytheparallelismbetweentrainsofthoughtandarguments:the
thoughtsthateffectthefixationofthebeliefthatPprovide,oftenenough,goodgroundsforbelievingthatP.(AsHolmesputsitinanotherstory,"onetrueinference
invariablysuggestsothers.")Werethisnotthecaseweretherenotthisgeneralharmonybetweenthesemanticalandthecausalpropertiesofthoughtsthere
wouldn't,afterall,bemuchprofitinthinking.
Whatyouwanttomakethinkingworththewhileisthattrainsofthoughtsshouldbegeneratedbymechanismsthataregenerallytruthpreserving(sothat"atrue
inference[generally]suggestsotherinferencesthatarealsotrue").Argumentisgenerallytruthpreservingthat,surely,istheteleologicalbasisofthesimilarity
betweentrainsofthoughtsandarguments.Theassociationistsnoticedhardlyanyofthisandeveniftheyhadnoticedit,theywouldn'thaveknownwhattodowithit.
Inthisrespect,ConanDoylewasafardeeperpsychologistfarclosertowhatisessentialaboutthementallifethan,say,JamesJoyce(orWilliamJames,forthat
matter).
When,therefore,Rationalistcritics(including,notably,Kant)pointedoutthatthoughtlikeargumentinvolvesjudgingandinferring,thecatwasoutofthebag.
AssociationismwasthebestavailableformofRealismabouttheattitudes,andassociationismfailedtoproduceacrediblemechanismforthinking.Whichistosaythat
itfailedtoproduceacredibletheoryoftheattitudes.Nowondereverybodygaveupandturnedintoabehaviorist.

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CognitiveScienceistheartofgettingthecatbackin.ThetrickistoabandonassociationismandcombineRTMwiththe"computermetaphor."InthisrespectIthink
therereallyhasbeensomethinglikeanintellectualbreakthrough.Technicaldetailstooneside,thisisinmyviewtheonlyrespectinwhichcontemporaryCognitive
SciencerepresentsamajoradvanceovertheversionsofRTMthatwereitseighteenthandnineteenthcenturypredecesors.
Computersshowushowtoconnectsemanticalwithcausalpropertiesforsymbols.So,ifthetokeningofanattitudeinvolvesthetokeningofasymbol,thenwecan
getsomeleverageonconnectingsemanticalwithcausalpropertiesforthoughts.Here,inroughestoutline,ishowthestoryissupposedtogo.
Youconnectthecausalpropertiesofasymbolwithitssemanticpropertiesviaitssyntax.Thesyntaxofasymbolisoneofitssecondorderphysicalproperties.Toa
firstapproximation,wecanthinkofitssyntacticstructureasanabstractfeatureofits(geometricoracoustic)shape.Because,toallintentsandpurposes,syntax
reducestoshape,andbecausetheshapeofasymbolisapotentialdeterminantofitscausalrole,itisfairlyeasytoseehowtherecouldbeenvironmentsinwhichthe
causalroleofasymbolcorrelateswithitssyntax.It'seasy,thatistosay,toimaginesymboltokensinteractingcausallyinvirtueoftheirsyntacticstructures.The
syntaxofasymbolmightdeterminethecausesandeffectsofitstokeningsinmuchthewaythatthegeometryofakeydetermineswhichlocksitwillopen.
But,now,weknowfromformallogicthatcertainofthesemanticrelationsamongsymbolscanbe,asitwere,"mimicked"bytheirsyntacticrelationsthat,whenseen
fromaverygreatdistance,iswhatprooftheoryisabout.So,withincertainfamouslimits,thesemanticrelationthatholdsbetweentwosymbolswhentheproposition
expressedbytheoneisimpliedbythepropositionexpressedbytheothercanbemimickedbysyntacticrelationsinvirtueofwhichoneofthesymbolsisderivable
fromtheother.Wecanthereforebuildmachineswhichhave,againwithinfamouslimits,thefollowingproperty:theoperationsofsuchamachineconsistentirelyof
transformationsofsymbolsinthecourseofperformingtheseoperations,themachineissensitivesolelytosyntacticpropertiesofthesymbolsandtheoperationsthat
themachineperformsonthesymbolsareentirelyconfinedtoalterationsoftheirshapes.Yetthemachineissodevisedthatitwilltransformonesymbolintoanotherif
andonlyifthesymbolssotransformedstandincertainsemanticrelationse.g.,therelationthatthepremisesbeartotheconclusioninavalidargument.Such
machinescomputers,ofcoursejustareenviron

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3

mentsinwhichthecausalroleofasymboltokenismadetoparalleltheinferentialroleofthepropositionthatitexpresses.

Iexpectit'sclearhowthisisallsupposedtoprovideanargumentforquantifyingovermentalrepresentations.Computersareasolutiontotheproblemofmediating
betweenthecausalpropertiesofsymbolsandtheirsemanticproperties.Soifthemindisasortofcomputer,webegintoseehowyoucanhaveatheoryofmental
processesthatsucceedswhereassociationism(tosaynothingofbehaviorism)abjectlyfailedatheorywhichexplainshowtherecouldregularlybenonarbitrary
contentrelationsamongcausallyrelatedthoughts.
But,patently,therearegoingtohavetobementalrepresentationsifthisproposalisgoingtowork.Incomputerdesign,causalroleisbroughtintophasewithcontent
byexploitingparallelismsbetweenthesyntaxofasymbolanditssemantics.Butthatideawon'tdothetheoryofmindanygoodunlesstherearementalsymbols
mentalparticularspossessedofsemanticandsyntacticproperties.Theremustbementalsymbolsbecause,inanutshell,onlysymbolshavesyntax,andourbest
availabletheoryofmentalprocessesindeed,theonlyavailabletheoryofmentalprocessesthatisn'tknowntobefalseneedsthepictureofthemindasasyntax
drivenmachine.4
Abriefaddendumbeforeweendthissection:thequestionoftheextenttowhichRTMmustbecommittedtothe'explicitness'ofmentalrepresentationisonethat
keepsgettingraisedinthephilosophicalliterature(andelsewhereseeDennett,1978bStabler,1983).Theissuebecomesclearifweconsiderrealcomputersas
deployedinArtificialIntelligenceresearch.So,toborrowanexampleofDennett's,therearechessmachinesthatplayasthoughthey'believe'thatit'sagoodideato
getone'sQueenoutearly.Butthereneedn'tbeinfact,thereprobablywouldn'tbeanywhereinthesystemofheuristicsthatconstitutestheprogramofsucha
machineasymbolthatmeans'(tryand)getyourQueenoutearly'ratherthemachine'sobediencetothatruleofplayis,asitwere,anepiphenomenonofitsfollowing
manyotherrules,muchmoredetailed,whosejointeffectisthat,ceterisparibus,theQueengetsoutassoonasitcan.Themoralissupposedtobethatthoughthe
contentsofsomeoftheattitudesitwouldbenaturaltoattributetothemachinemaybeexplicitlyrepresented,noneofthemhavetobe,evenassumingthesortof
storyabouthowcomputationalprocessesworkthatissupposedtomotivateRTM.So,then,whatexactlyisRTMminimallycommittedtobywayofexplicit
mentalrepresentation?
Theanswershouldbeclearinlightofthepreviousdiscussion.AccordingtoRTM,mentalprocessesaretransformationsofmental

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representations.Theruleswhichdeterminethecourseofsuchtransformationsmay,butneedn't,bethemselvesexplicitlyrepresented.Butthementalcontents(the
'thoughts',asitwere)thatgettransformedmustbeexplicitlyrepresentedorthetheoryissimplyfalse.Toputitanotherway:iftheoccurrenceofathoughtisan
episodeinamentalprocess,thenRTMiscommittedtotheexplicitrepresentationofthecontentofthethought.Or,toputitstillathirdwaythewaytheyliketoput
itinAIaccordingtoRTM,programsmaybeexplicitlyrepresentedanddatastructureshavetobe.
Forthesakeofasimpleexample,let'spretendthatassociationismistrueweimaginethatthereisaprincipleofAssociationbyProximityinvirtueofwhichthoughtsof
saltgetassociatedwiththoughtsofpepper.Thepointisthatevenontheassumptionthatitsubsumesmentalprocesses,therule'associatebyproximity'neednotitself
beexplicitlyrepresentedassociationbyproximitymayemergefromdynamicalpropertiesofideas(asinHume)orfromdynamicalpropertiesofneuralstuff(asin
contemporaryconnectionism).ButwhatmustbeexplicitistheIdeasofpepperandsalt,asitmightbethatgetassociated.For,accordingtothetheory,mental
processesareactuallycausalsequencesoftokeningsofsuchIdeasso,noIdeas,nomentalprocesses.
Similarly,mutatismutandis,forthechesscase.Therule'getitoutearly'maybeemergentoutofitsownimplementationoutoflowerlevelheuristics,thatis,anyone
ofwhichmayormaynotitselfbeexplicitlyrepresented.Buttherepresentationoftheboardofactualorpossiblestatesofplayoverwhichsuchheuristicsare
definedmustbeexplicitortherepresentationaltheoryofchessplayingissimplyfalse.Thetheorysaysthatatrainofchessthoughtsisacausalsequenceoftokenings
ofchessrepresentations.If,therefore,therearetrainsofchessthoughtsbutnotokeningsofchessrepresentations,itfollowsthatsomethingisnotwellwiththetheory.
Somuch,then,forRTMandthepolyadicityoftheattitudes.Whatabouttheirsemanticity?Weproceedtoourfinaldiagnosticquestion:
FourthQuestion:HowDoYouFeelaboutTruthConditions?
IremarkedabovethatthetwocharacteristictenetsofSRthattheattitudesaremonadicandthatthesemanticityoftheattitudesarisesfromisomorphismsbetween
thecausalnetworkofmentalstatesandtheinferentialnetworkofpropositionsaremutuallyindependent.SimilarlyforRTMit'snotmandatory,butyouareatliberty
tocombineRTMwithfunctionalrole(FR)semanticsifyouchoose.Thus,youcouldperfectlywellsay:'Believing,desiring,andsoforthare

Page25

relationsbetweenintentionalsystemsandmentalrepresentationsthatgettokened(intheirheads,asitmightbe).Tokeningamentalrepresentationhascausal
consequences.Thetotalityofsuchconsequencesimpliesanetworkofcausalinterrelationsamongtheattitudes...'andsoontoafunctionalrolesemantics.Inany
event,it'simportanttoseethatRTMneedssomesemanticstorytotellif,aswehavesupposed,RTMisgoingtobeRealistabouttheattitudesandtheattitudeshave
theirpropositionalobjectsessentially.
Whichsemanticstorytotellis,inmyview,goingtobetheissueinmentalrepresentationtheoryfortheforeseeablefuture.Thequestionsherearesodifficult,andthe
answerssocontentious,thattheyreallyfalloutsidethescopeofthispaperIhadadvertisedatourofanintellectuallandscapeaboutwhosetopographythereexists
someworkingconsensus.Still,Iwanttosayalittleaboutthesemanticissuesbywayofclosing.TheyarethepieceofCognitiveSciencewherephilosophersfeelmost
athomeandthey'rewherethe'philosophyofpsychology'(adisciplineoverwhichAuntieisdisinclinedtoquantify)joinsthephilosophyoflanguage(which,Inotice,
Auntieallowsmetospellwithoutquotes).
ThereareanumberofreasonsfordoubtingthatafunctionalrolesemantictheoryofthesortthatSRproposesistenable.Thisfactiscurrentlycausingsomethingofa
crisisamongpeoplewhowouldliketobeRealistsabouttheattitudes.
Inthefirstplacealmost,bynow,tooobvioustomentionfunctionalroletheoriesmakeitseemthatempiricalconstraintsmustunderdeterminethesemanticsofthe
attitudes.WhatI'vegotinmindhereisn'tthecollectionofworriesthatclusteraroundthe'indeterminacyoftranslation'thesisifthatsortofindeterminacyistobetaken
seriouslyatallwhichIdoubtthenitisequallyaproblemforeveryRealistsemantics.Thereare,however,certainsourcesofunderdeterminationthatappeartobe
builtintofunctionalrolesemanticsassuchconsiderationswhichsuggesteitherthatthereisnouniquebestmappingofthecausalrolesofmentalstatesontothe
inferentialnetworkofpropositionsorthat,evenifthereis,suchamappingwouldneverthelessunderdetermineassignmentsofcontentstotheattitudes.I'llmentiontwo
suchconsiderations,butnodoubtthereareothersthingsarealwaysworsethanonesupposes.
Idealization.Thepatternofcausaldispositionsactuallyaccruingtoagivenmentalstatemustsurelydivergeverygreatlyfromthepatternofinferencescharacteristicof
itspropositionalobject.Wedon't,forexample,believealltheconsequencesofourbeliefsnotjustbecausewehaven'tgottimeto,andnotjustbecauseeverybodyis
atleasta

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littleirrational,butalsobecausewesurelyhavesomefalsebeliefsaboutwhattheconsequencesofourbeliefsare.Thisamountstosayingthatsomesubstantial
idealizationisrequiredifwe'retogetfromthecausaldispositionsthatmentalstatesactuallyexhibittothesortofcausalnetworkthatwewouldliketohave:acausal
networkwhosestructureiscloselyisomorphictotheinferentialnetworkofpropositions.Andnowtheproblemistoprovideanoncircularjustificationonewhich
doesnotitselfappealtosemanticalorintentionalconsiderationsforpreferringthatidealizationtoaninfinityorsoofothersthatingenuitymightdevise.(Itwon'tdo,
ofcourse,tosaythatwepreferthatidealizationbecauseit'stheonewhichallowsmentalstatestobeassignedtheintuitivelyplausiblepropositionalobjectsforthe
presentquestionispreciselywhetheranythingbesidesprejudiceunderwritesourcommonsensepsychologicalintuitions.)Probablytheidealizationproblemarises,in
someformorother,foranyaccountoftheattitudeswhichproposestoreducetheirsemanticpropertiestotheircausalones.That,alas,isnoreasontoassumethatthe
problemcanbesolved.
Equivalence.Functionalismguaranteesthatmentalstatesareindividuatedbytheircausalroleshencebytheirpositionintheputativecausalnetwork.Butnothing
guaranteesthatpropositionsareindividuatedbytheirinferentialroles.Primafacie,itsurelyseemsthattheyarenot,sinceequivalentpropositionsareipsofacto
identicalintheirinferentialliaisons.Arewethereforetosaythatequivalentpropositionsareidentical?Not,atleast,forthepsychologist'spurposes,sinceattitudes
whosepropositionalobjectsareequivalentmayneverthelessdifferintheircausalroles.Weneedtodistinguish,asitmightbe,thebeliefthatPfromthebeliefthatP
and(QvQ),henceweneedtodistinguishthepropositionthatPfromthepropositionthatPand(QvQ).Butsurelywhatdistinguishesthesepropositionsisnottheir
inferentialroles,assumingthattheinferentialroleofapropositionissomethinglikethesetofpropositionsitentailsandisentailedby.Itseemstofollowthat
propositionsarenotindividuatedbytheirpositionintheinferentialnetwork,hencethatassignmentsofpropositionalobjectstomentalstates,ifconstrainedonlyto
preserveisomorphismbetweenthenetworks,ispofactounderdeterminethecontentsofsuchstates.Thereare,perhaps,waysoutofsuchequivalenceproblems
'situationsemantics'(seeBarwiseandPerry,1983)hasrecentlybeenadvertisingsome.ButallthewaysoutthatI'veheardofviolatetheassumptionsofFRsemantics
specifically,theydon'tidentifypropositionswithnodesinanetworkofinferentialroles.

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Inthesecondplace,FRsemanticsisn't,afterall,muchofapanaceaforNaturalisticscruples.ThoughithasaNaturalisticstorytotellabouthowmentalstatesmightbe
pairedwiththeirpropositionalobjects,thesemanticpropertiesofthepropositionsthemselvesareassumed,notexplained.Itis,forexample,anintrinsicpropertyof
thepropositionthatPsmithisseatedthatitistrueorfalseinvirtueofPsmith'sposture.FRsemanticssimplytakesthissortoffactforgranted.FromtheNaturalist's
pointofview,therefore,itmerelydisplacesthemainworryfrom:'What'stheconnectionbetweenanattitudeanditspropositionalobject?'to'What'stheconnection
betweenthepropositionalobjectofanattitudeandwhateverstateofaffairsitisthatmakesthepropositiontrueorfalse?'Or,toputmuchthesamepointslightly
differently,FRsemanticshasalottosayaboutthemindtopropositionproblembutnothingatalltosayaboutthemindtoworldproblem.IneffectFRsemanticsis
contenttoholdthattheattitudesinherittheirsatisfactionconditionsfromtheirpropositionalobjectsandthatpropositionshavetheirsatisfactionconditionsby
stipulation.
And,inthethirdplace,toembraceFRsemanticsistoraiseavarietyof(approximatelyQuinean)issuesabouttheindividuationoftheattitudesandthese,asPutnam
andStichhaverecentlyemphasized,whenonceconjureduparenoteasilyputdown.Theargumentgoeslikethis:accordingtoFRsemantictheories,eachattitudehas
itspropositionalobjectinvirtueofitspositioninthecausalnetwork:'differentobjectsiffdifferentloci'holdstoafirstapproximation.Sinceapropositionalattitudehas
itspropositionalobjectessentially,thismakesanattitude'sidentitydependontheidentityofitscausalrole.Theproblemis,however,thatwehavenocriteriaforthe
individuationofcausalroles.
Theusualscepticaltacticatthispointistointroducesomeorotherformofslipperyslopeargumenttoshoworatleasttosuggestthattherecouldn'tbea
criterionfortheindividuationofcausalrolesthatisotherthanarbitrary.Stich,forexample,hasthecaseofanincreasinglysenilewomanwhoeventuallyisableto
rememberaboutPresidentMcKinleyonlythathewasassassinated.GiventhatshehasnootherbeliefsaboutMcKinleygiven,let'ssuppose,thattheonlycausal
consequenceofherbelievingthatMcKinleywasassassinatedistoprompthertoproduceandassenttooccasionalutterancesof'McKinleywasassassinated'and
immediatelogicalconsequencesthereofisitclearthatsheinfacthasanybeliefsaboutMcKinleyatall?Butifshedoesn'thave,when,precisely,didsheceaseto
doso?HowmuchcausalroledoesthebeliefthatMcKinleywasassassinatedhavetohavetobethebeliefthatMcKinleywasassassinated?Andwhat

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reasonistheretosupposethatthisquestionhasananswer?(SeeStich,1983andalsoPutnam,1983.)Auntieconsidersslipperyslopeargumentstobeindubious
tasteandthereismuchtobesaidforherview.Still,itlooksasthoughFRsemanticshasbroughtustotheedgeofamorassandI,forone,amnotanenthusiastfor
wadinginit.
Wellthen,tosummarize:thesyntactictheoryofmentaloperationspromisesareductiveaccountoftheintelligenceofthought.Wecannowimaginethough,tobe
sure,onlydimlyandinaglassdarklyapsychologythatexhibitsquitecomplexcognitiveprocessesasbeingconstructedfromelementarymanipulationsofsymbols.
ThisiswhatRTM,togetherwiththecomputermetaphor,hasbroughtusanditis,inmyview,nosmallmatter.Butatheoryoftheintelligenceofthoughtdoesnot,in
andofitself,constituteatheoryofthought'sintentionality.(ComparesuchearlypapersasDennett,1978c,wheretheseissuesaremoreorlesscomprehensivelyrun
together,withsuchsecondthoughtsasFodor,1981,andCummins,1983,wheretheymoreorlessaren't.)IfRTMistrue,theproblemoftheintentionalityofthe
mentalislargelyperhapsexhaustivelytheproblemofthesemanticityofmentalrepresentations.Butofthesemanticityofmentalrepresentationswehave,asthings
nowstand,noadequateaccount.
Hereendsthetour.Beyondthispointtherebemonsters.Itmaybethatwhatonedescries,justthereonthefarthesthorizon,isaglimpseofacausal/teleologicaltheory
ofmeaning(Stampe1977Dretske,1981Fodor,unpublished,and1984)anditmaybethatthedevelopmentofsuchatheorywouldprovideawayoutofthe
currentmess.Atbest,however,it'salongwayoff.Imentionitonlytoencouragesuchofthepassengersasmaybefeelingqueasy.
"Areyoufinishedplayingnow?"
"Yes,Auntie."
"Well,don'tforgettoputthetoysaway."
"No,Auntie."
Notes
1.Unlessyouareaneliminativistbehaviorist(say,Watson)whichputsyou,forpresentpurposes,beyondthepale.
Whilewe'reatit,itrathermessesupmynicetaxonomythattherearephilosopherswhoacceptaFunctionalistviewofpsychologicalexplanationandareRealistabout
belief/desirepsychology,butwhorejectthereductionofthelattertotheformer.Inparticular,theydonotaccepttheidentificationofanyoftheentitiesthat
Functionalistpsychologistspositwiththepropositionalattitudesthatcommonsenseholdsdear.(Aversionofthisviewsaysthatfunctionalstates"realize"

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propositionalattitudesinmuchthewaythatthephysicalstatesaresupposedtorealizefunctionalones.See,forexample,Matthews,1984.)
2.Thisaccountoftheattitudesseemstobeintheairthesedays,and,aswithmostdoctrinesthatareintheair,it'salittlehardtobesureexactlywhoholdsit.Farthe
mostdetailedversionisinLoar,1981,thoughIhaveseenvariantsinunpublishedpapersbyTylerBurge,RobertStalnaker,andHartryField.
3.Sincethemethodsofcomputationalpsychologytendtobethoseofprooftheory,itslimitationstendtobethoseofformalization.Patently,thisraisesthewellknown
issuesaboutcompletenesslessobviously,itconnectstheCognitiveScienceenterprisewiththePositivistprogramfortheformalizationofinductive(and,generally,
nondemonstrative)stylesofargument.Onthesecondpoint,seeGlymour,1987.)
4.Itispossibletocombineenthusiasmforasyntacticalaccountofmentalprocesseswithanydegreeofagnosticismabouttheattitudesor,forthatmatter,about
semanticevaluabilityitself.Toclaimthatthemindisa"syntaxdrivenmachine"ispreciselytoholdthatthetheoryofmentalprocessescanbesetoutinitsentirety
withoutreferencetoanyofthesemanticalpropertiesofmentalstates(seeFodor,1981b),hencewithoutassumingthatmentalstateshaveanysemanticproperties.
StevenStichisfamousforhavingespousedthisoption(Stich,1983).MywayoflayingoutthefieldhasputthebigdividebetweenRealismabouttheattitudesandits
denial.Thisseemstomejustifiable,butadmittedlyitunderestimatesthesubstantialaffinitiesbetweenStichandtheRTMcrowd.Stich'saccountofwhatagood
scienceofbehaviorwouldlooklikeisfarclosertoRTMthanitisto,forexample,theeliminativematerialismoftheChurchlands.

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Chapter2
Semantics,WisconsinStyle
Thereare,ofcourse,twokindsofphilosophers.Onekindofphilosophertakesitasaworkinghypothesisthatbelief/desirepsychology(or,anyhow,somevarietyof
propositionalattitudepsychology)isthebesttheoryofthecognitivemindthatwecannowenvisionhencethattheappropriatedirectionforpsychologicalresearchis
theconstructionofabelief/desiretheorythatisempiricallysupportedandmethodologicallysound.Theotherkindofphilosophertakesitthattheentireapparatusof
propositionalattitudepsychologyisconceptuallyflawedinirremediablewayshencethattheappropriatedirectionforpsychologicalresearchistheconstructionof
alternativestotheframeworkofbelief/desireexplanation.Thiswayofcollectingphilosophersintophilosopherkindscutsacrossanumberofmoretraditional,but
relativelysuperficial,typologies.Forexample,eliminativistbehavioristslikeQuineandneurophilesliketheChurchlandsturnupinthesamebasketasphilosopherslike
SteveStich,whothinkthatpsychologicalstatesarecomputationalandfunctionalallright,butnotintentional.Dennettisprobablyinthebaskettoo,alongwithPutnam
andother(howshouldoneputit?)dogmaticrelativists.Whereas,amongphilosophersoftheotherkindonefindsamotleythatincludes,verymuchinteralia,
reductionistbehavioristslikeRyleand(fromtimetotime)Skinner,radicalindividualistslikeSearleandFodor,mildlyradicalantiindividualistslikeBurge,and,of
course,allcognitivepsychologistsexceptGibsonians.
Philosophersofthefirstkinddisagreewithphilosophersofthesecondkindaboutmanythingsbesidesthemainissue.Forexample,theytendtodisagreevehemently
aboutwhohastheburdenoftheargument.Howeveranencouragingsignrecentdiscussionhasincreasinglyfocusedupononeissueasthecruxparexcellenceon
whichtheresolutionofthedisputemustturn.Thepointaboutpropositionalattitudesisthattheyarerepresentationalstates.What
ReprintedwithpermissionfromSynthese59,1984,231250.

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everelseabeliefis,itisakindofthingofwhichsemanticevaluationisappropriate.Indeed,theveryindividuationofbeliefsproceedsvia(oblique)referencetothe
statesofaffairsthatdeterminetheirsemanticvaluethebeliefthatitisrainingisessentiallythebeliefwhosetruthorfalsitydependsonwhetheritisraining.Willynilly,
then,thefriendsofpropositionalattitudesincludeonlyphilosopherswhothinkthatserioussensecanbemadeofthenotionofrepresentation(defacto,theytendto
includeallandonlyphilosopherswhothinkthis).Iemphasizethatthenotionofrepresentationiscrucialforeveryfriendofpropositionalattitudes,notjusttheones
(like,say,Field,Harman,andFodor)whoseviewscommitthemtoquantificationoversymbolsinamentallanguage.Realistsaboutpropositionalattitudesareipso
factoRealistsaboutrepresentationalstates.Theymustthereforehavesomeviewaboutwhatitisforastatetoberepresentationalevenif(like,say,Loarand
Stainaker)theyareagnosticabout,orhostiletoward,identifyingbeliefsanddesireswithsentencesinthelanguageofthought.
Well,whatwoulditbeliketohaveaserioustheoryofrepresentation?Here,too,thereissomeconsensustoworkfrom.Theworryaboutrepresentationisaboveall
thatthesemantic(and/ortheintentional)willprovepermanentlyrecalcitranttointegrationinthenaturalorderforexample,thatthesemantic/intentionalpropertiesof
thingswillfailtosuperveneupontheirphysicalproperties.Whatisrequiredtorelievetheworryistherefore,ataminimum,theframingofnaturalisticconditionsfor
representation.Thatis,whatwewantataminimumissomethingoftheform'RrepresentsS'istrueiffCwherethevocabularyinwhichconditionCiscouched
containsneitherintentionalnorsemanticexpressions.1
Ihaven'tsaidanything,sofar,aboutwhatRandSaresupposedtorangeover.IproposetosayaslittleaboutthisasIcangetawaywith,bothbecausetheissuesare
hardanddisputatiousandbecauseitdoesn't,forthepurposesofthispaper,mattermuchhowtheyareresolved.First,then,Iproposetoleaveitopenwhichthings
arerepresentationsandhowmanyofthethingsthatqualifyanaturalistictheoryshouldcover.Iassumeonlythatwemusthaveanaturalistictreatmentofthe
representationalpropertiesofthepropositionalattitudesifpropositionalattitudesarerelationstomentalrepresentations,thenwemusthaveanaturalistictreatmentof
therepresentationalpropertiesofthelatter.2
Inlikespirit,IproposetoleaveopentheontologicalissuesaboutthepossiblevaluesofS.TheparadigmaticrepresentationrelationIhaveinmindholdsbetween
thingsofthesortsthathavetruthvaluesandthingsofthesortsbywhichtruthvaluesaredetermined.Ishall

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usuallyrefertothelatteras'statesofaffairs',andI'lluse'ingnominals'ascanonicalformsforexpressingthem(e.g.,'John'sgoingtothestore''Mary'skissingBill'
'Sam'sbeingtwelveyears'oldnextTuesday').Sincethetheorieswe'lldiscussholdthattherelationsbetweenarepresentationandwhatitrepresentsaretypicalcausal,
IshallassumefurtherthatSrangesoverkindsofthingsthatcanbecauses.
LastinthislistofthingsthatI'mnotgoingtoworryaboutistypetokenambiguities.Aparadigmoftherelationwe'retryingtoprovideatheoryforistheonethatholds
betweenmypresent,occurrentbeliefthatReaganispresidentandthestateofaffairsconsistingofReagan'sbeingPresident.Iassumethatthisisarelationbetween
tokensbetweenanindividualbeliefandanindividualstateofaffairs.ButIshallalsoallowtalkofrelationsbetweenrepresentationtypesandstateofaffairstypesthe
mostimportantsuchrelationistheonethatholdswhentokensofasituationtypecause,ortypicallycause,tokeningsofarepresentationtype.Hereagainthereare
ontologicaldeepwatersbutIdon'tproposetostirthemupunlessIhaveto.
OK,let'sgo.Thereare,sofarasIknow,onlytwosortsofnaturalistictheoriesoftherepresentationrelationthathaveeverbeenproposed.Andatleastoneofthese
iscertainlywrong.Thetwotheoriesareasfollows:thatCspecifiessomesortofresemblancerelationbetweenRandS:andthatCspecifiessomesortofcausal
relationbetweenRandS.3Theoneofthispairthatiscertainlywrongistheresemblancetheory.Foronething,aseverybodypointsout,resemblanceisasymmetical
relationandrepresentationisn'tsoresemblancecan'tberepresentation.And,foranother,resemblancetheorieshavetroubleswiththesingularityofrepresentation.
Theconcepttigerrepresentsalltigersbuttheconceptthistigerrepresentsonlythisone.Theremustbe(possible)tigersthatresemblethistigertoanyextentyou
like,andifresemblanceissufficientforrepresentation,you'dthinktheconceptthistigershouldrepresentthosetigerstoo.Butitdoesn't,soagainresemblancecan't
besufficientforrepresentation.
Allthisisoldnews.Imentionitonlytoindicatesomeofthewaysinwhichtheideaofacausaltheoryofrepresentationisprimafacieattractiveandsucceedswhere
resemblancetheoriesfail.(1)Causalrelationsarenaturalrelationsifanythingis.Youmightwonderwhetherresemblanceispartofthenaturalorder(orwhetherit's
only,asitwere,intheeyeofthebeholder).Buttowonderthataboutcausationistowonderwhetherthereisanaturalorder.(2)Causation,unlikeresemblance,is
nonsymmetric.(3)Causationis,parexcellence,arelationamongparticulars.Tigeracanresembletigerbas

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muchasyoulike,anditcanstillbetigeraandnottigerbthatcausedthissetoftigerprints.Indeed,ifitwastigerathatcausedthem,itfollowsthattigerbdidn't
(assuming,ofcourse,thattigeraisdistinctfromtigerb).
Well,inlightofallthis,severalphilosopherswhoaresympathetictowardspropositionalattitudeshaverecentlybeenplayingwiththeideaofacausalaccountof
representation(see,particularly,Stampe1975,1977Dretske1981andFodor,unpublished.MuchofthishasbeengoingonattheUniversityofWisconsin,hence
thetitleofthisessay.)Mypresentpurposeistoexploresomeconsequencesofthisidea.Roughly,here'showtheargumentwillgo:causaltheorieshavetrouble
distinguishingtheconditionsforrepresentationfromtheconditionsfortruth.Thistroubleisintrinsictheconditionsthatcausaltheoriesimposeonrepresentationare
suchthat,whenthey'resatisfied,misrepresentationcannot,bythatveryfact,occur.Hence,causaltheoriesabouthowpropositionalattitudesrepresenthavePlato's
problemtoface:howisfalsebeliefpossible?I'llsuggestthattheanswerturnsouttobethat,inacertainsense,it'snot,andthatthisconclusionmaybemore
acceptablethanatfirstappears.
IsaidIwouldargueforallofthatinfactI'mgoingtodoless.Iproposetolookatthewaytheproblemofmisrepresentationishandledinthecausaltheoriesthat
StampeandDretskehaveadvancedandIreallywillarguethattheirtreatmentsofmisrepresentationdon'twork.Thisexerciseshouldmakeitreasonablyclearwhy
misrepresentationissohardtohandleincausaltheoriesgenerally.I'llthenclosewithsomediscussionofwhatwe'llhavetoswallowifwechoosetobitethebullet.The
pointofallthis,Iemphasize,isnottoargueagainstcausalaccountsofrepresentation.Ithink,infact,thatsomethingalongthecausallineisthebesthopewehavefor
savingintentionalisttheorizing,bothinpsychologyandinsemantics.ButIthinktoothatcausaltheorieshavesomeprettykinkyconsequences,andit'sthesethatIwant
tomakeexplicit.
Tostartwith,thereare,strictlyspeaking,twoWisconsintheoriesaboutrepresentationonethat'scausalandonethat'sepistemic.Iproposetogivethesecondpretty
shortshrift,butwe'dbetterhaveaparagraphortwo.
Thebasicideaof(whatIshallcall)anepistemicaccesstheoryisthatRrepresentsSifyoucanfindoutaboutSfromR4So,forexample,Dretskesays(1983,p.10),
''Amessage...carriesinformationaboutXtotheextenttowhichonecouldlearn(cometoknow)somethingaboutXfromthemessage."AndStampesays(1975,p.
223),"Anobjectwillrepresentormisrepresentthesituation

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...onlyifitissuchastoenableonetocometoknowthesituation,i.e.,whatthesituationis,shoulditbeafaithfulrepresentation."
Now,generallyspeaking,ifrepresentationrequiresthatScauseR,thenitwillofcoursebepossibletolearnaboutRbylearningaboutSinferringfromtheireffectsisa
standardwayofcomingtoknowaboutcauses.So,dependingonthedetails,it'slikelythatanepistemicaccountofrepresentationwillbesatisfiedwheneveracausal
oneis.Butthereisnoreasontosupposethatthereverseinferenceholds,andwe'reabouttoseethatepistemicaccountshaveproblemstowhichthecausalonesare
immune.
1.Theepistemicstory(liketheresemblancestory)hastroublewiththenonsymmetryofrepresentation.Youcanfindoutabouttheweatherfromthebarometer,but
youcanalsofindoutaboutthebarometerfromtheweathersince,ifit'sstorming,thebarometerislikelytobelow.Surelytheweatherdoesn'trepresentthe
barometer,soepistemicaccesscan'tbesufficientforrepresentation.
2.Theepistemicstory(againliketheoneaboutresemblance)hastroublewiththesingularityofrepresentation.WhatshowsthisisakindofcasethatStampe(1977)
discussesextensively.Imagineaportraitof,say,ChairmanMao.Iftheportraitisfaithful,thenwecaninferfrompropertiesofthepicturetopropertiesoftheChairman
(e.g.,iftheportraitisfaithful,thenifitshowsMaoasbald,thenwecanlearnfromtheportraitthatMaoisbald).Thetroubleis,however,thatifMaohasa
doppelgngerandweknowhedoes,thenwecanalsolearnfromtheportraitthatMao'sdoppelgngerisbald.ButtheportraitisofMaoandnotofhisdoppelgnger
forallthat.
Dretskehasarestrictiononhisversionoftheepistemicaccesstheorythatis,Iexpect,intendedtocopewiththesingularityproblemheallowsthatamessagecarries
informationaboutXonlyifa"suitablyequippedbutotherwiseignorantreceiver"couldlearnaboutXfromthemessage(1983,p.10,myemphasis).Iimaginethe
ideaisthat,thoughwecouldlearnaboutMao'sdoppelgangerfromMao'sportrait,wecouldn'tdosojustfromtheportraitalonewe'dalsohavetouseour
knowledgethatMaohasadoppelgnger.Idoubt,however,thatthisfurtherconditioncanreallybeenforced.WhatDretskehastofaceis,ineffect,theDreaded
CollateralInformationProblemi.e.,theproblemofhowtodecidewhentheknowledgethatweusetointerpretasymbolcountsasknowledgeaboutthesymbol,and
whenitcountsascollateralknowledge.Thisproblemmayseemselfsolvinginthecaseofpicturessincewehaveaprettygoodpretheoreticalnotionofwhich
propertiesofapicturecountasthepictorialones.Butinthecaseof,e.g.,linguisticsymbols,it'sveryfarfromevidenthow,orevenwhether,thecorresponding
distinctioncanbe

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drawn.IfIsaytoyou'Johnisthirtytwo,'youcanlearnsomethingreliableaboutJohn'sagefromwhatIsaid.But,ofcourse,youcanalsolearnsomethingreliable
aboutJohn'sweight(e.g.,thatheweighsmorethanagram).ItmaybepossibletodisciplinetheintuitionthatwhatyoulearnaboutJohn'sageyoulearnjustfromthe
symbolandwhatyoulearnabouthisweightyoulearnfromthesymbolplusbackgroundinformation.Butdrawingthatdistinctionisnotoriouslyhardand,ifthe
construalofrepresentationdependsonourdoingso,weareinserioustrouble.
3.Epistemictheorieshavetheirownsortsofproblemsaboutmisrepresentation.Stampesays,
Anobjectwillrepresentormisrepresentthesituation...onlyifitissuchastoenableonetocometoknowthesituation,i.e.,whatthesituationis,shoulditbeafaithful
representation.Ifitisnotfaithful,itwillmisrepresentthesituation.Thatis,onemaynotbeabletotellfromitwhatthesituationis,despitethefactthatitisarepresentationofthe
situation.Ineithercase,itrepresentsthesamething,justasafaithfulandanunrecognizableportraitmayportraythesameperson.

But,tobeginwith,theexampleisperhapsalittlequestionbegging,sinceit'snotclearthatthebadportraitrepresentsitssitterinvirtueofthefactthatifitwere
accurateitwouldbepossibletolearnfromithowthesitterlooks.How,onewonders,couldthisbarecounterfactualdeterminerepresentation?Isn'tit,rather,the
otherwayaroundi.e.,notthatit'saportraitofMaobecause(ifit'sfaithful)youcanfindoutaboutMaofromit,butratherthatyoucanfindoutaboutMaofromit(if
it'sfaithful)becauseit'sMaothatit'saportraitof.
Toputthesamepointslightlydifferently:we'llseethatcausaltheorieshavetroublesayinghowasymbolcouldbetokenedandstillbefalse.Thecorresponding
problemwithepistemicaccesstheoriesisthattheymakeithardtoseehowasymbolcouldbeintelligibleandfalse.Stampesays:"Anobjectwillrepresentor
misrepresentthesituation...onlyifitissuchastoenableonetocometoknowthesituation,i.e.,whatthesituationis,shoulditbeafaithfulrepresentation."(1975,p.
223).Now,thereisanastyscopeambiguityinthisviz.,between:
(a)ifRisfaithful(youcantellwhatthecaseis)vs.
(b)youcantell(whatthecaseisifRisfaithful).
It'sclearthatitis(a)thatStampeintends((b)leadsinthedirectionofapossibleworldsemantics,whichiswhereStampeexplicitly

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doesn'twanttogoseeespecially1975,circap.224).So,considerthesymbol'TomisArmenian,'andlet'ssupposethefactviz.,thefactinvirtueofwhichthat
symbolhasitstruthvalueisthatTomisSwiss.ThenStampewantsittobethatwhatthesymbolrepresents(i.e.,misrepresents)isTom'sbeingSwissthat'sthe
facttowhich,ifitwerefaithful,thesymbolwouldprovideepistemicaccess.
Now,tobeginwith,thiscounterfactualseemsalittlequeer.What,preciselywoulditbelikefor'TomisArmenian'tobefaithfultothefactit(mis)representsviz.,to
thefactthatTomisSwiss?Roughlyspeaking,youcanmakeafalsesentencefaithfuleitherbychangingtheworldorbychangingthesentencebutneitherwilldothe
jobthatStampeapparentlywantsdone.
1.Changetheworld:makeitbethatTomisArmenian.Thesentenceisnowfaithful,buttothewrongfact.Thatis,thefactthatit'snowfaithfultoisn'ttheonethatit
(mis)representedbackwhenitusedtobeuntruethat,remember,wasthefactthatTomisSwiss.
2.Changethesentence:makeitmeanthatTomisSwiss.Thesentenceisnowfaithfultothefactthatitusedto(mis)represent.Butisthecounterfactualintelligible?
Canwemakesenseoftalkaboutwhatasentencewouldrepresentifittheverysamesentencemeantsomethingdifferent?And,ifmeaningcanchangewhilewhat
isrepresentedstaysthesame,inwhatsensedoesatheoryofrepresentationconstituteatheoryofmeaning?
Problems,problems.Anyhow,themainupshotisclearenough,andit'sonethatStampeaccepts.Accordingtotheepistemicaccessstory,whenasymbol
misrepresents,'onemaynotbeabletotellfromitwhatthesituationis,despitethefactthatitisarepresentationofthesituation'.Herenotbeing'abletotellwhatthe
situationis'doesn'tmeannotbeingabletotellwhatitisthat'strueinthesituationitmeansnotbeingabletotellwhatsituationitisthatthesymbolrepresents.You
can'ttell,forexample,thatthesymbol'TomisArmenian'representsTom'sbeingFrenchunlessyouhappentoknowTom'snationality.
ItmaybesupposedthatStampecoulddisapproveofthisalongthefollowinglines:youcan,inonesense,tellwhat'TomisArmenian'representsevenifyoudon't
knowthatTomisSwiss.For,youcanknowthat'TomisArmenian'representsTom'snationality(i.e.,thatifit'sfaithfulitprovidesepistemicaccesstohisnationality)
evenifyoudon'tknowwhatTom'snationalityis.IthinkthisisOK,butyoubuyitataprice:onthisaccount,knowingwhatasymbolrepresents(whatitprovides
epistemicaccessto)can'tbeequatedwithknowingwhatthesymbolmeans.Noticethatthough'TomisArmenian'hasthepropertythatifit'sfaithfulitprovides
epistemicaccess

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toTom'snationality,sotoodoascillionother,nonsynonymoussentenceslike'TomisDutch,''TomisNorwegian,''TomisSwiss,'andsoforth.Toputthesamepoint
anotherway,onthepresentconstrualofStampe'saccount,whatatruthvaluablesymbolrepresentsisn't,ingeneral,itstruthcondition.(Thetruthconditionofa
symbolisthestateofaffairswhich,ifitobtains,wouldmakethesymboltrueandwhatwouldmake'TomisArmenian'trueisTom'sbeingArmenian,notTom'sbeing
Swiss.)Correspondingly,whatyoucanknowabout'TomisArmenian'ifyoudon'tknowthatTomisSwissisnotwhatitstruthconditionis,butonlywhatit
represents,viz.,thatitrepresentsTom'snationality.ThismeansthatStampehaseithertogiveupontheideathatunderstandingasymbolisknowingwhatwouldmake
ittrue,ordevelopareconstructionofthenotionoftruthconditionaswellasareconstructionofthenotionofrepresentation.Neitherofthesealternativesseems
particularlyhappy.
There'smoretobesaidabouttheepistemicapproachtorepresentationbutlet's,forpresentpurposes,putittooneside.Fromhereon,onlycausalaccountswillbe
atissue.
Thebasicproblemforcausalaccountsiseasyenoughtosee.SupposethatSisthetruthconditionofRinvirtueofitsbeingthecauseofR.Now,causationisdifferent
fromresemblanceinthefollowingway:asymbolcan(Isuppose)resemblesomethingmerelypossibleit'sOKforapicturetobeapictureofaunicom.But,surely,no
symbolcanbeaneffectofsomethingmerelypossible.IfScausesR,thenSobtains.ButifSobtainsandSisthetruthconditionofR,itlooksasthoughRhastobe
truebeingtruejustishavingtruthconditionsthatobtain.Soitlookslikethis:atheorythatnumberscausationamongtherelationsinvirtueofwhicharepresentation
hasitstruthconditionsisgoingtoallowtruthconditionstobeassignedonlywhenthey'resatisfied.Idon'tsaythatthisargumentisdecisivebutIdosayandwillnow
proceedtoarguethatWisconsinsemanticshasn'tthusfarfoundawayaroundit.
I'llstartwithDretske'streatmentofthemisrepresentationprobleminKnowledgeAndtheFlowofInformation.Thecrucialpassageisonpp.194195.Hereiswhat
Dretskesays:
Inthelearningsituationspecialcareistakentoseethatincomingsignalshaveanintensity,astrength,sufficientuntodeliveringtherequiredpieceofinformationtothelearning
subject...Suchprecautionsaretakeninthelearningsituation...inordertoensurethataninternalstructureisdevelopedwiththeinformationthatsisF....Butoncewehave
meaning,oncethesubjecthasarticulatedastructurethatisselectivelysensitiveto

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informationabouttheFnessofthings,instancesofthisstructure,tokensofthistype,canbetriggeredbysignalsthatlacktheappropriatepieceofinformation.....We(thus)
haveacaseofmisrepresentationatokenofastructurewithafalsecontent.Wehave,inaword,meaningwithouttruth.[emphasisDretske's]

Allyouneedtoremembertounderstandthiswellenoughforpresentpurposesis(1)thatDretske'snotionofinformationisfundamentallythatofcounterfactual
supportingcorrelation(i.e.,thatobjectsoftypeRcarryinformationaboutstatesofaffairsoftypeStotheextentthattokeningsofthetypeSarenomicallyresponsible
fortokeningsofthetypeR).And(2)thatthetokeningofarepresentationcarriestheinformationthatsisFindigitalformifandonlyiftheinformationthatsisFis
themostspecificinformationthattokeningcarriesabouts.Roughlyspeaking,thepretheoreticnotionofthecontentofarepresentationisreconstructedasthe
informationthattherepresentationdigitalizes.
Nowthen:howdoesmisrepresentationgetintothepicture?Thereis,ofcourse,nosuchthingasmisinformationonDretske'ssortofstory.Informationiscorrelation
andthoughcorrelationscanbebetterorworsemoreorlessreliablethereisnosensetothenotionofamiscorrelationhencethereisnothing,sofar,tobuildthe
notionofmisrepresentationoutof.
Theobvioussuggestionwouldbethis:supposeRsarenomicallycorrelatedwithhencecarryinformationaboutSsthen,aswe'veseen,giventhesatisfactionof
further(digitization)conditions,wecantreatRsasrepresentationsofSs:SisthestateofaffairstypethatsymbolsoftheRtyperepresent.Butsupposethat,fromtime
totime,tokeningsofRarebroughtabout(notbytokeningsofSbut)insomeotherway.Thenthese,asonemightsay,'wild'tokeningswouldcountas
misrepresentations:for,ontheonehand,theyhavethecontentthatSbut,ontheotherhand,sinceitisn'tthefactthatSthatbringsabouttheirtokeningthecontent
thattheyhaveisfalse.Somesortofidentificationofmisrepresentationswithetiologicallywildtokeningsisattheheartofallcausalaccountsofmisrepresentation.
However,thecrudetreatmentjustsketchedclearlywon'tdoitisopentoanobjectionthatcanbeputlikethis:IftherearewildtokeningsofR,itfollowsthatthe
nomicdependenceofRuponSisimperfectsomeRtokensthewildonesarenotcausedbyStokens.Well,butclearlytheyarecausedbysomethingi.e.,by
somethingthatis,likeS,sufficientbutnotnecessaryforbringingRsabout.

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CallthissecondsortofsufficientconditionthetokeningofsituationsoftypeT.Here'stheproblem:Rrepresentsthestateofaffairswithwhichitstokensarecausally
correlated.SomerepresentationsoftypeRarecausallycorrelatedwithstatesofaffairsoftypeSsomerepresentationsoftypeRarecausallycorrelatedwithstatesof
affairsoftypeT.SoitlooksasthoughwhatRrepresentsisnoteitherSorT,butratherthedisjunction(SvT):ThecorrelationofRwiththedisjunctionis,afterall,
betterthanitscorrelationwitheitherofthedisjunctsand,exhypothesis,correlationmakesinformationandinformationmakesrepresentation.If,however,whatRs
representisnotSbut(SvT),thentokeningsofRthatarecausedbyTaren't,afterall,wildtokeningsandouraccountofmisrepresentationhasgoneWest.
Itisnoteworthythatthissortofargumentwhich,inoneformorother,willbewithusthroughouttheremainderofthisessayseemstobeonethatDretskehimself
accepts.Thekeyassumptionisthat,ceterisparibus,ifthecorrelationofasymbolwithadisjunctionisbetterthanitscorrelationwitheitherdisjunct,itisthe
disjunction,ratherthaneitherdisjunct,thatthesymbolrepresents.Thisisasortof'principleofcharity'builtintocausaltheoriesofrepresentation:'soconstruethe
contentofasymbolthatwhatitistakentorepresentiswhatitcorrelateswithbest'.Dretskeapparentlysubscribestothis.Forexample,in1983(circap.17)he
arguesthat,forsomeoneonwhoseplanetthereisbothXYZandH2Obutwholearnstheconceptwatersolelyfromsamplesoftheformer,thebeliefthatsuchand
suchiswateristhebeliefthatitiseitherH2OorXYZ.Thisseemstobecharityinaratherstrongform:RrepresentsadisjunctionevenifalltokeningsofRarecaused
bythesatisfactionofthesamedisjunct,solongassatisfactionoftheotherdisjunctwouldhavecausedRtokeningshadtheyhappenedtooccur.Istressthisby
wayofshowinghowmuchthecounterfactualscountDretske'sconditionsonrepresentationareintensional(withan's')theyconstraintheeffectsofcounterfactual
causes.
ToreturntoDretske'streatmentofmisrepresentation:hiswayoutoftheproblemaboutdisjunctionistoenforceastrictdistinctionbetweenwhathappensinthe
learningperiodandwhathappensafter.Roughly,thecorrelationsthatthelearningperiodestablishdeterminewhatRrepresentsandthefunctionoftheTeacheris
preciselytoensurethatthecorrelationsoestablishedisacorrelationofRtokenswithStokens.Itmaybethatafterthelearningperiod,Rtokensarebroughtabout
bysomethingotherthanStokensifso,thesearewildtokeningsofRandtheircontentsarefalse.

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Thismoveisingeniousbuthopeless.Justforstarters,thedistinctionbetweenwhathappensinthelearningperiodandwhathappensthereaftersurelyisn'tprincipled
thereisnotimeafterwhichone'suseofasymbolstopsbeingmerelyshapedandstartstobe,asitwere,inearnest.Perhapsidealizationwillbearsomeofthisburden,
butit'shardtobelievethatitcouldyieldanotionoflearningperiodsufficientlyrigoroustounderwritethedistinctionbetweentruthandfalsitywhichis,afterall,
preciselywhat'satissue.Second,ifDretskedoesinsistuponthelearningperiodgambit,helimitstheapplicabilityofhisnotionofmisrepresentationtolearned
symbols.Thisisbadformebecauseitleavesuswithnowayinwhichinnateinformationcouldbefalseandit'sbadforhimbecauseitimpliesabasicdichotomy
betweennaturalrepresentation(smokeandfireringsinthetreeandtheageofthetree)andtheintentionalityofmentalstates.
Allofthat,however,ismerelimberingup.TherealproblemaboutDretske'sgambitisinternalitjustdoesn'twork.ConsideratraineewhocomestoproduceR
tokensinScircumstancesduringthetrainingperiod.Suppose,forsimplification,thatthecorrelationthusengenderediscertainlynomic,andthatStokeningsare
elicitedbyallandonlyRtokeningsduringtraining:errorfreelearning.Well,timepasses,awhistleblows(orwhatever),andthetrainingperiodcomestoanend.At
sometimelaterstill,theerstwhiletraineeencountersatokeningofaTsituation(TnotequaltoS)andproducesanRincausalconsequence.Theideais,ofcourse,
thatthisTelicitedtokeningofRisipsofactowildand,sinceithappensafterthetrainingperiodended,ithasthe(false)contentthatS.
But,asIsay,thiswon'twork:itignoresrelevantcounterfactuals.Imagine,inparticular,whatwouldhavehappenedifatokenofsituationtypeThadoccurredduring
thetrainingperiod.PresumablywhatwouldhavehappenedisthatitwouldhaveelicitedatokeningofR.Afterall,tokeningsofTareassumedtobesufficienttocause
Rtokeningsaftertrainingthat'stheveryassumptionuponwhichDretske'streatmentofwildRtokeningsrests.Sowecanassumeindeed,wecanstipulatethatT
isasituationthat,ifithadoccurredduringtraining,wouldhavebeensufficientforR.Butthatmeans,ofcourse,thatifyouincludethecounterfactuals,thecorrelation
thattrainingestablishedis(notbetweenRandSbut)betweenRandthedisjunction(SvT).Sonowwehavetheoldproblembackagain.Iftrainingestablisheda
correlationwith(SvT)thenthecontentofatokeningofRisthat(SvT).SoatokeningofRcausedbyTisn'tawildtokeningafterallandsinceitisn'twilditalso
isn'tfalse.Atokenwiththecontent(SvT)is,ofcourse,truewhenit'sthecasethatT.

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ThereisawayoutforDretske.Hecouldsaythis:"Thetroubleis,youstillhaven'ttakencareofalltherelevantcounterfactualsinparticular,you'veignoredthefact
thatifaTtokeninghasoccurredduringtrainingandelicitedanRtokeningtheTeacherwouldhavecorrectedtheRresponse.Thisdistinguishesthecounterfactual
consequencesofTelicitedRtokensoccurringduringtrainingfromthoseofSelicitedRtokensoccurringduringtrainingsincethelatterwouldnot,ofcourse,have
beencorrected.Inthelongrun,then,itisthesecounterfactualsonesaboutwhattheteacherwouldhavecorrectedthatarecrucialRsrepresentsSs(andnotTs)
becausetheTeacherwouldhavedisapprovedofTelicitedRresponsesiftheyhadoccurred."
ButIdon'tthinkDretskewouldsettleforthis,andnorwillI.It'snogoodforDretskebecauseitradicallyaltersthefundamentalprincipleofhistheory,whichisthat
thecharacterofsymboltosituationcorrelationsdeterminesthecontentofasymbol.Onthisrevisedview,theessentialdeterminantisnottheactual,oreventhe
counterfactual,correlationsthatholdbetweenthesymbolandtheworldratherit'stheTeacher'spedagogicalintentionsspecifically,theTeacher'sintentiontoreward
onlysuchRtokeningsasarebroughtaboutbySs.Andit'snogoodformebecauseitfailsaprimeconditionuponnaturalistictreatmentofrepresentationsviz.,that
appealstointentional(witha't')statesmustnotfigureessentiallytherein.IshallthereforeputthissuggestionofDretske'stoonesideandseewhatelsemaybeon
offer.
Let'sregroup.Thebasicproblemisthatwewanttheretobeconditionsforthetruthofasymboloverandabovetheconditionswhosesatisfactiondetermineswhat
thesymbolrepresents.Now,accordingtocausaltheories,thelatterrepresentationdeterminingconditionsincludewhateverisnecessaryandsufficienttobring
abouttokeningsofthesymbol(includingnomicallypossiblecounterfactualtokenings.)Sotheproblemis,toputitcrudely,ifwe'vealreadyusedupallthattoestablish
representation,whatmorecouldberequiredtoestablishtruth?
AnideathatcirculatesinallthetextsI'vebeendiscussing(includingmyown)goeslikethis.Insteadofthinkingoftherepresentationmakingconditionsaswhateveris
necessaryandsufficientforcausingtokeningsofthesymbol,thinkofthemaswhateverisnecessaryandsufficientforcausingsuchtokeningsinnormal
circumstances.Wecanthinkofthewildtokensasbeing(or,anyhow,asincluding)theonesthatcomeaboutwhenthe'normalconditions'clauseisnotsatisfied.
Thisdoesn't,ofcourse,getusoutofthewoods.Ataminimum,we

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stillneedtoshow(whatisbynomeansobvious)thatforatheoryofrepresentationstoappealtonormalcyconditions(overandabovecausalones)isn'tmerely
questionbeggingforexample,thatyoucancharacterizewhatitisfortheconditionsofatokeningtobenormalwithoutinvokingintentionaland/orsemanticnotions.
Moreover,we'llalsohavetoshowthatappealingtonormalcyconditionsisawayofsolvingthedisjunctionproblem,andthat,alas,isn'tcleareither.Wecommence
withthefirstoftheseworries.
Itis,Ithink,noaccidentthatthereisatendencyinallthetextsI'vebeendiscussing(againincludingmine)tointroducenormalcyconditionsbyappealtoexamples
whereteleologyisinplay.Forexample,touseacasethatDretskeworkshard,avoltmeterisadevicewhich,undernormalconditions,producesanoutputwhich
covaries(nomically)withthevoltageacrossitsinputterminals.'Normalconditions'includethatallsortsofconstraintsontheinternalandexternalenvironmentofthe
deviceshouldbesatisfied(e.g.,theterminalsmustnotbecorroded)butitseemsintuitivelyclearthatwhatthedeviceregistersisthevoltageandnotthevoltage
togetherwiththesatisfactionofthenormalcyconditions.Ifthedevicereadszero,thatmeansthatthere'snocurrentflowing,notthateitherthereisnovoltageflowing
ortheterminalsarecorroded.
However,weknowthisbecauseweknowwhatthedeviceisforandwecanknowwhatthedeviceisforonlybecausethereissomethingthatthedeviceisfor.The
tendencyofcausaltheoriststoappealtoteleologyfortheirbestcasesofthedistinctionbetweenrepresentationmakingcausalconditionsandmerenormalcy
conditionsisthusunnerving.Afterall,inthecaseofartifactsatleast,being'for'somethingissurelyamatterofbeingintendedforsomething.Andwehadratherhoped
todetachtherepresentationalfromtheintentionalsince,ifwecan't,ourtheoryofrepresentationipsofactofailstobenaturalisticandthepointoftheundertaking
becomes,toputitmildly,obscure.
Thereare,itseems,twopossibilities.Onecaneitherarguethattherecanbenormalcywithoutteleology(i.e.,thattherearecasesotherthanteleologicaloneswherea
distinctionbetweencausalconditionsandnormalconditionscanbeconvincinglydrawn)oronecanarguethattherecanbeteleologywithoutintentionality(natural
teleology,asitwere)andthatthecrucialcasesofrepresentationrestexclusivelyuponteleologyofthislatterkind.UnlikeDretskeandStampe,Iaminclinedtowards
thesecondstrategy.Itseemstomethatourintuitionsaboutthedistinctionbetweencausalandnormalconditionsaresecureonlyinthecaseswherethecorresponding
intuitionsaboutteleologyaresecure,andthatwherewedon'thave

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5

intuitionsaboutteleology,thedisjunctionargumentseemspersuasive. Let'slookatacoupleofcases.
ThermometersareOKgivennormalcyconditions(e.g.,avacuuminthetube)thenomiccovariancebetweenthelengthofthecolumnandthetemperatureofthe
ambientairdetermineswhatthedevicerepresents.Violatethenormalcyconditionsand,intuitionreports,yougetwildreadingsi.e.,misrepresentationsofthe
temperature.But,ofcourse,thermometersareformeasuringsomething,andpreciselywhatthey'reformeasuring(viz.,thetemperatureoftheambientair)iswhatthe
presentanalysistreatsasacausal(ratherthananormalcy)condition.Compare,bywayofcontrast,thediameterofthecoininmypocket.Fixmybodytemperature
anditcovarieswiththetemperatureoftheambientairfixthetemperatureoftheambientair,anditcovarieswiththetemperatureofmybody.Iseenogroundsfor
sayingthatoneofthesethingsiswhatreallyrepresentsandtheotherisanormalcycondition(e.g.,thatthediametersthatareaffectedbybodytemperatureare
misrepresentationsoftheairtemperature).6Inshort,wherethereisnoquestionofteleologyitlooksasthoughone'sintuitionsaboutwhicharethenormalcyconditions
areunstable.Suchexamplesshouldmakeonedubiousaboutthechanceforanotionofnormalcythatappliesinnonteleologicalcases.
Or,consideranexampleofStampe's:
Thenumberofrings(inatreestump)representstheageofthetree....Thecausalconditions,determiningtheproductionofthisrepresentation,aremostsalientlytheclimatic
conditionsthatprevailedduringthegrowthofthetree.Ifthesearenormal...thenoneringwillbeaddedeachyear.Nowwhatisthatreading...Itisnot,foronething,infallible.
Theremayhavebeendroughtyears....Itisaconditionalhypothesis:thatifcertainconditionshold,thensomething'shavingsuchandsuchpropertieswouldcausethe
representationtohavesuchandsuchproperties....Evenunderthosenormalconditions,theremaybeotherthingsthatwouldproducetheringsanarmyofsomekindofborer,
maybe,oranomnipotenteviltreedemon.(1977,p.49)

Stampe'sanalysisofthiscaserestsonhisdecisiontotreattheseasonalclimaticvariationsasthecausalcomponentoftheconditionsonrepresentationandtheabsence
of(e.g.)drought,treeborers,evildemons,andtherestasnormalcyconditions.And,ofcourse,giventhatdecision,it'sgoingtofollowfromthetheorythatthetree's
ringsrepresentthetree'sageandthattreeborercausedtreeringtokens

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arewild(i.e.,thattheymisrepresentthetree'sage).Theworryingquestioniswhat,ifanything,motivatesthisdecision.
Weshoulddothisinseveralsteps.Let'sconsideraparticularcaseoftreeborercausedtreeringtokenings.Suppose,forthemoment,weagreethatthegeneraltruth
isthatatree'sringsrepresentthetree'sage.Andsupposeweagreethatitfollowsfromthisgeneraltruththatalltreeringtokeningsrepresenttheageofthetreethat
they'retokenedin.Well,evengivenallthatit'snotobviouswhatthesetreeborercausedtokeningsrepresentsinceit'snotobviousthattheyare,intherelevantsense,
treerings.
Perhapstherightwaytodescribethesituationistosaythatthesethingsmerelylookliketreerings.Comparethetokenof'Lookuponmyworks,ohyemighty,and
despair'thatthewindtracesinthedesertsands.ThislookslikeatokenofanEnglishsentencetype(and,ofcourse,ifitwereatokenofthatsentencetypeitwould
beunfaithful,whatwiththerenotbeinganythingtolookatandall).Butit'snotatokenofthatEnglishsentencesinceit'snotatokenofanysentence.Afortiori,it'snot
awildorunfaithfultoken.Similarly,mutatismutandis(maybe)withtheputativetreeringsthey'renotwild(unfaithful)representationsofthetree'sagebecause,evenif
alltreeringsarerepresentationofatree'sage,thesearen'ttreerings.
IhopeIwillbeseennottobemerelyquibbling.Stampewantsittocomeoutthattreeborercausedtreeringsarewildthatthey'remisrepresentationsofthetree's
age.HeneedsthisalotsincethissortofcaseisStampe'sparadigmexampleofadistinctionbetweencausalconditionsandnormalcyconditionsthatdoesn'treston
teleology.ButIclaimthatthecasedoesn'tworkevenassumingwhat'syettobeshown,viz.,thattreeringsrepresenttreeageratherthantreeageplus
satisfactionofnormalcyconditions.ForStampeisassuminganonquestionbegginghencenaturalisticcriterionforsomethingbeingatokenofarepresentation
type.Andthereisn'tone.(Ofcourse,wedohaveacriterionwhichexcludesthewindtoken'sbeingasentenceinscriptionbutthatcriterionisnonnaturalistic,hence
unavailabletoacausaltheoristitinvokestheintentionsoftheagentwhoproducedthetoken.)
Nowlet'slookatittheotherway.Supposethatthesetreeborercausedringsaretreerings(bystipulation)andlet'saskwhattheyrepresent.Thepointhereisthat
evenif'undernormalconditions,treeringsrepresentthetree'sage'istrue,itstilldoesn'tfollowthattheseabnormallyformedtreeringsrepresentthetree'sage.
Specifically,itdoesn'tfollowthattheseringsrepresentthetree'sageratherthanthetreeborer'sdepredations.(Lookcloselyandyou'llseethemarkstheirlittleteeth
left.Dotheserepresentthetree'sagetoo?)

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Thisisjustthedisjunctionproblemoveragain,thoughitshowsaninterestingwrinklethatyougetwhenyoucomplicatethingsbyaddinginnormalcyconditions.'If
circumstancesarenormal,xsareF'doesn't,ofcourse,tellyouabouttheFnessofxswhencircumstancesareabnormal.Themostyougetisacounterfactual,viz.,'if
circumstanceshadbeennormal,thisxwouldhavebeenF.'Well,inthepresentcase,ifetiologicalcircumstanceshadbeennormal,theseringswouldhaverepresented
thetree'sage(viz.,accurately).Itdoesn'tfollowthat,giventhewaytheetiologicalcircumstancesactuallywere,theseringsstillrepresentthetree'sage(viz.,
inaccurately).Whatyouneedissomereasontosupposethatetiologicallyabnormal(hencewild)ringsrepresentthesamethingthatetiologicallynormalringsdo.This
ispreciselyequivalenttosayingthatwhatyouneedisasolutiontothedisjunctionproblem,andthatispreciselywhatI'vebeenarguingallalongthatwehaven'tgot.
Wewouldhaveit,atleastarguably,ifthiswereateleologicalcase.Supposethatthereissomemechanismthat(notonlyproducestreeringsbut)producestreerings
withanendinview.(Treeringsare,let'ssuppose,MotherNature'scalendar).Thenthereisatrichotomousdistinctionbetween(a)treeringsproducedundernormal
circumstances(b)wildtreerings(inscribed,forexample,whenMotherNatureisalittletipsy)and(c)thingsthatlookliketreeringsbutaren't(treeborer's
depredations).Thisdoesenforceadistinctionbetweenrepresentation,misrepresentationandnonrepresentationnotsomuchbecauseitrelativizesrepresentationto
normalcy,however,butbecauseitrelativizesrepresentationtoendinview.Thereasonthatwildtreeringsrepresentthesamethingsasnormalonesisthatthewild
onesandthenormalonesaresupposedtoservethesamefunction.Noticethatit'stheintensionalityof'supposedto'that'sdoingallthework.
I'mafraidwhatallthiscomestoisthatthedistinctionbetweennormalandwildtokensrestssofaratleastonaprettystrongnotionofteleology.It'sonlyinthe
teleologicalcasesthatwehaveanywayofjustifyingtheclaimthatwildtokensrepresentthesamethingthatetiologicallynormalonesdoanditis,aswe'veseen,that
claimonwhichthepresentstoryaboutmisrepresentationrests.Howbadisthis?Well,foronething,it'snotasbadasifthedistinctionhadturnedouttorestonan
intentionalnotion.Thereare,asIremarkedabove,plausiblecasesofnonintentional,naturalteleologyandanaturalistictheoryofrepresentationcanlegitimately
appealtothese.Ontheotherhand,ifthelineoftheargumentwehavebeenexploringisright,thenthehopeforageneraltheoryofrepresentation(onethatincludes
treerings,forexample)isgoingtohavetobe

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abandoned.Treeringswillhavetorepresentonlyataremove,viatheinterestsofanobserver,sinceonlywhathasnaturalteleologycanrepresentabsolutely.Thisis,
asamatteroffact,OKwithme.ForIholdthatonlysentencesinthelanguageofthoughtrepresentin,asitwere,thefirstinstanceandtheyrepresentinvirtueofthe
naturalteleologyofthecognitivemechanisms.Propositionalattitudesrepresentquarelationstosentencesinthelanguageofthought.Allotherrepresentationdepends
uponthepropositionalattitudesofsymbolusers.
Evenallowingallthis,however,itisarguablethatwehaven'tyetgotanotionofmisrepresentationrobustenoughtolivewith.Forwestillhavethisconnectionbetween
theetiologyofrepresentationsandtheirtruthvalues:representationsgeneratedinteleologicallynormalcircumstancesmustbetrue.Specifically,supposeMisa
mechanismthefunctionofwhichistogeneratetokensofrepresentationtypeRin,andonlyin,tokensofsituationtypeSMmediatesthecausalrelationbetweenSs
andRs.ThenwecansaythatMproducedtokensofRarewildwhenMisfunctioningabnormallybutwhenMisfunctioningnormally(i.e.,whenitstokeningofRis
causallycontingent,intherightway,uponthetokeningofS)thennotonlydothetokensofRhavethecontentthatS,butalsothecontentsofthesetokensare
satisfied,andwhatthetokenssayistrue.
Well,considertheapplicationtobelieffixation.Itlooksasthough(1)onlybeliefswithabnormaletiologiescanbefalse,and(2)'abnormaletiology'willhavetobe
definedwithrespecttotheteleologyofthebelieffixing(i.e.,cognitive)mechanisms.AsfarasIcansee,thisistantamountto:'beliefsacquiredunderepistemically
optimalcircumstancesmustbetrue'since,surely,thefunctionofthecognitivemechanismswillitselfhavetobecharacterizedbyreferencetothebeliefsitwouldcause
onetoacquireinsuchoptimalcircumstances.(Itakeitforgrantedthatwecan't,forexample,characterizethefunctionofthecognitivemechanismsasthefixationof
truebeliefsbecausetruthisasemanticalnotion.Ifourtheoryofrepresentationistorestupontheteleologyofthecognitivemechanisms,cognitiveteleologymustitself
bedescribablenaturalisticallyviz.,withoutrecoursetosemanticconcepts.Foranextendeddiscussionofthissortofstuff,seeFodor,unpublished.)
Itappearsthatwehavecomeallthiswayonlyinordertorediscoververificationism.For,Itakeit,verificationismjustisthedoctrinethattruthiswhatwewould
believeincognitivelyoptimalcircumstances.Isthissimplytooshamefulforwords?Canwebearit?Ihavethreeverybriefremarkstomake.Theyare,youwillbe
pleasedtohear,concludingremarks.

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First,allNaturalistictheoriesinsemantics,assumingthattheyarereductiveratherthaneliminative,havegottoholdthattherearecircumstancesspecifiablewithout
resorttosemanticalnotionsliketruth,reference,correspondence,orthelike,suchthat,ifabeliefisformedinthosecircumstances,thenitmustbetrue.
Verificationismaddstothisonlytheideathatthecircumstancesareepistemic(theyinvolve,forexample,suchidealizationsasunrestrictedaccesstotheevidence)and
thatwouldn'tseemtobethepartthathurts.IguesswhatI'msayingis:ifyou'regoingtobeanaturalist,there'snoobviousreasonnottobeaverificationist.(Andif
you'renotgoingtobeanaturalist,whyareyouworkingonacausaltheoryofrepresentation?)
Thesecondpointisthis:verificationismisn'tanontologicaldoctrine.Ithasusually,inthehistoryofphilosophy,beenheldwithsomesortofidealisticmalice
aforethought,butthatsurelyisanaccidentandonewecanabstractfrom.Thepresentsortofverificationismdefinestruthconditionsbyreferencetothefunctionofthe
cognitivemechanisms.Plausibly,thefunctionofthecognitivemechanismsistoachieve,fortheorganism,epistemicaccesstotheworld.ThereisnoreasononGod's
greenearthwhyyoushouldn't,inparsingthatformula,construe'theworld'Realistically.
Finally,verificationismisn'tincompatiblewithacorrespondencetheoryoftruth.TheteleologyofthenervoussystemdetermineswhatmustbethecaseifRrepresents
SanditfollowsfromtheanalysisthatifRrepresentsSandthesituationisteleologicallynormal,Smustbetrue.ThisisbecausewhatRrepresentsisitstruthcondition,
anditstruthconditioniswhatevercausesitstokeninginteleologicallynormalsituations.ButthisisentirelycompatiblewithholdingthatwhatmakesRtruein
teleologicallynormalsituationsisthatitstruthconditionobtainsthatRcorresponds,thatistosay,tothewaythattheworldis.
Iseenowayoutofthis:acausaltheorymustsocharacterizerepresentationandnormalcythatthereisnomisrepresentationinnormalcircumstances.Myviewis:if
thatisthepriceofaworkabletheoryofrepresentation,weoughtsimplytopayit.
Notes
1.Sincewehaven'tanygeneralandsatisfactorywayofsayingwhichexpressionsaresemantical(/intentional),it'slefttointuitiontodeterminewhenaformulationofC
meetsthiscondition.Thiswillnot,however,poseproblemsforthecaseswewillexamine.
2.Isaidthattheformulationofnaturalisticconditionsforrepresentationistheleastthatthevindicationofanintentionalpsychologyrequires.Whatworriessome

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philosophersisthattheremaybenouniqueanswertothequestionwhatsomethingrepresentse.g.,thattherepresentationalcontentofasymbol(belief,etc.)maybe
indeterminategiventhetotalityofphysicalfact.Noticethatsettlingthequestionaboutnaturalismdoesn'tautomaticallysettlethisquestionaboutdeterminacy.Evenif
itprovespossibletogivenaturalisticnecessaryandsufficientconditionsforrepresentation,theremightbemorethanonewaytosatisfysuchconditions,hencemore
thanonethingthatRcouldbetakentorepresent.Forpurposesofthepresentpaper,however,Iproposetoputquestionsaboutdeterminacyofrepresentationentirely
toonesideandfocusjustontheprospectsfornaturalism.
3.Anexampleoftheformer:PropositionalattitudesarerelationstomentalrepresentationsmentalrepresentationsareIdeasIdeasareimagesandImagesrepresent
whattheyresemble.ItakeitthatHumeheldaviewnotentirelyunlikethis.
4.Infact,Dretskegivestheepistemicanalysisasaconditionupon'RcarriesinformationaboutS'ratherthan'RrepresentsS'.Thisdifferencemaymakea
differenceandI'dhavetoattendtoitifexpositionwerethegoal.Inmuchofwhatfollows,however,IshallbelessthansensitivetodetailsofDretskeandStampe's
proposals.WhatIhaveinmindtoexhibitarecertainverypervasivecharacteristicsofcausalaccountsoneswhichIdon'tthinkcanbeavoidedbytinkering.
5.Ishouldaddthat,thoughStampeclearlythinksthatyoucan,inprinciple,getrepresentationwithoutteleology,caseswhichturnonfunctionalanalysisloomlarge
amonghisexamples.''...onedoubtswhetherstatisticalnormalitywillgetusfarindealingwithlivingsystemsandwithlanguageorgenerallywithmattersof
teleologicalnatures.Here,Ithinkweshallwanttoidentifyfidelityconditionswithcertainconditionsofwellfunctioning,ofafunctionalsystem."(Stampe1977,p.51)
6.Alternatively,youcouldgothedisjunctionrouteandsaythatthediameterofthecoinrepresentssomefunctionofbodytemperatureandairtemperature.Butthis
hasthefamiliarconsequenceofrenderingthecovariancebetweenRandSperfectandthusdeprivingusofexamplesofwildtokenings.

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Chapter3
ATheoryofContent,I:
TheProblem
Introduction
Itcountsasconventionalwisdominphilosophythat(i)theintentional/semanticalpredicatesformaclosedcircleand(ii)intentionalstatesareintrinsicallyholistic.(i)
unpacksas:'Itmaybepossibletoformulatesufficientconditionsforthesatisfactionofsomeoftheintentional/semanticpredicatesinavocabularythatincludesotherof
theintentional/semanticpredicatesbutitisnotpossibletoformulatesuchconditionsinavocabularythatisexclusivelynonsemantic/intentional.'(ii)unpacksas:
'Nothingcanexhibitanyintentionalpropertiesunlessitexhibitsmanyintentionalpropertiesthemetaphysicallynecessaryconditionsforathing'sbeinginanyintentional
stateincludeitsbeinginmanyotherintentionalstates.'(i)issupposedtoruleoutthepossibilityofframingphysicalisticallysufficientconditionsforthetruthofintentional
ascriptions(ii)issupposedtoruleoutthepossibilityofpunctateminds.
Workingseverallyandtogether,(i)and(ii)haveservedtogroundquitealotofphilosophicalskepticismaboutintentionalexplanation.Forexample,(i)appearsto
precludeaphysicalisticontologyforpsychologysinceifpsychologicalstateswerephysicalthentherewouldsurelybephysicalisticallyspecifiablesufficientconditions
fortheirinstantiation.1Butit'sarguablethatiftheontologyofpsychologyisnotphysicalistic,thenthereisnosuchscience.
Bycontrast,(ii)couldbetrueconsonantwithphysicalismwhy,afterall,shouldn'ttherebepropertiesthatarebothphysicalisticandholistic?Butit'snevertheless
plausiblethat(ii)wouldprecludeanintentionalpsychologywithscientificstatus.Oneimportantwaythatpsychologicallawsachievegeneralityisbyquantifyingover
alltheorganismsthatareinaspecifiedmentalstate(alltheorganismsthatbelievethatP,orintendthatQ,orwhatever).Butholismimpliesthatverymanymental
statesmustbesharedifanyofthemare.Sothemoreholisticthemindis,themoresimilarthementallivesof

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twoorganisms(oroftwotimeslicesofthesameorganism)havetobeinorderthatthesamepsychologicallawsshouldsubsumethemboth.Atthelimitofholism,two
mindsshareanyoftheirintentionalstatesonlyiftheyshareallofthem.Andsince,ofcourse,notwomindseverdosharealloftheirintentionalstates,themore(ii)is
truethemoretheputativegeneralizationsofintentionalpsychologyfail,defacto,togeneralize.2(It'saquestionofsomeinterestwhether,havingonceembraceda
holisticviewofintentionalcontent,thereisanywheretostopshortofgoingthelimit.I'minclinedtothinkthatanyonewhotakesitseriouslythatthereisno
analytic/syntheticdistinctionisobligedtoanswerthisquestioninthenegative.Ishan't,however,arguethepointhere.)
Themoral,inshort,isthatthepriceofanIntentionalRealismthat'sworthhavingatleastforscientificpurposesisaphysicalistandatomisticaccountofintentional
states.And,asIsay,it'stheconventionalwisdominphilosophythatnosuchaccountcanbegiven.
Thereis,however,anincreasinglyvociferousminorityindissentfromthisconsensus.Inparticular,recentdevelopmentsin"informational"semanticssuggestthe
possibilityofanaturalisticandatomistictheoryoftherelationthatholdsbetweenapredicateandthepropertythatitexpresses.Suchastheorywould,ofcourse,
amounttoagooddeallessthanacompleteunderstandingofintentionality.Butitwouldservetodrawtheskeptic'sfangssincehislineisthatirreducibilityandholism
areintrinsictointentionalityandsemanticevaluability.Givenanysuitablyatomistic,suitablynaturalisticbreakintheintentionalcircle,itwouldbereasonabletoclaim
thatthemainphilosophicalproblemaboutintentionalityhadbeensolved.Whatremainedtodowouldthenbeajobofmoreorlessempiricaltheoryconstructionora
moreorlessfamiliarkind.
Whatfollowsisinpartareviewpaperthingshaverecentlybeenmovingsofastinworkon"naturalizedsemantics"3thatitseemedtomethatanoverviewmightbe
useful.HereishowIproposetoproceed.Inchapter3,I'llgiveasketchofhowapproachestothenaturalizationproblemhaveevolvedoverthelastcoupleof
decades.(SincewhatIprimarilywanttodoismakeclearthecurrentappreciationofthestructureofthenaturalizationproblem,mytreatmentwillbedialecticaland
polemical,andI'llsettleformyusualCinhistoricalaccuracy.)Inchapter4,I'llofferwhatseemstometobeapromisingversionofaninformationbasedsemantic
theory:thiswillhavetheformofaphysicalist,atomistic,andputativelysufficientconditionforapredicatetoexpressaproperty.Iwillthengothroughalltheproposed
counterexamplesandcounterargumentstothiscon

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ditionthatmyfriendsandrelationsandIhavethusfarsucceededindreamingup.Iwilltrytoconvinceyou(andme,andGreycat)thatnoneofthesecounterexamples
andcounterargumentsworks.Or,anyhow,thatnoneofthemcertainlyworks.
Even,however,ifIamrightthatnoneofthemworks,someonewillsurelyfindonethatworkstomorrow.So,theproposedmoralofthepaperisn'treallythatthereis
nolongeraphilosophicalproblemaboutintentionality.Rather,themoralI'minclinedtodrawandthatIhopeIcanconvinceyoutotakeseriouslyisthatanumber
oftheproblemsthatoncemadetheconstructionofanaturalisticsemanticsseemabsolutelyhopelessnowappearratherlessutterlyintractablethantheyusedto.It
mightthereforebewise,whenonegoesaboutone'sbusinessinthephilosophyoflanguageandthephilosophyofmind,tobecomecautiousabouttakingintentional
irrealismforgrantedmorecautious,ataminimum,thanhasbeenthephilosophicalfashionforthelastfortyyearsorso.
1.TheBackground
Skinner
Ourstorystartswith,ofallthings,Chomsky's(1959)reviewofSkinner'sVerbalBehavior.4Skinner,you'llremember,hadatheoryaboutmeaning.Aslightly
cleanedupversionofSkinner'stheorymightgolikethis:
TheEnglishword"dog"expressesthepropertyofbeingadog(andhenceappliestoall,andonly,dogs).ThissemanticalfactaboutEnglishreducestoacertainfact
aboutthebehavioraldispositionsofEnglishspeakerviz.,thattheirverbalresponse"dog"is'underthecontrolof'acertaintypeofdiscriminativestimuliviz.,thatit's
underthecontrolofdogs.Roughly,aresponseisunderthecontrolofacertaintypeofdiscriminativestimulusifitiscounterfactualsupportingthattheprobabilityofan
emissionoftheresponseincreases'inthepresenceof'astimulusofthattype.
ThereisalsoaSkinnerianstoryabouthowEnglishspeakerscometohavethesesortsofbehavioraldispositions.Roughly,anoperantresponse(includinganoperant
linguisticresponse)comesunderthecontrolofatypeofdiscriminativestimulusasafunctionofthefrequencywithwhichtheresponseelicitsreinforcementwhen
producedinthepresenceofstimuliofthattype.Sotokensof"dog"expressthepropertydogbecausespeakershavebeenreinforcedforuttering"dog"whenthere
aredogsaround.
Noticethatprimafaciethistheoryisnaturalisticbythepresentcriteria:Theconditioninvirtueofthesatisfactionofwhich"dog"

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meansdogisspecifiedintheprimafacienonintentional/semanticvocabularyofresponsefrequencyandstimuluscontrolandthetheoryisatomisticsincethereis,in
general,nointernalconnectionbetweenhavinganyoneresponsedispositionandhavinganyother.Itis,forexample,conceptuallypossiblethatthereshouldbea
speakerwhoseresponse"dog"isunderthecontrolofdogsbutwhohasnoverbalresponse(including,afortiori,"cat")thatisunderthecontrolofcats.Indeed,
Skinner'ssemanticsallowsthepossibilityofaspeakerwhohasnodiscriminatedverbaloperantsotherthanthedispositiontorespond''dog"todogs.Thatcouldbe,
asWittgenstein(1953)saysinarelatedcontext,"thewholelanguage...eventhewholelanguageofatribe."
Aseverybodyknows,Chomskyrolledalloverthistheorynotermwasleftunstoned.Nor,Ithink,couldanyonereasonabledenythathishavingdonesowasaVery
GoodThing.BehaviorismhadbecomeanincubusChomsky'scritiqueeffectedaliberationoftheoreticalimaginationinpsychologyandwasacriticalepisodeonthe
waytodevelopingaseriouscognitivescience.ButforallthataspeoplelikeMacCorquadale(1970)correctlypointedoutthetheoryoflanguagewewereleftwith
whenChomskygotfinishedwithSkinnerwasembarrassinglylackinginanswerstoquestionsaboutmeaning.Itstillis,andsomethingneedstobedoneaboutit.
Nowthatthedusthassettled,it'sworthtryingtogetclearonexactlywhatChomskyshowedthatSkinnerwaswrongabout.Iwanttosuggestthatthereisanonly
somewhatquixoticsenseinwhichChomsky'scriticism,thoughdevastatinglyeffectiveagainstSkinner'sbehaviorismandagainsthisattempttoapplylearningtheoryto
explainlanguageacquisition,neverthelessleftthesemanticalproposalperseprettymuchuntouched.Itis,Ithink,theimplicitrecognitionofthisthatgroundsthe
recentinterestininformationalsemantics.
Forexample,oneofChomsky'sbestlinesofattackisdirectedagainsttheidearequiredbySkinner'slearningtheorythatthecharacteristiceffectoflinguistic
apprenticeshipistoalterthestrengthofanoperantresponse.(BeforeyoulearnEnglish,theprobabilityofyouruttering"dog"whenthereisadogaroundispresumed
tobeverysmallafteryoulearnEnglishitispresumedtobeappreciablybigger).Chomskyargues,tobeginwith,thatthetechnicalsenseofresponsestrength,
accordingtowhichitismeasuredby,forexample,frequency,intensity,andresistancetoextinction,doesn'thaveanyseriousapplicationtotheuseoflanguage.One
doesnot,quaEnglishspeakerinthepresenceofadog,utter"dog"repeatedly,tirelessly,andinaloudvoice.Unless,perhaps,oneisbonkers.

