Opposition to Colombian Immigration in Venezuela

and the 1980 Matrcula General de Extranjeros

Alex Escalona
11.15.2004
B.A. Thesis
Faculty Reader: Andreas Feldmann

Introduction
In August of 1980, the government of Lus Herrera Campns instated a general amnesty
for undocumented immigrants residing in Venezuela. The amnesty titled the Matrcula General
de Extranjeros (General Register for Foreigners: 1980 MGE, thenceforth)came at the end of a
period of unprecedented economic prosperity that had been initiated in 1973 as a result of the
sudden increase in oil prices brought about by the OPEC cartel. As I will argue in this paper, the
ulterior purpose of this program was to displace the blame for the sudden economic downturn
onto the sizable undocumented immigrant population in the country. In the late 1970s with the
first signs of economic depressionthe Venezuelan media and government put into motion a
campaign to stigmatize undocumented immigration, blaming this group for much of the
countrys economic woes. The contradictions between the media- and government-sponsored
campaign to stigmatize undocumented immigration and the particular position of these flows
within the Venezuelan economy inform the role of the 1980 MGE. That is, many undocumented
Colombians who constituted the overwhelming majority of undocumented immigrantshad
been brought into the country to fulfill labor shortages in the mid-1970s, and, primarily, to build
a sustainable base of cheap labor. However, faced with a sharp economic downturn and
ineffective economic policiesthe government and the media began to blame undocumented
immigrants for the countrys unemployment problems, the social services deficit, and the overall
condition of underdevelopment they now confronted. Around the same time, and particularly
at the end of 1979, deportations took a stringent turn and the volume of deportations not only
increased, but procedures became more aggressive. On the one hand, then, the 1980 MGE
represented an attempt on the governments behalf to put a precise number on the magnitude of
the situation, one that would confirm the runaway figures estimating undocumented immigration

in the country. On the other, however, the rather sobering results of the 1980 MGE served to
counter further entrenchment of opposition to Colombian immigration in Venezuela. In fact,
according to the government and media, estimations of the size of undocumented immigration in
the country had reached up to 4 million people, in 1980. This figure overwhelmingly surpassed
the official figure of 1,312,318 registered foreigners, for 1979.1 In particular, I would argue that
opposition to Colombian immigration around the time of the 1980 MGE was formulated in the
language of national sovereignty and, primarily, economic development. As we shall see,
national sovereignty was inextricably bound to the theme of economic development. Thus,
though the problems the country faced were largely economic in nature, the language through
which they were formulated (i.e., opposition to undocumented immigration) was essentially
political.
In her study of Undocumented Immigrants within Colombian Immigration in
Venezuela, Adela Pellegrino notes that
the population exchange between Venezuela and Colombia was a running practice in the
border regions of both countries since Independence, both having fallen under the same
administrative jurisdiction during the colonial period.2
The reality of this historical interaction is highlighted by the common culture shared between
people living on both sides of the Colombo-Venezuelan border. This border region is
characterized by a relatively homogenous and even distinct cultural entity that shares not only
geography, but a common linguistic identity and even a common livelihood. As Pellegrino has
remarked,
the cultural identity presented by the Andean population of both countries, united by the
fact that the exchange of products within the international market of the border states was carried
1

Berglund, Susan, and Hernndez Calimn, Humberto, Los de Afuera: Un Estudio Analtico del Proceso Migratorio
en Venezuela, 1936-1985 (Caracas: CEPAM, 1985), 119.
2
Pellegrino, Adela, Los Indocumentados en la Inmigracin Colombiana en Venezuela (Caracas: UCAB, 1985) 1.

out through the Port of Maracaibo during most of the nineteenth century, determined a certain
economic unity in the region and a relative autonomy with respect to other economic circuits in
both countries.
These remarks emphasize not only the fluidity of immigration between these regions, but also
their well-established history. Colombian immigration in Venezuela, however, had not always
been a characterized by sizable flows.
Indeed, these movements did not register significant numbers until the 1930s, when a
small but significant contingent of Colombians immigrated to the neighboring country in search
of work in the new oil industry.3 Yet despite the sudden increase in immigration from Colombia
in the 1930s, these flows did not represent a sizable and sustained movement until the 1950s.
Furthermore, while immigration flows between Venezuela and Colombia began to receive
political attention in the beginning of the 1940s with the passage of the Estatuto de Rgimen
Fronterizo a statute regulating cross-border migrations through the issuance of frontier
permitsthe institution of cross-border immigration policies did not garner considerable
discussion until the late 1950s, when a joint commission was established by the governments of
both countries to debate the matter. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Colombian immigration in
Venezuela increased significantly in volume, owing to the growing practice of mechanized
agriculture and the concomitant decreases in employment opportunities. Moreover, with the
outbreak of la violencia in the 1940s and 1950s, Colombian immigrants began to seek refuge
away from highly vulnerable rural areas. With the outbreak of civil war, the Colombian economy
entered a period of declining power that was initiated by the political instability and growing
rural unemployment. Added to the displacing effects of industrialization, both in the urban

Castao, Juanita, La Legislacin Migratoria Colombiana y Andina: Un Marco Necesario para el Estudio de la
Migracin entre stos Pases, Migracin de Colombianos a Venezuela, ed. Ramiro Cardona Gutierrez, et al.
(Bogot: Editorial Carrera, 1983) 74.