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Moreimportant,Chomskypointsout,intheusualcaseutterancesaren'tresponsesatallthey'reactions.Thisistosay,ataminimum,thatthecharacterofone's
verbalbehaviorissensitivetothecontentofone'sbeliefsandutilities.Verbalbehavioris'cognitivelypenetrable',asonesaysthesedays:whetheroneutters"dog"in
thepresenceofadogdependsonthingslikewhetheronethinksone'sauditorswouldbeinterestedtohearthatthere'sadogabout,andwhetheroneisdesirousof
tellingthemwhatonethinkstheywouldbeinterestedtohear,andsoforth.Tosaynothingofitsdependingonwhetheronehappenstonoticethedog.Toputthesame
pointslightlydifferently:asSkinnerusesit(atleastwhenhe'soutsidethelaboratory)"response"isreallyacryptointentionalterm.SotheideathatSkinnerhas
achievedthenaturalizationofasemanticalconceptbythe(putative)reductionoflinguisticmeaningtoverbalrespondingturnsouttobeasham.
Andfinally,Chomskyremarks,itappearsjustnottobetruethatlanguagelearningdependsontheapplicationofcarefullyscheduledsociallymediatedreinforcement.
Languageseemstobelearnedwithoutbeingtaught,andSkinner'sstorydoesn'texplainhowthiscouldbeso.
Thisis,Ithink,allperfectlycorrectandbrilliantlyobserved.Butjusthowmuchdamagedoesitdo,andjustwhichdoctrinesdoesitdothedamageto?Notice,inthe
firstplace,thatinprincipleSkinner'ssemanticscanperfectlywelldispensewithhislearningtheory.Skinnercouldthough,ofcourse,hewouldn'twanttotellthe
storythatgoes"'dog"expressesthepropertydogbecausetokeningsoftheformerareunderthecontrolofinstantiationsofthelatter'withoutsayinganythingabout
howdiscriminatedresponsescometobeunderthecontrolofdiscriminativestimuli.Hecouldthereforesimplyjettisonthestuffaboutlanguagelearningreducingto
socialreinforcementsmediatingalterationsinthestrengthofverbaloperantswhichwouldbeaverygoodthingforhimtodosinceit'shopeless.
Theobjectionthatnotionslike'response'arecryptointentionalwhenappliedtotheuseoflanguageisfataltoSkinner'sbehaviorismbut,onceagain,nottohis
semantics.For,althoughtalkingisaformofvoluntarybehavior,andhenceakindofacting,thinkingpresumablyisn't.SomeonewhoisanIntentionalRealistbutnot
abehavioristcouldthusembraceaSkinneriansemanticsforthoughtswhileentirelyrejectingSkinner'saccountoflanguage.Here'showtherevisedstorymightgo:
ThereisamentalstateofentertainingtheconceptDOG,sayofwhichtheintentionalobjectisthepropertydog.(Or,asIshallsometimessayforbrevity,thereisa
mentalstatethatexpressesthepropertydog).Thefactthatthisstateexpressesthisproperty

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reducestothefactthattokeningsofthestateare,intherelevantsense,discriminatedresponsestoinstancesofthepropertyi.e.,instancingsofthestatecovarywith
(theyare'underthecontrolof')instancingsoftheproperty,andthiscovariationislawful,hencecounterfactualsupporting.
Thisaccountisn'tbehavioristicsinceit'sunabashedaboutthepostulationofintentionalmentalstates.Anditisn'tlearningtheoreticsinceitdoesn'tcareaboutthe
ontogenyofthecovarianceintermsofwhichthesemanticrelationbetweendogthoughtsanddogsisexplicated.Butitisatomisticsinceitispresumablyconceptually
possiblefordogthoughtstocovarywithdoginstanceseveninamindnoneofwhoseotherstatesareintentionaltheconditionsformeaningcanthusbesatisfiedby
symbolsthatdon'tbelongtosymbolsystems.
It'salsoatomisticinafurthersenseonethatIwanttoemphasizeforlaterreference.ThebasicideaofSkinneriansemanticsisthatallthatmattersformeaningis
"functional"relations(relationsofnomiccovariance)betweensymbolsandtheirdenotations.Inparticular,itdoesn'tmatterhowthatcovariationismediatedit
doesn'tmatterwhatmechanisms(neurological,intentional,spiritual,psychological,orwhatever)sustainthecovariation.ThismakesSkinneriansemanticsatomisticina
waythatQuineiansemantics,forinstance,isn't.It'satypicallyQuineianmovetoarguethatsincethesemanticalrelationsbetween,asitmightbe,'proton'sandprotons
istheorymediated(since,inparticular,theoreticalinferencesmediateourapplicationsof'proton'toprotons),itmustbethatwhatonemeansby'proton'ispartly
determinedbythetheoriesaboutprotonsthatoneendorses.Andsince,forQuine,theobservationvocabulary/theoryvocabularydistinctionisn'tprincipled,it
comesoutthatwhatonemeansbyany'X'ispartlydeterminedbywhatonebelievesaboutXs.5
ButQuineisnotagoodSkinnerianinholdingthis.AgoodSkinneriansaysthatwhat'proton'meansisdeterminedjustbyitsfunctionalrelationto(itscausal
covariancewith)protonsgiventhatthiscovariationholds,thetheoreticalinferencesbywhichit'smediatedaresemanticallyirrelevant.Inparticular,twoindividuals
whose'proton'tokensexhibitthesamefunctionalrelationtoprotonsipsofactomeanthesamethingby'proton',whatevertheoriesofprotonstheymayhappento
hold.Theconditionsformeaningconstrainthefunctionalrelationbetweenasymbolanditsreferent,buttheyquantifyoverthemechanisms(theoreticalcommitments,
asitmightbe)thatsustainthesefunctionalrelations.6ForSkinner,then,thoughnotforQuine,contentisradicallydetachedfromideology.Quine'saffectionfor

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Skinnerismerelysentimentalafterallgivenhissemanticholism,Quinecan'tbeaSkinnerian.
Well,finally,thisupdatedSkinneriansemanticsisphysicalisticontheassumptionthattokenstatesofentertainingaconceptcanbepickedoutbyreferencetotheir
nonsemanticalproperties(e.g.,byreferencetotheirneurological,orfunctional,or'syntactic'properties).Whichperhapstheycanwhoknows?7Thepointisthatthis
highlyreconstructedSkinnerianismfromwhich,tobesure,practicallyeverythingthatSkinnercaresabouthasbeenremovedwouldsatisfythenaturalism
requirementand,asfarasIcantell,itisnottouchedbytheargumentsthatChomskymountedagainstVerbalBehavior.
Infact,ifyoutakethebehaviorismandthelearningtheoryawayfromthetheoryofmeaninginVerbalBehavior,whatyou'releftwithisadoctrinethatlooksquitea
lotliketheinformationalsemanticsofDretske'sKnowledgeAndTheFlowofInformation.Whichbringsustothenextstageofourstory.
Dretske
F1giveswhatItaketobethebasicideaofDretske'stheory.
Fl.Sevents(e.g.,tokeningsofsymbols)expressthepropertyPifthegeneralization'PscauseSs'iscounterfactualsupporting.
Forexample,tokeningsof"dog"expressthepropertydogbecausethegeneralization,'Dogscause"dog"tokens'iscounterfactualsupporting.
IlikethiswayofputtingDretske'sproposalbecauseitmakesclearthecontinuityofhisprogramwithSkinner's.InDretske'sownformulation,however,the
fundamentalsemanticrelationis'carryinginformation'(ratherthan'expressingaproperty').AfirstblushaccountofcarryinginformationisgivenbyF2.
F2.SeventscarryinformationaboutPeventsif'PscauseSs'isalaw.8
However,F2wouldalsonotbeacceptabletoDretske.Forexample,accordingtohistheory,SscarryinformationaboutPsonlyiftheprobabilitythatanarbitrarySis
Pcausedisalwaysoneineffect,Dretskerequiresthat'PsandonlyPscauseSs'bealaw.
Hismainargumentforthisverystrongconditionisthis:9supposeweallowthatSscarryinformationaboutPsevenwhentheprobabilitythatSsarePcausedissome
plessthanone.ThenwecouldgetasituationwhereSscarryinformationaboutPs,Rscarryinfor

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mationaboutQs,butS&Rsdon'tcarryinformationaboutP&Qs(viz.,becausetheprobabilitythatP&QgivenS&Rislessthanp).
ButIthinkthisargumentisilladvised.Thereisnoreasonwhyasemanticaltheoryshouldassigninformationalcontentindependentlytoeachexpressioninasymbol
system.Itwilldoifcontentsareassignedonlytotheatomicexpressions,thesemanticsformolecularsymbolsbeingbuiltuprecursivelybythesortsoftechniquesthat
arefamiliarfromtheconstructionoftruthdefinitions.Inwhatfollows,Iwillinfactassumethattheproblemofnaturalizingrepresentationreducestotheproblemof
naturalizingitforatomicsymbols(mutatismutandis,atomicmentalstatesifitismentalrepresentationthatisbeingnaturalized).10
F1andF2aremorecloselyrelatedthanmayappearsincewecanassumethat'PscauseSs'iscounterfactualsupportingonlyifit'salaw.Theconnectionbetween
informationandnomologicitythatisexplicitinF2isthereforeimplicitinFl.Becausethenotionsoflawandcounterfactualsupportaresoclosetotheheartofboth
Skinner'sandDretske'sviewsofsemantics,thetheoriesshareafeaturethatwillbeimportanttousmuchlaterinthediscussion:bothimplythatwhatyourwords
(thoughts)meanisdependententirelyonyourdispositionstotokenthem,theactualhistoryoftheirtokeningsbeingsemanticallyirrelevant.
Thisprinciplethatactualhistoriesaresemanticallyirrelevantfollowsfromthebasicideaofinformationalsemantics,whichisthatthecontentofasymbolis
determinedsolelybyitsnomicrelations.Toputitroughlybutintuitively,whatlawssubsumeathingisamatterofitssubjunctivecareerofwhatitwoulddo(or
wouldhavedone)ifthecircumstanceswere(orhadbeen)thusandso.Bycontrast,athing'sactualhistorydependsnotjustonthelawsitfallsunder,butalsoonthe
circumstancesthatithappenstoencounter.WhetherSkinnerandDretskearerighttosupposethatanaturalizedsemanticscanignoreactualhistoriesinfavorofpurely
subjunctivecontingenciesisaquestionwe'llreturntolateinchapter4.Tillthen,wewillcleaverigorouslytotheprinciplethatonlynomicconnectionsandthe
subjunctivestheylicensecountformeaning.
Forthepresent,then,IproposetotakeF2asmystalkinghorse.ItformulatesadoctrinethatiswithinhailingdistanceofbothSkinner'sversionofnaturalized
semanticsandDretske's,anditmakescleartheintimateconnectionbetweentheinformationthat'sgeneratedbyacausaltransactionandtheexistenceofacausallaw
that"covers"thetransaction.11AndasfarasIcantell,theproblemswe'reabouttoraiseforF2willhavetobefacedbyanyversionofinformationbasedsemantics
thatcanclaimtoberemotelyplausible.

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2.ErrorandtheDisjunctionProblem
Youhavetogeterrorinsomewhere,andsofarwe'vemadenoroomforit.Infact,therelookstobeadilemmaaboutthis.Suppose,toputitcrudely,that"dog"
meansdog(andthushasdogsandonlydogsinitsextension)becauseit'salawthatdogscause"dogs."Thentherearetwopossibilities:
FirstPossibility
Onlydogscause"dog"s.Ifthisisso,thenonlythingsintheextensionof"dog"causeittobetokenedsoitlooksasthoughallthetokensof"dog"mustbetrue.
SecondPossibility
Somenondogscause"dog"s.Suppose,forexample,thateitherbeingadogorbeing(therightsortof)catonadarknightissufficienttocausea"dog"token.F2
says,ineffect,thatsymbolsexpressthepropertieswhoseinstantiationsarenomicallysufficientfortheirtokening.So"dog"expressesthepropertyofbeingeithera
dogoracatonadarknight.Sotheextensionof"dog"istheunionofthedogsandthecatsondarknights.Sotokensof''dog"thatarecausedbycatsondark
nightsaretrue,andwestilldon'thaveastoryaboutfalsehoodanderror.
IfF2isthebestthatacausaltheoryofcontentcando,itlooksasthoughsuchtheoriescan'tdistinguishbetweenatruetokenofasymbolthatmeanssomethingthat's
disjunctiveandafalsetokenofasymbolthatmeanssomethingthat'snot.Theliteratureoninformationalsemanticshascometocallthisthe"disjunctionproblem."
What,exactly,isgoingonhere?Well,itseemsplausiblethattheleastyou'dwantofafalsetokenofasymbolisthatitbecausedbysomethingthatisnotinthe
symbol'sextension.ButthisisaconditionthatF2hastroublemeeting.Because:
(i)it'satruismthateverytokenofasymbol(includingthefalseones)iscausedbysomethingthathassomepropertythatissufficienttocauseatokeningofthe
symbol
and
(ii)accordingtoF2,anypropertywhoseinstantiationissufficienttocausethetokeningofasymbolistherebyexpressedbythatsymbol.
Sincetheextensionofasymbolisjustthesetofthingsthathavethepropertythatthesymbolexpresses,itappearstofollowfrom(i)and

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(ii)thateverytokenofasymboliscausedbysomethingthatbelongstoitsextensionhencethatnotokenofasymbolcanbefalse.Thisis,toputthecasemildly,not
satisfactory.
Indeed,itissonotsatisfactorythatthequestionwhetheranaturalisticsemanticsispossiblehasrecentlycometobeviewedasidenticalinpracticetothequestion
whetherthedisjunctionproblemcanbesolvedwithinanaturalisticframework.Accordingly,mostoftherestofthispaperwillbeaboutthevicissitudesofrecent
attemptstofindsuchasolution.
WithanexceptionthatIwillretaillater,allthestandardattemptstosolvethedisjunctionproblemexhibitacertainfamilyresemblance.Thebasicideaistodistinguish
betweentwotypesofsituations,suchthatlawfulcovariationdeterminesmeaninginonetypeofsituationbutnotintheother.Therevisedtheorysays,ineffect,thata
symbolexpressesapropertyifinstantiationsofthepropertyarenomicallysufficientforinstantiationsofthesymbolinsituationsoftypeone.Sincethetokensofa
symbolthatoccurintypeonesituationsareipsofactocausedbythingsthatareinitsextension,itfollowsthatallsuchtokensaretrue.However,propertieswhose
instantiationscausetokensofasymbol(only)insituationsofthesecondtypearenottherebyexpressedbythesymbolsotokensofasymbolthatoccurintypetwo
situationsarenotipsofactocausedbythingsinitsextensionsoitisleftopenthatsuchtokensmaybefalse.
Thestrategyoftherevisedtheoryisthustosolvethedisjunctionproblembylocalizingit.It'sacceptedthatsymboltokensintypeonesituationsareipsofactotrue12
andit'stherebyconcededthatiftokeningsofasymbolarecausedbymorethanonesortofthingintypeonesituationsthenitfollowsthatthemeaningofthesymbol
isdisjunctive.But,accordingtothenewstory,notallsortsofsituationsenjoythisprivilegeofconveyinginfallibilityforexample,typetwosituationsdon't.Sothenew
storydoesmakeroomforthepossibilityoferror,which,aswe'veseen,theoldstoryfailedtodo.
Here'saslightlydifferent,thoughconvergent,waytothinkaboutthisdistinctionbetweentypeoneandtypetwosituations.Itmightreasonablyoccurtoaphilosopher
towonder,"Whyisitthatourcanonicalspecificationsofthoughts,beliefsandthelikeoperatebyemployingphrasesembedded'that'clausesthat(apparently)
expressactualorpossiblestatesofaffairs?Why,forexample,dowepickoutthethoughtthatit'srainingbyusingtheexpression'it'sraining'?Whatisitabout
thoughts,andaboutstatesofaffairs,thatmakesthispracticepossible?"(Papineau,1988,wondersthissortofthing,circap.88,asdoesLoar,1981).Thisisclosely
relatedtoarevealingquestionthatIbelievewasfirstraisedbyDonaldDavison:

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howarewetounderstandthefactthattheexpressionsthatcanappearasfreestandingdeclarativesentencescanalsoappearasthecomplementsofverbsof
propositionalattitude?
Allinformationalaccountstellessentiallythesamestoryaboutthiswhat'sgoingon,theysay,isaspeciesofetiologicalidentification.Whenweuse"it'sraining"to
specifytheintentionalobjectofthethoughtthatit'sraining,wearepickingthethoughtoutbyreferencetothestateofaffairsthatwould,incertaincircumstances,cause
ittobeentertained.It'sratherlikeanalcoholicstuporyouspecifythestatebyreferencetothesortofthingthatbringsiton.
Allrightsofarbutsince,ingeneral,thetokeningofanintentionalstatecanhaveanyofavarietyofdifferentkindsofcauses(unlike,bytheway,tokeningsofalcoholic
stupors)theproblemarises,underwhichcircumstancesthecauseofathoughtisipsofactoidenticaltoitsintentionalobject.Answer:Bydefinition,thiscoincidence
obtainsinsituationsoftypeone.Themoralisthatthedisjunctionproblemisa,butnottheonly,considerationthatmightmotivateaninformationalsemanticisttotryto
drawatypeone/typetwodistinction.Otherphilosophicalinterestspointtothesamedesideratum.
Soeverythingisfineallweneedisaconvincingand,ofcourse,naturalisticexplicationofthetypeone/typetwodistinctionandwewillunderstand,withinthe
frameworkofaninformationalaccountofcontent,bothhowerrorispossibleandhowitispossibletoindividuateintentionalstatesinthewaysthatwedo.Asitturns
out,however,convincingnaturalisticexplicationsofthisdistinctionhaveprovedtobealittlethinontheground.
3.Dretske'sStoryaboutError
ThefirstattemptwasowingtoDretske(1981).Inanutshell,Dretske'sideawastoidentifythetypeone(i.e.,meaningbestowing)situationswiththeonesinwhicha
symbolislearned:
Inthelearningsituationspecialcareistakentoseethatincomingsignalshaveanintensity,astrength,sufficientuntodeliveringtherequiredpieceofinformationtothelearning
subject....Suchprecautionsaretakeninthelearningsituation...inordertoensurethataninternalstructureisdevelopedwiththeinformationthatsisF....Butoncewehave
meaning,oncethesubjecthasarticulatedastructurethatisselectivelysensitivetoinformationabouttheFnessofthings,instancesofthisstructure,tokensofthistype,canbe
triggeredbysignalsthatlacktheappropriatepieceofinformation....We(thus)haveacaseof

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misrepresentationatokenofastructurewithafalsecontent.Wehave,inaword,meaningwithouttruth.(emphasisDretske's).

Seechapter2foranextendeddiscussionofthisproposaltheheartofthematterisasfollows.
F2impliesthatSexpressesthepropertythat,asaconsequenceofthetraining,cametobenomicallysufficientforcausingStokens.Itthereforemattersalotwhich
propertythisis,andthecrucialpointisthatitsidentityisnotdeterminedbytheactualStokeningsthatthetraineeproducesduringthelearningperiod.Forexample,
evenalearnerallofwhose"dog"tokensarecausedbydogsthroughoutthecourseofhistrainingmayneverthelessbeusing"dog"tomeannotdogbutdogorcaton
adarknight.Whetherheisdoingsowon'tshowinhisovertbehavior(inhistokeningsof"dog")unlesshehappenedtorunintoacatonadarknightwhich,by
assumption,hedidn't.Butremember,ininformationalsemantics,it'sthesubjunctives,counterfactualsincluded,thatcount.Thatis,it'stheactualandcounterfactual
StokeningsintrainingsituationsthatfixtheidentityofthepropertythatSexpresses.Sinceitgoeswithoutsayingthattheremustalwaysbeindefinitelymanyproperties
whoseinstantiationsarenotencounteredinanyfinitelinguisticapprenticeship,therearealwaysindefinitelymanydisjunctivepropertiesthatthetrainee'suseof"dog"
couldexpress,consonantwithallofhisactualtokeningsof"dog''beingdogoccasioned.ThiscreatesadilemmaforDretske'sproposalthatisitselfjustaversion
ofthedisjunctionproblem.
Caseone.Ifacatonadarknighthadbeenencounteredduringthelearningperiod,itwouldhavecauseda"dog"token.Butthentheconsequenceoftraininghas
beenthat"dog"meansdogorcatonadarknight,andtokensof"dog"causedbycatsondarknightsoutsidethetrainingsituationaretrue.Sothereisstillnoroom
forfalsetokens.
Casetwo.Ifacatonadarknighthadbeenencounteredduringthelearningperiod,itwouldnothavecauseda"dog"token.Then,theconsequenceofthetraining
hasbeenthatcatsondarknightsdon'tcause"dog"tokensafterallpresumably,onlydogsdo.(Ifacatonadarknightencounteredduringthetrainingperiod
wouldn'thavecauseda"dog"token,whyonEarthshouldacatonadarknightencounteredafterthetrainingperiodcauseone?)Butifonlydogs

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cause"dog"tokens,allsuchtokensaretrueandagainthere'snoroomforerrors.
Themoralseemstobethatwhenyoutakethecounterfactualsintothereckoning,thestoryaboutthetrainingdoesn'thelpwiththedisjunctionproblem.
IonceheardDretskemakewhatItooktobethefollowingsuggestion:Whatdeterminestheidentityoftheconceptthestudenthaslearnedisnottheactualand
counterfactualdistributionofhistokenings(asperthepreceding),butratherthedistributionofactualandcounterfactualpunishmentsandrewardsthatprevailsinthe
trainingsituation.So,forexample,imagineastudentwhohasbeenreinforcedforpositiveresponsestoapples,andsupposethatnowaxappleshavebeen
encountered.ThenwhatdeterminesthatthestudenthaslearnedtheconceptAPPLEratherthanthedisjunctiveconceptAPPLEORWAXAPPLEisthat,wereheto
respondpositivetoawaxapple,theteacher(orsomeotherenvironmentalmechanism)wouldcontrivetopunishtheresponse.
ButIdon'tthinkDretskereallywantstoholdthis(andit'sentirelypossiblethatIhavemisconstruedhiminthinkingthathethinksthathedoes).For,onthisaccount,it
wouldbeimpossibletomistakenlylearnadisjunctiveconceptwhenanondisjunctiveoneisbeingtaught.SupposeyouaretryingtoteachmeAPPLEi.e.,
supposethatyouwouldpunishmeforpositiveresponsestowaxapples.Andsupposethatitsomehowneverthelessgetsintomyheadthattheconceptyouaretrying
toteachmeisthedisjunctiveAPPLEORWAXAPPLE.Onthecurrentview,howeverexplicitlyIthinkthatthatistheconceptthatyouaretryingtoteachme,and
howevermuchitisthecasethatIwouldrespondpositivetoinstancesofWAXAPPLEwereanysuchtobepresented,stilltheconceptthatIhaveinfactacquiredis
notAPPLEORWAXAPPLEbutAPPLE.Because:theproposalisthatit'stheobjectivedistributionof(actualandcounterfactual)punishmentsandrewardsinthe
trainingsituationthatdeterminestheidentityoftheconceptthatIlearnand,byhypothesis,inthistrainingsituationit'sAPPLEsandnotAPPLEORWAXAPPLEs,
towhichtheactualandcounterfactualrewardsaccrue.This,surely,isareductiooftheproposal.Iftheobjectivereinforcementcontingenciesdeterminewhich
conceptsweacquirewe'dallbepracticallyinfallibleandinductionwouldbeasnap.Alas,whatconstitutesmyconceptsisnottheobjectivereinforcement
contingencies,butratherthereinforcementcontingenciesthatItaketoobtain.Cf.apointthatChomskymadeagainstSkinner:what'sreinforcedisonething,
what'slearnedisoftenquiteanother.
Noneofthisshows,ofcourse,thatyoucan'tgetoutofthedis

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junctionproblembyrestrictingthecircumstancesunderwhichcausationmakescontent.Butitdoessuggestthattheidentificationoftypeonesituationswithlearning
situationswon'tdothetrick.
4.Teleological/FunctionalSolutions
Thebasicideafordealingwiththedisjunctionproblemwastodefineatypeonesituationsuchthat:
(i)Ifit'salawthatPscauseStokensintypeonesituations,thenSmeansP(andifPisdisjunctive,thensobeit)
and
(ii)notallsituationsinwhichSgetstokenedqualifyastypeone,sothattokensofSthathappeninothersortsofsituationsareipsofactofreetobefalse.
Well,itlooksasthoughtypeonesituationscan'tbelearningsituationsbuthere'sanalternativeproposal.Normalsituationsarejustthesortofsituationswerequire.
Wearenowabouttospendsometimelookingatthisproposal.
Primafacie,thiskindofideaissortofattractiveit'ssensitivetotheplausibleintuitionthaterrorsarecaseswheresomethinghasgonewrong:"Wherebeliefsare
false...wealsoexpectsomeexplanationforthedeviationfromthenorm:eitheranabnormalityintheenvironment,asinopticalillusionsorotherkindsofmisleading
evidence,oranabnormalityintheinternalbeliefformingmechanisms,asinwishfulthinkingormisremembering"(Stalnaker,1984,p.19).Conversely,normal
situationsaremaybejusttheone'swhereeverythinghasgoneright.Inwhichcasesinceit'splausible(perhapsit'stautological)thatwheneverythinghasgoneright
whatyoubelieveistrueit'smaybeOKifStokensarealltrueinnormalsituations.
Somaybeit'sOKif,innormalsituations,theconditionsformeaningandtruthcomeouttobethesame.Normalatleastwhenit'susedthiswayisanormative
notion,13andtrueisanormativenotion,somaybeit'snotsurprisingiftheformernotionreconstructsthelatter.So,atleast,onemightbeinclinedtoargueatfirstblush.
Ofcourse,iftheintentionalcircleistobebrokenbyappealtoNormalsituationsforsymboltokenings,wehadbetterhavesomenaturalisticstorytotellaboutwhatit
isforasituationtobeNormalintherelevantrespect.Whatmightsuchastorylooklike?Roughly,thesuggestionisthatNormalityshouldsomehowbecashedby
appealto(natural)teleologye.g.,tosomemoreorlessDarwinian/historicalnotionofbiologicalmechanismsdoingwhattheywereselectedfor.

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So,then,here'sasketchofthestory:anorganism'smentalstatetokensgetcausedby,forexample,eventsthattranspireintheorganism'slocalenvironment.There
are,ofcourse,mechanismstypicallyneuronalonesthatmediatethesecausaltransactions.Andthesemechanismshavepresumablygotanevolutionaryhistory.
Theyarepresumablytheproductsofprocessesofselection,andit'snotimplausiblethatwhattheywereselectedforispreciselytheirroleinmediatingthetokeningof
mentalstates.Sotherearethesecognitivemechanisms,andtherearethesecognitivestatesandthefunctionoftheformeristoproduceinstancesofthelatterupon
environmentallyappropriateoccasions.
Strictlyspeaking,itdoesn't,ofcourse,follow,thatthecognitivestatesthemselvesstateslikebelievingthatPordesiringthatQordoubtingthattheDodgerswill
evermovebacktoBrooklynhaveaNormalfunctioninfact,itdoesn'tfollowthattheyhaveanyfunctionatall.(Youcouldperfectlywellhaveamachinewhose
functionistoproducethingsthatarethemselvesfunctionless.Inaconsumersocietyyoumighthavequitealotofthese.)Sincetheassumptionthatthereisa
teleologicalstorytobetoldaboutthemechanismsofbelieffixationdoesnotimplythatthereisateleologicalstorytobetoldaboutbeliefs,itafortioridoesnotimply
thatbeliefs(or,mutatismutandis,otherintentionalstates)canbeindividuatedbyreferencetotheirfunctions.Thisisimportantbecauseit'smoreintuitivethat
belieffixingmechanisms(nervoussystems,forexample)havefunctionsthanthatbeliefsdoandtheimplausibilityofthelatterideaoughtnottoprejudicetheplausibility
oftheformer.
Norwouldateleologicalsolutionofthedisjunctionproblemrequirethatintentionalstatescanbefunctionallyindividuated.Allsolvingthedisjunctionproblemrequires
isadistinctionbetweenNormalandabNormalcircumstancesforhavingabelief(hencebetweentypeonecircumstancesforhavingabeliefandothers).Therewould
besuchadistinctioneveniftherewerenosuchthingsasNormallyfunctioningbeliefs,solongastherearesuchthingsasNormallyfunctioningmechanismsofbelief
fixation.Perse,teleologicalsolutionstothedisjunctionproblemdonotthereforerequirethattherebeDarwinian(or,indeed,any)answerstoquestionslike,"Whatis
thebeliefthatsevenisprimefor?"
ThereseemstobeacertainamountofconfusionaboutthispointinpaperslikeMillikan(1986).Millikanthinksthatbeliefs,desiresandthelikemusthave"proper
functions,"andshethinksthisbecauseshethinksthat"theremust,afterall,beafinitenumberofgeneralprinciplesthatgoverntheactivitiesofourvariouscognitive
statemakingandcognitivestateusingmechanismsandtheremust

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beexplanationsofwhytheseprincipleshavehistoricallyworkedtoaidoursurvival"(p.55).
Buttheassumptionthatthemechanismsthatmake/usecognitivestateshavefunctionsdoesnotentailthatcognitivestatesthemselvesdo.Andtheassumptionthatit's
usefultohavecognitivestatesdoesnotentailthatyoucandistinguishamongcognitivestatesbyreferencetotheiruses.It'sasortofdistributivefallacytoarguethat,if
havingbeliefsisfunctional,thentheremustbesomethingthatisthedistinguishingfunctionofeachbelief.Thefunctionofthehumanspermcellistofertilizethehuman
ovumwhat,then,isthedistinguishingfunctionofthisspermcell?Thehaironyourheadfunctionstopreventtheradiationofyourbodyheatwhat,then,isthe
distinguishingfunctionofthishair(or,forthatmatter,ofredhair)?
ConverselyandcontrarytoMillikanifthereisnothingthatthebeliefthatsevenisprimeisfor(andthatthebeliefthatfourisevenisnotfor),itwouldn'tfollowthat
"ourcognitivelifeisanaccidentalepiphenomenalcloudhoveringovermechanismsthatevolutiondevisedwithotherthingsinmind."HavingtoesisagoodideaI
supposethere'sevenaselectionalstoryaboutwhywehavethem.Itdoesnotfollowthateachtoehasitsdistinguishingfunction,orthatthistoehasanyfunctionthat
onehasn't.Nor,forallthat,aremytoesatalllikeepiphenomenalcloudshoveringoversomething.
Millikan'sideaisthat,ontheonehand,cognitivestatesaredistinguishedbytheirfunctionsand,ontheother,it'sthefunctionofacognitivestatethatdeterminesits
intentionalobject."...thedescriptionswegiveofdesires[andthelike]aredescriptionsoftheirmostobviousproperfunctions[sothatthefactthat]desire(s)are...
individuated...inaccordancewithcontentisasordinaryafactas...thatthecategories'heart','kidney',and'eye'arecarvedoutbyreferencetotheirmostobvious
properfunctions"(pp.6364).TheideathatcontentreducestoNormalfunctionisoneofthetwomainthreadsinthestorywe'reexamining(theotherbeingtheidea
thatfunctionreducestoselectionalhistory,ofwhichalotmorepresently).
Nowthereis,rightatthebeginning,somethingfishyabouttheideathatthecontentofamentalstateistobeunderstoodbyreferencetoitsfunctionsincethissortof
accountleavesitmysteriouswhytheidentificationofcontentwithfunctionworksonlyforintentionalstateswhybeliefshaveintentionalcontentinvirtueoftheir
functionsbuthearts,eyes,andkidneysdon't.Inanyevent,thedisanalogybetweenthefunctionalindividuationofpropositionalattitudesandthefunctionalindividuation
ofhearts,eyes,andkidneyswouldseemtobeglaring.Functionsare,Isuppose,speciesofNormaleffects.Wefindoutthatthefunctionoftheheartistopumpthe
bloodwhen

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wefindoutthat,amongtheNormaleffectsofheartbeat,bloodcirculation(andnot,say,heartnoise)istheeffectthatheartsaredesignedtoproduce.Buthowwould
thecorrespondinganalysisgointhecaseofintentionalstateslikedesires?WhatisitthatthedesiretoberichandfamouscanNormallybereliedupontoeffectinthe
waythatheartscanNormallybereliedupontoeffectthecirculationofblood?Tryingtobecomerichandfamousisperhapsacandidatesince,Isuppose,people
whowanttobecomethatdoNormallytrytobecomeit.Buttryingisnogoodforthejobathandsinceitisitselfanintentionalstate.Actuallybecomingrichand
famouswoulddo,exceptthatit'ssowildlyimplausiblethatitis,inanynonquestionbeggingsense,aNormaleffectofwantingtobecomeit.
ContrarytowhatMillikanclaims,it'sjustnotonthecardsthat"theproperfunctionofeverydesire...istohelpcauseitsownfulfillment."(p.63)For,ontheone
hand,nothingistheproperfunctionofXsexceptwhatXsNormallyhelptocauseand,ontheother,ifXsNormallyhelptocauseYs,thenpresumablywhenthe
situationisNormalYscanbereliedupontohappenwhen(ever)it'sthecasethatX.Thustheactivityofthehearthelpstocauseastateofaffairsviz.,thatthe
bloodcirculatesthatcanNormallybereliedupontohappenwhentheheartbeats(i.e.,thatcanbereliedupontohappenwhentheheartbeatsandthesituationis
Normal).ButdoesMillikanreallybelievethatwantingtobecomerichandfamoushelpstocauseastateofaffairsviz.,thatonebecomesrichandfamouswhich
canNormallybereliedupontohappenifonewantsthatitshould?And,ifshereallydoesbelievethis,isn'tthatbecauseshe'ssortofsneakedalookattheintentional
objectofthewant?14
Millikanremarksinonebreath,asitwerethat"aproperfunctionofthedesiretoeatistobringitaboutthatoneeats[and]aproperfunctionofthedesiretowin
thelocalDemocraticnominationforfirstselectmanistobringitaboutthatonewinsthelocalDemocraticnominationforfirstselectman"(p.63).Butwhilethereis
arguablyalawthatconnectsdesirestoeatwitheatings(ceterisparibus)andalawthatconnectsfunctioningheartswithbloodpumpings(ceterisparibus),what'sthe
chancethatthereisanyNormallyreliable,nonintentionalconnectionbetweendesirestowinelectionsandelectionwinnings?Stevensonwantedtowinjustasmuchas
Eisenhowerdid,andthecircumstanceswereequallyNormalforboth.ButEisenhowerwonandStevensondidn't.InNormalcircumstances,notmorethanoneof
themcouldhave,whatwithelectionsbeingzerosumgames.Sohowcoulditbethat,invirtueofalaworotherreliablemechanism,inNormalcircumstances
everybodywins

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whateverelectionshewantsto?WhenthesituationisNormal,thelionwantstoeatandthelambwantsnottobeeaten.But...
TheproposalisthattheproperfunctionofadesireistobringaboutthestateofaffairsthatitNormallyhelpstocause,andthatthestateofaffairsthatadesirewould
bringaboutwereitperformingitsproperfunctionisitsintentionalobject.ThusfarI'vebeenrunningthediscussionofthisproposalonthereadingof'Normallyhelpsto
cause'thatexampleslikehearts,eyes,kidneys,andthelikemostobviouslysuggest:'ifXNormallyhelpstocauseY,then"ifXthenY"istrueifthesituationis
Normal.'But,asTimMaudlinhaspointedouttome,it'sentirelypossiblethatMillikanhasalessrobustnotionof'Normallyhelpingtocause'inmindperhapsit's
enoughforXNormallyhelpingtocauseYthattheprobabilityofYgivenXisNormallygreaterthantheprobabilityofYgivennotX.15Thiswouldcopewiththekinds
ofcounterexamplesI'vebeenofferingsinceitwouldn'trequirethatwhenthesituationisNormalyouactuallygetYswheneveryougetXs.
Thisrevisedproposalis,however,clearlytooweak.Forexample:therecordingthatIwanttobuyistheCallasTosca,butI'mpreparedto"suboptimize":I'llsettlefor
theMilanovifMilanovisallthey'vegot.SomywantingtobuytheonerecordingincreasestheprobabilitythatI'llactuallybuytheother"allshipsfloatonarisingtide,"
asGrannyisalwayssaying.Noristheretheslightestreasontodoubtthatthissortofsuboptimizinghassurvivalvalueprobablyifwedidn'tdoit,we'dallgomad.
(Perhapsifwedidn'tdoitwe'dalreadybemadsinceourwillingnesstosuboptimizeisarguablyaconstituentofourpracticalrationality.)Inshort,helpingmetoget
theMilanovToscasatisfiestherevisedconditionforbeingtheproperfunctionofmywantingtheCallasTosca.(Asdoes,ofcourse,helpmegettheCallasTosca.
Oneconsequenceofthisconstrualof'properfunction'beingtooweakisthatitfailstoyielduniqueproperfunctions.)Butitis,forallthat,theCallasToscaandnotthe
MilanovToscathatistheintentionalobjectofmywant.
Othersortsofcasespointthesamemoral.Normally,mydesiringtowinthelotteryincreasesatmostveryslightlythelikelihoodthatIwilldoso.Itincreases
considerablymorethelikelihoodthatIshallpresentlybefivedollarspoorer,fivedollarsbeingthepriceofaticket.Forallthat,whatIwantistowinthelottery,notto
getpoorergettingpoorercomesinnotastheintentionalobjectofmywantbutmerelyasacalculatedrisk.
So,foronereasonandanother,therevisedconstrualof'Normallyhelpingtocause'istooweakbutliketheoriginalconstrualitisalsotoostrong,andthisisthemore
seriousfault.Itissimplyintrinsicto

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thelogicofwantsthattheycanbecausallyisolatedfromthestatesofaffairswhoseoccurrencewouldsatisfythem,evenwhenthingsareperfectlyNormal.So,Ican
wantlikestinkthatitwillraintomorrowandspoilIvan'spicnic.NotonlyisitnotthecasethatmywantingthisisNormallysufficienttobringitaboutmywantingit
doesn'talterintheslightestscintillathelikelihoodthatitwillhappen.Thatitispossibletohavewantsthatarearbitrarilycausallyinertwithrespecttotheirown
satisfactionis,indeed,oneoftherespectsinwhichwantsareintentionalit'swhatmakeswantingsofrightfullynonfactive."Ifwishesweren'tcausallyisolatedfrom
horses,beggarswouldrideceterisparibus,"asGrannyisalsoalwayssaying.
Aswe'veseen,however,theteleologicalsolutiontothedisjunctionproblemdoesn'thavetogoMillikan'swayinparticular,itdoesn'trequireeitherthatintentional
states(asopposedtocognitivemechanisms)shouldhaveproperfunctions,orthattheputativeproperfunctionsofintentionalstatesshoulddeterminetheircontents.
LetusthereforeleaveMillikanandreturntothemainlineofargument.
Therearelet'sassumethesecognitivemechanismswhosefunctionistomediatethecausalrelationsbetweenenvironmentalstatesontheonehandandmental
statesontheother.Ofcourse,theydon'tmediatethoserelationsinjustanyoldcircumstances.Organismsdon'thearwellwhentheyhavecarrotsintheirears,and
theydon'tseewellwhentheyhavedustintheireyes...etc.Butifthereisanevolutionarystoryaboutacognitivemechanism,thenpresumablytheremustbe
naturalisticallyspecifiablecircumstancesCsuchthat
(i)ceterisparibus,themechanisminquestionmediatestherelationsinquestionwhenevercircumstancesCobtain
and
(ii)ceterisparibus,possessionofthemechanismbestowsselectionaladvantagebecauseitdoesmediatetherelationwhenevercircumstancesCobtain.
Let'ssupposethatallofthisisso.Thenweidentify'Normal'(hence,typeone)situationsastheonesinwhichit'sthecasethatCandwesaythatifmentalstatetokens
oftypeSarecausedbyPinstantiationsinsuchsituations,thentokensofmentalstateSmean(expresstheproperty)P.Sincesituationswhereitisn'tthecasethatC
areipsofactonotNormalforthetokeningofS,andsinceit'sonlyinNormalcircumstancesthatcausationissupposedtobeconstitutiveofcontent,Stokensthat
transpirewhenitisn'tthecasethatCarefreeto

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becausedbyanythingtheylike.Inparticular,theyarefreetobefalse.
So,then,DarwinianteleologyunderwritestheappealtoNormalfunctioningandtheappealtoNormalfunctioningsolvesthedisjunctionproblemandnaturalizes
content.Inconsequence,ifyousaytoaninformationalsemantical"Please,howdoesmeaningwork?"youarelikelytogetasonganddanceaboutwhathappens
whenfrogssticktheirtonguesoutatflies."Thereis,"sothesonggoes,"astateSofthefrog'snervoussystemsuchthat:
(i)SisreliablycausedbyfliesinNormalcircumstances
(ii)SistheNormalcauseofanecologicallyappropriate,flydirectedresponse
(iii)EvolutionbestowedSonfrogsbecause(i)and(ii)aretrueofit."

S,onemightsay,Normallyresonatestoflies.AnditisonlybecauseitNormallydoessothatMotherNaturehasbestoweditonthefrog.Anditisonlybecause
MotherNaturebestoweditonthefrogonlybecauseitNormallyresonatestofliesthattokensofthisstatemeanflyeveninthose(abNormal)circumstancesin
whichitisnotfliesbutsomethingelsetowhichtheStokensareresonating.16
Sothat,atlast,isthefullblowncausal/teleological/historicalDarwinianstoryabouthowtosolvethedisjunctionproblemandnaturalizecontent.17
Now,anybodywhotakesthepictureofevolutionaryselectionthatthisteleologicalstoryaboutNormalcircumstancespresupposestobeotherthanprettycredulous
shouldlookatGouldandLewontin'ssplendidpaper,"TheSpandrelsofSanMarco"(1979).Itis,Ithink,mostunlikely,evenonempiricalgrounds,thatDarwinis
goingtopullBrentano'schestnutsoutofthefire.Forpresentpurposes,however,I'mgoingtobypasstheempiricalissuessincethereareinternalreasonsfordoubting
thattheevolutionaryversionoftheteleologicalaccountofintentionalitycandotheworkforwhichithasbeenpromoted.
Inthefirstplacecontrarytoadvertisementsthatyoumayhaveseentheteleologicalstoryaboutintentionalitydoesnotsolvethedisjunctionproblem.Thereasonit
doesn'tisthatteleologicalnotions,insofarastheyarethemselvesnaturalistic,alwayshaveaproblemaboutindeterminacyjustwhereintentionalityhasitsproblem
aboutdisjunction.Toputitslightlymoreprecisely,there'sakindofdilemmathatariseswhenyouappealtothefunctionofapsychologicalmechanismtosettle
questionsabouttheintentionalcontentofapsychologicalstate.Ifyouspecifythefunctionofthemechanismby

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referencetothecontentofthestate(forexample,youdescribethemechanismasmediatingtheinitiationofactionsundercertainmaximsorthefixationofbeliefsde
dicto)thenyoufind,unsurprisingly,thatyougetindeterminacyaboutthefunctionofthemechanismwhereverthereisambiguityaboutthecontentofthestate.Andif,
ontheotherhand,youdescribethefunctioninsomewaythatisintentionallyneutral(e.g.,asmediatingtheintegrationofmovementsorthefixationofbeliefsdere)
youmaygetunivocalfunctionalascriptionsbutyoufind,stillunsurprisingly,thattheydon'tchoosebetweencompetingascriptionsofcontent.Eitherwaythen,the
appealtoteleologydoesn'thelpyouwithyourdisjunctionproblem.
Wecanseethisdilemmaplayitselfoutinthecaseofthefrogandtheflies.HereisDavidIsrael(1987)expoundingateleologicalsolutiontothefrog'sdisjunction
problem:
We'vetalkedof[acertainneuralstateofthefrog'sas]...meaningthatthere'saflyinthevicinity.Othershavesaidthatwhat'fly'meanstothefrogisjust[a]characteristic
patternofoccularirradiationi.e.,asofasmallblackmovingdot.Thisisjustbackwards.Thefactsarethat,inawiderangeofenvironments,fliesarewhatactuallycausethat
patternonthefrog'seyesandthatfliesontheflyarewhatthefrogisafter.Thisconvergenceofthe'backwardlooking'(environmentcaused)and'forwardlooking'(behavior
causing)aspectsofthestateisagoodthing(fromthefrog'sparochialpointofviewofcourse)(pp.67)....Talkofbeliefisessentiallyfunctionaltalk:thecrucialfunction...of
beliefstatesisthattheyrepresenttheworldasbeingacertainwayand,togetherwithdesirestates,causebodilymovements.Whatmovements?....Ifthingsgowell,theycause
thosemovementswhich,iftheworldisasitisrepresented,willconstitutetheperformanceofanactionthatsatisfiestheagent'sdesires.Iftheworldisnotthewayitis
representedasbeing,thebodilymovementisconsiderablylesslikelytosucceed.(p.15)

Thetroubleis,however,thatthisdoesn'tsolvethedisjunctionproblemitjustbegsit.For,thoughyoucandescribetheteleologyofthefrog'ssnapguidance
mechanismthewaythatIsraelwantsyoutoinNormalcircumstances,itresonatestofliessoitsfunctionistoresonatetofliessoitsintentionalcontentisabout
fliesthereispreciselynothingtostopyoufromtellingthestoryinquiteadifferentway.Onthealternativeaccount,whattheneuralmechanisminquestionisdesigned
torespondtoislittleambientblackthings.It'slittleambientblackthingswhich,"inawiderangeofenvironments

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...arewhatactuallycausethatpatternonthefrog'seyes''andlittleambientblackthingsare"whatthefrogisafter."Hence,afrogisrespondingNormallywhen,for
example,itsnapsatalittleambientblackthingthatisinfactnotaflybutabeebeethathappenstobepassingthrough.
Noticethat,justasthereisateleologicalexplanationofwhyfrogsshouldhaveflydetectorsassumingthatthatistherightintentionaldescriptionofwhattheyhave
sotoothereisateleologicalexplanationofwhyfrogsshouldhavelittleambientblackthingdetectorsassumingthatthatistherightintentionaldescriptionofwhat
theyhave.TheexplanationisthatintheenvironmentinwhichthemechanismNormallyoperatesall(ormost,oranyhowenough)ofthelittleambientblackdots
areflies.So,inthisenvironment,whatambientblackdotdetectorsNormallydetect(dere,asitwere)isjustwhatflydetectorsNormallydetect(dedicto,asitwere)
viz.,flies.
ItbearsemphasisthatDarwindoesn'tcarewhichofthesewaysyoutelltheteleologicalstory.YoucanhaveitthattheneuralmechanismNormallymediatesfly
snaps,inwhichcasesnapsatbeebeesareipsofactoerrors.OryoucanhaveitthatthemechanismNormallymediatesblackdotsnapsthatare,asonesaysat
Stanford,"situated"inanenvironmentinwhichtheblackdotsareNormallyflies.(Onthelatterreading,it'snotthefrogbuttheworldthathasgonewrongwhenafrog
snapsatabeebeewhatyou'vegotisaNormalsnapinanabNormalsituation.)Itis,inparticular,trueoneitherdescriptionoftheintentionalobjectofthefrog's
snapsthat,ifthesituationisNormal,then"iftheworldisasitisrepresented[snapping]willconstitutetheperformanceofanactionthatsatisfiestheagent'sdesires."
Correspondingly,bothwaysofdescribingtheintentionalobjectsofthesnapssatisfywhatMillikan(1986)apparentlytakestobethecrucialconditiononcontent
ascription:Bothmakethesuccessofthefrog'sfeedingbehaviornot"...anaccident[but]...theresultoftheelegantselfprogrammingofhiswelldesignednervous
system.Moreexplicitly[theybothmakeita]resultofhisnervoussystem'soperatinginaccordancewithgeneralprinciplesthatalsoexplainedhowhisancestors'
nervoussystemsprogrammedthemselvesandusedtheseprogramssoastohelpthemtoproliferate"(p.68).Huffingandpuffingandpilingontheteleologyjust
doesn'thelpwiththedisjunctionproblemitdoesn'tleadtounivocalassignmentsofintentionalcontent.18
TheMoral,torepeat,isthat(withincertainbroadlimits,presentlytobedefined)Darwindoesn'tcarehowyoudescribetheintentionalobjectsoffrogsnaps.Allthat
mattersforselectionishowmanyflies

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thefrogmanagestoingestinconsequenceofitssnapping,andthisnumbercomesoutexactlythesamewhetheronedescribesthefunctionofthesnapguidance
mechanismswithrespecttoaworldthatispopulatedbyfliesthatare,defacto,ambientblackdots,orwithrespecttoaworldthatispopulatedbyambientblackdots
thatare,defacto,flies.19"ErstkommtdasFressen,dennkommtdieMorale."Darwincareshowmanyfliesyoueat,butnotwhatdescriptionyoueatthem
under.(Similarly,bytheway,fliesmaybeassumedtobeindifferenttothedescriptionsunderwhichfrogseatthem.)Soit'snouselookingtoDarwintogetyououtof
thedisjunctionproblem.
I'vebeenarguingthatateleologicallybasedtheoryofcontentwillhavetoputupwithalotofintentionalindeterminacy.Indefiance,probably,ofprudence,Ipropose
topushthislineofargumentfurther.Let'saskhowmuchintentionalindeterminacyonewouldhavetoputupwithontheteleologicalstory.
Ithinkthattherightansweristhatappealstomechanismofselectionwon'tdecidebetweenreliablyequivalentcontentascriptionsi.e.,theywon'tdecidebetween
anypairofequivalentcontentascriptionswheretheequivalenceiscounterfactualsupporting.Toputthisintheformalmode,thecontext:wasselectedfor
representingthingsasFistransparenttothesubstitutionofpredicatesreliablycoextensivewithF.Afortiori,itistransparenttothesubstitutionofpredicates
necessarily(includingnomologicallynecessarily)coextensivewithF.Inconsequence,evolutionarytheoryoffersusnocontextsthatareasintensionalas'believes
that....'Ifthisisright,thenit'saconclusivereasontodoubtthatappealstoevolutionaryteleologycanreconstructtheintentionalityofmentalstates.Let'slookatthe
frogcaseagainwiththisinmind.
Itmightbearguedthatthereisarealindeterminacyaboutwhetherfrogssnapatfliesoratlittleblackdots.But,surely,ifthereareanymattersoffactaboutcontent,
it'soneofthemthatfrogsdon'tsnapatfliesunderthedescriptionflyorbeebee.Yet,asfarasIcansee,it'sequallyOKwithDarwinwhichwayyoudescribethe
intentionalobjectsofflysnaps,solongasit'sreliable(say,nomologicallynecessaryanyhow,counterfactualsupporting)thatallthelocalfliesorbeebeesareflies.
Thepointis,ofcourse,thatifallthelocalfliesorbeebeesareflies,thenitisreliablethatthefrogthatsnapsatonedoesneitherbetternorworseselectionwisethan
thefrogthatsnapsattheother.Soevolutionaryteleologycannottellthesefrogsapart.
Hereonehastobealittlecarefultoavoidredherrings.Itmightbearguedthatyoucan'thaveaflyorbeebeeconceptunlessyouhaveabeebeeconcept,and,since
havingabeebeeconceptwoulddothefrognogood,wedo,afterall,haveDarwinianreasonto

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supposethatit'sflies,andnotfliesorbeebeesthatfrogssnapat.Thisargumentisinjeopardyofprovingthatwedon'thavetheconceptUNICORN.And,anyhow,
itsmajorpremiseisfalse.Inprinciple,thefrogcouldperfectlywellhaveaprimitiveconceptwhoseextensionisdisjunctive(fromourpointofview,asitwere).In
particular,itcouldperfectlywellhavetheconceptfleebee,whoseextensionembracesthefliesandthebeebeesbutwhichhasneithertheconceptbeebeenorthe
conceptflyasconstituents.Thepresentquestion,then,iswhetherconsiderationsofevolutionary(orother)utilitycandistinguishthehypothesisthattheintentional
objectofthefrog'ssnapisafleebeefromthehypothesisthatit'safly.AndIclaimthatthelineofargumentI'vebeenrunningstronglysuggestthattheycannot.
SelectionaladvantagecareshowmanyfliesyougettoeatinNormalcircumstancesand,inNormalcircumstancesyougettoeatthesamenumberofflieswhetherit's
fliesorfleebeesthatyousnapat.
Notice,bytheway,howexactlyanalogousconsiderationsshowthat,if"FiffG"isreliable,thenjustasevolutionarytheorycannotappealtoadifferencein
probableutilitytodistinguishorganismsthatrespondtoFnessfromorganismsthatrespondtoGness,sotooreinforcementtheorycannotdistinguishbetweensuch
organismsbyappealingtoadifferenceinprobablereward.Thisiswhatgeneratedthetraditionalproblemabout"whatislearned"overwhichSkinneriansusedto
agonizeit'spreciselywhatoneshouldexpectgiventheveryclosesimilaritybetweenDarwinianaccountsofhowenvironmentsselectgenotypesandSkinnerian
accountsofhowenvironmentsselectbehavioralphenotypes.
Suppose,inanoperantconditioningparadigm,Itrainanorganismtoprefergreentrianglestosomenegativestimulus.Isitthenthegreennessorthetriangularityor
boththattheanimalisrespondingto?IcantellonlyifIcan"split"thegreennessfromthetriangularity(e.g.,byprovidingaredtriangleoragreennontriangleasa
stimulus)andseewhichwaytheanimalgeneralizes.Similarly,Icanteachapreferenceforgreennessasopposedtoapreferencefortriangularityonlyifgreensare
trianglesandviceversaisnotcounterfactualsupportinginthetrainingsituation,sincethat'stheonlycircumstanceinwhichresponsestogreennessandresponsesto
triangularitycanbedifferentiallyreinforced.20Since,however,respondingtoFnessandrespondingtoGnesscanbedistinctintentionalstatesevenwhen'FiffG'is
reliable,Itakethistobeasortofproofthattherecouldnotbeaconditioningtheoreticsolutionofthedisjunctionproblem.Contextslike"whetherthestimulusis...
determinestheprobabilityofreinforcement"slicespecificationsofthestimulusthickerthantypicalintentionalcontextsdoif'F'makesthiscontexttrue,sotoodoes

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21

'G,'solongas'FsareGs'isreliable.So,thesamereasoningthatshowsthatDarwinisnousetoBrentanoshowsthatSkinnerisnousetohimeither.

Perhapsyouarenowyourselfpreparedtobitethebeebeeperhapsyouarenowpreparedtosaythatit'sOKafterallifthere'snofactofthematteraboutwhether
theintentionalobjectsofthefrog'ssnapsarefleebeesratherthanflies.Butnoticethatthatisn'tsolvingthedisjunctionproblemit'sjustdecidingtolivewithit.
Specifically,it'sdecidingtolivewiththemassiveintentionalindeterminacythatthedisjunctionproblemimplies.But,ifallyouwanttodoisnotsolvethedisjunction
problem,thenunvarnished,nonteleological/nonevolutionaryversionsofcausaltheoriesofcontentwilldothatquiteadequatelywithoutappealingtotheDarwinstuff.
So,eitherway,itwouldn'tappearthattheDarwinstuffisbuyingyouanything.
Letmepauseabittorubthisin.Dennett(1987)arguesthatDretskeandIhavethisdisjunctionproblembecausewedon'ttakeaccountof"utility.""...whenwe
adopttheintentionalstance...thedictatedattributionsarethosethatcomeoutveridicalanduseful(sic).Withoutthelattercondition...[oneis]stuckwithFodor's
andDretske'sproblemofdisjunctivedissipationofcontent..."(p.311).ButasfarasIcansee,usefulnessisuselessforthepurposesathand.Afterall,itisuseful,in
factit'ssimplysuper(forafrog)toeatfliesorbeebeesinanyworldinwhichthefliesorbeebeesarereliablyflies.It'seatingfliesorbeebeesinworldslikethat
thatkeepsfrogsgoing.
Isupposeitmightbeawayoutofthisfixtoappealtocounterfactualsaboutwhatwouldhappenifthelocallyreliablecoextensionbetweenfliesandfliesorbeebees
werebroken.Thethoughtwouldbethatsnappingatfliesorbeebeeswouldbebadforthefroginaworldwheremanyofthefliesorbeebeesarebeebees.But:
First,Dennettisexplicitinrejectingthesortoftheorythatmakescontentrestonthecausalrelationsthatwouldholdin(merely)counterfactualcircumstances(seep.
309).ForDennett(asforMillikan)it'sselectionalhistorythatdeterminescontent.
Second(toreverttoapointImadeindiscussingPapineauseenote19),it'snotclearhowtodecidewhichcounterfactualsaretheonesthatcountfleebeesnaps
aren'tadvantageousinabNormalworldswherethefleebeesmostlyaren'tfliesunlessithappensthatthebeebeesinthoseworldsareedible.
Third(andthisisthecrucialpoint),goingcounterfactualtodefinefunction(andhencecontent)wouldbetogiveuponaDarwiniansolutiontothedisjunctionproblem
sinceutilitythataccruesonlyincounterfactualenvironmentsdoesn'tproduceactualselectionaladvantages.Thismeansthatyoucan'treconcileappealsto
counterfactualadvan

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tageswithananalysisthatconstruescontentandfunctionintermsofselectionhistory.
Thatoughttobejustobvious.Consider,forexample,thebrightlycoloredfishthat,accordingtopopularlegend,arefoundinsunlessoceandeeps.Idon'tknowwhat
theevolutionaryexplanationissupposedtobe,butonethingisforcertain:itcan'tbethatthefisharecoloredbecauseforthemtobesowouldbeadvantageousif
theirenvironmentwerelitup.Howcouldtheselectionaladvantagesthatwouldaccrueifyoulivedinanilluminatedworld(which,we'reassuming,youdon't)explain
yourbeingcoloredinthisworld(which,we'reassuming,youare).Merelycounterfactualadvantagesdon'taffectactualhistoriesofselection.Soappealstomerely
counterfactualadvantagescanplaynoroleinDarwinianexplanations.
Well,similarly,inthepresentcase,ifit'sreliablethatallthefliesorbeebeesareflies,thenthat'struenotjustofallthefliesorbeebeesthatthisfroghasencountered,
butalsoofallthefliesorbeebeesthatitsGrannyencountered,andthatitsGranny'sGrannyencountered...andsoonbacktotheprimordialprotoplasmicslime.But
then,bywhatmechanismcouldselectionhavepreferredfrogsthatsnapatfliestofrogsthatsnapatfliesorbeebees?Whatselectionwantsisthatsomeactualfrogs
shouldactuallygohungryinconsequenceofactuallysnappingatthewrongsortofthings.Butthatwon'teverhappenif,inpointofnomologicalnecessity,allthefrog
orbeebeesnapsthatarepromptedbybeebeesareipsofactocounterfactual.
Itcan'tbeoveremphasized,inthiscontext,thatDarwinianexplanationsarespeciesofhistoricalexplanations:theyaccountforthegeneotypicalpropertiesof
organisms(or,ifyouprefer,forthestatisticalpropertiesofgenepools)byreferencetotheactualnotthecounterfactualhistoriesofpredecessors.(See,for
example,Millikan,1984,p.3:"The'functions'ofthesenaturaldevicesare,roughly,thefunctionsuponwhichtheircontinuedreproductionorsurvivalhasdepended."
Notethetenseandmood.)
Sofar,I'vefollowedDennett,Millikan,etal.andassumedthatit'sessentialtoteleologicalsemanticstobeDarwinian.But,ofcourse,onemightjustgiveuponthe
reductionofcontenttoselectionalhistoryandtryforanonhistoricaltheoryofcontentoneinwhichcontentisdeterminednotbytheselectionalpressuresthat
actuallygovernedtheevolutionofapsychologicalstatebutbytheselectionalpressuresthatwouldapplyifcertaincounterfactualsweretrue.E.g.:Eitherflysnapsand
flyorbeebeesnapsareequallyadvantageousinthisworld.Buttheintentionalobjectsoffrogsnapsarefliesandnotfliesorbeebeesbecauseflysnapswouldbe
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worldswherethereareflieswhetherornottherearebeebeestherebutflyorbeesnapswouldnotbeselectedinnearbyworldswheretherearebeebeesunless
therearealsofliesthere.Ineffect,there'saquestionaboutwhichoftwolocallyconfoundedpropertiesselectioniscontingentonsooneappliesthemethodof
differencesacrosscounterfactualworldstodeconfoundthem.Appealingtothecounterfactualslicensesanintensional(withan's')notionofselectionitdistinguishes
theeffectsthatselectionreallycaresabout(gettingfliesin)fromthosethataremerelyadventitious(gettingfleebeesin).
Butthequestionariseswhythesecounterfactualsshouldmatterfordeterminingcontentevenif,asseemsquiteplausible,theyareexactlywhatmattersfordetermining
function.Considerthefollowingcase:Isupposethatthefunctionofthepreferenceforsweetsistogetsugars(hencecalories)aboard,andIsupposethatthe
ingestionofsaccharineisnonfunctional.Thisworksoutfineonthecounterfactualapproachtofunction:Apreferenceforsweetswouldbeagoodthingtohaveina
worldwhereallthesweetthingsaresugarbutitwouldlacksurvivalvalueinaworldwhereallthesweetsaresaccharine.Butthetroubleisthat,inthissortofcase,
functionandcontentcomeapart.Thefunctionofasweettoothistogetyoutoingestsugarbutitsintentionalobjectisnotsugarbutsweetsthat'swhysaccharine
satisfiesthecraving.N.b.,saccharinesatisfiesthecravingforsweetsitdoesn'tjustcausethecravingtogoaway.22
Itlookstomeasthoughtheevolutionarylineoncontentmakestwomistakes,eitherofwhichwouldbeadequatelyfatal:Ontheonehand,itsupposesthatyoucanget
ahistorical/selectionalanalysisoffunction(thatthefunctionofastateiswhatitwasactuallyselectedfor)whereaswhatyouneedforfunctionisprettyclearlysome
kindofcounterfactualanalysis(thefunctionofastateiswhatitwouldhavebeenselectedforevenif...).And,ontheotherhand,itsupposesthatifyou'regiventhe
functionofastateyouaretherebygivenitsintentionalobject,andthesweettoothcasestronglysuggeststhatthisisn'tso.
Inmyview,whatyou'vegothereisadeadtheory.
OnelastpointbeforeIstopjumpingupanddownonthisdeadtheory.OnewaythatyoucanreallyconfuseyourselfaboutthevalueofappealstoDarwiningrounding
intentionalityistoallowyourselftospeak,sortofsemiseriouslyasyoumightsay,ofevolutionaryteleologyintermsof"whatMotherNaturehasinmind."Thereason
thatthiscanbesoconfusinginvolvesapointIcalledattentiontoabove:Theexpressionsthataredeployedwhereweseriouslyandnonmetaphoricallyexplainthings
byappealingtopeople'spurposes,intentions,andthelike,arefarlesstransparenttothesubstitution

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ofcoextensivepredicatesthanthosethatevolutionaryexplanationsuse.
AsfarasIcansee,solongaswe'redealingstrictlyinDarwinian(viz.,historical)explanations,there'snosensetotheclaimthatastateisselectedforbeingFbutnot
forbeingGincaseswhereit'snecessarythatFandGarecoextensive.23Ineffect,Darwinianexplanationstreatreliablycoextensiverepresentationsassynonymous
whereas,ofcourse,psychologicalexplanationsdon't.Soifyou'reinthehabitofthinkingofevolutionaryexplanationsonthemodelofappealstoaninvisibleengineer,
youarelikelytothinkthatthey'redoingyoualotmoregoodthantheyreallycandowhenitcomestotheindividuationofcontents.
Look,ifGrannybuildsamechanicalfrog,shemayhaveitinmindthatherfrogshouldsnapatflies,andnothaveitinmindthatherfrogshouldsnapatthingsthatare
fliesorbeebees.Sohermechanicalfrogisaflysnapperandnotaflyorbeebeesnapper,howeverreliablyallthelocalflyorbeebeesareflies.(Thisisjustlike
Dennett's"twobitser,"thoughapparentlyourintuitionsdon'tagreeaboutsuchcases.Onmyview,butnotonhis,ifIbuildamachinethatIintendtogointostateS
wheneverIputaquarterin,thenthemachineisaquarteraccepterevenifthereare,insomeotherpartoftheforest,Mexicanrupeeswhicharephysicallyverylike
quartersandhencewouldmakethemachinegointostateSifitweretoencounterany.)Attributionsof(socalled)"derivedintentionality,"unlikespecificationsof
"whatMotherNaturehasinmind"aretypicallyopaquetothesubstitutionofreliablycoextensiveexpressions.Inparticular,theycandistinguishbetweenflysnapsand
flyorbeebeesnaps.
Sothereisnodisjunctionproblemforderivedintentionality.Wherewehavethingswhosestateshavederivedintentionality(theintentionalityofalltheartifactsthat
Granny'smadesofar,bytheway)wecanconstrueveryfinedistinctionsamongthecontentsoftheirstates.That'sbecausewecanconstrueveryfinedistinctions
amongthecontentsofourstates,andderivedintentionalityisintentionalitythat'sderivedfromus.AscriptionsofderivedintentionalobjectstoGranny'sfrogcan
distinguishbetweenreliablycoextensivecontentsbecauseattributionsofmentalstatestoGrannycandistinguishbetweenreliablycoextensivecontents.Therereallyis
adifferencebetweenmechanicalflysnappersandmechanicalflyorbeebeesnappersbecausetherereallyisadifferencebetweenGrannieswhointendtheirfrogsto
snapattheoneandGrannieswhointendtheirfrogstosnapattheother.

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Thelogicofteleologicalexplanationsthatappealtoselectionaladvantagewouldappear,however,tobeverydifferent.Aswe'veseen,it'squiteunclearthatappeals
to"whatMotherNaturehasinmind"canrationalizedistinctionsbetweenreliablyequivalentcontentattributions.IndeedyoumightputBrentano'sthesislikethis:The
differencebetweenMotherNatureandGrannyispreciselythatGrannydoes,andMotherNaturedoesn't,honormerelyintentionaldistinctions.Idon'tsaythatGranny
issmarterthanMotherNaturebutIdosayshe'smuchmorerefined.
Itis,inconsequence,very,verymisleadingtosaythatsince"...inthecaseofanorganism...[content]...isnotindependentoftheintentionsandpurposesof
MotherNature,[itis]justasderivedas...themeaningin[statesofanartifact]"(Dennett,p.305).24Theputativeanalogygetsitwrongaboutattributionsofderived
intentionalitysinceitunderestimatesthedistinctionsamongcontentsthatsuchattributionscansustainrelativetothosethatattributionsofcontentto"MotherNature"
can.AndwhatismaybeworseitdeeplymisinterpretstheDarwinianprogram,whichwaspreciselytopurgebiologyofanythingthathasthelogicofthekindsof
explanationthatareintentionalwitha't.'Really(asopposedtometaphorically),Darwinianexplanationisn'tanythinglikeascribinggoalstoMotherNature.Contrary
towhatDennettsays,Darwin'sideaisnotthat"...weareartifactsdesignedbynaturalselection..."(p.300).Darwin'sideaismuchdeeper,muchmorebeautiful,
andappreciablyscarier:WeareartifactsdesignedbyselectioninexactlythesenseinwhichtheRockiesareartifactsdesignedbyerosionwhichistosaythatwe
aren'tartifactsandnothingdesignedus.Weare,andalwayshavebeen,entirelyonourown.
OfcourseDarwinhasnothingtosaytoBrentanothewholepointofDarwin'senterprisewastogetbiologyoutofBrentano'slineofwork.
Andthat'snotallthat'swrongwiththeevolutionary/teleologicaltreatmentofthedisjunctionproblem.Manyparagraphsback,Iremarkedonthenaturalnessofthe
intuitionthatgroundstheteleologicalstory,theintuitionthaterroriswhathappenswhensomethinggoeswrong.Butyouneedmorethanthistolicenseateleological
solutiontothedisjunctionproblemyoualsoneeditthatwhenthingsgorightmoreparticularly,whenthingsareNormalwhatevercausesasymboltobetokened
isipsofactointheextensionofthesymbol.It'sthisthattiestheteleologicalstoryaboutNormalcytothecausalstoryaboutcontent.Teleologydefinestheclassof
situationsinwhicheverythingisNormalbutit'stheassumptionthatNormally

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causedsymbolsipsofactoapplytotheircausesthatbringsthesemanticsin.Inparticular,it'sthisassumptionthatlicensestheidentificationoftheNormalsituations
withtheonesinwhichcausationmakescontent.
Asitturnsout,however,thiskeyassumptionthatwhenthesituationisteleologicallyNormal,symboltokensipsofactoapplytowhattheyarecausedbyissimply
nogood.What'strueatbestisthatwhensymboltokensarecausedbywhattheyapplytothesituationisdefactoteleologicallyNormal.Maybeit'splausiblethat
wheneverythinggoesrightwhatyoubelievemustbetrue.Butit'scertainlynotplausiblethatwheneverythinggoesrightwhatcausesyourbeliefmustbethe
satisfactionofitstruthconditions.Toputitstillanotherway,ifallthattheappealtoNormalfunctioningallowsyoutodoisabstractfromsourcesoferror,thenthe
Normalsituationsarenotgoingtobeidenticalwiththetypeonesituations.
Theglaringcounterexampleistheoccurrenceofrepresentationinthought.Suppose,havingnothingbettertodo,Iwhileawaymytimethinkingaboutfrogs.And
supposethat,inthecourseofthismeditation,byanaturalprocessofassociationasitmightbe,mythoughtsaboutfrogsleadmetothoughtsaboutflies.Theresultisa
tokenofthementalstatetypeentertainingtheconceptFLY,whichis,surely,causedinaperfectlyNormalway(theteleologyofmentalfunctioningmayabstract
fromerror,butsurelyitdoesn'tabstractfromthinking).Butitisnotaninstanceofanintentionalstatethatwascausedbywhatitmeans.Whatcausedmetothink
aboutflieswasthinkingaboutfrogsbuttheeffectofthiscausewasathoughtaboutfliesforallthat.Itmaybethattherearecausalconnectionstofliessomewherein
thehistoricalbackgroundofthoughtsaboutfliesthatarepromptedbythoughtsaboutfrogs.Butsuchthoughtshaven'tgotthesortofcausalhistoriesthat
Skinnerian/Dretskianaccountscontemplatethereductionofcontentto:theyaren'toccasionedbyflies,andtheydon'tcarryinformationaboutfliesinanysensein
whichwhatsymbolscarryinformationaboutistheircauses.Specifically,the"covering"lawthatconnectedmyflythoughttokeningwithitscauseprojectstherelation
betweenflythoughtsandfrogthoughts,nottherelationbetweenflythoughtsandflies.
ComparePapineau:"...sometimes[abelief]willbetriggeredby'abnormal'circumstances,circumstancesotherthantheonethatinthelearningprocessensuredthe
beliefhadadvantageouseffectsandwhichthereforeledtotheselectionofthedispositionbehindit.Mysuggestionisthatthebeliefshouldbecountedasfalseinthese
'abnormal'circumstances...thetruthconditionofthebeliefisthe'normal'circumstanceinwhich,giventhelearningprocess,itis

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biologicallysupposedtobepresent"(pp.6566).Thebasicideaisthatallofthefollowingpickoutthesamestateofaffairs:
P'struthcondition,
the'normal'(viz.,theNormal)circumstanceforentertainingP,
thesituationinwhichPisbiologicallysupposedtobepresent.
Butthiscan'tberight.Thinkingisacircumstanceinwhichbeliefsare,oftenenough,Normallyentertainedand,Isuppose,it'sacircumstanceinwhichbiologyintended
thattheyshouldoccur.Butthematrixofmentalstatesinwhichabeliefistokenedinthecourseofmentalprocessingispatentlynottobeidentifiedwithitstruth
condition.(Hereaselsewhere,comingdownheavilyon"thelearningprocess"doesn'thelpmuch.Lotsofwords/conceptsaren'tlearnedostensively.)
Thisis,Ithink,arealproblem.Infact,it'sthedisjunctionprobleminstillanotherguise.Whatwewantisthatflyoccasioned"fly"s,andbeebeeoccasioned"fly"s,and
representationsoffliesinthoughtallmeanFLY.Atbest,teleologicalsolutionspromisetoallowustosaythisforthefirsttwocasesbeebeeoccasionedtokens
aresomehow'abNormal'hencenottypeonehencetheircausationisnotrelevanttothecontentof"fly"thoughwe'veseenthatit'sapromisethattheywelshon.
Butteleologicaltheoriesdon'tevenpretendtodealwiththethirdcasetheyoffernoreasonnottosupposethatflythoughtsmeanflyorthoughtofafroggiventhat
bothfliesandthoughtsoffrogsnormallycauseflythoughttokens.
God,bydefinition,doesn'tmakemistakesHissituationisalwaysNormal.ButevenGodhasthedisjunctionproblemontheassumptionthatthecontentofHis
thoughtsisdeterminedbytheircausesandthatsomeofHisthoughtsarecausedbysomeofHisothers.Thesadmoralis,westillhavethedisjunctionproblemeven
afterweidealizetoinfallibility.
Ithinkalotofphilosophers(andalotofpsychologistsintheDewey/Gibson/AmericanNaturalisttradition)believedeepdownthatcontentstartswithperceptual
statesthatarecloselyimplicatedinthecontrolofaction.It'sperceptionand,specifically,suchperceptionsaseventuateincharacteristiccorrespondingbehaviors,as
inorientandcapturereflexesthatprovidestheaboriginalinstanceofintentionality.Thoughtandthelikecomelater,notjustphylogeneticallybutalsointheorder
ofexplanation.Thus,Israelremarksthat,intheorizingaboutnaturalizedsemantics,"itmakessensetolookfirstatperceptualstatesoflivingorganismsbeforemoving
ontoanythingmoresophisticated"(p.6).Since,aswe'veseen,Israelholdsthatthecontentofastateisdeterminedbyitsfunction,hemustbeassuming

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25

thatthefunctionofperceptionis,atleastinprinciple,dissociablefromitsroleinthefixationofbelief iftheconnectionbetweenperceptionandbelieffixationis
internal,theadvicetolookatperceptionfirstdoesn'tnoticeablysimplifythetheorist'sproblems.
Butevenonthisdubiousassumption,thisisdubiousadvice.Presumably,perceptionandthoughtareintentionalinthesamesense,soit'slikelythatasemanticsthat
worksonlyfortheformerworksforthewrongreason.Inperceptionthereisgenerallyacoincidencebetweenwhatacognitivestatecarriesinformationaboutand
whatitrepresents(viz.,betweenitsNormalcauseanditsintentionalobject).Buttheintentionalityofthoughtshowsthatthiscoincidenceisanartifactit'snotessential
tocontent.
Inlightofallthis,I'minclinedtothinkthattheteleologicalstoryaboutcontentisjusthopeless.Ontheonehand,theappealtoteleologicallynormalconditionsdoesn't
provideforaunivocalnotionofintentionalcontentspecificallyitdoesn'tsolvethedisjunctionproblem.And,ontheotherhand,typeonesituationscan'tbeidentified
withteleologicalNormalconditionsit'sjustnottruethatNormallycausedintentionalstatesipsofactomeanwhatevercausedthem.Soweneedanonteleological
solutionofthedisjunctionproblem.Sobeit.
Notes
1.Thiswouldbetrueevenif,asfunctionalistssuppose,physicalisticformulationsofnecessaryandsufficientconditionsforbeinginpsychologicalstatesaretypically
notlawlike.
2.Someintentionallawsconstraintherelationsamongthestatesofagivenorganismatagiventime(e.g.,ceterisparibus,ifyoubelieveP&QthenyoubelieveP).
Theselawscouldgeneralizeevenoverorganismsthathadnoneoftheirmentalstatesincommoninthepresentcase,there'snoPorQthattwoorganismsbothhave
tobelieveinorderthatbothshouldfallunderthelaw.
Butlawsthatquantifyintoopaquecontexts,e.g.:(x)(y)(ifxbelievesthatyisdangerousthenceterisparibusxtriestoavoidy),looktobeindeeptroubleif
holismistrue,sincesuchlawspurporttogeneralizeoverorganismsinvirtueofthesharedintentionalcontentsoftheirmentalstates.Similarlyforlawsthat
constrainthementalstatesofagivenorganismacrosstime,including,notably,thelawsthatgovernbelieffixationinreasoning,learning,andperception(about96.4%
ofseriouspsychology,ataroughestimate).Suppose,forexample,thatit'salawthat,ceterisparibus,themoreofthexsanorganismcomestobelieveareF,themore
theorganismcomestobelieve(x)Fx.Suchalawwouldpresupposethatanorganismcanholdthesame(quantified)belieffordifferentreasonsatdifferenttimes.But
it'shardtosquarethiswithanintentionalholismthatimpliesthatchanginganyoneofone'sbeliefschangesthecontentofalltherest.
3.Toavoidrepetition,Ishallusethisasatechnicaltermforatheoryofcontentthatisbothphysicalisticandatomistici.e.,atheoryaccordingtowhich(i)and(ii)are
bothfalse.