economy and in the agricultural sector, these factors created the conditions for larger migrations
out of rural regions in Colombia.4
As former campesinos became landless and jobless, people looked to escape the growing
unrest and economic downturn through migration to more populous centers within the country,
but also through emigration, especially to Venezuela and the US, as well as to Ecuador, Panama
and Peru in smaller numbers. Small groups of skilled workers and technicians left for Venezuela
as well in the 1970s to take advantage of higher pay in the neighboring country. During this time
particularly after WWIIVenezuela saw a sudden increase in immigration that made it and
Argentina the two largest destinations for migrants moving to South America, especially those
originating in Europe. These European immigrants came largely from Mediterranean countries,
in particular, Spain, Italy and Portugal, though smaller groups came from other Western and
Eastern European nations. Before this period, it should be noted, Colombian immigration
represented the largest group of people entering the country. In the 1960s however, European
immigration lost much of its momentum, and many Europeans that had settled in Venezuela
packed their belongings and returned to their home countries due to political instability in the
country, but also because of economic growth back home.
In the decade of the 1970s, immigration in Venezuela reached its highest point, as an
increasing number of immigrants from Venezuelas brother country were joined by flows from
South America and the Caribbean. These movements were constituted by a large number of men
in search of work in Venezuelas growing urban sectors.5 However, even when migration flows
from Colombia lost momentum in the 1980s, due largely to deteriorating economic conditions in

4
5

Pellegrino, Adela, Historia de la Inmigracin en Venezuela, Siglos XIX y XX (Caracas: ANCE, 1989).
Pellegrino (1985), 1-2.

Venezuela, many Colombian immigrants opted to remain in their new country of residence due
to a rise in unemployment next door and the devaluation of the Colombian peso.6
The growth in overall immigration to Venezuela in the 1970s from Colombia and
elsewhere in South America, and the Caribbeanwas due to two major economic factors. The
first was the renewed strength of the Venezuelan economy added to the stability of its
currencywhich was due largely to OPECs strategy of increasing oil prices, in 1973. The
upsurge in oil prices created a newfound source of public spending, thanks to artificially-high oil
profits and heavy borrowing. This spending translated into significant economic expansion and
the creation of new employment opportunities in the country.7 Further, faced with acute labor
shortage, the government proceeded to address the issue by looking past its borders for sources
of labor both skilled and unskilled. At the same time, government efforts to attract immigrant
workers to the country through newly established legal channels were largely ineffective. That is,
while the Venezuelan government had setup a program to attract skilled workers from South
America and Europe, most immigrants came to Venezuela on their own means. In fact, the
overwhelming majority of skilled workers applied to consulates in their home countries, ignoring
the legal mechanisms established through the new program that sought to attract skilled workers.
Immigrants from the southern cone countries, in particular, sought to escape military regimes at
home, while other Latin American immigrants faced stagnant economies and high rates of
unemployment.8 However, this period of economic bonanza was rather short-lived. Between
1979 and 1980, the countrys economy took a sharp turn for the worse. The signs of this

Ibid, 33.
Ibid, 29.
8
Bidegain, Gabriel, Inmigrantes: Mito o Realidad?, Revista sobre Relaciones Industriales y Laborales, 18
(1986): 17.
7

downturn were increasing inflation, deteriorating social services, and worsening levels of
unemployment, as well as an overall decrease in private and public spending.
Faced with ineffective economic policies that sought to rescue the country from further
economic depression, in 1980 the government of Lus Herrera Campns instated an amnesty for
undocumented immigrants residing in the country. The unprecedented scope of this amnesty
made it the first of its kind in the countrys history, though smaller amnesty programs had been
instated before. Further, practically everybody who applied for the amnesty was successfully
registered and, in the process, their previously irregular situation was regularized. That is, the
overwhelming majority of these undocumented immigrants were granted a temporary
identification card that lasted for a period of one year and that was open to renewal. At first sight,
the implementation of the MGE may be seen as a conscientious step on the governments behalf
to right the situation of thousands of undocumented immigrants. Despite its veneer of
benevolence, however, the particular context within which it was implemented points to a
different role for the amnesty program.
As will be argued in this paper, the role of the 1980 MGE was to displace the blame for
the economic downturn onto the countrys sizable undocumented population. The media- and
government-sponsored campaign to stigmatize undocumented immigration blamed this group of
people for the increasing social services deficit, worsening levels of unemployment, and a
general importation of underdevelopment. However, figures published in the media and stated
by government officials concerning the size of the undocumented population were essentially
disproved by the sobering results of the MGE. While running estimates over the size of this
group were as high as 4 million people, the number of applicants for the MGE failed to reach
300,000 people.

This begs the following questions. How is opposition to Colombian immigration in 1980
Venezuela informed by the end of the "economic bonanza" of the 1970s? Moreover, how was
opposition to Colombian immigration formulated in the public sphere during this time? In order
to answer these questions, I will look closely at immigration discourse in government and in the
media around the time of the 1980 MGE. In particular, I will consider the various ways through
which this opposition was formulated, focusing on the role of territorial sovereignty specifically
within the context of the ongoing diferendo, a dispute between the governments of Colombia
and Venezuela over territorial waters in the oil-rich region of the Gulf of Venezuelaand
economic development within the discussion of undocumented immigration. Before we may
proceed with this, however, it will be necessary to develop a description of the particular
political and economic context within which the Colombian immigrant in Venezuela became a
pivotal actor. The ongoing project of economic development which informs the question of
territorial sovereignty, among othersis central to the formulation of opposition to Colombian
immigration in Venezuela. The questions this paper will address, moreover, are not only relevant
to the current Venezuelan political situation, they offer important contributions to the
immigration literature as whole.
The issue of undocumented immigration in Venezuela has garnered considerable
discussion within the immigration literature of the 1970s and 1980s. Most of this literature is
sociological in nature, though there have been some anthropological and historical approaches to
the subject. However, within this literature the issue of opposition to Colombian immigration in
Venezuela was generally considered as a secondary topic. Thus, there exist few elaborated
discussions on the particular factors whether economic, historical, or geopoliticalthat inform
the subject. Moreover, I was unable to find any one source that devoted itself fully to the topic of

opposition to Colombian immigration, particularly surrounding the 1980 MGE. Several