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4.MaybeitstartsearlierwiththebreakdownofimagetheoriesofIdeas.ThetheorythatIdeasrefertowhattheyresembleis,afterall,bothphysicalistic(onthe
assumptionthatresemblanceissomesortofgeometricalrelationandthatphysicscontainsgeometry)andatomistic(since,presumably,whatoneofone'sIdeas
resemblesdoesnotdependonwhatotherIdeasonehas).Alas,theimagetheory,thoughnaturalistic,is,bygeneralconsensus,untenable.
5.Quineisn't,ofcourse,theonlyone.SeethefirsttwochaptersofPutnam'sRepresentationandReality(1988)whereit'sassumedwithoutanyargumentthatif
you'reholistaboutconfirmationyou'vegottobeholistaboutmeaningtoo.
6.Onthisview,there'saninterestinganalogybetweenthesemanticalroleofthetheoriesthatoneespousesandthesemanticalroleoftheinstrumentsofobservation
thatonedeploys:Theybothjustfunctiontosustainthehead/worldcoordinationsthatconstitutemeaning.AsIremarkedinPsychosemantics(1987),the
Operationalistswererightinthinkingthat''star"meansstarbecausewehaveproceduresthathavestarsononeendand"star"sontheothertheywentwrongthey
stumbledintoholismbysupposingthatsuchproceduresareconstitutiveofmeaning,sothat"star"meantsomethingdifferentwiththeinventionoftelescopes.
Bytheway,notjustone'sownskills,theories,andinstruments,butalsothoseofexpertsonerelieson,mayeffectcoordinationsbetween,asitmightbe,"elms"inthe
headandelmsinthefield.Thatwouldbequitecompatiblewiththemeaningrelationbeingbothatomisticandindividualistic,assuming,onceagain,theSkinnerian
viewthattheconditionsformeaningarepurelyfunctionalandthattheyquantifyoverthemechanismsthatsustainthesemanticallysignificantfunctionalrelations.
Putnam(1988)arguesthatsinceappealstoexpertsmediatethecoordinationofone'stokensof"elm"withinstancesofelm,itfollowsthat"referenceisasocial
phenomenon."Primafacie,thisseemsaboutassensibleasarguingthatsinceoneusestelescopestocoordinateone'stokensof"star"withinstancesofstar,itfollows
thatreferenceisanopticalphenomenon.
ThatPutnam,ofallpeople,shouldmakethismistakeisheavywithirony.For,itisPutnamwhoisalwaysandrightlyremindingusthat"...'meanings'are
preservedundertheusualproceduresofbelieffixation..."(1988,chapter1,p.14).Itakethistobeaformulationofantiinstrumentalistdoctrine:thewayswehave
oftellingwhenourconceptsapplyarenot,ingeneral,germanetotheirsemantics.Why,Iwonder,doesPutnammakeanexceptioninthecasewhereourwayof
tellinginvolvesexploitingexperts?
7.ThenicetyatissueisthatmyrevisedSkinnerianstoryisn't,strictlyspeaking,naturalisticasI'vebeentellingit:itrequiresacounterfactualsupportingcorrelation
betweendogsanddogthoughts(tokenstatesofentertainingtheconceptDOG)and,'isadogthought'isanonnaturalisticpredicateitpicksoutathoughtby
referencetoitsintentionalobject.Skinnergetsaroundthecorrespondingproblemintheoriginalversionofhistheoryby(tacitly)assumingthathecanspecifythe
contentbearingexpressionsofnaturallanguages"formally":e.g.,phonologicallyororthographically.(Thus,theregularityinvirtueofwhichtheEnglishword"dog"
expressesthepropertydogconnectsinstancesofdogwithtokensoftheexpression#"d"^"o"^"g"#.)ASkinneriansemanticsformentalstateswouldhavetoassume
analogouslyformalspecificationsforthetokensofmentalstates.
8.ThismaynotstrikeyouassoundingalotlikeDretske.That'sbecauseatleastaslateastheBBSPrecise(1983)Dretskeactuallyhastwostoriesaboutcontent
runningtogether.There'stheoneI'vesketchedinthetext,whichtakesthenotionofnomicconnectednessasbasicandthere'sonethat'selaboratedintermsof

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conditionalprobabilities(roughly,whetheraneventelcarriesinformationaboutanevente2isafunctionoftheconditionalprobabilityofe2givenel).It'snotclearjust
howthesetwotheoriesfittogether,orwhatthesecondonebuysyouthatthefirstonedoesn't.Togivejustoneexample,onthenomicconnectednessstory,the
transitivityof'carriesinformationabout'(whatDretskecallsthe"XeroxPrinciple")followsfromthetransitivityof'islawfullyconnectedto'ontheconditional
probabilitystory,bycontrast,itrequiresspecialstipulation.(Specifically,itrequiresthestipulationthatelcarriesinformationaboute2onlyiftheconditionalprobability
ofe2givenelisone.)
IthinkthattheconditionalprobabilitystoryisadeadendandthatconnectingcontenttonomicrelatednessisthereallyinterestingideainKnowledgeandTheFlow
ofInformation.Anyhow,IproposetoreadDretskethatwayforpurposesofthisdiscussion.
9.Asubsidiaryargumentisthatit'srequiredtoguaranteetheXeroxprinciple.Seeprecedingfootnote.
10.Accordingtothisview,asemantictheoryprovidesanaturalizedconditionforcontentintermsofnomicrelationsamongpropertiesroughly,thesymbolS
expressesthepropertyPifit'salawthatPscauseStokens.Thisconditionisperfectlygeneralinthesensethatitcanbesatisfiedbothbyatomicsymbolsand
complexones.Correspondingly,theappealtorecursive("Tarskian")apparatusinasemantictheoryfunctionsnotaspartofthedefinitionofcontent,butratherto
showhowtheconditionsforcontentcouldbesatisfiedbyinfinitelymanyformulasbelongingtoaproductivesystemofrepresentations.Theideaisthatcontent
emergesfromlawfulrelationbetweentokenings(intheworld)ofthepropertythatasymbolexpressesandtokenings(intheorganism)ofthesymbolandtheinternal
representationoftheTarskianapparatusispartofthecomputationalmechanismthatmediatesthislawfulrelation.
Theseremarksareintendedtosoothephilosopherswhoholdthat"...aTarskiantruthcharacterization...makesnocontributionatalltoasolutionoftheproblemof
intentionalityforsemanticnotions...[because]eveniftheinquirerhasamaterialisticallyacceptableexplanationofwhatitisaboutthesimplersentenceAandits
relationtotheworldthatmakesittrue,hegetsnohelpatallfromthetruthdefinitioninhissearchforanexplanationofthephysicalbasisofthesemanticstatusofthe
complexsentence"(Stalnaker,1984,p.31).Stillthere'ssomethingtowhatStalnakersays.Aswe'llseeinchapter4,nonomicconnectiontheorycouldaccountfor
thecontentofcomplexpredicatesthatcan'tbeinstantiated(e.g.,"isasquarecircle"andthelike).And,forjustthereasonthatStalnakerpointsout,addingTarskian
apparatusdoesn'thelpwiththenaturalizationproblemintheseareas.
11.AsF2understands'informationcarried',thereisametaphysicalassumptionthatifxcausesy,thentherearepropertiesofxandyinvirtueofwhichitdoesso,and
thereisalawthatsubsumes("covers")thecausalinteractionandrelatestheproperties.Seealsochapter5.
12.Thisapproachtothedisjunctionproblemthusexhibitsacertainspiritualaffinitywith'paradigmcase'argumentsinepistemology.Bothassumethatthereare
situationssuchthatthefactthatasortofsymbolisappliedtoasortofthinginthosesituationsisconstitutiveofthesymbolmeaningwhatitdoes.'"Dog"can'tbutbe
trueofRoverbecauseit'sconstitutiveofthemeaningof"dog"thatRoverisaparadigmofthekindofthingthatonesays"dog"about.Sopoohtopeoplewhothink
thatthere'saskepticaldoubtaboutwhethertherearedogs!'Butifthisisnottobegtheargumentagainstskeptics,'Roverisaparadigmofthekindof

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thingthatonesays"dog"about'can'tmean'Roveristhekindofthingthat"dog"istrueof'rather,it'sgottomeansomethinglike'Roveristhekindofthingthat"dog"
issaidof'.Andnowthereneedstobeacaveat:viz.,Roverhastobethekindofthingthat"dog''issaidofwhentheconditionsfordogspottingareprettygood.
(Thereareotherconditiondarknightsandsuchwhencatsareparadigmaticofthekindofthingthat"dog"issaidofaconsiderationthat'sgristfortheskeptic
mill.)Ineffect,paradigmcaseargumentspresupposethatthereisadistinctionbetweentypeonesituationsandothersandthatdarknightsdon'tcountastypeone
situationsforsaying"dog."Itwasnot,however,inthetraditionofparadigmcaseargumentstobeexplicitaboutmuchofthis.
13.Cf.exampleslikenormalpulserateratherthanexampleslikesnafu.IshallfollowtheconventioninitiatedbyRuthMillikanandwrite"Normal"withacapN
whenIwanttostressthatanormativeratherthanastatisticalnotionofnormalcyisintended.
14.Ishouldemphasizethatwhat'sbeingdeniedhereisn'tjustthestatisticalclaimthatallormostormuchofthetimeifyouwanttobecomerichandfamousyoudo
becomeit.I'mclaimingthatasituationinwhichsomebodywantsverymuchtobecomerichandfamouscanbeperfectlyNormalinanyreasonablesenseoftheterm,
andyetwhat'swantedverymuchmayneverthelessfailtocomeoff.Thisseemstometobeatruism.
15.NoticethatNormalcyisn'tastatisticalnotionevenonthisaccount.It'sassumedthatifXNormallycausesY,thenifthesituationisNormalthenifXthenit's
relativelylikelythatY.Thisis,ofcourse,perfectlycompatiblewithXsnevercausingwhattheyNormallycausebecausethesituationisneverNormal.Dennett(ina
1988manuscriptcalled"FearofDarwin'sOptimizingRationales")succumbstoilltemperbecausehethinksIhavemisreadMillikanasproposingastatisticalaccount
ofnormalfunctioning.Butshedoesn'tandIhaven'tandnoneImeannoneoftheargumentsI'veproposeddependsuponassumingthatshedoes.Iamalittle
miffedaboutthis.
16.So,tokeeptherecordstraight:whereasMillikanapparentlywantstodefinethecontentofabeliefstateintermsofitsselectionalhistory,thealternativeproposal
definesbeliefcontentbyreferencetotheteleologyofthebelieffixingmechanisms(roughly,abeliefisaboutwhatwouldcauseittobetokenedinthesortof
circumstancesinwhichthemechanismsofbelieffixationweredesignedtooperate).Thepresentproposalincludesbothnationssoasnottoprejudicethecaseagainst
either.
17.Thoughothersortsofteleologicalaccountsarenotprecludedinprinciple,Iassumeinwhatfollowsthatanynaturalisticstoryaboutteleologyisgoingtoreston
somesortofappealtoevolutionaryhistory.Butactually,asfarasIcantell,themainlineofargumentgoesthroughjustaswellifit'sassumedonlythattheaccountof
teleologyisconsequentialistandnotsubjunctivei.e.,thatthepurposeofabiologicalmechanismissomehowdeterminedbythegoodresultsit(actually)produces,
whetherornotgoodresultisitselfconstruedintermsofselectionaladvantage.
18.Millikanhasthistosayaboutthefrog/fly/beebeeexample:"Wesaythatthetoadthinksthepelletsarebugsmerelybecausewetakeitthatthetoad'sbehavior
wouldfulfillitsproperfunctions(its'purpose')Normallyonlyifthese(viz.,thepellets)werebugsandthatthisbehavioroccursNormally(notnecessarilynormally)
onlyuponencounterwithbugs"(pp.7172).Butassumethatthetoadthinksthatthebeebees(andthebugs)areblackspots(sothebeebeeelicitedsnapsare
"true").IftheNormalenvironmentforsnappingatblackspotsisone

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whereblackspotsarepredominantlybugs,itstillgoesthroughthatfrogsnapsatbeebeeswouldfulfilltheirproperfunctionsNormallyonlyifthebeebeeswerebugs.
Thisisbecause,inthecaseswheretheblackdotsthatthefrogsnapsataren'tbugs,theenvironment,ipsofacto,isn'tNormal.And,forthesamereason,itstillgoes
throughthatfrogsnapsoccurNormally"onlyuponencounterwithbugs."Sowestillhaven'tgotasolutiontothedisjunctionproblemevenafterwe'vesatisfiedthe
conditionsthatMillikanimposesi.e.,satisfyingherconditionsontheNormalfunctionoffrogsnapsiscompatiblewithtakingtheintentionalobjectsofthesnapstobe
(notfliesbut)littleblackdots.
19.MillikanandIsraelarebynomeanstheonlyphilosopherswhoarehoistonthispetard(whatever,precisely,apetardmaybe).DavidPapineau,whorunsa
teleologicallineoncontentinRealityandRepresentation(1988),suggeststhat"...thebiologicalfunctionofanygivendesiretypeistogiverisetoacertainresult:
theresultisthenthedesire'ssatisfactioncondition"(p.64).Butthisassumesthatanaturalisticaccountoftheteleologyofdesireswillspecifyauniquebiological
functionforeachdesiretypeinparticular,itsupposesthattheteleologywillbeunivocalincaseswherethedisjunctionproblemwouldotherwisemakeintentional
contentindeterminate.Papineauprovidesnoargumentthatnaturalteleologyisunivocalinthisrespect,andwe'vejustseenwhy,ifit'sgroundedbyappealsto
selection,itprettyclearlywon'tbe.
Correspondingly,Papineausuggeststhat"thetruthconditionsforbeliefsare...thecircumstancesinwhichtheywillhaveeffectsthatwillsatisfythedesirestheyare
workinginconcertwith."Well,supposethatwhatthefrogdesiresisfoodsuppose,even,thatwhatitdesiresisthatitshouldingestflies.It'sstilltruethat(given
Normalcircumstances),eitherthebeliefthattherearefliesorthebeliefthatthereareblackdotswillhaveeffectsthatwillsatisfythefrog'sdesire.
It'salsotrue,ofcourse,thatsnappingatblackdotswon'tsatisfythefrog'sdesireforfliesintheabNormalcircumstancewheretheblackdotsarebeebeesandsome
ofthethingsthatPapineausays(p.72)suggestthathewantstorestonthis.Butthatwon'tdosincethereareother,alsoabNormal,circumstancesinwhichsnapping
atflieswon'tsatisfythedesiretoingestflieseither(thefrog'stongueiscoveredwithsilicon,andthefliesslipoffthefliesareofanewhightechvarietyandcanfly
fasterthanfrogscansnap,etc.).Themoralisthatyoucanrelyonthefrog'sflybeliefsleadingtoflyingestions(andthusbestowingselectionaladvantagewhen
entertainedinthepresenceofflies)onlyifyouaretakingitforgrantedthatthefrog'secologyisNormal.Butthenwe'vejustseenthatifyouaretakingitforgranted
thatthefrog'secologyisNormal,therequirementthatitsbeliefsshouldoperateinconjunctionwithitsdesirestoproducesuccessesisn'tstrongenoughtomotivate
uniqueassignmentsofintentionalcontenttothebeliefs.Dilemma.
20.Strictlyspeaking,giventhepossibilityofhigherorderconditioning,itmaybethatgettinganorganismtorespondtothetriangularityratherthanthegreennessof
greentrianglesdoesn'tdependongreenandtrianglebeingdissociatedinthecourseoftraining,solongassomecolorsaredissociatedfromsomeshapes.Ageneral
habitofrespondingtoshaperatherthancolorcouldperhapsbeestablishedbydifferentialreinforcementinthosecases.Ihavenoideawhetherthiswouldactually
work,and,anyhow,it'sjustacuriosityitsuggests,contrarytofact,thatif"greenifftriangular"isreliable,itcan'tbethatanorganismisrespondingtotriangularity
ratherthangreennessunlessithasadispositiontorespondtoshaperatherthancoloringeneral.

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21.ItshouldnowbeclearthattheargumentagainstDarwiniantheoriesofcontentwas,ineffect,that"MotherNature"canselectfororganismsthatsnapatfliesas
opposedtoorganismsthatsnapatfleebeesonlyifshecanperforma"splitstimulus"experimenti.e.,onlyifshecancontrivetopresentthefrogwithfleebeesthat
aren'tfliesi.e.,onlyifshecancontrivetopresentthefrogwithfleebeesthatarebeebeesafortiori,onlyif"allthefleebeesareflies"isn'treliableinthefrog'secology.
22.I'mverygratefultoDavidRosenthalforaconversationthathelpedtogetthissortedout.Thesaccharinecaseisn'texceptional,bythewayanyexampleofwhat
ethnologistscalla"supernormal"stimulusservestopointthesamemoral.
23.TillnowI'vebeenarguingthatappealstoselectionalhistorycan'tdistinguishanorganismthatrepresentsthingsfromFfromanorganismthatrepresentsthemas
Ginaworldwhereit'scounterfactualsupportingthatallandonlytheFsareGs.Aparallellineofargumentsecuresthepresentclaimthatappealstoevolutionary
historycan'tdistinguishselectionforbeingFfromselectionforbeingGwhenFandGarenecessarilycoextensive:IfyoualwaysgetFsandGstogether,thena
mechanismthatselectsonetherebyselectstheother,sotheutilityofbeingFandbeingGalwayscomesoutthesame.
Thishasphilosophicallyinterestingconsequences.Forexample,evenassumingthatit'salawthatheartsandonlyheartsmakethenoisestheydo,stillit'sintuitively
plausiblethatthefunctionoftheheartispumpingtheblood,notmakingthenoises.IfthelineofargumentI'vebeensellingisright,thenappealstoselectionalhistorydo
not,inandofthemselves,underwritethisintuition.Thisdoesnot,ofcourse,implythatit'sfalsethatthefunctionoftheheartisbloodpumpingitonlyimpliesthatfacts
aboutfunctiondon'treducetofactsaboutselectionalhistory.Dennett(1987)saysthat"ifyouwanttomaintainthatitisperfectlyrespectabletosaythateyesarefor
seeing...youtakeonacommitmenttotheprinciplethatnaturalselectioniswellnamed...thereisnotjustselectionoffeaturesbutselectionforfeatures...
withoutthis'discriminating'prowessofnaturalselection,wewouldnotbeabletosustainfunctionalinterpretationsatall"(p.316hisitalics).Butnoargumentisgiven
forthis,and,aswesawabove,itcouldturnoutthatfunctiongetsananalysisinterms(notofselectionalhistorybut)ofcounterfactuals.Thegoverningintuitionis,
perhaps,thatitwouldbeOKiftheheartstoppedmakingnoiseaslongasitkeptpumping,butnotsogoodtheotherway'round.
24.Similarly,mutatismutandis:Teddybearsareartificial,butrealbearsareartificialtoo.WestufftheoneandMotherNaturestuffstheother.Philosophyisfullof
surprises.
25.Theideathat"the"functionofperceptionistoguidemovementratherthantofixbeliefisalsoamainthemeintheAmericanNaturalisttraditionandinwhatis
sometimesdescribedastheevolutionaryapproachtothemind(seePatriciaChurchland,1987).Fordiscussion,seechapter9.

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Chapter4
ATheoryofContent,II:
TheTheory
"...theappealtoteleologicallyNormalconditionsdoesn'tprovideforaunivocalnotionofintentionalcontent...it'sjustnottruethatNormallycausedintentional
statesipsofactomeanwhatevercausesthem.Soweneedanonteleologicalsolutionofthedisjunctionproblem.Sobeit."Sothefirstpartofthisdiscussion
concluded.Butthatdidratherbegthequestionagainsttheguywhoholdsthatthereisn'tgoingtobeasolutionofthedisjunctionproblembecausethereareno
intentionalstates,andhencenomattersoffactaboutthedisjunctiveness,orotherwise,oftheirintentionalcontents.Whatyouneed,toputthematterbrutally,isone
thingwhatyouarelikelytogetisquiteanother.Whatonearthwouldanaturalisticandnonteleologicaltheoryofcontentbelike?
ThisrestofthispaperexploresandextendsanapproachtothedisjunctionproblemthatIfirstsketchedinPsychosemantics(1987)andin"Informationand
Representation"(forthcoming).Thissolutionisbroadlywithinthetraditionofinformationalapproachestocontent1butitdoesnotequatewhatasymbolmeanswiththe
informationthatitstokenscarryanditdoesnottrytosolvethedisjunctionproblembydistinguishingtypeonesituations(thoseinwhichwhatevercausesasymbolto
betokenedisipsofactoinitsextension)fromtypetwosituations(thoseinwhichsymbolsareallowedtobecausedbythingsthattheydon'tapplyto.)2Inthesecond
respect,atleast,itdiffersfromalltheothertreatmentsofthedisjunctionproblemthatI'veseenintheliterature.
Imustacknowledgeattheoutsettheexistenceofwhatseemstobequiteanimpressiveconsensusamongthemaybesixoreightpeoplewhocareaboutthese
mattersthatmywayofdoingthedisjunctionproblemwon'twork.ButGrannysaysI'mnottobedisconsolateRomewasn'tdeconstructedinaday,shesays.
Accordingly,InowproposetorunthroughmoreorlessalloftheobjectionstomytreatmentofthedisjunctionproblemthatI'veheardof,andafewthatI'vedreamed
up.PartlythisistoshowyouthatIamnot

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disconsolatepartlyitistotrytoconvinceyouthatmystoryactuallycopesprettywellwiththeputativecounterexamplesandpartlyit'stoprovideanopportunityto
refineanddeepenthetheory.
AsymmetricDependence(andTeleologyforAlmosttheLastTime)
Errorsraisethedisjunctionproblem,butthedisjunctionproblemisn'treally,deepdown,aproblemabouterror.Whatthedisjunctionproblemisreallyaboutdeep
downisthedifferencebetweenmeaningandinformation.Let'sstartwiththis.
Informationistiedtoetiologyinawaythatmeaningisn't.Ifthetokensofasymbolhavetwokindsofetiologies,itfollowsthattherearetwokindsofinformationthat
tokensofthatsymbolcarry.(Ifsome"cow"tokensarecausedbycowsandsome"cow"tokensaren't,thenitfollowsthatsome"cow"tokenscarryinformationabout
cowsandsome"cow"tokensdon't).Bycontrast,themeaningofasymbolisoneofthethingsthatallofitstokenshaveincommon,howevertheymay
happentobecaused.All''cow"tokensmeancowiftheydidn't,theywouldn'tbe"cow"tokens.
So,informationfollowsetiologyandmeaningdoesn't,andthat'swhyyougetadisjunctionproblemifyouidentifythemeaningofasymbolwiththeinformationthatits
tokenscarry.Errorismerelyillustrativeitcomesintothedisjunctionproblemonlybecauseit'ssoplausiblethatthefalsetokensofasymbolhaveadifferentkindof
causalhistory(andhencecarrydifferentinformation)thanthetrueones.But,aswesawinchapter3,thereareothersortsofexamplesofetiologicalheterogeneity
(includingrepresentationinthought)andtheyproducedisjunctionproblemstoo.
Toputthesamepointanotherway,solvingthedisjunctionproblemrequiresnotatheoryoferrorbutatheoryofmeaningifatheoryofmeaningisanygood,the
conditionsfordisjunctivemeaningshouldfalloutasaspecialcase(seethediscussioninFodor,forthcoming.IfoneissympathetictotheSkinnerDretsketradition,the
trickinconstructingsuchatheoryistoexplainhowthemeaningofasymbolcanbeinsensitivetotheheterogeneityofthe(actualandpossible)causesofitstokens
eventhough,ontheonehand,meaningissupposedsomehowtoreducetoinformationand,ontheotherhand,informationvarieswithetiology.
Youcannowseewhat'sreallywrongwithteleologicaltheoriesofcontent.Theheartofateleologicaltheoryistheideathat"inNormalcircumstances"thetokensofa
symbolcanhaveonlyonekindofcauseviz.,thekindofcausethatfixesmeaning.(Normally,onlycowscause"cows,"sotheteleologicalstorygoes.)Butsurelythis

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underestimateswhatonemightcalltherobustnessofmeaning:Inactualfact,"cow"tokensgetcausedinallsortsofways,andtheyallmeancowforallofthat.
Solvingthedisjunctionproblemandmakingclearhowasymbol'smeaningcouldbesoinsensitivetovariabilityinthecausesofitstokeningsarereallytwowaysof
describingthesameundertaking.Ifthere'sgoingtobeacausaltheoryofcontent,therehastobesomewayofpickingoutsemanticallyrelevantcausalrelationsfrom
alltheotherkindsofcausalrelationsthatthetokensofasymbolcanenterinto.Andwe'dbetternotdothisbyimplicitlydenyingrobustnesse.g.,byidealizingto
contextsofetiologicalhomogeneity.
Well,then,howarewetodoit?Here'safirstapproximationtotheproposalthatIfavor:Cowscause"cow"tokens,and(let'ssuppose)catscause"cow"tokens.But
"cow"meanscowandnotcatorcoworcatbecausetherebeingcatcaused"cow"tokensdependsontherebeingcowcaused"cow''tokens,butnotthe
otherwayaround."Cow"meanscowbecause,asIshallhenceforthputit,noncowcaused"cow"tokensareasymmetricallydependentuponcowcaused"cow"
tokens."Cow"meanscowbecausebutthat"cow"tokenscarryinformationaboutcows,theywouldn'tcarryinformationaboutanything.
NoticethatthissortofstoryhasthedesirablepropertyofnotassumingthattherearesuchthingsasTypeonesituationsinparticular,itdoesn'tassumethatthereare
circumstancesnomologicallypossibleandnaturalisticallyandotherwisenonquestionbegginglyspecifiableinwhichit'ssemanticallynecessarythatonlycowscause
"cows".Nordoesitassumethattherearenonquestionbegginglyspecifiablecircumstancesinwhichit'ssemanticallynecessarythatallcowswouldcause"cows."3All
that'srequiredfor"cow"tomeancow,accordingtothepresentaccount,isthatsome"cow"tokensshouldbecausedby(moreprecisely,thattheyshouldcarry
informationabout)cows,andthatnoncowcaused"cow"tokensshoulddependasymmetricallyonthese.
Teleologicaltheoriessaythatwhat'sspecialaboutfalsetokensisthattheycan'thappenwhencircumstancesareNormalifit'ssupposedthatthingsactuallyare
Normalsomeofthetime(as,indeed,itmustbeifthetheoryishistorical/Darwinian)itfollowsthatsomeofthetimewhat'ssaid(orthought)can'tbutbetrue.By
contrast,thetheoryI'msellingsaysthatfalsetokenscanhappenwhenevertheylikeonlyiftheyhappen,sotoomusttokeningsofotherkinds:Nononcowcaused
"cow"swithoutcowcaused"cow"sfalsetokensaremetaphysicallydependentontrueones.4Sincethesatisfactionoftheasymmetricdependenceconditionis
compatiblewithanyamountofheterogeneityinthecausalhistoryof"cow"tokens,thiswayof

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5

solvingthedisjunctionproblemiscompatiblewithmeaningbeingarbitrarilyrobust.

Thisstoryalsohasthedesirablepropertyofbeingnaturalisticinthesensediscussedinchapter3.It'satomistic("cow"scouldbeasymmetricallydependentoncowsin
aworldinwhichnootherasymmetricdependenciesobtain)andit'sphysicalistic(youcansaywhatasymmetricdependenceiswithoutresorttointentionalorsemantic
idiom).6Butdespiteitshavingthesedesirableproperties,theproposalI'vejustsketchedisonlyafirstapproximation.Asitstandsthere'slotstobesaidagainstit.
Beforewecommencetolookattheproblems,however,IhavethreeprefecatoryremarksIwanttomake:ashortishoneaboutadoctrinethatyoumightcall
"pansemanticism,"alongishoneaboutontology,andthenaveryshortoneaboutwhohastheburdenofargument.
Pansemanticism
Here'saclashofintuitionsforyou.
Ontheonehand:
...symbolsandmentalstatesbothhaverepresentationalcontent.Andnothingelsedoesthatbelongstothecausalorder:notrocks,orwormsortreesorspiralnebulae....
themainjointbusinessofthephilosophyoflanguageandthephilosophyofmindistheproblemofrepresentation....Howcananythingmanagetobeaboutanythingand
whyisitthatonlythoughtsandsymbolssucceed?(Me,inPsychosemantics,1987,p.xi)
Andontheotherhand:
Cloudsmeanrain.Spotsofacertainkindmeanmeasles...Inallsuchcasesthereisalawlikeornomologicalregularityconnectingonetypeofsituationwithanother.
Instancesoftheseregularitiesarecasesinwhichonesituationmeanssomethingorcarriesinformationaboutanother:and,ofcourse,insuchcasesthereneedbeneither
mindsnorsymbolsusedbyminds.(Israel,1987,p.3emphasishis)

Infact,theideathatmeaningisjusteverywhereisanaturalconclusiontodrawfrominformationalanalysesofcontent.If,afterall,meaningreduces(moreorless)7to
reliablecausalcovariance,thensincethereispatentlyalotofreliablecausalcovariancearound,itlookstofollowthattheremustbealotofmeaningaroundtoo.And
theintuitionthat"means"isunivocalandmeanscarriesinformationaboutin"'smoke"meanssmoke'and'smokemeansfire'isclosetotheheartofinformation
basedsemantics.

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Butthiscan'tberight.Ifitwere,then(since"carriesinformationabout"istransitive)itwouldfollowthat"smoke"meansfirewhichitdoesn't.Ontheasymmetric
dependenceaccount,bycontrast,thissortofcasecomesoutallright.''Smoke"tokenscarryinformationaboutfire(whenthey'recausedbysmokethat'scausedby
fire).Buttheydon'tmeanfirebecausetheirdependenceonfireisasymmetricallydependentontheirdependenceonsmoke.Breakthefiresmokeconnection,and
thesmoke"smoke"connectionremainsintactourusing"smoke"insituationswherethere'sfiredoesn'tdependonsmoke'scarryinginformationaboutfire.But
breakthesmoke"smoke"connectionandthefire"smoke"connectiongoestooourusing"smoke"insituationswherethere'sfiredoesdependon"smoke"'s
carryinginformationaboutsmoke.
Thereis,inshort,alotlessmeaningaroundthanthereisintormation.That'sbecauseallyouneedforinformationisreliablecausalcovariance,whereasformeaning
youneed(atleast)asymmetricdependencetoo.Informationisubiquitousbutnotrobustmeaningisrobustbutnotubiquitous.Somuchforpansemanticism.
Ontology
AsIremarkedinchapter3,IassumethatifthegeneralizationthatXscauseYsiscounterfactualsupporting,thenthereisa"covering"lawthatrelatesthepropertyof
beingXtothepropertyofbeingacauseofYs:counterfactualsupportingcausalgeneralizationsare(eitheridenticaltoor)backedbycausallaws,andlawsare
relationsamongproperties.So,whatthestoryaboutasymmetricdependencecomesdowntoisthat"cow"meanscowif(i)thereisanomicrelationbetweenthe
propertyofbeingacowandthepropertyofbeingacauseof"cow"tokensand(ii)iftherearenomicrelationsbetweenotherpropertiesandthepropertyofbeinga
causeof"cow"tokens,thenthelatternomicrelationsdependasymmetricallyupontheformer.
Ontologicallyspeaking,I'minclinedtobelievethatit'sbedrockthattheworldcontainspropertiesandtheirnomicrelationsi.e.,thattruthsaboutnomicrelations
amongpropertiesaredeeperthanandhencearenottobeanalyzedintermsofcounterfactualtruthsaboutindividuals.Inanyevent,epistemologicallyspeaking,
I'mquitecertainthatit'spossibletoknowthatthereisanomicrelationamongpropertiesbutnothavemuchideawhichcounterfactualsaretrueinvirtueofthefactthat
therelationholds.Itistherefore,methodologicallyspeaking,probablyabadideatorequireofphilosophicalanalysesthatarearticulatedintermsofnomicrelations
amongpropertiesthat

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theybe,asonesaysinthetrade,"cashed"byanalysesthatarearticulatedintermsofcounterfactualrelationsamongindividuals.
ThismethodologicalpointisoneaboutwhichIfeelstrongly.SomuchsothatIampreparedtosuccumbtoadigression.Herecomeseveralparagraphsabouthowa
philosophercangetintotroublebytakingitforgrantedthattruthsaboutlawsneedtobeanalyzedby,orinto,counterfactualtruths.
ThecontextisKripke'scriticaldiscussion(1982)ofdispositionalaccountsofrulefollowing.Accordingtosuchaccounts,meaningplusby"+"isanalyzedintermsofa
dispositionto"respondwiththesumof[the]twonumbers"whenaskedthingslike''What'sm+n?"Kripkesaysthissortofanalysiswon'tdobecausewehaveno
suchdispositions:ourcomputationalpowersarefinitewemakemistakesandsoforth.Towhichheimagineshisinterlocutorreplyingthat:"...thetroublearises
solelyfromtoocrudeanotionofdisposition:ceterisparibusnotionsofdispositions,notcrudeandliteralnotions,aretheonesstandardlyusedinphilosophyandin
science."Sowhat'simaginedis,ineffect,adispositionalstoryaboutrulefollowingthatisbackedbyanappealtotheperformance/competencedistinction.But,
accordingtoKripke,thatwon'tdoeither.For"...howshouldwefleshouttheceterisparibusclause?Perhaps[byinvokingcounterfactuals]assomethinglike:Ifmy
brainhadbeenstuffedwithsufficientextramattertograsplargeenoughnumbers,andifitweregivenenoughcapacitytoperformsuchalargeaddition...[etc.]...,
thengivenanadditionprobleminvolvingtwolargenumbersmandn,Iwouldrespondwiththeirsum....Buthowcanwehaveanyconfidenceofthis?Howinthe
worldcanItellwhatwouldhappenifmybrainwerestuffedwithextrabrainmatter....Surelysuchspeculationshouldbelefttosciencefictionwritersand
futurologists.Wehavenoideawhattheresultsofsuchexperimentswouldbe.Theymightleadmetogoinsane...[andsoforth]"
ApparentlyKripkeassumesthatwecan'thavereasontoacceptthatageneralizationdefinedforidealizedconditionsislawfulunlesswecanspecifythecounterfactuals
whichwouldbetrueiftheidealizedconditionsweretoobtain.Itis,however,hardtoseewhyoneshouldtakethismethodologyseriously.Forexample:Godonly
knowswhatwouldhappenifmoleculesandcontainersactuallymettheconditionsspecifiedbytheidealgaslaws(moleculesareperfectlyelasticcontainersare
infinitelyimpermeableetc.)forallIknow,ifanyofthesethingsweretrue,theworldwouldcometoanend.Afterall,thesatisfactionoftheseconditionsis,
presumably,physicallyimpossibleandwhoknowswhatwouldhappeninphysicallyimpossibleworlds?

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Butit'snotrequired,inorderthattheidealgaslawsshouldbeinscientificgoodrepute,thatweknowanythinglikeallofwhatwouldhappeniftherereallywereideal
gasses.Allthat'srequiredisthatweknow(e.g.)thatiftherewereidealgasses,then,ceterisparibus,theirvolumewouldvaryinverselywiththepressureuponthem.
Andthatcounterfactualthetheoryitselftellsusistrue.8
Similarly,iftherearepsychologicallawsthatidealizetounboundedworkingmemory,itisnotrequiredinorderforthemtobeinscientificgoodreputethatweknow
allofwhatwouldhappenifworkingmemoryreallywereunbounded.Allweneedtoknowisthat,ifwedidhaveunboundedmemory,then,ceterisparibus,wewould
beabletocomputethevalueofm+nforarbitrarymandn.9Andthatcounterfactualthetheoryitselftellsusistrue.
Similarlyagain,wecanknowthatthereareasymmetricdependencesamongnomicrelationsbetweenpropertieswithoutknowingmuchaboutwhichcounterfactuals
theseasymmetricdependencesmaketrue.AllweneedtoknowisthatifthenomicrelationbetweenP1andP2isasymmetricallydependentonthenomicrelation
betweenP3andP4,then,ceterisparibus,breakingtherelationbetweenP3andP4wouldbreaktherelationbetweenP1andP2.Andthatcounterfactualthetheory
itselftellsusistrue.Asperabove.
Havinggottenallthatoffmychest,Ishalljointhecrowdandtalkcounterfactualsfromtimetotime,fautdemieux.And,sinceit'swidelysupposedthattalkabout
counterfactualsitselftranslatesintotalkaboutpossibilia,Ishallsometimesequate"thereisanomicdependencebetweenthepropertyofbeingaYandthepropertyof
beingacauseofXs"with"YscauseXsinall(nearby?seebelow)nomologicallypossibleworld".ButIamnothappyaboutanyofthisitseemstometobejustthe
sortofreductivemovethatisalwaysblowingupinphilosophers'faces.Isuspect,inparticular,thatsomeofthetroubleswe'reabouttosurveystemnotfromthere
beinganythingwrongwiththeproposalthatcontentrestsonasymmetricaldependencesamongnomologicalrelations,butratherfromtherebeingeverythingwrong
withtheassumptionthatclaimsaboutnomologicalrelationsneedcounterfactual/possibleworldtranslations.10
WhoHastheBurdenofArgument
ThetheoryofmeaningthatI'mgoingtoproposeiselaboratedlargelyintermsofsubjunctiveconditionals.Ithasthisincommonwithallinformationaltheoriesof
meaningit'sinthenatureofsuchtheoriestoclaimthatasymbolmeanssuchandsuchbecauseiftherewereinstancesofsuchandsuchtheywouldcausetokenings
ofthesymbol.Soitmayoccurtoyou,inthecourseoftheseproceedings,toobject

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asfollows:"WhyshouldIbelievethatthecounterfactualsthatarebeinginvokedaretrue?WhyshouldIbelievethatifthereactuallyweresuchandsuchesthey
actuallywouldcausesymboltokeningsinthewaysthatyourtheoryrequires?"
Theansweris:Don'tforget,thisstuffissupposedtobephilosophy.Inparticular,it'sanattempttosolveBrentano'sproblembyshowingthattherearenaturalistically
specifiable,andatomistic,sufficientconditionsforaphysicalstatetohaveanintentionalcontent.Inthatcontext,Igettostipulatethecounterfactuals.It'senoughifI
canmakegoodtheclaimthat"X"wouldmeansuchandsuchifsoandsoweretobethecase.It'snotalsoincumbentuponmetoarguethatsince"X"doesmean
suchandsuch,soandsoisthecase.Thatis,solvingBrentano'sproblemrequiresgivingsufficientconditionsforintentionality,notnecessaryandsufficientconditions.
So,ifyouwanttoarguewiththemetaphysicalconclusionsofthispaper,you'vegottoconstructaworldwheremycounterfactualsareallinplacebutwhere"X''
doesn'tmeanwhatIsayitdoes.Fairenoughlet'sseeone.
OK,nowtobusiness.
Tobeginwith,notanobjection,butsomethingmorelikeavaguediscomfort:Evenifyoucangetthetheorytocopewiththeexamples,Idon'tseewhythe
theoryshouldbetrueIdon'tseewhyasymmetricdependenceshould,asitwere,makethedifferencebetweeninformationandcontent.
Let'sstartbyforgettingaboutthenaturalizationproblem(we'llreturntoitinacoupleofparagraphs).Iwanttomakeitseemplausiblethatasymmetricdependence
mighthavedeeprootsintheanalysisofsemanticalphenomenawhenthephenomenaareviewedcommonsensically,outsidethecontextofmetaphysicalissuesabout
reduction.Andlet's,forthemoment,talkaboutlinguisticratherthanmentalrepresentationinordertokeepthefactsasmuchaspossibleoutintheopen.So,then:
Wehave,Isuppose,avarietyofpracticeswithrespectofthelinguisticexpressionsweuse.AndIsupposeit'splausiblethatthesepracticesaren'tallonalevelsome
ofthempresupposeothersinthesensethatsomeworkonlybecauseothersareinplace.Forabanalexample,there'sthebusinessofhavingpeoplepaged.Howit
worksis:Someonecallsout"John"and,ifeverythinggoesright,Johncomes.WhyJohn?Imean,whyisitJohnthatyougetwhenyoucallout"John"?Well,because
thepracticeisthattheguywhoistocomeistheguywhosenameisthevocablethatiscalled.Thismuch,surely,isuntendentious.
Noticethatyouhavetoinvokethepracticeofnamingtospecifythepracticeofpaging.Sothepracticeofpagingisparasiticonthe

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practiceonnamingyoucouldn'thavetheformerbutthatyouhavethelatter.Butnot,Isuppose,viceversa?Couldn'tyouhavethepracticesthatareconstitutiveof
naming(sothat,forexample,theconventionisthat"Johnispink"istrueifit'sthepersonwhosenameis"John"thatispink)eveniftherewerenopracticeofpaging
peoplebycallingouttheirnames?Itakeittobeplausiblethatyoucould,soItakeittobeplausiblethatpagingisasymmetricallydependentonnaming.
Oh,nodoubt,IcouldhaveanarrangementwithmydogaccordingtowhichmydogcomeswhenIwhistleandthisthoughthesoundthatImakewhenIwhistlefor
mydogisn't,ofcourse,mydog'sname.Butherelearningthelanguagegamereallyisjusttraining.Thewhistlingworksbecausethere'saprearrangementbetweenme
andmydogI'vetaughtthedogwhattodowhenImakethatnoise.Bycontrast,IcanpageJohnbycallinghisnamewithoutthissortofprearrangement.Whena
conventionofnamingisinplace,there'sroomforapracticeofpagingthatisperfectlyabstract:Anyonewhohasanamecanbepagedjustbycallinghisname.
So,theproductivityofthepagingarrangementdependsontherebeingaconventionofnaming.Similarly,mutatismutandis,fortheproductivityofthepracticein
virtueofwhichIbringyouaslabwhenyousay"bringmeaslab."Thatit'soneofthosethingsthatyougetwhenyousaythishasessentiallytodowiththosebeingthe
kindsofthingsthatarecalled"slabs"(withitsbeingthecase,forexample,thatthosearethekindsofthingsthathavetobepinkif"slabsarepink"istrue.)Butnot,
surely,viceversasurelythepracticesinvirtueofourpursuitofwhich"isaslab"meansisaslabcouldbeinplaceeveniftherewerenoconventionofbringingslabs
whenthey'recalledfor.Sothenit'splausiblethattheclusterofpracticesthatcenteraroundbringingthingswhenthey'recalledforisasymmetricallydependentonthe
clusterofpracticesthatfixtheextensionsofourpredicates.
Thesekindsofconsiderationsshowoneofthewaysthatasymmetricdependencegetsafootholdinsemanticanalysis:Someofourlinguisticpracticespresuppose
someofourothers,andit'splausiblethatpracticesofapplyingterms(namestotheirbearers,predicatestothingsintheirextensions)areatthebottomofthepile.11
Butwhat,precisely,hasallthisgottodowithrobustnessandwiththerelationbetweeninformationandcontent?Theideaisthat,althoughtokensof"slab"thatrequest
slabscarrynoinformationaboutslabs(ifanything,theycarryinformationaboutwantsviz.,theinformationthataslabiswanted),still,sometokensof"slab"
presumablycarryinformationaboutslabs(inparticular,thetokensthatareusedtopredicate

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slabhoodofslabsdo)and,butfortherebeingtokensof"slab"thatcarryinformationaboutslabs,Icouldn'tgetaslabbyusing"slab"tocallforone.My"slab"
requestsarethus,inacertainsense,causallydependentonslabseventhoughtherearenoslabsintheircausalhistories.Butthey'renot,ofcourse,causally
dependentonslabsinthewaythat(accordingtoinformationalsemantics)my"slab"predicationsare.Sothentherearetwosemanticallyrelevantwaysthat''slab"
tokenscanbecausallydependentonslabsconsonantwiththeirmeaningslab:bybeing"slab"tokensthatarecausedbyslabs,andbybeing"slab"tokensthatare
asymmetricallydependentupon"slab"tokensthatarecausedbyslabs.Equivalently:Bybeing"slab"tokensthatcarryinformationaboutslabs,andbybeing"slab"
tokensthatasymmetricallydependupon"slab"tokensthatcarryinformationaboutslabs.
Sofarsogoodwecanseehowasymmetricdependencesamongourlinguisticpracticesmightexplainhowatokenof"slab"couldmeanslabevenwhen,asinthe
caseofslabrequests,it'sawantratherthanaslabthatcausesthetokeningandhowatokenof"John"couldmeanJohneventhough,ifit'susedtopageJohn,it's
causednotbyJohnbutbyhisabsence.Whichistosaythatwecanseesomethingoftheconnectionbetweenasymmetricdependenceandrobustness.
But,ofcourse,asitstandsnoneofthisisofanyusetoareductionist.For,intheseexamples,we'vebeenconstruingrobustnessbyappealtoasymmetricdependences
amonglinguisticpractices.Andlinguisticpracticesdependonlinguisticpoliciestheasymmetricdependenceofmypagingsonmynamingscomesdowntomy
undertakingthat,ceterisparibus,Iwillcallout"John"onlywhenthemanIwanttocomeistheonewhomIundertakethatIwilluse"John"tonameandsoforth.
Since,however,beinginpursuitofapolicyisbeinginanintentionalstate,howcouldasymmetricdependenceamonglinguisticpracticeshelpwiththenaturalization
problem?
Thefirstpointisthatwordscan'thavetheirmeaningsjustbecausetheirusersundertaketopursuesomeorotherlinguisticpoliciesor,indeed,justbecauseofany
purelymentalphenomenon,anythingthathappenspurely'inyourhead'.YourundertakingtocallJohn"John"doesn't,allbyitself,make"John"anameofJohn.How
couldit?For"John"tobeJohn'sname,theremustbesomesortofrealrelationbetweenthenameanditsbearerandintentionsdon't,perse,establishrealrelations.
Thisisbecause,ofcourse,intentionsare(merely)intentionalyoucanintendthattherebeacertainrelationbetween"John"andJohnandyettheremaybenosuch
relation.A

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fortiori,youcanintendthattherebeacertainsemanticalrelationbetween"John"andJohnthattheoneshouldnametheother,forexampleandyettheremaybe
nosuchrelation.Mereundertakingsconnectnothingwithnothing"intentionalrelation"isanoxymoron.Fortheretobearelationbetween"John"andJohn,something
hastohappenintheworld.That'spartofwhatmakestheideaofacausalconstrualofsemanticrelationssoattractive.(Andit'salso,Ithink,what'srightabout
Wittgenstein's"privatelanguage''argument.Though,asIreadthetext,hehasitmuddledupwithirrelevantepistemology.For"John"tomeanJohn,somethinghasto
happenintheworld.Itdoesn'tfollowthatfor"John"tomeanJohnsomeonehastobeinapositiontotellthatthatthinghashappened.)
Linguisticpoliciesdon'tmakesemanticrelationsbutmaybetheymakecausalrelations,andmaybecausalrelationsmakesemanticrelations.This,anyhow,isahope
bywhichinformationalsemanticslives.IpursueapolicyaccordingtowhichIuse"isaslab"topredicateslabhood,andapolicyaccordingtowhichIuse"bringaslab"
torequestslabs,andapolicyaccordingtowhichthesecondofthesepracticesisasymmetricallydependentonthefirst.Mypursuingthesepoliciesismybeingina
certaincomplexmentalstate,andmybeinginthatmentalstatehascausalconsequences:inparticularithastheconsequencethatthereisacertainpatternofcausal
relationsbetweenslabsandmytokeningsof"isaslab"andthatthereisacertain(verydifferent)patternofcausalrelationsbetweenslabsandmytokeningsof"bringa
slab"andthatthesecondpatternofcausalrelationsisasymmetricallydependentonthefirst.
Nowmaybewecankickawaytheladder.Perhapsthepoliciespersearen'twhatmattersforsemanticsmaybeallthatmattersisthepatternsofcausaldependencies
thatthepursuitofthepoliciesgiveriseto.Thatonekindofcausalrelationbetween"slab"sandslabsshoulddependasymmetricallyuponanotherkindofcausal
relationbetween"slab"sandslabsmightbeenoughtoexplaintherobustnessof"slab"tokenings,howevertherelationsaresustained.(Cf.adoctrineofSkinner'scited
withapprovalinChapter3:semanticsdependsona"functionalrelation"arelationofnomicdependencebetweensymbolsandtheirdenotata.Howthisrelationis
mediatede.g.,thatitisneurologicallymediated,orforthatmatter,psychologicallymediatedisn'tpartofthesemanticalstory.)
Thepointis,iftheasymmetricdependencestoryaboutrobustnesscanbetoldjustintermsofsymbolworldcausalrelations,thenwecantelliteveninacontext
wheretheprojectisnaturalization.Nodoubt,it'sthelinguisticpoliciesofspeakersthatgiverisetotheasymmetriccausaldependencesintermsofwhichthe
conditionsforrobustness

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aredefinedbuttheconditionsforrobustnessquantifyoverthemediatingmechanisms,andsocanbestatedwithoutreferringtothepolicieshencetheircompatibility
withnaturalism.
Ataminimum,nobodywhoisindependentlycommittedtothereductionofsemanticrelationstocausalonesshouldboggleatthiswayofaccommodatingthefacts
aboutrobustness.Informationaltheories,forexample,define"information"injustthissortofway:i.e.,theyappealtoreliablecovarianceswhilequantifyingoverthe
causalmechanismsbywhichthesecovariancesaresustained.Bydoingso,theyexplainwhyinformation(indeed,whytheverysameinformation)canbetransmitted
oversomanydifferentkindsofchannels.
Well,similarly,ifit'sthecausalpatternsthemselvesthatcount,ratherthanthemechanismswhoseoperationsgiverisetothem,thenperhapsourmental
representationscanberobustjustinvirtueofasymmetricdependencesamongthecausalpatternsthatourconceptsenterinto.12Thatis,perhapstherecouldbe
mechanismswhichsustainasymmetricdependencesamongtherelationsbetweenmentalrepresentationsandtheworld,eventhough,patently,wehavenopolicies
withrespecttothetokeningsofourmentalrepresentations.Ifthatwereso,thentheconditionsfortherobustnessoflinguisticexpressionsandtheconditionsforthe
robustnessofmentalrepresentationsmightbeidenticaleventhough,ofcourse,themechanismsinvirtueofwhoseoperationsthetwosortsofsymbolssatisfythe
conditionsforrobustnesswouldbevery,verydifferent.Someracesarewonbysailboatsandsomearewonbysteamboats,andthemechanismswhoseoperation
eventuatesinwinningthetwosortsofracesarevery,verydifferent.Buttheconditionsforwinningquantifyoverthemechanismsandarethesameforbothsortsof
raceshoweveryouaredriven,allyouhavetodotowiniscomeinfirst(oncorrectedtime,tobesure).
Somuchforsomeoftheintuitionsthatarerunningtheshow.Nowlet'sseetothecounterexamples.
1.FirstObjection:"Whatabout'unicorn'?Itseemsimplausiblethatnonunicorncaused'unicorn'tokensshoulddependonunicorncaused'unicorn'tokenssince,as
youmayhavenoticed,therearemanyoftheformerbutnoneofthelatter."
Firstreply:That'soneofthereasonswhyIwanttodothethingintermsofnomicrelationsamongpropertiesratherthancausalrelationsamongindividuals.Itakeit
thattherecanbenomicrelationsamongpropertiesthataren'tinstantiatedsoitcanbetruethatthe

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propertyofbeingaunicornisnomologicallylinkedwiththepropertyofbeingacauseof"unicorn"seveniftherearen'tanyunicorns.Maybethiscashesoutinto
somethinglike"therewouldn'tbenonunicorncaused"unicorn"tokensbutthatunicornswouldcause"unicorn"tokensiftherewereanyunicorns.And
maybethatcashesoutintosomethinglike:therearenonunicorncaused''unicorn"tokensinworldsthatareclosetousonlyifthereareunicorncaused
"unicorn"tokensinworldsthatareclosetothem.Butthisisveryapproximate.Forexample,Isupposethat"unicorn"isan(uninstantiated)kindterm.Itwill
becomeclearlater,whenweworryaboutdoppelgngersofthingsthatareintheextensionsofkindterms,thatthisentailsthat,ceterisparibus,noworldinwhichonly
nonunicornscause"unicorns"canbeasclosetooursassomeworldinwhichonlyunicornsdo.Andanyhow,forreasonspreviouslysetout,Iamnotanenthusiastfor
suchtranslations.
Twosubsidiarypointsshouldbenoticed.First,thiswayofcompensatingforthelackofunicornswon'tworkifthelackofunicornsisnecessary(e.g.,nomologically
ormetaphysicallynecessary).For,inthatcase,it'snotalawthatiftherewereunicornstheywouldcause"unicorn"tokenslawsaren'tmadetruebyvacuous
satisfactionsoftheirantecedents.Similarlinesofargumentsuggestwhatappearstobequiteastrongconsequenceoftheasymmetricdependencestory:noprimitive
symbolcanexpressapropertythatisnecessarilyuninstantiated.(Therecan't,forexample,beaprimitivesymbolthatexpressesthepropertyofbeingaroundsquare).
Onewouldthinkthatatheorythatmakessostrongaclaimshouldbeprettyeasytotest.Notso,however,inthepresentcase.Foronething,thenotionof
primitivenessthat'satissuehereisn'tentirelyclear.Youcould,presumably,haveasyntacticallyprimitivesymbol13thatmeansisaroundsquaresolongasitis
'introducedby'adefinition.Whatever,precisely,thatmaymean.Inshort,althoughtheclaimthatallnecessarilyuninstantiatedpropertiesmaybeexpressedby
complexsymbolslookstoruleoutalotofpossibilities,I,forone,can'tthinkofanywaytodecidewhetherit'strue.Suggestionsaregratefullysolicited.
2.SecondObjection:Whydoesn't"horse"meansmallhorse,seeingthat,afterall,ifhorsescause"horses"itfollowsthatsmallhorsescause"horses".
SecondReply:That'sanotherreasonwhyIwanttodothethingintermsofnomicrelationsamongpropertiesratherthancausalrelationsamongindividuals.Being
struckbylightningcausedthedeathofthecow.TheboltthatkilledthecowwasthefourththatTuesday,sobeingstruckbythefourthboltonthatTuesdaycausedthe
death

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ofthecow"cause"istransparenttothatsortofsubstitution.Butthoughit'strue(giventheassumptions)thatbeingstruckbythefourthboltonTuesdaykilledthecow,
thelawthat"covered"thatcausaltransactionappliestocowsandlightningboltsquacowandlightningbolts(or,perhaps,quaorganismsandelectricaldischarges?)it
wasbecauseitwasalightningboltandnotbecauseitwasthefourthsuchboltthatTuesdaythatitshittingthecowcausedthecowtodie.
Well,similarlyinthesemanticcase.Smallhorsescause"horse"sifhorsesdobutnothingfollowsastotheidentityofthepropertiesinvolvedinthelawthatcovers
thesecausaltransactions(exceptthatsmallhorsesmustbeintheextensionoftheoneandtoken"horse"sintheextensionoftheother).Asitturnsout,routine
applicationofthemethodofdifferencessuggeststhatitmustbethepropertyofbeingahorseandnotthepropertyofbeingasmallhorsethatisconnectedwiththe
propertyofbeingacauseof"horse"tokenssincemanythingsthathavethefirstpropertyhavethethirddespitetheirlackofthesecond:largehorsesandmedium
horsessimplyspringtomind.(Similarconsiderationsexplainwhy''horse"meanshorseratherthan,asitmightbe,animalconsiderthisatakehomeassignment.)
3.ThirdObjection(suggestedindependentlybyStevenWagner,TimMaudlin,andScottWeinstein,inreversechronologicalorder.)Aha!Buthowaboutthis:
Consider,ontheonehand,OldPaint(hereinafterOP)and,ontheotherhand,allthehorsesexceptOldPaint(hereinafterHEOPs).It'splausiblethatOPwouldn't
cause"horse"sexceptthatHEOPsdoandit'salsoplausiblethatHEOPswouldcause"horse"sevenifOPdidn't.SoOP'scausing"horse"sisasymmetrically
dependentonHEOPscausing"horse"sso"horse"meansallthehorsesexceptOldPaint.
ThirdReply:ThisisathirdreasonwhyIwanttodoitintermsofnomicrelationsamongpropertiesratherthancausalrelationsamongindividuals.Inwhatfollows,I
willoftenhaveclaimstomakeaboutwhathappenswhenyoubreaktheconnectionbetweenXsand"X"s.Inthinkingabouttheseclaimsitisessentialtobearinmind
that'breaktheconnectionbetweenXsand"X"s'isalwaysshorthandfor'breaktheconnectionbetweenthepropertyinvirtueofwhichXscause"X"sandthe
propertyofbeingacauseof"X"s'.Inthepresentcase,bystipulationthepropertyinvirtueofwhichOPcauses"horse"sisthepropertyofbeingahorse.Butifyou
breaktheconnectionbetweenthatpropertyandthepropertyofbeingacauseof"horse"s,thentheconnectionbetweenHEOPsand"horse"sfailstoo(since,of
course,

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HEOPsarecausesof"horse"snotinvirtueofbeingHEOPs,butinvirtueofbeinghorses).
SoOP'scausing"horse"sisnot,afterall,asymmetricallydependentonHEOPscausing"horse"s,andthecounterexamplefails.
NextWorry:Doesasymmetricdependencereallysolvethedisjunctionproblem?
Asymmetricdependencefindsadifferencebetween,ontheonehand,falsetokens,representationinthought,andthelikeand,ontheotherhand,symboltokensthat
arecausedbythingsthattheyapplyto.Butisittherightdifference?Doesit,forexample,explainwhyit'sonlyinthecaseofthelattersortoftokeningsthatetiology
determinesmeaning?Inowproposetolookrathercloselyatsomeworriesabouthowtheasymmetricdependencestorycopeswiththedisjunctionproblem.
4.Baker'sObjection:HereisapassagefromacriticaldiscussionofasymmetricdependenceinarecentpaperbyLynneRudderBaker(inpress).
Letusconsiderthisaccountinlightofaparticularcase.Supposethat,althoughtherearemanyordinarycatsaround,acertainperson,S,learnsaparticularMentalesesymbol
solelyfromartifacts(say,Putnam'srobotcats)thatimpingeonsensorysurfacesinexactlythesamewayascats.Now(forthefirsttime)Sseesarealcat....HowshouldFodor
interpretthecatcausedtoken?...Thereseemtobethreepossibilities...

noneofwhich,Bakerthinks,istolerable.Theseare:
(a)thetokenmeanscatandisthustrueofthecat.Butthiscan'tberightbecause"...ifthereisanyasymmetricdependence,itgoestheotherway.S'spresent
dispositiontoapply'cat'toarealcatdependsuponhercorrespondingcurrentdispositiontoapplyittorobotcats."
(b)thetokenmeansrobotcatandisthusfalseofthecat.Butthiscan'tberightsinceitignoresrelevantcounterfactuals.Specifically,itignoresthefactthatalthough
onlyrobotsdidcauseS's"cats"catswouldhavecausedthemifShadhappenedtoencounterany."...the[counterfactualsupporting]correlationisbetweentokens
ofacertaintypeand(catsorrobotcats).ItissimplyanaccidentthattheactualcausesofS'searlyrepresentationswereallrobotcats..."
ThisisaformofargumentIacceptseethediscussionofDretske's"learningperiod"accountofthedisjunctionprobleminChapter3.
(c)thetokenmeansrobotcatorcatandisthustrueofthecat.But

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thiscan'tberightbecauseit"...justrekindlesthedisjunctionproblem....[Moreover,onthisaccount]boththecatcausedandtherobotcausedtokensare
veridicalafterallevenwhenS,onsubsequentlydiscoveringthedifferencebetweencatsandrobotcats,exclaims,'Imistookthatrobotforacat!'[OptionC]seems
toprecludesayingthatSmadeanerror.Wewouldhavetosaythathermistakewastothinkthatshehadmadeamistake,andtry...tofindsomewaytomake
senseofher'secondorder'mistake."(Allquotesfromms.pp.68,passim).
Sononeofthethreeoptionsisanygood.Sotheremustbesomethingwrongwiththewaytheasymmetricdependencestorytreatsthedisjunctionproblem.Whatto
dothen,whattodo?
ForreasonsthatwillbecomeclearwhenwediscusstheechtTwinEarthproblem(theoneaboutH2OandXYZ),Baker'scaseisincertainimportantrespects
underdescribed.However,givenjusttheinformationthatsheprovidesandthechoicesthatsheoffers,Ioptfor(c)thatfirst"cat"14tokenmeanscatorrobotandis
thustrueofthecatthatit'sappliedto.15Iampleasedtobeabletotellyouthatatleastoneotherphilosophersharesthisintuition.FredDretskesomewhereconsiders
thefollowingvariantofaTwinEarthexample:TherearebothH2OandXYZonTwinEarth,but,justfortuitously,somespeakerofthelocaldialectlearns"water"only
fromostensionsofsamplesofH2O.Dretske'sintuition(andmine)isthatthisspeaker'stokensof"water"meanH2OorXYZinthiscase,thoughnotinthestandard
Twincases,thefactthatthespeakerwouldhavecalledXYZsamples"water''countsfordeterminingtheextensionthattermhasinhismouth.SinceBaker'scat/robot
caseseemstobemuchthesamesortofexample,ItakeitthatDretskewouldsharemyviewthat"cat"meanscatorrobotcatinthecircumstancesthatBaker
imagines.16
HowgoodaretheobjectionsBakerraisesagainstthisanalysis?Bakersaysthattooptfor(c)"rekindlesthedisjunctionproblem,"butIdon'tseethatthatisso:Itis
OKforsomepredicatestobedisjunctiveaslongasnotallofthemare.Onecanperfectlyconsistentlyhold,ontheonehand,that"cat"meansrobotorcatwhenit's
accidentalthatyoulearneditjustfromrobotcatswhiledenying,ontheotherhand,thatitwouldmeancatorrobotifyouhadlearneditinaworldwhereallyou
couldhavelearneditfromwererobotcats(e.g.,becausetherearen'tanycatsaround.)Similarly,Dretskecanconsistentlyholdthat"water"istrueofH2OorXYZin
thecasehedescribeswhileagreeingthatitistrueofH2OandfalseofXYZinthecasethatPutnamdescribes.

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ButwhatofS'ssense,onsubsequentlydiscoveringthedifferencebetweenrobotsandcats,thatsheusedtobemistakenwhensheapplied"cats"torobots?Ifher
"cat"tokensmeantcatorrobot,thentheyweretrueofboththecatsandtherobotsthatsheappliedthemto.Isshe,then,mistakentosupposethatsheusedtobe
mistaken?Thereis,Ithink,aneasyanswerandaninterestinganswer.
EasyAnswer:Susednottodistinguishbetweencatsandrobotsherindiscriminateapplicationofthesametermtobothwasasymptomofherfailuretodistinguish
betweenthem.Notdistinguishingbetweencatsandrobotswasaseriousmistake(byS'scurrentlights.And,ofcourse,byours).
InterestingAnswer:Thisdependsonformulatingthedisjunctionproblemalittlemorecarefullythanoneusuallyneedsto.Atypicalinstanceofthedisjunction
problemis:"Whydoestheextensionof'cat'notcontainbothcatsandrats,assumingthatbothcatsandratscause'cat's?"Thisisn'tquitethesameas:"Whydoesn't
'cat'meancatorratgiventhatbothcatsandratscause'cats'?"ThedifferencemakesadifferenceinBaker'scase.
Supposethatoption(c)isright.Then,ifSusedtouse"cat"inthewaythatBakerimagines,catsandrobotswerebothinitsextension.Butthisdoesn't,ofcourse,
implythatSused"cat"toexpressthedisjunctiveconceptCATORROBOT(i.e.,tomeancatorrobot).Quitethecontrary,Scouldn'thaveused"cat"toexpress
thatconceptbecause,byassumption,shedidn'thavethatconcept.NobodycanhavetheconceptCATORROBOTunlesshehastheconstituentconceptsCATand
ROBOTwhichbyassumption,Sdidn't.
So,then,whatconceptdidSuse"cat"toexpressaccordingtooption(c)?Therejustisn'tanywaytosayEnglishprovidesonlyadisjunctiveformula(viz.,the
expression"catorrobot")topickouttheextension{catsUrobots},andthisdisjunctiveformulaexpressesadisjunctiveconcept(viz.,theconceptCATOR
ROBOT),hencenottheconceptthatShadinmind.(RathersimilarargumentsshowthatEnglishwon'tletyousaywhat"water"meansinthemouthofmyTwinEarth
twinand,mutatismutandis,thatEnglish2won'tletmytwinsaywhat"water"meansinmymouth.)
NowwecanseewhatmistakeSusedtomakewhensheapplied"cat"torobots.Nodoubtwhatshesaidwhenshedidsowassomethingtrue.Butshesaiditbecause
shetookitthattherobotsthatshecalled"cats"hadacertainnondisjunctivepropertywhichtheysharedwitheverythingelseintheset{catsUrobots}.Byherpresent
lights,bycontrast,thereisnosuchproperty.Byherpresentlights,theonly

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propertythatcatsandrobotssharequacatsandrobotsisthedisjunctivepropertyofBEINGACATORAROBOT.So,byherpresentlights,whensheusedtosay
"cat"ofrobots(orofcatsforthatmatter)shewassayingsomethingtrue,butshewassayingitforthewrongreason.Henceherpresent(wellfounded)intuitionthat
therewassomesortofmistakeunderlyingherusage.
Givenallthis,ItakeitthatBaker'scasedoesn'trefutetheasymmetricdependenceaccountofcontent.
5.Indeterminacy.WesawinChapter3thatteleologicalsolutionstothedisjunctionproblemhavethefollowingnastyhabit:Teleologygoessoftjustwhenyouneedit
mostyougetindeterminaciesoffunctioninjustthecaseswhereyouwouldliketoappealtofunctiontoresolveindeterminaciesofcontent.
Inthenotoriousfrogandbugcase,forexample,onewouldthinkthatagoodtheoryofcontentshoulddecideandshouldgivesomereasonsfordecidingwhether
theintentionalobjectsofthefrog'ssnapsarefliesorlittleblackthings(ineffect,whetherthecontentofthefrog'smentalstateis'there'safly'or'there'saflyorbee
bee').17But,oninspection,theteleologicalstoryaboutcontentfailstodoso.TorecapitulatetheargumentIgaveinChapter3:Youcansaywhysnappingisagood
thingforfrogstodogiventheirsituation,whicheverwayyoudescribewhattheysnapat.Allthat'srequiredforfrogsnapstobefunctionalisthattheynormally
succeedingettingthefliesintothefrogsand,solongasthelittleblackdotsinthefrog'sNormalenvironmentareflies,thesnapsdothisequallywelloneitheraccount
oftheirintentionalobjects.Themathematicsofsurvivalcomeoutpreciselythesameeitherway.(Thisisthesortofthingthatmakesphilosophersfeelincorrectlybut
understandablythat,deepdown,contentmakesnodifference.FirstDarwinism,thennihilismwhenDarwinismfailsacareerfamiliarenoughfromnineteenth
centurymoraltheory.)
Theasymmetricdependencestory,bycontrast,decidesthecase.Thefrog'ssnapsatfliesareasymmetricallydependentonitssnapsatlittleblackdots.Soitisblack
dots,notflies,thatfrogssnapat.(Dedicto,ofcoursedereit'strueboththatfrogssnapatlittleblackdotsandthattheysnapatfliessinceNormallyfliesaretheonly
littleblackdotsthatfrogscomeacross.)
Threesubsidiaryobjectionsnowneedtobeconsidered.Towit:
(i)"Whatmakesyousosurethatthecounterfactualsarethewaythatyou'reassuming?Whosaysthattheflysnapsareasymmetricallydependentonthe
blackdotsnapsandnotviceversa?"

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Strictlyspeaking,thisisasortofquestionIdonotfeelobligedtoansweritsuffices,forthepresentmetaphysicalpurposes,thattherearenaturalisticallyspecifiable
conditions,notknowntobefalse,suchthatiftheyobtainthereisamatteroffactaboutwhatthefrogissnappingat.(Seeabove,thediscussionofwhohastheburden
ofargument.)However,justthisonce:
Thecrucialobservationisthatfrogscontinuetosnapat(andingest)beebeesevenwhentheyhaveplentyofevidencethatthebeebeesthatthey'resnappingataren't
flies.Thatis:frogscontinuetosnapatdotsinworldswheretherearedotsbutnofliesbuttheydon'tsnapatfliesinworldswheretherearefliesbutnodots.18(Infact,
frogswon'tevensnapatdeadfliesit'smovingblackdotstheycareabout.)Itakeitthatthisstronglysuggeststhateitherthereisnonomicrelationbetweenthe
propertyofbeingaflyandthepropertyofbeingacauseoffrogsnaps,orthat,ifthereissucharelation,itdependsasymmetricallyuponthenomicrelationbetween
thepropertyofbeingablackdotandthepropertyofbeingacauseofflysnaps.
SofarasIcantell,there'snothingspecialherejustaroutineemploymentofthemethodofdifferences.
(ii)"Doesn'tasymmetricdependencecapitulatetotheargumentfromillusion?Iftheintentionalobjectofthefrog'sflysnapsislittleblackdotswhen(dere)the
frogsnapsatflies,thenmaybetheintentionalobjectofmyflyswatsislittleblackdotswhen(dere)Iswatatflies.Ifthefactthatfrogssometimessnapatlittle
blackdotsthataren'tfliesmeansthattheyhaven'tgotaFLYconcept,doesn'tthefactthatIsometimesswatatlittleblackdotsthataren'tfliesmeanthatI
haven'tgotaFLYconcepteither?"
Therelevantconsiderationisn'thowever,justthatfrogssometimesgoforbeebeesit'sthattheyarepreparedtogoongoingforbeebeesforever.SometimesIswat
atmereflyappearancesbutusuallyIonlyswatifthere'safly.SometimesMacbethstartsatmeredaggerappearancesbutmostofthetimehestartlesonlyifthere'sa
dagger.WhatMacbethandIhaveincommonandwhatdistinguishesourcasefromthefrog'sisthatthoughheandIbothmakemistakes,wearebothina
positiontorecover.19Bycontrast,frogshavenowayatalloftellingfliesfrombeebees.Ifyouthinkoffrogsnapsatblackdotsasmistakenwhentheblackdots
arebeebees,thensuchmistakesarenomologicallynecessaryforthefrogandthisnotjustintheweakishsensethatit'salawthatblackdotselicitsnapsiffliesdoin
thisworld,butalsointhestrongersensethatblackdotselicitsnapsif

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fliesdoinallrelevantworldswherethefrog'spsychologicalconstitutionisthesameashere.
Thereisnoworldcompatiblewiththeperceptualmechanismsoffrogsinwhichtheycanavoidmistakingblackdotsforflies.Whereasevenif,freakishly,Imistakeall
thedaggerappearancesIactuallycomeacrossfordaggersandevenif,stillmorefreakishly,Ineverdorecoverfromanyofthesemistakes,still,thatwouldbean
accidentsinceitisnomologicallyconsonantwiththewaythatI'mconstructedthatIshoulddistinguishdaggersfromdaggerappearancessomeofthetime.Butitisnot
nomologicallyconsonantwiththewaythatfrogsareconstructedthattheyshouldeverdistinguishblackdotsfromflies.
SoMacbethandIhavedaggerdetectorsandnotdaggerordaggerappearancedetectorsbutfrogshaveblackdotdetectorsandnotflydetectors.
Here,then,isaninterestingconsequenceofthepresentstoryaboutcontent:Anorganismcan'thaveakindofsymbolwhichitnecessarilymisapplies,i.e.,whichit
misappliesineveryworldcompatiblewithitspsychology.SupposethatXslookalotlikeYssupposetheylookenoughlikeYsthatStokensarequiteoftenappliedto
them.Still,ifSmeansYandnotX,then(accordingtothetheory)theremustbeworlds,consonantwiththeorganism'spsychologyinthisworld,inwhichStokens
areappliedtoYsbutwithheldfromXs.(And,ofcourse,theasymmetricdependenceconditionrequiresthat,ceterisparibus,somesuchworldsarenearertoours
thenanyworldsinwhichStokensareappliedtoXsbutwithheldfromYsseesections8and10below).Thebottomlineisthatit'simpossibleforfrogstohaveFLY
conceptsbutnotimpossibleforustohaveFLYconcepts.Thisisbecauseit'sconsonantwithourpsychology,butnotwiththeirs,tosometimesdistinguishfliesfrom
beebees.
Thisconsequenceconstrainsrobustness.Thereare,afterall,somemistakesthatcan'tbemadeviz.,mistakesfromwhichitisnomologicallyimpossibletorecover,
consonantwiththecharacterofone'spsychology.Tothisextent,theasymmetricdependencestoryisanattenuatedsortofverificationism.Ithinkthatperhapsit
captureswhat'strueaboutverificationismbut,ofcourse,Iwouldthinkthat.20
(iii)"Howdoyouavoidsayingthatfrogsarereallysnappingattheirretinas?"
Thepointaboutblackdotswasthat(we'reassuming)inthefrog'secology,'isablackdot'isadescriptionNormallytrueofflies.Soourproblemwastochoose
fromamongthedescriptionsthatfliesNormallysatisfywhenfrogssnapatthemthedescriptionsthatfrogs

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snapatthemunder.Theremay,however,beXsotherthanflies,andFsotherthanbeingablackdot,suchthatfliesgettingsnappedatbyfrogsisasymmetrically
dependentonXsbeingF.Iftherearesuch,thequestionwouldarise:Whyaren'tXsthatareFstheintentionalobjectsofflysnaps?
Forexample:it'spresumablyalawthatnoflygetssnappedatexceptassomeproximalprojectionoftheflyproducessomestateofexcitationoftheretinaofthefrog
aretinalexcitationthatis,inturn,causallyimplicatedinproducingthesnap.Moreover,it'splausiblethatsuchstatesofretinalexcitationwouldbesufficientforcausing
frogsnapsevenifthey(theexcitations)weren'tproducedbyproximalprojectionsofflies.Ifallthisistrue,thenthefrog'sflyelicitedflysnapsareasymmetrically
dependentonthesestatesofretinalexcitation.Sowhyaren'ttheexcitationstatestheintentionalobjectsofthefrog'ssnaps?
Idon'tknowwhatthestoryiswithfrogs,butinthegeneralcasethereisnoreasonatalltosupposethatthecausaldependenceofperceptualstatesondistalobjectsis
asymmetricallydependentonthecausaldependenceofspecificarraysofproximalstimulionthedistalobjectse.g.,thattherearespecifiablesortsofproximal
tracesthatacowhastoleaveonpainofthecowCOWconnectionfailing.Onthecontrary,intheusualcasethereareaheterogeneityofproximalarraysthatwill
eventuateincowperception,andthere'sagoodreasonforthis:Since,duetothelawsofoptics,interaliacowsaremappedonemanyontotheirproximal
projections,themechanismsofperceptionconstancy,bias,sharpening,andthelikemustmaptheproximalprojectionsmanyoneontotokeningsofCOW.Given
thevastnumberofwaysthatcowsmayimpingeuponsensorymechanisms,aperceptualsystemwhichmadeCOWtokeningsintimatelydependentuponspecific
proximalprojectionswouldn'tworkasacowspotter.
Itmightstillbesaid,however,thatthedependenceofcowthoughtsondistalcowsisasymmetricallydependentontheirdependenceondisjunctionsofproximalcow
projectionsdistalcowswouldn'tevokeCOWtokensbutthattheyprojectproximalwhiffsorglimpsesorsnapsorcracklesor...well,orwhat?Since,afterall,cow
spottingcanbemediatedbytheorytoanyextentyoulike,thebarestwhifforglimpseofcowcandothejobforanobserverwhoissuitablyattuned.Less,indeed,
thanawhifforglimpseamererippleincowinfestedwatersmaysufficetoturnthetrick.Onthepresentview,cowthoughtsdonot,ofcourse,owetheirintentional
contenttothebeliefsystemsinwhichtheyareembeddedwhatdeterminestheircontentissimplytheirasymmetriccausalde

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pendenceoncows.Butitisquitecompatiblewiththisthatbeliefsystemsshouldmediatethesesemanticallysalientcausaldependencies.Theycanformlinksinthe
causalchainthatrunsfromcowstoCOWtokens,justasinstrumentsofobservationformlinksinthecausalchainthatrunsfromgalaxiestoGALAXYtokens.21To
theextentthatthisisso,justaboutanyproximaldisplaymightmediatetherelationbetweencowsandcowthoughtsforsomecowthinkerorotheronsomeorother
cowspottingoccasion.
Sobarringappealstoopendisjunctions,itseemslikelythatthereisjustnowaytospecifyanarrayofproximalstimulationsuponwhichthedependenceofcow
thoughtsuponcowsisasymmetricallydependent.Andhere'swhereIquit.22Imean,itdoesseemtomethatthepriceofintentionalunivocalityisholdingthatprimitive
intentionalstatescan'texpressopendisjunctions.Theideamightbethat,ontheonehand,contentdependsonnomicrelationsamongpropertiesand,ontheother,
nothingfallsunderalawbysatisfyinganopendisjunction(opendisjunctionsaren'tprojectible).Liketheprohibitionagainstprimitivesymbolsthatexpressimpossible
properties,thisstrikesmeasaverystrongconsequenceofthepresentsemanticaltheorybutnotanembarrassmentbecausenotobviouslyfalse.23
6.WhatabouttheLogicalVocabulary?Idon'tknowwhataboutthelogicalvocabulary.SinceIthinkthatKripke'sobjectionfails(seeabove),I'minclinedtothink
thatmaybethereisnoobjectiontotheideathat"+","and","all"andthelikehavethemeaningstheydobecausetheyplayacertaincausalroleinthementallivesof
theirusers.Thiswould,ofcourse,betoacceptadistinctioninkindbetweenthelogicalandthenonlogicalvocabularies.(Thesemanticsfortheformerwouldbeakind
of'use'theory,whereasthesemanticsforthelatterwoulddependonnomic,specificallymindworld,relations.)GilbertHarmansomewheresuggeststhattobea
logicalwordjustistobethesortofwordofwhichausetheoryofmeaningistrue.Thatproposalstrikesmeasplausible.
Youmaywonderhowanybodywhoclaimstobeimplacablyopposedtoinferentialrolesemanticscanhavethegalltoidentifythemeaningofalogicalwordwithits
use.Answer:thetroublewithusetheoriesisthattheyinviteholismbywellknownpathsofargument(seechapter3aboveand,moreextensively,Psychosemantics,
chapter3).Buttheseholisticargumentsdependontheacknowledgedimpossibilityofdefiningmostterms(specifically,ontheimpossibilityofdistinguishingdefining
frommerelynomicbiconditionals).Itisthereforeunclearthattheyapplytothelogicalvocabularysincetermsin

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thelogicalvocabularygenerallyaredefinable:Anythingcountsasmeaningplusthatexpressesafunctionfromthenumbersm,ntom+nanythingcountsasmeaning
andthatexpressesafunctionfrompropositionstotruthvaluesandassignstruetoP,QiffitassignstruetoP&Q.
Correspondingly,itisarguablyasufficientconditionforaspeaker'smeaningplusby"+"that,ceterisparibus,hetakes"m+n"todesignatethesumofmandna
sufficientconditionforaspeaker'smeaningandby"and"that,ceterisparibus,hetakes"PandQ"tobetrueiffhetakes"P''tobetrueand"Q"tobetrueandso
forth.(Relationslike"takingtoexpress,""takingtobetrue"which,onthisconstrual,holdbetweensymbolusersandsymbolstheyusewouldhavetoreceivea
causal/dispositionalreconstructionifcircularityistobeavoided.Buttherearefamiliarproposalsforweddingfunctionalistconstrualsoftheserelationstofunctionalrole
theoriesofcontent:Thus,aspeakermeansandby"and"iff,ceterisparibus,hehas"PandQ"inhisbeliefboxiffhehas"P"inhisbeliefboxandhehas"Q"inhis
beliefbox.Inthecaseoflogicalvocabulary,Iknowofnoprincipledreasonwhysomesuchproposalshouldn'tbeendorsed.)
7.WhataboutPredicatesthatExpressAbstractions(like"Virtuous")?Allpredicatesexpressproperties,andallpropertiesareabstract.Thesemanticsofthe
word"virtuous,"forexample,isdeterminedbythenomicrelationbetweenthepropertyofbeingacauseoftokensofthatwordandthepropertyofbeingvirtuous.It
isn'tinterestinglydifferentfromthesemanticsof"horse."
8.Block'sProblem.ThefollowingcharacteristicallyinsightfulobjectionwaspointedouttomebyNedBlockinthefollowingconversationIsupposeI'mgratefulto
him.
Look,yourtheorycomesdownto:"cow"meanscowandnotcatbecause,thoughtherearenomologicallypossibleworldsinwhichcowscause"cow"sbutcatsdon't,thereare
nonomologicallypossibleworldsinwhichcatscause"cow"sbutcowsdon't.Butsuchfaceplausibilityasthisideamayhavedependsonequivocatingbetweentworeadingsof
"cow".Infact,there'sadilemma:Ifyoumeanby"cow"somethinglikethephonological/orthographicsequence#c^o^w#,thenthere'sjustnoreasonatalltobelievetheclaim
you'remaking.Forexample,thereissurelyapossibleworldinwhichcowsdon'tcause#c^o^w#sbuttreesdo,viz.,theworldinwhich#c^o^w#meanstree.So,ifwhenyouwrite
"cow"whatyoumeanis#c^o^w#,thenitclearlycan'tbe

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nomologicallynecessaryinorderfor"cow"tomeancowthatnothingcauses"cows"inworldswherecowsdon't.Noticethatitdoesnogoodtoprotestthattheasymmetric
dependenceconditionissupposedtobesufficientbutnotnecessaryforcontent.Thereisnoorthographic/phoneticsequence'X'whichmightn'tmeantreeinsomenomologically
possibleworldorother,whatever'X'happenstomeanhere.Giventheconventionalityofmeaning,therecouldn'tbe.Itfollowsthatthereisnoorthographic/phoneticsequence'X'
thenomologicallypossibilityoftokeningsofwhichisdependenton'X'sbeingcausedbyXs.SothereisnosuchsequencethatsatisfiesyoursufficientconditionformeaningX.
Asufficientconditionforcontentthatnothingsatisfiesneedn'tmuchconcernBrentano.Orus.
Itwouldn't,ofcourse,beawayoutofthistoamendtheproposaltoread'#c^o^w#meanscowonlyif,ineveryworldinwhichyoubreakthecow#c^o^w#connection,either
nothingcauses#c^o^w#s,or#c^o^w#doesn'tmeancow'.For,thoughthatwouldindeedexcludetheunwantedcases,itwoulddosobyappealingtoasemanticalconditionand
wouldthereforebecircular.Well,forthesamesortofreasonit'salsonogoodarguingthat,intheworldimagined,tokensof#c^o^w#don'tcountastokensofthe(viz.,our)word
"cow"i.e.,toread"cow"in"cows'sareasymmetricallydependentoncows''asnamingtheword"cow"ratherthantheorthographic/phonologicalsequence#c^o^w#.For,that
wouldbetoappealimplicitlytoasemanticalconstrualoftheconditionsfortypeidentifyingwords.Barringcircularity,theorthographic/phonologicalconstrualof'sameword'is
accessibletoanaturalisticsemantics,butthesemanticalconstrualof'sameword'isnot.
So,toputitinanutshell,ifyouread"cow"orthographically/phonologicallytheclaimthat"cow"meanscowbecause"cow"sareasymmetricallydependentoncowsisfalseand
ifyouread"cow"morphemicallytheclaimthat"cow"meanscowbecause"cow"sareasymmetricallydependentoncowsiscircular.Eitherway,it'saclaimthatseemstobein
trouble.

Thisisaprettyniftylineofargument.Justthesame,Ithinktheproblemitraisesisactuallyonlytechnical.
Blockis,ofcourse,perfectlyrightthatforthepurposesofanaturalisticsemanticstheonlynonquestionbeggingreadingof"cow"is#c^o^w#.Henceforthbeitso
read.However,theasymmetricdependenceproposalisthatallelsebeingequal,breakingcow"cow"breaksX"cow"forallX.24Correspondinglytoputthe
point

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intuitivelywhat'swrongwithBlock'sargumentisthatallelseisn'tequalintheworldsthatheimagines.Togetthoseworlds,youneedtosupposenotonlythat
cow"cow"isbroken,butalsoandindependentlythattree"cow"isinforce.It'sthisindependentsuppositionthatviolatesthe'allelseequal'clause.
Here'sawaytomakethesamepointintermsofpossibilia.Ifyouputin'allelseequal',thenwhatthetheoryrequiresisnotthatcowscause"cow"sinevery
nomologicallypossibleworldwhereXscausecows.Rather,what'srequiredisjustthattherebeworldswherecowscause"cows"andnoncowsdon'tandthatthey
benearertoourworldthananyworldinwhichsomenoncowscause"cows"andnocowsdo.Noticethat,onthisformulationoftheasymmetricdependence
condition,thenomologicalpossibilityofBlock'sworldwhere#c^o^w#meanstreeiscompatiblewith"cow''meaning(andhencebeingasymmetricallydependent
upon)cowsinourworld.Atleast,itisontheintuitivelyplausibleassumptionthatworldsthatarejustlikeoursexceptthatit'sthecasethatcowsdon'tcause"cow"s
areipsofactonearertousthanworldsthatarejustlikeoursexceptthatit'sboththecasethatcowsdon'tcause"cows"andthattreesdo.
Let'sdothisonemoretime:Togetthenearestsemanticallyrelevantworldtohere,youbreakcow"cow".AlltheX"cow"relationsthatnomicallydependon
cow"cow"will,ofcourse,gotoo,sincetosaythatX"cow"isnomicallydependentoncow"cow"istosaythat[not(X"cow")unless(cow"cow")]is
nomologicallynecessary.Whatthepresenttheoryclaimsisthat,intheworldthat'sjustlikeoursexceptthatcow"cow"andeverythingnomologicallydependentonit
aregone,X"cow"isfalseforallX(where,torepeat,"cow"isreadas#c^o^w#.)Well,ifthisiswhatyoumeanby'thenearestpossibleworldinwhich
cow"cow"isgone',then,clearly,Block'sworlddoesn'tqualify.TogettoBlock'sworld,youhavetobothbreakcow"cow"andstipulatetree"cow".Sothe
nomologicalpossibilityofBlock'sworldiscompatiblewith"cow"meaningcowaccordingtothepresentversionoftheasymmetricdependencecriterion.So
everythingwouldseemtobeOK.
Corollary:Supposethat,inthisworld,therehappenstobealanguageLinwhich"cow"(viz#c^o^w#)meanstree.Presumablyour(Englishspeakering)useof
"cow"forcowsiscausallyindependentofL'suseof"cow"fortrees.So,then,thenearestworldtooursinwhichcow"cow"goes(takingwithiteverythingthat's
nomicallydependentonit)stillhastree"cow"intactandthenearestworldtooursinwhichtree"cow"goes(takingwithiteverythingthat's

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nomicallydependentonit)stillhascow"cow"intact.Butbyassumption(specifically,bytheassumptionthatonlyLandEnglishuse#c^o^w#),inthenearestworld
inwhichbothcow"cow"andtree"cow"goesforeveryX.So,foreveryX,eitherX"cow"dependsoncow"cow''orX"cow"dependsontree"cow",
neitherofwhichdependsupontheother.So,ifthereisalanguageinwhich"cow"meanscowandalanguageinwhich"cow"meanstree,thentherearetwodifferent
waysinwhichtokensof"cow"satisfytheasymmetricdependencecondition.So"cow"(viz.,#c^o^w#)isambiguous.Thisis,Itakeit,theintuitivelycorrectsolution.
Nextobjection?
9.WhyDoesn't"WATER"MeantheSameas"H2O"?Afterall,it'splausiblethattheyexpressthesamepropertyinwhichcase,itpresumablyfollowsthatneither
conceptisasymmetricallydependentontheother.
Actually,I'minclinedtothinkthat"WATER"doesmeanthesameas"H2O."Whatdoesn'tfollowandisn'ttrueisthathavingtheconceptWATERisthesame
mentalstateashavingtheconceptH2O.(I.e.,it'snotthecasethatconceptsareindividuatedbytheircontents.Foradiscussionofthissortofdistinction,seechapter
6).Wouldyou,therefore,kindlyrephraseyourobjection?
OK.Why,giventhattheyexpressthesameproperty,ishavingtheconceptWATERnotthesamementalstateashavingtheconceptH2O?
Reply:Becauseyoucan'thavetheconceptH2OwithouthavingtheconceptHYDROGENandyoucanhavetheconceptWATERwithouthavingtheconcept
HYDROGENas,indeed,isevidentfromthefactthatthe(Mentalese)expression"H2O"hasinternallexicosyntacticstructure.
10.DotheTwinCases.Tellmewhy"water"doesn'tmeanXYZ.Anddon'ttellmethat"water"doesmeanXYZXYZisn'teveninitsextension.
IsupposetheworryisthatanEnglishspeakerexposedtoXYZwouldcallit"water,"andthetruthofthiscounterfactualsuggeststhatthere'sanomicdependence
betweenthepropertyofbeingacauseof"water"tokensandthedisjunctivepropertyofbeingH2OorXYZ.Since,accordingtothepresentproposal,contentarises
fromsuchnomicdependencies,theproblemistoexplainwhyH2Ois,butXYZisnot,intheextensionof"water."(Lessprecisely,it'stoexplainwhy"water"doesn't
meansomethingdisjunctive.)

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Thethingtokeepyoureyeonisthis:It'sbuiltintothewaythatonetellstheTwinEarthstorythatit'saboutkindterms(mutatismutandis,kindconcepts).Inparticular,
it'spartofthestoryabout"water"beingakindtermthatEnglishspeakersintendedittoapplytoallandonlystuffofthesame(natural)kindasparadigmaticlocal
samples(andsimilarlyfor"water2"asit'susedbyspeakersofEnglish2.)Afortiori,it'spartof"water''and"water2"beingkindtermsthatspeakersintendnottoapply
themtoanythingthatisdistinguishablynotofthesamekindastheirlocalsamples.(Thereare,ofcourse,sortsofexpressionswithperfectlykoshersemanticswhose
usesarenotcontrolledbythesesortsofintentions,thatarethereforenotusedtopickoutnaturalkinds,andwhoseextensionsarethereforedisjunctiveinthesense
thatthingsofmorethanonenaturalkindbelongtothem.Theexpression"stuffsortoflikewater"is,Isuppose,onesuch.)
Mypointisthattheintentiontouse"water"onlyofstuffofthesamekindasthelocalsampleshastheeffectofmakingitsapplicationstoXYZasymmetrically
dependentonitsapplicationstoH2Oceterisparibus.Giventhatpeoplearedisposedtotreat"water"asakindterm(and,ofcourse,giventhatthelocalsamplesare
allinfactH2O)itfollowsthatallelseequaltheywouldapplyittoXYZonlywhentheywouldapplyittoH2Ospecifically,theywouldapplyittoXYZonlywhen
theymistakeXYZforH2Oonlywhen(andonlybecause)theycan'ttellXYZandH2Oapart.Whereas,givenaworldinwhichtheycantellXYZandH2Oapart
(andinwhichtheirintentionswithrespectto"water"arethesameastheyareinthisworld),theywillcontinuetoapply"water"toH2Oandrefrainfromapplyingitto
XYZ.
Noticethatworldsinwhichspeakersintendtouse"water"asakindtermandXYZisdistinguishablefromH2Oare'nearby'relativetoworldsinwhichspeakersdo
notintendtouse"water"asakindtermandXYZisdistinguishablefromH2O.Sothepossibilitiesplayoutlikethis:
InnearbyworldswhereXYZcan'tbedistinguishedfromH2O,ifyoubreaktheH2O/"water"connectionyoulosetheXYZ/"water"connectionandviceversa.
InnearbyworldswhereXYZcanbedistinguishedfromXYZ,ifyoubreaktheH2O/"water"connectionyoulosetheXYZ/"water"connection,butnotviceversa.
So,ceterisparibus,therearenearbyworldswhereyougettheH2O/"water"connectionwithouttheXYZ/"water"connection,butnonearbyworldswhereyougetthe
XYZ/"water"connectionwithout

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theH2O/"water"connection.I.e.,it'snomologicallypossiblefortheXYZ/waterconnectiontofailwithouttheH2O/waterconnectionfailing,butnotviceversa.So
applicationsof"water"toXYZareasymmetricallydependentonapplicationsof"water"toH2O.So''water"meansH2OandnotXYZintheconditionsthattheTwin
Earthstoryimaginesjustasthestandardintuitionsrequire.25
SomuchforH2OandXYZ.Itmaybeuseful,bywayofsummary,tobringtogetherwhatI'vesaidabouttheunicornworry,theBakerworryandtheH2O/XYZ
worry,sinceallthreeinvolvecaseswhereasemantictheoryisrequiredtomakeintuitivelycorrectdeterminationsoftheextensionofatermwithrespecttomerely
possibleentities.
Tobeginwith,youcannowseewhyIsaidthattheBakerexample(aboutcatsandrobotcats)wasunderdescribed.IntheechtTwincases,it'salwaysassumedthat
thespeakerintendsthewordinquestiontobeanaturalkindterm,andthespeaker'shavingthisintentionhastheeffectofmakingthesemanticallyrelevantasymmetric
dependenciestrueofhisuseoftheword.InBaker'scase,bycontrast,weknowthatthespeakereventuallycomestoapply"cat"tocatsandnottorobots,butwe
don'tknowwhetherthisisinvirtueofapreviousstandingdispositiontouse"cat"asakindterm.Bakerdoesn'tsay,soI'veassumedthatthespeakerhadnosuch
standingdisposition.SoBaker's"cat"meanscatorrobotbecause,ontheonehand,Swould(indeed,does)use"cat"foreitherand,ontheother,there'snothingin
Baker'sdescriptionofthecasethatsuggestsamechanism(suchasanintentiontouse"cat"asakindterm)thatwouldmaketheusefortherobotsasymmetrically
dependentupontheuseforthecats(orviceversa).
"Unicorn"meansunicornbecauseyoucanhavelawfulrelationsamonguninstantiatedproperties(andpeoplewouldapply'unicorn'tounicornsiftherewereany).By
contrast,"water"meanswater(andnotXYZ)because,althoughpeoplewoulduse"water"ofXYZiftherewereany(XYZissupposedtobeindistinguishablefrom
H2O)nevertheless,theyhaveasettledpolicyofusing"water"asakindterm(ofusingitonlyforsubstancesactuallyofthesamekindaswater),andtheiradherenceto
thispolicymakestheiruseof"water"forXYZasymmetricallydependentontheiruseof"water"forH2O:there'sabreakintheXYZ/"water"connectionwithouta
breakintheH2O/"water"connectioninnearbyworldwhereH2OisdistinguishablefromXYZ.(If,however,youdon'tlikethisstoryaboutwhy"water"doesn'tmean
XYZ,I'lltellyouadifferentonepresently.)

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11.AbsolutelyLastObjection:Buthowcouldasymmetricdependencebesufficientforcontent?Surelyyoucanhavecaseswhereonenomicrelationis
asymmetricallydependentonanotherbutwherethereisnosemanticalrelationatissue?
Well,maybe,butI'veonlybeenabletothinkoftwocandidates:asymmetricdependencesthatarisefromcausalchainsandasymmetricdependencesthatinvolve
nomicrelationsatdifferentlevelsofanalysis.Andwhat'sstrikingaboutboththesecasesisthattheasymmetricdependencestheygeneratearen'ttherightkindto
producerobustness.Sincemerestipulationcanensurethatonlyasymmetricdependenciesthatdoproducerobustnesscountforsemanticpurposes,neitherofthese
kindsofcasesposesarealthreattomystory.Let'shavealookatthis.
InterlevelRelations:Supposeyouhaveacasewhereamicrolevellaw(BC)providesthemechanismforamacrolevellaw(AD)(inthewaythat,forexample,
Bernoulli'slawprovidesthemechanismforlawsaboutairfoils).ThenitmightbethattheADlawisasymmetricallydependentontheBClaw.Youmightgetthis
if,forexample,BCisnecessarybutnotsufficienttosustainADinthatcase,breakingtheBCconnectionwouldbreaktheADconnectioninall
nomologicallypossibleworlds,buttheremightbenomologicallypossibleworldsinwhichtheADconnectiongoeseventhoughtheBCconnectionisintact.Since
itis,toputitmildly,notobviousthatChastomeanBinsuchcases,itseemsthatasymmetricdependenceisn'tsufficientforcontentafterall.
Reply:Thepointofappealstoasymmetricdependenceintheoriesofcontentistoshowhowtokensofthesametypecouldhaveheterogeneouscausescompatible
withtheirallmeaningthesamethingi.e.,it'stoshowhowrobustnessispossible.Correspondingly,ifasufficientconditionforcontentisgoingtobefashionedinterms
ofasymmetricdependence,itmustadverttothedependenceofonecausallawabout"X"tokensuponanothercausallawabout"X"tokens.Butthesortof
asymmetricdependencesthatinterlevelcasesgeneratedon'tmeetthiscondition.Whatwehaveinthesecasesisalawthatgovernsthetokeningofonething(Dsinthe
example)that'sdependentonalawthatgovernsthetokeningofsomeotherthing(Csintheexample).Thissortofasymmetricdependencedoesn'tproduce
robustness,soit'snotsemanticallyrelevant.
CausalChains:Wediscussedtheseinaslightlydifferentcontextwhenweaskedwhythefrog'sretinalirradiationsarenottheintentionalobjectsofitsflysnaps:The
causallinkbetweendistalstimuliand

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mentalrepresentationsismediatedby(andthusdependsasymmetricallyupon)causallinksbetweenproximalstimuliandmentalrepresentations.Inthatexample,we
weregivenastatewhoseintentionalobjectwasassumedtobeoneofitscauses,andthequestionwaswhichone.Thepresentissueisslightlydifferent:Sincecausal
chainsgiverisetoaspeciesofasymmetricaldependence,andsinceeveryeventbelongstosomecausalchainorother,howarewetoavoidconcludingthateverything
meanssomething?Pansemanticismgonemad.
ShortForm:SupposeAs(quaAs)causeBs(quaBs),andBs(quaBs)causeCs(quaCs),andassumethatAsaresufficientbutnotnecessaryfortheBs.Thenthe
lawACisasymmetricallydependentonthelawBC.Whydoesn'titfollowthatCsmeanB?
Answer:Because,althoughthecausalchainmakestheACconnectionasymmetricallydependontheBCconnection,thedependenceofCsonBsthatit
engendersisnotipsofactorobust,andcontentrequiresnotjustcausaldependencebutrobustnesstoo.ThedependenceofCsonBsisrobustonlyiftherearenon
BcausedCs.ButthecausalchainABC,engendersanasymmetricdependenceinwhichalltheAcausedCsarealsoBcaused.Sotheasymmetric
dependenceofAConBCdoesn'tsatisfytheconditionsonrobustnesssoit'snotsemanticallyrelevant.
ButsupposewehavebothABCandDBC.
(i)Cstilldoesn'tmeanBbecauseeveryCisBcausedandrobustnessfails.
(ii)Cdoesn'tmeanAbecauseCsbeingcausedbynonAsdoesn'tdependonCsbeingcausedbyAs,(i.e.,youdon'tgetXCrelationsthatareasymmetrically
dependentonACrelations).AnanalogousargumentshowsthatCdoesn'tmeanDeither.
(iii)Cdoesn'tmean(AorD)becauseXcausedCsthatareasymmetricallydependentonAorDcausedCsareipsofactoasymmetricallydependentonBcaused
Cs.Intuitively,what'swantedisthat'X'meansXonlyifXsaretheonlysortsofthingsonwhichXsarerobustlydependent.Takehomeproblem:Formulatethe
asymmetricdependenceconditiontomakethisthecase.
Allthatthistechnicalfoolingaroundshowsisthatifwestipulatethatasymmetricdependenceengenderscontentonlyifitproducesrobustness,thenperhapswecan
avoidCrazyPansemanticism:thedoctrinethateverythingmeanssomething.But,ofcourse,somecausalchainsviz.,theonesthatdomeetconditionsforinformation

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androbustnesswill,ipsofacto,meetthepresentconditionsforcontent.So,thereallyinterestingquestioniswhethermeetingtheconditionsforinformationand
robustnessreallyismeetingtheconditionsforcontent.We'llreturntothisattheend.
SomuchforalltheobjectionsI'vebeenabletothinkof.
UnverificationistInterlude
Wearriveatamajorwatershed.Ifweacceptthetheoryasithasbeendevelopedsofar,we'recommittedtoaformofverificationism.For,accordingtothetheory,
it'sasemanticaltruth(itfollowsfromthenatureofsemanticalrelationsassuch)that:
P:Youcannothaveasymbol(/concept)whichexpressespropertyXunlessitisnomologicallypossibleforyoutodistinguishXinstantiationsfrom
instantiationsofanyotherproperty.
Or,toputitslightlydifferently:
P':If"X"expressesatleastX,andifthereisaYwhichitisnotnomologicallypossibleforyoutodistinguishfromX,then"X"expressesYaswellasX(e.g.,it
expressesthedisjunctivepropertyXorY.)26
Now,Idon'tknowofanyperfectlyclearcounterexamplestoP(PaulBoghossianhasstruggledmanfullytoproduceone,butI'mnotconvincedthathe'ssucceeded).27
But,ontheotherhand,Idon'tseewhyPorP'havetobetrue.WhyshouldhavingawordthatmeansXbutnotYdependonbeingable,eveninprinciple,totellXs
andYsapart?Afterall(byassumption)beingXisadifferentstateofaffairsfrombeingYevenif(byassumption)theworldsinwhichdifferencesbetweenXsandYs
showuparetoofarawayforustogetto.ButifthedifferencebetweenbeingXandbeingYisreal,thensotoo,surely,isthedifferencebetweenbeingXandbeing(X
orY).AndifthedifferencebetweenbeingXandbeing(XorY)isreal,whyshouldn'twebeabletotalk(/think),inwaysthatrespectthatdifference?
Idon'tknowhowconvincingyouwillfindthatlineofthoughtI'mnotatallsure,forthatmatter,howconvincingIfindit.Putit,ataminimum,thatthesuccessesof
verificationistphilosophizinghavenot,overtheyears,beenexactlystaggering.Perhapsitwouldbewell,ifonlyasanexercise,toseewhatwewouldhavetochange
aboutthestorywe'vebeentellingifwewantitnottoentailPorP'.
Ithinktheanswerisprettyclear.Thestoryuptonowhashadtwoparts:there'san"information"condition(roughly,"X"expresses

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XonlyifXsquaXscause"X"s)andthere'san"asymmetricdependence"conditionwhichissupposedtotakecareofthe'robustness'casesthecaseswhere"X''sare
causedbythingsotherthanXs.28Itisthefirstofthesetheinformationconditionthatentrainstheverificationism.Correspondingly,thecostofgettingridofthe
verificationismisasemanticaltheorythatis,inasensethatshouldpresentlybecomeclear,notpurelyinformational.Iproposetolayouttherelevantgeography,
leavingittoyoutodecidewhetherornotbeingaverificationistisworthitattheprice.
Youmayrecallthatinchapter3,whenwediscussedtheSkinnertoDretsketraditioninsemantics,Isuggestedthatthefollowingclaimisclosetoitsheart:Whatyour
words(/thoughts)meanisdependententirelyonyourdispositionstotokenthem(onwhatIcalledthe"subjunctivehistory"oftheirtokenings),theactualhistoryof
theirtokeningsbeingsemanticallyirrelevant.
ThediscussionuptillnowhasstuckwithSkinnerandDretskeinassumingthatthisdoctrineiscorrectthatsemanticrelationsare,asIshallnowsay,purely
informational29andit'sprettyclearhowtheverificationismfollows.ConsidertheTwincases.Perhapsthefirstthingoneisinclinedtopointtoasrelevantto
distinguishingtheWATERconceptfromtheWATER2conceptisthattheformer,butnotthelatter,isformedinanenvironmentofH2O.But(purely)informational
theoriesdon'tacknowledgethisappeal.Suchtheoriesdistinguishbetweenconceptsonlyiftheirtokeningsarecontrolledbydifferentlaws.Henceonlyifdifferent
counterfactualsaretrueoftheirtokenings.Henceonlyifthereare(possible)circumstancesinwhichoneconceptwouldbecausedtobetokenedandtheother
conceptwouldnot.SoifyouwanttohavetheWATERconceptdistinctfromtheWATER2concept,andyouwanttoplaybytherulesofapurelyinformational
semantics,youhavetoassumeaworldwhereWATERisunderthecontrolofH2ObutnotunderthecontrolofXYZ,30i.e.,aworldwhereH2OandXYZare
distinguished(afortiori,aworldinwhichH2OandXYZaredistinguishable).Thatishowyougetfrominformationalsemanticstoverificationism.
Correspondingly,thewayyouavoidtheverificationismis:Yourelaxthedemandthatsemanticrelationsbeconstruedsolelybyreferencetosubjunctiveconditionals
youlettheactualhistoriesoftokeningscounttoo.Whatfollowsisasketchofamixedtheoryofthissort.Iproposethreeconditionsontherelationbetween(a
symbol)"X"and(aproperty)X,suchthat,whentheyaresimultaneouslysatisfied,"X"expressesX.OrsoIclaim.I'llthencomment,briefly,onthesortsof
considerationsthatmotivateeachoftheseconditions.AndthenI'llsaysomethingaboutwhatsortsoffactsarehardfor

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thiskindoftheorytoaccommodate.AndthenI'lldoalittletidyingupandalittlemoralizing.Andthenyou'llbegladtohearIproposetostop.
Iclaimthat"X"meansXif:
1.'Xscause"X"s'isalaw.
2.Some"X"sareactuallycausedbyXs.
3.ForallYnot=X,ifYsquaYsactuallycause''X"s,thenYscausing"X"sisasymmetricallydependentonXscausing"X"s.
Comments:
Condition1:'X"X"'isalaw.
ThisjustfollowsDretske.Itensuresthat"X"satleastcarryinformationaboutXs(butnot,N.B.,thattheycarryinformationonlyaboutXs.)
Italsoexplainswhy"horse"meansHORSEandnotSMALLHORSE(eventhoughsmallhorsescause"horses"ifhorsesdo.Theideaisthatwhensmallhorses
cause"horses"thecoveringlawishorse"horse"andnotsmallhorse"horse"(seeabove).
Notice,however,thatcondition1doesn'truleout"horse"meansHORSEOR(COWONADARKNIGHT)sincetheconnectionbetweenthepropertyofbeinga
"horse"tokenandthepropertyofbeinganinstanceofcowonadarknight(unliketheconnectionbetweenthepropertyofbeinga"horse"tokenandthepropertyof
beinganinstanceofsmallhorse)presumablyisnomicontheoperativeassumptionthatcowsondarknightsquacowsondarknightsaresometimesmistakenfor
horses.Thatis,theinformationrequirementdoesn't,inandofitself,solvethedisjunctionproblem.Bynowthisshouldcomeasnotnews.
Condition2:Some"X"sareactuallycausedbyXs.
Thisinvokestheactualhistoryof"X"tokensasconstitutiveofthemeaningof"X"andtherebyviolatestheassumptionsofpureinformationaltheories.
Itrulesout'"horse"meansTwinhorse',"'water"meansXYZ',andthelike.
Italsoallowstheintuitionthatthefirstnonrobotcaused"cat"(inBaker'sexample)wasfalse,incasethat'stheintuitionthatyoufeelinclinedtohave.(Itdoesn't
requirethisintuition,however.Ifyoudon'thaveit,you'refreetoarguethat,forsemanticalpurposes,acausalhistorythatincludesonlyXscountsasincludingXsand
YswhentheexclusionoftheYswasaccidental

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inwhichcase,theintuitionshouldbethatthefirstcatoccasioned"cat"meansCATORROBOTandisthereforetrue.)
Condition3:Asymmetricdependence.
Thisistheheartofthesolutionofthedisjunctionproblemforthemixedtheoryasitwasforthepureone:Itrulesout"horse"meansHORSEORCOWONA
DARKNIGHT,given(a)theassumptionthatsomecowsondarknightsactuallydocause"horses,"and(b)theusualassumptionaboutcounterfactuals(viz.,that
cowsondarknightswouldn'tcause"horses"butthathorsesdo).
Noticethatwecan'trelyoncondition2todothisjob.It'sonethingtoassumethattheactualhistoryof"X"mustcontainXssothat"horse"can'tmeanTWIN
HORSE.It'squiteanotherthingtosupposethatitmustcontainonlyXs(sothat,ifsomecowsondarknightshavecaused"horses"then"horse''meansHORSEOR
COWONADARKNIGHT.)Havingcondition2inthetheoryallowsactualhistoriesoftokeningtobeconstitutiveofthesemanticpropertiesofsymbolscondition
3allowssymbolstoberobustwithrespecttotheiractualhistoriesoftokeningaswellaswithrespecttotheircounterfactualhistories.Thatis,itallowstokensofa
symbolactuallytobecausedbythingsthatarenotitsextension.
Condition3isalsorequiredtoruleout"'horse"meansHORSEPICTURE',toaccountforthedependenceofthemetaphoricalusesof"horse"uponitsliteraluses,
andthelike.Rememberthatnotallnonhorseoccasioned"horse"sareipsofactofalse.
Generalcomment:Themixedtheoryisitselfjustasouponverificationist,butonlyinawaythatmightsurelybeconsidereduntendentious.Weusedtohavetosay
that"X"smeaningXrequiresthenomologicalpossibilityofdistinguishingXfromanypropertythatwouldcause"X"sifitwereinstantiated.(Hencewehadtosay
that"water"meanssomethingdisjunctiveunlessthereisanomologicallypossibleworldinwhichH2OisdistinguishedfromXYZ,etc.)Nowallwerequireisthatitbe
nomologicallypossibletodistinguishXfromanypropertythatisactuallyinstantiatedinthecausalhistoryof"X"s.(Anypropertythatdoesn'tactuallycause"X"sipso
factofailstomeetcondition2that'swhy"water"doesn'tmeanXYZaccordingtothepresentaccount.)Thetheoryisresiduallyverificationistonlyinassumingthatif
cowsondarknightsactuallydocause"horses,"either"horse"meanssomethingdisjunctiveoritisnomologicallypossibletodistinguishhorsesfromcowsonadark
night.(I.e.,the

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residualverificationismisrequiredsothattokensof"horse"thatarecausedbycowsondarknightscanfallundercondition3.)
Ithink,infact,thatthismuchverificationismisprobablybuiltintocausaltheoriesofcontentperse.Thus,yougetactualcausalhistoriestobearonthesemanticsof
kindconceptsbytakingtermslike"water"tomeansomethinglikewhateverbearsthesamekindrelationtothelocalsamples.ThiswillmakeXYZbenotinthe
extensionof"water"ontheassumptionthatthere'snoXYZinthelocalsamples.If,bycontrast,watertokensactuallyarecausedindifferentlybyH2OandXYZ,
youcan'tappealtoactualhistoriestoexcludeXYZfromtheextensionof''water."AndiftheywouldbecausedbyH2OandXYZindifferentlyinanynomologically
accessibleworld(if,thatistosay,it'snotnomologicallypossibletotellthemapart)thenyoucan'tappealtosubjunctivecausalconditionalstoexcludeXYZfromthe
extensionof"water."SothereseemstobenothinglefttokeepXYZoutoftheextensionof"water"consonantwithassumingthatwhat"water"meansmusthave
somethingtodowiththecausationofitstokens.Myadviceis,ifthisbeverificationism,swallowit.
Notice,bytheway,thatit'sstilltrue,onthemixedview,thatfrogssnapatblackdotsratherthanflies.For:somefrogsnaparecausedbyblackdots(blackdots
satisfycondition2)andthereisnoworldcompatiblewiththefrog'spsychologyinwhichfrogssnapatfliesbutnotatblackdots(fliesfailtosatisfycondition3).
Conversely,it'sdaggersratherthandaggerappearancesthatMacbeth'sDAGGERconceptexpressesbecause,althoughdaggersanddaggerappearancesboth
causeDAGGERtokensinthisworld,stilltherearepossibleworldsinwhichMacbethcantellthemapart.Evenifyoudon'twantalotofverificationism,youprobably
wantalittleverificationismtodealwithsemanticalversionsoftheargumentfromillusion.
Here'swhat'shappened:Whereweusedtohaveacausallawaccountofsemanticproperties,wenowhaveanaccountthatinvokesbothcausallawsandactual
causalhistories.Theresultantstoryisonlyminimallyverificationist,whichisarguablyagoodthing.But,ofcourse,thereistheusualnothingfreeforlunch.Pure
informationaltheoriesaren'tgratuitoustherearethingstheydobetterthanmixedtheoriescan.Inparticular,they'reverygoodatunicorns.
Pureinformationaltheoriescantreat"unicorn"sjustthesamewaytheytreat"table"sand"chair"s.Since,accordingtosuchtheories,allthatsemanticrelationsrequireis
therightnomicconnectionsamongproperties,andsinceyoucanhavenomicconnectionsamonguninstantiatedproperties,allthat'srequiredfor"unicorn"stomean
unicornsisanomologicallypossibleworldinwhichtheformerareelicitedbythelatter,togetherwiththesatisfactionoftheusualasym

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metricdependenceconstraints.Uninstantiationisnot,accordingtopureinformationaltheories,asemanticallyinterestingpropertyofproperties.
Mixedinformationaltheories,bycontrast,takequiteaseriousviewofuninstantiationinparticular,"unicorn"can'tmeanUNICORNinvirtueofsatisfyingconditions1
to3sinceitfailsegregiouslytosatisfy2.Theupshotisthat,whereaspuretheoriescantreatUNICORNasaprimitiveconcept,mixedtheorieshavetotreatitas,in
effect,anabbreviateddescription.Mixedtheorieshavetosay,ineffect,thatconceptsthatexpressuninstantiatedpropertiesareipsofactoconstructionsoutof
conceptsthatexpressinstantiatedpropertiesthereis,nodoubt,somethingquaintlyRusselleaninthis.Perhaps,however,it'snotatragedy.Evenpuretheorieshaveto
saythat"squarecircle"can'tbeprimitivesince,ofcourse,thereisn'tanomologicallypossibleworldinwhich"squarecircles"arecausedbyinstantiationsofsquare
circlehood.So,ifthemixedtheorythatembraces1to3can'tbenecessaryforcontent,neithercanthecorrespondingpuretheorythatomitscondition2.
Pureandmixedtheoriesbothhavetoacknowledgeprimitive/derivedasadistinctionofkind.Still,puretheoriescantoleratearathercloserconnectionbetweenbeing
semanticallyprimitiveandbeingsyntacticallysimplethanmixedtheoriescan.Iusedtothink(see"TheCurrentStatusoftheInnatenessControversy"inFodor,
1981c)that"primitiveconcept"justaboutmeant"lexicalconcept"(viz.,conceptexpressedbyasyntacticallysimplepredicateof,asitmightbe,English).I'mnow
inclinedtothinkitjustaboutmeans"lexicalandinstantiatedconcept."Extensionally,thisprobablymakesvanishinglyclosetonodifferencebecauseuninstantiated
lexicalpropertiesarevery,veryrare.Sorarethatonemightriskthespeculationthattheirrarityisn'tanaccident.Maybetheinstantiatedlexicalconcepts
constituteasemanticalnaturalkind.
Summary:HowGodKnowsWhatYou'reThinking.
"EvenGodcouldn'ttell,justbylookinginyourhead,theintentionalcontentofyourneuralstates."31That'sawayofsummarizingthe"externalist"viewofcontent.It's
alsoawayofrejecting"functionalrole"semanticssince,accordingtofunctionalroletheories,whenyouknowthefactsabouttheintramentalcausalrelationsofa
mentalstate,youknowthefactsonwhichitscontentsupervenes.
Robustnessupstheante.If,asI'vebeensupposing,theetiologyofthetokensofanintentionalstatecanbepracticallyarbitrarilyheterogeneousconsonantwithallthe
tokenshavingthesamecon

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tent,thenitpresumablyfollowsthatevenGodcouldn'ttellwhatthecontentofamentalstateisjustbylookingatitsactualcausalrelations.Andthismayseem
unsatisfactory,becausereallycausalasopposedtoinformationaltheorieswouldhaveitthattheactualcausalrelationsofamentalstatetokenarewhat
determinesitscontent.Attheheartofsuchtheoriesistheintuitionthatitmustbesomethinglikebeingcausedbyacatthatmakesacertainthoughtacatthought.
Thetugofwarbetweenthissortofintuitionandthefactsaboutrobustnesshasbeenamainthemeinourdiscussionindeed,the'mixed'storyaboutcontentisan
attempttogiveboththecausalandthenomictheoriestheirdue.
What'sinyourheaddoesn'tdeterminecontentandactualcausalrelationsdon'tdeterminecontent,but:IfGodhasalookatboththeactualcausalrelationsofyour
mentalstateandthesurroundingspaceofcounterfactualcausalrelations,thenHecantellthecontentofyourstate.Thecontentofastatesupervenesonitsactual
causalrelationstogetherwithcertaincounterfactuals.OrsoIclaim.
Ifthisistruethen(barringsomecaveatswe'lllookatpresently)itsolvesBrentano'sproblemaboutthepossibilityofprovidinganaturalisticaccountofcontent.Soif
it'strue,it'simportant.Justbywayofmakingtheclaimgraphic,Iproposetorunthroughanexamplethatshowshow,assumingthetheory,Omnisciencemightconsult
theactualcausalrelationsofamentalstate,togetherwithrelevantcounterfactuals,toresolveasimplecaseofthedisjunctionproblem.Thismaydoasasummaryof
thebodyofdoctrinethatI'vebeendeveloping.
Forsimplicity,IassumethatwhatGodseeswhenHelooksinyourheadisalotoflightbulbs,eachwithaletteronit.(HightechheadshaveLCDs.)Amentalstate
typeisspecifiedbysayingwhichbulbsareoninyourheadwhenyouareinthestate.Atokenofamentalstatetypeisaregionofspacetimeinwhichthe
correspondingarrayofbulbsislit.Thisis,Iimagine,asclosetoneurologicalplausibilityasitisevernecessarytocomeforseriousphilosophicalpurposes.
WhatGodseeswhenhelooksattherelationsbetweenwhat'sinyourheadandwhat'sintheworldisthattherearemanycasesinwhichthebulbsturnonandoffin
lawfulcorrelationwithfeaturesof,say,thelocaldistalenvironment.HecantellthattheserelationsarelawfulbecauseHecantellthattheyarecounterfactual
supporting.AndHecantellthattheyarecounterfactualsupportingbecause,byassumption,Hecanseenotjustactualcausalrelationsbutthespaceofcounterfactuals
thatsurroundthem.
Let'ssupposethathereishowitlookstoHiminaparticularcasesay,inyourparticularcase.Thereisalightbulbmarkedcthat

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regularlygoesonwhentherearecatsaroundandthereislightbulbmarkedsthatregularlygoesonwhenthereareshoesaround.Wecanassumethattherightstory
isthatc'sbeingonmeanscat(i.e.,itconstitutesyourentertainingasatokenoftheconceptCAT)ands'sbeingonmeansshoe.
ButGodcan'tassumethisatleast,notyet.ThereasonHecan'tisthatHe'sgotproblemsaboutrobustness.Itturnsoutthatthoughsomeofthectokeningsinyour
headarecausedbycats,it'salsotruethatsomeofyourctokeningsarecausedbyshoes.Moreover,likethecatccausalpattern,theshoeccausalpattern
supportscounterfactualstherearecircumstancesinwhichshoescausecsreliably.(Iassumethatthestatisticsdon'tmatterthatis,itdoesn'tmattertotheintentional
contentofcstateswhattherelativefrequencyofshoecausedcstocatcausedcsturnsouttobe.Goddoesn'tplaydicewithintentionalascriptions.)
Also,GodhastroublewithTwincats.Twincatsarerobots,henceneithercatsnorshoes.ButtheywouldturnonthecbulbinvirtueofthesimilaritybetweenTwin
catsandrealcats,andtheywouldturnonthesbulbinvirtueofthesimilaritybetweenTwincatsandrealshoes.SinceGodcanseecounterfactuals,Heisabletosee
thatallofthisistrue.
BecauseGodhasthesetroubleswithrobustnessandTwins,Hehasadisjunctionproblem.Thewayit'ssupposedtocomeoutisthatthecsTwincatswouldcause,
likethecsthatshoesdoorwouldcause,aresemanticallyjustlikethecsthatcatsdocause,viz.,theyallmeancat.Caseswhereshoescausecsarecaseswhere
shoesaremistakenforcatscaseswhereTwincatscausecsarecaseswhereTwinswouldbemistakenforcatsiftherewereany.
God,cannot,however,takethewayit'ssupposedtoturnoutforgranted.CharityrequiresthatHeconsideranalternativehypothesis,viz.,thatcisambiguous,with
somectokensmeaningshoeandsomemeaningTwincat.32Here'showGodresolvesthedilemma.HeasksHimself,"Whatwastheactualcausalpatternlike?"and
"Whatwouldthecausalpatternshavebeenlikeinaworldthat'srelevantlyliketherealoneexceptthat,inthecounterfactualworld,csaren'tcausedbycats?"
TheanswertothefirstquestionrulesouttheTwinstherearenoTwincatsintheactualcausalhistoryofctokenings,soctokeningsdon'tmeanTwincats.33The
answertothesecondquestionissupposedtoruleouttheshoes.Therearetworelevantpossibilitieshere:
Oneisthatyouwouldhavegottentheshoecausedctokensevenifthecatcconnectionhadn'tbeeninplace.Butthen,theseshoecausedctokenscan'tmeancat.
For:Nosymbolmeanscatunlessit

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carriesinformationaboutcats.Butnosymbolcarriesinformationaboutcatsunlessitstokeningsaresomehownomicallydependentuponcats.But,onthepresent
assumptions,shoecausedctokeningsaren'tnomicallydependentoncatsyou'dgetthemeveninworldswherethecatcconnectionisbroken.Thepointisthatif
shoescausingcsisn'tsomehownomicallydependentoncatscausingcs,thenGodcanonlytakeshoecausedcstomeancatifHeispreparedtogiveupthebasic
principleofinformationbasedsemanticsviz.,thatthecontentofasymbolissomehowdependentonthelawfulcausalrelationsthatitstokensenterinto.Iassumethat
Godisnotabouttogivethisup.
Theotherrelevantpossibilityisthatshoeswouldn'tcausecsifcatsdidn'tcausecs.Ifthiscounterfactualistrue,thenGodcansquaretheassumptionthatcmeanscat
withontheonehandtherebeingcsthataren'tcausedbycats(robustness)and,ontheotherhandthefoundationalintuitionthatasymbolmeanscatinvirtue
ofsomesortofreliablecausalconnectionthatitstokensbeartocats.Ifevenshoecausedcsarecausallydependentoncatsinthesensethatifcatsdidn'tcausecs
thenshoeswouldn'teitherthenit'sOKforGodtoreadactokenasmeaningcatevenwhenit'scausedbyashoe.
SoGodcantelltheintentionalcontentofyourneuralstatebylookingatitsactualcausalrelationsandatrelevantcounterfactualsineffect,Hecanapplythemethodof
differences,justlikeanyotherrationalagent.Sothere'safactofthematteraboutwhattheintentionalcontentofyourneuralstateis.SoGoddoesn'thavetoworry
aboutBrentano'sproblem.Andneitherdowe.
Orsoitseems.
Conclusion:HaveWeSolvedBrentano'sProblem?
Supposethateverythinginthispaperistrue.Thenwhatwehaveisanexplicationofasemanticalrelation(viz.,thesemanticalrelationbetweenasyntacticallyprimitive
predicateandthepropertyitexpresses)couchedinavocabularythatinvolvesonlynaturalistic(specificallycausal)expressionsandexpressionsthatdenoteintensional
withansobjects(specificallyexpressionsthatdenotelawsandproperties.)Itcomesoutofthistreatmentthatsymbolscanbebothrobustandinformative,consonant
withthebasicsymbolmakingrelationbeingnomicdependence.Since,moreover,theaccountisentirelyatomistic,itfollowsthattheconnectionbetweenintentionality
andholismisn'tintrinsic,eversomanyfashionablephilosophersrecentlytothecontrarynotwithstanding.

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So,doesthissolveBrentano'sproblem?Or,toputitanotherway,doesinformationplusrobustnessequalcontent?Areinformationandrobustnessallyouneed
forintentionality?
Idon'tknowtheanswertothisquestion.Thestandardobjectiontotheidentificationofcontentwithinformationisthedisjunctionproblem.Correspondingly,I've
tacitlyassumedthroughoutthispaperthatifyoucangetatheoryofcontentthatsquarestheintuitionthat"X"meansXonlyif"X"tokenscarryinformationaboutX
instantiationwiththeintuitionthat"X"meansXonlyifyoucanhaveXtokensthataren'tcausedbyXs,thenyou'vedoneallthatasolutiontoBrentano'sproblemis
requiredtodo.Maybe,however,therearereasonsforwantingmorethaninformationandrobustnessforcontent.Whatmightthesereasonsbe?
Well,therearepeoplewhothinkthatyouhavetothrowinsomeconsciousness,forexample.However,toinsistonaninternalconnectionbetweencontentand
consciousnessinthefaceofasuccessfulresearchprogram,fromFreudtoChomsky,thatdependsondenyingthatthereisone,seemstomevaguelyLuddite.)34I
don't,therefore,proposetotakethisideaseriouslybutIdoagreethatifI'mwrong,anditisaseriousidea,thentheproblemofintentionalityisprobablyhopeless
becausetheproblemofconsciousnessisprobablyhopeless.
Anotherpossibilityisthatyouhavetothrowinsomenormativity.Iamsortofinsympathywiththis.Robustnesscapturesthepointthatsomewaysofusingsymbols
areontologicallyparasiticonothers.Butwesurelywantmorewewantittoturnoutthatsomewaysofusingsymbolsarewrong.35Where,inthepictureof
representationthatwe'vebeenconstructing,doestheideagetafootholdthattherearemisrepresentationsandthattheyarethingstobeavoided?
Onemightconsidertryingtoderivethenormativerelationsfromtheontologicalones,butatsecondthought,thisseemsnotplausible.There'snoobviousreasonwhy
thefactthatonewayofusingasymbolisasymmetricallydependentonanotherimpliesthatweshouldpreferthesecondwayofusingittothefirst.Itseems,notjust
herebutalsointhegeneralcase,thatontologicalpriorityisnormativelyneutral,Platotothecontrarynotwithstanding.Whattodo?
Thereaderwhohasfollowedtheargumentthewholewearywaytoheremaynowbefeelingatwingeofnostalgiafortheteleologicalaccountofcontentdeprecatedin
chapter3.AsIremarkedatthetime,talkoffunctionbrings(akindof,anyhow)normativetalkinitstrainwhereveryouhavefunctions,youhavethelogicalspacefor
misfunctionsandmalfunctionstoo.It'sthereforearguablethatteleologicaltheoriesgosomewaytowardreconcilingthedemands

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ofnaturalismwiththenormativityofintentionalascription,withsemanticevaluationsbeingreallyevaluative.Toobadteleologicaltheoriesaresorottenatresolving
intentionalindeterminacy.
It'snot,however,outofthequestionthatwemighthaveitbothways.Theargumentsinchapter3seemtometoshowprettyconclusivelythatyoucannotderivethe
intentionalcontentofamentalstatefromitsbiologicalfunction(not,atleast,ifyouraccountofitsbiologicalfunctionisgroundedinitsselectionalhistory).Butitmight
bewelladvisedtotrygoingtheotherway'round:givenanindependent,nonteleological,naturalisticaccountofcontent(like,forexample,theonethatwe'vebeen
workingon),youmighttryconstruingthefunctionofamentalstatebyreferencetowhatitrepresents.Forexample,thefunctionofthebeliefthatPistorepresentthe
worldasbeingsuchthatPon(certain)occasionswhenit'sthecasethatP.Talkingthiswaydoesnothingtooffendnaturalisticscruplesgiventhatthenotionof
representationisindependentlydefined.
Itis,moreover,anargumentforthisorderofanalysisthattheaccountofthefunctionofintentionalstatesthatitprovidesisplausiblytrue.Iassumethat(anyhow,
higher)organismsarespeciesofdecisiontheoreticmachinesplusorminusabit,theyactinwaysthatwillmaximizetheirutilitiesif(and,exceptbyluck,onlyif)their
beliefsaretrue.Whatisthereforerequiredofabeliefinorderthatitshouldperformitsfunctioninsuchamachineisthatitshouldbetrue.So,tothatextent,false
beliefsipsofactofailtoperformtheirfunctions.Itmightturnout,onthissortofview,thattherearenonormativeimplicationsofrepresentationperse.Representation
isjustacertainkindofcausalrelationit'sjustinformationplusasymmetricdependenceandassuchit'sneitheragoodthingnorabad.Evaluationgetsagripwhen
representationalstateshavefunctionsthataredefinedbyreferencetotheircontents(whenastatethatrepresentstheworldassuchandsuchhasthefunctionof
representingtheworldassuchandsuch).Inthesecases,misrepresentationsarefailuresoffunctionandare,assuch,tobedeplored.
Thisis,however,allverycomplicatedthere'salotmoretobedoneifthissortofstoryistobemadeconvincing.Forexample,ifFreudwasrightsomefalsebeliefs
performafunctionbyscreeningunbearabletruths.Dotheytherebyperformtheirfunction?Ifso,itlookslikefalsebeliefscanbefunctional,sosemanticevaluation
andfunctionalevaluationcomeapart.Thisthrowsdoubtonthecurrentproject,whichproposes,ineffect,thatmisrepresentationisabadthingbecauseit'saspecies
ofmalfunction.Idon'tknowhowseriously

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oneshouldtakesuchexamples,andIdon'tproposetoexploretheissueanyfurtherhere.Perhapswecouldleaveitatthis:ifyou'removedbytheideaofa
teleologicalaccountofthenormativityofintentionalascription,thatoptionisstillopenevenifyouthink(asIthinkyououghtto)thatteleologicalaccountsofcontent
arehopeless.
Well,then,supposewecanfinessethenormativityissueinsomethinglikethewayI'vejustdiscussed.WoulditthenbereasonabletoclaimtohavesolvedBrentano's
problem?Here'sathoughtintendedtoplacatephilosopherswhoholditamatterofprinciplethatnophilosophicalproblemshouldeverbesolved:Evenifit'struethat
intentionalityequalsinformationplusrobustness,itwouldn'thavetofollowthatinformationplusrobustnessissufficientformentality.Sufficientconditionsforbeingin
astatewithintentionalcontentneedn'talsobesufficientconditionsforhavingabelieforadesireor,indeed,forbeinginanyotherpsychologicalcondition.
It'sarguable,forexample,thatbeliefsaren'tjuststatesthathavecontentthey'restatesthathavecontentandwhosecausalrelationsobeytheaxiomsofsome
reasonabledecisiontheoryandtheaxiomsofsomereasonabletheoryofinference,etc.NoargumentI'veheardofshowsthatyoucan'tsatisfytheintentionality
conditionforbeingabeliefwithoutsatisfyingtheseothers.(Functionalroletheoriesofcontentmightwellentailthissincetheygenerallyconnectcontentwith'minimal
rationality'somuchtheworseforthem.)Ifcontentisjustinformationplusrobustness,agoodtheoryofcontentmightlicensetheliteralascriptionof(underived)
intentionalitytothermometers,thermostats,andthelikethatis,itmightturnoutonagoodtheoryofcontentthatsomeofthestatesofsuchdevicesaresemantically
evaluable.Idon'tthinkthatshouldcountasareductio,though(inmyview)theascriptionofbeliefsanddesirestothermometersorthermostatscertainlywould.
Inshort,itmightturnoutthattheintentionalisabigsupersetofthepsychological,andthatmightbeacceptablesolongasitisn'tacrazysupersetofthepsychological
(solongasitdoesn'tincludeeverything,forexample).It'sgoodtorememberthiswhenyou'reworkingoveryourintuitions,lookingforcounterexamplestoputative
solutionsofBrentano'sproblemonedoesnotrefuteatheorythatentailsthatstateShascontentsuchandsuchjustbyshowingthatSisnotapropositionalattitude.
It'salsogoodtorememberthattheintentionalmightbeabigsupersetofthepsychologicalifyou'reinclinedtoweepoverthepossibilityofBrentano'sproblembeing
solved.SolvingBrentano'sproblemmight,afterall,leavemostofthephilosophyofmindstillintheoldfamiliarmesssonotechnologicalunemploymentneedresult.

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LastWord.Supposewehadnaturalisticallysufficientconditionsforcontent.Itwouldn't,ofcourse,followthatanyofourneuralstates,oranyofourpublicsymbols
havethecontentthattheydobecausetheysatisfytheconditionsonoffer.Indeed,itwouldn'tfollowfromthemereexistenceofsufficientconditionsforcontentthat
anythingintheuniversehasactuallygotany.'PimpliesQ'isneutralaboutQ.GodcanaccepttheconsequentsofanytruehypotheticalswhoseantecedentsHedoesn't
knowtobefalsebutwecan't.
Ontheotherhand,iftherearenaturalisticsufficientconditionsforcontent,andifwedon'tknowtheseconditionsnottobesatisfied,thenwewouldatleastbeina
positiontoclaim,forexample,that"cat"couldmeancatforallweknowtothecontrary.Thiswouldbeasatisfactorysituationforthephilosophyofmind(orthe
philosophyoflanguage,orwhateverthisstuffis)tohavefinallyarrivedat.For,theprimafacieplausibilitythat"cat"doesmeancatis,afterall,prettysubstantial.I
don'tknowaboutyouguys,butwhenfriendsinotherlinesofworkaskmewhatphilosophersareintothesedays,andItellthemthatthesedaysphilosophersareinto
claimingthatreally,deepdowninafirstclassconceptualsystem,youknow?it'snottruethat"cat"meanscat...theylaughatme.Idofindthatembarrassing.
Acknowledgments
IwanttoexpressaspecialindebtednesstoPaulBoghossianforveryhelpfulconversationsonthesetopicsandforhavingcaughtabadmistakeinanearlierdraftof
thispaper.LiterallydozensofotherpeoplehavemadesuggestionsI'vefoundilluminating.Theyincludeall,butnotonly,thefollowing(andIherebyapologizeto
anyoneIhaveleftout):LouiseAntony,LynneBaker,NedBlock,DanDennett,MichaelDevitt,JoeLevine,BarryLoewer,TimMaudlin,BrianMcLaughlin,Georges
Rey,SteveWagner,andmanygraduatestudentsatRutgersandCUNY.
Notes
1.AvariantofthetheorythatI'lldiscussneartheenddepartssignificantlyfromtheletterofinformationalsemantics,thoughperhapslesssignificantlyfromitsspirit.
2.Forthetypeone/typetwodistinction,seechapter3.
3.ComparePsychosemantics(1987),inwhichItookitforgrantedwrongly,asInowthinkthataninformationbasedsemanticswouldhavetospecifysuch
circumstances.AsfarasIcantell,IassumedthisbecauseIthoughtthatanyinformationaltheoryofcontentwouldhavetoamounttoamoreorlesshedgedversionof
'allandonlycowscause"cow"s'.This,too,wasafailuretotakesemanticrobustnesssufficientlyseriously.It'snomoreplausiblethattherearenonquestionbeggingly

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specifiablesituationsinwhichit'ssemanticallynecessarythatallcowscause"cows"thanthattherearesuchsituationsinwhich,necessarily,onlycowsdo.Howcould
therebecircumstancesinwhichthecontentofathoughtguaranteesthatsomeonewillthinkit?
4.Asareallother"nonlabeling"usesofasymbol.SeeFodor[inpress].
5.Well,almostarbitrarilyrobustseebelow.
6.Thoughnot,ofcourse,withoutresorttointentional(withan"s")idiom.TheasymmetricdependencestoryisuptoitsearsinRealismaboutproperties,relations,
laws,andotherabstracta.WhetherthissortofRealismprejudicesasemantictheory'sclaimtobephysicalisticandwhether,ifitdoes,itmatterswhetherasemantic
theoryisphysicalisticarequestionsofsomeinterestbutnotonesthatIproposetotakeonhere.Sufficeitthatnaturalism,asIunderstandtheterm,needn'timply
materialismifthelatterisunderstoodasdenyingindependentontologicalstatustoabstractentities.
7.Thecaveatisbecauseinformationalsemanticistsrarelystraightoutidentify"meaningthat...."with"carryingtheinformationthat...."(thoughIsrealseemstobe
rightontheedgeofdoingsointhepassagecitedinthetext).Dretske,forexample,addsconstraintsintendedtoensurethattheinformationcarriedshouldbe
perfectlyreliable,andthatitshouldbe"digitally"encoded(thisisDretske'swayofensuringthat"dog"meansdogratherthananimal.)Also,theStanfordtheorists
generallyallowthatinformationcanbegeneratedbyreliablerelationsotherthancausalones(e.g.,entailmentrelations).Theseconsiderationsdon't,however,affect
thepointinthetext.
8.AsGeorgesReyremarks,"Theviabilityofaceterisparibusclausedependsnotupontheactualspecificationorrealizabilityoftheidealization,butratherupon
whethertheapparentexceptionstothelawtowhichitisattachedcanbeexplainedasduetoindependentlyspecifiableinterference.Itisacheckwrittenonthebanks
ofindependenttheories,whichisonlyasgoodasthosetheoriesandtheirindependentevidencecanmakeit.Sothequestion...isnotwhethertheceterisparibus
clausecanbereplaced,butrather:Canalltheerrorsbeexplainedasindpendentinterference?"(Rey,ms.)It'sworthspellingoutanimplicationofRey'spoint:To
knowwhat,ingeneral,theconsequenceofsatisfyingaceterisparibusconditionwouldbe,wewouldhavetoknowwhatwouldhappenifnoneofthesourcesof
"independentinterference"wereoperative.Andtoknowthat,we'dhavetoknow,ataminimum,whatthesourcesofindependentinterferencearewe'dhaveto
knowwhichotherlawscaninteractwiththeceterisparibuslawunderexamination.But,ofcourse,it'sneverpossibletoknow(much)ofthisundertheconditions
actuallyoperativeinscientifictheoryconstructionwhatinteractionsbetweenLandotherlawsarepossibledependsnotjustonhowLturnsout,butalsoonhowthe
restofscienceturnsout.
9.Thiscounterfactualis,ofcourse,bynomeansvacuous.Itclaims,ineffect,thatourcapacitiestoaddareboundedonlybythelimitationsofourworkingmemoryin
particular,theyaren'tboundedbywhatweknowabouthowtoaddnumbers.Suchclaimsare,toputitmildly,oftennonobvious.Forexample,asofthisdate
nobodyknowswhetherit'struethat,butformemoryconstraints,anormalEnglishspeakercouldparseeverysentenceofhislanguage.("Gardenpath"sentences
appeartooffercounterexamples.)Asitturnsout,theresolutionofsomeratherdeepissuesinlinguisticsdependonthisquestion.
10.Forexample,StevenWagner's"TheoriesofMentalRepresentation"(ms)criticizesoneversionoftheviewI'llbeproposingbyremarkingthatit"hasthewildly

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implausibleconsequencethatthereareworldsremotelylikeoursinwhichcowscouldnotbemistakenforhorses.''Infact,whatIholdisonlythatif"cow"meanscow
andnothorsethenitmustbenomologicallypossibletotellanycowfromahorsewhichdoesn'tsoundallthatwildafterall.(Actually,there'saversionofmystory
thatrequiresstilllessseethediscussionofverificationismbelow.)YougettheconsequencethatWagnerdenouncesonlyifyouconjoinmystoryaboutsemanticsto
thestoryaboutmodalsthatsaysthatifPisnomologicallypossible,thenthereisaworldinwhichit'sthecasethatP.Somuchtheworseforthatstoryaboutmodals.
11.Tobesure,thiscan'tbetheonlywaythatasymmetricdependencegetsitsfoothold.Forexample:if,asI'mclaiming,theuseoflinguisticsymbolstoeffect
mislabelings,falsepredications,andthelikeisasymmetricallydependentontheirbeingappliedcorrectly,thatasymmetrycan'tarisefromlinguisticpracticesinanything
likethewaythattheasymmetricdependenceofpagingsonnamingsdoesthere'saconventionforpaging,butnotformislabeling.And,ofcourse,wehaveno
linguisticpractices(noconventions)atallwithrespecttoourmentalrepresentations.Patience,dearReaderallingoodtime.
12.I'lluse"concept"ambiguouslysometimesitreferstoamentalrepresentation(thusfollowingpsychologicalusage)andsometimestotheintensionofamental
representation(thusfollowingphilosophicalusage).Thecontextwilloftenmakeclearwhichreadingisatissue.WhenIwishtonameaconcept,I'llusethe
correspondingEnglishwordincapshence,"COW"fortheconceptcow.
13.Roughly,asymbolissyntacticallyprimitiveiffithasnosemanticallyevaluableproperparts.
14.BakerraisesherproblemfortokensofMentalese,butnothingturnsonthis,andEnglishiseasiertospell.
15.Theremaybereaderswhodemandasemanticsthatmakesthefirst"cat"tokencomeoutfalse(i.e.,whodemandthatitmeanrobotcat).Ibegatemporary
suspensionoftheirdisbelief.We'llseefurtheronhowthetheorycouldberevisedtoaccommodatethem.
16.IthinkthesesortsofcasesthrowsomeinterestingsidelightonthestandardTwinEarthexamples.It'susualintheliteraturetotakethemoraloftheTwincasesto
bethesignificanceofcontextindeterminingcontent:"Water"meansH2Obecausethereisn'tanyXYZonearth.ButDretske'scaseopensthepossibilityof
superTwins:creatureswhohavenotonlytypeidenticalneuralstructures,butwhoalsoshareacontext(insomereasonablesense),butwhoseintentionalstates
neverthelessdifferincontent:theextensionofA'sterm"water"includesXYZandtheextensionofB'sterm"water"doesnotbecauseit'sfortuitousforAbutnotforB
thathehasencounterednosamplesofXYZ.
Apparently,then,thecontentofyourtermmaydifferfromthecontentofmineifthere'ssomethingthatpreventstokensofyourtermfrombeingcausedby
instantiationsofapropertywhoseinstantiationscould(i.e.,reallycould,notjustnomologicallypossiblycould)causetokeningsofmine.Thismightbetrueevenoftwo
creatureswholiveinthesameworldif,asithappens,theyliveindifferentpartsofthewood.IfthenearestXYZtomeissofarawaythatIcan'tpossiblygetthereina
lifetime,then,Isuppose,"water"meanssomethingnondisjunctiveinmymouth.Whereas,ifthenearestXYZtoyouissoclosethatit'sjustanaccidentthatyouhaven't
comeacrossany,then,Isuppose,"water"doesmeansomethingdisjunctiveinyours.
Doesanyofthismatter?Ifso,towhat?

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17.ThehyphensarebecausenobodycouldthinkthatthefroghasthedisjunctiveconceptFLYORBEEBEE(justasnobodycouldthinkthatShasthedisjunctive
conceptCATORROBOTCATintheBakercasediscussedabove).Theissue,rather,iswhetherthefroghastheconceptFLYortheconceptofacertainvisible
propertywhich,defacto,fliesandbeebeesbothexhibit.
18.It'scrucialthatthisclaimbereadsynchronicallysince,presumably,frogswouldn'tdevelopadispositiontosnapatblackdotsinworldswheretheblackdots
haveneverbeenflies.Thesemanticallyrelevantsortofasymmetricdependenceisarelationamonganorganism'scurrentdispositions.Takerealworldfrogsandput
theminpossibleworldswheretheblackdotsarebeebeesandthey'llsnapaway,happyasthedayislong.Butrealworldfrogsinpossibleworldswheretheflies
aren'tblackdotsareipsofactosnapless.
19.Cf:"IsthisadaggerwhichIseebeforeme.../Come,letmeclutchthee./Ihavetheenot,andyetIseetheestill./Artthounot,fatalvision,sensible/Tofeelingas
tosight?orartthoubut/Adaggerofthemind,afalsecreation,/Proceedingfromtheheatoppressedbrain?"Macbeth'smoralswere,nodoubt,reprehensible,buthis
epistemologywasspoton.
20.I'vethusfarmadeapointofnotdistinguishingtwotheses:(a)ifXandYaredistinctconcepts,thentheremustbeaworldinwhichxsbutnotyscause"X"s(b)if
XandYaredistinctconceptsandxsandysbothcause"X"sinthisworldthentheremustbeaworldinwhichxsbutnotyscause"X"s.The(b)storyismarkedly
lessverificationistthanthe(a)storyandsomephilosophersmaypreferitonthatground.We'llcometothispresentlybutsufficeitfornowthatbothstoriessaythe
samethingsaboutwhatfrogssnapatandaboutwhatMacbethmeansby"dagger.''
21.Forfurtherdiscussionoftheanalogybetweenthefunctionoftheoriesandofinstrumentsofobservationinmediatingthesymbol/worldrelationsuponwhichcontent
depends,seechapter3(especiallyfn.4)alsoFodor,Psychosemantics,chapter4.
22.Thecaseisalittledifferentwhenstatesofthecentralnervoussystem(asopposed,e.g.,toretinalstates)areproposedastheintentionalobjectsofthethoughts
thatcowscausallyoccasion.Isupposeitmightturnoutthattherearespecifiable,nondisjunctivestatesofthebrainuponwhosetokeningtheconnectionof
cowoccasionedthoughtstocowsasymmetricallydepend.Suchadiscoverywouldnot,however,requireustosaythattheintentionalobjectofone'scowthoughtsare
brainstates.Rather,wecouldsimplytakethebrainstatetokenstobetokensoftheMentalesetermforcow.
23.Isaythatonemightruleoutproximalreferentsformentalrepresentationsbyappealtotheprinciplethatopendisjunctionsaren'tprojectible.Butonecouldalso
takethehighgroundandrulethemoutbystipulation:justasprimitivesymbolsaren'tallowedtoexpressnecessarilyuninstantiatedproperties,sotootheyaren't
allowedtoexpressproximalproperties.Ifthisseemsarbitrary,rememberthatwe'relookingfor(naturalistically)sufficientconditionsforrepresentation.
24.Andnotviceversa.ButwheretheasymmetryofthedependenceisnotgermanetothepointatissueI'llleavethisclauseouttosimplifytheexposition.
25.Itakeitthat,butforthetalkaboutintentionsandpolicies,thesamesortoflineappliestokindconcepts.Whatmakessomethingakindconcept,accordingtohis
view,iswhatittracksinworldswhereinstancesofthekindtowhichitappliesaredistinguishablefrominstancesofthekindstowhichitdoesn't

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26."E.g."ratherthan"i.e."because,forpresentpurposes,we'renotattendingtothedistinctionbetweendisjunctivepredicatesandambiguousones.
27.Boghossianisn'ttheonlycriticwhohasobjectedtotheverificationistimplicationsofthesortoftreatmentI'vebeenproposing.Cf.Cummins(1989)andWagner
(ms).
28.Forthosekeepingscore:Theinformationandasymmetricdependenceconditionsareclausesina(putatively)sufficientconditionfor"X"expressingXi.e.,they
areseverallynecessaryandjointlysufficientconditionsforthesatisfactionofasufficientcondition.
29.Dretskeishimselfnotfaithfultopurelyinformationalsemanticshisproposalfordealingwiththedisjunctionproblemrequiresthatfactsaboutthehistoryof
acquisitionofaconceptarerelevanttodeterminingitsextension(seechapter3).There'snothingunreasonableaboutthisthere'snoaprioriargumentthatpure
informationaltheoriesarebetterthanimpureones.But,aswe'veseen,Dretske'swayofaddingadashofcausalhistorytohispurelyinformationalstorydoesn'tget
himwherehewantstogo.
30.AworldwherethereisH2ObutnotXYZ(orviceversa)doesn'tcount,becausealthoughonlyH2OcontrolstheactualWATERtokeningsinworldswherethere
isonlyH2O,XYZcontrolscounterfactualWATERtokeningsinthoseworldsassumingthattheconnectionbetweenXYZandWATERtokensisnomic.Remember
unicorns:therecanbelawsaboutuninstantiatedproperties.
31.Bycontrast,Hecouldtelljustbylookinginyourheadwhichofyourmentalstatesareintherangesanddomainsofwhichofyourmentalprocesses.Atleast,He
couldifHe'samethodologicalsolipsist,whichI'msureHeis.
32.Idon'thaveastoryaboutthedifferencebetweenambiguityanddisjunctivenessthatIfeelliketellingheresothe"disjunction"problemisreallythe"disjunctionor
ambiguity"problem,aspernote26.
33.Strictlyspeaking,ofcourse,theclaimisonlythatifctokeningsdomeanTwins,thenitmustbeinvirtueofthesatisfactionofsomesemanticconditionotherthan
theonewe'vebeendiscussing.We'veseen,aswe'vegonealong,severalreasonswhyourcondition,thoughitisarguablysufficientforcontent,can'tpossiblybe
necessary.
34.Searlearguesthatconsciousnessmustcomeinbecausenothingelsesuggestsitselfasdistinguishing"derived"intentionalityfromtherealthing.However,ifthe
presentstoryisright,thisisn'tso.Roughly,X'sintentionalityisrealifitdependsonX'ssatisfyingconditions1to3X'sintentionalityisderivedifitderivesfromY's
satisfyingconditions1to3,whereY?X.
35.Compare:"ThecruxofKripke'sreadingofWittgensteinmaybeputlikethis.Itisoftheessenceofmeaninganexpressioninacertainway,thatmeaningitthat
waydetermineshowtheexpressionwouldhavetobeusedifitistobeusedcorrectly....Anyproposedcandidateforbeingthepropertyinvirtueofwhichan
expressionhasmeaningmustbesuchastogroundthe'normativity'ofmeaning...."(Boghossian,1989,pp.8384.)
IsaythatIamsortofsympathetic.Thetroubleisthatrequiringthatnormativitybegroundedsuggeststhatthereismoretodemandofanaturalizedsemanticsthanthat
itprovideareductionofsuchnotionsas,say,extension.Butwhatcouldthis'more'amountto?Toapplyatermtoathinginitsextensionistoapplytheterm
correctlyonceyou'vesaidwhatitisthatmakesthetablestheextensionof"table"s,thereissurelynofurtherquestionaboutwhyit'scorrecttoapplya"table"toa
table.Itthusseemsthatifyouhaveareductivetheoryofthesemanticrelations,thereisnojobofgroundingnormativitylefttodo.

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Inshort,I'mnotclearhoworwhether'openquestion'argumentscangetagripinthepresentcase.IamdarklysuspiciousthattheKripkensteinianworryabout
thenormativeforceofmeaningiseitheranonissueorjustthereductionissueoveragainanyhow,thatit'snotanewissue.Inthetext,however,I'vesurpressedthese
qualms.

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Chapter5
MakingMindMatterMore
Anoutbreakofepiphobia(thefearthatoneisturningintoanepiphenomenalist)appearstohavemuchofthephilosophyofmindcommunityinitsgrip.Thoughitis
generallyagreedtobecompatiblewithphysicalismthatintentionalstatesshouldbecausallyresponsibleforbehavioraloutcomes,epiphobicsworrythatitisnot
compatiblewithphysicalismthatintentionalstatesshouldbecausallyresponsibleforbehavioraloutcomesquaintentional.Sotheyfearthattheverysuccessesofa
physicalistic(and/oracomputational)psychologywillentailthecausalinertnessofthemental.Fearingthismakesthemunhappy.
Inthischapter,Iwanttoarguethatepiphobiaisaneuroticworryifthereisaproblem,itisengenderednotbytheactualorpossiblesuccessesofphysicalistic
psychology,butbytwophilosophicalmistakes:(a)awrongideaaboutwhatitisforapropertytobecausallyresponsible,and(b)acomplexofwrongideasaboutthe
relationsbetweenspecialsciencelawsandtheeventsthattheysubsume.1Here'showIproposetoproceed:First,we'llhavealittlepsychodramaIwanttogiveyou
afeelforhowanotherwisehealthymindmightsuccumbtoepiphobia.Second,I'llprovideabrief,sketchy,butIhopegoodenoughforpresentpurposesaccountof
whatitisforapropertytobecausallyresponsible.Itwillfollowfromthisaccountthatintentionalpropertiesarecausallyresponsibleifthereareintentionalcausallaws.
I'llthenarguethat(contrarytothedoctrinecalled"anomalousmonism")thereisnogoodreasontodoubtthatthereareintentionalcausallaws.I'llalsoarguethat,so
farasthematteraffectstheclusterofissuescenteringaroundepiphenomenalism,thesortsofrelationsthatintentionalcausallawscanbeartotheindividualsthey
subsumearemuchthesameasthesortsofrelationsthatnonintentionalcausallawscanbeartotheindividualsthattheysubsume.Sotheneverythingwillbeallright.

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CausalResponsibility
Therearemanyroutestoepiphobia.Oneofthemrunsviatwopremisesandastipulation.
1.PremiseofSupervenienceofCausalPowers:Thecausalpowersofaneventareentirelydeterminedbyitsphysicalproperties.Supposetwoeventsareidentical
intheirphysicalpropertiesthenallcausalhypotheticalstrueofoneeventaretrueoftheother.If,forexample,elande2areeventsidenticalintheirphysical
properties,thenallhypotheticalsoftheform"ifeloccurredinsituationS,itwouldcause...."remaintrueif"e2"issubstitutedfor"el",andviceversa.
2.PremiseofPropertyDualism:Intentionalpropertiessuperveneonphysicalproperties,butnointentionalpropertyisidenticaltoanyphysicalproperty.(Aphysical
propertyisapropertyexpressibleinthevocabularyofphysics.Nevermindfornowwhatthevocabularyofphysicsisjustassumethatitcontainsnointentional
terms.)
3.Stipulation:Apropertyis"causallyresponsible"iffitaffectsthecausalpowersofthingsthathaveit.And(alsobystipulation)allpropertiesthataren'tcausally
responsibleareepiphenomenal.
Butthen,considerthementaleventm(let'ssay,aneventwhichconsistsofyoudesiringtoliftyourarm)whichisthecauseofthebehavioraleventb(let'ssay,anevent
whichconsistsofyouliftingyourarm).mdoes,ofcourse,havecertainintentionalproperties.But,accordingtopremise2,noneofitsintentionalpropertiesisidentical
toanyofitsphysicalproperties.And,accordingto3,m'sphysicalpropertiesfullydetermineitscausalpowers(including,ofcourse,itspowertocauseb).So,it
appearsthatm'sbeingthecauseofyourliftingyourarmdoesn'tdependonitsbeingadesiretoliftyourarmmwouldhavecausedyourliftingofyourarmevenifit
hadn'thaditsintentionalproperties,solongasitsphysicalpropertieswerepreserved.2Soitappearsthatm'sintentionalpropertiesdon'taffectitscausalpowers.Soit
appearsthatm'sintentionalpropertiesarecausallyinert.Clearly,thisargumentiteratestoanyintentionalpropertyofthecauseofanybehavioraleffect.Sothe
intentionalpropertiesofmentaleventsareepiphenomenal.Epiphobia!
Now,thefirstthingtonoticeaboutthislineofargumentisthatithasnothingtodowithintentionalityassuch.Onthecontrary,itappliesequallyhappilytoprove
theepiphenomenalityofanynonphysicalproperty,solongaspropertydualismisassumed.Consider,forexample,thepropertyofbeingamountainandsuppose
(whatissurelyplausible)thatbeingamountainisn'taphysicalproperty.

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(Remember,thisjustmeansthat"mountain"anditssynonymsaren'titemsinthelexiconofphysics.)Now,untutoredintuitionmightsuggestthatmanyoftheeffectsof
mountainsareattributabletotheirbeingmountains.Thus,untutoredintuitionsuggests,itisbecauseMountEverestisamountainthatMountEveresthasglaciersonits
topanditisbecauseMountEverestisamountainthatitcastssuchalongshadowanditisbecauseMountEverestisamountainthatsomanypeopleareprovoked
totrytoclimbit...andsoon.Butnotso,accordingtothepresentlineofargument.For,surelythecausalpowersofMountEverestarefullydeterminedbyits
physicalproperties,andwe'veagreedthatbeingamountainisn'toneofthephysicalpropertiesofmountains.Sothen,MountEverest'sbeingamountaindoesn't
affectitscausalpowers.Sothencontrarytowhatonereadsingeologybooksthepropertyofbeingamountainiscausallyinert.Geoepiphobia!
Nodoubttherewillbethosewhoarepreparedtobitethisbullet.Suchfolkmayeither(a)denythatpropertydualismappliestomountainhood(because,onreflection,
beingamountainisaphysicalpropertyafterall)or(b)assertthatitisintuitivelyplausiblethatbeingamountainiscausallyinert(because,onreflection,itis
intuitivelyplausiblethatit'snotbeingamountainbutsomeotherofMountEverest'spropertiesspecifically,someofitsphysicalpropertiesthatarecausally
responsibleforitseffects).SobeitIdonotwantthistoturnintoasquabbleaboutcases.Instead,letmeemphasizethattherearelotsandlotsandlotsofexamples
where,ontheonehand,considerationslikemultiplerealizabilitymakeitimplausiblethatacertainpropertyisexpressibleinphysicalvocabularyand,ontheother
hand,claimsforthecausalinertnessofthepropertyappeartobewildlyimplausible,atleastprimafacie.
Considerthepropertyofbeingasail.Iwon'tboreyouwiththefinepoints(terriblytempted,thoughIam,toexercisemyhobbyhorse3).Sufficeitthatsailsareairfoils
andthereisquiteanicelittletheoryaboutthecausalpropertiesofairfoils.Typically,airfoilsgenerateliftinadirection,andinamounts,thatisdeterminedbytheir
geometry,theirrigidity,andmany,manydetailsoftheirrelationstothe(liquidorgaseous)mediumthroughwhichtheymove.Thebasicideasisthatliftispropagated
atrightanglestothesurfaceoftheairfoilalongwhichthemediumflowsfastest,andisproportionaltotherelativevelocityoftheflow.Holdaflatpieceofpaperby
oneedgeandblowacrossthetop.Thefreesideofthepaperwillmoveup(i.e.,towardtheairflow),andtheharderyoublow,themoreitwilldoso.(Ceteris
paribus.)