academic sources that did emphasize the effects of economic factors on opposition to Colombian
immigration even endorsed the very ascriptions of crime, disease epidemics, unemployment, and
other sources of stigmatization published in the press and voiced by government officials at the
time. Therefore, I hope to illuminate on the particular context within which such sources of
opposition to Colombian immigration were formulated, placing a particular emphasis on the
economic and political factors that inform the issue.
This paper is divided into three sections. The first section seeks to provide the economic
and political context within which Colombian immigration played a pivotal role. In this section, I
will elaborate on the contemporary economies of Colombia and Venezuela, highlighting the
effects the countries economies had on the sudden increase in Colombian migration to
Venezuela in the 1970s. These migrations took place during a period of considerable policy
planning that sought to define the role of immigration within a general program for economic
development. As we shall see, economic actors in Venezuela actively stimulated Colombian
immigration to the country through various means. These efforts to attract immigration were
quite successful, and they aimed to create a sustainable base of cheap labor for the Venezuelan
economy. While these objectives were seen as essential for the economic development of the
nation, the role of undocumented immigration changed drastically at the end of the decade,
particularly in the face of a sharp economic downturn. At that time, deportations came to be seen
as a solution to economic problems posed by undocumented immigration.
The second section of the paper discusses the demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics of Colombian immigration. Most of this discussion will be based on the evidence
presented by sociologists working with the topic of immigration in Venezuela. In the same

section, I will elaborate on the meaning of the undocumented immigrant in Venezuela. In

particular, I will show that not only was undocumented immigration considered to be
problematic for the countrys economy, but, at the same time, Colombian immigration was
described as largely undocumented. This contributed to a process of stigmatizing redefinition of
Colombian immigration as largely undocumented. That is, while most of the undocumented
immigrants applying for the 1980 MGE were Colombian, the size of the legally-resident
Colombian population was actually larger if only slightlyin comparison. Through this process
of redefinition, the problems associated with undocumented immigration however unfounded
they may have beenwere essentially ascribed to Colombian immigration as a whole.
The third and final section of this paper will discuss the general implications of the 1980
Matrcula General de Extranjeros and, in particular, the discussion of Colombian immigration in
government and in the media at the time. The purposes of the 1980 MGE were largely defined by
opposition to Colombian immigration. Thus, the press reported statements by government
officials that stigmatized undocumented immigration by blaming these flows for the economic
downturn of the late 1970s. Further, undocumented Colombian immigration was seen as a threat
to territorial sovereignty, a subject which was closely tied to the securing of the same oil
resources that had fueled the economic boom of the 1970s. Ultimately, the magnitude of these
problems was widened by overestimations of the size of undocumented immigration published in
the press and voiced by government officials.
The discussion of immigration in the media and in government represents an influential
forum through which public opinion on the subject of immigration especially undocumented
immigrationis elaborated. In his study on the Influence of the Press on Public Opinion
concerning Immigration, van Roy (1983: 368) states that within a democratic system,

government has to confront and compete in the formation and capture of public opinion
mainly with those who, like the mass media, have the easiest and most direct reach over that
opinion. While this assertion may be true, government statements concerning immigration and
those made by the press around the time of the 1980 MGE did not differ too strongly on their
treatment of undocumented immigration. Moreover, not surprisingly articles in the press often
cited extracts of statements by government officials concerning undocumented immigration.
Therefore, most of the official statements on immigration cited in this paper come from sources
in the Venezuelan press.
Van Roys study found that between 1977 and 1980 discussion of immigration in the
press editorials of two popular newspapers increased with time. Though this trend was not
uniform for the period in question, the author notes that the discussion of immigration was most
frequent around the time of the 1980 MGE, between the last quarter of 1979 and through 1980.
Most importantly, we know that the total circulation for the nations four largest newspapers
reached 800,000 people, around 1983. Evidently, newspapers in Venezuela have a broad and
captive audience, and it can be said that their discussion of immigration is an important source of
public opinion concerning the topic. The thrust of this paper, therefore, will be its consideration
of this discussion within the context of opposition to Colombian immigration.
Most of my newspaper sources were gathered during research in Caracas, over a period
of two to three weeks.9 I have translated all of these sources into English. I will be discussing
mostly newspaper articles from 1980 and before, though I gathered sources for other periods as
well. The overwhelming majority of my newspaper sources were taken from the pages of El
Nacional, which circulates throughout the country and competes with another major newspaper,
9

A list of the newspaper articles cited in this paper is available under Appendix A.

10

El Universal, for national readership. A few of my newspaper sources will also come from a
work on undocumented immigration written by Alcides Gmez Jimnez and Luz Marina Daz
Mesa, which is titled The Modern-day Slavery: Undocumented Immigrants in Venezuela
(1983). In this work, the authors catalogued a considerable number of newspaper sources
between 1979 and 1980 that discussed the subjects of xenophobia, chauvinism, and others in
response to undocumented Colombian immigration in Venezuela.
This paper is essentially a case study of the public perception of undocumented
immigration in Venezuela. Therefore, I will be considering sources that relate mostly to
immigration in Venezuela. Many of these sources are in Spanish, and I have translated excerpts
cited in this paper where necessary. Although the general purpose of this paper is to provide a
case study of undocumented immigration, I hope to contribute not only to the Venezuelan and
Colombian immigration literature, but also to the general literature on international migrations.
Again, most of my sources are not only sociological in nature, but pertain to the topic of
immigration as it applies to the Venezuelan and Colombian contexts. Furthermore, most of these
sources are dated in the 1980s, and only one comes from the 1990s. This is a result of the relative
obscurity of the topic, and it is largely confined to discussion around the time of the 1980 MGE,
and the half decade or so that followed. For this reason, I hope to offer new interpretations of this
dated discussion of undocumented immigration in Venezuela.