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Now,therelativevelocityoftheairfoilmaybeincreasedbyforcingthemediumtoflowthrougha"slot"(aconstriction,onesideofwhichisformedbythesurfaceof
theairfoil.)Thecontrollinglawisthatthenarrowertheslotthefastertheflow.(OnsailboatsofconventionalBermudarig,theslotistheopeningbetweenthejiband
themain.Butperhapsyoudidn'twanttoknowthat.)Anyhow,airfoilsandslotscanbemadeoutofallsortsofthingssailsareairfoils,butsoarekeelwings,and
airplanewings,andbird'swings.Slotsaremultiplyrealizabletoo:youcanhaveaslotbothsidesofwhicharemadeofsailcloth,asinthejib/mainsailarrangement,but
youcanalsohaveaslotonesideofwhichismadeofsailclothandtheothersideofwhichismadeofair.(That'spartoftheexplanationofwhyyoucansailtoward
thewindevenifyouhaven'tgotajib).Sothen,ifoneofyourreasonsfordoubtingthatbelievingthatPisaphysicalpropertyisthatbelievingismultiplyrealizable,
thenyouhavethesamereasonfordoubtingthatbeinganairfoilorbeingaslotcountsasaphysicalproperty.
Andyet,ofcourse,itwouldseemtobequitemadtosaythatbeinganairfoiliscausallyinert.Airplanesfalldownwhenyoutaketheirwingsoffandsailboatscome
toastopwhenyoutakedowntheirsails.Everybodywhoisn'taphilosopheragreesthattheseandothersuchfactsareexplainedbythestoryaboutliftbeing
generatedbycausalinteractionsbetweentheairfoilandthemedium.Ifthatisn'ttherightexplanation,whatkeepstheplaneup?Ifthatistherightexplanation,how
coulditbethatbeinganairfoiliscausallyinert?
Epiphobicsprimarilyconcernedwithissuesinthephilosophyofmindmightwellstophere.Thegeologicalandaerodynamicanalogiesmakeitplausiblethatifthere'sa
caseforepiphenomenalisminrespectofpsychologicalproperties,thenthereisthesamecaseforepiphenomenalisminrespectofallthenonphysicalproperties
mentionedintheoriesinthespecialsciences.Ipause,foramoment,tomoralizeaboutthis:
Manyphilosophershavethebadhabitofthinkingaboutonlytwoscienceswhentheythinkaboutsciencesatall,thesebeingpsychologyandphysics.Wheninthegrip
ofthishabit,theyarelikelytoinferthatifpsychologicaltheorieshavesomepropertythatphysicaltheoriesdon't,thatmustbebecausepsychologicalstates(qua
psychological)areintentionalandphysicalstates(quaphysical)arenot.Inthepresentcase,ifthere'sanargumentthatpsychologicalpropertiesareepiphenomenaland
nocorrespondingargumentthatphysicalpropertiesareepiphenomenal,thatmustshowthatthereissomethingfunnyaboutintentionality.
Butwenowseethatitshowsnosuchthingsince,ifthecausalinertnessofpsychologicalpropertiesismaintainedalonganything

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likethelinesof13,therearelikelytobeparallelargumentsthatallpropertiesarecausallyinertexceptthoseexpressedbythevocabularyofphysics.Inwhich
case,whyshouldanybodycarewhetherpsychologicalpropertiesareepiphenomenal?Allthatanybodycouldreasonablywantforpsychologyisthatitsconstructs
shouldenjoywhateversortofexplanatory/causalroleispropertotheconstructsofthespecialsciences.Ifbeliefsanddesiresareaswelloffontologicallyas
mountains,wings,spiralnebulas,trees,gears,levers,andthelike,thensurelythey'reaswelloffasanyonecouldneedthemtobe.
But,infact,weshouldn'tstophere.Because,thoughit'struethatclaimsfortheepiphenomenalityofmountainhoodandairfoilhoodand,ingeneral,ofanynonphysical
propertyyoulikehood,willfollowfromthesamesortsofargumentsthatimplyclaimsfortheepiphenomenalityofbeliefhoodanddesirehood,it'salsotruethatsuch
claimsareprimafacieabsurd.Whateveryoumaythinkaboutbeliefsanddesiresandtheotherparaphrenaliaofintentionalpsychology,it'safactyouhavetolivewith
thatthereareallthesenonintentionalspecialsciencesaroundandthatmany,manymaybeevenallofthepropertiesthatfigureintheirlawsarenonphysicaltoo.
Surelysomethingmusthavegonewrongwithargumentsthatshowthatallthesepropertiesareephiphenomenal.Howcouldtherebelawsaboutairfoils(notice,laws
aboutthecausalconsequencesofsomething'sbeinganairfoil)ifairfoilhoodisepiphenomenal?Howcouldtherebeascienceofgeologyifgeologicalproperties
arecausallyinert?
Itseemstome,inlightoftheforegoing,thatitoughttobeaminimalconditionuponatheoryofwhatitisforsomethingtobeacausallyresponsiblepropertythatit
doesnotentailtheepiphenomenalityofwinghood,mountainhood,gearhood,leverhood,beliefhood,desirehood,andthelike.I'mabouttoproposeatheorywhich
meetsthisconditionandtherebycommendsitselfasatonicforepiphobics.Thistheoryisn't,asyouwillsee,veryshockingorsurprisingoranythingactuallyit'spretty
dull.Still,IneedalittlestagesettingbeforeIcantellyouaboutit.Inparticular,Ineedsomecaveatsandsomeassumptions.
Caveats
First,curingepiphobiarequiresmakingitplausiblethatintentionalpropertiescanmeetsufficientconditionsforcausalresponsibilitybutoneisnotalsorequiredto
showthattheycanmeetnecessaryandsufficientconditionsforcausalresponsibility.Thisisjustaswell,sincenecessaryandsufficientconditionsforcausal
responsibilitymightbesortofhardtocomeby(necessaryandsufficientconditionsfor

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anythingtendtobesortofhardtocomeby)andI,forone,don'tclaimtohaveany.
Second,thequestion,"Whatmakesapropertycausallyresponsible?"needstobedistinguishedfromtheprobablymuchharderquestion,"Whatdetermineswhich
propertyisresponsibleinagivencasewhenoneeventcausesanother?"Supposethatelcausese2then,trivially,itmustdosoinvirtueofsomeorotherofitscausally
responsiblepropertiesi.e.,invirtueofsomeorotherpropertyinvirtueofwhichitisabletobeacause.(Or,perhaps,invirtueofseveralsuchproperties.4)Butitmay
bethatelhasmanyperhapsmany,manypropertiesinvirtueofwhichitisabletobeacause.Soitmustnotbeassumedthatifeliscapableofbeingacausein
virtueofhavingacertainpropertyP,thenPisipsofactothepropertyinvirtueofwhichelisthecauseofe2.Indeed,itmustnotevenbeassumedthatifeliscapable
ofbeingacauseofe2invirtueofitshavingP,thenPisipsofactothepropertyinvirtueofwhichelcausese2.Foragainitmaybethatelhasmanyevenmany,
manypropertiesinvirtueofwhichitiscapableofbeingthecauseofe2,anditneednotbeobviouswhichoneofthesepropertiesistheoneinvirtueofwhichit
actuallyisthecausee2.Atleast,Icanassureyou,itneednotbeobvioustome.
Itis,toputallthisalittlelesspedantically,onesortofsuccesstoshowthatitwasinvirtueofitsintentionalcontentthatyourdesiretoraiseyourhandmadesomething
happen.Itisanother,andlesser,sortofsuccesstoshowthatbeingadesiretoraiseyourhandisthekindofpropertyinvirtueofwhichthingscanbemadeto
happen.Curingepiphobiarequiresonlyasuccessofthelatter,lessersort.
Assumptions
Iassumethatsingularcausalstatementsneedtobecoveredbycausallaws.Thatmeanssomethinglike:
4.Coveringprinciple:Ifaneventelcausesanevente2,thentherearepropertiesF,Gsuchthat:
4.1.elinstantiatesF
4.2.e2instantiatiesG
and
4.3."FinstantiationsaresufficientforGinstantiations"isacausalLaw.5
Whenapairofeventsbearsthisrelationtoalaw,I'llsaythattheindividualsareeachcoveredorsubsumedbythatlawandI'llsaythat

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thelawprojectsthepropertiesinvirtueofwhichtheindividualsaresubsumedbyit.Noticethatwhenanindividualiscoveredbyalaw,itwillalwayshavesome
propertyinvirtueofwhichthelawsubsumesit.If,forexample,thecoveringlawisthatFscauseGs,thenindividualsthatgetcoveredbythislawdosoeitherinvirtue
ofbeingFs(incasetheyaresubsumedbyitsantecedent)orinvirtueofbeingGs(incasetheyaresubsumedbyitsconsequent).Thiscouldallbemademoreprecise,
butIseenoreasontobother.
OK,Icannowtellyoumysufficientconditionforapropertytobecausallyresponsible:
5.Condition:Pisacausallyresponsiblepropertyifit'sapropertyinvirtueofwhichindividualsaresubsumedbycausallawsequivalently:
5.1.Pisacausallyresponsiblepropertyifit'sapropertyprojectedbyacausallaw.
Orequivalently(sincethesatisfactionoftheantecedentofalawisipsofactonomologicallysufficientforthesatisfactionofitsantecedent):
5.2.Pisacausallyresponsiblepropertyifit'sapropertyinvirtueoftheinstantiationofwhichtheoccurrenceofoneeventisnomologicallysufficientforthe
occurrenceofanother.6
Ifthisisright,thenintentionalpropertiesarecausallyresponsibleincasethereareintentionalcausallawsaerodynamicpropertiesarecausallyresponsibleincasethere
areaerodynamiccausallawsgeologicalpropertiesarecausallyresponsibleincasetherearegeologicalcausallaws...andsoforth.Toallintentsandpurposes,on
thisviewthequestionwhetherthepropertyPiscausallyresponsiblereducestothequestionwhethertherearecausallawsaboutP.Tosettlethesecondquestionis
tosettlethefirst.
Idon'tminditifyoufindthisproposaldull,butIwouldbedistressedifyoufounditcircular.How,youmightask,canonepossiblymakeprogressbydefining
"causallyresponsibleproperty"intermsof"coveringcausallaw"?Andyetit'sunclearthatwecanjustdroptherequirementthatthecoveringlawbecausalbecause
therearenoncausallaws(e.g.,thegaslawaboutpressureandvolumevaryinginversely)andperhapsanevent'sbeingcoveredbythosesortsoflawsisn'tsufficient
foritshavingacausallyresponsibleproperty.
Icanthinkoftwofairlyplausiblewaysoutofthis.First,itmaybethatanypropertyinvirtueofwhichsomelawcoversanindividualwillbeapropertyinvirtueof
whichsomecausallawcoversan

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individual7i.e.,thatnopropertyfiguresonlyinnoncausallaws.Thisis,Ithink,aninterestingmetaphysicalpossibilityifitistrue,thenwecanjustidentifythecausally
responsiblepropertieswiththepropertiesinvirtueofwhichindividualsarecoveredbylaws.
And,evenifit'snottrue,itmaybethatwhatmakesalawcausalcanitselfbespecifiedinnoncausaltermsperhapsitinvolvessuchpropertiesascoveringtemporal
successions,beingasymmetric,andthelike.InthatcaseitwouldbeOKtoconstrue''causallyresponsible"intermsof"causallaw"sincethelattercouldbe
independentlydefined.Barringargumentstothecontrary,I'mpreparedtosupposethatthiswillwork.
We'renowinapositiontodoalittlediagnosis.Accordingtothepresentview,thepropertiesprojectedinthelawsofbasicsciencearecausallyresponsible,andso
tooarethepropertiesprojectedinthelawsofthespecialsciences.Thisistruisticsincethepresentviewjustisthatbeingprojectedissufficientforbeingcausally
responsible.Notice,inparticular,thatevenifthepropertiesthatthespecialsciencestalkaboutaresupervenientuponthepropertiesthatthebasicsciencestalkabout,
thatdoesnotarguethatthepropertiesthatthespecialsciencestalkaboutareepiphenomenal.Not,atleast,iftherearecausallawsofthespecialsciences.Thecausal
lawsofthespecialsciencesandcausallawsofbasicscienceshaveitincommonthattheybothlicenseascriptionsofcausalresponsibility.Orso,atleast,thepresent
viewwouldhaveit.
Thisisnot,however,todenythattherearemetaphysicallyinterestingdifferencesbetweenspecialsciencelawsandbasicsciencelaws.Letmeintroducehereapoint
thatIproposetomakeafussoflater.
Roughly,thesatisfactionoftheantecedentofalawisnomologicallysufficientforthesatisfactionofitsconsequent8(I'llsometimessaythatthetruthoftheantecedentof
alawnomologicallynecessitatesthetruthofitsconsequent.).Butametaphysicallyinterestingdifferencebetweenbasicandnonbasiclawsisthat,inthecaseofthe
latterbutnottheformer,therealwayshastobeamechanisminvirtueofwhichthesatisfactionofitsantecedentbringsaboutthesatisfactionofitsconsequent.If'Fs
causeGs'isbasic,thenthereisnoanswertothequestionhowdoFscauseGstheyjustdo,andthattheydoisamongthenottobefurtherexplainedfactsabout
thewaytheworldisputtogether.Whereas,if'FscauseGs'isnonbasic,thenthereisalwaysastoryaboutwhatgoesonwhenandinvirtueofwhichFscause
Gs.
Sometimesit'samicrostructurestory(meanderingriverserodetheiroutsidebanksfactsabouttheabrasiveeffectsofparticlessus

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pendedinmovingwaterexplainwhythereiserosiontheBernoullieffectexplainswhyit'stheoutsidebanksthatgeterodedmost).Sometimesthere'sastoryabout
chainsofmacroleveleventsthatintervenebetweenFinstantiationsandGinstantiations(ChangesinCO2levelsintheatmospherecausechangesinfauna.There'sa
storyabouthowCO2blocksradiationfromtheEarth'ssurfaceandthere'sastoryabouthowtheblockedradiationchangestheairtemperatureandthere'sastory
abouthowchangesintheairtemperaturecauseclimacticchangesandthere'sa(Darwinian)storyabouthowclimacticchangeshavezoologicalimpacts.Itrytobeas
topicalasIcan.)
Or,togetcloserhome,considerthecaseincomputationalpsychology.TherearesoIfondlysupposeintentionallawsthatconnect,forexample,statesof
believingthatP&(PQ)tostatesofbelievingthatQ.(Ceterisparibus,ofcourse.Moreofthatlatter.)Becausethereareeventscoveredbysuchlaws,itfollows
(trivially)thatintentionalproperties(likebelievingthatP&(PQ)arecausallyresponsible.Andbecausenobody(except,maybe,panpsychistswhomIam
preparednottotakeseriouslyforpresentpurposes)thinksthatintentionallawsarebasic,itfollowsthattheremustbeamechanisminvirtueofwhichbelievingthatP
&(PQ)bringsitaboutthatonebelievesQ.
Thereare,asithappens,somereasonablypersuasivetheoriesaboutthenatureofsuchmechanismscurrentlyonoffer.TheoneIlikebestsaysthatthemechanisms
thatimplementintentionallawsarecomputational.Roughly,thestorygoes:believing(etc.)isarelationbetweenanorganismandamentalrepresentation.Mental
representationshave(interalia)syntacticpropertiesandthemechanismsofbeliefchangearedefinedoverthesyntacticpropertiesofmentalrepresentations.Let'snot
worry,forthemoment,aboutwhetherthisstoryisrightlet'sjustworryaboutwhetherit'sepiphobic.
Variousphilosophershavesupposedthatitis.StevenStich,forexample,hasdonesomepublichandwringingabouthowanybody(afortiori,howI)couldholdboth
thatintentionalpropertiesarecausallyresponsibleandthe("methodologicallysolipsistic")viewthatmentalprocessesareentirelycomputational(/syntactic).And
NorbertHornstein9hasrecentlyascribedtometheviewthat"thegeneralizationsofpsychology,thelawsandthetheories,arestatedoversyntacticobjects,i.e.,itis
oversyntacticrepresentationsthatcomputationsproceed."But:theclaimthatmentalprocessesaresyntacticdoesnotentailtheclaimthatthelawsof
psychologyaresyntactic.Onthecontrary,thelawsofpsychologyareintentionalthroughandthrough.

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Thisisapointtothereiterationofwhichmydecliningyearsseemsomehowtohavebecomedevoted.What'ssyntacticisnotthelawsofpsychologybutthe
mechanismsbywhichthelawsofpsychologyareimplemented.Cf.:Themechanismsofgeologicalprocessesare(asitmightbe)chemicalandmolecularitdoesnot
followthatchemicalormolecularpropertiesareprojectedbygeologicallaws(onthecontrary,it'sgeologicalpropertiesthatareprojectedbygeologicallaws)andit
doesnotfollowthatgeologicalpropertiesarecausallyinert(onthecontrary,it'sbecauseMountEverestissuchaverydamnedbigmountainthatit'ssoverydamned
coldontop.)
Itis,Ishouldadd,notintheleastunusualtofindthatthevocabularythat'sappropriatetoarticulateaspecialsciencelawissystematicallydifferentfromthevocabulary
that'sappropriatetoarticulateitsimplementingmechanism(s).Rather,shiftofvocabularyasonegoesfromthelawtothemechanismisthegeneralcase.Ifyouwant
totalklawsofinheritance,youtalkrecessivetraitsanddominanttraitsandhomozygotesandheterozygotesifyouwanttotalkmechanismsofinheritance,youtalk
chromosomesandgenesandhowtheDNAfolds.Ifyouwanttotalkpsychologicallaw,youtalkintentionalvocabularyifyouwanttotalkpsychologicalmechanism,
youtalksyntactic(ormaybeneurological)vocabulary.Ifyouwanttotalkgeologicallaw,youtalkmountainsandglaciersifyouwanttotalkgeologicalmechanism,
youtalkabrasioncoefficientsandcleavageplanes.Ifyouwanttotalkaerodynamiclaw,youtalkairfoilsandliftforcesifyouwanttotalkaerodynamicmechanism,
youtalkgaspressureandlaminarflows.Itdoesn'tfollowthatthepropertyofbeingabelieforanairfoilorarecessivetraitiscausallyinertallthatfollowsisthat
specifyingthecausallyresponsiblemacropropertyisn'tthesameasspecifyingtheimplementingmicromechanism.
It'saconfusiontosupposethat,ifthere'salaw,thenthereneedn'tbeanimplementingmechanismandit'saconfusiontosupposethereifthere'samechanismthat
implementsalaw,thenthepropertiesthatthelawprojectsmustbecausallyinert.Ifyoutakegreatcaretoavoidboththeseconfusions,youwillbedelightedtosee
howrapidlyyourepiphobiadisappears.Youreallywill.Trustme.
IntentionalLaws
Accordingtothepositionjustdeveloped,thequestionwhetherapropertyiscausallyresponsiblereducestothequestionwhetheritisapropertyinvirtueofwhich
individualsaresubsumedbycoveringcausallaws.Soinparticular,ifthereareintentionallaws,thenitfollowsthatintentionalpropertiesaren'tepiphenomenal.But
maybe

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therearen'tintentionallawsor,ifthereare,maybetheycan'tcoverindividualcausesinthewaythatcausallawsaresupposedtocovertheeventsthattheysubsume.
Theviewthatthisissoiswidespreadinrecentphilosophyofmind.Clearly,ifintentionalcoveringdoesn'tactuallyhappen,thequestionwhetheritwouldbesufficient
forthecausalresponsibilityofthementalifitweretohappenisacademicevenbyacademicstandards.AndthetreatmentforepiphobiathatIprescribedabovewon't
work.Therestofthepaperwillbedevotedtothisissue.
Thereseemstobesometensionbetweenthefollowingthreeprinciples,eachofwhichItaketobeprimafaciesortofplausible:
6.Strictcovering:Justlike4exceptwiththefollowinginplaceof4.3:
"P1instantiationsarecausallysufficientforP2instantiations"isastrictcausallaw.
7.Anomiaofthemental:Theonlystrictlawsarelawsofphysics.Specifically,therearenostrict'psychophysical'lawsrelatingtypesofbrainstatestotypesof
intentionalstatesandtherearenostrict'psychological'lawsrelatingtypesofmentaleventstooneanotherortotypesofbehavioraloutcomes.
8.Causalresponsibilityofthemental:Intentionalpropertiesaren'tepiphenomenal.
Principle6meanssomethinglikethis:Causaltransactionsmustbecoveredbyexceptionlesslawsthesatisfactionoftheantecedentofacoveringlawhastoprovide
literallynomologicallysufficientconditionsforthesatisfactionofitsconsequentsothatitsconsequentissatisfiedineverynomologicallypossiblesituationinwhichits
antecedentissatisfied.
Principle7meanssomethinglikethis:Thelawsofphysicsdifferinacharacteristicwayfromthelawsofthespecialsciences(notablyincludingpsychology).Special
sciencelawsaretypicallyhedgedwith'ceterisparibus'clauses,sothatwhereasphysicallawssaywhathastohappencomewhatmay,specialsciencelawsonlysay
whathastohappenallelsebeingequal.10
Howweshouldconstrueprinciple8has,ofcourse,beenamainconcernthroughoutbut,accordingtotheaccountofcausalresponsibilitythatI'vebeentryingtosell
you,iteffectivelyreducestotherequirementthatmentalcausesbecoveredbyintentionallaws.Sonowwecanseewherethetensionbetweenthethreeprinciples6
through8arises.Theresponsibilityofthementalrequirescoveringbyintentionallaws.Butgiventherevisednotionofcovering,ac

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cordingtowhichcauseshavetobecoveredbystrictlaws,itmustbephysicallaws,andnotintentionalones,thatcovermentalcauses.Soitturnsoutthatthe
intentionalpropertiesarecausallyinertevenaccordingtothecountofcausalresponsibilitycommendedabove.11
Somethinghastobedone,andIassumeithastobedonetoprinciples6or8(orboth)since7wouldseemtobeOK.Itisquitegenerallytrueaboutspecialscience
lawsthattheyholdonly'barringbreakdowns',or'underappropriatelyidealizedconditions',or'whentheeffectsofinteractingvariablesareignored'.Ifevengeological
lawshavetobehedgedasindeedtheydothenit'smorethanplausiblethatthe'allelseequal'provisoinpsychologicallawswillprovenottobeeliminable.On
balance,wehadbestassumethat7stays.
Whatabout8,then?Surelywewant8tocomeouttrueonsomereasonableconstrual.I'veoptedforarobustreading:mentalpropertiesarecausallyresponsible
becausetheyarepropertiesinvirtueofwhichmentalcausesaresubsumedbycoveringlawswhichistosaythatmentalpropertiesarecausallyresponsiblebecause
thereareintentionalgeneralizationswhichspecifynomologicallysufficientconditionsforbehavioraloutcomes.Butthisreadingof8lookstobeincompatiblewith7.
Principle7suggeststhattherearen'tintentionallyspecifiablesufficientconditionsforbehavioraloutcomessince,atbest,intentionallawsholdonlyceterisparibus.So,
maybethenotionofcausalresponsibilityI'vebeensellingistoostrong.Maybewecouldlearntomakedowithless.12
Thisis,moreorlessexplicitly,thecoursethatLePoreandLoewerrecommendin"MindMatters"(1987):Ifthecausalresponsibilityoftheintentionalcansomehow
bedetachedfromitscausalsufficiencyforbehavioraloutcomes,wecouldthenmaybereconcilecausalresponsibilitywithanomicness.Ineffect,LandL'sideaisto
holdontoprinciples6and7atthecostofnotadoptinganomologicalsubsumptionreadingof8.Primafacie,thisstrategyisplausibleinlightofapointthatLandL
emphasize(intheirdiscussionofSossa):theveryfactthatpsychologicallawsarehedgedwouldseemtoruleoutanyconstrualofcausalresponsibilitythatrequires
mentalcausesquamentaltobenomologicallysufficientforbehavior.Ifit'sonlytrueceterisparibusthatsomeonewhowantsadrinkreachesforthelocallysalientglass
ofwater,thenit'sepiphobictoholdthatdesiringiscausallyresponsibleforreachingonlyifliterallyeveryonewhodesireswouldthereuponreach.Afterall,quiteaside
fromwhatyouthinkofprinciple6,it'ssimplynotcoherenttorequiretheantecedentsofhedgedlawstoprovideliterallynomologicallysufficientconditionsforthe
satisfactionoftheirconsequents.

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That'sthestickbutLandLalsohaveacarrottooffer.Theyconcedethat,iftheonlystrictlawsarephysical,theninstantiationsofintentionalpropertiesarenot
strictlysufficientfordeterminingbehavioraloutcomes.Buttheyobservethatgrantingprinciples6and7doesn'tconcedethatthephysicalpropertiesofmental
eventsarenecessaryfortheirbehavioraleffects.Toseethis,assumeaneventmwhichinstantiatesthementalpropertyMandthephysicalpropertyP.Assumethat
mhasthebehavioraloutcomeb,aneventwiththebehavioralpropertyB,andthatitdoessoinvirtueofaphysicallawwhichstrictlyconnectstheinstantiationofP
withtheinstantiationofB.LePoreandLoewerpointoutthatallthisisfullycompatiblewiththetruthofthecounterfactual:Pm&MmBb(i.e.,withitbeingthecase
thatmwouldhavecausedBbevenifithadn'tbeenP.)ThinkofthecasewhereMeventsare"multiplyrealized,"e.g.,notjustbyPinstantiationsbutalsobyP*
instantiations.Andsupposethatthere'sastrictlawconnectingP*eventswithBevents.ThenMmBbwillbetruenotonlywhenmisaPinstantiation,butalsoin
whenmisaP*instantiation.ThepointisthatonewaythatPm&MmBbcanbetrueisiftherearestrictpsychologicallawsi.e.,ifbeinganMinstantiationis
strictlysufficientforbeingaBinstantiation.ButthecounterfactualcouldalsobetrueontheassumptionthatBinstantiationshavedisjointphysicallysufficient
conditions.Andthatassumptioncanbeallowedbysomeonewhoclaimsthatonlyphysicallawscangroundmentalcauses(e.g.,becauseheclaimsthatonlyphysical
lawsarticulatestrictlysufficientconditionsforbehavioraloutcomes.)
Inshort,LePoreandLoewershowusthatwecangetquitealotofwhatwewantfromthecausalresponsibilityofthementalwithoutassumingthatintentionalevents
arenomologicallysufficientforbehavioraloutcomes(i.e.,withoutassumingthatintentionallawsnomologicallynecessitatetheirconsequentsi.e.,withoutdenyingthat
thementalisanomic).Specifically,wecangetthattheparticularconstellationofphysicalpropertiesthatamentalcauseexhibitsneedn'tbenecessaryforitsbehavioral
outcomes.ItakeLePoreandLoewer'sadvicetobethatweshouldsettleforthisthatweshouldconstruethecausalresponsibilityofthementalinsomewaythat
doesn'trequirementaleventstobenomologicallysufficientfortheirbehavioralconsequences.Ineffect,givenaconflictbetweenprinciple6andacoveringlaw
construalofprinciple8,LePoreandLoeweroptfor6.Theykeeptheideathatcauseshavetobestrictlycovered,andgiveupontheideathatthecausalresponsibility
ofthementalisthenomologicalnecessitationofthebehavioralbytheintentional.
Now,thismaybegoodadvice,butIseemtodetectanotvery

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hiddenagenda.Suppose,justforthesakeofargument,thatthereissomewayofprovidingintentionallysufficientconditionsforbehavioraloutcomes.Thenthiswould
notonlyallowforanintuitivelysatisfyingconstrualofthecausalresponsibilityofthemental(viz.,mentalpropertiesarecausallyresponsibleifmentalcausesare
coveredbyintentionallaws,asdescribedabove),itwouldalsounderminetheideathatmentalcauseshavetobecoveredbyphysicallaws.Ifthelawsofpsychology
haveitincommonwiththelawsofphysicsthatbothstrictlynecessitatetheirconsequents,thenpresumablyeitherwoulddoequallywelltosatisfytheconstraintsthat
principle6imposesonthelawsthatcovermentalcauses.Buttheideathatmentalcauseshavetobecoveredbyphysicallawsisthekeystepinthefamous
Davidsonianargumentfromtheanomiaofthementaltophysicalism.ItmaybethatLePoreandLoewerwouldliketohangontotheDavidsonianargumentit'spretty
clearthatDavidsonwould.
ItakeDavidson'sargumenttogosomethinglikethis:
9.1Mentalcauseshavetobecoveredbysomestrictlaworother.(Strictcovering)
9.2Butnotbyintentionallawsbecauseintentionallawsaren'tstrictthesatisfactionoftheirantecedentsisn'tnomologicallysufficientforthesatisfactionoftheir
consequents.(Anomiaofthemental.)
9.3Somentalcausesmustbecoveredbyphysicallaws.
9.4Sotheymusthavephysicalproperties.Q.E.D.
Butifthereareintentionallysufficientconditionsforbehavioraloutcomesyoulosestep9.2andifyoulosestep9.2,youlosetheargument.Itappearsthatthecostof
anintuitivelyadequateconstrualofmentalresponsibilityisthatthere'snoargumentfrommentalcausationtophysicalism.
Well,somuchforlayingoutthegeography.Here'swhathappensnext.First,I'lltrytoconvinceyouthatyourintuitionsreallydocryoutforsomesortofcausal
sufficiencyaccountofcausalresponsibilitysomethinglikethatifit'sm'sbeingMthat'scausallyresponsibleforb'sbeingB,thenbisBinallnearbyworldswheremis
M.(Thisis,torepeat,aconsequenceofdefiningcausalresponsibilityintermsofstrictlycoveringlaws,sinceitisadefiningpropertyofsuchlawsthatthesatisfaction
oftheirantecedentsnecessitatesthesatisfactionoftheirconsequents.)I'llthensuggestthat,appearancestothecontrary,itreallyisn'tveryhardtosquaresuchan
accountwiththeadmissionthateventhebestpsychologicallawsareverylikelytobe

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hedged.Ineffect,I'mclaimingthat,givenaconflictbetweenprinciples,6and8,there'sanaturalreplacementfor6.Atthispointthequestionaboutphysicalism
becomesmootsinceitwillnolongerbeclearwhyhedgedpsychologicallawscan'tgroundmentalcausesand,presumably,ifhedgedpsychologicallawscan,then
strictphysicallawsneedn't.Itstillmightturnout,however,thatyoucangetaphysicalistconclusionfromconsiderationsaboutmentalcausation,thoughbyaslightly
differentroutefromtheonethatDavidsonfollowsaroutethatdoesn'trequirethesubsumptionofcausesbystrictlawsasalemma.
Myfirstpoint,then,isthatnotwithstandingLandLtothecontrary,thenotionofthecausalresponsibilityofthementalthatyourintuitionsdemandisthatMsshouldbe
anomologicallysufficientconditionforBs.Acceptnosubstitutes,iswhatIsay.I'mnot,however,exactlysurehowtoconvinceyouthatthisisindeedwhatyour
intuitionscryoutforperhapsthefollowingconsiderationswillseempersuasive.
Therearen't,ofcourse,anyreliableproceduresforscientificdiscovery.Butonemightthinkoftheproceduresthathavesometimesbeenproposedas,ineffect,
codifyingourintuitionsaboutcausalresponsibility.Forexample,it'srighttosaythatPasteurusedthe"methodofdifferences"todiscoverthatcontactwithstuffinthe
airandnotspontaneousgenerationinthenutrientisresponsibleforthebreedingofmaggots.Thisisnot,however,acommentonhowPasteurwentaboutthinking
uphishypothesesofhisexperiments.Themethodofdifferencesdoesn'ttellyouhowtofindoutwhatiscausallyresponsible.Rather,ittellsyouwhattofindoutto
findoutwhat'scausallyresponsible.Itsays,thrashaboutinthenearbynomologicallypossibleworldsandfindapropertysuchthatyougetthemaggotsjustwhenyou
getthatpropertyinstantiated.Thatwillbethepropertywhoseinstantiationiscausallyresponsibleforthemaggots.
I'mclaimingthatPasteurhaditinmindtoassigncausalresponsibilityforthemaggots,andthat,indoingso,itwaspreeminentlyreasonableofhimtohaveargued
accordingtothemethodofdifferences.Viz.,iftheinfestationisairborne,thenfittingagauzetoptothebottleshouldgetridofthemaggots,andtakingthegauzetop
offthebottleshouldbringthemaggotsbackagain.Assigningcausalresponsibilitytocontactwithstuffintheairinvolvedshowingthatsuchcontactisnecessaryand
sufficientforgettingthemaggotsthatwaswhatthemethodofdifferencesrequired,andthatwaswhatPasteurfiguredouthowtodo.Ifthoseintuitionsaboutcausal
re

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sponsibilityweregoodenoughforPasteur,Iguesstheyoughttobegoodenoughforyouandme.
Sothen,Iassumethatthemethodofdifferencescodifiesourintuitionsaboutcausalresponsibility.Butthisimpliesthatassigningcausalresponsibilitytothemental
requiresthetruthofmorecounterfactualsthanLandLarepreparedtoallow.Intuitively,whatweneedisthatm'sbeingMiswhatmakesthedifferencein
determiningwhetherbisB,hencethat'BbwheneverMm'istrueinallnearbyworlds.Ifthemethodofdifferencestellsuswhatcausalresponsibilityis,thenwhatittells
usisthatcausalresponsibilityrequiresnomologicalsufficiency.13Sothecausalresponsibilityofthementalmustbethenomologicalsufficiencyofintentionalstatesfor
producingbehavioraloutcomes.
ThefirstandcrucialstepisgettingwhatarobustconstrualofthecausalresponsibilityofthementalrequiresistosquaretheideathatMsarenomologically
sufficientforBswiththefactthatpsychologicallawsarehedged.Howcanyouhaveitboththatspeciallawsonlynecessitatetheirconsequentsceterisparibusand
thatwemustgetBswheneverwegetMs?Answer:youcan't.Butwhatyoucanhaveisjustasgood:viz.,thatifit'salawthatMBceterisparibus,thenitfollows
thatyougetBswheneveryougetMsandtheceterisparibusconditionsaresatisfied.14Thisshowsushowceterisparibuslawscandoseriousscientificbusiness,
sinceitcapturesthedifferencebetweenthe(substantive)claimthatFscauseGsceterisparibus,andthe(empty)claimthatFscauseGsexceptwhentheydon't.
So,it'ssufficientforMtobeacausallyresponsiblepropertyifit'sapropertyinvirtueofwhichMscausesBs.Andhere'swhatitisforMtobeapropertyinvirtueof
whichMscausesBs:
10.1.MscausesBs.
10.2.'MBceterisparibus'isalaw.15
10.3.TheceterisparibusconditionsaresatisfiedinrespectofsomeMs.
Imustsay,theideathathedged(includingintentional)lawsnecessitatetheirconsequentswhentheirceterisparibusclausesaredischargedseemstometobeso
obviouslythepertinentproposalthatI'mhardputtoseehowanybodycouldseriouslyobjecttoit.Butnodoubtsomebodywill.
Onemight,Isuppose,takethelinethatthere'snofactofthematteraboutwhether,inagivencase,theceterisparibusconditionsonaspecialsciencelawaresatisfied.
Orthat,evenifthereisafact

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ofthematter,stillonecan'teverknowwhatthefactofthematteris.But,surelythatwouldbemad.AfterallPasteurdiddemonstrate,tothesatisfactionofall
reasonablemen,thatceterisparibusyougetmaggotswhenandonlywhenthenutrientsareincontactwithstuffintheair.Andpresumablyhediditbyinvestigating
experimentalenvironmentsinwhichtheceterisparibusconditionwassatisfiedandknowntobeso.WhateverisactualispossiblewhatPasteurcoulddoinfact,even
youandIcandoinprinciple.
Iremark,inpassing,thatdeterminingthatceterisparibusstuffintheaircausesmaggotsdidnotrequirethatPasteurbeabletoenumeratetheceterisparibus
conditions,onlythathebeabletorecognizesomecasesinwhichtheywereinfactsatisfied.Sufficientconditionsforthesatisfactionofceterisparibusclausesmaybe
determinateandepistemicallyaccessibleevenwhennecessaryandsufficientconditionsfortheirsatisfactionaren't.Afortiori,hedgedlawswhoseceterisparibus
conditionscannotbeenumeratedmayneverthelessbesatisfiedinparticularcases.PerhapsweshouldsaythatMiscausallyresponsibleonlyifMscauseBsinany
worldinwhichtheceterisparibusclauseof'M?Ballelseequal'isdischarged.Thiswouldleaveitopen,andnotveryimportant,whether'allandonlytheworldsin
whichtheceterisparibusconditionsaredischarged'isactuallywelldefined.It'snotveryimportantbecausewhatdetermineswhetheragivenlawcancoveragiven
eventiswhetherthelawisdeterminatelysatisfiedbytheevent.Itisnotalsorequiredthatitbedeterminatewhetherthelawwouldbesatisfiedbyarbitraryotherevents
(orbythatsameeventinarbitraryotherworlds).ItseemstomethattheplausibilityofDavidson'sassumptionthathedgedlawscan'tgroundcausesmaydependon
overlookingthispoint.
Finally,itmightbearguedthat,althoughtheceterisparibusconditionsonotherspecialsciencelawsaresometimesknowntobesatisfied,thereisnevertheless
somethingpeculiaraboutintentionallaws,sothattheirceterisparibusconditionscan'tbe.ItakeitthatDavidsonthinksthatsomethingofthissortistruebutIhave
neverbeenabletofollowtheargumentsthataresupposedtoshowthatitis.AndInotice(withapproval)thatLePoreandLoewerareapparentlynotcommittedto
anysuchclaim.
WheredoesallthisleaveuswithrespecttotheclassicalDavidsonianargumentthatinfersphysicalismfromtheanomalousnessofthemental?Itseemstomethatwe
arenowlackinganyconvincingargumentforacceptingprinciple6.
Supposeit'struethatcausesneedtobecoveredbylawsthatnecessitatetheirconsequentsitdoesn'tfollowthattheyneedtobe

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coveredbystrictlaws.Hedgedlawsnecessitatetheirconsequentsinworldswheretheirceterisparibusconditionsaresatisfied.Why,then,shouldmentalcausesthat
arecoveredbyhedgedintentionallawswithsatisfiedantecedentsandsatisfiedceterisparibusconditionsrequirefurthercoveringbyastrictlawofphysics?
Thepointtillnowhasbeenthatifstrictlawswilldotocovercauses,sotoowillhedgedlawsinworldswherethehedgesaredischarged.Idigresstoremarkthat
hedgedlawscanplaythesameroleasstrictonesincoveringlawexplanations,solongasit'spartoftheexplanationthattheceterisparibusconditionsaresatisfied.
Whentheantecedentofastrictlawissatisfiedyouareguaranteedthesatisfactionofitsconsequent,andtheoperationofstrictlawsincoveringlawexplanations
dependsonthis.What'stypicallyinwantofacoveringlawexplanationissomesuchfactasthataneventmcausedaneventb(andnot,N.B.,thataneventmcaused
aneventbceterisparibus.Indeed,it'snotcleartomethattherearefactsofthislattersort.Hedgedgeneralizationsareonethinghedgedsingularlycausalstatements
wouldbequiteanother.).16Well,thepointisthatstrictlawscanexplainm'scausingbpreciselybecauseifit'sstrictthatMscauseBsandit'struethatthereisanM,
thenitfollowsthatthereisanMcausedb.'YougotaBbecauseyouhadanM,andit'salawthatyougetaBwheneveryougetanM'.Butifthatsortofexplanation
issatisfying,thensotoooughttobe:'YougotaBinworldwbecauseyouhadanMinworldw,andit'salawthatceterisparibusyougetaBwheneveryouhavean
M,andtheceterisparibusconditionsweresatisfiedinworldw.'
Thelongandshortis:onereasonwhyyoumightthinkthatcauseshavetobecoveredbystrictlawsisthatcoveringlawexplanationsdependonthisbeingso.Butthey
don't.Strictlawsandhedgedlawswithsatisfiedceterisparibusconditionsoperatealikeinrespectoftheirrolesincoveringcausalrelationsandinrespectoftheirroles
incoveringlawexplanations.Surelythisisasitshouldbe:strictlawsarejustthespecialcaseofhedgedlawswheretheceterisparibusclausesaredischarged
vacuouslythey'rethehedgedlawsforwhich'allelse'isalwaysequal.
Still,Ithinkthatthereissomethingtobesaidfortheintuitionthatstrictphysicallawsplayaspecialroleinrespectofthemetaphysicalunderpinningsofcausal
relations,andIthinktheremayafterallbearoutefromconsiderationsaboutmentalcausationtophysicalism.I'llclosebysayingalittleaboutthis.
Inmyview,themetaphysicallyinterestingfactaboutspecialsciencelawsisn'tthatthey'rehedgedit'sthatthey'renotbasic.Corre

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spondingly,themetaphysicallyinterestingcontrastisn'tbetweenphysicallawsandspecialsciencelawsit'sbetweenbasiclawsandtherest.Forpresentpurposes,I
needtoremindyouofadifferencebetweenspeciallawsandbasiclawsthatIremarkedonearlierinthischapter:Ifit'snonbasicallylawfulthatMscauseBs,there's
alwaysastorytotellabouthow(typically,bywhattransformationsofmicrostructures)instantiatingMbringsabouttheinstantiationofB.Nonbasiclawswant
implementingmechanismsbasiclawsdon't.(That,Iimagine,iswhatmakesthembasic).
Itisthereforesurelynoaccidentthathedgedlawsaretypicallymaybealwaysnotbasic.Ontheonehand,it'sintrinsictoalawbeinghedgedthatitis
nomologicallypossibleforitsceterisparibusconditionsnottobesatisfied.And,ontheotherhand,astandardwaytoaccountforthefailureofaceterisparibus
conditionistopointtothebreakdownofaninterveningmechanism.Thus,meanderingriverserodetheiroutsidebanksceterisparibus.Butnotwhenthespeedofthe
riverisartificiallycontrolled(noBernoullieffect)andnotwhentheriverischemicallypure(nosuspendedparticles)andnotwhensomebodyhasbuiltawallonthe
outsidebank(notenoughabrasiontoovercomeadhesion).Insuchcases,theceterisparibusclausefailstobesatisfiedbecauseaninterveningmechanismfailsto
operate.Bycontrast,thisstrategyisunavailableinthecaseofnonbasiclawsbasiclawsdon'trelyonmechanismsofimplementation,soiftheyhaveexceptionsthat
mustbecausethey'renondeterministic.
Weseehereonewayinwhichceterisparibusclausesdotheirwork.Nonbasiclawsrelyonmediatingmechanismswhichtheydonot,however,articulate
(sometimesbecausethemechanismsaren'tknownsometimesbecauseAscancauseBsinmanydifferentways,sothatthesamelawhasavarietyof
implementations).Ceterisparibusclausescanhavetheeffectofexistentiallyquantifyingoverthesemechanisms,sothat'AscauseBsceterisparibus'canmean
somethinglike'Thereexistsaninterveningmechanismsuchthatwhenit'sintact,AscauseBs.'Iexpectthattheceterisparibusclausesinspecialsciencelawscando
otherusefulthingsaswell.Itisascandalofthephilosophyofsciencethatwehaven'tgotagoodtaxonomyoftheirfunctions.
However,Idigress.Thepresentpointisthat:
11.Nonbasiclawsrequiremediationbyinterveningmechanisms,
and
12.Therearesurelynobasiclawsofpsychology.

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17

Letusnowmakethefollowingboldassumption:allthemechanismsthatmediatetheoperationofnonbasiclawsareeventuallyphysical. Idon't,Iconfess,know
exactlywhatthisboldassumptionmeans(becauseIdon'tknowexactlywhatitisforamechanismtobephysicalasopposed,say,tospiritual)andIconfessthatI
don'tknowexactlywhyitseemstometobeareasonablyboldassumptiontomake.ButIdosuspectthatifitcouldbestatedclearly,itwouldbeseentobeasortof
boldassumptionforwhichthepastsuccessesofourphysicalisticworldviewrendersubstantialinductivesupport.
Well,ifallthemechanismsthatnonbasiclawsrelyonareeventuallyphysical,thenthemechanismsofmentalcausationmustbeeventuallyphysicaltoo.For,onthe
currentassumptions,mentalcauseshavetheireffectsinvirtueofbeingsubsumedbypsychologicallawsand,sincepsychologicallawsaren'tbasic,theyrequire
mediationbyinterveningmechanisms.However,itseemstomethattoadmitthatmentalcausesmustberelatedtotheireffects(including,notice,theirmentaleffects)
byphysicalmechanismsjustistoadmitthatmentalcausesarephysical.Or,ifit'snot,thenit'stoadmitsomethingsoclosethatIcan'tseewhythedifferencematters.
So,then,perhapsthere'saroutetophysicalismfromstuffaboutmentalcausationthatdoesn'trequiretheclaimthatceterisparibuslawscan'tgroundmentalcauses.If
so,thenmystorygivesusbothphysicalismandareasonableaccountofthecausalresponsibilityofthementalwhereasDavidson'sstorygivesusatmosttheformer.18
Butifwecan'tgetboththecausalresponsibilityofthementalandanargumentforphysicalism,thenitseemstomethatweoughttogiveuptheargumentfor
physicalism.I'mnotreallyconvincedthatitmattersverymuchwhetherthementalisphysicalstilllessthatitmattersverymuchwhetherwecanprovethatitis.
Whereas,ifitisn'tliterallytruethatmywantingiscausallyresponsibleformyreaching,andmyitchingiscausallyresponsibleformyscratching,andmybelievingis
causallyresponsibleformysaying...,ifnoneofthatisliterallytrue,thenpracticallyeverythingIbelieveaboutanythingisfalseandit'stheendoftheworld.
Acknowledgment
ThispaperisarevisedandextendedversionofsomeremarkspresentedatanAPAsymposiumonDecember30,1987,inreplytoErnestLePoreandBarry
Loewer's''MindMatters"(1987).IamgratefultoLePoreandLoewerandtoBrianMcLaughlinformuchstimulatingconversationontheseandrelatedissues.

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Notes
1.Ishallmoreorlessassumeinwhatfollowsthateventsaretheindividualsthatcausallawssubsumeandtowhichcausalpowersareascribed.Nothingwillturnon
thisit'sjustthatit'saboretoalwaysbehavingtosay"events,orsituations,orthings,orwhatever..."
2.Itfacilitatesthediscussionnottoworryaboutwhichoftheirpropertieseventshaveessentially.Inparticular,Ishallassumethatwecanmakesenseof
counterfactualsinwhichacertainmentaleventissupposedtohavenointentionalcontentorphysicalconstituencydifferentfromitsactualcontentorconstituency.
Nothinggermanetothepresentissueshangsonthissince,asfarasIcantell,thesamesortsofpointsI'llbemakingaboutcounterfactualpropertiesofeventscould
justaswellbemadeaboutrelationsbetweeneventsandtheircounterparts.
3.Whatfollowsisaverycrudeapproximationtotheaerodynamicfacts.EnthusiastswillfindaseriousexpositioninRoss,1975.
4.Thereis,Isuppose,noguaranteethatthereisauniquepropertyofelinvirtueofwhichitcausese2.Infact,accordingtotheaccountofcausalresponsibilityI'll
propose,bothmacropropertiesandmicropropertiesoftheeventswilltypicallybeimplicated.Thisseemstometobeintuitivelyplausibleoneresistschoosing
between,say,hisbeingtallandhishavingtallgenesas'the'propertyofJohn'sinvirtueofwhichhehastallchildren.
5.ThecoveringprincipleisgenerallyinthespiritofproposalsofDonaldDavidson's,exceptthat,unlikeDavidson,I'mpreparedtobeshamelessaboutproperties.
6.5.2isinthetexttoemphasizethatthenomologicalsubsumptionaccountofthecausalresponsibilityofthementaliscloselyconnectedtotheideathatmentalevents
arenomologicallysufficientforbehavioraloutcomes.Wewillthushavetoconsiderhowtosquarethenomologicalsubsumptionstorywiththefactthattheantecedents
ofpsychologicallawsgenerallydonotspecifynomologicallysufficientconditionsforthesatisfactionoftheirconsequents(because,likethelawsoftheotherspecial
sciences,thelawsofpsychologytypicallyhaveessentialceterisparibuscauses.)SeethesectiononIntentionalLaws.
7.I'mleavingstatisticallawsoutofconsideration.Ifsomelawsareirremediablystatistical,thentheproposalinthetextshouldbechangedtoread:"anypropertyin
virtueofwhichsomedeterministiclawcoversanindividualwillbeapropertyinvirtueofwhichsomecausallawcoversanindividual."
8.Butthiswillhavetobehedgedtodealwithceterisparibuslaws.Thesecondpartofthischapter(IntentionalLaws)isaboutwhat'stherightwaytohedgeit.
9.Hornstein(1988),p.18.
10.Specialsciencelawsareunstrictnotjustdefacto,butinprinciple.Specifically,theyarecharacteristically"heteronomic":youcan'tconvertthemintostrictlaws
byelaboratingtheirantecedents.Onereasonwhythisissoisthatspecialsciencelawstypicallyfailinlimitingconditions,orinthecaseofconditionswherethe
idealizationspresupposedbythesciencearen'tapproximatedandgenerallyspeaking,youhavetogooutsidethevocabularyofthesciencetosaywhatthese
conditionsare.Oldriversmeander,butnotwhensomebodybuildsalevee.Noticethat"levee"isnotageologicalterm.(Neither,forthatmatter,is"somebody.")
Iemphasizethispointbecauseit'ssometimessupposedthatheteronomicityisaproprietaryfeatureofintentionallawsquaintentional.Poppycock.
11.Itcouldnodoubtbesaidthatacceptingprinciple6doesn'treallymakethementalpropertiesdropoutofthepictureevenifmentalcauseshavetobecoveredby

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physicallaws,itcanstillbetruethattheyarealsocoveredbyintentionallaws,viz.,intheold(4.3)senseof"covering"thatdidn'trequirecoveringlawstobestrict.As
BrianMcLaughlin(unpublished)hasrightlypointedout,it'sperfectlyconsistenttoholdthatcoveringbystrictlawsisnecessaryandsufficientforcausalrelationsand
alsotoholdthatcoveringbylooselawsisnecessary,orevensufficient,forcausalrelations,solongasyouarepreparedtoassumethateverycausethatis
looselycoveredisstrictlycoveredtoo.
However,itisnotclearthatthisobservationbuysmuchrelieffromepiphobia.Afterall,ifmentalpropertiesreallyarecausallyactive,whyisn'tintentionalcoveringall
byitselfsufficienttogroundthecausalrelationsofmentalevents?I'vebeenurgingthatintentionalpropertiesarecausallyresponsibleifmentalcausesarecoveredby
intentionallaws.Butthatseemsplausibleonlyifmentaleventsarecausesinvirtueoftheirbeingcoveredbyintentionallaws.Buthowcouldmentalcausesbecauses
quaintentionallycoveredif,inordertobecauses,theyarefurtherrequiredtobesubsumedbynonintentionallaws?Takentogether,principles6and7makeitlookas
though,evenifmentaleventsarecoveredquaintentional,they'recausesonlyquaphysical.Soagainitlooksliketheintentionalpropertiesofmentaleventsaren'tdoing
anyofthework.
12.I'mdoingalittlepussyfootinghere,soperhapsI'dbetterputthepointexactly:ontheviewthatIwillpresentlycommend,therearecircumstancesinwhich
instantiationsofmentalpropertiesnomologicallynecessitatebehavioraloutcomes.Whatisn't,however,quitethecaseisthatthesecircumstancesarefullyspecifiedby
theantecedentsofintentionallaws.Inmyview,onlybasiclawshavethepropertythattheirantecedentsfullyspecifythecircumstancesthatnomologicallynecessitate
thesatisfactionoftheirconsequents(andthenonlyifthey'redeterministic).
13.ItwillbenoticedthatI'mstressingtheimportanceofcausalsufficiencyforcausalresponsibility,whereasitwascausalnecessitythatPasteurcaredaboutmost.
Pasteurwasouttoshowthatcontactwithstuffintheairandonlycontactwithstuffintheairiscausallyresponsibleformaggotsspecificallythatcontactwithstuffin
theairaccountsforallofthemaggots,hencethatspontaneousgenerationaccountsfornone.Itakeitthatitisnotamongourintuitionsthatacertainmentalpropertyis
causallyresponsibleforacertainbehavioronlyifthatsortofbehaviorcanhavenoothersortofcause.
14.So,whatIsaidabovethatalawisahypotheticalthesatisfactionofwhoseantecedentnomologicallynecessitatesthesatisfactionofitsconsequentwasn'tquite
truesinceitdoesn'tquiteapplytohedgedlaws.Whatistrueisthatalawisahypotheticalthesatisfactionofwhoseantecedentnomologicallynecessitatesthe
satisfactionofitsconsequentwhenitsceterisparibusconditionsaresatisfied.
15.Ifit'sastrictlaw,thentheceterisparibusclauseisvacuouslysatisfied.
16.Toputitanotherway:Supposeyou'refeelingHempelianabouttheroleofcoveringlawsinscientificexplanations.Thenyoumightworrythat:
(i)CeterisparibusAscauseBs
togetherwith
(ii)Aa
yieldssomethinglike
(iii)CeterisparibusBb

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whichisn'tstrongenoughtoexplainthedatum(Bb).'CeterisparibusBb'doesn'tlooktohavetheformofapossibledatastatement.Iwonderinthetextwhetherit
evenhastheformofapossibletruth.
17."Eventually"means:Eitherthelawisimplementedbyaphysicalmechanism,oritsimplementationdependsonalowerlevellawwhichisitselfeitherimplemented
byaphysicalmechanismorisdependentonastilllowerlevellawwhichisitselfeitherimplementedbyaphysicalmechanismor...etc.Sinceonlyfinitechainsof
implementationareallowed,youhavetogettoaphysicalmechanism"eventually."
Weneedtoputitthiswaybecause,aswe'vebeenusingit,a"physical"mechanismisonewhosemeansofoperationiscoveredbyaphysicallaw,i.e.,byalaw
articulatedinthelanguageofphysics.Andthoughpresumablyphysicalmechanismsimplementeveryhighlevellaw,theyusuallydosovialotsoflevelsofintermediate
lawsandimplementations.So,forexample,intentionallawsareimplementedbysyntacticmechanismsthataregovernedbysyntacticlawsthatareimplementedby
neurologicalmechanismsthataregovernedbyneurologicallawsthatareimplementedbybiochemicalmechanismsthat...andsoondowntophysics.
Noneofthisreallymattersforpresentpurposes,ofcourse.Ademonstrationthatmentaleventshaveneuralpropertieswoulddotosolvethemind/bodyproblemsince
nobodydoubtsthatneuraleventshavephysicalproperties.
18.Ontheotherhand,Idon'tpretendtodowhatDavidsonseemstothinkhecan,viz.,getphysicalismjustfromconsiderationsabouttheconstraintsthatcausation
placesoncoveringlawstogetherwiththetruismthatpsychologicallawsaren'tstrict.Thatprojectwasbreathtakinglyambitiousbutmaybenotbreathtakinglywell
advised.Myguessis,ifyouwanttogetalotofphysicalismout,you'regoingtohavetoputalotofphysicalismin.WhatIputinwastheindependentassumptionthat
themechanismofintentionalcausationisphysical.

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Chapter6
SubstitutionArgumentsandtheIndividuation
ofBeliefs
Introduction
TheolderIget,themoreIaminclinedtothinkthatthereisnothingatalltomeaningexceptdenotationforexample,thatthereisnothingtothemeaningofaname
exceptitsbearerandnothingtothemeaningofapredicateexceptthepropertythatitexpresses.
Thepopularalternativetotheviewthatthereisnothingtomeaningexceptdenotationisthatmeaningisacompositeofdenotationandsense.Andeversince
Wittgenstein(ormaybesinceSaussure)ithasbeenwidelyassumedthatthesenseofanexpressionistobeunderstoodassomehowemergingfromitsuse.Practically
everybodywho'sanybodyinmodernAngloAmericanphilosophyhasheldsomeorotherversionofthissensecumusedoctrine.Still,asIsay,I'mincreasingly
inclinedtothinkthatit'sadeadendandthatthereisnothingatalltomeaningexceptdenotation.
WhatImostwanttodointhispaperisreconsideramainargumentthat'ssupposedtoshowthattheremustbesomethingmoretomeaningthandenotation.SoIdon't
proposetospendmuchtimereviewingthegeneralconsiderationsthatleadmetothinkthatthesense/usestoryisnogood.Roughly,however,nobodyhassucceeded
inmakingitclearjusthowthesenseofanexpressionissupposedtoemergefromitsusenot,atleast,ifuseistakenassomethingthatisnonsemanticallyand
nonintentionallyspecifiable.(Andifit'snot,it'shardtoseewhattheinterestofareductionofsensetousewouldbe.)
Ataminimum,ausetheoryofmeaningoughttobeafunctionfromusesontomeanings.Thereare,however,preciselynocandidatesfortheformulationofsucha
function.Wittgenstein,intheInvestigations(1953),imaginesa"primitivelanguagegame"inwhichoneguyisdisposedtobringaslabwhenanotherguysays(i.e.,
utters)"Slab!"Presumablythefactthatutterancesof"Slab!"have

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complianceconditionsinthisgame(andthatit'sbringingaslabthatcountsascomplying)reducestothefactthatthepeopleplayingthegamehavethedispositionsthat
theydo.Buthowdoesthisreductiongo?Whydoesthefactthatoneguybringsaslabwhentheothersays"Slab!"constitute"Slab!"meaningbringmeaslaband
not,asitmightbe,meetmeattheAlgonquinortwoisaprimenumber?Itis,afterall,easyenoughtodreamupastoryinwhichaguybringsaslabwhenyousay
"Slab!"becausehetakes''Slab!"tomeanmeetmeattheAlgonquin.Imagine,forexample,someonewhosepracticeitistobringyouaslabwheneverheintendsto
meetyouthere.ItmaybethatyoucouldgettheWittgensteinianversionofthereductionofsensetousetogothroughifyouthrewinalittlebehaviorism.Thewhich,
however,Heavenforfend.(Theseremarksalsoapply,mutatismutandis,toversionsofsense/usesemanticsaccordingtowhichthesenseofanexpressionisa
constructoutofitsroleinatheory,assumingthat'role'isconstruedcausallyorsyntacticallyanyhownotinferentiallyorintentionallyorotherwisequestionbeggingly.)
Second,thesense/usetheoryinvitessemanticholismviaalineofargumentthatisbynowtoowellknowntobotherrecapitulatingindetail.Briefly,thereappearstobe
noatomisticwayofindividuatinguseshencenoatomisticwayofindividuatingsenseshencenowheretostopshortofidentifyingtheunitsofsensewithentirebelief
systems(or"waysoflife"orwhatever).Whenpursuedinthisdirection,however,thesense/usestoryisnotatheoryofmeaningbutthereductioadabsurdumofthe
possibilityofsuchatheory.Ontheholisticaccountofcontentindividuation,ithardlyeverturnsoutthattwotokensofasymbolhavethesamesense.Andwhat'sthe
goodofasuicidalsemantics?
Whereas,bycontrast,asenselessaccountofmeaninglookstobeinbettershapeinboththeserespects(assumingthatitcanbemadetosatisfy"internal"conditions
ofadequacythatasemantictheoryoughttomeet,likeassigningtherighttruthconditions,exhibitingcompositionalstructure,andsoforth).Whereasnothingisknown
abouthowsensearisesfromuse,therehasbeensomeglimmerofprogressinattemptstoreducedenotationtocausation.(SeerecentworkbyDretske,Stampe,
Fodor,etc.)And,whiletheuseofasymbolisgenerallyassumedtobeatleastpartlyconstitutedbyitsintralinguisticrelations,denotationispresumablyaword/world
relationpurely.1Thereisthussomehopethatanextensionalsemanticscanavoidtheholismthatplaguesusetheories.(Formorediscussionofboththesepoints,see
Fodor,1986).

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Sotellmeagain:whydoestherehavetobesenseaswellasdenotation?What'swrongwiththeideathatdenotationisallthatthereistomeaning?
TheSubstitutionArgument.
Here'swhat'ssupposedtobewrong.Theexpressions"Jocasta"and"Oedipus'Mother"2arecoreferentialandmustthereforebesynonymsifdenotationisallthat
thereistomeaning.Butit'struethatOedipusbelievedthatJocastawaseligibleandit'sfalsethatOedipusbelievedthatOedipus'Motherwaseligible.Sothe
expressions"Jocasta"and''Oedipus'Mother"arenotfreelysubstitutablesalveveritate.Sotheyarenotsynonyms.Sodenotationcan'tbeallthatthereistomeaning.
I'llcallthiskindofargumenta"substitutionargument"(andI'llcalltheimpliedtestforcontentidentitythe"substitutiontest").Ithinkthatsubstitutionargumentsare
andhavebeensinceFregealotofwhat'sbehindtheideathattheremustbesomethingmoretomeaningthandenotation.ButtheolderIget,themoreIwonder
whethersubstitutionargumentsareanydamnedgood.Ithereforeproposetohaveagoodlookatsubstitutionarguments.Startingnow.
Onthefaceofit,substitutionsalveveritateinbeliefcontextsdoesn'tlooktobeatestforidentityofcontent.Whatitlookstobeisatestforidentityofbeliefstate.3If
'ObelievesE'istrueand'ObelievesE"isfalse,thenitmustbethatbelievingEandbelievingE'aredifferentstates.Inthepresentcase,ifbelievingJtobeeligibleand
believingO'sMtobeeligiblewerethesamestate,thenitwouldbebothtrueandfalsethatOwasinit,andthatisnotallowed.Butit'sonethingtoadmitthatbelieving
thatJiseligibleisadifferentstatethanbelievingthatO'sMiseligibleitwouldseemtobequiteanotherthingtoadmitthat'J'and'O'sM'arenonsynonymous.Andit
is,decisively,thelatterconclusionthatweneedtobeabletodrawifwe'retoinferfromthefactsaboutOedipusthatthereismoretomeaningthandenotation.
Recap:
(i)What'sgrantedisthatiftheexpressionEfailstosubstitutefortheexpressionE'salveveritateinthecontext'believesthat...',thenbelievingthatEisadifferent
statefrombelievingthatE'.
(ii)What'sclaimedisthatiftheexpressionEfailstosubstitutefortheexpressionE'salveveritateinthecontext'believesthat...',thenEandE'differinsemantic
value.

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Required:anargumentthatgetsfromwhat'sgrantedtowhat'sclaimed.TheolderIget,themoreIaminclinedtodoubtthatthereisone.
Inowproposetorunthroughacoupleofcandidatearguments,neitherofwhichstrikesmeasveryconvincing.Ithenwanttotellyouastoryabouttheindividuationof
beliefsthatmakesitclearwhytheinferencefrom(i)to(ii)shouldn'tbeexpectedtogothroughandthatis,Ithink,notimplausibleonindependentgrounds.
Argument1
Premise1:If'believesE'issometimestruewhen'believesE"isfalse,thenEandE'arenotfreelysubstitutablesalveveritate.
Premise2:Synonymsarefreelysubstitutablesalveveritate.
Conclusion:EandE'aren'tsynonymsif'believesE'issometimestruewhen'believesE"isfalse.
Comment:Premise1iscommonground,butwhyshouldwebelievepremise2?
Certainly2isfalseasstatedaseverybodyandhisgrandmotherpointsout,substitutionofsynonymsclearlyfailsinquotationcontexts(like"uttered'....'")maybeit
failsinbeliefcontextstoo.Howarewetotell?
I'dprefertoavoidavulgarsquabbleoverintuitions.Forwhatit'sworth,however,itseemstome(asitseemedtoMates'1952)thatitispossibleformetodoubt
(/deny)thateverybodywhobelievesthatOedipusisabachelorbelievesthatOedipusisanunmarriedmaneventhoughIdon'tdoubt(/deny)thateverybodywho
believesthatOedipusisabachelorbelievesthatOedipusisabachelor.Ataminimum,it'ssurelypossibleforittoseemtomethat[it'spossibleformetodoubt
(/deny)thateverybodywhobelievesthatOedipusisabachelorbelievesthatOdeipusisanunmarriedman]eventhoughitdoesn'tseemtomethat[it'spossibleforme
todoubt(/deny)thateverybodywhobelievesthatOedipusisabachelorbelievesthatOedipusisabachelor].For,asamatteroffact,itdoesseemtomethatitseems
tomethatallofthisissoandIwouldseemtobeinaboutasgoodapositionasanyonecanbetosayhowthingsseemtometobe,nichtwahr?Somaybe
substitutionofsynonymssalveveritatefailsinthecontext'itseemstomethat....',oriniterationsofthatcontext.Inwhichcase,thefailureof'J'and'O'sM'to
substituteinsuchcontextswouldnotshowthattheyaren'tsynonyms.

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Inrathersimilarspirit,itseemstomecertainthatmydaughter,whenshewasthreeyearsold,believedmetobeherfather.ButIreallydohavemydoubtsabout
whethershebelievedmetobehermaleparent.Introspectionsuggests(again,forwhatit'sworth)thatthereasonIreallydodoubtthisisthatIdoubtthatthreeyear
oldshavetheconceptPARENT,andI'minclinedtoholdthatyoucan'tbelievethatsomeoneisyourmaleparentunlessyoudohavetheconceptPARENT.Merely
havingtheconceptFATHERaconceptthat'sdefinableintermsofPARENTstrikesmeasnotgoodenough.
TheMatessortofargumentthrowsdoubtontheclaimthatfailuresofsubstitutionsalveveritateinbeliefcontextsareipsofactoargumentsfornonsynonymy.Reflection
onKripke'sexampleaboutPierre(1979)makesthisclaimseemstillmorequestionableatleastifyou'repreparedtobelievethattranslationisatestforsynonymy.4
Forourpurposesastrippeddownversionoftheexamplewilldo.PierreisaFrench/Englishbilingualwhohascomeacrosstokensofthetype'Londres'inFrench
textsandtokensofthetype'London'inEnglishtexts.Heunderstandsthat'London'and'Londres'bothrefertocities,buthedoesn'trealizethattheybothrefertothe
samecityforsimplicity,wecanassumethathetakesitthattheydon't.Sotheintuitionseemstobethat"PierrebelievesthatLondresispretty"istrueand"Pierre
believethatLondonispretty"isfalse.(Itisanargumentforthisintutionthatifyousaytohim:"Pierre,doyoubelievethatLondonispretty?''Pierresays"Butno!",
whereasifyousaytohim"Pierre,doyoubelievethatLondresispretty?"hesays"Butyes!")However,'London'translatesas'Londres'ifanythingtranslatesas
anything.So,iftranslationsareipsofactosynonyms,itwouldseemthatthere'satleastonecasewhereyoucan'tinferdifferenceofmeaningfromfailureof
substitution.5Butthatwastheveryformofinferencethatwerequiredinordertogetfrom'Obelieved...J...'and'Odidn'tbelieve...O'sMom...'to"J'and'O's
Mom'meandifferentthings'.WhyissauceforPierre'sgoosenotsauceforOedipus'gander?Sincetherearecaseswherethesubstitutiontestfailswhenthetranslation
testissatisfied,therightconclusionwouldseemtobethatiftranslationtestsforsense,substitutiondoesn't.
But,asIsay,allthisreliesalotonintuitions,overwhichIdonotwishtosquabble.AllIaskforatthisstageisaScotchverdict.Itturnsoutthat,givenastoryabout
theindividuationofquotationstogetherwithastoryabouthowembeddedformulasfunctionincontextslike'uttered"..."',wecanseehowsubstitutionofsynonyms
couldfailinquotationcontexts.Somaybetherecouldbea

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storyabouttheindividuationofbeliefsthat,togetherwithastoryabouthowembeddedformulasfunctionincontextslike'believesthat...',wouldshowushow
substitutionofsynonymscouldfailinbeliefcontextstoo.We'llreturntothispresently.
Argument2
Premise1:Distinctintentionalstatesmustdiffereitherintheirmode(e.g.,inthewaythatbelievingthatPdiffersfromdesiringthatP)orintheircontent(e.g.,inthe
waythatbelievingthatPdiffersfrombelievingthatQ).6
Premise2:BelievingthatJiseligibleisanintentionalstatedistinctfrombelievingthatO'sMiseligible(thefailureofthesubstitutiontestshowsthisseeabove).
Thesestatesdonotdifferinmode(they'rebothbeliefstates)
Sotheydifferincontents(theyhavedifferentpropositionalobjects)
So'Jiseligible'and'O'sMiseligible'arenonsynonymous(theyexpressdifferentpropositions).
So'J'and'O'sM'arenonsynonymous(bytheprinciplethatifnonsynonymousformulasdifferonlyinthatonehasconstituentCwheretheotherhasconstitutentC',
thenCandC'arenonsynonymous.Iproposetograntthisforthesakeofargument.).
Sodenotationcan'tbeallthatthereistomeaning.
Comment:Excellent,exceptthatwhyshouldwebelievepremise1?Specifically,whyshouldn'ttherebecaseswherebeliefsthataretokensofdifferentstatetypes
neverthelesshavethesamepropositionalobject?
Inowproposetotellyouastoryaboutbeliefindividuation,andabouthowembeddedformulasfunctioninbeliefattributions.Therelevantpeculiarityofthisstoryis
thatitpermitsdistinctbeliefstatestohavethesamecontents(thesamepropositionalobjects).Thepointoftellingyouthisstoryisthatsincesuchcasesareallowed,
thepropositionthatJiseligiblemightturnouttobeidenticaltothepropositionthatO'sMiseligibleeventhoughbelievingtheonepropositionisadifferentstatefrom
believingtheother.Butifthesepropositionsmightbethesamethenwehave,sofar,noreasontodoubtthat'J'and'O'sM'aresynonyms.Whichistosaythat,at
leastsofarasthefactsaboutOedipusareconcerned,wehavenoreasontodoubtthatdenotationisallthatthereistomeaning.
Let'sstartwithbeliefindividuation,leavingtheissuesaboutbeliefattributiontilllater.Thestandardstoryaboutbelievingisthatit'sa

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twoplacerelation,viz.,arelationbetweenapersonandaproposition.Mystoryaboutbelievingisthatit'safourplacerelation,viz.,arelationbetweenaperson,a
proposition,avehicle,andafunctionalrole.Accordingtomystory,ifallyouknowisthattwoofaguy'sbeliefstatesdiffer,thenallyoucaninferisthattheydiffer
eitherincontentorinvehicleorinfunctionalrole.Since,inparticular,youcan'tinferthattheydifferincontent,argument2isinvalidifmystoryabouttheindividuation
ofbeliefstatesistrue.
Avehicleisasymbol.Asymbol(token)isaspatiotemporalparticularwhichhassyntacticandsemanticpropertiesandacausalrole.Vehicles,likeothersymbols,are
individuatedwithrespecttotheirsyntacticandsemanticproperties,butnotwithrespecttotheircausalroles.Inparticular,twovehicletokensaretypedistinctifthey
aresyntacticallydifferentoriftheyexpressdifferentpropositions.Buttypeidenticalvehicletokenscandifferintheircausalrolesbecausetherolethatatokenplays
dependsnotjustonwhichtypeit'satypeof,butalsoontherestoftheworldinwhichitstokeningtranspires.(Thisistrueofthecausalrolesofsymbolsbecauseit's
trueofthecausalrolesofeverything.Roughly,yourcausalroledependsonwhatyouare,whatthelocallawsare,andwhatelsethereisaround.)
Iassume,finally,thatvehiclescanbetypedistinctbutsynonymousdistinctvehiclescanexpressthesameproposition.Somuchfortheindividuationofvehicles.
Ifyoulikelanguageofthoughtstories,thenthetypicalvehicleofbelievingisaformulaofMentalese.Ifyoudon'tlikelanguageofthoughtstories,thenletitbea
formulaofanythingyouplease.What'sessentialtomystoryisthatbelievingisneveranunmediatedrelationbetweenapersonandaproposition.Inparticular,
nobody"grasps"apropositionexceptinsofarasheisappropriatelyrelatedtoatokenofsomevehiclethatexpressestheproposition.(Ithinkthisnotonlybecauseit
strikesmeasmetaphysicallyplausible,butalsobecauseitisrequiredforastoryIlikeabouthowgraspingsofpropositionsmorespecifically,tokeningsof
propositionalattitudescaneventuateinthebehavioralconsequencesthattheydo.ButI'vetoldthatstoryelsewhereandIdon'tproposetorepeatithereseeFodor
1975and1978.)
IcannowtellyoumystoryaboutOedipus,whichisthathehadtwodifferentwaysofrelatingtothepropositionthatJwaseligible(and,mutatismutandis,toits
denial).Onewaywasviatokensofsomesuchvehicleas'Jiseligible'andtheotherwaywasviatokensofsomesuchvehicleas'O'sMiseligible'.Sincedifferenceof
vehiclesimplies(or,moreprecisely,canimplyseebelow)correspondingly

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differentmentalstates,itwaspossibleforOedipustohavetwobeliefswiththesamecontenti.e.,twobeliefsbothofwhoseobjectwasthepropositionthatcanbe
expressedaseitherJocastaiseligibleorOedipus'Motheriseligible.
MystoryaboutOedipusis,nodoubt,tendentious.It'snotoriouslypossibletohangontotheideathatdistinctbeliefstatesimplydistinctbeliefcontentsby
distinguishingbetweentwopropositionsthatextensionaliststaketobeidentical:thepropositionthatO'sMiseligibleandthepropositionthatJis.Sinceitthusappears
thatyoucantellthestoryaboutOeitherway,O'scasedoesn'tdistinguishbetweenmyviewofbeliefindividuationandthestandardview.
But,aswe'veseen,Pierreisahorseofadifferentcolor.InPierre'scase,asinO's,yougetthefailureofsubstitutionofcoextensiveexpressions('London'/'Londres'
'J'/'O'sM').ButinthePierreexampleit'simplausiblethattheexplanationofthesubstitutionfailureisthattheexpressionsmeandifferentthings.'London'/'Londres'is
badnewsforFrege'sstrategyofexplainingfailuresofsubstitutionbypositingdifferencesofsense.Butifit'snotdifferenceinsensethatexplainsthesubstitutionfailure
(asapparentlyit'snot)andiffailureofsubstitutionisatestfordistinctnessofbeliefstate(asapparentlyitis),thenitmustbethatdistinctbeliefstatescanhavethe
samecontent.I.e.,theremustbemoretotheidentityofanattitudethanitscontentanditsmode.Thevehiclebymeansofwhichthecontentispresenteddoesrather
suggestitselfsince,inPierre'scase,differencesintheirvehiclesseemtobeallthat'slefttodistinguishhisLondonbeliefsfromhisLondresones.
Averyroughtheoryofbeliefindividuationmightmakedowithjustaperson,avehicle,andacontent.Yougetarathersharperpictureifyoualsoallowinafunctional
roleforthevehicle.Looselyspeaking,Imeanbythefunctionalroleofavehicletherolethatitplaysininferencemorestrictlyspeaking,Imeanitscausalrolein
(certain)mentalprocesses.Itseemstomeplausiblethatyoucanhavetwobeliefswiththesameobjectandthesamevehicle,wherethedifferencebetweenthebeliefs
comesfromdifferencesintheinferential/causalrolesthatthevehiclesplay.Thishappenswhen,forexample,twoguyswhousethesamevehicletoexpressthesame
contentdifferintheirbackgroundtheoriesspecifically,intheidentitystatementsthattheyholdtrue.
Let'ssupposewhatisplausiblethecasethatIknowthatJanetismywife.WhatbeliefamIexpressingwhenIsay"I'mexpectingmywifetophoneat3"?Itseems
tomemerelycaptioustoinsistthatit'sthebeliefthatmywifewillphoneat3andnotthebeliefthatJanetwill.Ontheotherhand,whatbeliefisacquiredbytheguy
whoheard

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mesaywhatIdidbutwhodoesn'tknowaboutJanetbeingmywife?ClearlynotthebeliefthatJanetwillphoneclearlyonlythebeliefthatmywifewill.Theintuitions
getstillclearerifyouruntheexampleon'Janet'and'JanetD.Fodor'mybelievingthatJanetwillcallismybelievingthatJanetD.Fodorwill.Butifyoudon'tknow
aboutJanetbeingJDF,thenyouracquiringtheonebeliefisn'tyouracquiringtheother.Orsoitseemstome.7Iadmitthatthisisallthemerestintuitionmongeringbut
ifyouaccepttheintuitions,whatitlookslikewehaveis:oneformat('Janetwillcall'),oneproposition(extensionalistprinciplesareassumedtobeoperative),buttwo
beliefsdependingondifferencesinthebackgroundofcognitivecommitment.8
Somuchforthebeliefstateindividuationaccordingtomyrevisionistaccount.Whatisthestoryaboutbeliefstateattributiongoingtobe?
Considertheexpression'believesthatE'whereitisusedtoattributetosomeagentthestateofbelievingthatE.Howdoesitgoaboutdoingwhatitisusedtodo?
How,inparticular,doesthe"E"partwork?
Firstoff,Eneedssomehowtopickoutthepropositionalobjectofthebeliefithastospecifythecontentofthebeliefascribed.Ithinkthisworksinthefollowing
simpleandaestheticallysatisfyingfashion.Thepropositionthatistheobjectofthebeliefstatethatisattributedbyusingtheformula'believesE'istheverysame
propositionthatisexpressedbyusingtheunembeddedformulaE.So,forexample,theexpression'believesthatit'sraining'isusedtoattributeabeliefrelationtothe
propositionthatit'srainingandthisistheverysamepropositionthattheunembeddedformula'it'sraining'isusedtoexpress.
Itfollows,onmysemanticprinciples,thatthefunctionof'believesJiseligible'in'ObelievesJiseligible'istoattributeto0abeliefrelationtothepropositionthatis
expressedbothbytheunembeddedformula'Jiseligible'andbytheunembeddedformula'O'sMiseligible'.Itdoesn't,ofcourse,followthatbelievingthatO'sMis
eligibleandbelievingthatJiseligiblearethesamebeliefstatesince,onmymetaphysicalprinciples,theidentityofapropositionalattitudeisnotdeterminedby
specifyingamodeandanobject.Youmustalsospecify(interalia)avehicleandthisistheotherthingthattheembeddedformulain'believesE'canfunctiontodo.It
doesit,toputitroughly,bydisplayingthevehicleortoputitslightlylessroughly,itdoesitbydisplayingaformulathatis,tooneoranotherdegree,structurally
isomorphictothevehicle.Imay,forexample,wishtodistinguish(seeabove)betweenbeliefsaboutone'sfatherandbeliefsaboutone'smaleparent.Icandosoby
distinguishing

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betweenattributionsviatheformula'believes...father...'andviatheformula'believes...maleparent...'.Similarly,mutatismutandis,Icandistinguishbetween
'...O'sM...'beliefsand'...J...'beliefsorbetween'...Janet...'beliefsand'...mywife...'beliefs.Ineachcase,accordingtomystoryaboutbelief
individuation,it'sthevehicle,notthecontent,thatdistinguishesthebeliefstates.And,ineachcase,theintendeddistinctionissignaledbyachoiceamong(coextensive
butstructurallydistinct)formulasembeddedtothe'believes'predicate.
Itbearsemphasisthatacostofacceptingthissortofviewisabandoningtheprincipleofstrictcompositionalityofreference:i.e.,theprinciplethatitsdenotationisall
thatareferringexpressioncontributestofixingthedenotationofthereferringexpressionsofwhichitisaconstituent.Onthepresentview,thereasonthat'thebelief
thatO'sMiseligible'picksoutadiffentmentalstatefromtheonepickedoutby'thebeliefthatJiseligible'despitethedenotationalequivalenceof'J'and'O'sM'is
thatthedenotationsofexpressionslike'thebeliefthat...'aredeterminedbyboththedenotationandtheformoftheirconstituents.
However,strictcompositionofreferenceneverwasaparticularlyattractivestoryaboutopaquecontexts.ClassicalFregiansemanticspreservesitonlybyendorsing
thenotwildlyplausibleviewthat,although'J'and'O'sM'bothreferinbothopaqueandtransparentcontexts,andalthoughtheybothrefertothesamethingin
transparentcontexts,theyneverthelessrefertodifferentthingswhentheyoccurembeddedtoverbslike'believes'.(Specifically,'O'sM'referstothesenseO'sMand
'J'referstothesenseJ.O'sMandJaredifferentsensessince'O'sM'and'J'are,byassumption,nonsynonymous.)It'sarguablethat,asbetweengivingupthestrict
compositionalityofreferenceandgivingupwhatDavidsonhascalled"semanticinnocence"(theprinciplethat,ingeneral,wordsmeanthesameinopaquecontextsas
theydointransparentones),theredoesn'tseemtobemuchtochoose.Inparticular,it'snotaprioriobviousthatstrictcompositionalityofreferenceisworthhavingif
it'sgoingtocostthatmuch.
Actually,thesituationisratherworsethanthissuggests.Ifreferringexpressionsdenotetheirsensesinopaquecontexts,andifstrictcompositionalityofreference
holds,thenbeliefclausesthatdifferonlyinsynonymsmustcorefersynonymousexpressionswhichdenotetheirsensesipsofactodenotethesamething.Butthen,it's
hardtoseehow'Pierre'sbeliefthatLondresispretty'couldfailtorefertothesamementalstateas'Pierre'sbeliefthatLondonispretty'.Butiftheydorefertothe
samestate,howcoulditbethatPierrehas

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oneofthebeliefsandnottheother?(Similarargumentscould,ofcourse,beconstructedfromMatescases.)Itappearsthatif,asPierresuggests,substitution
sometimesdoesfailforsynonyms,andif,aseveryonesupposes,synonymscorefer,thenitmustnotbesupposedthattermsthatfailtosubstitutehaveipsofactogot
differentreferents.9
It'splausible,givenallofthis,thatatermmaycontributenotjustitsreferent,butalsoitsvehicle,tofixingthereferentsoftheexpressionsinwhichitoccurs.Howmuch,
then,ofthestructureofthevehicleofabeliefistheembeddedformulainabeliefstateattributingexpressionrequiredtodisplayinorderthattheattributionshouldbe
univocal?Inthecaseofthefirstofthefunctionsoftheembeddedformulaspecifyingthepropositionalobjectoftheattributedbeliefthematterisclear:the
embeddedformulamustexpresstheverypropositionthatthe'believes'predicateattributes.Ithink,however,thatitisotherwisewiththespecificationofthevehicle
hereeverythingisslipperyandpragmatic.Roughly,what'srequiredisadegreeofisomorphismtothevehiclethatisappropriatetothepurposesathandandthereisn't
anypurposeindependentspecificationofhowmuchisomorphismisenough.
Isay:'BabybelievesthatSantaClauswillcomedownthechimney'.Myintentionistospecifyabeliefthatisindividuated,inpart,byreferencetoavehicleinwhichthe
expression'SantaClaus'occursessentially.Ontheotherhand,Isay:'IbelievethatBillSmithwillcomedownthechimneydressedasSantaClaus'andhereit's
probablynotessentialthat'BillSmith'occurinthevehicle('he'or'MarySmith'shusband'wouldperhapsdoaswell).Similarly,Isay'SomefolksbelievedFDRtobe
theincarnationofthedevil'herepracticallynothingaboutthevehicleoftheattributedbeliefmatterstothesuccessoftheattribution.Itdoesn'tmatter,forexample,
thatthefolksinquestionthoughtofFDRviatheformula'theSOBintheWhiteHouse'orthattheythoughtoftheemptysetviathevehicle'OldNick'or'the
archfiend'(itdoesmatter,however,thattheydidn'tthinkofititviathevehicle'theemptyset').Idon't,inshort,generallyrequirethatmybeliefattributionsbeunivocal
Iamgenerallysatisfiedtopickoutanyofaclassofbeliefstatesthathavetheirpropositionalobjectsandcertainfeaturesoftheirvehiclesincommon.Anddonotsend
toknowjusthowvehicleindependentmybeliefattributionsarerequiredtobe,forthereisnopreciseanswer.GoodenoughforthepurposesathandisgenerallyallI
haveinmind.
Therealsoisn'tananswertotherequestforaformofembeddedexpressionsthatisguaranteedtospecifythevehicleofanattitudeuniquely.Thisistosaythatthere
isn't,inordinarybelief/desiretalk,

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anythingthatcorrespondstothecanonicaldescriptionofabelieforadesire.Toputitanotherway,it'snotthattherearededictoattributionsanddereattributionsit's
ratherthatthereisacontinuumalongwhichanembeddedexpressioncanbeexplicitaboutthevehicleofanattributedbelief.Ifthere'saruleinplay,it'saruleof
conversation:'Kindlysoconstruemyembeddedformulasthatmybeliefattributionscomeoutplausibleontheassumptionthatmyutilitiesarerational'.IfIsaythat
JohnbelievesthatCicerowasTully,ImustbetryingtospecifyJohn'svehiclewhatwouldbethepointofmytellingyousomethingthatwouldbetrueinvirtueof
John'sbelievingthatCiceroisCicero?Ontheotherhand,ifItellyouthattheEnglishwantedtoseizeNewYorkfromtheDutch,Icouldn'tpossiblybewantingto
specifytheirvehicleeverybodycalledtheplaceNewAmsterdamatthetime.
Here'stheboxscore:beliefsarerelationsbetweenpersons,contents,vehicles,andfunctionalroles.Wehaveaprecisesemanticsfortheattributionsofbeliefsinsofar
astheiridentitydependsupontheircontents.Wehavealessprecise,butserviceable,semanticsforindividuatingbeliefsinsofarastheiridentitydependsupontheir
vehicles:whenitmatters,andtotheextentthatitmatters,youcanindicatethevehicleofabeliefbychoosinganembeddedformulathatismoreorlessstructurally
isomorphictoit.
Thereis,however,noparameterofa'believes'formulawhosefunctionistosignalthefunctionalroleofthevehicleofabelief.Typicalcasesofbeliefattributioninvolve
peoplewhoshare,moreorless,theideologyofthebeliever.Whenthisisn'tso,the'believesthatE'formatbreaksdownandevenareasonabledegreeofunivocality
ofattributionmayinvolvetellingquitealongstory.
Conclusion
Isupposethatmypolemicalstrategymustnowbeembarrassinglyclear.Supposecontrarytowhatthesubstitutiontestassumesthatdifferenceofbeliefstatedoes
notimplydifferenceofbeliefcontent.ThenI'mpreparedtoacceptpracticallyanythingthatpracticallyanyonehaseversaidaboutcontentattributioneven,ifyoulike,
thatit'spragmatic,holistic,hermenutic,ich/duistic,andsoforth.ExceptthatIclaimthatit'sbeliefstateattributionandnotcontentattributionthatallthatstuffistrue
of,andfromtruthsabouttheonenothingmuchofinterestfollowsabouttheother.
Thusaswe'veseentherearepeoplewhosaythatthesubstitutiontestisatestforcontentidentitywhatIsayisthattheyarealmostrightexceptthatwhatittestsforis
notidentityofcontentbutidentity

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ofbeliefstate.Insimilarspirittherearesuchthingsasfunctionalrolesemanticists,andtheysaythatfunctionalrolesmakescontent.Andtheyarealmostrightbecause
functionalroledoesmakebeliefstateit'sjustthatbeliefstatedoesn'tmakecontent,socontentneedn'tbeafunctionalnotionevenifbeliefstateis.
Or,again,thereareKuhniansoutthere,andtheysaythatdifferencesincognitivebackgroundaresometimestantamounttocontentdifferences.That'sOKwithme
too,exceptthatit'sdifferencesinbeliefstatethatdifferencesincognitivebackgroundmakeandnotdifferencesincontent,soitdistinguishesmyviewfromKuhn'sthat
I'mnotcommittedtothe"incommensurability"ofradicallydifferenttheories.TheGreeksthoughtthatstarsareholesintheskyIthinkthattheyarenot.Iftheoretical
backgroundmakescontent,it'shardtoseehowtheGreeksandIcouldagreeabout(e.g.)howmanyvisiblestarsthereare.Butdifferencesoftheoreticalbackground
don'tmakedifferencesofcontentallthereistocontentisdenotation.
Ontheotherhand,differencesoftheorydo(can),onmyview,makedifferencesofbeliefstate,sohowdoesitcomeoutofthestoryI'vebeentellingthatwhatI
believeaboutthecardinalityofthevisiblestarsagreeswhattheGreeksbelieved?Allthat'srequiredforagreementisthatthepropositionalobjectsofthebeliefstates
arethesame:ifxbelievesthatP,andybelievesthatP,thenxandyagree,whetherornotxandyareinthesamebeliefstateandwhattheyagreeaboutistrue
iffit'sthecasethatP.Similarly,ifxbelievesthatPandYbelievesthatP,thentheydisagreeregardlessofconsiderationofvehiclesandrolesandxisrightiffPandy
isrightiffP.Thisisareasonablewaytoassessdisputessincewhat'satissueinaclashofbeliefsis,afterall,thetruthoftheirpropositionalobjectsandtheidentityof
thepropositionalobjectsofabeliefstateisindependentofitsvehicleandfunctionalrole,assumingthatvehicleandfunctionalroledon'tmakecontent.
Also,thereareDavidsoniansoutthere,andDavidsonianssaythattheattributionofcontentisconstrainedbyconditionsofrationality.Forexample,wehaveto
distinguishbetweenO'sbelievingthatJisnothismotherandhisbelievingthathismotherisnothismotheronpainofuncharitablyascribingtoOabeliefthatis
manifestlyselfcontradictoryandtherebyviolatingtheveryconditionsofintentionalascription.
Well,maybeDavidsoniansarerighttoo.Onlyinmyviewtherationalityconditionsconstrainbeliefstateattribution,notcontentattributionand,onceagain,
differencesofbeliefstatedon'tmakedifferencesofcontent.This,surely,istherightendofthestickitisn'tremotelyplausiblethat'principlesofcharity'constrain
intentional

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attributionsperse,howevermuchtheymaybesupposedtoconstrainattributionsofbeliefstates.Inparticular,itcouldn'tconceivablyberequiredthatthe
propositionalobjectsofalltheattitudesattributedtoaguyatanyonetimeshouldbetoanyextentmutuallyconsistent:There'snothingwrongwithhopingthatP
whilefearingthatnotPandbelievingthatPwhilewishingthatnotPpracticallydefinesthehumancondition.Iftherearerationalitycontraintsonpropositionalattitude
attributions,theyapplytorelationsamongtheattitudes,nottorelationsamongtheirpropositionalobjects.10
Wecanputallthisinanutshell:inmyview,themostthatthestandardskepticalargumentsaboutcontentactuallyshowisthatbeliefindividuationisplausiblypragmatic
andholistic.Butthisimpliesnothingabouttheindividuationofcontentunlessyouaccept'differentbeliefs?differentpropositionalobjects'.WhichIdon't.Whatstrikes
measespeciallyattractiveaboutthisstrategyisthatitallowsmetodistinguishbetweentwoquestionsthatareinvariablyconfusedinthephilosophicalliterature:the
questionaboutthescientificstatusofpropositionalattitudepsychologyandthequestionaboutthescientificstatusofintentionalpsychology.Awordaboutthisto
closethediscussion.
Thepredictiveandexplanatorysuccessofcommonsensebelief/desirepsychologystrikesmeasthesecondmostremarkablefactabouttheintellectualhistoryofour
species.(Thefirstmostremarkablefactabouttheintellectualhistoryofourspeciesisthepredictiveandexplanatorysuccessofcommonsensemiddlesizedobject
ontology.)For,hereisthisdelicateandelaborateandlargelyinexplicitpsychologicaltheorythatweseem,inseveralrespects,togetforfree.Itispresumably
prehistoricinoriginitisculturallyuniversalanditisassimilatedpracticallyinstantaneouslyandwithoutexplicitinstructionbyeverynormalchild.And,byallreasonable
empiricalcriteria,thistheorythatweseemtogetforfreeappearstobetrue:itspredictiveadequacyisnotsusceptibletoseriousdoubt,andithasrepeatedlyproven
superiortosuchrivaltheoriesashavesoughttoreplaceit(e.g.,behavioristictheoriesandpieintheskyneuroscienceoftheSanDiegosort).Soimpressivearethe
successesofgrandmotherpsychologythattherationalstrategyforanempiricalapproachtothemindissurelytocooptitsapparatusforserviceasexplicitscience.
ThishasinfactbeenthestrategyofmodernintentionalrealistsfromFreudtoChomsky,anditseemstomeperfectlyobviousthatithasproducedallthebest
psychologywe'vegot.Itwouldbebarelyhyperbolictoclaimthatithasproducedalltheonlypsychologywe'vegot.

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Buthavingsaidallthesereactionaryandantirevisionistthings,Ineverthelesswanttodistinguishbetweentwoversionsofintentionalrealism,oneofwhichismerely
conservative,andtheotherofwhichisdiehard.Themerelyconservativeviewisthatthebesthopeforpsychologyistheexploitationofintentionalcategories,justas
Grannyhasalwayssaid.Thediehardline,bycontrast,isthattheintentionalcategoriesthatwewantforscienceoughttoincludebelief,desire,andtheothertaxaof
commonsensepropositionalattitudinizing.It'sherethatI(and,bytheway,FreudandChomsky)finallypartcompanywithGranny.
IfmuchofwhatI'vebeensayingaboutbeliefindividuationistrue,thentheidentityconditionsforbeliefstatesarevagueandpragmaticinpracticeperhapstheyare
ineliminablyso.Ontheonehand,therearenoguaranteedunivocaldescriptorsforpickingthemout.And,ontheother,beliefstateindividuationappearstodependon
theindividuationoffunctionalroleswherearewetolookforidentitycriteriaforthese?Butweneedn'tcareifitturnsoutthatbelievinganddesiringareineliminably
infectedwithvaguenessandholism.Aconservativeintentionalrealistwhoisnotadiehardcancontemplatewithequanimitytheabandonmentofbelief/desire
psychologystrictlysocalled,solongastheapparatusofintentionalexplanationisitselfleftintact.So,twotakehomequestions:
1.Howmuch,ifany,oftheskepticalargumentationaboutgrandmotherpsychologyiseffectiveagainstintentionalrealismasopposedtobelief/desirerealism?
and
2.Howmuch,ifany,ofthepredictive/explanatorysuccessofgrandmotherpsychologydependsonbelief/desirerealismasopposedtointentionalrealism?
Itwouldbeacomforttoagingintentionalrealistslikemeiftheanswertoboththesequestionsturnedouttobe''None."
Notes
1.Putnam(1983)remarks(plausibly)that"...determiningtheextensionofatermalwaysinvolvesdeterminingtheextensionofotherterms."(p.149)Butofcourseit
wouldn'tfollowthatanyterm'shavinganextensiondependsonanyotherterm'shavingone.Epistemicdependenceisonething,metaphysicaldependenceisquite
another.
2.Thereaderwoulddomeakindnessifheweretotake"Oedipus'Mother"asanameratherthanadescription.(Like"theIronDuke"or"theBigApple.")
3.I'mtalkinginthisfunnyhyphenatedwaybecauseit'simportanttomypresentpurposestoavoidstate/objectambiguities.'ThebeliefthatP'isnotoriousfor

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equivocatingbetweenthestateofbelievingthatPandthepropositionthatP.I'musing"beliefstate"toindicatetheformer.
4.It'snotselfevidentthattranslationisatestforsynonymywhereas'synonymy'ispresumablyanequivalencerelation,'translates'isarguablyintransitive,and
translationsofthesameexpressionneednottranslateoneother.ImakethispointinlightofthetendencyofwriterslikePutnam,Davidson,andQuinetojusttakeitfor
grantedthattheconstraints(epistemic,metaphysical,orwhatever)onsemantictheoriescanbejustreadofffromtheconstraintsontranslation.However,Idoubtthat
thesegeneralconsiderationsabouttranslationbearonthemoralIwanttodrawfromthePierrecase.
5.Icanimaginesomebodyarguingthatthisisn'tabonafidefailureofsubstitutiononthegroundsthatsince'London'isanEnglishwordand'Londres'isaFrench
word,theycan'tcontrastinthe(English)frame"Pierrebelieves...ispretty"or,mutatismutandis,inthe(French)frame"Pierrecroitque....estjolie".Isaypoohto
this."DoyoubelievethatLondresispretty?"isaquestionthatPierreperfectlywellunderstandsandisperfectlywellpreparedtoanswertheevidencethattheformof
words"Londresispretty''expressesabeliefthatheholdsiseverybitasgoodastheevidencethattheformofwords"Londonispretty"expressesabeliefthathe
doesn't.
6.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatthisclaimismadeonbehalfofstatetypes,notstatetokens.Itwillbetheindividuationoftypesratherthantokensthat'satissue
throughoutthefollowingdiscussion,exceptwherethecontraryisexplicit.
7.Ifyou'repreparedtoacceptthatencapsulated'subdoxastic'statesqualifyasbonafidebeliefstates,thentheyofferfurthercaseswherebeliefstatesthatare
identicalincontent,vehicle,andformataredistinguishedbytheirfunctionalroles.Fordiscussion,seeFodor,1986.
8.I'mclaimingthatyoucanhavedifferenceoffunctionalrole(hencebeliefstate)withoutdifferenceofvehiclebutdoesitgotheotherwayaroundaswell?Otherwise,
wecandowithoutspecifyingvehiclesinbeliefindividuationallweneedisfunctionalroles.
I'minclinedtothinkthatMatestypeconsiderationsshowthatthereareatleastsomecontextsinwhichyoucanslicebeliefstatesasthinasyoucanslicequotations.
Sinceit'shardtoimagineausefulcriterionforindividuationoffunctionalrolesthatdoesn'tslicethemprettythick,itseemsplausiblethat'vehicle'and'functionalrole'
are,atleastinprinciple,independentparametersintheindividuationofbeliefs.
9.I'mindebtedtoBarryLoewerforadiscussionthatpromptedtheprecedingthreeparagraphs.
10.Correspondingly,accordingtothepresentview,questionsofrationalityareassessedwithrespecttothevehicleofabeliefaswellasitscontentwhereas
questionsoftruthareassessedwithrespecttocontentalone(seeabove).It'sbecausethevehicleofhisbeliefthathismotherwaseligiblewas,say,"Jiseligible"
ratherthan,say,"Motheriseligible"thatO'sseekingtomarryhismotherwasnotirrationalinfaceofhisabhorrenceofincest.(I'vehearditclaimedthatthiswon'tdo
becauseappealstomerelymorphosyntacticdifferencesamongvehiclescan'trationalizedifferencesinbehavioronlyappealstodifferencesinthecontentcandothat.
ButthePierrecaselookstobeacounterexample.)

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Chapter7
StephenSchiffer'sDarkNightofTheSoul:
AReviewofRemnantsofMeaning
StephenSchifferusedtobelieveinatheoryorbetter,inatheoryschema,orbetterstill,inaresearchprogramthathecalls"IntentionbasedSemantics"(IBS).But
hedoesn'tbelieveinitanymore,andit'stheoldstory:youloseyourfaith,youhaveanexistentialcrisisyouhaveanexistentialcrisis,youwriteabook."...[Aremy
views]despairing?Thatisa...difficultquestiontoanswer,andonethatIcareverymuchabout.Idonotwanttothinkthatmycareeristoshowtheflythewayout
oftheflybottle.IwishthatIcouldgoonfromheretoraisenewquestions....ButIhavenotbeenabletodefinethosequestions.IwouldliketothinkthatIhavenot
yetsucceeded.Maybetheanswerliesinsomealliancewithcognitivescience"(Schiffer,1987,271).YoucanreadRemnantsofMeaningasaphilosopher's81/2,
ananalyticalBaby,ItsColdOutsideimagineEither/orrewrittenbyTarski,andyou'llhavethefeelofit.Howeveryoureadit,it'sasuperbook:richlydetailed,
beautifullyargued,andwithacomprehensivegeographer'ssenseofthelayofthelandscape.Thisis,Ithink,thebestattackonIntentionalRealismthathaseverbeen
written.Whatitisn't,however,isconvincing.ThankHeaven,since,ofcourse,IntentionalRealismistrue.
TwodoctrinesdistinguishIBSfromotherspeciesofIntentionalRealism.Theseare(i)theideathatthesemanticalpropertiesofnaturallanguageexpressions(the
meaningofwordsandsentences,forexample)shouldreducetotheintentionalpropertiesofthementalstatesofspeaker/hearers(I'llcallthisGrice'sProgram),and(ii)
theideathatthereshouldbesomethingnaturalisticallyspecifiablethatisasSchifferlikestoputitwhatmakesitthecasethatsomeonebelievesthatP(I'llcall
thistheNaturalizationProgram).IftheGriceanprogramandtheNaturalizationprogramcanbecarriedthrough,thenIBSwillhavesolvedoneoftheGreat
MetaphysicalProblems:itwillhavefoundaplaceformeaninginthenaturalorder.ItwouldcertainlybenicetosolveaGreatMetaphysicalProblemphilosophycould
dowithasuccessortwo.

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But,asremarkedabove,SchifferhaslosthisfaithinIBS.It'snotthathethinksitsuffersfrominternalincoherenceratherhehascometodoubtthatIBScancashits
checks.NeithertheGriceannortheNaturalisticreductioncan,inSchiffer'sview,becarriedout.Hisbooksurveysalltheproposalsfordoingsothathehasfoundin
theliterature,togetherwithalltheotheroptionsthathe'sbeenabletothinkof,withargumentstoshowthatnoneofthemwillwork.
Now,thetroublewiththiswayofarguingisthatit'sconvincingonlyifyouhaveacatforeverymousehole.It'sopentothecommittedadvocateofIBStoclaimthat
Schifferhasfailedtoconsideralltheoptionsorthatsomeoftheoptionsthathedoesconsiderareinfactinbettershapethanhesupposes.Apredictablereactionto
Schiffer'spolemicis,"Well,he'srightabouteverybody'skindofIBSexceptmine."Imustconfesstoreactinginsomethinglikethisway.Thereare,Ithink,paths
throughthethicketthatSchifferhasn'tshowntobedeadends.AndIthinkthatheunderestimatestheempiricalasopposedtothelogicosemanticalmotivations
forIBS.IBSmustberightbecausetherearefactsaboutintentionalitythatnothingelsewillexplain.Orsoitseemstome.Therestofthisdiscussionisdevotedtothe
elaborationofthesethemes.
1.IntentionalProperties.
SchifferoftenhasitthatthemainissueiswhetherintentionalpsychologicalstatesarerelationalstandardversionsofIBStreatbeliefasarelationbetweenabeliever
andathingofacertainkind,wherethecontentofone'sbeliefdependsonwhichthingofthatkindoneisbeliefrelatedto.Toputthesameideaintheformalmode,
"believesthatP"expressesarelationbetweenabelieverandsomethinganobjectofbeliefthat"thatP"names.QuaIntentionalRealists,IBStheoristshaveto
holdthatthe"thatP"positionin"believesthatP''issubjectto'objectual',asopposedtomerely'substitutional'quantification.QuaGriceanReductionists,IBStheorists
havetoholdthatthefactsabouttheseputativeobjectsoftheattitudesareontologicallyindependentofanysemanticalfactsaboutnaturallanguagessincethe
semanticalfactsaboutnaturallanguagesarethemselvessupposedtodependonthefactsaboutpropositionalattitudes.And,quanaturalists,IBStheoristshavetohold
thattheobjectofthebeliefrelationandtheconditionsforbearingthatrelationtooneoftheseobjectsarespecifiableinnonsemanticandnonintentionalvocabulary.
Whenheisinthemoodtosetthingsupthisway,Schiffer'sargumentisthattheresimplyaren'tanycandidatesforobjectsofthe

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attitudesthatwillmeettheseconditions.Propositions,setsofworlds,mentalrepresentations,modesofpresentation,prototypes,andsoforthareexaminedand
dismissed,sometimesforfamiliarreasons,oftenforreasonsthatarenewandstrikinglyinsightful.
Now,theclaimthatpropositionalattitudesarerelationsequivocatesbetweenametaphysicalthesisandathesisaboutlogicalform.YoucouldimagineaversionofIBS
thatrunslikethis:Semanticfactsaboutnaturallanguagesreducetofactsabouttheintentionalstatesofspeaker/hearers(asabove).Anintentionalstateisastateof
instantiatinganintentionalproperty.TheNaturalisticProgramrequiresprovidingnaturalisticallyspecifiedconditionsforhavingsuchpropertiesanditmaybethatsome
oralloftheseconditionsarerelational.(MaybetheyinvolvehavingasentenceofMentaleseinyourbeliefboxorbeingcausallyconnectedtotheworldintheright
sortofway,etc.)Butit'sleftopen,sofarasquestionsoflogicalformareconcerned,whether"xbelievesthatP"isnotatedasR(x,thatP)orjustasFx.In
particular,it'sleftopenwhether"thatP"isareferringexpressionin"believesthatP"andwhat,ifitis,itdenotes.
Consider,forexample,informationalversionsofIBS.Accordingtothem,thebasicsemanticpropertiesarespeciesofcarryingtheinformationthatP,andthe
conditionsforathing'shavingthesepropertiesarespelledoutbyreferenceto(actualandcounterfactual)causalrelations.Toazeroithapproximation,"xcarriesthe
informationthataifF"comesout,afterNaturalization,assomethinglike"xisinastatethatisreliablycausedbya'sbeingF."Thequestionofthedenotational(or
otherwise)statusof"thataisF"in"carriestheinformationthataisF"ismoot,sincenothingcorrespondingtothisexpressionisleftintheNaturalizedversionofthe
theory"thataisF''translatesout,likethereferencetotheaveragemanin"theaverageman'sincome."(Schifferdoesn'tactuallysaymuchaboutinformationaltheories
ofcontent.HeseemtothinkthattheyhaveaninsuperableprobleminmakingsenseoferrorandIagreethatthisproblemisinsuperableifgoingteleological(la
recentproposalsbyDennett,Millikan,Papineau,andStalnaker,forexample)istheonlywaytosupeit.Butthismaybeoneofthosecasesoftoomanymouseholes
fortoofewcats(seechapter3).
Anyhow,insofarasIBSisdefinedbyitscommitmenttoRealism,Griceanism,andNaturalism,it'suncleartomethatitalsoneedstoendorseanyparticulardoctrine
aboutthelogicalformofattitudesentencesor,indeed,anylogicosemanticthesesaboutattitudesentenceswhatever.WhatreallymatterstoIntentionalRealism
hencetoIBSisnotwhetherpsychologicalpropertiesarerelational,but

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justwhetherthereareanypsychologicalpropertiesandwhether,ifthereare,anyofthemareinstantiated.
FromtheIBStheorist'sperspective,theremaybeastrategicpointtothisshiftofemphasis.Theargumentthat"that"clausesrefer(topropositions,asitmightbe)is
motivated,almostentirely,bysemanticalandepistemologicalconsiderations.Oneneedsastoryaboutwhatitisforasentencetomeanwhatitdoesoneneedsastory
aboutwhatitistograspthemeaningofasentenceoneneedsasolutionofFrege'sproblemandoneneedsareadingofbeliefsentencesthatquantifyovercontents.
Propositionsandthelikearetailormadearguablealltootailormadetogiveonewhatoneneeds.Butnoneofthiswillimpressaguywhoisalreadydubiousabout
thestatusoftheallegedsemanticfacts.ComplaintoQuinethattherearenotruthsaboutmeaningunless"that"clausesdenote,andhewilltellyouthat,sure,themyth
aboutpropositionsisofapiecewiththemythofcontentandsomuchtheworseforboth.SchifferisclearlyinclinedtoseethisQuine'sway:therealchargeislessthat
IBSdoesn'tworkthanthatitisn'tmotivated.It'sonlybecauseyouarealreadycommittedtoamisguidedsortofsemanticalRealismthattheIBSagendaseems
pressing."Thequestionsthatnowdefinethephilosophyoflanguageseemtohavefalsepresuppositions"(p.269)sothecureforIBSistostopaskingthequestionsit's
supposedtoanswer.Stopasking,''Whatdo'that'clausesreferto?"and"What,besidepeople,doeseverybodybelievessomethingquantifyover?"fortwo
examples.
Buthoweverthatmaybe,Realismaboutpsychologicalstatesandpropertiesseemstobemotivatedindependentoftendentioussemanticalassumptions.Allthe
evidencesuggeststhatthereareintentionalpsychologicallaws.Ontheonehand,lawsarerelationsamongproperties,sotherecan'tbepsychologicallawsunlessthere
arepsychologicalpropertiesontheotherhand,individualsaresubsumedbypsychologicallawsinvirtueofthepsychologicalstatesthey'rein,soifthereare
psychologicallawstheremustbepsychologicalstatestofallunderthem.1Iwouldn'tfortheworldbetakenassuggestingthatSchifferhasfailedtonoticethiswayof
runningIBS.ButIdothinkhesubstantiallyunderestimatesitsresilience,andInowproposetoharponthis.
Schifferofferstwodifferentlinesofargument:
(i)Therearen'treallyanypsychologicallaws,sopsychologicalpropertiesaren't,afterall,requiredforpsychologicallawstoholdamong.

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2

(ii)Iftherearepsychologicalproperties,theymustbereducibletophysicalproperties.Buttherearenosuchreductions.Sotherearenopsychologicalproperties.

Let'shavealookatthis,startingwithargument(ii).
FirstoffIproposetogiveSchifferhispremisethatpsychologicalstates/propertiesaren'treducibletophysicalstates/properties.Foronething,nothingeverseemsto
reducetoanything,asSchifferoftenremindsus,andwhyshouldintentionalityprovetheexception?Indeed,thestandardattemptstoprovideareductionbehaviorism,
typephysicalism,andfunctionalismareallprettyclearlybankrupt.Itmaybe,forexample,thatintentionalstateshavesomeoftheirfunctionalpropertiesessentially
but,likeSchiffer,Idoubtthere'sanychancethattheyhavetheirsemanticalpropertiesinvirtueoftheirfunctionalproperties,whichiswhatafunctionalistreductionof
believingthatPwouldrequire.
Notice,however,thatconcedingthisdoesn'tgivethegameawaytoantiNaturalists.Thereisn'tareductiveaccountofbeingamountain,butnobodydoubtsthat
mountainhoodisasrealasanypropertygets.Ifnothingeverreducestoanything,thatjustshowsthatreductionisthewrongthingforNaturalistsinpsychologyto
demand.What'swantedforthegeologicalpropertiesaswellasthepsychologicalpropertiesisjustthatwebeabletounderstandhowpurelyphysicalthingscan
havethem.Inthecaseofmountains,wewanttoknowhowanythingmadeentirelyofelectrons,protons,quarks,andthelikecouldobeythelawsthatgeologysays
applytomountains.Inthecaseofbeliefsanddesires,wewanttoknowhowanythingmadeentirelyofelectrons,protons,quarks,andthelikecouldobeythelaws
thatpsychologysaysapplytointentionalstates.Inneithercasedogeneralstricturesagainstreductionshowthatwecan'thavethis.
Allofwhichamountstosayingthatifyou'reaRealistaboutpsychologicalproperties,youhadbetterbepreparedtobea(Property)Dualistaboutthem.Butthen,if
SchifferisrightandIBSrequirespropertymonismifitrequires,specifically,theidentityofpsychologicalpropertieswithphysicalonesthenIBSisindeeptrouble.
So,whatisSchiffer'scaseforpropertymonism?
Schifferhasitinmindtorunasortofoverdeterminationargument(seecircap.151)it'savariantofthecurrentlyfashionableworrythateitherpsychological
propertiesarephysicalproperties,ortheyareepiphenomenal.Here'showthisargumentgoes:Nobodydoubtswell,almostnobodydoubtsthattheetiologyof
humanbehavior,liketheetiologyofeverythingelse,fallsunderphysicallaws.Soiftherearealsoirreduciblypsychologicallawsaspresumably

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therewillbeifthereareirreduciblypsychologicalpropertiesitmustbe,accordingtoSchiffer,that"thereisoverdeterminationatthelevelofcausallaws.Thatisto
say,thereisonecausallaw[L]containing[neural/physicalproperty]Pandanother[causallaw]L'containing[psychological/intentionalproperty]Bsubsumption
undereitherlawissufficienttoexplain[anevent]n'sbeingacauseof[somebehavior],andniscoveredbybothlawsbyvirtueofhavingPandB."Schifferthinksthat
propertydualismthusimplies"asortofoverdetermination[that]isindangerofbeingasdifficulttobelieveinasthe[substancedualism]thatpostulate[s]an
overdeterminationofactualcauses,andforprettymuchthesamereason:superfluousnesswithrespecttoindependentapplication.Becauseallbodilymovementshave
completeexplanationsinwhollyphysicalterms,L'wouldneverexplainasequenceofeventsexceptwhenthatsequencewasalreadyexplainedbyanLstylelaw."
NowIadmittobeingnotmuchmovedbythis,andforreasonsthatSchifferhimselfgoesontorecite:"Areasonableversionoftheunityofsciencewouldholdthatthe
lawsofnospecialsciencehaveapplicationindependentlyofthelawsofphysics....Thiscouldbeviewedasakindofacceptable'overdetermination'atthelevelof
causallaws,anditisimaginablethatthe[property]dualist...wouldtrytoclaimthathisoverdeterminationwasacceptableinthesameway."Quiteso.Special
sciencelaws(psychologicallawsofcourseincluded)arealwaysnonbasicthisistosaythatthereareinvariablyphysicalmechanismstheoperationofwhich
connectsthesatisfactionoftheantecedentsofsuchlawswiththesatisfactionoftheirconsequents.And,ofcourse,theoperationofthesephysicalmechanismsis
governedbythelawsofphysics.Thisisarguablyallthat"overdeterminationatthelevelofcausallaws"comestoinpsychologyorelsewhereinthespecialsciences.
Butifthissortofoverdeterminationisn'tanargumentagainstBoyle'sLaw,whyisitanargumentagainsttheWeberFechnerlaw?SchifferUnfairtoWorking
Psychologists!ShopElsewhere!
FormykindofIBS,thisisacriticaljunctureintheargumentmyownparticularmouselivesrighthere.Iamthereforerelievedtoreportasubstantialabsenceofcat.
SchiffersaysthatthedifficultyisinseeinghowthePropertyDualistcouldsuggestassimilatingintentionaloverdeterminationtotheroutineoverdeterminationofspecial
sciencelawsgiventhatthe"[psychological]propertyBwas[assumedtobe]irreducibleandgivenhisdenialthatitscausalefficacycouldbeexplainedintermsof
[neurophysicalproperties]....AlthoughIdonothaveatheoryofacceptableintertheoreticrelationstooffer,itdoesseemclearthattheonusisonthe[Property
Dualist]todefeat

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theassumptionthathisoverdeterminationwouldnotfitintotheacceptablemold"(p.151).
I'mnotatallsurewhat'sgoingonhere.Since"nothingreducestoanything"appliestomountainhoodinteralia,theirreducibilityofpsychologicalpropertiesisnoworse
thantheirreducibilityofgeologicalproperties.(Atleastithasn'tbeenshowntobeworse).So,ifSchifferispreparedtolivewithoverdeterminationinthecaseof
irreduciblegeologicallawsaboutmountainhood,whyishenotpreparedtolivewithoverdeterminationinthecaseofirreduciblepsychologicallawsaboutbeliefhood?
Andcorrespondingly,ifthere'sasenseinwhichthecausalefficacyofpsychologicalpropertiescan'tbeexplainedbyappealtothephysicalpropertiesoforganisms,
that'sjusttosaythattherereallyarepsychologicallaws,andwereallydoneedthemtoexplainthewaythatorganismsbehave.Butthen,inthatsense,thecausal
efficacyofmountainhoodcan'tbeexplainedbyappealingtothephysicalpropertiesofmountains.That'sjusttosaythattherereallyaregeologicallaws,andwereally
doneedthemtoexplainthewaythatmountainsbehave.Ifwedidn'tneedthem,Isupposewe'dstopdoinggeologyanddojustphysics.
Theseare,nodoubt,deepwatersbuttheproliferationofspecialsciences(forevidenceofwhich,seeanyuniversitycatalogue)doessuggestacertainmetaphysical
speculation:Itappearsthatmatterissubsumedbyreliable,counterfactualsupportinggeneralizationsatmanylevelsofaggregation.Correspondingly,ifscientists
wanttocapturethesegeneralizations,theyneedtobeRealistaboutthepropertiesofmatteratmanylevelsofaggregation.Thatis,arguably,whattheexplanatory
irreducibilityofspecialsciencelawsandpropertiescomestoinpsychologyandgeology.SowhyisSchifferworriedabouttheonebutnotabouttheother?
Schiffer'sflagshipargumentforintentionalpropertymonismisoverdeterminationbutIthinkthatwhat'sreallydrivinghisintuitionsisjustskepticismabouttherebeing
psychologicallawsatall.Intentionallawsaren'tabletobetakenseriously,andthat'swhythemetaphysicalmoralssuggestedbyrealspecialsciencesdon'tapplyto
psychology.(ThatSchiffer'sbookshould,inspiteofthis,closewiththehopethatanalliancewithcognitivesciencemayrevivethetheoryofintentionalityonlyshows
thedepthsofhisexistentialdespair).Well,whatdoesthisskepticismaboutintentionallawsactuallycometo?HereSchiffer'spolemicsturnuncharacteristicallyoldhat:
Putativepsychologicallawshaveceterisparibusclausesthatcan'tbefilledinwhenonetriestostatethelawspreciselytheydegenerateintotautologies.

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ForsupposethatAvasteppedbackbecauseshesawthatacarwascoming...Ifthereisany"law"thatappliestothementalcausationofheract,itissurelysomebelief/desire
generalization,somegeneralizationthatrefinesandcompletes,andotherwisemakesrespectable,theplatitudethatifapersondesirestoavoidacertainresult(say,gettingrun
overbyacar),believesthatshewillavoidthatresultbydoinganactofacertaintype(say,steppingbacktothecurb),believesthatsheisabletoperformanactofthattype,does
notbelievethatthereisanybetter,orequallygood,wayofavoidingthatresult[etc.,then]...shewillperformanactofthattype.Whatisproblematichereisthat,first,itisbyno
meansclearthatthis"generalization"hasanytruecompletion,and,second,totheextentthatwecanfillitout,tothatextentitbeginstolookmoreandmoreanalytic,moreand
moreexpressiveoftruthsconstitutiveofourpropositionalattitudeconcepts,andthuslessandlesslikeacontingentcausallaw.(p.148)

Now,inthefirstplace,if"many[philosophers]havecommentedontheanalytic,orquasianalytic,natureofbeliefdesiregeneralizations"(p.286),equallymanyhave
commentedonthe"analytic,orquasianalytic"natureofthedeepestlawsinanyempiricaltheoryandQuinehassuggestedcompletelyconvincingly,inmyviewthat
theywereallwrongtodoso.Whatseemstobetheanalyticity,(conventionality,etc.)oftheselawsisjusttheircentralitymisperceivedthedoctrinethat
"F=MA"(asitmightbe)isquasianalyticpostulatesasemanticfactwherethereisonlyanepistemicone.Butifthisistrueoftheputativeanalyticityofthebasiclaws
ofmechanics,whyshouldn'titalsobetrueoftheputativeanalyticityofthebasicdecisiontheoreticlawsthatrelatebeliefsanddesirestooneanotherandtoactions?
Inthesecondplace,itisunclearwhytheeliminationofceterisparibusclausesthereplacementofceterisparibuslawsby"somegeneralizationthatrefinesand
completes[them]"isrequiredtomakesuchlaws"respectable."Respectablelawsdoallsortsofusefulthingstheybacksingularlycausalstatementstheyplaya
crucialroleinHempelianexplanationstheysecurecounterfactuals,andsoforth.Presumably,therespectabilityofalawjustisitsavailabilityforthesesortsof
functions.Well,Iknowofnoargumentwhyceterisparibuslawscan'tdothesethings,evenassumingwhat,indeed,Idoassumethattheirceterisparibicityis
typicallyineliminable.Indeed,ithadbetterbethatceterisparibuslawscanberespectable

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quaceterisparibuslawsbecause,asusual,Schiffer'scomplaintsaboutintentionalpsychologyapply,wholecloth,totheuntendentiousspecialsciences.Thelawsof
geologyarealsoceterisparibuslawsineliminablyi.e.,theycan'tbe"completed"inthevocabularyofgeology.(Isupposethattheycanbe"completed"inthe
vocabularyofphysicsbutIsupposethisofpsychologicallawstoo.)Butthelawsofgeologyare,surely,OK?Imean,like,they'rerespectableevenbyphilosophy's
stringentstandards?
And,finally,whataboutalltheotherpsychologicallaws?Forexample,whataboutthelawthat,ceterisparibus,theprobabilityofrecallinganitemfromalistof
otherwiseunstructuredstimuliisanonmonotonicfunctionofitsordinalposition.Orthelawthat,ceterisparibus,theapparentchangeofintensityofastimulusisa
powerfunctionofitschangeinphysicalintensity.Orthelawthat,ceterisparibus,theapparentprosodyofasentenceisafunctionofitsconstituentstructure.Unlike
thepracticalsyllogism,theselawstypicallyquantifynotjustovercontents,butalsointocontentclauses.3(Forexample,lawsaboutprosodysaythingslike:For
certainprosodicfeaturesX,therearecertainstructuralfeaturesYsuchthat,formanypositionsZ,ifasentencehasYatZ,thenthesentencewillbeheard
ashavingXatZ.Primafacie,thesegeneralizationsquantifyintotheintentionalcontext"heard...as...").Butpsychologicalgeneralizationsthatquantifyintocontent
clausesexhibitnotendencytolookmore"moreandmoreanalytic"astheyarestatedwithincreasingprecision.Thisishardlysurprisingsuchalawappliestoabelief
statenotquabeliefstatebut,asitmightbe,quastateofbelievingthataisF.Soit'shardtoseehowitcouldbeanalyticofbelief("constitutiveofourpropositional
attitudeconcepts")evenif,forexample,thepracticalsyllogismturnsouttobe.
Thepracticalsyllogismmayanalyzetoaplatitude(thoughIdoubtitifnothingreducestoanything,nothinganalyzestoanythingeither).But,Ipromiseyou,theserial
positioncurveisn'tgoingto.It'scontingentallthewaythrough.Andit'sintentionalallthewaythrough.Becausetherearemany,manysuchexamples,Itakeitthatthe
primafacieevidencestronglyfavorscontingentandirreducibleintentionallaws.SoItakeitthattheargumentfromirreducibleintentionallawstointentionalProperty
Dualismremainsintact.SoItakeitthatthere'satleastoneintactargumentforIntentionalRealism.And,asSchifferagrees,anintactargumentforIntentionalRealism
isanintactargumentforIBS,sinceIBSistheonlykindofIntentionalRealismthathasachancetowork.
IconcludethatSchifferisshortatleastonecat.

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2.CompositionalSemantics
Schifferholdsthat,ifthereistobeacompositionalsemanticsforbeliefpredicates,thatalonerequiresthatbelievingmustberelational:Justbyassumingcompositional
semantics,youget,ifnotIBS,thenatleastIntentionalRealism."...Ihavearguedthat...therelationaltheoryofpropositionalattitudes[isfalse]andthefalsityofthe
theorywouldseemtobeinconsistentwiththepropositionthatnaturallanguageshaveacompositionalsemantics...theonlyfeasiblewayofaccommodating
propositionalattitudeverbswithinacompositionalsemanticsisasrelationalpredicatesthatrelate,inthecaseof'believes',abelievertowhathebelieves."Schifferis
preparedtobitethisbullet:Sincepropositionalattitudesarenotrelational,thesemanticsofnaturallanguagesisnotcompositional.Schiffer'sargumentthatitis
independentlyplausiblethatthesemanticsofnaturallanguagesisnotcompositionalisamongthemoststrikingfeaturesofhisbook.Here'showthatargumentgoes:
Tobeginwith,it'suntendentiousthatspeakerhearers(ofEnglish,say)areabletounderstandutterancesofnovelexpressionsintheirlanguage.Thiswouldbe
comprehensibleifEnglishdidhaveacompositionalsemantics.For,ineffect,acompositionalsemanticsforLisaprocedurewhichdeterminesthemeaningofany
formulaofLgiventhemeaningandsyntacticarrangementofitslexicalconstituents.Thespeakerhearer'sabilitytograspnovelexpressionsisexplainedonthe
assumptionthatheknowssuchaprocedure.
Schiffer'sreplytothis,setoutindetailinchapter8,strikesmeasexactlyrightandisintrinsicallyinterestinghoweverthingsturnoutforIBS.WhatSchiffersays,
considerablyboileddown,amountstothis:assumethestandardstoryaccordingtowhichspeakerhearersarecomputationalsystemswhosementalprocessesare
definedovertheformulasinsomelanguageofthought(callitM[entalese]).Thenyoucanthinkofunderstandingnaturallanguageexpressionsasamatterof
translatingthemintoM.TounderstandasentenceofEnglishonthisaccountjustistocomputeitsMtranslation.
Now,presumablyyouhavetoknowthesyntaxofEnglishinordertocomputeitsMtranslationsbecausetheMtranslationofanEnglishexpressiondependsnotjust
onitslexicalcontentbutonitssyntaxaswell.(TheMtranslationof"JohnlovesMary"hastocomeoutdifferentfromtheMtranslationof"MarylovesJohn,"etc.).
Butit'sfarfromobviousthatyouhavetoknowthesemanticsofanEnglishexpressiontodetermineitsMtranslationonthecontrary,thetranslationalgorithmmight
wellconsistofoperationsthatdeliverMentaleseexpressionsundersyntacticdescriptionasoutputgiven

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Englishexpressionsundersyntacticdescriptionasinputwithnosemanticscominginanywhereexcept,ofcourse,thatifit'sagoodtranslation,thensemantic
propertieswillbepreserved.Thatpurelysyntacticoperationscanbedevisedtopreservesemanticpropertiesisthephilosophicalmoralofprooftheory.
Sothen,there'satleastonewayitmightworkoutthatthetheoryoflanguageunderstandingdoesnotpresupposeacompositionalsemanticsforthelanguage
understood.AsIremarkedabove,thisobservationisextremelyimportant,regardlessofthepresentmetaphysicalissues.Itisverywidelyassumed,amongcognitive
scientistsatleast,thatsemanticsisaleveloflinguisticdescription,justlikesyntaxorphonologyspecifically,thatthesamesortsofargumentsthatsuggestthat
speakerhearershavetoknowthesyntaxoftheirlanguagealsosuggestthattheyhavetoknowitssemantics.(Toseethisassumptionatwork,lookatbookslike
Jackendoff'sSemanticInterpretationinGenerativeGrammar.)Butinfactthisisallwrong,andforpreciselythereasonthatSchifferpointsout.It'sentirelynatural
torunacomputationalstoryabouttheattitudestogetherwithatranslationstoryaboutlanguagecomprehensionandthere'snoreasontodoubt,sofaratleast,thatthe
sortoftranslationthat'srequiredisanexhaustivelysyntacticoperation.Thatyouknowthesemanticsofyourlanguagedoesnotfollowfromthefactthatyoucan
understandtheindefinitelymanysentencesofyourlanguageitdoesn'tfollowevenbyargumenttothebestexplanation.
Thereis,inshort,awayofdevelopingthecomputationalpictureinphilosophyofmindthatsuggestsmuchthesamemoralasrecent'externalist'speculationsin
philosophyoflanguage:Syntaxisaboutwhat'sinyourhead,butsemanticsisabouthowyourheadisconnectedtotheworld.Syntaxispartofthestoryaboutthe
mentalrepresentationofsentences,butsemanticsisn't.Ilikethisverymuch.Isuspectinfact,thatIlikeitevenmorethanSchifferdoes.
However,backtowork.ArguingagainstacompositionalsemanticsforEnglishis,ofcourse,nogoodforSchiffer'spurposeofunderminingIntentionalRealism,unless
oneisalsopreparedtoargueagainstacompositionalsemanticsforMentalese.Andhere,itseemstome,Schifferhadtrouble.Hesays,correctly,that"...ifthere'sa
reasonforthinkingMneedsacompositionalsemantics,thenthatreasoncannothaveanythingtodowithunderstandingpubliclanguageutterances"(p.206).Thatis,
sofarasthestoryaboutunderstandingEnglishisconcerned,it'scoherenttoassumethatneitherEnglishnorMentalesehasacompositionalsemantics.Wedon'tneed
acombinatorialsemanticsforEnglishbecause,thoughusingEnglishrequiresunderstandingitssentences,wecanidentifyunderstanding

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EnglishsentenceswithtranslatingthemintoMentalese(seeabove).And,appearancestothecontrarynotwithstanding,thisneednotgeneratearegress.Inparticular,
wedon'tneedacombinatorialsemanticsforMentalesebecauseusingaproductivelanguageasamediumofcomputationdoesn'trequireaccesstoits
semanticsbydefinition,computationalprocessesareexhaustivelysyntactic,andit'snotindisputethatMentalesehasacombinatorialsyntax.Makingthesyntactic
characterofcomputationclearwasTuring'sfoundationalcontributiontothephilosophyofmind.Turing'swayofgettingmentalprocessestobesymbolicwithout
havingtopostulatearegressionofunderstandersiswhattheideaofcomputationbuysyouinthephilosophyofmind.
OKsofar.However,thereareatleasttwootherkindsofconsiderationsconsiderationsthatdon'tderivefromfactsabouthowweunderstandEnglishthatargue
foracompositionalsemanticsforMentalese.Schifferconsidersonlyoneofthese,andIfindwhathesaysaboutitunconvincing.
Schifferthinksthatyoudon'tneedtoassumeacompositionalsemanticsforMtoaccountfortherolethatitsformulasplayastoputitalittlemisleadinglythe
'immediateobjects'ofbeliefs.Thisrequiressomeunpacking.ThestandardlanguageofthoughtstorytheonethatSchifferrequiresforhisaccountofunderstanding
EnglishastranslationintoMentaleseisthatbelievingPisbeinginacertainrelationtoaformulaofM.FormulasofMaretheimmediateobjectsofbeliefinthesense
givenbyS:
S:(u)(EP)(ifuisasentenceofManduisinone'sbeliefbox,thenonebelievesthatP).(p.218)
Sothepresentquestionis:doesSpresupposeacompositionalsemanticsforM?No,accordingtoSchiffer,because"wecoulddiscoverthis[i.e.,thatSistrue]viaa
mappingofformulaeofMontoEnglishcontentsentences(i.e.,thosethatoccurin"that"clauses)ineffect,atranslationfromMintoEnglishtogetherwiththe
understandingwealreadyhaveofEnglish."(p.218).Thisisalittlecryptic,butIguesstheideaisthatifweknowwhichpartofHerbertishisbeliefbox(thismeans,
nearenough,'ifweknowwhatcausalroleuiplaysinHerbert'smentallife'),thenwecouldfindout,empirically,thatuiisinHerbert'sbeliefboxifacertainEnglish
sentence(saythesentence"Herbertbelievesthere'sacatonGranny'smat")istrue.Andthatwouldbefindingoutwhatuimeansviz.,thatitmeansthatthere'sacat
onGranny'smat.
Now,I'mmorethanjustalittledoubtfulaboutthis.Schifferputshisclaimepistemologically:"Wecoulddiscoverthat[Sistrue]...

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etc."ButwhathastobethecaseforustodiscoverthatSistrueisn'ttothepoint.What'stothepointiswhathastobethecaseforStobetrue.Andwhathastobe
thecaseforStobetruecan't,onpainofcircularity,besomethingabouttherelationbetweenMandEnglish.
SchifferthinksthatthesentencesofEnglishhavetheirsemanticalproperties(specifically,their"sayingpotentials")invirtueoftheir"processingroles,"where,ineffect,
theprocessingroleofasentenceisitsrelationtoitstranslationinM.(ForSchiffer'selaborationofthisstory,seeespeciallychapter8,section2).Well,theworryis
thatitcan'tbothbethat:
(i)EnglishsentenceshavetheirsemanticalpropertiesinviruteoftheirrelationtosentenceofMentalese

andthat:
(ii)Whatmakesitthecasethatu iistheimmediateobjectof,say,thebeliefthatthere'sacatonGranny'smat,isthatuiistheformulathattranslatestheEnglishsentence
"there'sacatonGranny'smat"(i.e.,uiistheformulathattranslatestheEnglishsentencewhose"sayingpotential"isthatthere'sacatonGranny'smat).

Youcan'tbothderivethesemanticalpropertiesofEnglishsentencesfromthoseoftheirMentalesetranslationsandderivethesemanticalpropertiesofMentalese
formulasfromthoseoftheirEnglishtranslations.Atleast,Idon'tthinkyoucan.
IsupposeSchiffermightrespondwithachargeofbeggingthequestionviz.,that,onthecurrentdeflationaryview,thereisnothingthat"makesitthecase"that
Mentaleseformulasmeanwhattheydo.ButIdon'tthinkI'mhavingthis.Mypointisn't,afterall,thatSchifferhasfailedtoprovideareductiveaccountofthemeaning
offormulasinMentalesethatcomplaintwouldbequestionbegginginthepresentcontext.Butit'sonethingtosaythereisnoreductivestoryaboutMentalese
semanticsit'squiteanotherthingtosaythereisnostoryatallthatitis,asitwere,justabrutefactthatacertainMentaleseformulameansthatit'srainingandnotthat
thecatisonthemat.Thatasymbolmeanswhatitdoescan'tbeabrutefactit'snottherightkindoffacttobebrute.So,astoryiswantedaboutwhatmakesthe
symbolsofMentalesemeanwhattheydo.And,asfarasIcansee,eitherSchifferhasnosuchstory,orhe'sgotonethatswallowsitsowntailbyembracingboth(i)
and(ii),therebycommittingcircularity.Eitherway,IdoubtthatSchifferhaswhathe

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admitsheneeds:acasethatSdoesn'trequireacompositionalsemanticsforM.
AnyhowSchifferignoresastraightforwardandindeedfamiliarargumentthatMentalesemusthaveacompositionalsemanticsonewhichseemstomeasdecisiveas
anythingevergetsinthispartofthewoods.I'llclosewithawordonthis.
Mentalesemustitselfbeproductive.Thereasoningis,asIsay,familiar:ontheonehand,propositionalattitudesderivetheirsemanticalproperties(theirintentional
contents)fromthesemanticsoftheMentaleseexpressionsthataretheirimmediateobjects(asperS).And,ontheotherhand,thereareinfinitelymanypsychologically
possible,semanticallydistinct,propositionalattitudes(ofwhichthebeliefthatGrannyhasacatonhermat,thebeliefthatGrannyhastwocatsonhermat,the
beliefthatGrannyhasthreecatsonhermat,etc.,provideanextendiblesubset.)ItfollowsthatthereareinfinitelymanyformulasofMentalese.
NoticeandthisiscrucialthatthisinfinityofMentaleseexpressionsisnottobeaccountedforsimplybyassumingthatMhasarecursivesyntax.Whatneedstobe
explainedisthat(synonymyaside)eachofthesyntaticallydistinctexpressionsofMhasitsdistinctivetruthcondition.ThepointisnotjustthatwhatcorrespondsinM
totheEnglish''Grannyhasacat"hastobemorphosyntacticallydistinctfromwhatcorrespondsinMtotheEnglish"Grannyhastwocats"italsohastocomeout
thateachofthesemorphosyntacticallydistinctMexpressionshasatruthconditiondifferentfromtheother.And,ontheonehand,onpainofcircularity,thebuckhas
tostopatMentalesethesefactsaboutthemeaningsofMexpressionscan'tbeparasiticonsemanticfactsaboutEnglish.And,ontheotherhand,nobodyhasthe
slightestideahowMcouldbesemanticallyproductiveunlessithasacompositionalsemantics.
Itakeit,andItakeitthatSchiffergrantsit,thatthemetaphysicalconsequencesofpostulatingacompositionalsemanticsforMentalesewouldnotbeinterestingly
differentfromthemetaphysicalconsequencesofpostulatingacompositionalsemanticsforEnglish.Inparticular,if(theory)Tisthecorrectcompositionalsemanticsfor
M,thenTmustentailinfinitelymanyformulasoftheformFmeansthatP,whereFisaquotedformulaofMandPisaformulasemanticallyequivalenttoF.And
nowwe'reinthesoupagainweneedatheorytoexplainhowmerelyphysicalthingsliketokensofFcouldhavesemanticalpropertieslikemeaningthatPthevery
sortoftheorythatSchifferdoubtsthatwecanhave.
(Ipausetoremarkparenthetically,forthosewhoarenotpreparedtoidealizetoaninfinityofpsychologicallypossibleattitudes,orwho

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arepreparedtoaccepttheidealizationonlyinthecaseofverbalorganisms,thatananalogtotheproductivityargumentcanberunonthesystematicityofthe
attitudessystematicityisapropertythatfinitemindsindeed,quitesmallfinitemindscanhave.SeeFodor,1987FodorandPylyshyn,1988.)
So,here'sthestoryinanutshell.Schifferisrightwedon'tknowhowIBScouldbetrue.ButIBSisthemetaphysicswerequiretoexplainhowtherecouldbe
intentionallaws,andit'sthemetaphysicsthatthecomputationaltheoryofthemindpresupposes.SoweknowthatIBSmustbetrue.SoweknowthatIBSistrue.So,
there'snoneedtothrowanexistentialfiteverythingisgoingtobeallright,manycurrentappearancestothecontrarynotwithstanding.
Itdoesn'tfollow,ofcourse,thateverythingisgoingtobeallrightinthenearfuture.Inthemeantime,faithistheevidenceofthingsunseen.
Notes
1.TheimplicationsofthisissueaboutwhethertherearepsychologicallawsreverberatethroughthewholearchitectureofSchiffer'sargument.Thus,it'spartof
Schiffer's"notheorytheory"ofmeaning(seehischapter10)thattherearen'tsubstantiveanswerstoquestionslike"Invirtueofwhatdoessomeonehavethebeliefthat
P?"(Nonsubstantive,"pleonastic"answersinclude''invirtueofbelievingthatP"andthelike).Butthislineisplausibleonlyontheassumptionthat"believesthatP"isn't
anaturalkindpredicate(i.e.,thattherearenolawsaboutcreaturesthatbelievethatPquacreaturesthatbelievethatP.)Schifferisquiteawarethat,wherewedo
have(nonbasic)naturalkinds(like,say,water),weexpectsubstantiveanswersto"invirtueofwhat"questions(answerslike"somethingiswaterinvirtueofitsbeing
H2O").
2.What'satissuehereisn't,ofcourse,Nominalism.Somebodywhodoesn'tdoubtthattherearepropertiescanneverthelessdoubtthattherearementalproperties
thatareirreduciblynonphysical(whereaphysicalpropertyis,let'ssay,oneinvirtueofwhichindividualsaresubsumedbythelawsofanappropriatelyidealphysics.)
3.It'salittleunfortunatethatwhenphilosophershavewantedexamplesofgoodcandidatesforintentionallaws,they'vegenerallychosenoneslikethepractical
syllogismor"ceterisparibus,ifyoubelievePandyoubelieveifPthenQ,thenyoubelieveQ"andsoforth.Thepointaboutthesesortsofexamplesisthattheyare
indifferenttothecontentofthementalstatesthattheyapplytorelationsofidentityanddifferenceofcontentareallthattheycareabout.
Itis,however,abadideatorunyourphilosophicalpsychologyontheassumptionthatallintentionallawsarelikethis.Theexamplesinthetextarecounterinstances
andthereareverymanyothers.

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PARTIIModularity
Youhavetohavethefactsbeforeyoucanpervertthem.
MarkTwain

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Chapter8
PrcisofTheModularityofMind
Everybodyknowsthatsomethingiswrong.Butitisuniquelytheachievementofcontemporaryphilosophyindeed,itisuniquelytheachievementofcontemporary
analyticalphilosophytohavefiguredoutjustwhatitis.Whatiswrongisnotmakingenoughdistinctions.Ifonlywemadeallthedistinctionsthatthereare,thenwe
shouldallbeashappyaskings.(Kingsarenotoriouslyveryhappy.)
TheModularityofMind(henceforthModularity)isamonographmuchinthespiritofthatdiagnosis.Iwantedtoarguethere(andwilllikewisearguehere)that
modernCognitivismfailed,earlyon,tonoticeacertainimportantdistinction:roughly,adistinctionbetweentwowaysinwhichcomputationalprocessescanbe
"smart."Becauseitmissedthisdistinction,Cognitivismfailedtoconsidersomemodelsofmentalarchitectureforwhichadegreeofempiricalsupportcanbe
marshaled,modelsthatmay,indeed,turnouttobetrue.Ifthesemodelsaretrue,thenstandardaccountsofthenatureofcognitionandperceptionandofthe
relationsbetweenthemareseriouslymisled,withconsequencesthatcanbefeltallthewayfromartificialintelligencetoepistemology.Thatwasmystory,andIam
goingtosticktoit.
"What,"youwillask,"wasthismisseddistinctionwhomisseditandhowdidmissingitleadtothesehorrendousconsequences?"Iofferahistoricalreconstructionin
theformofafairytale.Noneofwhatfollowsactuallyhappened,butitmakesagoodstoryandhasanedifyingmoral.
Sothen:Onceuponatime,therewasaWickedBehaviorist.Hewas,alas,amingyanddogmaticcreatureoflittlehumorandlesspoetrybuthedidkeepaclean
attic.Eachday,hewouldclimbuptohisatticandthrowthingsout,foritwashisambitioneventuallytohavealmostnothinginhisatticatall.(Somepeople
whisperedthatthiswashisonlyambition,thattheWickedBehavioristwasactuallyjustaclosetOntologicalPurist.ForallIknow,theywererighttowhisperthis.)

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Anyhow,onedaywhentheWickedBehavioristwasupstairscleaningouthisattic,thefollowingVeryInterestingThoughtoccurredtohim."Look,"hesaidtohimself,
"Icandowithoutperceptualprocesses."(BecausehehadbeeneducatedinVienna,theWickedBehavioristusuallythoughtintheformalmode.Sowhatactually
occurredtohimwasthathecoulddowithoutatheoryofperceptualprocesses.Itcomestomuchthesamething.)''For,"itcontinuedtooccurtohim,"perceptual
identificationreduceswithoutresiduetodiscriminativeresponding.Anddiscriminativerespondingreduceswithoutresiduetothemanifestationofconditioned(asit
mightbe,operant)reflexes.AndthetheoryofconditionedreflexesreduceswithoutresiduetoLearningTheory.So,thoughlearningisoneofthethingsthatthereare,
perceptualprocessesareoneofthethingstherearen't.Therealsoaren't:TheTrue,orTheBeautiful,orSantaClaus,orTinkerbellandunicornsaremetaphysically
impossibleandGeorgeWashingtonworefalseteeth.Sothere.Grrr!"HereallywasaveryWickedBehaviorist.
Fortunately,however,intheverysamepossibleworldinwhichtheWBekedoutameagerexistenceasavalueofaboundvariable(forwhowouldcallthatliving?),
therewasalsoaHandsomeCognitivist.AndwhereastheWBhadthispreferenceforcleanatticsanddesertlandscapes,theHC'smottowas:"Themorethemerrier,
moreorless!"ItwastheHC'sviewthatalmostnothingreducestoalmostanythingelse.Tosaythattheworldisfullofanumberofthingswas,hethought,puttingit
mildlyfortheHC,everydaywaslikeChristmasinDickens,ontologicallyspeaking.Infact,farfromwishingtothrowoldthingsout,hewasmainlyinterestedin
turningnewthingsup."Onlycollect,"theHCwasoftenheardtosay.AboveallandthisiswhyI'mtellingyouthisstorytheHCwantedmentalprocessesin
general,andperceptualprocessesinparticular,tobepartofhiscollection.
Moreover,theHChadanargument."Perceptualprocesses,"hesaid,"can'tbereflexesbecause,whereasreflexesareparadigmaticallydumb,perceptualprocesses
aredemonstrablysmart.Perceptionisreallyapartofcognitionitinvolvesakindofthinking."1
"Andwhatdemonstratesthatperceptualprocessesaresmart?"grumbledtheWickedBehaviorist.
"Iwilltellyou,"answeredtheHandsomeCognitivist."Whatdemonstratesthatperceptualprocessesaresmartispovertyofthestimulusarguments".(Apovertyof
thestimulusargumentallegesthatthereistypicallymoreinformationinaperceptualresponsethanthereisintheproximalstimulusthatpromptstheresponsehence
perceptualintegrationmustsomehowinvolvethecontributionofinformationby

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theperceivingorganism.Nooneknowshowtoquantifytherelevantnotionofinformation,soitishardtoshowconclusivelythatthissortofargumentissound.Onthe
otherhand,suchphenomenaastheperceptualconstancieshavepersuadedalmosteverybodyexceptGibsoniansandWickedBehavioriststhatpovertyofthe
stimulusargumentshavetobetakenveryseriously.Ishallassume,inwhatfollows,thatthisisso.)"Povertyofthestimulusarguments,"continuedtheHC,"showthat
perceptualidentificationscan'tbereflexiveresponsestoproximalstimulusinvariants.Infact,povertyofthestimulusargumentsstronglysuggestthatperceptual
identificationsdependonsomesortofcomputations,perhapsoncomputationsofquiteconsiderablecomplexity.So,oncewehaveunderstoodtheforceofpoverty
ofthestimulusarguments,weseethatthereprobablyareperceptualprocessesafterall.And,"theHCaddedinarush,''IbelievethathereareTruthandBeautyand
SantaClausandTinkerbelltoo(onlyyouhavetoreadtheexistentialquantifierleniently).AndIbelievethatforeachdropofrainthatfalls/Aflowerisborn.So
there."(SomepeoplewhisperedthattheHandsomeCognitivist,thoughhewasveryhandsome,wasperhapsjustalittlewet.ForallIknow,theywererightto
whisperthat,too.)Endoffairytale.
Mypointisthis:ModernCognitivismstartswiththeuseofpovertyofthestimulusargumentstoshowthatperceptionissmart,hencethatperceptualidentificationcan't
bereducedtoreflexiveresponding.HoweverandIthinkthisisgoodhistoryandnotafairytaleatallintheirenthusiasmforthislineofargument,earlyCognitivists
failedtodistinguishbetweentwoquitedifferentrespectsinwhichperceptualprocessesmightbesmarterthanreflexes.Or,toputittheotherwayaround,theyfailedto
distinguishbetweentworespectsinwhichperceptionmightbesimilartocognition.ItisatpreciselythispointthatModularityseekstoinsertitswedge.
Reflexes,itistraditionallysupposed,aredumbintwosortsofways:theyarenoninferentialandtheyareencapsulated.2Tosaythattheyarenoninferentialisjustto
saythattheyaresupposedtodependon"straightthrough"connections.Onthesimplestaccount,stimulielicitreflexiveresponsesdirectly,withoutmediatingmental
processing.ItismyviewthattheHCwasrightaboutperceptualprocessesandreflexiveonesbeingdifferentinthisrespect.Povertyofthestimulusargumentsdo
makeitseemplausiblethatalotofinferencetypicallyintervenesbetweenaproximalstimulusandaperceptualidentification.
Bycontrast,todescribereflexesasencapsulatedistosaythattheygoofflargelywithoutregardtothebeliefsandutilitiesofthebehav

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ingorganismtoafirstapproximation,allthatyouneedtodotoevokeareflexistopresenttheappropriateelicitingstimulus.Here'showModularityputthispoint:
SupposethatyouandIhaveknowneachotherformanyalongyear...andyouhavecomefullytoappreciatetheexcellenceofmycharacter.Inparticular,youhavecometo
knowperfectlywellthatundernoconceivablecircumstanceswouldIstickmyfingerinyoureye.Supposethatthisbeliefofyoursisbothexplicitanddeeplyfelt.Youwould,in
fact,gotothewallforit.Still,ifIjabmyfingernearenoughtoyoureyes,andfastenough,you'llblink....[Theblinkreflex]hasnoaccesstowhatyouknowaboutmycharacter
or,forthatmatter,toanyotherofyourbeliefs,utilities,[or]expectations.Forthisreasontheblinkreflexisoftenproducedwhensoberreflectionwouldshowittobeuncalledfor..
..(p.71)

Inthisrespect,reflexesarequiteunlikealotof"highercognitive"processes,orsoitwouldcertainlyseem.Chessmoves,forexample,aren'telicitedwillynillyby
presentationsofchessproblems.Rather,theplayer'smovesaredeterminedbythestateofhisutilities(ishetryingtowin?ortolose?orishe,perhaps,justfooling
around?)andbyhisbeliefs,includinghisbeliefsaboutthecurrentstateofthegame,hisbeliefsaboutthestructureofchessandthelikelyconsequencesofvarious
patternsofplay,hisbeliefsaboutthebeliefsandutilitiesofhisopponent,hisbeliefsabouthisopponent'sbeliefsabouthisbeliefsandutilities,andsoonupthrough
eversomanyordersofintentionality.
So,then,cognitionissmartintwowaysinwhichreflexesaredumb.Nowthequestionarises:Whatisperceptionlikeintheserespects?Modularityoffersseveral
kindsofargumentsforwhatis,really,amainthesisofthebook:Althoughperceptionissmartlikecognitioninthatitistypicallyinferential,itisneverthelessdumblike
reflexesinthatitistypicallyencapsulated.Perhapsthemostpersuasiveoftheseargumentscertainlytheshortestisonethatadvertstothepersistenceofperceptual
illusions.TheapparentdifferenceinlengthoftheMuellerLyerfigures,forexample,doesn'tdisappearwhenonelearnsthatthearrowsareinfactthesamesize.It
seemstofollowthatatleastsomeofone'sperceptualprocessesareinsensitivetoatleastsomeofone'sbeliefs.VerymuchwantingtheMuellerLyerillusiontogo
awaydoesn'tmakeitdisappeareitheritseemstofollowthatatleastsomeofone'sperceptualprocessesareinsensitivetoatleastsomeofone'sutilities.The
ecologicalgood

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senseofthisarrangementissurelyselfevident.Prejudicedandwishfulseeingmakesfordeadanimals.
ThissortofpointseemsprettyobviousonemightwonderhowCognitivistenthusiasmfor"topdown,""cognitivelypenetrated"perceptualmodelsmanagedtosurvive
infaceofit.Ithinkwehavealreadyseenpartoftheanswer:Cognitivistspervasivelyconfusedthequestionabouttheencapsulationofperceptionwiththequestion
aboutitscomputationalcomplexity.Becausetheybelievedrightlythatpovertyofthestimulusargumentssettledthesecondquestion,theyneverseriously
consideredtheissuesimplicitinthefirstone.YoucanactuallyseethisconfusionbeingperpetratedinsomeoftheearlyCognitivisttexts.Thefollowingpassageisfrom
Bruner's"OnPerceptualReadiness":
Letitbeplainthatnoclaimisbeingmadefortheutterindistinguishabilityofperceptualandmoreconceptualinferences....ImayknowthattheAmesdistortedroomthatlooks
sorectangularisindeeddistorted,butunlessconflictingcuesareputintothesituation...theroomstilllooksrectangular.SotoowithsuchcompellingillusionsastheMueller
Lyer:Inspiteofknowledgetothecontrary,thelinewiththeextendedarrowheadslookslongerthantheequallengthlinewitharrowheadsinclinedinward.Butthesedifferences,
interestinginthemselves,mustnotleadustooverlookthecommonfeatureofinferenceunderlyingsomuchofcognitiveactivity.(Bruner1973,p.8emphasisadded)

Theissueraisedbythepersistenceofillusionisnot,however,whethersomeinferencesare"moreconceptual"thanotherswhatever,precisely,thatmightmean.Still
lessisitwhetherperceptionisinsomeimportantsenseinferential.Rather,what'satissueis:Howrigidistheboundarybetweentheinformationavailabletocognitive
processesandtheinformationavailabletoperceptualones?Howmuchofwhatyouknow/believe/desireactuallydoesaffectthewayyousee?Thepersistenceof
illusionsuggeststhattheanswermustbe:"atmost,lessthanallofit."
Sofar,mychargehasbeenthatearlyCognitivismmissedthedistinctionbetweentheinferentialcomplexityofperceptionanditscognitivepenetrability.Butofcourse
it'snoaccidentthatitwasjustthatdistinctionthatCognitivistsconfused.Thoughtheyareindependentpropertiesofcomputationalsystems,inferentialcomplexityand
cognitivepenetrabilityareintimatelyrelatedsointimatelythat,unlessoneisverycareful,it'seasytoconvinceoneselfthattheformeractuallyentailsthelatter.
Whatconnectsinferentialcomplexityandcognitivepenetrabilityis

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thetruismthatinferencesneedpremises.Here'showtheargumentmightseemtogo:povertyofthestimulusargumentsshowthattheorganismmustcontribute
informationtoperceptualintegrations"perceptualinferences"justarethecomputationsthateffectsuchcontributions.Now,thisinformationthattheorganism
contributesthepremises,asitwere,ofitsperceptualinferencesmustincludenotjustsensoryspecificationsofcurrentproximalinputsbutalso"background
knowledge"drawnfrompriorexperienceorinnateendowmentforwhatpovertyofthestimulusargumentsshowispreciselythatsensoryinformationalone
underdeterminesperceptualintegrations.But,surely,theavailabilityofbackgroundknowledgetoprocessesofperceptualintegrationisthecognitivepenetrationof
perception.Soifperceptionisinferentiallyelaborated,itmustbecognitivelypenetrated.Q.E.D.
What'swrongwiththisargumentisthatitdependsonwhatonemeansbycognitivepenetration.Onemightmeantheavailabilitytoperceptualintegrationofsome
informationnotgivenintheproximalarray.Becausepovertyofthestimulusargumentsshowthatsomesuchinformationmustbeavailabletoperceptualintegration,it
followsthattoacceptpovertyofthestimulusargumentsistoacceptthecognitivepenetrabilityofperceptioninthissense.Butonemightalsomeanbythecognitive
penetrabilityofperceptionthatanythingthattheorganismknows,anyinformationthatisaccessibletoanyofitscognitiveprocesses,isipsofactoavailableas
apremiseinperceptualinference.Thisisamuchmoredramaticclaimitimpliesthecontinuityofperceptionwithcognition.And,ifitistrue,ithasallsortsof
interestingepistemicpayoffs(seeFodor,1984).Notice,however,thatthisstrongerclaimdoesnotfollowfromtheinferentialcomplexityofperception.
Whynot?Well,forthefollowingboringreason.Wecan,inprinciple,imaginethreesortsofarchitecturalarrangementsinrespectoftherelationsbetweencognition
andperception:nobackgroundinformationisavailabletoperceptualintegrationsomebutnotallbackgroundinformationisavailabletoperceptualintegration
everythingoneknowsisavailabletoperceptualintegration.Becausepovertyofthestimulusargumentsimplytheinferentialelaborationofperception,andbecause
inferencesneedpremises,thefirstofthesearchitecturesisclosedtotheCognitivist.Butthesecondandthirdarestillopen,andthepersistenceofillusionsisprima
facieevidencethatthesecondisthebetterbet.
Wearrive,atlast,atthenotionofapsychologicalmodule.Amoduleis,interalia,aninformationallyencapsulatedcomputationalsystemaninferencemaking
mechanismwhoseaccesstoback

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groundinformationisconstrainedbygeneralfeaturesofcognitivearchitecture,hencerelativelyrigidlyandrelativelypermanentlyconstrained.Onecanconceptualizea
moduleasaspecialpurposecomputerwithaproprietarydatabase,undertheconditionsthat(a)theoperationsthatitperformshaveaccessonlytotheinformationin
itsdatabase(together,ofcourse,withspecificationsofcurrentlyimpingingproximalstimulations),and(b)atleastsomeinformationthatisavailabletoatleastsome
cognitiveprocessisnotavailabletothemodule.ItisamainthesisofModularitythatperceptualintegrationsaretypicallyperformedbycomputationalsystemsthat
areinformationallyencapsulatedinthissense.
ModularityhastwoothermaintheseswhichImightaswelltellyouaboutnow.Thefirstisthat,althoughinformationalencapsulationisanessentialpropertyof
modularsystems,theyalsotendtoexhibitotherpsychologicallyinterestingproperties.Thenotionofamodulethusemergesasasortof"clusterconcept,"andthe
claimthatperceptualprocessesaremodularizedimpliesthatwhereverwelookatthemechanismsthateffectperceptualintegrationweseethatthisclusterof
propertiestendstorecur.Thethirdmainthesisisthat,whereasperceptualprocessesaretypicallymodularizedhenceencapsulated,hencestupidinoneoftheways
thatreflexesarethereally"smart,"really"higher"cognitiveprocesses(thinking,forexample)arenotmodularand,inparticular,notencapsulated.SoModularity
advocatesaprincipleddistinctionbetweenperceptionandcognitionincontrasttotheusualCognitivistclaimsfortheircontinuity.
SinceModularitygoesintoallofthisinsomedetail,Idon'tproposetodosohereotherwise,whywouldyoubuythebook?ButIdowanttostresstheplausibilityof
thepicturethatemerges.Ontheonehand,therearetheperceptualprocessesthesetendtobeinputdriven,veryfast,mandatory,superficial,encapsulatedfrommuch
oftheorganism'sbackgroundknowledge,largelyorganizedaroundbottomtotopinformationflow,largelyinnatelyspecified(henceontogeneticallyeccentric),and
characteristicallyassociatedwithspecificneuroanatomicalmechanisms(sometimesevenwithspecificneuroanatomicalloci).Theytendalsotobedomainspecific,so
thattocitetheclassiccasethecomputationalsystemsthatdealwiththeperception/productionoflanguageappeartohavenotmuchincommonwiththosethat
dealwith,forexample,theanalysisofcolororofvisualform(or,forthatmatter,theanalysisofnonspeechauditorysignals).Sostrikinglyarethesesystems
autonomousthattheyoftenrejoiceintheirproprietary,domainspecificpathologies:comparetheaphasiasandagnosias.Modularitytakestheviewthatitishightime

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topraiseFranzJosephGallforhavingpredictedtheexistenceofpsychologicalmechanismsthatexhibitthisbundleofproperties.(Gallwasapproximatelya
contemporaryofJaneAusten's,soyouseehowfarwehavecomeincognitivepsychologyandinthenovel,forthatmatter.)Itispreciselyintheinvestigationof
these"verticalfaculties"thatmodernCognitivismhascontributeditsmostimportantinsights,andModularitysuggeststhatthisisnoaccident.Preciselybecausethe
perceptualmechanismsareencapsulated,wecanmakeprogressinstudyingthemwithouthavingtocommitourselvesaboutthegeneralnatureofthecognitivemind.
Ontheotherhand,therearethetruehighercognitivefaculties.Solittleisknownaboutthemthatoneishardputeventosaywhichtruehighercognitivefacultiesthere
are.But"thought"and"problemsolving"aresurelyamongthenamesinthegame,andhereModularity'slineisthattheseareeverythingthatperceptionisnot:slow,
deep,globalratherthanlocal,largelyundervoluntary(or,asonesays,"executive")control,typicallyassociatedwithdiffuseneurologicalstructures,neitherbottomto
topnortoptobottomintheirmodesofprocessing,butcharacterizedbycomputationsinwhichinformationflowseverywhichway.Aboveall,theyare
paradigmaticallyunencapsulatedthehigherthecognitiveprocess,themoreitturnsontheintegrationofinformationacrosssuperficiallydissimilardomains.Modularity
assumesthatinthisrespectthehighercognitiveprocessesarenotablysimilartoprocessesofscientificdiscoveryindeed,thatthelatteraretheformerwritlarge.
Both,ofcourse,aredeeplymysteriouswedon'tunderstandnondemonstrativeinferenceineitheritsmacrocosmicoritsmicrocosmicincarnation.
Ifmuchoftheforegoingisright,thenmainstreamCognitivesciencehasmanagedtogetthearchitectureofthemindalmostexactlybackwards.Byemphasizingthe
continuityofcognitionwithperception,itmissedthecomputationalencapsulationofthelatter.Byattemptingtounderstandthinkingintermsofabaroqueproliferation
ofscripts,plans,frames,schemata,specialpurposeheuristics,expertsystems,andotherspeciesofdomainspecificintellectualautomatismsjumpeduphabits,to
putitinanutshellitmissedwhatismostcharacteristicandmostpuzzlingaboutthehighercognitivemind:itsnonencapsulation,itscreativity,itsholism,anditspassion
fortheanalogical.Onelaughsorweepsaccordingtoone'stemperament.Itwas,perhaps,Eeyorewhofoundpreciselytherightwords:"'Pathetic,'hesaid,'That's
whatitis,pathetic.'"
Well,yes,butismuchofthisright?Iwantatleasttoemphasizeitsplausibilityfromseveraldifferentpointsofview.Perceptionisaboveallconcernedwithkeeping
trackofthestateoftheorganism's

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localspatiotemporalenvironment.Notthedistantpast,northedistantfuture,andnotexceptforecologicalaccidentslikestarswhatisveryfaraway.Perceptionis
builttodetectwhatisrighthere,rightnowwhatisavailable,forexample,foreatingorbeingeatenby.Ifthisisindeeditsteleology,thenitisunderstandablethat
perceptionshouldbeperformedbyfast,mandatory,encapsulated,etc.,systemsthatconsidered,asitwere,detectiontheoreticallyarepreparedtotradefalse
positivesforhighgain.Itis,nodoubt,importanttoattendtotheeternallybeautifulandtobelievetheeternallytrue.Butitismoreimportantnottobeeaten.
Why,then,isn'tperceptionevenstupider,evenlessinferentialthanitappearstobe?Whydoesn'titconsistofliterallyreflexiveresponsestoproximalstimulations?
Presumablybecausethereissomuchmorevariabilityintheproximalprojectionsthatanorganism'senvironmentofferstoitssensorymechanismsthanthereisinthe
distalenvironmentitself.Thiskindofvariabilityisbydefinitionirrelevantifitisthedistalenvironmentthatyoucareaboutwhich,ofcourse,italmostalwaysis.Sothe
functionofperception,fromthisvantagepoint,istoproposetothoughtarepresentationoftheworldfromwhichsuchirrelevantvariabilityhasbeeneffectivelyfiltered.
Whatperceptualsystemstypically"knowabout"ishowtoinfercurrentdistallayoutsfromcurrentproximalstimulations:thevisualsystem,forexample,knowshowto
derivedistalformfromproximaldisplacement,andthelanguagesystemknowshowtoinferthespeaker'scommunicativeintentionsfromhisphoneticproductions.
Neithermechanism,onthepresentaccount,knowsagreatdealelse,andthatisentirelytypicalofperceptualorganization.Perceptualsystemshaveaccessto(implicit
orexplicit)theoriesofthemappingbetweendistalcausesandproximaleffects.Butthat'salltheyhave.
Iftheperceptualmechanismsareindeedlocal,stupid,andextremelynervous,itisteleologicallysensibletohavethepictureoftheworldthattheypresenttempered,
reanalysed,andasKantsawaboveallintegratedbyslower,betterinformed,moreconservative,andmoreholisticcognitivesystems.Thepurposesofsurvival
are,afterall,sometimessubservedbyknowingthetruth.Theworld'sdeepregularitiesdon'tshowinasnapshot,sobeingbullheaded,ignoringthefactsthataren't
visibleonthesurfaceencapsulationinshortisnotthecognitivepolicythatonewantstopursueinthelongrun.ThesurfaceplausibilityoftheModularitypicture
thusliesintheideathatNaturehascontrivedtohaveitbothways,togetthebestoutoffastdumbsystemsandslowcontemplativeones,bysimplyrefusingtochoose
betweenthem.Thatis,Isuppose,thewaythat

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Naturelikestooperate:"I'llhavesomeofeach"onedamnedthingpiledontopofanother,andnothinginmoderation,ever.
Itwillhaveoccurredtoyou,nodoubt,thatCognitivismcouldquitepossiblyhavehitontherightdoctrine,evenifitdidsoforthewrongreasons.Whateverconfusions
mayhavespawnedtheideathatperceptionandcognitionarecontinuous,andhoweverplausibletheencapsulationstorymayappeartobeapriori,thereisalotof
experimentalevidencearoundthatarguesfortheeffectsofbackgroundknowledgeinperception.Ifthemindreallyismodular,thosedataaregoingtohavetobe
explainedaway.Iwanttosayjustawordaboutthis.
Thereare,prettyclearly,threeconditionsthatanexperimenthastomeetifitistoprovideabonafidecounterinstancetothemodularityofaperceptualsystem.
1.Itmust,ofcourse,demonstratetheinfluenceofbackgroundinformationinsomecomputationthatthesystemperforms.But,moreparticularly,thebackground
informationwhoseinfluenceitdemonstratesmustbeexogenousfromthepointofviewofthemoduleconcerned.Remember,eachmodulehasitsproprietary
databasewhateverinformationisinitsdatabaseisipsofactoavailabletoitscomputations.So,forexample,itwouldbenouseforpurposesofembarrassing
modularitytheorytoshowthatwordsaresuperiortononwordsinaspeechperceptiontask.Presumably,thelanguageprocessingsystemhasaccesstoagrammarof
thelanguagethatitprocesses,andagrammarmustsurelycontainalexicon.Whatwordsareinthelanguageisthusoneofthethingsthatthelanguagemodulecan
plausiblybeassumedtoknowconsonantwithitsmodularity.
2.Theeffectofthebackgroundmustbedistinctivelyperceptual,notpostperceptualandnotacriterionshift.Forexample,itisofnousetodemonstratethatutterances
of"implausible"sentencesarehardertoprocessthanutterancesof"plausible"onesifitturnsoutthatthemechanismofthiseffectisthehearer'sinabilitytobelievethat
thespeakercouldhavesaidwhatitsoundedlikehesaid.Nooneinhisrightminddoubtsthatperceptioninteractswithcognitionsomewhere.What'satissueinthe
disagreementbetweenmodularitytheoryand"NewLook"Cognitivism(e.g.,Bruner1957)isthelocusofthisinteraction.Inpractice,itusuallyturnsoutthattheissue
iswhethertherecruitmentofbackgroundinformationinperceptionispredictive.ModularitytheorysaysalmostneverNewLookCognitivismsaysquitealotofthe
time.
3.Thecognitivelypenetratedsystemmustbetheonethatshoulderstheburdenofperceptualanalysisinnormalcircumstances,andnot,forexample,somebackup,
problemsolvingtypeofmechanism

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thatfunctionsonlywhenthestimulusistoodegradedforamoduletocopewith.Therefore,itisofnousetoshowthathighlyredundantlexicalitemsareeasierto
understandthanlessredundantoneswhenthespeechsignalisverynoisyunless,ofcourse,youcanalsoshowthattheperceptionofverynoisyspeechreallyisbona
fidespeechperception.
SofarasIknow,thereisverylittleintheexperimentalliteraturethatisallegedtodemonstratethecognitivepenetrationofperceptionthatmeetsallthreeofthese
conditions(tosaynothingofreplicability).Thisisn'ttoclaimthatsuchexperimentscannotbedevisedorthat,ifdevised,theymightnotprovethatNewLook
Cognitivismisrightafterall.Iclaimonlythat,contrarytothetextbookstory,theempiricalevidenceforthecontinuityofperceptionwithcognitionisnotoverwhelming
whencontemplatedwithajaundicedeye.Thereis,inanyevent,somethingforlaboratorypsychologytodoforthenexttwentyyearsorso:namely,trytodevelop
somedesignssubtleenoughtodeterminewho'srightaboutallthis.
"Butlook,"youmightask,"whydoyoucareaboutmodulessomuch?You'vegottenurewhydon'tyoutakeoffandgosailing?"Thisisaperfectlyreasonable
questionandonethatIoftenaskmyself.AnsweringitwouldrequireexploringterritorythatIcan'tgetintohereandraisingissuesthatModularitydoesn'teven
broach.Butroughly,andbywayofstrikingaclosingnoteTheideathatcognitionsaturatesperceptionbelongswith(andis,indeed,historicallyconnectedwith)the
ideainthephilosophyofsciencethatone'sobservationsarecomprehensivelydeterminedbyone'stheorieswiththeideainanthropologythatone'svaluesare
comprehensivelydeterminedbyone'sculturewiththeideainsociologythatone'sepistemiccommitments,includingespeciallyone'sscience,arecomprehensively
determinedbyone'sclassaffiliationsandwiththeideainlinguisticsthatone'smetaphysicsiscomprehensivelydeterminedbyone'ssyntax.Alltheseideasimplyasort
ofrelativisticholism:becauseperceptionissaturatedbycognition,observationbytheory,valuesbyculture,sciencebyclass,andmetaphysicsbylanguage,rational
criticismofscientifictheories,ethicalvalues,metaphysicalworldviews,orwhatevercantakeplaceonlywithintheframeworkofassumptionsthatasamatterof
geographical,historical,orsociologicalaccidenttheinterlocutorshappentoshare.Whatyoucan'tdoisrationallycriticizetheframework.
Thethingis:Ihaterelativism.IhaterelativismmorethanIhateanythingelse,excepting,maybe,fiberglasspowerboats.Moretothepoint,Ithinkthatrelativismisvery
probablyfalse.Whatitoverlooks,toputitbrieflyandcrudely,isthefixedstructureofhumannature.