11

I. Colombian Immigration and the Period of Economic Bonanza

The Economic Bonanza of the 1970s
Beginning in 1973, the Venezuelan economy entered a period of economic bonanza
that was due partly to an upsurge in the prices of hydrocarbon and iron exports. That same year
the OPEC cartel implemented a policy of increasing oil prices that benefited its exporting
members. As an OPEC member country, Venezuela profited considerably from the hike in oil
prices. Further, Venezuela was in an advantageous position given the countrys role as the
number one exporter of oil in the western hemisphere. The higher oil prices thus brought in new
financial resources for the country, which allowed it to accelerate its programs in search of
economic and social development.1 As a result of this newfound source of national income, the
country saw a resurgence of immigration flows from the region that now included groups of
people from Chile, Argentina, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Peru and Uruguay.2 Colombian
and Portuguese immigration, which had been steady before this period, also saw a reinvigoration
of their flows. Part of this renewed source of immigration, particularly the increase in Portuguese
and the new Southern Cone immigrants, was a result of government policies that sought to attract
skilled labor to the country. Indeed, immigration hit a high point during this period of positive
economic performance and the active segment of the foreign-born population doubled, going
from 325,755 to 632,702 between 1971 and 1981.3 To understand the considerable rise in
immigration flows, then, it is important that we take a closer look at the Venezuelan economy of
the 1970s.

Berglund and Hernndez (1985), 112.

Ibid, 60.
3
Pellegrino, Adela, Los Indocumentados en la Inmigracin Colombiana en Venezuela, Revista sobre Relaciones
Industriales y Laborales 18 (1986): 51.
2

The Venezuelan economy of the 1970s

Between 1972 and 1977, per-capita income in the country nearly tripled.4 Investments in
the country, both in the public and private sectors, increased 45% between 1974 and 1978.
Capital in agriculture, mining, industry, and construction increased every year through 1978. The
manufacturing sector, in particular, saw considerable growth. Out of 654 new projects, 71%
corresponded to new firms that had been founded during this period. Construction alone saw a
ten percent annual growth rate during this period. Indeed, as a result of high growth rates across
all economic sectors in the country, Venezuela found itself in a period of economic bonanza.5
The overwhelming effects of this bonanza the fact that it affected all sectors of the economy
simultaneouslygave rise to a high demand for labor that could not be fulfilled by the native
population. As Berglund and Hernndez (1985: 115) put it, native labor was not sufficient with
respect to capacity and technical experience. As a result, the country decided to turn to sources
of labor beyond its borders to fulfill this shortage. Moreover, as Bidegain (1986: 17) has pointed
out, much of Latin America at this time was experiencing economic and social crisis and in
some [countries] coups had taken place, all of which furthermore facilitated political and highly
qualified immigration. However, this high point in the Venezuelan economy was to be rather
short-lived. The subsequent fall of the economy came just before the end of the 1970s, some five
years after the launch of this fecund period of economic production.
Berglund and Hernndez (1985: 131) state that during the period 1980-1984, the country
experienced a radical change in the behavior and performance of the economy, since from a
situation of general bonanza it passes to the opposite extreme. Samper, et al (1981: 33) argue

In fact, it went from Bs. 1,072 to 3,180. At the time, the exchange rate was about Bs. 4.5 to the dollar, which would
translate the latter figure into roughly $707.
5
Figures cited from Berglund and Hernndez (1985), 112-5, and Pellegrino (1986), 44.

13

that, due to an excess in public spending, the economy became overheated. As a result, private
investment began to drop. Signs of this economic decline had begun to appear in 1979, when
many sectors of the economy and particularly economic investments experienced a drop from the
general state of economic resurgence. At the same time, the government faced staggering debt, in
the figure of $6.175 billion. This led to a decrease in protectionist policies, the devaluing of the
currency and tightening spending limits, all of which created a climate of uncertainty.
Unemployment nearly doubled between 1978 and 1980, going from an all-time low of 4.3
percent to 7.3 percent. Tellingly, overall trade between Venezuela and Colombia dropped
considerably between the first semesters of 1979 and 1980. In fact, the trade balance between the
two countries went from a surplus of $189 million, to a deficit of $21.7 million. In 1983, then,
the abrupt economic changes effectuated a so-called economic crisis that practically broke
with the high economic performance that had characterized the previous decade.6
Concomitantly, official immigration from Colombia became negative in 1979, as more
Colombians left than entered the country. However, it should be noted that despite the steady
economic decline of the early 1980s, Colombian immigration continued to enter the country due
mostly to a parallel rise in unemployment in Colombia and the devaluation of the Colombian
peso.7
In 1979 Venezuelan immigration policy took a stringent turn. Deportations became more
frequent and the government tried to suppress flows from the Andes (primarily Colombia) and
the Caribbean.8 Coming at the end of a decade of economic bonanza, these restrictive
immigration policies reflected the close relationship between immigration and the Venezuelan

Berglund and Hernndez (1985), 131.

Pellegrino (1986), 54.
8
Bidegain (1986), 20.
7

14

economy, especially seeing as immigration had brought in rather large flows in the earlier,
economically-productive period of the 1970s. Within the context of an abrupt downturn in the
economy, the media and government began to use undocumented immigration as a scapegoat for
Venezuelas economic woes.9 In 1980 the Venezuelan government unrolled the MGE as a
political solution to the economic implications of the presence of a large, cheap source of labor
that could competitively displace Venezuelan workers. Indeed, as Berglund and Hernndez
(1985: 136) have speculated,
it would be lamentable and dangerous, with regards to xenophobia, if unemployed
[Venezuelans] saw their possibilities reduced, or if they would be substituted by non-national
labor that enters the country in an uncontrolled manner, attracted by the existence of new
opportunities.
Whether the Venezuelan government implemented the 1980 MGE to prevent a worsening of
unemployment levels, and particularly the displacement of Venezuelan workers, remains to be
seen. The motives behind the 1980 MGE, however, may be elucidated through a closer look at
the policies implemented during the period of economic bonanza.
The New Model for Economic Development
Implemented under President Rafael Calder (1969-74), the Fourth Plan of the Nation
1970-4 an outline of the national goals of the executive officecalled for selective immigration
policies that did not compromise the employment opportunities of Venezuelans. As stated within
the plan,
unskilled workers hinder, if not completely outdo, any effort to solve the present
occupational problem. The increase of this type of immigrants normally translates into a
displacement of national labor and generally results in a significant deterioration of the level of
real salaries, which definitively accentuates unemployment and underemployment.10

Samper P., E. et al., No a Venezuela (Bogot: ANIF, 1981), 35; Berglund and Hernndez (1985), 135.
Pellegrino (1989), 244.

10

15

This opposition to undocumented immigration had been elaborated before, in 1970. That year,
the Department of Labor presented a speech on The Policy of Selective Immigration at the
First National Convention for Employment, highlighting the challenges posed by mass
immigration and, contrastively, the advantages of selective immigration. Selective immigration
policies selected for qualified immigrants, or skilled workers, shunning open-door policies that
attracted mass immigration. Put simply, Venezuela would decide on policies that determine
how many and which [immigrants] we need for its economic development.11 The Secretary of
the department considered undocumented Colombian immigration a grave concern that should
be addressed within the framework of a concrete, national labor policy. This led to a rejection of
immigration agreements with Colombia, favoring instead unilateral, but decisive national
policy.12 These convictions against undocumented immigration were closely tied to the poor
economic situation in the country at the time.
In 1973, however, economic expansion knocked on the door and, faced with acute labor
shortages the government responded with a new and vigorous plan for selective immigration. By
the following year, under President Carlos Andrs Prez, the country had entered a period of
unforeseen economic productivity fueled by a sudden rise in oil prices. In order to attract muchneeded skilled labor to the country, Prez reintroduced immigration policies that called for the
recruitment of immigrants from Europe and a select group of Latin American countries. While in
Europe these efforts were mostly unsuccessful, in the Southern Cone countries they were met
with a willing and professional work force looking to escape the political situation in their home
countries. Further, while the initial implementation of the new selective immigration program

11

Inmigracin Si, pero Selectiva, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Dec. 27.

Chen, Chi-Yi, et al., Los Movimientos Migratorios Internacionales en Venezuela: Politicas y Realidades,
Revista sobre Relaciones Industriales y Laborales (Caracas: UCV, 1982), 22-3.
12

16

took place during a high point in the period of economic bonanza of the 1970s, coinciding with
this apogee was a boom in immigration from South America as a whole. In fact, South American
immigration flows more than doubled in size during this year, in comparison to the first year of
the decade of the 1970s.13
In 1976, the Fifth Plan of the Nation called for the implementation of a new program for
economic development. This program called for one million new workers over the following
four years. Fifty percent of these workers were to be brought in from oversees. These alternative
sources for economic expansion were thought to be necessary for the attraction of new sources of
economic investment. Concerning this, Didonet (1983: 426) states that
not only in the government but also in the institutions that represented the [countrys]
capital and employment sources, [was] a strong conviction that the country should reopen itself
to immigration or face the consequences of shortcutting the new possibilities for development
created by Venezuelas condition as an oil country.
These skilled workers would be directed to basic industries controlled by the state, for example,
such as petroleum, petrochemicals, iron and electrification.14 These recruitments were made
possible by the founding of several government entities in charge of the new policies for
selective immigration.
To fulfill these recruitment goals, the government created the Human Resources Program
and established the Tripartite Committee for Selective Immigration, which was constituted by
Fedecmaras, the CTV the countrys largest workers unionand the government. Recruitment
of the necessary foreign workers was to be carried out under the Human Resources program. In
particular, this program which was responsible for handling the petitions for workers submitted

13

Berglund and Hernndez (1985), 116.

Schloeter, et al., Selective Latin American migration in Venezuela: the Case of Sidor, White Collar Migrants in
the Americas and the Caribbean, ed. Arnaud, A.F., and Vessuri, H.M.C. (Leiden: Royal Institute of Linguistics and
Anthropology, 1983) 212.
14

17

by the various entities in the countrys economic sector. The DIEX, the countrys immigration
office, was to take charge of visa processing and to ensure that the nations security standards
were fulfilled throughout the programs implementation. Finally, the CIME was to take charge of
the recruitment process in Europe.
From 1973 on, the CIME the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migrations
handled settlement, funding, and the general coordination of the entry of European immigrants.15
This was the same entity that had controlled the logistics for the largely European immigration of
the 1950s. The CIME had been founded in Brussels in 1951, and was largely a result of US
backing. The entity took charge of oversight of the then lively European emigration process,
including placement, finance, and transportation means.16 However, Venezuela had suspended
the local functions of this entity in 1966, when the country withdrew from the committee
following the end of the era of European immigration.
However, despite the hopeful planning that went into effect, the goals of the program
were poorly met: between 1977 and 1980, only 18,400 qualified foreign workers were brought
into the country through the newly established legal channels. On the contrary, many more
immigrants entered the country through legal means that made no recourse to the Human
Resources program. Between 1970 and 1979, the DIEX processed a total of 246,944 visas for
foreigners coming to Venezuela. Moreover, as Chen, Chi-Yi, et al (1982: 24) have noted,
alongside the recruitment of skilled professionals came a large group of unskilled workers that
filled numerous industrial and agricultural positions. Thus, though the explicit goals of the new

15

Pellegrino (1986), 30.