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(Thisisnot,ofcourse,anovelinsightonthecontrary,themalleabilityofhumannatureisadoctrinethatrelativistsareinvariablymuchinclinedtostress.See,for
example,JohnDeweyinHumanNatureandConduct,1922.)Well,incognitivepsychologytheclaimthatthereisafixedstructureofhumannaturetraditionally
takestheformofaninsistenceontheheterogeneityofcognitivemechanismsandontherigidityofthecognitivearchitecturethateffectstheirencapsulation.Ifthereare
facultiesandmodules,thennoteverythingaffectseverythingelsenoteverythingisplastic.WhatevertheAllis,atleastthereismorethanOneofit.
Theseare,asyouwillhavegathered,notissuestobedecisivelyarguedorevenperspicuouslyformulatedinthecourseofaparagraphortwo.Sufficeitthatthey
seemtobethesortsofissuesthatourcognitivescienceoughttobearon.Andtheyareintimatelyintertwined:surely,surely,noonebutarelativistwoulddrivea
fiberglasspowerboat.
Cominginournextinstallment:"RestoringBasicValues:PhrenologyinanAgeofLicense."Trynottomissit!
Notes
1.See,forexample,Gregory(1970,p.30):"perceptioninvolvesakindofproblemsolvingakindofintelligence."Foramorerecentandcomprehensivetreatment
thatrunsalongthesamelines,seeRock(1983).
2.Idon'tatallcarewhetherthese"traditionalassumptions"aboutreflexesareinfactcorrect,orevenwhethertheyweretraditionallyassumed.WhatIwantisanideal
typewithwhichtocompareperceptionandcognition.

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Chapter9
WhyShouldtheMindBeModular?
DannyKayeoncedescribedtheoboeas''anillwindthatnobodyblowsgood."Muchthesamecouldbesaidandwithmorejusticeofteleologicalexplanationsin
psychology.Thereisanirresistibletemptationtoarguethattheorganizationthatone'sfavoritecognitivetheoryattributestothemindistheveryorganizationthatthe
mindoughttohave,givenitsfunction.Oneknowsthatsuchargumentsare,inthenatureofthecase,posthoconeknowsthatthecognitivetheoriestheypresuppose
invariablycomeunstuck,leavingtheteleologistwithafunctionalexplanationformentalstructuresthatdon'texistoneknowsthatthereare,ingeneral,lotsof
mechanismsthatcanperformagiventask,sothatinferencesfromatasktoamechanismareuptotheirearsinaffirmationoftheconsequentoneknowsaboutthe
philosopherwho,justbeforetheydiscoveredtheninthplanet,provedfromfirstprinciplesthattherehavetobeexactlyeight.Oneknowsallthisbutthetemptation
persists.
Inthischapter,Iproposetooffersometeleologicalexcusesforthemodularorganizationofperception.Inparticular,I'llraisesomefunctionalconsiderationsthatmight
favormodularityinperceptionevenifasI'minclinedtosupposetheorganizationofmuchoftherestofcognitionisnonmodularinimportantways.Someofthe
argumentsformodularitythatI'veseenintheliteratureforexample,thatmodularprocessesareespeciallydebuggabledon'tdothissotheysuggestthat,insofaras
teleologyrules,themindoughttobemodularallover.Myline,bycontrast,isthatgiventhespecificsofwhatperceptionissupposedtodo,andgiveninternal
constraintsonprocessesthatdothatsortofthing,modularstructureinperceptualsystemsisperhapswhatyou'dexpect.
Whatisperceptionsupposedtodo?Psychologistshavetendedtodisagreeaboutthisinwaysthathavedeepconsequencesfortherestofwhattheysayabout
cognition.Thereare,forexample,thosewhotakeitforgrantedthattheprimaryfunctionofperceptionistoguideaction.(Illustriouspsychologistswhohaveheldthis
viewinclude

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Piaget,Gibson,Dewey,Vygotsky,andsurelymanyothers).Itisnoaccidentthatsuchpsychologistsinvariablytakethereflextobetheprimitivemodeof
psychologicalorganization,towhichcognitivefunctionsmustsomehowbereduced(phylogenetically,ontogenetically,orotherwise).1Inreflexes,specificperceptual
eventsarelawfullyconnectedtocorrespondinglyspecificbehavioraloutcomes.Totakethereflexastheparadigmpsychologicalprocessisthustoseeperceptual
mechanismsasdetectorsthatfunctiontomonitoranorganism'senvironment,lookingforoccasionsonwhichtheassociatedbehaviorisappropriatelyreleased.
Iamgoingtoassume(withoutargument,forthemoment)thatthispictureisprofoundlymisled.Inmyview,behaviorisnormallydetermineddecisiontheoretically,viz.,
bytheinteractionofbeliefwithutilitiesintheinterestingcases,perceptionislinkedtobehavioronlyviasuchinteractions.Specifically,perceptionfunctionsinbelief
fixation(inwaysthatweareabouttoexplore),andperceptuallyfixedbeliefs,likeanyothers,mayeventuateinbehavioraloutcomes.Whethertheydosodependson
whattheorganismwantsandontherestofitscognitivecommitments.Iwasoncetold(byaGibsonian)thatthisdecisiontheoreticunderstandingoftherelation
betweenperceptionandbehaviorwon'tdoforflies,sinceit'splausiblethattheirbehaviorsreallyareallreflexive.Ifthisistrue,itisanothercontributiontothe
accumulatingevidencethatfliesaren'tpeople.Perhapsmindsstartedoutasstimulusresponsemachines.Ifso,thenaccordingtothepresentviewthecourseof
evolutionwastointerposeacomputerprogrammed,asitmightbe,withtheaxiomsofyourfavoritedecisiontheorybetweentheidentificationofastimulusandthe
selectionofaresponse.
Somyworkingassumptionisthatperceptionisaspeciesofcognitionit'soneofthepsychologicalmechanismswhosemainjobisthefixationofbelief.If,therefore,
youarelookingforateleologicalstoryaboutthedesignofperceptualsystems,thefirststepistogetclearaboutjustwhatperceptioncontributestobelieffixation.You
canmaybethengoontoshowwhymechanismsthatmakethatcontributiontobelieffixationoughttobemodular.That,inanyevent,isthegameplanforwhat
follows.
Togetstarted,weneedageneralstoryaboutbelieffixationwithinwhichtolocateperception'srole.Here'sanoldfashionedstoryassembledasmuchfrom
epistemologyasfrompsychologythatstrikesmeasreasonableasfarasitgoes.Beliefshavetwomainkindsofcauses:otherbeliefsandorganismenvironment
interactions.So,forexample,onewaythatyoumaycometobelievethatQisasacausalconsequenceofbelievingPQandP.Beinginthefirst

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mentalstateisapproximatelycausallysufficientforbeinginthesecond.2Inprinciple,suchchainsofmentalcausationcanbeaslongasyoulike,boundedonlybythe
inferentialcapacitiesoftheorganism.ButIsupposethat,asamatteroffact,theyrarelygetverylong.Itspriorcognitivecommitmentsimpactuponanorganism's
presentcognitivestatebutsotoodoitscausaltransactionswiththeworld.Inconsequenceofsuchtransactions,chainsofthoughtareforeverbeingsupplementedby
underivedpremises.
Thetypicalnonmentalcauseofabeliefisaninteractionbetweenthebodyofanorganismandsomethinginitsenvironment.Bodilystatesregisterandarethus
informativeabouttheeffectsoflocalenvironmentalcausesinexactlythewaythatthermometersregisterambienttemperatureandtidemarksregisterencroachments
ofthesea,infact,inexactlythewaythatanyeffectregistersandisthusinformativeaboutitscause.Changesinstatesoftheretina,forexample,registerchanges
inthepropertiesofincidentlight,whichareinturncausedbyalterationsinthearrangementofthedistalobjectsthatradiateandreflectthelight.Totheextentthatsuch
proximaleffectsarespecifictotheirdistalcauses,cognitiveprocesseswithaccesstotheonehavegroundsforinferencetotheother.
So,thepictureisthatcertainorganicstatesregistertheproximalstimulithatcausethem,andthatcertaincognitiveprocessesinferthearrangementoflocaldistal
objectsfromtheorganiceffectsoftheseproximalstimulations.Inparticular,Iassumethatit'sthefunctionofperceptualmechanismstoexecutesuchinferences.3
Somuchforthefunctionofperception.Themodularitythesisforperceptionisaccordinglytheclaimthatthemechanismsthatperformthisfunctionare(a)dedicated,
and(b)encapsulated.Andtheteleologicalquestioniswhetherthereissomethingaboutinferencesfromrepresentationsofproximalstimulitorepresentationsofdistal
layoutsthatmakesdedicatedandencapsulateddevicesespeciallyappropriateforexecutingthem.BeforeIturntothisquestion,however,Iwanttosayawordabout
thethesisthatperceptionisaspeciesofinferencededicated,encapsulated,orotherwise.ThewaythatI'vebeensettingthingsup,thisthesisturnsouttobenext
doortoatruismbycontrast,somepsychologists(andmanyphilosophers)havetakenittobeextremelytendentious.
Discussionofthisissueinthecognitivescienceliteraturehastendedtocentermisleadingly,inmyviewonthequestionwhether"povertyofthestimulus"arguments
arereliable.It'sworthtakingamomenttodissociatetheseissues.
Thefirststepindevelopingapovertyofthestimulusargumentfortheinferentialityofperceptionistoclaim,onempiricalgrounds,

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thatproximalstimulationtypicallycontains'lessinformation'thantheperceptualbeliefsthatitengenders(sensationunderdeterminesperception,toputthisinanolder
vocabulary).ThephenomenonofperceptualambiguityNeckercubesandthelikeisonesortofevidenceforthispremise.Thesecondstepistonotethatthisextra
informationhastocomefromsomewherepresumablyitcomesfromtheorganism'sstoreofbackgroundknowledge.Thelaststepistoidentifytheclaimthat
perceptionisinferentialwiththeclaimthatitexploitscognitivebackground.Ineffect,thecompletedargumentisthatperceptionmustbeinferentialbecauseitis'top
down'.Correspondingly,psychologistswhodon'tliketheinferentialstoryaboutperceptionhavegenerallyundertakentoshowthatproximalstimulationisactually
informationallyricherthanpovertyofthestimulusargumentssuppose,andthatatleastin'ecologicallyvalid'circumstancesthereis,inprinciple,enoughinformation
inthelightimpingingattheretina(andhenceenoughinformationregisteredbytheretinaleffectsthatthisimpinginglightproduces)todetermineauniqueandcorrect
perceptualanalysisofthedistallayout.4
Whateveronethinksofthisargument,however,itisimportanttoseethattheclaimthatperceptionisinferentialisdistinguishablefromtheclaimthatitis
underdeterminedbyitspsychophysicalbasis.Inparticular,itisnotrequiredofaninferencethatitsconclusionmustbestrongerthan(thatitmustbe'underdetermined'
by)itspremises.Demonstrativeinferencesare,ofcourse,allcounterexamplesPandQPisaparadigmcaseofaninference,though,onanyreasonablemeasure,P
containslessinformationthanPandQ.Similarly,thementalprocessthatgetsonefromthethoughtthatJohnisanunmarriedmantothethoughtthatheisabachelor
presumablycountsasinferential,thoughinnosenseisthesecondthought'strongerthan'thefirst.Similarlyagainfortheperceptualcase:eveniftheinformationinthe
proximallightuniquelydeterminesthevisiblepropertiesofthedistallayout,theinferentialityofthementalprocessthatproceedsfromrepresentingtheoneto
representingtheotherwouldnotbeimpugned.
Thecoreargumentfortheinferentialityofperceptionderivesfromtwoconsiderations,bothofwhicharequiteindependentofclaimsforunderdetermination.Onthe
onehand,perceptionfixesbeliefsaboutdistalobjects,objectstypicallyatsomespatialremovefromtheperceivingorganism.5Ontheotherhand,thereisnocausal
interactionatthesedistancesalltheintentionaleffectsofdistalstimulimustbemediatedbytheorganiceffectsofproximalstimuli(byretinalstatesandthelike).I
assumethat,iftheseorganiceffectsrepresentanything,thentheyrepresenttheirproximalcauses(cf.note3).On

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thisassumption,itfollowsthatperceptionisaprocessinwhichrepresentationsofproximalstimulicausallydeterminebeliefsaboutdistallayouts.Butthatiswhat's
claimedwhenit'sclaimedthatperceptionisinferential.
Iamnot,bytheway,takingitforgrantedthateverycausalchainofintentionalstatesisaninferenceforexample,associativechainsaren't.Butthen,association
doesn'teventuateinthefixationofbelief,andperceptiondoes.NordoIholdthatperceptualinferencesdifferinnoimportantwaysfromparadigmsofexplicit
reasoning.Foronething,explicitreasoningisexplicitandthatmaybeimportant.Foranotherthing,inparadigmcaseswherethethoughtthatA'scausingthe
thoughtthatBcountsastheagent'sinferringBfromA,theagentacceptsthepropositionifAthenBinwhateversenseheacceptsthepropositionAandB.6Thisis,
however,unlikelytobetrueinperceptualinference,especiallyifperceptionprovestobemodular.It'sgenerallyassumedthatmodularsystemsare"hardwired,"i.e.,
thattheprinciplesofinferenceaccordingtowhichtheyoperateare"inexplicit":notjustnotconscious,butalsonotmentallyrepresented.Ahardwiredsystemthat
'accepts'theprinciple'ifAthenB'maythusdosoonlyinthesensethatitisdisposedtoacceptBswhenitacceptsAs.Bycontrast,thesenseinwhichitacceptsthe
AsandBsthemselvesismuchstrongeritinvolvesthetokeningofrepresentationalstatesofwhichtheyaretheintentionalobjects.
Sotherearethese(andperhapsother)legitimaterespectsinwhichthecausalchainfromrepresentationsofproximalstimulitorepresentationsofdistallayoutsmay
differfromparadigmcasesofinferences.Whetherthismakesthesechainsnoninferentialdependsonwhetherthemissingpropertiesareamongthosethatareessential
toinference.And,forusRealists,thatdependsinturnonwhatinferencesreallyare,aquestionthatonlyadevelopedcognitivesciencecouldreasonablybeexpected
toanswer.Forpresentpurposes,Iproposetobegthesesortsofissues.AllIcareaboutisthattherearementalprocessesinwhichrepresentationsofproximalstimuli
causerepresentationsoflocaldistallayouts.Itreatitasastipulationthatperceptualinferenceismodularifforrather,totheextentthattheseprocessesare
executedbydedicatedandencapsulatedsystems.
WhyShouldPerceptualMechanismsBeDedicated?
Whyshouldperceptualinferencesbecarriedoutbyspecializedmechanisms?Or,toputitanotherway,whyshouldthemindtreattheproblemofinferringlocaldistal
layoutsfromproximalstimulationsasadifferentkindofcomputationaltaskthantheproblemoffiguring

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outthenextchessmovefromthecurrentboardstate,ortheproblemoffiguringoutyouraccountbalancefromyourcheckstubs,ortheproblemofdiagnosinga
diseasefromadisplayofitssymptoms?Forthatmatter,preciselywhichproximaltolocaldistalinferencesaresupposedtobeexecutedbydedicatedmechanisms?
Perhaps,onnoticingasuddenincreaseinthevolumeofthestreetnoise,Iinferthatsomeonehasopenedawindow.Surelythereisn'tamentalfacultythatisdedicated
todoingthat?
I'mgoingtoconsiderthesequestionsfirstastheyapplytothespecialcaseoflanguageperception.I'llthensayalittleabouthowthemoralsmightgeneralizetoother
perceptualcapacities.
Iassumethatlanguageperceptionisconstitutedbynondemonstrativeinferencesfromrepresentationsofcertaineffectsofthespeaker'sbehavior(soundsthathe
producesmarksthathemakes)torepresentationsofcertainofhisintentionalstates.Asaroughapproximation,I'llsaythatsuchinferencesrunfrompremisesthat
specifyacousticpropertiesofutterancetokenstoconclusionsthatspecifythespeaker'scommunicativeintentions.Aspeakermakesacertainnoise(e.g.,thesortof
noisethatgetsmadewhenyoupronouncethesentence"it'sgoingtoraintomorrow"),and,inconsequenceofhearingthenoise,oneissomehowabletoinfer
somethingaboutwhatthespeakerintendsthatoneshouldtakehimtobelieve(e.g.,thatheintendsthatoneshouldtakehimtobelievethatit'sgoingtoraintomorrow.)
Thequestionbeforeusis,whyshouldtherebededicatedmechanismsdevotedtotheexecutionofsuchinferences?
Ithinkthecrucialconsiderationisthatinferencesfromacousticpropertiesofutterancetokenstointentionalpropertiesofthespeaker'smentalstateunlikealmostall
oftherestofthementalprocessingthatmediatestheintentionalinterpretationofthebehaviorofone'sconspecificsarealgorithmic.Thatis,theyareeffectedby
employingamechanicalcomputationalprocedurethatisguaranteedtodeliveracanonicaldescriptionofaspeaker'smentalstategivenacanonicalrepresentationof
hisbehavior.7(Moreprecisely,you'reguaranteedacanonicaldescriptionofacommunicativeintentioninexchangeforacanonicaldescriptionoftheacoustic
propertiesofatokenofanyexpressioninthelanguagethatthespeakerandhearershare.)Ifthecomputationsthatmediatespeechperceptionareindeedspecialized
inthisway,thenfamiliarteleologicalargumentsforthecomputationaldivisionoflaborwouldfavorcognitivearchitecturesinwhichtheyareimplementedbydedicated
processors.8
Whetherthereisanalgorthmforinferringthementalstateofaspeakerfromtheacousticsofhisspeechclearlydependsonwhich

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acousticpropertiesarespecifiedinthepremisesandwhichintentionalpropertiesarespecifiedintheconclusion.Itmaybethatit'sthespeaker'sdesiretostartle
Grannythatcauseshimtospeaksoloudlybut,patently,thereisgoingtobenogeneralformofinferencethatwillconnectthatsortofacousticpropertyofan
utterancetothatsortofintentionalpropertyofamentalstate.Bycontrast,theremaybearoutineprocedurewherebysomeonewhohearsanutteranceoftheacoustic
form"it'sgoingtorain"caninferadescriptionofthespeakerasintendingtocommunicatehisbeliefthatit'sgoingtorain.Ifso,itwouldbenaturaltoviewtheabilityto
executethisprocedureaspartofknowingEnglish.9
Noticethat,inthisview,itisquitepossiblyamistaketoassumeasmanypsychologistsliketodothat"...thefunctionof[thelanguagecomprehension
mechanisms]istoprojectthespeechinputontoarepresentationoftheworldonto,forexample,amentalmodel...."(MarslenWilson&Tyler1987,p.58)No
doubt,whatthehearerwantsfromthespeakerinthelongrunisnewsabouttheworldnewsthathecanintegratewiththerestofwhatheknows.Butthewaythat
hecontrivestogetthenews,accordingtothepresentview,isbyfirsteffectingamoreorlessalgorithmicconstructionofacanonicalrepresentationofwhatthe
speakersaid.Andthepriceofthealgorithmicityofthisconstructionmaybepreciselyitsencapsulationfrominformationgarneredfromtheprecedingdialogueor,for
thatmatter,frominformationgarneredfromanysourcesotherthanthespeaker'sphoneticoutput.
Theidea,then,isthatspeechcommunicationexhibitsatradeoffinwhichthealgorithmicityofacomputationalprocedureispurchasedatthepriceofsevere
constraintsonthesortsofinferencesthatitcanmediate.Ontheonehand,therearepropertiesofthespeaker'sstateofmindthatcanbeinferredjustfromthenoises
thathemakesandthespeakerhasaguaranteethat(ceterisparibus)anyofhiscolingualswhohearthenoiseswillbeabletodrawtheinferences,justinvirtueof
theirbeinghiscolinguals.Thatspeakerscanrelyonthisisreallyquiteremarkable,consideringhowtrickyinferencesfrombehaviorstotheirmentalcausesareinthe
generalcase.Oneexpectsthemtogowrong,oftenenough,evenwiththespouseofone'sbosom.Oneexpectsthemtogowrongproportionatelymoreoftenwhere
thebackgroundofsharedexperienceisthinner.Whatisusuallyrequiredintheintentionalanalysisofbehaviorisakindofhermeneuticsophisticationthat'sasfaras
canbefromtheexecutionofaroteprocedure.Thenotableexceptionisinferringintentionalcontentfromutteranceform.ShowmeanEnglishspeakerwhoutters"it's
abouttorain"andI'llshowyouanEnglishspeakerwhois,in

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alllikelihood,thinkingabouttheweather.Thissortofinferenceisenormouslyreliableeventhoughitspremisesarestrikinglyexiguous.Allyouhavetoknowaboutan
Englishspeakeristhathemadeacertainsortofnoise,andtheintentionalinterpretationofhisbehaviorisimmediatelytransparent.
Ontheotherhand,onebuysthistransparencyataprice.Thereappearstobesomethinglikeaprocedurefromtheintentionalinterpretationofverbalbehaviorbutall
thatexecutingtheproceduregivesyouisaspecificationofthepropositionalobjectofacommunicativeintention.Theonlyintentionalinformationaboutaspeakerthat
hiscolingualsareipsofactoabletorecoverfromhisverbalbehavioristheliteralcontentofwhathesays.Foralltheothersortsofthingsthatyoumightwanttoknow
aboutthespeaker'sstateofmind("Whydidhesaythat?""Didhemeanit?""Whatdidhemeanbyit?"''Whydoeshebelieveit?""What'shetryingtogetawaywith?")
you'reonyourownhermeneuticsophisticationcomesintoplay,mediatedbyheavenknowswhatproblemsolvingheuristics.Thegoodnewsisthatasharedlanguage
approximatesaguaranteedchannelalongwhichaspeakermayindicatethecontentsofhisthoughtsthebadnewsisthatit'saverynarrowchannel.
Ifmuchofthisisright,it'sclearwhyyoumightexpectthemechanismsofspeechperceptiontobediscontinuousfromthemechanismsofcognitiveproblemsolvingat
large.Realproblemsolvinggenerallyhastwoparts:firstthere'sthebusinessoffiguringouthowtosolvetheproblem,andthenthere'sthebusinessofproceedingto
solveitthatway.10Butspeechperceptionhasonlyparttwoitconsistsentirelyofexecutinganalgorithimfortheintentionalanalysisofverbalbehavior.Onedoesn't
havetoinventtheprocedurebeforeoneappliesitbecauseonefinishesinventingitwhenonefinisheslearningthelanguage.Onedoesn'thavetoworryaboutwhether
toemploytheprocedure,becausespeechperceptionisn'tvoluntary.Andonedoesn'thavetoworryaboutwhattodoiftheprocedurefails,becauseitssuccessis
guaranteed(modulonotes7and9).Speechperceptionreallyisn'tthinkingit'sjustcomputing.Inferringcommunicativeintentionsfromverbalbehaviorisasolved
problem,sowhyshouldthemindtreatitasproblemsolving?11
It'sinstructivetocontrastthepresenttreatmentoflanguageperceptionwiththeapproachfavoredinFodor,Bever,andGarrett,1974.FB&Gareenthusiasticabout
theanalogybetweenperceptionandtheprocesswherebyadetectiveinferstheidentityofacriminalfromhisinformationabouttheclues.Theforceoftheanalogyis
thatbothkindsofmentationinvolvenondemonstrativeinferencesfromeffectstocausesthey'represumablybothspeciesofhypothesisformation

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andconfirmation.ButwhatFB&Gmissedandnowstrikesmeasimportantisthatthefirstsortofinferenceisplausiblyalgorithmicinawaythatthesecond
certainlyisn't.HolmeshastothinktofigureoutthatitwasMoriartywhodiditwhereasinperception,youdon'tthink,youjustopenyoureyesandlook.Forthe
perceiver,butnotforHolmes,thespaceofhypothesesthat'savailabletobeconfirmedisdeterminedapriori(it'sjustthesetofwellformedcanonicaldescriptionsof
distalobjects)and,giventhedataascanonicallydescribed,thechoiceofoneofthesehypothesesisapproximatelymechanical.It'swrongtosupposethatbecause
perceptionisphenomenologicallyinstantaneousitmustbenoninferentialbutit'sequallywrongtosupposethatifperceptionisinferential,thenitmustbe
computationallyjustlikethought.
We'vebeenseeingthattheteleologicalargumentforadedicatedspeechprocessordependsontheplausiblityoftheclaimthatspeechperceptionisalgorithmic.And
thatmightleadonetowonderaboutthegeneralityofthislineofargument.Afterall,ifthere'sanalgorithmfortheperceptualanalysisofutterances,that'spresumably
becausespeakersandhearersabidebythesameconventionsforcorrelatingformsofutterancewithmentalstates.Noneofthisapplies,however,tocomputingthe
correspondencebetweendistalarrangementsandproximalstimuliin,forexample,vision.Sowhyshouldonesupposeperceptualmechanismstobededicatedinthe
nonlinguisticcases?
But,infact,theconventionalityoflanguageisinessentialtothealgorithmicityofspeechperception.Whatreallymattersisthis:Foranyperceptuallyanalyzable
linguistictokenthereisacanonicaldescription(DT)suchthatforsomementalstatethereisacanonicaldescription(DM)suchthat'DTscauseDMs'is
trueandcounterfactualsupporting.(Fortokensof"it'sraining,"thereisacanonicaldescriptionviz.,"tokenof'it'sraining'"suchthat"tokensof'it'sraining'are
causedbyintentionstocommunicatethebeliefthatit'sraining"istrueandcounterfactualsupporting.)
Whichistosaythatspeechperceptioncanbealgorithmicbecausecertainoftheacousticpropertiesoflinguistictokensbearregularrelationstocertainintentional
propertiesoftheirmentalcauses.Ithappens,inthecaseoflanguage,thatthisrelationislargelysupportedbyconventions.Butitwouldworkjustaswellifitwere
supportedbynaturallaws.12AsIsupposethecorrespondingrelationoftenisinthecaseofothersortsofperceptualsystems.Forexample,certainaspectsofvisual
perceptualprocessingcanbealgorithmicbecause:Foranyperceptuallyanalyzablepatternofproximalexcitationoftheretina,thereisacanonical
description(RD)suchthatforsomedistal

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layoutofvisibleobjectsthereisacanonicaldescription(DL)suchthat'DLscauseRDs'isalaw(andhencetrueandcounterfactualsupporting).
Thus,therearelawsrelatingthetwodimensionalshapeandorientationofretinalimagestothethreedimensionalshapesandorientationsoftheirdistalcauses.
Because,insuchcases,therelationbetweenbeingRDandbeingcausedbyaDLisquiteregular,theprocedurethatinfersDLsfromRDscanbeapproximatelyfail
proof.AndbecausethereisaDLforeveryperceptuallyanalyzableRD,itcanbegeneral.If,moreover,thefunctionfromRDstoDLsismechanicallycomputable,
thenthelawfulrelationbetweendistallayoutsandproximalarraysopensthewaytoanalgorithmicsolutiontotheseaspectsofvisualperception.
Allofthismakesperceptionseemratherspecialamongthevarietiesofproblemsolvingthatcaneffectbelieffixation.Inperceptiononeisoftenguaranteeda
descriptionoftheproblemandadescriptionofitssolutionsuchthatgiventheformerthereisamechanicalprocedureforcomputingthelatter.Andaccesstothedata
forthiscomputationisitselfnomologicallyguaranteedforany(normal)organismthatbearstheappropriatepsychophysicalrelationtoadistalstimulus.Allyouhaveto
doisturnupthelightsandpointyoureyes,andalltheretinalinformationrequiredfor(e.g.)visualperceptionofthreedimensionalshapeisipsofactoavailable.For
auditoryperceptionyouhavetodostilllessallthat'srequiredis(whattheycallontheContinent)beingthere.
Needlesstosaythatnothinglikethisholdsforcognitiveproblemsolvingatlarge.Thinkingishard:Thereneedbenodescriptionofthetermsofaproblemfromwhich
a(nontrivial)specificationofitssolutionfollowsmechanically.And,evenifthereissuchadescription,thereneedbenoguaranteedprocedureforgettingaccesstoit.
Soperceptionbutnotthinkingcanoftenbecarriedoutby"canned"computationalprocedures.So,itwouldn'tbeverysurprisingifmanyperceptualmechanisms
werededicated.So,somuchforthat.
WhyShouldPerceptionBeEncapsulated?
Anunencapsulated(or"penetrable"seePylyshyn,1984)psychologicalmechanismisonethathasunconstrainedaccesstocognitivebackground.Thelimitof
perceptualpenetrabilityisreachedwheninformationthatisavailabletoanycognitivemechanismisipsofactoavailableasthepremiseofanyperceptualinference.
Thatperceptionactuallyapproximatesthislimithasbeenamaintenentofmostpostbehavioristcognitivescienceandofmostpostpositivistepistemol

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ogy.Thesupportforthisviewoftheperception/cognitionrelationderivespartlyfromempiricalevidence,butalsopartlyfromawidelyacceptedteleologicalargument
thatissupposedtoshowthatunencapsulatedperceptionmakesecologicalgoodsense.Let'snowconsiderthisargument.
ThelocusclassicusisBruner's"OnPerceptualReadiness"(1957),apsychologicalworksoinfluentialthatevenphilosophershaveheardofit.Here'sthekernelof
Bruner'steleologicalargumentforthecognitivepenetrationofperception:"Whereaccessibilityofcategoriesreflectsenvironmentalprobabilities,theorganismisinthe
positionofrequiringlessstimulusinput,lessredundancyofcuesfortheappropriatecategorizationofobjects."(p.19)Thatis,themoreperceptionexploitsthe
organism'sbackgroundofcognitivecommitments,thelessproximalinformationtheorganismrequirestoidentifyadistallayout.Penetrationbuysshallowprocessingof
proximalstimulishallowprocessingofproximalstimulibuysspeedofperceptualidentificationandspeedofperceptualidentificationisadesideratum.ThusBruneron
theteleologicalargumentforpenetratedperception.
Whetherthisargumentisanygood,however,dependsonacoupleofempiricalquestionsthatBrunerlargelyignoresand,unfortunately,answeringthesequestions
involvesquantativeestimatesthatnobodyisinapositiontomake.
Whatistherelativecomputationalcostsofprocessingtheproximalstimulusvsprocessingthebackgroundinformation?
It'sallverywelltoemphasize,asBrunerdoes,thatpenetrationallowsperceptualanalysistoproceedwith"fairlyminimal"proximalinformation.Butthisisvaluable
onlyifitachievesareductionofcomputationalloadoverallandwhetheritdoessodependsonhowmuchprocessingisrequiredtobringthecognitivebackground
tobear.
Thecostofcomputingthebackgrounddependsontwounknowns:
1.Thecostofachievingaccess.Backgroundinformationmustbelocatedbeforeitcanbeapplied.Dependingonthesearchmechanismsemployed,thisprocess
maybecomemorecostlyinproportionasthepotentiallyavailablebackgroundgetslarger.Ifitdoes,thenallelsebeingequalthepredictionisthatperceptiongets
slowerascognitivepenetrabilityincreases.
Thisconsequencemaybeavoidableontheassumptionthatcognitivebackgroundisaccessedby"massivelyparallel"memorysearches,asinassociativenetworks.
Butheretootheissuesareunclear.Innetworksystems,thecomputationalcostofaccessis

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reducedbecausethepossiblesearchpathsarefixedantecedently:theyaredeterminedbythecharacteroftheconnectivityamongthenodesinthenetwork,whichisin
turndeterminedbythestochasticpropertiesofthenetwork's"training."Insucharchitectures,memorysearchischeapbecauseit'squiteinsensitivetothedetailsofthe
perceptualtaskinhand.(Inparticular,youdon'tgettherecursiveloopsthataresocharacteristicofclassicaltopdownmodelsofperceptualprocessingacandidate
analysisoftheinputdeterminestheinitialdirectionofasearch,whichinturnmodifiestheanalysisoftheinput,whichinturnmodifiesthesubsequentdirectionof
search...untilsomesuccesscriterionisachieved.)Theconsequenceforallthenetworkmodelssofarproposed,atanyrateisthatalotofperceptual
preprocessingisrequiredtostartthemrunningTheyachievethecognitivepenetrationofperceptionbyassumingtheperceptualpenetrationofmemorysearch.
Nobodyknowswhetherthereissomeoptimalbalanceinwhichtherightkindofpreprocessorconjoinedwiththerightkindofnetworkmemoryproduces
computationalsavingsrelativetoencapsulatedperceptualsystems.Unlessthereis,Bruner'sspeedargumentforthepenetrationofperceptionlookstobeunreliable.
2.Thecostofcomputingconfirmationlevels.Whateverbackgroundinformationisaccessedmustbeappliedtotheanalysisofthecurrentproximaldisplay.Ifyou
insistonthecognitivepenetrationofperceptualinference,youhavetobearthecostofdetermininghowmuchconfirmationthebackgroundinformationthatyou
recoverbestowsonyourcurrentperceptualhypothesis.Theproblemisthatthemorebackgroundinformationyouaccess,themoresuchconfirmationrelationsyou
willhavetocompute.
Thisisratherdifferentfromtheworrythatthemorecognitivebackgroundyouhaveaccessto,themoreexpensiveitmaybetofindthepieceofinformationthatyou
want.Aswe'vejustseen,thewayoutofthatproblemmaybetofixthesearchpathsantecedentlyandthenexploretheminparallel.Butthatkindofsolutionis
implausiblefortheproblemofcomputingconfirmationrelations.Whatdegreeofconfirmationagivenpieceofbackgroundinformationbestowsonagivenperceptual
hypothesiscan'tbedecidedaheadoftimebecauseitdependsnotjustonwhattheinformationisandwhatthehypothesisis,butalsoonabundleoflocal
considerationsthatchangefrommomenttomoment.
"CouldtheyellowstripythingI'vejustglimpsedbeatiger?"
"ButthisisthemiddleofNewYork."

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"Yes,buttheBronxZooisinthemiddleofNewYork."
"Yes,butIcanseetheEmpireStateBuilding,andyoucan'tseetheEmpireStateBuildingfromtheBronxZoo."
"Yes,buttigerssometimesescapefromzoos."
"Yes,buttheTimeswouldhavementioneditifatigerhadescapedfromtheBronxZoo."
So,insomecircumstancesitcanmattertodecidingwhetherayellowstripythingisatigerthattheTimesreallydoestellallthenewsthat'sfittoprint.Inother
circumstancesifI'minBudapest,say,orifI'minayellowstripychairstoretheinductiverelevancesarequitedifferent.Themoralisthatit'sjustabout
inconceivablethatconfirmationrelationscouldbe"hardenedin"onceandforallinthewaythatthestructureofmemorysearchmightbe.Ourestimatesofwhat
confirmswhatchangeasfastasourchangingpictureoftheworld.
What,youmightreasonablyask,isthebearingofallthisonBruner'sargument?It'sthatif1and2arelargewithrespecttothecostofbottomupprocessingof
proximalstimuli,youmaygaintimebyencapsulation.Thiswas,infact,thelineItookinTheModularityofMind,whereIarguedthatsinceperceptionisclearly
specializedforthefixationofbeliefaboutlocaldistalobjects,andsinceit'sthelocaldistalobjectsthatoneeatsandgetseatenby,itisbiologicalgoodsensefor
perceptualsystemstobefast.AllthatagreeswithBruner.ButIthenmadethereverseassumptionfromhisabouttherelativecomputationalcostsofbottomup
proximalanalysisascomparedtotheexploitationofcognitivebackgroundItookitforgrantedthatmemorysearchesandcomputationsofconfirmationrelationscost
alot.IthusarrivedatateleologicalconclusionexactlyoppositetoBruner's:MOMsaysthatifyouwantspeed,makeperceptionasmuchlikeareflexaspossible.13
Thatis,makeitasencapsulatedasyoucan.Therealpoint,Isuppose,isthatneitherBruner'sargumentnormineisempiricallywarrantedinthecurrentstateofour
science.Howtheteleologygoesdependsonestimatingempiricaltradeoffsaboutwhich,infact,almostnothingisknown.
Whatistherelativepayoffforbeingfastwhenyou'rebackgroundassumptionsarerightvs.beingaccuratewhentheyarewrong?
I'vebeensayingthatBruner'steleologicalargumentforthecognitivepenetrationofperceptionignoresthecomputationtheoreticcostsoftopdownprocessing.The
nextpointisthatitalsoignoresthegametheoreticcostsofmisperception.

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Tobesure,Brunernoticesthat"themoreinappropriatethereadiness,thegreatertheinputorredundancyofcuesrequiredforappropriatecategorizationsto
occur."(p.20)I.e.,ifyouletyourexpectationsrunawaywithyourperceptions,thenyou'relikelytodoworsethananencapsulatedperceiverwhenyou're
expectationsarewrong(justasyou'relikelytodobetterthananencapsulatedperceiverwhenthey'reright).Whathedoesn'tnotice,however,istheconsequent
tradeoffbetweenspeedandaccuracy.Ceterisparibus,penetratedperceiversarerelativelyfastwhentheirbackgroundbeliefsaretruebutthey'rerelativelyinaccurate
whentheirbackgroundbeliefsarefalseceterisparibus,encapsulatedperceiversarerelativelyaccuratewhentheirbackgroundbeliefsarefalse,butthey'rerelatively
slowwhentheirbackgroundbeliefsaretrue.Assumingthatthechoiceisexclusive,whichsortofperceiverwouldyouprefertobe?14
Alas,it'ssimplynotpossibletoestimatewhichcognitivearchitectureisbetteroverallstilllesstoguesswhichonewouldhavebredmostorlivedlongestinthe
conditionsinwhichthebrainevolved.Sufficeitthatit'seasytoimaginecasesinwhichthecautiousviz.,encapsulatednervoussystemclearlywins.Considermy
beliefthatthereisn'tatigersalivatinginmywordprocessor.ThisisabeliefthatIcleavetofirmlyIhaven'tadoubtintheworldthatit'strue.DoIwantittobiasmy
perceptions?Well,whataretheprobablepayoffs?
IfI'mrightaboutthetigernotbeingthere,I'llgetcertaingainsfromcognitivepenetration:IfI'mlookingforatiger,Iwon'tstartbylookinginmywordprocessorand,
sincethereisn'tatigerinmywordprocessor,thiswillsavemetime.Similarly,ifI'mmuckingaroundinmywordprocessor,tryingtofigureoutwhat'sgonewrong
withit,Iwillnotentertainthehypothesisthatthebugisatigerandthattoowillsavemetime.Thesegainsarerealbuttheyaremodest.
OntheotherhandI'mwrongaboutwhetherthere'satigerinthewordprocessor,thenwhatIwantisformytigerperceptiontobeaccurateinspiteofmy
expectations.Infact,Iwantmytigerperceptionstocorrectmyexpectations,andIwantthisverymuch.Tiggersbounce,(asPoohremarked)andtheyalsobite(a
pointthatPoohfailedtostress).Forthissortofcase,givenan(exclusive)choicebetweenapenetratedperceptualsystemthatisfastwhenmybiasesarerightandan
encapsulatedperceptualsystemthatisaccuratewhenmybiasesarewrong,Ioptforencapsulation.
What'sthesituationwhenwhatIbelieveisthatthereisasalivatingtigerinthewordprocessor?Here,whetherI'mrightorwrong,neitherperceptualspeednor
perceptualaccuracybuysmemuch.

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That'sbecause,unlessoneisabsolutelybonkers,whatonedoesn'tdoifonebelievesthatthereisasalivatingtigerinone'swordprocessorislookandsee.Whatyou
doinsteadis,youtiptoeveryquietlyoutthedoor,whichyouthenlockbehindyou.Thenyourunlikestink.
Theupshotisthatinthepayoffmatrixifyou'reapossibleedible,thecellwherepenetrationmattersistheonewhereyouthinkthatthereisnoeateraroundand
you'rewrong.Andwhatyouwantinthatcellisencapsulation.Asyoumightexpect,thesituationisroughlysymmetrical,butwiththesignsreversed,ifyou'rethetiger.
Inthepayoffmatrixforpossibleeatersthecellthatmattersistheonewhereyouthinkthereisanediblearoundandyou'reright.Whatyouwanttobeifyou'rein
thatcellisfast,sincewhatyoudon'teatsomeoneelseislikelyto.
Asfortheremainingpossibilities:Perceptualaccuracyindisconfirmingthehypothesisthatthere'salocaledibledoesn'tbuyyoumuchyou'rejustashungryafteryou
lookasyouwerebefore.Howmuchmightperceptualaccuracybuyyouinthecasewhereyouthinktherearenoediblesonofferandyou'rewrong?Probablynot
muchbecauseprobablyasinthecasewhereyouwronglybelievethatthere'satigerinthewordprocessorthemorefirmlyyouholdthebelief,themoreyoudon't
bothertolook.
Somuchforthepayoffmatrix.There'sacasewhereitisverydesirabletobefastifyou'rerightevenatthecostofnotbeingaccurateifyou'rewrong(i.e.,you'dwant
yourperceptiontobepenetrated)andthere'sacasewhereitisverydesirabletobeaccurateifyou'rewrongevenatthecostofnotbeingfastifyou'reright(i.e.,
you'dwantyourperceptiontobeencapsulated.)WhetherBrunerhasateleologicalargumentforpenetrationdependsprimarilyontherelativepayoffsassociatedwith
thesetwoconditions.Thetroubleisthatwhatthesepayoffsareisnotanaprioriissueitdependsentirelyonhowtheworldisarranged.AndneitherInorBrunerisin
apositiontoestimatetherelevantfacts.Perhapstheonlywaytotellwhicharchitectureisworthmoreistoarguetheotherway'round:inferthecostbenefitsbyfinding
outwhicharchitectureselectionactuallyendorsed.
Itlookslikethestandarddesignargumentsforpenetratedperceptionaren'tactuallyveryconvincingIproposepresentlytosailoffonadifferenttack.First,however,
adigression:Someepistemologistshaveexhibitedgreatenthusiasmfortheperceptualpenetrationofobservationinscience,andthisappearspeculiarinlightofthe
previousdiscussion.HereisPaulChurchland,(1988)forexample,feelingquiterhapsodicaboutperceptualbias:

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...eventhehumblestjudgement...isalwaysaspeculativeleap....Inthecaseofperceptualjudgements,whatthesensesdoiscausetheperceivertoactivatesomespecific
representationfromthe...conceptualframework...thathasbeenbroughttotheperceptualsituationbytheperceiver.Aperceptualjudgement,therefore,canbenobetter,
thoughitcanbeworse,thanthebroadsystemofrepresentationsinwhichitisconstituted....Thejourneyofthehumanspiritisessentiallythestoryofourevolvingconception
oftheworld....Thehumanspiritwillcontinueitsbreathtakingadventureofselfreconstruction,anditsperceptualandmotorcapabilitieswillcontinuetodevelopasanintegral
partofitsselfreconstruction....

Well,ifsothensobeit.ButonewondersjustwhatitisthatChurchlandthinksperceptualbiasbuysforthescientist.We'veseenthatthestandard(Bruner)argument
forpenetrationcomesdowntoanassumptionabouttherelativepayoffsinspeed/accuracytrades.Andwe'veseenthatit'sperfectlyconceivablethatselectionmay
havefavoredspeedintheconditionsunderwhichthenervoussystemevolved(justasit'sperfectlyconceivablethatitmayhavefavoredaccuracy).Butsurelythereis
noquestionaboutwhichtochooseinthecircumstancesthatobtaininscientificinvestigationssurelywhatonewantsthereisobservationalaccuracyevenifaccuracy
takesalotoftime.15Andwhatyouparticularlywantisthatyourobservationsshouldbeaccuratewhenyourtheoriesarewrong,becausethenyourobservations
cancorrectyourtheories.Butif,inscience,thesmartmoneyisonobservationalaccuracy,thenit'sanencapsulatedperceptualpsychologythatascientistshould
wanttohave.There'snopointtryingtobuildbiasoutofscientificinstrumentsifit'sbuiltintotheguywhoreadsthem.16
Theupshotseemstobethatnaturemayhaveequippeduswithcognitivelypenetratedperceptualsystemsbutifshedid,thereisnothinginthattogladdentheheartof
anepistemologist.Onthecontrary,ifwehaveanunencapsulatedperceptualarchitecture,that'sjustanotherrespectinwhichwearenotaspeciesideallyendowedfor
thescientificenterprise.
EncapsulationandObjectivity
Weseemnottobegettinganywhereafterallthetalkaboutcostaccounting,we'restillinwantofaplausibleteleologicalargumentfor(oragainst)encapsulated
perception.Let's,however,makeonelasttry.

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Earlyoninthisdiscussion,IendorsedwhatIcalleda'decisiontheoretic'accountoftheetiologyofbehavior,accordingtowhichbehavioriscausedbytheinteraction
ofbeliefsandutilities.Iremarkedthatthisdecisiontheoreticpictureistobedistinguishedfromtheviewthatthemodelfortheetiologyofbehavioristhereflex.Onthe
reflexstory,anorganism'sbehavioralrepertoireismadeupofperceptionactionpairs.Onthedecisiontheoreticstory,bycontrast,thereisnothingspecialaboutthe
relationbetweenperceptionandactionperceptionaffectsbehaviorinmuchthesamewaythatothercognitiveprocesses(e.g.,thinking)doviz.,viathefixationof
belief.(Theonlydifferenceisthatperceptiontypicallygivesrisetobeliefsaboutrelativelylocaldistallayouts,sogivenreasonableutilitiesthedemandsthat
perceptualbeliefsmakeonactionarelikelytoprovepressing.AsIobservedabove,it'sthelocaldistallayoutsthatoneeatsandgetseatenby.)
Now,thisdifferencebetweenwaysofunderstandingtheperceptionactionrelationimpliescorrespondingdifferencesinthewayoneunderstandsthefunctionof
perception,andthusaffectsthestatusofteleologicalargumentsfromfunctiontodesign.Presumably,anorganismthatisbuilttoactonitsbeliefswilldobest,on
balance,ifthebeliefsthatitactsonaretrue.Ifthisisso,thenagoodwaytoilluminatetheteleologyofcognitivemechanismsmightbetoconsiderwhatdesign
constraintsthequestfortruebeliefsimposesontheprocessofbelieffixation.Thearchitecturalorganizationofperceptionmightthenbeunderstoodbyreferencetoits
contributiontothetruthseekingprocess.
What,then,shouldthedesignofperceptionbeifourperceptualinferencesaregenerallytoleadusfromtruepremisestotrueconclusions?Thiswayofframingthe
questionsuggestsanapproachtoteleologicalargumentsinwhichnormativeepistemologyprovidesdesignhypothesesfortheoriesofcognitivearchitecture.Youtell
mesomethingaboutwhatgoodnondemonstrativeinferenceislikeandI'lltellyousomethingaboutwhatthecomputationalstructureofcognitionoughttobe,assuming
thatthefunctionofcognitionisthefixationoftruebeliefs.
Thetroublewiththisresearchstrategyinpracticeisthatverylittleisknownaboutgoodnondemonstrativeinferences.Still,therearesomeconsiderationsonwhich
practicallyeverybodyseemstobeagreed,andIthinkthesemaybearontheteleologicaljustificationofperceptualencapsulation.SoIproposefirsttoenunciateafew
epistemologicaltruismsandthentoseewhatsupporttheymayofferfortheviewthatperceptionismodular.

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Firsttruism:Agoodempiricalinferenceissubjecttoatleasttwoconstraints:observationaladequacyandconservatism.Ononethehand,onewantsthe
hypothesesoneacceptstobecompatiblewithasmuchofone'sdataaspossibleand,ontheotherhand,onewantsacceptingthehypothesistodotheleastpossible
damagetoone'spriorcognitivecommitments.
Secondtruism:Observationaladequacyandconservatismareindependentconstraintsonnondemonstrativeinference.Thereisnoguaranteethatthehypothesisthat
fitsmostofthedatawillbemaximallyconservativeor,conversely,thatthemaximallyconservativehypothesiswillbetheonethatfitsmostofthedata.It'stoobadthat
thisissoifthemostconservativetheorywerealwaysbestconfirmed,we'dneverhavethenuisanceofhavingtochangeourminds.
Thirdtruism:Wehaverepeatedlyremarkeduponthespecialrolethatperceptionplaysinthefixationofbeliefsaboutthespatiotemporallylocalenvironment.But,it
isn't,ofcourse,theconcernwithlocalitypersethatdistinguishesperceptionfromotherprocessesofbelieffixationsomeofyourbeliefsaboutstarsareperceptualand
mostofyourbeliefsaboutyourappendixarenot,thougheventhefarthestappendixesareappreciablylocalerthaneventheneareststars.Theessentialdifference
betweenperceptionandothermodesofcognitionisthatperceptionprovidesthedatafortheinferencesbywhichweconstructourtheoriesoftheworldperception
isouronlysourceofunderived,contingentpremisesforsuchinferences.Ifitisn'tatruthoflogic,andifitdoesn'tsomehowfollowfromwhatyoualreadyknow,then
eitherperceptiontellsyouaboutitoryoudon'tfindout.IfthisbeEmpiricism,makethemostofit.
Somuchforepistemologicaltruisms.Nowlet'sputthisalltogether.We'vegotsofarthatthedataforourempiricalhypothesestheunderivedcontingentpremisesof
ournondemonstrativeinferencesaremostlyinformationaboutthelayoutofspatiotemporallylocaldistalstimuliandthesedataaresuppliedlargelyorentirelyby
perception.Anditisaconstraintonrationalbelieffixationthatthehypothesesthatweselectshouldbeascompatiblewiththesedataasmaybe,consonantwitha
simultaneousandindependentrequirementtomaximizeconservatism.Thefollowingdesignquestionthusarises:Accordingtowhatarchitectureshouldoneconstructa
primatenervoussystemconsidered,now,asamachinefordrawingsound,nondemonstrativeinferencesifoneisconcernedthatempiricalhypothesesshouldbe
simultaneouslyandindependentlyconstrainedbyobservationaladequacyandconservatism?Thereare,nodoubt,

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lotsofpossibleanswerstothisquestionyouwillrememberthatIcomplainedintheopeningparagraphthatteleologicalargumentshavetheformofaffirmationsofthe
consequent.Still,forwhatit'sworth,onesortofarchitecturalschemethatwouldworkwouldbetomodularizeperception.
Roughly,theideawouldbetomaketwoestimatesoflevelsofempiricalconfirmationinthecourseofhypothesisselection:First,decidewhichhypothesisyouwould
acceptgivenjustthecurrentevidenceaboutthelayoutoflocaldistalobjectsthendecidewhathypothesisyouwouldacceptgiventhisevidenceplussolicitudefor
cognitivecommitmentspreviouslyundertaken.Thisprocedurewouldhavethedesirableconsequenceofensuringthatbothobservationaladequacyandconservatism
havetheirvoicesheardinthecourseofbelieffixation.Suchatwostepapproachtohypothesisselectionwouldbesupportedbyanarchitectureinwhichperceptual
estimatesofthelocalproximallayoutareencapsulated,sinceencapsulatedperceptionjustisperceptionthat'sminimallyvarnishedbyconservatism.Conversely,the
morecognitivelypenetratedperceptionis,thelessithonorstheinjunctionthatrationalconfirmationshouldreconcileestimatesofobservationaladequacyand
conservatismthatareindependentlyarrivedat.
Sothere'sateleologicalargumentformodularityfromplausibleepistemologicalpremisesforwhateverteleologicalargumentsmaybeworth.Itbearsemphasizing
thatthisargumentmightholdevenifthecostaccountingargumentsdon't.Ifthefunctionofperceptionisitsroleinthefixationoftruebeliefs,thenwewouldhave
epistemologicalreasonsforwantingperceptiontobeencapsulatedevenifencapsulatedperceptionisslowandexpensive.
SummaryandConclusion
InpsychologyundertheBruner/NewLookinfluenceteleologicalargumentsaboutthedesignofperceptualmechanismshavegenerallyassumedthatthefunctionof
perceptionistoguidebehavior.Wehaveseenthatsuchargumentsarelargelyequivocalwhetherpenetratedorencapsulatedsystemswouldguidebehaviormost
efficientlydependsonempiricalestimatesthatnobodyknowshowtomake.
Butwhyshouldwepreferthereflexologicalideathatthefunctionofperceptionistomodulateactiontothedecisiontheoreticideathatthefunctionofperceptionisthe
fixationofbelief?Oneneeds,atthispoint,toresistthesirensongofPopDarwinism.Nodoubtthecognitivearchitecturesthatsurvivearetheonesthatbelongtothe

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organismsthatcontrivetogenerateecologicallyvalidbehaviors.Nodoubtthecomputationalstructureofourperceptualmechanismwasshapedbyselection
processesthatfavorbehavioraladaptivity.Itwouldbeperfectlynaturaltoinferthatthefunctionwhichperceptualsystemsaredesignedtoperformthefunctionfor
whichperceptualsystemsareselectedisthereforetheproductionofthisselfsameadaptivebehavior.Perfectlynatural,bututterlymisled.
Theinferenceinvolvesasortofdistributivefallacy.Toseejusthowutterlymisleditis,consider,'Selectionpressuresfavorreproductivesuccessthedesignofthe
heartwasshapedbyselectionpressuressothefunctionoftheheartistomediatereproductivesuccesses'.Parallelargumentswouldshowthatthefunctionofall
organsistomediatereproductivesuccesshencethatallorganshavethesamefunction.
Poppycock!Thefunctionoftheheartthefunctionthatitsdesignreflectsistocirculatetheblood.Thereisnoparadoxinthis,andnothingtoaffrontDarwinian
scruples.Animalsthathavegoodheartsareselectedfortheirreproductivesuccessascomparedtoanimalsthathavelessgoodheartsornoheartsatall.Buttheir
reproductivesuccessisproducedbyadivisionofbiologicallaboramongtheirorgans,andit'sthefunctionoftheheartrelativetothisdivisionoflaborviz.its
functionasapumpthatteleologicallydeterminesitsdesign.
Analogouslyinthepresentcase.It'sentirelypossiblethatthekindofmentalarchitecturethatmaximizesbehavioraladaptivityisonethatinstitutesacomputational
divisionoflabor:Aperceptualmechanismthatisspecializedtoreportonhowtheworldisprovidesinputtoadecisionmechanismthatisspecializedtofigureouthow
togetwhatyouwantinaworldthatisthatway.IfthisisindeedthemeansthatNatureusestomaximizetheecologicalvalidityofthebehaviorofhigherprimates,then
thefunctionthatdeterminesthedesignofperceptualmechanismsistheirroleinfindingouthowtheworldis.Specifically,whatdeterminestheirdesignistheirfunction
inprovidingcontingentpremisesfornondemonstrativeinferencestotrueempiricalconclusions.
Compare(andcontrast)somerecentcommentsbyPatriciaChurchland(1987):''Thereisafataltendencytothinkofthebrainasessentiallyinthefactfinding
business....Lookedatfromanevolutionarypointofview,theprinciplefunctionofnervoussystemsistoenabletheorganismtomoveappropriately....The
principlechoreofnervoussystemistogetthebodypartswheretheyshouldbeinorderthattheorganismmaysurvive....Truth,whateverthatis,definitelytakesthe
hindmost"(pp.548549).Itlooksasthough

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Churchlandisarguing,'Organismsgetselectedforgettingtheirbodiestobewheretheyshouldbeonlynervoussystemsthatbelongtoorganismsthatgetselected
survivesothefunctionofnervoussystemsthefunctioninvirtueofwhichtheirdesignisteleologicallyintelligibleisnot"factfinding"butgettingthebodiesof
organismstowheretheyshouldbe'.Butaswe'vejustbeenseeing,thatisadistributivefallacy,hencenotagoodwaytoargueitoverlooksthepossibilitythatnervous
systemsgetorganismstowheretheyshouldbebyfactfindingandactinguponthefactsthattheyfind.
Alternatively,itmaybethatChurchlandiscommittingaversionofthegeneticfallacyagainstwhichGouldandLewontinhaverecentlywarnedus:"[Therearecases
whereonefinds]adaptationandselection,buttheadaptationisasecondaryutilizationofpartspresentforreasonsofarchitecture,development,orhistory....If
blushingturnsouttobeanadaptationaffectedbysexualselectioninhumans,itwillnothelpustounderstandwhybloodisred.Theimmediateutilityofanorganic
structureoftensaysnothingatallaboutthe[original]reasonforitsbeing"(1979,p.159).Ifthisistrue,itfollowsthatthecurrentfunctionofanorgancannotbe
securelyinferredfromthefunctioninvirtueofwhichitspossessioninitiallybestowedselectionaladvantage.Apparentlytheoriginaluseoffeatheredwingswasnot
flightbutthermalinsulation.Correspondingly,itmaybethattheoriginaluseofnervoussystemswastheintegrationofmovements.Nothingwouldfollowaboutwhat
theyareusedfornow.
Itis,inshort,unclearjustwhatabout"anevolutionarypointofview"rulesoutthehypothesisthatthewaythatnervoussystemsaffecttheecologicallyappropriate
dispositionofthebodypartsof(anyhow,higher)organismsisbymediatingthefixationoflargelytruebeliefsandtheintegrationoflargelyrationalactions.Thinking
specifically,thinkingtruethoughtsisarguablythebestwaytoachieveadaptivitythatevolutionhasthusfardevised.
Onthisstory,thebiologicaldemandsonperceptionareexactlyanalogoustotheepistemologicaldemandsonscientificobservation:Inbothcases,what'swantedis
proceduresthatyieldaccuratedataaboutlocaldistallayouts.Correspondingly,thedemandsthatcognitionplacesonperceptionfavorencapsulationforthesame
reasonthatrationalscientificpracticefavorsunbiasedobservation.Inbothcases,thegoaloftheexerciseistodrawgoodinductiveinferencesandgoodinductive
inferencesrequireindependentestimatesofconservatismandobservationaladequacy.Thebottomlineisthatunliketheteleologicalargumentsfromcost
accountingteleologicalargumentsfromepistemologyarereasonablyunivocalontheques

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tionofmodularity.Theysuggestthatperceptionoughttobeencapsulated.
Ontheotherhand,howmanythingshaveyouheardofrecentlythatarethewaytheyoughttobe?
Notes
1.Forarecentattempttounderstandcognitionintermsofitsphylogeneticconnectionstosensormotorreflexes,seeLinas,1987.
2.Iassumethatit'sapsychologicallawthat,allelsebeingequal,organismsthatbelievePQandPbelieveQ.Theceterisparibusclauseconstrainsboththe
characterofthebeliefs(e.g.,theircomplexity)andthevaluesof'performance'variables(e.g.,motivation,attention,availablememory,etc.).
3.Idon'twanttoarguetheverycomplicatedquestionwhetherthestatesofsensorymechanismsshouldcountasrepresentingaswellasmerelyregisteringtheir
proximalcauses(inthewaythatperceptualstatessurelydocountasrepresentingtheirdistalcauses).Idon'tforthelifeofmeseewhytheyshouldn't,and,givena
goodtheoryofrepresentation,itmayturnoutthattheoptionsareforced.Forexample,theoriesthatconstruerepresentationintermsofcausalcovariancewould
surelyimplythatstatesoftheretinarepresentthepropertiesofincidentlightbywhichtheyarelawfullydeterminedthatstatesofthetympanicmembranerepresentthe
spectrographicpropertiesofacousticproximalstimuli,etc.(See,forexample,Dretske,1981,Stampe,1977,Fodor,1987.)Buttheissuesaboutmodularityare
presumablyindependentoftheissuesaboutrepresentation,soIproposetobegthelatterinwhatfollows.
4.WhatI'mcallingthepovertyofthestimulusargumentisn'ttheonethatChomskyusesthattermfor,thoughthetwoargumentsarestructurallysimilar.Chomsky's
povertyofthestimulusargumentinfersthetopdownnessoflanguagelearningfromitsunderdeterminationbydata(specificallyfromtheunderdeterminationofthe
child'sgrammarbyhiscorpus)analogously,thepresentargumentinfersthetopdownnessofperceptionfromitsunderdeterminationbysensation.Bothsortsof
underdeterminationraisethequestionwheretheaddedinformationcomesfrom.Intheperceptualcase,theobviouscandidateistheperceiver'scognitivebackground
inthelearningcase,theobviouscandidateisthechild'sinnatecognitivecommitments.SoChomskyarguesfromunderdeterminationtoinnatenesshedoesn't,
however,offerunderdeterminationasanargumentthatlearningisaspeciesofinference.Hejusttakesthatforgranted.
5.Orobjectspartsofwhichareatsomespatialremovefromtheorganism.Itouchpartofitssurfaceandtherebyacquirethebeliefthatthere'satableinthe
landscape.
6.Thisisdifferentfromsayingthat,insuchcases,thethoughtthatifAthenBmustmediatethecausalrelationbetweenthethoughtthatAandthethoughtthatB.Any
suchrequirementwouldleadtothewellknownLewisCarrollregress.
7.Sincetheinferenceisnondemonstrative,thereisnopromisethatthecanonicaldescriptionofthespeaker'scommunicativeintentionthatitdeliverswillactuallybe
trueofhim.It'sanotherquestionwhetheryou'reguaranteedthatitwillbetrueofhimifheisobeyingthelinguisticconventions.Theanswertothisquestion
depends,ofcourse,onwhatlinguisticconventionsare.I'minclinedtothinkthattheyaresomethinglikepairingsofacoustictypeswithmentalstatetypestheyspecify
theacousticpropertiesofthenoiseyoushouldmakeiffyouintendtocommunicate

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thebeliefthatP.Ifthat'sright,thentheinferencefromtheacousticalpropertiesoftheutterancetotheintentionalstateofthespeakerisapodictic(subjecttoambiguity,
ofcourse)whenheobservestheconventions.
8.Forexample,theelementaryoperationscanoftenbelargerinadedicatedprocessorthaninageneralpurposeone,therebyeliminatingredundantcomputations.
Sinceyoualwayswearsockstwoatatime,itmakessensetobuyandselltheminpairs.(Comparemixandmatch.)
9.Chomsky(1986,p.14)deniesthealgorithmiccharacterofspeechperceptiononthegroundsthatthereare"gardenpath"sentenceswhichspeakersregularly
misparse"thehorseracedpastthebarnfell"istheclassicexample.Idoubt,however,thatsuchcasesshowthenonmechanicalcharacterofspeechperception.
Rather,theysuggestthattheclassofstructuresthatperceptualalgorithmsrecoverfails(slightly)tocorrespondtotheclassofwellformedsentencesthereisadegree
ofmismatchbetweenwhatonecanparseandwhatthegrammarofthelanguagegenerates.Phenomonological(tosaynothingofchronometric)considerationsmakeit
plausiblethat,whenheencountersagardenpathsentence,thehearergoesoverintoaproblemsolvingmodeofprocessingthatisquitedifferentfromtheusual
smoothfunctioningofperceptualparsing.
10.Isupposethiscorresponds,roughly,tothedistinctionbetweenthe'declarative'andthe'procedural'stageinproblemsolving(seeAnderson,1983,ch.6)or,ina
slightlyolderidiom,tothedifferencebetweenformulatingaplanandexecutingit(seeMiller,Galanter,andPribrum,1960).I'mnot,however,convincedthatthe
psychologicaltheorizinginthisareahasgottenmuchbeyondGranny'scommonsenseintuitions.Untilitdoes,IproposetocontinuetotalkinGranny'sterms.
11.Intheserespectsspeechperceptionresemblesotheroverlearnedandroutinizedcognitiveskills.Forexample,insolvingphysicsproblems,"...novicesusepainful
meansendanalyses,workingwithequationstheyhopearerelevanttotheproblem.Incontrast,expertsapplycorrectequationsinaforwarddirection,indicatingthat
theyhaveplannedthewholesolutionbeforetheybegin....Theschemataintermsofwhichexpertsorganizetheirknowledge...enablethemtograspthestructureof
problemsinawaythatnovicescannot."(Carey,1985,p.3,summarizingLarkin,1983).Thisisnot,however,tosaythatthemechanicalcharacterofspeech
perceptionisplausiblyaneffectofoverlearning.Sofarasanybodyknows,theontogenesisofspeechperceptionexhibitsnothingcomparabletothe'novice/expert'
shift.Intheexerciseoftheirlinguisticcompetences,childrenarenevernovicesallnormalchildrenbehavelikeexpertusersofthecharacteristicdialectoftheir
developmentalstage.Thus,afouryearold'sprattlingisnothinglikeaneophyte'shesitantgrapplingwithahardcomputationaltask.Analogousobservationswould
appeartoholdfortheontogenesisofotherperceptualcapacitieslike,forexample,thevisualdetectionofthreedimensionaldepth.
12.Infact,eveninthelinguisticcaseit'sonlyroughlytruethattheconnectionbetweenthepsychophysicalpropertiesofutterancesandtheintentionalpropertiesof
theirmentalcausesisconventional.Partoftheperceptualproblemindecodingspeechistoinferthespeaker'sphoneticintentionsfromarepresentationofthe
spectrographicstructureofhisutterance.Suchinferencesarereliablebecausephoneticintentionshaveregularacousticconsequences.Buttheregularitythatconnects
phoneticintentionstotypesofsoundsisnotaconventionbutalaw.Thespeakerrealizessuchintentionsbyactivatinghisvocaltract,andtheacousticconsequencesof
hisdoingsoaredeterminedbythephysicalstructureofthatorgan.

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13.Moreexactly,Iarguedthatperceptionshouldexploitonlysuchbackgroundasdedicatedmechanismsrequireforalgorithmiccomputationsofverygeneral
propertiesofproximaldistalrelationsseetheprecedingdiscussion.
14.Atonepoint,Brunerremarksthat"...themostappropriatepatternofreadinessatanygivenmomentwouldbethatonewhichwouldlead,ontheaverage,tothe
mostveridicalguessaboutthenatureoftheworldaroundoneatthemoment....Anditfollowsfromthisthatthemostreadyperceiverwouldthenhavethebest
chancesofestimatingsituationsmostadequatelyandplanningaccordingly.Itisinthisgeneralsensethatthereadyperceiverwhocanproceedwithfairlyminimalinputs
isalsoinapositiontousehiscognitivereadinessnotonlyforperceivingwhatisbeforehimbutinforeseeingwhatislikelytobebeforehim."(p.15).Buthavingthe
mostveridicalguessonaveragedoesn't,infact,entail"havingthebestchancesofestimatingsituationsmostadequatelyandplanningaccordingly"unlessyou're
indifferentabouthowyourrightandwrongguessesaredistributed.Mostpeoplewouldbepreparedtotradelotsofwrongguessesabouttheweatherforjustafew
rightonesaboutthestockmarket.
15.Noticehowmuchaccuracyiswhatwewantevenifaccuracycostsalotofmoneynoticehowmuchweareoftenpreparedtopayforsensitiveinstrumentsof
scientificobservation.
16.ThatacertaindegreeoftheoreticalbiasisunavoidableinobservationalinstrumentsisperhapsamoralofDuhemianphilosophyofscience(justasitisperhapsa
moralofKantianphilosophyofmindthatacertainamountoftheoreticalbiasisunavoidableinperception).Butanaprioriargumentthattheremustbepenetrationis
quiteadifferentthingfromateleologicalargumentthatthereoughttobe.And,ofcourse,it'scompatiblewithbothDuhemandKantthatobservation,though
inevitablybiasedinsomerespects,shouldbeneutralwithrespecttoindefinitelymanyhypothesesthatscientistsinvestigate.

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Chapter10
ObservationReconsidered
GrannyandIthinkthatthingshavegonetoofar,whatwithrelativism,idealism,andpragmatismatHarvard,graffitiinthesubwaystations,andLordknowswhatall
next.GrannyandIhavedecidedtoputourfeetdownanddigourheelsin.Grannyisparticularlyarousedaboutpeopleplayingfastandloosewiththeobservation/
inferencedistinction,andwhenGrannyisaroused,sheisterrible."Wemaynothaveprayersinthepublicschools,"Grannysays,"butbyGd,wewillhavea
distinctionbetweenobservationandinference."
Theobservation/inferencedistinctionaccordingtoGranny:
"Thereare",Grannysays,"twoquitedifferentroutestothefixationofbelief.Thereis,ontheonehand,belieffixationdirectlyconsequentupontheactivationofthe
senses(belieffixation"byobservation,"asIshallsayforshort)andthereisbelieffixationviainferencefrombeliefspreviouslyheld("theoretical"inference,asIshall
sayforshort).Thistaxonomyofthemeansofbelieffixationimplies,moreover,acorrespondingtaxonomyofbeliefs.For,thecharacterofanorganism'ssensory
apparatusand,moregenerally,thecharacterofitsperceptualpsychologymaydeterminethatcertainbeliefs,ifacquiredatall,mustbeinferentialandcannotbe
attainedbyobservation.Itis,forexample,anaccident(ofourgeography)thatourbeliefsaboutMartianfaunaarenonobservationallyacquired.Bycontrast,itisnot
anaccidentthatourbeliefsaboutthedoingsofelectromagneticenergyintheextremeultravioletareallinferential.IfthereareMartianfauna,thenwereweclose
enough,wecouldobservesome(unlessMartiansareverysmall).Butmakingobservationsintheextremeultravioletwouldrequirealterationofour
sensory/perceptualmechanismsbeliefsabouttheextremeultravioletmust,forus,allbeinferential.
"Somebeliefsarethusnonobservationalinthenatureofthings.(Toafirstapproximation,nobeliefsarenoninferentialinthenatureofthingsanybeliefcouldbefixed
byinferenceexcepting,maybe,

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trickyonesofthe'Iexist'variety.)Moreover,beliefsthatarefixedbyobservationplayaninterestingandcentralroleintheacquisitionofknowledge.(Not,perhaps,
sointerestingandcentralasphilosophershavesometimessupposed,butstill....)Foronething,observationallyfixedbeliefstend,byandlarge,tobemorereliable
thaninferentiallyfixedbeliefs.ThisisprimarilybecausetheetiologicalroutefromthefactthatPtothebeliefthatPismetaphoricallyandmaybeliterallyshorterin
observationthanininferencelessislikelytogowrongbecausethere'slessthatcangowrong.And,becausebeliefsthatarefixedbyobservationtendtoberelatively
reliable,ourrationalconfidenceinourknowledgeclaimsdependsverylargelyontheirabilitytosurviveobservationalassessment.
"Second,theobservationalfixationofbeliefplaysaspecialroleintheadjudicationandresolutionofclashesofopinion.Whenobservationisnotappealedto,attempts
tosettledisputesoftentaketheformofasearchforpremisesthatthedisputantsshare.Thereis,ingeneral,nopointtomyconvincingyouthatbeliefBisderivable
fromtheoryTunlessTisatheoryyouendorseotherwise,myargumentwillseemtoyoumerelyareductioofitspremises.Thisisapeculiarlynastypropertyof
inferentialbelieffixationbecauseitmeansthatthemorewedisagreeabout,theharderitwilllikelybetosettleanyofourdisagreements.Noneofthisapplies,
however,whenthebeliefsatissueareobservational.Sinceobservationisnotaprocessinwhichnewbeliefsareinferredfromoldones,theuseofobservationto
resolvedisputesdoesnotdependonapriorconsensusastowhatpremisesmaybeassumed.Themoral,children,isapproximatelyBaconian.Don'tthinklook.Try
nottoargue."
AlsosprachGranny.Recentopinion,however,hastendedtoignorethesehomelytruths.Inthispaper,Iwanttoclaimthatwidelyendorsedargumentsagainstthe
possibilityofdrawingaprincipledobservation/theorydistinctionhave,infact,beenoversold.ThisdoesnotamountquitetoGranny'svindication,sinceIwillnot
attempttosayinanydetailwhatrolethenotionofobservationalbelieffixationmightcometoplayinareasonablynaturalizedepistemology.Sufficeit,forpresent
purposes,tohaveclearedthewayforsuchareconstruction.
Theclaim,then,isthatthereisaclassofbeliefsthataretypicallyfixedbysensory/perceptualprocesses,andthatthefixationofbeliefsinthisclassis,inasensethat
wantsspellingout,importantlytheoryneutral.Asafirstshotatwhatthetheoryneutralityofobservationcomesto:giventhesamestimulations,twoorganismswiththe
samesensory/perceptualpsychologywillquitegenerallyobservethesamethings,andhencearriveatthesameobservationalbeliefs,however

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muchtheirtheoreticalcommitmentsmaydiffer.Thiswillgetsomeprettycomprehensiverefinementaswegoalong,butit'sgoodenoughtostartfrom.
Thereare,asfarasIknow,threesortsofargumentsthathavebeenallegedtoshowthatnoseriousobservation/inferencedistinctioncanbedrawn.1Theseare:
ordinarylanguagearguments,meaningholismarguments,anddefactopsychologicalarguments.Iproposetoconcentrate,inwhatfollows,mostlyonargumentsofthe
thirdkindIthinkthatrecentchangesintheway(some)psychologistsviewsensory/perceptualprocesseshavesignificantimplicationsforthepresentphilosophical
issues.Butit'sworthafastrunthroughtoseewhythefirsttwosortsofargumentsarealso,toputitmildly,lessthandecisive.
TheOrdinaryLanguageArgument
Themaincontentionofthischapteristhatthereisatheoryneutralobservation/inferencedistinctionthattheboundarybetweenwhatcanbeobservedandwhatmust
beinferredislargelydeterminedbyfixedarchitecturalfeaturesofanorganism'ssensory/perceptualpsychology.I'mpreparedtoconcede,however,thatthisisnotthe
doctrinethatemergesfromattentiontothelinguisticpracticesofworkingscientists.Scientistsdohaveauseforadistinctionbetweenwhatisobservedandwhatis
inferred,butthedistinctionthattheyhaveinmindistypicallyrelativizedtotheinquirytheyhaveinhand.Roughly,sofarasIcantell,whataworkingscientistcountsas
anexperimentalobservationdependsonwhatissuehisexperimentisdesignedtosettleandwhatempiricalassumptionsthedesignofhisexperimenttakesfor
granted.Onespeaksoftelescopicobservationsandofthetelescopeasaninstrumentofobservationbecausethefunctioningofthetelescopeisassumedin
experimentaldesignsthatgiveusobservationsofcelestialevents.Onespeaksofobservedreactiontimesbecausetheoperationoftheclockisassumedinthedesign
ofexperimentswhenreactiontimeisthedependentvariable.If,bycontrast,itbeginstoseemthatperhapstheclockisbroken,itthenbecomesanissuewhether
reactiontimesareobservedwhentheexperimenterreadsthenumeralsthattheclockdisplays.
Thatwayofusingtheobservation/inferencedistinctionis,ofcourse,responsivetoanepistemicallyimportantfact:notalltheempiricalassumptionsofanexperiment
cangettestedinthesamedesignwecan'ttestallofourbeliefsatonce.Itisperfectlyreasonableofworkingscientiststowanttomarkthedistinctionbetweenwhat's
foregroundinanexperimentandwhatismerelytakenforgranted,

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anditisagainperfectlyreasonableofthemtodosobyrelativizingthenotionofanobservationtowhateverexperimentalassumptionsareoperative.But,ofcourse,if
thatiswhatonemeansbytheobservation/inferencedistinction,thenthereisnointerestingissueaboutwhetherscientificobservationcanbetheoryneutral.Patently,
onthatconstrual,thetheoryoftheexperimentalinstrumentsandthe(e.g.,statistical)theoryoftheexperimentaldesignwillbepresupposedbythescientist's
observationalvocabulary,andwhatthescientistcan(besaidto)observewillchangeasthesebackgroundtheoriesmature.WecannowobservecratersonVenus
(smalldifferencesinreactiontimes)becausewenowhavepowerfulenoughtelescopes(accurateenoughclocks).Onthiswayofdrawingit,theobservation/inference
distinctionisinherentlyheuristicitisrelativizednotjusttothesensory/perceptualpsychologyoftheobserver,butalsotothecurrentlyavailablearmementariumof
scientifictheoriesandgadgets.
Muchthatisphilosophicallyilluminatingcan,nodoubt,belearnedbycarefulattentiontowhatworkingscientistsusetermslike'observed'and'inferred'todobut
naturalizedepistemologyisnot,forallthat,amerelysociolinguisticdiscipline.Thoughoneofthethingsthatthesetermsareusedforistomarkadistinctionthatis
beyonddoubttheoryrelative,thatdoesnotsettlethecaseagainstGranny.For,itisopentoGrannytoarguelikethis:
"True,thereisanepistemologicallyimportantdistinctionthatit'sreasonabletocall'the'observation/inferencedistinction,andthatistheoryrelative.And,alsotrue,itis
thistheoryrelativedistinctionthatscientistsusuallyusetheterms'observed'and'inferred'tomark.Butthatisquitecompatiblewiththerebeinganotherdistinction,
whichitisalsoreasonabletocall'the'observation/inferencedistinction,whichisalsoofcentralsignificancetotheepistemologyofscience,andwhichisnottheory
relative.Nolinguisticconsiderationscandecidethis,andIthereforeproposetoignoremeremattersofvulgardialectologyhenceforth."
Inheradvancedyears,Grannyhasbecomequitebitteraboutordinarylanguagearguments.
ArgumentsfromMeaningHolism
Thinkofatheory(or,mutatismutandis,thesystemofbeliefsagivenpersonholds)asrepresentedbyaninfinite,connectedgraph.Thenodesofthegraphcorrespond
totheentailmentsofthetheory,andthepathsbetweenthenodescorrespondtoavarietyofsemanticallysignificantrelationsthatholdamongitstheoremsinferential
rela

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tions,evidencerelations,andsoforth.Whenthetheoryistested,confirmationpercolatesfromnodetonodealongtheconnectingpaths.Whenthetheoryis
disturbede.g.,byabandoningapostulateoraprincipleofinferencethelocalgeometryofthegraphisdistorted,andtheresultingstrainsaredistributedthroughout
thenetwork,sometimesshowingupinunanticipateddeformationsofthestructureofthegraphfarfromtheinitiallocusofthedisturbance.
ThatsortofpicturehasdonealotofworkforphilosopherssinceQuinewrote"TwoDogmas."Mostfamously,skepticalwork.Since,sothestorygoes,everything
connects,theunitofmeaningtheminimalcontext,sotospeak,withinwhichthemeaningofatheoreticalpostulateisfixedappearstobethewholetheory.Itis
thusunclearhowtwotheoriescoulddisputetheclaimthatP(sincetheclaimthatPmeanssomethingdifferentinatheorythatentailsthatPthanitdoesin,say,a
theorythatentailsitsdenial).And,similarly,itisunclearhowtwobeliefsystemsthatdifferanywherecanhelpbutdiffereverywhere(sinceanodeisidentifiedbyits
positioninagraph,andsinceagraphisidentifiedbythetotalityofitsnodesandpaths,itappearsthatonlyidenticalgraphscanhaveanynodesincommon).
Itis,ofcourse,possibletoacceptthissortofholism(as,bytheway,GrannyandIdonot)andstillacknowledgesomesortofdistinctionbetweenobservationand
inferencee.g.,thedistinctionmightbeconstruedasepistemicratherthansemantic.Supposeeverysentencegetsitsmeaningfromitstheoreticalcontextstill,some
sentencesareclosertothe'edges'ofthegraphthanothers,andthesemightbesupposedtodependmoredirectlyuponexperiencefortheirconfirmationthan
sentencesfurtherinlanddo.Quinehimselfhassomesuchtaletotell.Howeverandthisiswhatbearsonthepresentissuestheholismstorydoessuggestthat
observationcouldn'tbetheoryneutralinthewaythatGrannyandIthinkitis.Ontheholisticaccount,whatyoucanobserveisgoingtodependcomprehensively
uponwhattheoriesyouholdbecausewhatyourobservationsentencesmeandependscomprehensivelyonwhattheoriesyouhold.
ThisispreciselythemoralthatanumberofphilosophershavedrawnfromQuineanholism.Forexample,herearesomequotationsfromPaulChurchland'sScientific
RealismandThePlasticityofMind(1979):
Themeaningoftherelevantobservationtermshasnothingtodowiththeintrinsicqualitativeidentityofwhateversensationsjusthappentoprompttheirnoninferential
applicationinsin

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gularempiricaljudgements.Rather,theirpositioninsemanticspaceappearstobedeterminedbythenetworkofsentencescontainingthemacceptedbythespeakerswhouse
them(p.12).
...theviewthatthemeaningofourcommonobservationtermsisgivenin,ordeterminedby,sensationmustberejectedoutright,andaswesaw,weareleftwithnetworksofbeliefasthebearers

ordeterminantsofunderstanding...(p.13).
...achild'sinitial(stimulusresponse)useof,say,'white'asaresponsetothefamiliarkindofsensation,providesthattermwithnosemanticidentity.Itacquiresasemantic
identityas,andonlyas,itcomestofigureinanetworkofbeliefsandacorrelativepatternofinferences.Dependingonwhatthatacquirednetworkhappenstobe,thattermcould
cometomeanwhiteorhot...,oraninfinityofotherthings(p.14).