Venezuela Decidi Retirarse de Comit Intergubernamental para Migraciones Europeas, El Nacional [Caracas],
1966, Oct. 9.
16

18

plan for immigration called for skilled workers, provisions for the entry of unskilled workers
were included within this plan, though in a less formal manner.
Interestingly, in 1976 Fedecmaras the nations largest business conglomerate
announced that included within the new plan for selective immigration was the possibility of
immigration programs to bring in unskilled labor.17 On the one hand, we might assume that the
potential need for unskilled labor was the result of labor shortages addressed by the plan. On the
other hand, another possibility is that the nations preeminent business conglomerate was looking
for sources of cheap labor outside of the countrys borders. Indeed, the unofficial economic
strategies that took advantage of mass undocumented immigration in the country operated along
similar lines, and knowledge of their widespread implementation was known to the public by the
1980s. As we shall see, undocumented Colombian immigration occupied a vulnerable space
within the new model for economic development. These flows were exploited for their size and
promise of cheap labor. Moreover, they fulfilled a real need for experienced workers in the
stagnant agricultural sector. Therefore, their undocumented flows were not only condoned, they
were encouraged by powerful actors in the economic sector. For many unemployed rural workers
in Colombia, then, the promise of paid work across the border was a prospect that stood within
their grasp.
Colombian Immigration and the New Model for Economic Development
Powerful economic actors in Venezuela looked to secure a sustainable source of cheap
labor by attracting undocumented Colombian immigration. However, Colombian workers also
provided much-needed labor for the stagnant agricultural sector. Given decreasing wages and a

17

Bolsa de Trabajo para Inmigraciones Selectivas Propuesta en Fedecmaras, El Nacional [Caracas], 1976, Sep.
12.

19

largely landless and unemployed peasant community in Colombia, these immigrants were
willing to take positions in better-paid, readily available agricultural work in Venezuela. Of
course, undocumented Colombian immigration was not merely a response to the attractive
economic surplus in the Venezuela of the 1970s. On the one hand, as I have already stated, local
actors in the Venezuelan economic sector could and did solicit Colombian workers through
extra-legal channels. On the other hand, Colombian immigration to Venezuela date to the very
inception of the Republic of Venezuela. Therefore, the reasons for Colombian immigration to
Venezuela included both economic and historical factors. Further, while immigrants made the
final choice whether to migrate or not to Venezuela, mechanisms for their recruitment as well
as the social networks that often supported their journeywere already in place. In particular,
the mechanisms for the enganche, or hooking, of Colombian agricultural workers were wellestablished processes that operated along the Colombo-Venezuelan border. Contrary to
government and media statements that blamed the deteriorating economic situation on
undocumented immigration, undocumented Colombian immigrants were in fact considered
essential to the economic model of the country.
Colombian Immigration as a Source of Cheap Labor
In an interview with the newspaper El Nacional, Efrn Lopez de Corral, the general
director of the countrys central immigration office, the DIEX, noted that some Venezuelan
employers might discourage their workers from registering in the 1980 MGE.18 As noted in the
interview, many would complain that once workers statuses were regularized, they would likely
leave their current employer in search of better-paying employers. Others argued that once
documented, their workers would demand higher pay. Moreover, as is already known, in order
18

Visa de Transente y Cdula de Identidad a Extranjeros que se Hayan Registrado, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980,
Nov. 4.

20

to maintain a source of labor with very low pay, some employers turn in their employees before
disbursement of their salaries, and in response to, we might assume, pleas for salary increases.
Interestingly, just a month later another article in the same newspaper reported that while
officials in government were concerned about the economic effects of mass expulsions that
would theoretically follow the 1980 MGE, landowners were eagerly expectant of the new waves
of undocumented immigrants resulting from a new shortage of cheap labor.19 Quoted in the
article were the governor of Tchira, the major-entry point for migration flows from Colombia,
and the secretary of Zulia, another important western state within the context of Colombian
immigration. These officials stated that,
this immigration flow of Colombians is not only useful, but indispensable, especially
seeing as Colombians accept work in agriculture and ranching, something Venezuelans do not
do.
However, despite the fact that Colombian immigration was an integral part of the Venezuelan
economy of the 1970s, officials in government often argued that the low, competitive wages
accorded this group lead to an increase in the countrys unemployment levels by displacing
better-paid Venezuelan workers.
In fact, one newspaper article in early 1980 quoted the denouncements of the Federation
of Workers of the state of Carabobo, a powerful industrial center for the country, which alleged
that in at least one case, payments had been made to facilitate the employment of undocumented
workers.20 Fetracarabobo, as the federations initials are spelled, accused an anonymous union
leader of managing these transactions. Quoting the secretary general of the workers federation,
contractors in the region throw out Venezuelan workers in order to [replace them with]
foreigners that are recommended by the union, whose members allegedly receive commissions.
19
20

Tensa Expectativa en Colombia y Honda Preocupacin en Venezuela, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Dec. 4.
En 60 Das Censo de Indocumentados, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Feb. 12.

21

These accusations, then, posit a direct connection between the active efforts of local economic
actors to recruit cheap labor and the effects of undocumented immigration with regards to
unemployment. The frequency of such practices, however, is unknown. Despite this uncertainty,
reports of the displacement of Venezuelan workers by poorly-paid undocumented workers
contributed to the stigmatization of undocumented immigrants. More likely, undocumented
workers filled vacant positions in the agricultural sector, and less so in urban industries.
Moreover, in order to understand the willingness of these Colombian workers to emigrate to
Venezuela, we shall take a look at the condition of the Colombian economy in the 1970s.
The Colombian Economy of the 1970s and Emigration to Venezuela
As a result of the era of la violencia in the 1950s and the concomitant trend in
decampesinization, throughout the 1950s and 1960s Colombian campesinos became
increasingly landless while the few that were able to hold on to their lands faced growing poverty
and damaged harvests.21 At the same time, the economy suffered significant overall losses. These
factors, argues Pellegrino (1989), are the principal reasons for the mass migration flows of
Colombians to Venezuela, and abroad, that took off starting in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Pellegrino cites figures that illustrate the major losses in rural land ownership. While in 1950,
270,000 hectares of land were cultivated through industrial methods, by 1970, 2,700,000
hectares out of a total of 4,200,000 hectares of agricultural landshad joined the trend in
industrial agriculture. In terms of monetary value, this industrial sector controlled 70 percent of
overall production in agriculture. Thus, in 1960 campesino landowners who comprised 58
percent of the countrys landownerscontrolled 3.6 percent of the agricultural lands in
Colombia. Conversely, large landowners who comprised 1.7 percent of the landowners
21

Pellegrino (1989) 263. Much of the data in this section were cited from Pellegrino (1989: 263-8).

22

controlled 55 percent of the agricultural lands. The new trend, then, was characteristic of the
growing stake in agriculture commanded by large landowners. As Pellegrino has noted, the
growing concentration of agricultural lands under a decreasing number of landowners
exacerbated unemployment levels in the country. In fact, with the industrialization of agriculture
not only did campesinos become increasingly landless, but mechanization of agricultural
decreased the need for manual labor. Throughout the 1960s, unemployment rates increased
steadily. High rates of unemployment held steady in the 1970s.
Starting in the 1960s, then, the Colombian economy underwent a strong movement
towards industrialization. Imports gave way to manufacturing exports, a process which
encouraged foreign investment in manufacturing. At the same time, rural-urban migrations grew
significantly, as unemployed rural workers migrated to the countrys metropolitan centers in
search of better employment opportunities. In fact, industrial employment grew significantly in
the 1970s. Over the first three years of the 1970s, more employment opportunities were created
within this rapidly growing sector than were during the entire previous decade. From these
figures, it is not hard to imagine how already-mobilized rural populations that had migrated to
their countrys urban centers saw the employment opportunities created by the booming
economy next door. Further, due to a depopulation of frontier regions in Venezuela, landless,
unemployed rural Colombians stepped in to fill labor shortages in the growing agricultural and
ranching industries of that country.
Owing to the nature of these movements, Pellegrino (1989: 267) has termed this trend in
migrations to the border regions in Venezuela a border regionalization of the labor market.
That is, Colombian immigrants originally went mostly from rural and border regions in
Colombia, to border regions in Venezuela. Their geographic distribution in Venezuela was in

23

fact confirmed by the 1980 MGE, which showed that more than two-thirds seventy-three
percent, to be exactof Colombians that had registered resided in border regions. Over time,
however, Colombian immigration to Venezuela shed its largely rural characteristics, as these
flows were joined by a large contingent of Colombians from urban areas. This shift in the origin
of migration flows may have been a result of the sizable rural-urban migrations of the 1960s.
That is, faced with rising unemployment rates particularly in urban areasits possible that
previously rural Colombians decided to try their luck in the Venezuelan economy. In fact,
Pellegrino (1989: 330) reports a rather diverse geographic representation amongst deported
Colombian immigrants, as evidenced in a group of surveys carried out following deportation.
However, the economic trends delineated in this section illustrate only one part of the
larger picture. Another crucial factor in the discussion of Colombian migration flows to
Venezuela is the active recruitment of Colombian immigrants by economic actors many of
them landowners, but also business entitieson the Venezuelan side of the border. As I have
stated before, the purposes of these actors were to contract largely undocumented workers that
not only helped keep wages down, but filled vacant positions in the growing agricultural and
ranching sectors, and particularly in the agro-industrial sector of the economy. The position of
these undocumented workers, then, was a highly vulnerable one that left them open to economic
exploitation. In fact, these undocumented workers were actively recruited by Venezuelan
companies in search of a cheap and willing source of labor.
Securing an Undocumented Colombian Workforce
In their chapter on the Entry of Colombians for the Sugar-Cane Harvest in Venezuela,
Daz & Gmez (1983: 106) published their findings on the nature of the enganche, or hooking
in, of Colombian immigrants. Most of their data was based on interviews with human-

24

traffickers and business leaders in Venezuela. The authors concluded that while the mechanisms
for legal entry allowed businesses to petition for workers, it was in the workers and employers
interests to subvert these mechanisms and reach arrangements in a more direct manner. As
Daz & Gmez explained, this gave workers greater liberty in switching between employers,
especially given the fact that many of them were seasonal migrants. Further, the authors reported
that businesses made general recourse to bribes paid to authorities patrolling the Venezuelan
border in order to import undocumented Colombian workers. Many Colombians, they said,
secured entry into Venezuela through the same means.
As the authors have explained, businesses generally recruited Colombian workers
through middlemen that traveled personally to specific regions in Colombia in search of willing
seasonal workers. The targeted regions included: Valle del Cauca (including Choc, to the north,
and Nario, to the south), in southwestern Colombia; Boyac, which borders on Venezuela in the
northeast; and Puerto Santander, located just north of Ccuta, the main entry-point for
Colombian immigrants entering Venezuela. A third of these Colombians were recruited from the
Valle del Cauca region, which includes regions north and south of the state.
Active efforts to recruit Colombian workers from within Colombia originated in the mid1970s. According to the manager of a large agricultural services firm,
starting in 1975, [the country] suffered from a general labor shortage, and enganches
began to take place in Valle del Cauca tailors, lawyers, technicians came, and 60 percent were
sugar-cane workers.22
While the interviewee claimed to have submitted the necessary paperwork in order to bring these
workers into Venezuela, extralegal alternatives prevailed in the recruitment process. Further, one
interviewee commented on the economic considerations involved in the recruitment process. In
22

Daz, Luz M. and Gmez, Alcides, La Moderna Esclavitud: Los Indocumentados en Venezuela, (Bogot: Oveja
Negra, 1986) 108.