Andsoforth.SoChurchlandholds,onholisticgrounds,thatanobservationsentencemightmeananythingdependingupontheoreticalcontext.
Iemphasizethatthisconclusionisequivalenttotheclaimthatanythingmightbeanobservationsentencedependingupontheoreticalcontextor,materialmode,
thatanythingmightbeobserveddependingupontheoreticalcontext.ForChurchlandas,ofcourse,formanyotherphilosophersyoucanchangeyour
observationalcapacitiesbychangingyourtheories.Indeed,Churchlandseesinthisaprogramforeducationalreform.''Ifourperceptualjudgementsmustbeladen
withtheoryinanycase,thenwhynotexchangetheNeolithiclegacynowinusefortheconceptionofrealityembodiedinmodernerascience?"(p.35).Reallywell
broughtupchildrenwouldnot
...sitonthebeachandlistentothesteadyroarofthepoundingsurf.Theysitonthebeachandlistentotheaperiodicatmosphericcompressionwavesproducedasthecoherent
energyoftheoceanwavesisaudiblyredistributedinthechaoticturbulenceoftheshallows...TheydonotobservethewesternskyreddenastheSunsets.Theyobservethe
wavelengthdistributionofincomingsolarradiationshifttowardsthelongerwavelengths
...astheshorterareincreasinglyscatteredawayfromthelengtheningatmosphericpaththattheymusttakeasterrestrialrotationturnsusslowlyawayfromtheirsource....They
donotfeelcommonobjectsgrowcoolerwiththeonsetofdarkness,norobservethedewformingoneverysurface.TheyfeelthemolecularKEofcommonaggregatesdwindle
withthenowuncompensatedradiationoftheirenergystarwards,andtheyob

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servetheaccretionofreassociatedatmosphericH2OmoleculesastheirKEislosttothenowmorequiescentaggregateswithwhichtheycollide...(p.30).

Ohbravenewworld/thathassuchchildreninit.
Onceagain:themoralthatChurchland(andothers)drawfromholisticsemanticdoctrinesaboutbeliefs/theoriesisthatanobservationsentencecanmeananything
dependingontheoreticalcontexthencethatanythingcanbeanobservationsentencedependingontheoreticalcontexthencethattherecouldnotbeaclassof
beliefsthatmustbeinferentialregardlessofwhattheoriesthebelieveresouses.Churchland'swayofputtingthisis,perhaps,misleading.Afterall,ifthegathering
ofthedewistheaccretionofatmosphericH2Omolecules,thenofcoursewedo,rightnowandwithouttechnologicalretraining,observetheaccretionofatmospheric
H2Omoleculeswheneverweobservethegatheringofthedew'observe'istransparenttothesubstitutivityofidenticals.ButIdon'treallythinkthatChurchland(or
anybodyelsepartytothepresentcontroversy)isseriouslyconfusedaboutthis,andIdon'tproposetocarpaboutit.Indeed,it'seasytofixup.WhatChurchlandmust
beclaiming,ongroundsofholism,isthatwhatyoucanseethingsaswhatyoucanobservethatthingsareiscomprehensivelydeterminedbytheoreticalcontextso
that,dependingoncontext,youcan,orcanlearnto,seeanythingasanything.
GrannyandIdoubtthatyoucanlearntoseeanythingasanything(thatanythingcanbeanobservationsentence)butourreasonsfordoubtingthiswillkeepuntil
section3.Forpresentpurposes,sufficeittorepeatthelessonthatcausalsemantictheorieshaverecentlybeenteachingus,viz.,thatholismmaynotbetrue.
Specifically,itmaynotbetruethat(all)thesemanticalpropertiesofsentences(/beliefs)aredeterminedbytheirlocationinthetheoreticalnetworksinwhichtheyare
embeddeditmaybethatsomeoftheirsemanticpropertiesaredeterminedbythecharacteroftheirattachmenttotheworld(e.g.,bythecharacterofthecausalroute
fromdistalobjectsandeventstothetokeningofthesentenceorthefixationofthebelief.)Thepointis,ofcourse,thattheirattachmenttotheworld,unliketheir
inferentialrole,issomethingthatsymbols(/beliefs)canhaveseverallysothat,whensuchattachmentsareatissue,themoralsofholismneednotapply.
Ataminimum,thissuggestsawayoutofChurchland'sdilemma.ItwillhavebeenclearfromthefragmentsquotedabovethatChurchland'sdiscussionreliesheavily,if
implicitly,onthefollowingmodustollens:ifthesemanticsofobservationsentencesistheoryneutral,

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thatmustbebecauseobservationsentencesgettheirmeaningssomehowfromtheirconnectionswithsensations.Butwehavegoodreasontodenythattheyget
theirsemanticsthatway.Thealternativeisthatobservationsentencesgettheirmeaningsfromtheirtheoreticalcontexts(from"networksofbeliefs").
Infact,however,neitheroftheseaccountsofthesemanticsofobservationsentencesseemsparticularlyattractive,leastofallforcolorterms,although,asithappens,
colortermsareChurchland'sfavoriteworkingexamples.Ittellsagainstthefirstalternativethat'white'istypicallyusedtorefertothecolorofobjects,nottothecolor
ofsensationsandittellsagainstthesecondthattheinferentialrolesofcolortermstendtobeisomorphichenceinvertedspectrumpuzzlessothatcolorwords
providetheworstpossiblecasesfor'functionalrole'theoriesofmeaning.Infact,itlooksasthoughthesensiblethingtosayabout'white'mightbethatitmeanswhatit
doesbecauseofthespecialcharacterofitsassociation(notwithasensationoraninferentialrolebut)withwhitethings.Toacceptthat,however,istorejectholism
as,anyhow,thewholestoryaboutthesemanticsofcolorterms.
Idon'tsupposethatthere'sanythingmuchnovelinthis,andIcertainlydon'tsupposeitestablishesthatthereisaviable,theoryneutral,observation/inference
distinction.ThepointIhavebeenmakingismerelynegative:meaningholismisunequivocallydestructiveofatheoryneutralnotionofobservationonlyifyousuppose
thatallthesemanticpropertiesofsentences/beliefsaredeterminedbytheirtheoreticalcontextfor,ifsomearenot,thenperhapstheessentialsemanticconditionsfor
beingobservationalcanbeframedintermsofthese.Theobvioussuggestionwouldbe,ontheonehand,thatwhatmakesatermobservationalisthatitdenoteswhat
is,byindependentcriteria,anobservablepropertyand,ontheother,thatwhatatermdenotesisnonholistically(perhapscausally)determined.Inlightofthis,I
proposesimplynottograntthatallthesemanticpropertiesofsentences/beliefsaredeterminedbytheirtheoreticalcontext.AndGrannyproposesnottograntthattoo.
PsychologicalArguments
Preciselyparalleltothephilosophicaldoctrinethattherecanbenoprincipleddistinctionbetweenobservationandinferenceisthepsychologicaldoctrinethatthere
canbenoprincipleddistinctionbetweenperceptionandcognition.Theleadingideahereisthat"perceptioninvolvesakindofproblemsolvingakindof
intelligence"(Gregory1970,p.30).Perception,accordingtothisaccount,istheprocess

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whereinanorganismassignsprobabledistalcausestotheproximalstimulationsitencounters.Whatmakesthesolutionofperceptualproblemsotherthanmereroutine
isthefactthat,asamatterofprinciple,anygivenpatternofproximalstimulationiscompatiblewithagreatvarietyofdistalcausesthereare,ifyoulike,manypossible
worldsthatwouldprojectagivenpatternofexcitationontothesensorymechanismsofanorganism.Toviewthementalprocesseswhichmediateperceptionas
inferencesisthusnecessarilytoviewthemasnondemonstrativeinferences."Weareforced...tosupposethatperceptioninvolvesbettingonthemostprobable
interpretationofsensorydata,intermsoftheworldofobjects"(Gregory1970,p.29).Itisworthstressingtheputativemoral:whatmediatesperceptionisan
inferencefromeffectstocauses.Thesortofmentationrequiredforperceptionisthusnotdifferentinkindthoughnodoubtitdiffersalotinconsciousaccessability
fromwhatgoesoninSherlockHolmes'headwhenheinferstheidentityofthecriminalfromastraycigarbandandahairortwo.IfwhatHolmesdoesdeservestobe
calledcognition,perceptiondeservedtobecalledcognitiontoo,orso,atleast,somepsychologistsliketosay.
NeitherGrannynorIhaveheardofaseriousalternativetothisviewofperception,solet'ssuppose,forpurposesofargumentatleast,thatthesepsychologistsare
right.Itmaythenseemthatthepsychologyofperceptionprovidesanargumentindeed,quiteadirectargumentthatobservationcan'tbetheoryneutral.Toseehow
suchanargumentmightgo,considerthefollowingquestion:if,ingeneral,therearemanydistalsolutionscompatiblewiththeperceptualproblemthatagivensensory
patternposes,howisitpossiblethatperceptionshouldevermanagetounivocal(tosaynothingofveridical)?Why,thatis,doesn'ttheworldlooktobemanyways
ambiguous,withone'reading'oftheambiguitycorrespondingtoeachdistallayoutthatiscompatiblewiththecurrentsensoryexcitation(as,indeed,aNeckercube
doeslooktobeseveralwaysambiguous,withonetermoftheambiguitycorrespondingtoeachofthepossibleopticalprojectionsfromathreedimensionalcubeonto
atwodimensionalsurface).Assuming,inshort,thatperceptionisproblemsolving,howonearthdoperceptualproblemsevergetsolved?AsGregorycomments,"it
issurelyremarkablethatoutoftheinfinityofpossibilitiestheperceptualbraingenerallyhitsonjustaboutthebestone"(1970,p.29).
Allpsychologicaltheoriesthatendorsethecontinuityofperceptionwithproblemsolvingoffermuchthesameanswertothisquestion:viz.,thatthoughperceptual
analysesareunderdeterminedbysensoryarrays,itdoesnotfollowthattheyareunderdeterminedtout

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court.For,perceptualanalysesareconstrainednotjustbytheavailablesensoryinformation,butalsobysuchpriorknowledgeastheperceivermaybringtothetask.
Whathappensinperceptualprocessing,accordingtothisaccount,isthatsensoryinformationisinterpretedbyreferencetotheperceiver'sbackgroundtheories,the
latterserving,ineffect,toruleoutcertainetiologiesasimplausiblecausalhistoriesforthepresentsensoryarray.Onlythusissensoryambiguityresolvedand,if
perceptionistypicallyveridical,that'sbecausethebackgroundtheoriesthatorganismsexploitinperceptualanalysisare,forthemostpart,true.
Acceptingthisaccountoftheperceptualreductionofsensoryambiguityis,ofcourse,fullycompatiblewithstressingtheanalogybetweenperceptionandproblem
solving.Therearemany,manywaysthatthehairsandthecigarbandcouldhavecometowhereHolmesfoundthemmanyprojections,ifyoulike,ofpossible
criminalsontoactualclues.How,then,itispossibleeveninprinciplethatHolmesshouldsolvethecrime?Answer:Holmesknowsabouttheclues,butheknowsa
lotmoretooandhisbackgroundknowledgecomesintoplaywhenthecluesgetunravelled.Jonescouldn'thaveleftbrownhairsbecauseJonesisblondSmith
couldn'thaveleftthecigarbandbecauseheonlysmokesicedtea.Bentley,however,hasbrownhairandhisdogcollectscigarbandssoBentleyandhisdogitmust
havebeen.Thecluesunderdeterminethecriminal,butthecluesplusbackgroundknowledgemaybeunivocaluptoaveryhighorderofprobability.Thetrickthe
trickthatproblemsolvingalwaysamountstoishavingtherightbackgroundinformationandknowingwhenandhowtoapplyit.Sotoointhecaseofperception,
accordingtothecognitivists.
Whathasallthistodowithreconsideringobservation?Thepointisthat,ifthepresentstoryisright,thentheappealtoabackgroundtheoryisinherentintheprocess
ofperceptualanalysis.Perceptionwouldn'tworkwithoutitbecausetheperceptualproblemisthereductionofsensoryambiguity,andthatproblemissolvedonly
whenone'ssensoryinformationisinterpretedinthelightofone'spriorbeliefs.So,theonethingthatperceptioncouldn'tbe,onthisaccountofhowitworks,istheory
neutral.Indeed,thisispreciselythemoralthatanumberofphilosophershavedrawnfromthepsychologicaltexts.Thus,ThomasKuhnremarksthat"therich
experimentalliterature[inpsychology]...makesonesuspectthatsomethinglikeaparadigmisprerequisitetoperceptionitself.Whatamanseesdependsbothupon
whathelooksatandalsouponwhathispreviousvisualconceptualexperiencehastaughthimtosee"(Kuhn1962,p.113).Kuhnclearlythinksthat,amongthe
"visual

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conceptualexperiences"thatcanworksuchalterationsinperceptionistheassimilationofscientificdoctrine:"Paradigmchangesdocausescientiststoseetheworldof
theirresearchengagementsdifferently....Itisaselementaryprototypesforthesetransformationsofthescientist'sworldviewthatthefamiliardemonstrationsofa
switchinvisualgestaltprovesosuggestive"(1962,p.111).NelsonGoodmanreadstheexperimentalliteratureonperceptioninmuchthesameway."Thatwefind
whatwearepreparedtofind(whatwelookfororwhatforcefullyaffrontsourexpectations),andthatwearelikelytobeblindtowhatneitherhelpsnorhindersour
pursuits,arecommonplaces...amplyattestedinthepsychologicallaboratory"(Goodman1978,p.14.SeealsoGoodman'sLanguagesofArt,wherethisviewof
perceptualpsychologyisstrikinglyinevidence.)
Infact,however,itisunclearthatthat'swhatthepsychologicallaboratorydoesattest,andtherebyhangsapuzzle.Forifweoughttobeimpressedbythedegreeto
whichperceptionisinterpretive,contextuallysensitive,labile,responsivetobackgroundknowledge,andallthat,wesurelyoughtalsotobeimpressedbythedegreeto
whichitisoftenbullheadedandrecalcitrant.Infact,manyofthestandardpsychologicaldemonstrationsseemtopointbothmoralsatthesametime.Considerthe
famousMullerLyerfigures.Thetextbookstorygoeslikethis:whenthearrowheadsbendin(top)thefigureisunconsciouslyinterpretedinthreedimensional
projectionasaconvexcornerwithitsedgeemergingtowardtheviewerfromthepictureplane.Conversely,whenthearrowheadsbendout(bottom)thefigureis
unconsciouslyinterpretedinthreedimensionalprojectionasaconcavecornerwithitsedgerecedingfromtheviewer.Itfollowsthatthecenterlineisinterpretedas
fartherfromtheobserverintheupperfigurethaninthelowerone.Since,however,thetwocenterlinesareinfactofthesamelength,theirretinalprojectionsare
identicalinsize.Thisidentityofretinalprojectioncouldbecompatiblewiththethreedimensionalinterpretationofthefiguresonlyifthecenterlinewerelongerinthe
upperfigurethaninthelowertwoobjectsatdifferentdistancescanhavethesameretinalprojectiononlyifthemoredistantobjectislarger.Sosizeconstancy
operates(tocompensate,asonemightsay,forwhatappearstobetheapparenteffectofdistance)andthetwolinesareperceivedasdifferinginlength.Seewhata
niceregardforconsistencytheunconscioushas,Freudtothecontrarynotwithstanding.Thereisabundantempiricalevidenceforthisexplanationincluding,notably,the
factthatchildren,havinghadlessexperiencewithedgesandcornersthanadults,arecorrespondinglylesssusceptibletotheillusion.

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TheMullerLyerillusionthusappearstobeandisoftencitedasaprimeexampleofhowbackgroundinformationinthiscaseacomplexofassumptionsaboutthe
relationsbetweenthreedimensionalobjectsandtheirtwodimensionalprojectionscanaffecttheperceptualanalysisofasensoryarray."What,"onemightask,
"couldbeclearerevidenceofthepenetrationofperceptionbyinformationthatisnotavailableattheretina?"Ontheotherhand,there'sthis:TheMullerLyerisa
familiarillusionthenewshasprettywellgottenaroundbynow.So,it'spartofthe"backgroundtheory''ofanybodywholivesinthiscultureandisatallintopop
psychologythatdisplayslikefigure10.1areinfactmisleadingandthatitalwaysturnsout,onmeasurement,thatthecenterlinesofthearrowsarethesamelength.
Query:Whyisn'tperceptionpenetratedbyTHATpieceofbackgroundtheory?Why,thatis,doesn'tknowingthatthelinesarethesamelengthmakeitlookas
thoughthelinesarethesamelength?(Forthatmatter,sinceoneknowsperfectlywellthatfigure10.1isadrawingintwodimensions,whydoesn'tthatinformation
penetrateperception,therebyblockingthethreedimensionalinterpretationandcancellingtheillusion?)Thissortofconsiderationdoesn'tmakeitseematallasthough
perceptionis,asit'softensaidtobe,saturatedwithcognitionthroughandthrough.Onthecontrary,itsuggestsjustthereverse:thathowtheworldlookscanbe
peculiarlyunaffectedbyhowoneknowsittobe.IpausetoemphasizethattheMullerLyerisbynomeansatypicalinthisrespect.Tothebestofmyknowledge,all
thestandardperceptualillusionsexhibitthiscuriouslyrefractorycharacter:knowingthattheyareillusionsdoesn'tmakethemgoaway.2
Ihopethatthepolemicalsituationisbeginningtoseemalittlequeer.Ontheonehand,reflectionupontheimpoverishmentandambiguityofsensoryinformationleads,
byaplausibleroute,totheanalysisofperceptionasaformofproblemsolvinginwhichproximalstimulationsareinterpretedinlightofsomebackgroundtheory
accessibletotheperceiver.Thismakesitseemthathowtheworldisperceivedtobeoughttodependverylargelyontheperceiver'spriorbeliefsandexpectations
hencetheperceptualeffectsofcognitivesetthatpsychologistsofthe"NewLook"persuasionmadealivingby

Figure10.1.
TheMullerLyerIllusion.

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advertising.But,ontheotherhand,therearethesecuriousandpersuasiveperceptualimplasticities,caseswhereknowingdoesn'thelpseeing.Itis,ofcourse,
reflectiononexamplesofthesecondsortthatkeepsGrannygoing.Thesearethecaseswheretheideaoftheoryneutralobservationcangetatoehold.Theproblem
is,whichsortofcasesoughtwetobelieve?And,whilewe'reatit,howcanatheoryofperceptionaccommodatetheexistenceofboth?
Wecometothemainpointatlast.TheNewLookideathatperceptionisakindofproblemsolvingdoesnot,allbyitself,implythetheorydependenceofobservation.
Philosopherswhoreadthatmoralinthepsychologicaltextsreadthetextstoofast.(Grannysaysthatalittlepsychologyisadangerousthingandinclinethamanto
relativism.)Togetfromacognitivistinterpretationofperceptiontoanyepistemologicallyinterestingversionoftheconclusionthatobservationistheorydependent,you
neednotonlythepremisethatperceptionisproblemsolving,butalsothepremisethatperceptualproblemsolvinghasaccesstoALL(or,anyhow,
arbitrarilymuch)ofthebackgroundinformationattheperceiver'sdisposal.Perceptualimplasticitiesofthesortswe'vejustbeennoticingmakeithighly
implausible,however,thatthissecondpremiseistrue.
Allthissuggeststhatwe'dbetterdistinguishbetweentwoquestionsthatupuntilnowwe'vebeentreatingasthesame:thequestionwhetherperceptionisakindof
problemsolving(i.e.,whetherobservationisinferential)andthequestionwhetherperceptioniscomprehensivelypenetratedbybackgroundbeliefs(i.e.,whether
observationcanbetheoryneutral).ItisentirelypossibletoputthepointanotherwaytosteeramiddlecoursebetweenGrannyandJeromeBruner:toagreewith
Bruner(asagainstGranny)thatthereisanimportantsenseinwhichobservationisakindofinference,butalsotoagreewithGranny(asagainstHarvardrelativists)
thatthereis,inperception,aradicalisolationofhowthingslookfromtheeffectsofmuchofwhatonebelieves.
Sinceitisthesecondissueratherthanthefirstthatraisesalltheepistemologicalquestions,thisseemstobeamoralvictoryforGranny.Ifforexampletheinferential
characterofperceptionis,asI'msupposing,compatiblewiththetheoryneutralityofobservation,thennothingfollowsfromperceptualpsychologyaboutwhether
scientistswhoacceptradicallydifferenttheoriescanobservethesamephenomena.Inparticular,onthisview,itwouldnotfollowfromtheinferentialcharacterof
perceptionthat"theinfantandthelayman...cannotseewhatthephysicistsees"(Hanson,1961,p.17),orthat"[whenthephysicistlooksatanXraytube]...he
seestheinstrumentintermsofelectricalcircuittheory,thermodynamicthe

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ory,thetheoriesofmetalandglassstructure,thermionicemission,opticaltransmission,refraction,diffraction,atomictheory,quantumtheoryandspecialrelativity"(pp.
1516).Similarly,onthisaccount,theinferentialcharacterofperceptionleavesitopenthatthechildrenwhomChurchlandwantstoteachnottoseethegatheringof
thedewmight,thankGod,seethingsmuchthesamewayafterthey'velearnedphysicsastheydidbefore.Theargumentfortherelativityofobservationrequires,to
repeat,notjusttheinferentialcharacterofperception,buttheideathatallyourbackgroundknowledge,includingespeciallyyourscientifictheories,isaccessibleas
premisesforperceptualintegration.Bycontrast,ifyouthinkthatperception,thoughinferential,isneverthelessencapsulatedfrommuchofwhattheperceiverbelieves,
thecommonepistemicsituationofthescientistandthelaymanstartstoshowthrough.Thereis,perhaps,justoneperceptualworld,thoughtheexpertssometimes
knowmoreaboutitthantheamateurs.
Whatmightthepsychologyofperceptionlooklikeifobservationisbothinferentialandtheoryneutral?I'llsayawordaboutthisbeforereturningtothe
epistemologicalissues.
Theviewthatperceptionisproblemsolving,thoughittakesthedistinctionbetweenperceptionandcognitionasheuristic,takesquiteseriouslythedistinctionbetween
perceptionandsensation.Sensoryprocesses,accordingtothisaccount,merelyregistersuchproximalstimulationsasanorganism'senvironmentaffords.It'sleftto
cognitiveprocessesnotablytheperceptualonestointerpretsensorystatesbyassigningprobablydistalcauses.Sowehavethefollowingpicture:sensationis
responsivesolelytothecharacterofproximalstimulationandisnoninferential.Perceptionisbothinferentialandresponsivetotheperceiver'sbackgroundtheories.Itis
not,ofcourse,anaccidentthatthingsaresupposedtolineupthiswayinferencerequirespremises.Perceptualprocessescanbeinferentialbecausetheperceiver's
backgroundtheorysuppliesthepremisesthattheinferencesrunon.Sensoryprocessescan'tbeinferentialbecausetheyhave,byassumption,noaccesstothe
backgroundtheoriesinlightofwhichthedistalcausesofproximalstimulationsareinferred.Themoralisthat,ifyouwanttosplitthedifferencebetweenGrannyand
theNewLook,youneedtopostulateatertiumquidakindofpsychologicalmechanismwhichisbothencapsulated(likesensation)andinferential(likecognition).
Theapparentcontradictionbetweeninferenceandencapsulationisresolvedbyassumingthattheaccesstobackgroundtheorythatsuchmechanismshaveissharply
delimitedindeed,delimitedbytheintrinsiccharacterofthemechanisms.
Iwon'tsaymuchaboutthisheresinceI'vesetoutthepsychological

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storyatsomelengthinapreviousstudy(seeFodor,1983)andI'manxioustoreturntothephilosophicalmorals.Sufficeitjusttosuggest,bywayofabriefexample,
whattheorganizationofsuch"modular"perceptualmechanismsmightbelike.
It'splausibletoassumethattheperceptualanalysisofspeechtypicallyeffectsanassignmentofsentencetokenstosentencetypes.Onereasonit'splausibletoassume
thisisthatit'sobviouslytrue.Anotherreasonisthatunderstandingwhatsomeonesaystypicallyrequiresknowingwhatformofwordsheuttered,andtoassignan
utterancetoaformofwordsistoassignatokentoatype.Cognitivepsychologyproceedsbydiagnosingfunctionsandpostulatingmechanismstoperformthemlet's
assumethatthereissomepsychologicalmechanismaparser,let'scallitwhosefunctionisthis:ittakessensory(asitmightbe,acoustic)representationsof
utterancesasinputsandproducesrepresentationsofsentencetypes(asitmightbe,linguisticstructuraldescriptions)asoutputs.Nodoubtthiswayofsettingupthe
problemassumesalotthatalotofyouwon'twanttograntforexample,thattherearepsychologicalmechanisms,andthattheyareproperlyviewedasfunctionsfrom
onesortofrepresentationsontoanother.However,rememberthecontext:we'vebeenwonderingwhatcurrentpsychologicaltheoryimpliesaboutthe
observation/inferencedistinction.Andthesortofpsychologicaltheorythat'scurrentistheoneI'vejustoutlined.
Thereisabundantempiricalevidencewithwhich,however,Iwon'tbotheryouthatparsinghasallthepropertiesthatmakepsychologistswanttosaythat
perceptionisinferential.Alltheindicationsarethattheacousticcharacterofanutterancesignificantlyunderdeterminesitsstructuraldescription,sotheparserifitis
tosucceedinitsfunctionwillhavetoknowalotofbackgroundtheory.Thisisn't,bytheway,particularlymysterious.Considerthepropertyofbeinganounasort
ofpropertythatsomeutterancessurelyhaveandthatadequatestructuraldescriptionsofutterancesmustsurelymark.Patently,thatpropertyhasnosensory/acoustic
correspondentthere'snothingthatnounsquanounssoundlike,orlooklikeonanoscilliscope.Soamechanismthatcanrecognizeutterancesofnounsassuchmust
knowaboutsomethingmorethantheacoustic/sensorypropertiesofthetokensitclassifies,inthiscase,somethingaboutthelanguagethatitparsesi.e.,ithastoknow
whichwordsinthelanguagearenouns.
Well,then,whatwoulditbelikefortheparsertobeamodule?AsimplestorymightgolikethisaparserforLcontainsagrammarofL.Whatitdoeswhenitdoesits
thingis,itinfersfromcertainacousticpropertiesofatokentoacharacterizationofcertainofthedistal

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causesofthetoken(e.g.,tothespeaker'sintentionthattheutteranceshouldbeatokenofacertainlinguistictype).Premisesofthisinferencecanincludewhatever
informationabouttheacousticsofthetokenthemechanismsofsensorytransductionprovide,whateverinformationaboutthelinguistictypesinLtheinternally
representedgrammarprovides,andnothingelse.Itis,ofcourse,theclosureconditionthatmakestheparsermodular.
CompareaNewLookparser.Intheextremecase,aNewLookparsercanbringtotheprocessofassigningstructuraldescriptionsanythingthattheorganism
knows(orbelieves,orhopes,orexpects,etc.).Forexample,aNewLookparserknowshowveryunlikelyitisthatanyonewouldsay,rightsmackinthecourseofa
philosophicallectureonobservationandinference,"PigletgavePoohastiffeningsortofnudge,andPooh,whofeltmoreandmorethathewassomewhereelse,got
upslowlyandbegantolookforhimself."Soifsomeoneweretosaythat,rightsmackinthemiddleofaphilosophicallectureonobservationandinference,aNew
Lookparserwouldpresumablyhavealotoftroubleunderstandingitbydefinition,aNewLookparsertendstohearjustwhatitexpectstohear.Bytheway,this
examplesuggestsoneofthereasonswhyencapsulatedperceptualmodulesmightbequiteagoodthingforanorganismtohave:backgroundbeliefs,andthe
expectationsthattheyengender,fromtimetotimeprovenottobetrue.Thatdoesn'tmattersomuchwhentheyarebackgroundbeliefsaboutobservationand
inference,oraboutPoohandPiglet.When,however,theyarebackgroundbeliefsaboutTigger,it'sadifferentstory.Tiggersbounce.Andbite.
Iwon'ttrytoconvinceyouthattheparseroranyotherperceptualmechanismactuallyismodularwhatIwanttourge,forpresentpurposes,isjustthatif
perceptionismodular(inferentialbutencapsulated),thenthathasseriousimplicationsfortheputativepsychologicalargumentsagainstthetheoryneutralityof
observation.Ihaveascatteringofpointstomakeaboutthis.
First,andmostimportant,ifperceptualprocessesaremodular,then,bydefinition,bodiesoftheorythatareinaccessibletothemodulesdonotaffectthewaythe
perceiverseestheworld.Specifically,perceiverswhodifferprofoundlyintheirbackgroundtheoriesscientistswithquitedifferentaxestogrind,forexamplemight
neverthelessseetheworldinexactlythesameway,solongasthebodiesoftheorythattheydisagreeaboutareinaccessibletotheirperceptualmechanisms.
Second,themodularitystorysuggestsnotonlythatsomethingcanbemadeofthenotionoftheoryneutralobservation,butalsothatsomethingcanbemadeofthe
notionofobservationlanguagei.e.,

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thatmuchcurrentopiniontothecontrarynotwithstandingthereisagoodsenseinwhichsometerms(like'red',asitmightbe)areobservationalandothers(like
'proton',asitmightbe)arenot.Supposethatperceptualmechanismsaremodularandthatthebodyofbackgroundtheoryaccessibletoprocessesofperceptual
integrationisthereforerigidlyfixed.Byhypothesis,onlythosepropertiesofthedistalstimuluscountasobservablewhichtermsintheaccessiblebackgroundtheory
denote.Thepointis,nodoubt,entirelyempirical,butIamwillingtobetlotsthat'red'willprovetobeobservationalbythiscriterionandthat'proton'willnot.Thisis,
ofcourse,justawayofbettingthatHanson,Kuhn,Churchland,Goodman,andCo.arewrongthatphysicsdoesn'tbelongtotheaccessiblebackground.
Thereareothermoreexcitingcaseswherewearealreadyinaprettygoodpositiontosaywhichpropertiesofdistalobjectswillcountasobservable,hencewhich
termswillcountasobservationvocabulary.Thecaseofparsingisamongthese.Thisisbecauseitisplausibletosupposethatthebackgroundtheoryaccessibletoa
modularizedparserwouldhavetobeagrammar,andweknow,moreorless,whatsortsofpropertiesofsentencesgrammaticaldescriptionsspecify.Sothen,
applyingthepresentcriteriontothepresentassumptions,theobservablelinguisticpropertiesofutterancesofsentencesoughttoincludethingslikebeinganutterance
ofasentence,beinganutteranceofasentencethatcontainstheword'the',beinganutteranceofasentencethatcontainsawordthatreferstotrees,andsoforth,
dependingondetailsofyourviewsaboutwhatpropertiesofsentenceslinguisticstructuraldescriptionsspecify.Bycontrast,whatwouldnotcountasobservableon
thecurrentassumptionsaresuchpropertiesofsentencesasbeingutteredwiththeintentionofdeceivingJohn,beingilladvisedinthecontext,containingawordthatis
frequentlyusedinrestaurantswheretheysellhamburgers,andsoforth.Itshouldbenotedinpassingthatthissortofaccountpermitsonetodistinguishsharply
betweenobservablepropertiesandsensoryproperties.Ifsensorypropertiesareonesthatnoninferentialpsychologicalmechanismsrespondto,thenthesensory
propertiesofutterancesareplausiblyallacousticandalmostallareinaccessibletoconsciousness.
Thirdpoint:whatI'vebeensayingaboutmodularitysofarisequivalenttotheclaimthatperceptualprocessesare"synchronically"impenetrablebyinsensitiveto
muchoftheperceiver'sbackgroundknowledge.YourcurrentsophisticationabouttheMullerLyerisinaccessibletothemodulethatmediatesvisualformperception
anddoesnot,therefore,servetodispeltheillusion.Butthisleavesopenthequestionwhetherperceptionmaybe"diachronically"

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penetrableineffect,whetherexperienceandtrainingcanaffecttheaccessabilityofbackgroundtheorytoperceptualmechanisms.
Todenydiachronicpenetrabilitywouldbetoclaim,ineffect,thatallthebackgroundinformationthatisaccessibletomodularperceptualsystemsisendogenously
specified,andthatisviewedasimplausibleevenbymaddognativistslikeme.Forexample,parsingmaybemodular,butchildrenmustlearnsomethingabouttheir
languagefromthelanguagethattheyhearwhyelsewouldchildrenlivinginChinasooftengrowupspeakingChinese?Thepointaboutthediachronicpenetrabilityof
perceptionis,however,justlikethepointaboutitssynchronicpenetrability:itoffersanargumentforthecontinuityofperceptionwithcognitiononlyifjustanyold
learningorexperiencecanaffectthewayyousee,andthereisnoreasonatalltosupposethatthatisso.Perhaps,onthecontrary,perceptionisdiachronically
penetrableonlywithinstrictlymaybeendogenouslydefinedlimits.NotonlydoyourcurrentCopernicanprejudicesfailtomuchdispeltheapparentmotionofthe
sun,itmaybethatthereisnoeducationalprogramthatwoulddothetrickbecauseitmaybethattheinaccessibilityofastronomicalbackgroundtotheprocessesof
visualperceptualintegrationisaconsequenceofinnateandunalterablearchitecturefeaturesofourmentalstructure.Inthiscase,ouragreementonthegeneral
characteroftheperceptualworldmighttranscendtheparticularitiesofourtrainingandgoasdeepasourcommonhumanity.GrannyandIhopethatthisissosince
commonhumanityissomethingthatwefavor.
Ireturnnowtomorestrictlyepistemologicalconcerns.TwopointsandI'llhavedone.
First,ifGrannywantstoappealtomodularitypsychologyasawayofholdingontotheoryneutralobservation,sheisgoingtohavetogiveabit.Inparticularsheis
goingtohavetodistinguishbetweenobservationandtheperceptualfixationofbelief.Itisonlyfortheformerthatclaimsfortheoryneutralityhaveanyplausibility.
Thusfar,I'vebeenemphasizingthatpsychologicalsophisticationdoesn'tchangethewaytheMullerLyerlooks.Knowingthatit'sanillusionevenknowinghowthe
illusionworksdoesn'tmaketheeffectgoaway.Butifonesideofperceptionisaboutthelookofthings,theothersideisabouthowthingsarejudgedtobeandit
bearsemphasisthathowtheMullerLyerlooksdoesn't,inthecaseofasophisticatedaudience,muchaffecttheperceptualbeliefsthatitsobserverscometohave.I
assume,forexample,thatyou'renotremotelytemptedtosupposethatthecenterlineinthelowerfigureactuallyislongerthanthecenterlineintheupperandthe
reasonyou'renotisthatthemechanismsofbelieffixation,incontrasttothe

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presumptiveperceptualmodules,AREincontactwithbackgroundtheory.Belieffixation,unlikethefixationofappearanceswhatI'mcallingobservationisa
conservativeprocesstoafirstapproximation,ituseseverythingyouknow.
Hereisonewaytoconceptualizethesituation:thefixationofperceptualbeliefeffectsareconciliationbetweenthecharacterofcurrentsensorystimulation,asanalyzed
bymodularprocessors,andbackgroundtheory.Themodularsystemsmightbethoughtofasproposinghypothesesaboutthedistalsourcesofsensorystimulation
thesehypothesesarecouchedinarestricted(viz.,observational)vocabularyandarepredicatedonacorrespondinglyrestrictedbodyofinformation,viz.,current
sensoryinformationtogetherwithwhateverfragmentofbackgroundtheorythemoduleshaveaccessto.Thehypothesesthatmodularsystemsproposearethen
comparedwiththerestoftheorganism'sbackgroundtheory,andtheperceptualfixationofbeliefisconsequentuponthiscomparison.
So,toafirstapproximation,theactivityofthemodulesdetermineswhatyouwouldbelieveifyouweregoingontheappearancesalone.But,ofcourse,thisisonlya
firstapproximationsince,asremarkedabove,modulesdealnotonlyinarestrictedbodyofbackgroundknowledge,butalsoinarestrictedconceptualrepertoire.
Therearesomehypothesesthatmodulesneverofferbecausetheyhavenoaccesstoavocabularyinwhichtoexpressthem:hypothesesabouttheinstantiationof
nonobservablepropertiessuchasthatwhat'scurrentlyonviewisaproton.Soonemightbetterputitthattheactivityofmodulesdetermineswhatyouwouldbelieve
abouttheappearancesifyouweregoingjustontheappearances.Lessgnomically:modulesofferhypothesesabouttheinstantiationofobservablepropertiesof
things,andthefixationofperceptualbeliefistheevaluationofsuchhypothesesinlightofthetotalityofbackgroundtheory.Accordingtothisusage,whatyou
observeisrelatedtowhatyoubelieveinsomethinglikethewaythatwhatyouwantisrelatedtowhatyouwantonbalance.
ItshouldbeclearfromallthisthatevenifGrannygetsthetheoryneutralityofobservation,sheisunlikelytogetanythingremotelylikeitsinfallibility.Forstarters,only
afacultyofbelieffixationcanbeinfallibleand,accordingtothepresentstory,thepsychologicalmechanismsthatareinformationallyencapsulateddonot,inandof
themselves,effectthefixationofbelief.Anyhowbesidethissomewhatlegalisticconsiderationtheinfallibilityofobservationwouldpresumablyrequirethe
introspectiveavailabilityofitsdeliverancesand,thoughIsupposeoneusuallyknowshowthingslooktoone,itseemstobeempiricallyfalsethatonealwaysdoes.If,
forexample,

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thestoryItoldabouttheMullerLyeristrue,thentheexistenceoftheillusionturnsonthefactthatoneseesthefiguresasthreedimensionalcorners.Butitisnot
introspectivelyobviousthatoneseesthemthatway,andthepsychologistswhofiguredouttheillusiondidsonotbyintrospectingbutbytheusualrouteoftheory
constructionandexperimentation.(Similarly,acrucialissueinthehistoryofthepsychologyofcolorperceptionwaswhetheryellowlookstobeamixedhue.Itis
nowposttheoreticallyintrospectivelyobviousthatitdoesnot.)
"Butlook,"youmightsay,growingbynowunderstandablyimpatient,"ifthenotionofobservationwe'releftwithisasattenuatedasitnowappearstobe,what,
epistemologicallyspeaking,isitgoodfor?Haven'tyouandyourGrannyreallygivenawayeverythingthattheoppositioneverwanted?"
IquotefromNorwoodRussellHanson:"TosaythatTychoandKepler,SimpliciusandGalileo,HookeandNewton,PriestlyandLavoisier,SoddyandEinstein,De
BroglieandBorn,HeisenbergandBohmallmakethesameobservationsbutusethemdifferentlyistooeasy.Thisparallelsthetooeasyepistemologicaldoctrinethat
allnormalobserversseethesamethingsinx,butinterpretthemdifferently.Itdoesnotexplaincontroversyinresearchscience"(Hanson1961,p.13.InHanson's
text,thesecondsentenceappearsasafootnoteatthepointwhereIhaveinsertedit.)Now,ontheviewofsciencethatGrannyandIholdto,thisisworsethanthe
wronganswerit'stheanswertothewrongquestion.Itisnoparticularpuzzle,giventhenondemonstrativecharacterofempiricalinference,thatthereshouldbe
scientificcontroversy.Rather,astheskepticaltraditioninphilosophyhasmadecrystalclear,theepistemologicalproblemparexcellenceistoexplainscientific
consensustoexplainhowitispossible,giventhevastandnotoriousunderdeterminationoftheorybydata,thatscientistsshouldagreeaboutsomuchsomuchofthe
time.
WhatGrannyandIthinkisthatpartofthestoryaboutscientificconsensusturnscruciallyonthetheoryneutralityofobservation.Becausethewayoneseestheworld
islargelyindependentofone'stheoreticalattachments,itispossibletoseethatthepredictionsevenoftheoriesthatonelikesalotaren'tcomingout.Becausethe
wayoneseestheworldislargelyindependentofone'stheoreticalattachments,itisoftenpossibleforscientistswhosetheoreticalattachmentsdiffertoagreeonwhat
experimentswouldberelevanttodecidingbetweentheirviews,andtoagreeonhowtodescribetheoutcomesoftheexperimentsoncethey'vebeenrun.Weadmit,
GrannyandIdo,thatworkingscientistsindulgeineveryconceivable

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formoffudging,smoothingover,browbeating,falseadvertising,selfdeception,andoutrightratpaintingalltheintellectualillsthatfleshisheirto.Itis,indeed,amain
moralofthispaperthat,inmanyimportantways,scientistsarealotlikeus.Nevertheless,itisperfectlyobviouslytruethatscientificobservationsoftenturnup
unexpectedandunwelcomefacts,thatexperimentsoftenfailandareoftenseentodoso,inshortthatwhatscientistsobserveisn'tdeterminedsolely,orevenlargely,
bythetheoriesthattheyendorse,stilllessbythehopesthattheycherish.It'sthesefactsthatthetheoryneutralityofobservationallowsustoexplain.
Thethingis:ifyoudon'tthinkthattheoryneutralobservationcansettlescientificdisputes,you'relikelytothinkthattheyaresettledbyappealstocoherence,or
conventionorworseyetbymereconsensus.AndGrannywhoisaRealistdowntohertennissneakersdoesn'tseehowanyofthosecouldcompelrational
belief.GrannyandIhavebecomeprettyhardened,inourrespectiveoldagesbutwe'rebothstillmovedbytheideathatbeliefinthebestscienceisrationalbecauseit
isobjective,andthat.itisobjectivebecausethepredictionsofourbesttheoriescanbeobservedtobetrue.I'mlessadamantthanGrannyis,butIdon'tfindthe
argumentsagainstthetheoryneutralityofobservationpersuasive,andIthinkthatthetheoryneutralityofobservationisadoctrinethatRealistshavegottoholdonto.
"Helpstampoutcreepingpluralism,"Grannysays"give'emaninchandthey'lltakeamile!""Righton(withcertainsignificantqualifications)!"sayI.
Notes
1.Well,fourreally.ButIshan'tdiscussontologicalapproachesthatsupportadistinctionbetweenobservationtermsandothersbyclaimingthatonlytheformer
denote(e.g.,becausewhateverisunobservableisipsofactofictitious).ThattheassumptionsofthepresentdiscussionarefullyRealisticwithrespecttounobservables
willbecomeentirelyapparentasweproceed.
2.Interestinglyenough,JeromeBruner,inhisfoundationalNewLookdisquisition"OnPerceptualReadiness,"takesnoteofthispointusing,infact,thesameexamples
Ihavecited.Buthemakesnothingofit,remarkingonlythatthepersistenceofillusionsinfaceofcontrarybackgroundknowledge,thoughitmilitatesagainstthe"utter
indistinguishabilityofperceptualandmoreconceptualinterferences...mustnotleadustooverlookthecommonfeatureofinferenceunderlyingsomuchofcognitive
activity"(1973,p.8).Theissue,however,isnotwhethersomeinferencesare"moreconceptual"thanotherswhatever,precisely,thatmightmeanorevenwhether
perceptionisinsomeimportantsenseinferential.What'satissueisrather:howmuchofwhatyouknowactuallydoesaffectthewayyousee.Failingtodistinguish
amongthesequestionswas,inmyview,theoriginalsinofNewLookpsychologicaltheorizing.

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Appendix:
AReplytoChurchland's''PerceptualPlasticityandTheoreticalNeutrality"
Ihaveitinmindoneofthesedaystowriteapapercalled"ModularityandObjectivity"(ormaybe"ObjectivityandModularity").This,however,isn'tit.WhatI
proposetodointhisappendixisargueaverynarrowcase.Churchland(1988)offersabatchofconsiderationsintendedtoconvinceusthatthecognitive
impenetrabilityofperception"doesnotestablishatheoryneutralfoundationforknowledge"andthatmyempirical"viewsonimpenetrabilityarealmostcertainlyfalse."
Iproposetogothroughtheseargumentsandshow,insomedetail,thattheyarenogoodi.e.,thattheyarenogoodwhetherornottheirconclusionsaretrue.
Churchland'spaperismostlyconcernedwiththreetopics:1.Whataretheepistemologicalimplicationsofperceptualencapsulation(assuming,forthemoment,that
perceptualprocessesareindeedencapsulated)?2.Istheencapsulationthesistrue?3.Somesemanticalconsiderationsthataresupposedtoshowthatthemeaningof
observationtermsmustbetheorydependenteveniftheperceptualprocessesinvolvedinobservingthingsareencapsulatedandtheoryneutral.Iproposetodiscuss
Churchland'sargumentsundertheseheads,butwithasparecategoryinsertedformiscellanea.
TheEpistemologicalImplicationsofEncapsulation
Churchland:"Letussuppose...thatourperceptualmodules...embodyasystematicsetof...assumptionsabouttheworld,whoseinfluenceonperceptual
processingisunaffectedbyfurtherorcontraryinformation...thismaybearecipeforacertainlimitedconsensusamonghumanperceivers,butitishardlyarecipe
fortheoreticalneutrality....Whatwehaveisauniversaldogmatism,notaninnocentEdenofobjectivity....Encapsulationdoesnothingtoinsurethetruthofour
perceptualbeliefs..."(p.5)
Reply:Nobodywasofferinginnocenceoraguaranteeoftruth.Thequestionatissueis,whatarethepsychologicalconditionsunder

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whichdifferencesamongthetheoriesthatobserversholdarenotimpedimentstoperceptualconsensusamongtheobservers?Cognitiveencapsulationseemstobean
empiricallynecessaryconditionforthis,andonethatis(contrarytoNewLookpsychologizing)apparentlysatisfied.
However,ifyouconsiderthesortofbackgroundinformationthatpenetratesperception(accordingtomodularitytheory),itturnsoutthatperceptionisneutral,de
facto,withrespecttomostofthescientific(and,forthatmatter,practical)disagreementsthatobservationiscalledupontoresolve.Accordingtostandard
versionsofmodularitytheory(includingtheversionIsetoutinTheModularityofMind)perceptualprocessinghasaccessonlytobackgroundinformationabout
certainpervasivefeaturesoftherelationsbetweendistallayoutsandtheirproximalprojections.(Hardlysurprising,sinceitispreciselytherelationbetweenproximal
anddistalstimulithatperceptualprocessesarerequiredtocompute.)Thus,inthecaseofvision,agoodcandidateforaccessiblebackgroundisinformationaboutthe
geometricalrelationsbetweenthreedimensionalobjectsandthetwodimensionalimagestheyprojectontothesurfaceoftheretina.Inthelinguisticcase,agood
candidateforaccessiblebackgroundisinformationaboutthegrammaticalstructuresthatinformthetype/tokenrelationforthespeaker/hearer'sdialect.
Thepointisthat,inbothcases,relianceonsuchinformationconstitutesaperceptualbiasandinbothcasesitmakesperception"inferential"intherequiredsense.But
thisbiasleavesperceptionneutralwithrespecttoalmostalltheoreticaldisputes,soitcouldn'tgroundanygeneralargumentfortheunreliabilityofobservation.
ContrarytoChurchland,thereseemsnoreasontodoubtthatthisveryrestrictedsortofbiasmightbecompatiblewithmorethanenoughperceptualneutralityto
"ensureforusatheoryneutralfoundationforknowledge."(p.7)Indeed,itmightleaveuswithenoughtheoryneutralobservationtoallowustodiscover,and
correctfor,ourownperceptualbiases.Wemightdosobyrelyinguponinferencesfromtheoriestotheobservationalconfirmationofwhichourperceptualbiases
areirrelevant.Thissortofbootstrappingiscomplicatedtodescribebutoftenroutinelyeasytoperform.
Bytheway,theprecedingisnotmepullinginmyhornsafterthefact.Thatthepremisestowhichperceptualinferencescanappealaresubstantivelyrestrictedbythe
architectureofthemindisthewholepointofmodularitytheory.
Churchland:"Inanycase,theconsensuswouldlastonlyuntilthe

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firstmutantoraliencomesalong,toconfrontuswithadifferentperceptualpointofview."(p.7)
Reply:Churchlandapparentlywantsanaturalisticaccountofscientificobjectivitytosupplyaguaranteethatanarbitrarycollectionofintelligentorganisms(e.g.,a
collectionconsistingofsomehomosapiensandsomeMartians)wouldsatisfytheempiricalconditionsforconstitutingascientificcommunity.Ofcoursetherecanbe
nosuchguarantee.Ourdependenceuponthereliabilityofourcognitivefacultiesperceptualbiasesandallispartoftheinductiveriskthatmakesscientificinference
nondemonstrative.Ontheotherhand,IoncehadabookthatpurportedtodivideallthepossibleworriesintotheRealandtheMerelyBaroque.Churchland's
worrythat(unspecified)aliensmightarriveatasciencedifferentfromoursinvirtueof(unspecified)differencesbetweentheirperceptualbiasesandoursbelongs,it
seemstome,tothesecondcategory.
IstheEncapsulationThesisTrue?
Twopreliminarypoints:First,modularityisanempiricalthesis,sohowitcomesoutdependslargelyonwhatthepsychologicaldataprovetobe.Second,the
epistemologicallyrelevantquestionisnotwhethermodulesareperfectlyencapsulated,butwhethertheyareencapsulatedenoughtopermittheoryneutral,
observationalresolutionofscientificdisputes.Nowreadon,s.v.p.
Ambiguity
Churchland:"Manyillusions[show]thatourvisualmodulesareindeedpenetrablebyhighercognitiveassumptions....Onelearnsveryquicklytomakethe
[ambiguous]figureflipbackandforthatwill...bychangingone'sassumptionsaboutthenatureoftheobjectorabouttheconditionsofviewing."(p.8)
Reply:False.Onedoesn'tgettheduckrabbit(ortheNeckercube)toflipby"changingone'sassumptions"onedoesitby(e.g.)changingone'sfixationpoint.
Believingthatit'saduckdoesn'thelpyouseeitasonewantingtoseeitasaduckdoesn'thelpmucheither.Butknowingwheretofixatecanhelp.Fixatethereand
thentheflippingisautomatic.
Whenonebecomessophisticatedaboutthelawsthatgovernthewaythingslook,onecanfinaglethelooksbyplayingthelaws.Inthemostobviouscases:onesquints
tomakethingslooksharperonecupsone'shandbehindone'seartomakethemsoundlouder,

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etc.Itdoesn'tbegintofollowthatauditoryandvisualacuityarecognitivelypenetrable.
Exactlyinthesameway,onelearnsthatonecangetthefiguretoflipbyalteringone'sfixationpoint(or,forthatmatter,byjustwaitingeventuallyitwillflipofitsown
accord).Toconfusethiswiththepenetrationofperceptionbyutilitiesistomakethefollowingmistake:
(a)Heartrateiscognitivelypenetrable!Icanchoosetherateatwhichmyheartbeats.
(b)Remarkablehowdoyoudoit?
(a)Well,whenIwantittobeatfaster,Itouchmytoesahundredtimes.WhenIwantittobeatslower,Itakealittlenap.
(b)Oh.
Churchlandhassomefurther,rathercomplicatedcasesonofferinwhichthereversalofanambiguousfigurebringsotherperceptualeffectsautomaticallyintrain(e.g.,
ifyouseethefigureasreversedindepth,itsapparentsurfaceilluminationisalsoseentochange.)Churchland'sconclusionseemstobe:SoIcanseethesurface
illuminationasIchoose.
Buttheseexamplesdon'tadvancetheargumenttheyrestonthesamemistakejustscoutedonly,asitwere,atonefurtherremove.Whatisgoingonis:(i)there'sa
choiceabouthowyouseetheshapeambiguousfigureand(ii)there'sanomicconnectionbetweenseeingthefigureashavingacertainshapeandseeingitashavinga
certainsurfaceillumination.Soyougettoseetheilluminationyouwantbychoosinghowyouseetheshape.(Andyougettoseetheshapeyouwantby,e.g.,squinting,
alteringyourfixationpoint,etc.)Itdoesn'tfollowthatyoucanchoosehowyouseetheilluminationallthatfollowsisthattherearethingsyoucandotoget
yourselftoseetheilluminationonewayortheother(cf.theheartbeatcase).Afortiori,itdoesn'tfollowthatthereare"awiderangeofelementscentraltovisual
perception...allofwhicharecognitivelypenetrable"(p.10).Indeed,sofarwehaven'tseenany.Itmaybethatyoucanresolveanambiguousfigurebydeciding
whattoattendto.But(a)whichfiguresareambiguousisnotsomethingyoucandecide(b)norcanyoudecidewhatthetermsoftheambiguityare(c)norcanyou
decidewhatfurtherpsychologicalconsequences(e.g.,consequencesforapparentillumination)theresolutionoftheambiguitywillentrain.Thisallsoundspretty
unpenetratedtome.
Attentionis,inshort,awildcardinanaccountofobservationalneutralitybutitmaywellbethatifyoufixtheperceptualapparatusandyoufixtheobjectofattention,
thenyoufixtheappearancesforallnormalobserverseveninthecaseofambiguousfigures.Ifthisistrue

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it'sepistemologicallyinteresting,sincepartofarrivingataconsensusastowhatexperimenttoperformtochooseamongrivaltheoriesisagreeingaboutwhatpartof
theexperimentalenvironmenttoattendto."It'swherethedialpointstothatmatters,notthecolorofthenumerals"andsoforth.
FinalwordaboutNeckercubes.Eveniftheyshowedthattheperceptualanalysisofstructurallyambiguousfiguresisunencapsulated(whichtheydon't),thatmightn't
mattermuchfortheneutralityofobservationatlargesince,patently,moststimuliaren'tstructurallyambiguous.
SynchronicandDiachronicPenetration
Churchland:Theissueis"notwhethervisualprocessingisingeneralveryeasilyorquicklypenetratedbynovelorcontraryinformationtheissueiswhetheringeneral,
itispenetrableatall[forexampleby]longregimesofdeterminedtraining,practiceorconditioning."(p.11)
Reply:Itlookstomeasthoughthereareseveralissues.Let'sseewhereweare.
Itusedtobethoughtthatthereislotsofevidenceforrelativelyshorttermeffectsofbeliefsandutilitiesonperceptionperceptualeffectsofyourexpectationsaboutthe
color/suitcorrelationsofplayingcardsperceptualeffectsoftransientpeerpressures,etc.ThiswastheevidentialstuffofwhichNewLookperceptualtheorywas
made.Anditwasworryingbecauseinsensitivitytolocalalterationsinbeliefsandutilitiesis,inanyevent,anecessaryconditionforthetheoryneutralityofobservation.
Butnowitisconcededthattheremay,afterall,benosuchlocaleffects.Itis,perhaps,only"comprehensiveandprotractedkindsofpressures"(15)towhich
perceptualprocessingisplastic.(Thesemightnotevenbeperceptualeffectsofacquiringbeliefsperhapsthey'reperceptualeffectsofhavingtheexperiencesin
virtueofwhichthebeliefsareacquired.)
Howmuchwouldthismatter?Whatdegreeofdiachronicencapsulationwouldberequiredforthepossibilityoftheoryneutralobservationalresolutionofscientific
disputes?Well,surelylessthancastironinsensitivityofperceptualprocessestotraining.Rather,whatseemstoberequiredisjustenoughdiachronicencapsulationto
allowperceptualconsensustosurvivetheeffectsofthekindsofdifferencesoflearninghistoriesthatobserversactuallyexhibit.Forexample,iftrainingaffects
perceptualacuity,thenthatwouldbeakindoffailureofdiachronicencapsulationbutitwouldn'tbeany

Page258

thingthatanepistemologistneedworryaboutsinceobservationalconsensusdoesn'tgenerallydependontheobserversallhavingperceptualacuitytothesame
degree.
Well,what'stheevidence?Isthereenoughdiachronicencapsulationforthepurposesathand?
Answer:moot.Naturalizedepistemologyawaitstheempiricalfindings.Whereasthere'sarespectableempiricalargumenttobemadeforsynchronicencapsulation,
nobodyknowswhat'sgoingoninthediachroniccasetheonlypointthatisworthmakingisthatifdiachronicencapsulationprovestobepervasive,thenwewillbe
withinhailingdistanceofanaturalisticaccountofhowtheoryneutralobservationispossible.
Inanyevent,thepointofpresentconcernisthattheconsiderationsChurchlandraisesasmilitatingagainstdiachronicencapsulationcutnexttonoiceatall.Therearea
numberofthese.
InvertingLensesItis,atfirstblush,ashocktomodularitytheorythatpeoplecanadapttosuchdrasticaffrontstotheirperceptualprejudicesastheinversionofthe
retinalimage.Thisreallydoessuggestthesortofperceptualplasticitythesortofpenetrationofperceptionbyexperiencethatmodularitytheorysaysshouldn'tbe
there.
That'sfirstblushsecondblushismuchbetter.Forthereare,afterall,goodecologicalreasonswhyyoumightexpectplasticityofthissort.Viz.,organismsgrow,and
astheygrowtheymustrecalibratetheperceptual/motormechanismsthatcorrelatebodilygestureswithperceivedspatialpositions(paradigmatically,inthehuman
case,themechanismsofhandeyecoordination).Thatis,whatneedstobekeptopenforrecalibrationiswhatevermechanismscomputetheappropriatemotor
commandsforgettingto(orpointingto,orgrasping)avisibleobjectonthebasisofitsperceivedlocation.Adaptationtoinverted(andotherwisespatiallydistorting)
lensesisplausiblyanextremecaseofthissortofrecalibration.Indeed,thereisexperimentalevidencethatthisisso.Itturnsoutthatsmoothadaptationoccursonly
whenthesubjectispermittedtoactivelymanipulatetheenvironment.Inparticular,adaptationdoesnotoccur(much)inorganismsthatare,forexample,passively
wheeledaroundbutdeprivedofperceptualmotorfeedback.(SeeHeldandBossom,1961.)
Inshort,thesubjectinaninvertinglensexperimenthastolearnsuchthingsastograspdownforwhatlooksupandviceversa.Andthissortofrelearningislikelynot
differentinkindfromthecorrectionsthathavetobemadeforalterationsintheangularrelations

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betweenhand,eye,anddistalobjectinconsequenceofgrowth.Soit'splausiblethattherearespecificmechanismsthatfunctiontoeffecttherequiredvisualmotor
calibrations,andthatit'sthesemechanismsthatareengagedinadaptationtoinvertinglenses.Themoraloftheinvertinglensexperimentthusseemstobe,youfind
specificperceptualplasticityprettymuchwhereyou'dexpecttofinditonspecificecologicalgrounds.WhatChurchlandneedstoshowanddoesn'tisthatyou
alsofindperceptualplasticitywhereyouwouldn'texpectitonspecificecologicalgroundse.g.,thatyoucansomehowreshapetheperceptualfieldbylearning
physics.Churchlandoffers,however,noexamplesofthis.Istronglysuspectthat'sbecausetherearen'tany.
ReadingChurchland:"Inrecentcenturies[we]havelearnedtoperceivespeech,notjustaurally,butvisually:wehavelearnedtoread....theeyes...were[not]
evolvedfortheinstantaneousperceptionofthosecomplexstructuresoriginallyfoundinauditoryphenomena,buttheiracquiredmasteryhereillustratesthehighly
sophisticatedandsupernormalcapacitiesthatlearningcanproduceinthem."(p.16)
Impatientreply:Inrecentcenturieswehavelearnedtoperceiveautomobiles(notjustaurally,butvisually).Nowtheeyeswerenotevolvedfortheinstantaneous
perceptionofthosecomplexstructures.Sodoesn'ttheiracquiredmasteryillustratethehighlysophisticatedandsupernormalcapacitiesthatlearningcanproducein
perception?
Fiddlesticks.Churchlandneeds,anddoesn'thave,anargumentthatthevisualperceptualcapacitiesofpeoplewhocanread(or,mutatismutandis,peoplewhocan
automobilespot)differinanyinterestingwayfromthevisualperceptualcapacitiesofpeoplewhocan't.Inpreciselywhatrespectsdoeshesupposeilliteratestobe
visuallyincapacitated?
Theoldstoryis:youread(spotautomobiles)bymakingeducatedinferencesfrompropertiesofthingsthatyourvisualsystemwasevolvedtodetectshape,form,
color,sequenceandthelike.Churchlandoffersnoevidencethateducatingtheinferencesalterstheperceptualapparatus.
NeurologicalDataChurchland:Therearelotsof"descendingpathways"fromhighertoperceptualcenters.Tobesure,"experimentationontheirfunctional
significanceissofarsparse,but..."(17)Reply:Nonerequired.Heavenknowswhatpsychologicalfunction"descendingpathways"subserve.(Heavenknowswhat
psycholog

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icalfunction98.769percentofknownneuroanatomicalstructuressubserve,forthatmatter).Onethingisclear:ifthereisnocognitivepenetrationofperception,then
atleast"descendingpathways"aren'tforthat.
PerceptualLearningChurchland:Someonemusicallysophisticated"perceives,inanycompositionwhethergreatormundane,astructure,developmentandrationale
thatislostontheuntrainedear."(20)
Reply:Thismerelybegsthequestion,whichiswhethertheeffectsofmusicaltrainingare,infact,perceptual.Churchlandaddsthatonecan"justaseasilylearnto
recognizesoundsundertheirdominantfrequencydescription[or]undertheirwavelengthdescription"(p.20),butagainnoargumentisprovidedthatsomeonewho
haslearnedthishaslearnedtoperceivedifferently(asopposedtohavinglearnedadifferentwayoflabellinghisperceptionsandadifferenttheoryaboutwhathis
perceptionsareperceptionsofseebelow).
WhatChurchlandhastoshowis,first,thatperceptualcapacitiesarealteredbylearningmusicaltheory(asopposedtothetruismthatlearningmusicaltheoryalters
whatyouknowaboutmusic)second,thatit'slearningthetheory(asopposedtojustlisteningtolotsofmusic)thatalterstheperceptionandthirdthatperceptionis
alteredinsomedifferentwayifyoulearnnotmusicaltheorybutacoustics.Churchlanddoesn'tshowanyofthesethingshedoesn'tevenbothertoargueforanyof
themandIdoubtthatanyofthemaretrue.(Attemptstomakeacaseforthecorrespondingphenomenaincolorperceptionhavenotfaredwellseetherecent
experimentalliteratureonthe"Whorfhypothesis.")Inanyevent,youdon'trefusemodularitytheorybytheunsupportedassertionthatitiscontrarytothefacts.
Miscellaneous:TwoDigressions
TheArgumentaboutCaloric
IamnotatallclearhowChurchlandthinksthisargumentgoes.Iparaphraseundercorrection.
Churchland:Somebodywhodescribeshisheatexperiencesintermsofcalorictheorycouldinsistuponthecognitiveimpenetrabilityof'caloricillusions'(e.g.,ofthe
twobucketillusion)withtheabsurdconsequencethat"ourperceptualjudgmentsaboutthecaloricfluidpressuresofcommonobjectsareinanimportantsensetheory
neutral."(p.25)

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Reply:WhatonearthdoesChurchlandsupposethatthisobservationshows?Thetheoryneutralityofperceptionisn'tabouttheimpactofone'sbeliefsuponhowone
describesone'sexperiencesit'sabouttheimpactofone'sbeliefsuponone'sexperiences.Itisthusperfectlytrue,andperfectlyharmless,thatourperceptual
judgmentsaboutthecaloricfluidpressuresofcommonobjectsareinanimportantsensetheoryneutrali.e.,theyaretheoryneutralquaperceptualjudgments,butnot
quajudgmentsaboutcaloricfluidpressures.Thus,ifwechangedtheories,thenwewouldnolongerdescribetheillusionintermoftheapparentcaloricpressuresinthe
twobucketsperhapswe'ddescribeitintermsoftheapparentmmke.But,torepeat,theencapsulationthesisisn'tthatchangingaguy'sbeliefsleaveshisdescriptions
ofhisexperiencesintactit'sthatitleavestheexperiencesthemselvesintactinthepresentcase,changingfromthecalorictheorytothemmkestorydoesn'tmake
theillusiongoaway.
Idonotwishtoharponthis,butreally!The"false"conclusionofwhichthethoughtexperimentissupposedtobeareductioisthat"thetheoriesweembracehaveno
effectoncaloricperception,andallhumanswithnormalperceptualsystemswillthusperceivetheworldinexactlythesameway"(25).Now,(a)thefirstconjunctis
surelytruesincethereisnosuchthingascaloric,thereisnosuchthingascaloricperception.Whattheoriesoneholdsdoesn'tchangethat,sothetheoriesweembrace
havenoeffectoncaloricperception.And(b)thesecondconjunctmaybefalse,butit'snotshowntobebyremarkingthatifyouthinkthereiscaloricandyoudon't
thinkthereismmke,thenifyouhaveaheatillusionyouwilldescribeitasacaloricillusionandyouwon'tdescribeitasanmmkeillusion.It'snotonlynotshownthe
observationdoesn'tevenbear.
Ifyouexperienceaperceptualphenomenonandyouhappentothinkit'sthesortofperceptualphenomenonthatGrannyisalwaysexperiencing,thenyouwillperhaps
describeitasaGrannyphenomenon.AndifyouthenhappentostopthinkingthatitisthesortofphenomenonthatGrannyisalwaysexperiencing,youwillthen
perhapsstopdescribingitasaGrannyphenomenon.Thesetruismsdonottendtosubstantiatethehypothesisthatyourperceptualphenomenaarepenetratedbyyour
beliefsaboutGranny.(Or,forthatmatter,tosubstantiateitsdenial).
ItmaybethatChurchlandhasinmindanargumentthatgoeslikethis:Ourtheorieschangethewaywedescribeourexperiences.Butestablishingascientific
consensusrequiresthattherebesomedescriptionsofperceptionthataretheoryneutral(e.g.,thedialispointingtotheseven,thefluidhasturnedpink,etc.).Soeven
ifourexperiencesaretheoryneutral,that'snotenoughfortheoryneutral

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observationalvalidationofourtheoriesnot,atleast,ifobservationalvalidationissomethingthatscientificcommunitiesdo.
Reply:Thethoughtexperimentaboutcaloricshowsthatsomeofthewayswedescribeourexperienceschangewithchangesintheory(sodoesthethoughtabout
Granny)butwhatChurchlandneedsisthatallofthewayswedescribeourexperiencesare(inprinciple)theorysensitive.Ineffect,heneedstoarguethattherecan
benotheoryneutralobservationvocabularyevenifthereistheoryneutralobservation.Thisseemstome,toputitmildly,lessthanselfevident.Inanyevent,itsurely
doesn'tnotfollowfromthethoughtexperiments.OrfromanyotherargumentthatChurchlandoffers,sofarasIcantell.
DigressiononSensations
Churchland:"IfrigidityinthecharacterofoursensationsisallFodorisconcernedtodefend,thenIdonotunderstandhisobjectiontoanddismissalof...alternative
perceptualpossibilities[thatmake]noassumptionsabouttheplasticityofoursensations."(p.30)Reply:Churchlandconstructsasensation/judgmentdilemma,and
thenproposesthatIimpalemyselfononeofthehorns.Nothanks.Theremaybesomenontruthvaluable(purelysensory)statesinvolvedinperception,buttheyaren't
theoutputstatesofmodules.Toafirstapproximation,theoutputsofmodulesarejudgmentsabouthowthingsappearjudgmentswhicharethenupforbeing
correctedbyreferencetobackgroundbeliefsinthecourseof"higher"cognitiveprocessing.Theideaisthattherearetwosortsofjudgmentalprocesses(perceptual
andhighercognitive),onebutnottheotherofwhichisencapsulated.Thisideaisneutralontheissueofwhetherthereisalsosomenonjudgmentalprocesswhose
encapsulationmightfollow(perhapstrivially)fromitsnonjudgementalness.Modularitytheoryisneutralonallofthis,andsoamI.
Semantics
Churchland:Ifyouaccepta"conceptualrole"storyaboutmeaning,thenitwillprobablyfollowthatwhattheoryyouholddetermineswhatyourobservationstatements
mean.
Reply:Somuchtheworseforconceptualrolestoriesaboutmeaning.Somuchtheworseforusetheoriesingeneral,forthatmatterIwouldn'thaveoneatadiscount.

Page263

Churchland:Youhadbetteracceptaconceptualrolestoryaboutmeaning,because''Ifaterm'F'istobeameaningfulobservationterm,thenit'spredication'Fa'must
havesomematerialconsequences:itmustimplysomefurthersentences...Butif'F'figuresinno...backgroundbeliefsorassumptionswhatever,then'Fa'willbe
entirelywithoutconsequenceorsignificanceforanything...itwillbeawheelthatturnsnothing....Meaningfulobservationtermsthereforewillalwaysbeembedded
withinsomesetofassumptions.Andsincethereisnoanalytic/syntheticdistinction,theseassumptionswillalwaysbespeculativeandcorrigible."(p.28)
Reply:(a)Fromthefactthatmeaningfulobservation(orother)termsarealwaysembeddedinatheory,itdoesnotfollowthatthetheorythatatermisembeddedin
contributestodeterminingwhatitmeans.(b)Theobservationsentence'Fa'istrueiffaisF.So,byassumption,'Fa'hasatruthconditionandisafortiorisignificant.It
wouldappearthatthisissowhetherornot'F'"figuresinbackgroundbeliefsorassumptions,"soI'matalosstoimaginewhatargumentChurchlandthinkshehas
givenforaconceptualroletheoryofmeaning.(Ofcourse,Churchlandmightclaimthat'Fa'couldn'thaveatruthconditionunless'F'figuresinbackgroundbeliefsbut
thatwouldbetobegthequestionandestablishconceptualrolesemanticsbyfiat.)Fordiscussionofwhatappearstobeasimilarbadargumentthatturnsupin
Dennett's"IntentionalSystems",seeFodor,1987,p.89.
Coda
Churchland:Mustthejourneyendhere?...Thelongawakeningispotentiallyendless.Thehumanspiritwillcontinueitsbreathtakingadventureofselfreconstruction,
anditsperceptualandmotorcapacitieswillcontinuetodevelopasanintegralpartofitsselfreconstruction"(p.35).
Reply:Anendlessawakeningsoundslikenotallthatmuchfun,cometothinkofit:I,forone,amsimplyunabletoselfreconstructuntilI'vehadmymorningcoffee.
Actually,theoriescomeandtheoriesgoandpeopledon'treallychangeverymuchorsoitseemstome.That'sprobablyjustaswellifwebecomeourtheories,how
aretheyto"dieinourstead"?

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Page269

IndexofNames

A
Anderson,J.,229
Antony,L.,131
Auntie,3,4,5,8,10,14,16,19,20,25,28
Austen,J.,202

B
Bacon,F.,232
Baker,L.,103106,116,121,131,133,134
Barwise,J.,26
Bernoulli,117,145,155
Bever,T.,214
Block,N.,10,13,17,111114,131
Boghossian,P.,119,131,135136
Bossom,J.,258
Boyd,R.,7
Brentano,F.,70,75,79,96,112,125,127,126,130
Bruner,J.,199,204,217221,222,225,230,243,251
Burge,T.,17,29,31

C
Callas,M.,68
Carey,S.,229
Carroll,L.,228
Chomsky,N.,5357,63,128,174,175,228,229
Churchland,Paul,8,10,11,12,29,31,221222,235238,244,247,253263
Churchland,Patricia,11,12,29,31,87,226227
Cummins,R.,10,28,135

D
Darwin,C.,64,65,70,72,7379,8687,91,106,145,225226
Davidson,D.,6,60,150,153,156,157,159,170,173,176
Dennett,D.C.,7,9,12,23,28,31,75,76,78,79,85,87,131,179,263
Devitt,M.,131
Dewey,J.,81,206,208
Doyle,C.,21
Dretske,F.,28,34,35,3842,43,49,5758,6164,75,80,90,8384,103,104,120,121,132,133,135,162,228
Dreyfus,B.,11,12
Duhem,P.,230

E
Eisenhower,D.,67

F
Field,H.,16,29,32
Fodor,J.A.,ix,6,8,16,17,28,29,31,32,34,47,75,90,92,103,124,132,134,162,167,176,191,200,214,228,245,262,263
Frege,G.,163,168,170,180
Freud,S.,128,129,174,175,241

G
Galanter,G.,229
Gall,F.,202
Garrett,M.,214
Gibson,J.,31,81,197,208
Glymour,C.,29
Goodman,N.,241,247
Gould,S.J.,70,227
Gregory,R.,206,238,239
Grice,H.P.,177,178,179

H
Hanson,N.,243244,247,250
Harman,G.,17,32,110
Haugeland,J.,11,12
Held,R.,258
Hempel,C.,158,184
Hornstein,N.,145,157
Hume,D.,24,49

I
Israel,D.,7172,81,86,92,132

Page270

J
Jackendoff,R.,187
James,W.,21
Joyce,J.,21

K
Kant,I.,21,203,230
Kaye,D.,207
Kripke,S.,94,110,135136,165
Kuhn,T.,173,240241,247

L
Larkin,J.,229
Lepore,E.,148150,153,156
Levine,J.,131
Lewontin,R.C.,70,227
Linas,R.,228
Loar,B.,17,29,32,60
Loewer,B.,131,148150,153,156,176
Lycan,W.,17

M
MacCorquadale,K.,54
MarslenWilson,W.,213
Mates,B.,164,165,171,176
Matthews,R.,29
Maudlin,T.,68,102,131
McGinn,C.,17
McKinley,W.,27
McLaughlin,B.,ix,131,156,157158
Milanov,Z.,68
Miller,G.,229
Millikan,R.,6569,72,75,76,8586,179
Moore,G.E.,x

P
Papineau,D.,60,75,80,86,179
Pasteur,L.,151152,153,158
Perry,J.,26
Piaget,J.,208
Plato,128
Pribrum,K.,229
Putnam,H.,6,7,2728,31,83,103,105,175,176
Pylyshyn,Z.,ix,191,216

Q
Quine,W.,x,xi,6,27,31,5657,83,176,180,184,235

R
Ramsey,F.,13
Rey,G.,131,132
Rock,I.,206
Rosenthal,D.,87
Ross,W.,157
Russell,B.,124
Ryle,G.,31

S
Saussure,F.,161
Schiffer,S.,177191
Searle,J.,11,12,17,31,135
Sellars,W.,17
Skinner,B.F.,31,5357,58,63,7475,80,83,90,99,120
Sossa,E.,148
Stabler,E.,23
Stalnaker,R.,17,29,32,64,84,179
Stampe,D.,28,3438,43,4445,49,162,228
Stevenson,A.,67
Stich,S.,6,8,11,12,2728,29,31,145

T
Tarski,A.,84,177
Turing,A.,188
Tyler,L.,213

V
Vendler,Z.,18,28
Vygotsky,L.,208

W
Wagner,S.,102,131,132133,135
Weinstein,S.,102
Wittgenstein,L.,54,99,135,136,161162