25

particular, one company opted to recruit Colombian workers from contractors working within
Venezuela, particularly because this outsourcing strategy saved the company time and money.
These contractors were said to have recruited Colombian workers leaving other agricultural
companies or migrating into Venezuela on their own.
Explained the Chief Engineer of Cane Harvest of the Central Azucarero Carora that,
the majority of those that leave [us] go to the center of the country. Despite the
desertions [the company] has the good fortune of a prolonged harvest many sugar-cane
workers come our way. I want to say that Central Carora will not be returning to Colombia to
make enganches; its far easier and more economic to contact contractors that supply
Colombians that are already in Venezuela everyone knows that close to Puerto Santander is
El Chivo, a Colombian colony. You pay a fee that varies between 200 and 600 Bs. and you can
get to the front door of [the company] without any problems.23
The interviewee reported that when the company handled the recruitment process, the cost per
worker came to be Bs. 366, which apparently included Bs. 15 a day for basic necessities. The trip
lasted 28 hours, from Cali to Ccuta, and the workers were generally recruited through radio
announcements. Further, desertion was a common concern for companies and landowners that
relied on recruited workers for their harvest. Thus, guards were often employed to ensure
workers commitment to the company. That is, in the event that a worker decided to desert his
company, the guards could release detailed information, including workers documents and
pictures, to the necessary authorities, asking that the workers be deported at first sight. These
desertions were termed sonsaques, or wheedling outs of migrant workers. Daz & Gmez
explained that the frequency of desertions was due the difficult working and living conditions of
migrant workers in Venezuela.
Many Colombian workers were recruited in the northern part of Boyac. Daz & Gmez
(1983: 109) inform that since the mid-1970s, this region has figured prominently in the
23

Ibid, 108-9.

26

recruitment drives from Venezuela. Recruited workers from this region move on to work in
sugar-cane plantations, coffee plantations in Tchira, ranching in Zulia and in agro-industry in
Portuguesa, further east, as well in domestic service in the countrys urban centers. However,
many Colombians opted for passage on their own through the infamous green paths caminos
verdes, or paths cutting across unsettled parts of the borderalong the Colombo-Venezuelan
border. Ccuta and Maicao were the two main entry points for many immigrants from Colombia
and abroad. However, those that opted for a less conspicuous passing often crossed at other
points, including Puerto de Santander. From this point, many immigrants proceeded to
Coloncito, in the Venezuelan state of Tchira, where 4 in every 10 migrant workers were
recruited, according to Daz and Gmez. Many of these immigrants fell prey to the whims of
human-traffickers.
Reading through the interviews with human-traffickers, the reader can note several
important facts related to their work. Like in the recruitment drives carried out by Venezuelan
companies, these human-traffickers generally bribed border authorities in order to carry out their
work. Moreover, one interviewee informed that the National Guard the Venezuelan entity in
charge of border patrolwould alert these traffickers as to when they would carry out their
roundups of undocumented immigrants, always for a certain fee. This enabled traffickers to
choose potential workers from recent arrivals on the Venezuelan side. In such instances, many
undocumented immigrants simply sat and waited in or around local inns after crossing the
border. Although Daz and Gmez do not elaborate fully on the procedures of this informal
process, its presumed that human traffickers and middlemen working for Venezuelan companies
visited these inns sporadically in search of undocumented workers. Falling prey to the National
Guards roundups, then, were the leftovers, the old, the sick, and the weak amongst

27

undocumented immigrants.24 Once deported, of course, many immigrants attempted the border
crossing once again, while others settled in local colonies, or even ended up homeless.
Indeed, recruitment and enganche efforts were thriving in the 1970s. Undocumented
Colombian immigrants offered an indispensable source of cheap labor that helped fill the acute
labor shortages in the agricultural sector. Ironically, the pivotal role they played in the
Venezuelan economy lost its meaning in the face of the economic depression of the late 1970s.
Instead, these immigrants came to be seen as the main source of the countrys economic woes.
As a result, undocumented immigrants began to be deported in large numbers in 1979 and 1980.
Deporting the Immigrant Problem
The DIEXs official figures reported 168,895 immigrants deported between 1970 and
1979.25 Didonet (1983: 419) notes that seven percent of those deported to Colombia were nonColombian nationals. The author identifies this trend as a break from the bi-national treatment of
immigration. Instead of addressing the issue of deportations via diplomacy with the deportees
countries of origin, the Venezuelan government began to simply rid itself of its immigration
problem by deporting undocumented immigrants across the same Colombo-Venezuelan border
through which they entered. Moreover, in 1980 deportation procedures in Venezuela became
more unilateral, shunning cooperation even with the Colombian authorities. No longer would the
Colombian border police, the DAS, carry out transportation-runs between Colombia and jails on
the Venezuelan side of the border during deportations. Rather, immigration authorities in
Venezuela decided to simply release deportees at entry points along the border. This, notes
Didonet (1983), causes a distortion in the registry of the real number of deportees. However,
24

Ibid, 113.
Didonet, Mateo, La Inmigracin Clandestina y la Poltica Inmigratoria en Venezuela, Migraciones Latinas y
Formacin de la Nacin Latinoamericana, Instituto de Altos Estudios de Amrica Latina (Caracas: Universidad
Simn Bolvar, 1983): 423.
25

28

the step away from established deportation procedures may reflect an important change in
immigration policy. Faced with more numerous deportations, Venezuelan immigration
authorities may have decided to cease cooperation with their Colombian counterparts in order to
expedite the outflow of deportees. In fact, during this time press articles in Venezuela published
frequent reports of deportations to Colombia.
As reported that year, a noticeable increase in deportations had taken place between July
1979 and February 1980.26 Given the informal deportation methods employed in 1980, however,
it is difficult to provide exact deportation figures for the end of this period. Official figures from
the DIEX the countrys department of immigrationshowed that while almost 46,000 people
had been deported in 1977, less than 19,000 were deported the following year, and only 9,000 in
1979.27 However, Didonet (1983: 424) states that, according to local police reports, 15,000
people had been deported in the first four months of 1980. Reports of the mass deportations
taking place at this time were often accompanied by a generic shopping list of problems
associated with undocumented immigration. One report in March 1980 stated that 1,429
undocumented immigrants had been detained around the various states in the Venezuelan
Andes.28 These roundups had been carried out over a period of hardly a week, and the report
emphasized that an operation to detain these immigrants had taken place in order to diminish
the criminal incidents carried out principally by undocumented immigrants that come to these
frontier regions in order to commit their misdeeds. Further, a National Guard general involved

26

Reunin en Ccuta, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Mar. 5.

The large number of deportations for 1977 which were similar to figures for 1976may be a result of concerns
over the sudden increase in immigration between 1974 and 1976. Selective immigration policies that sought to
encourage mostly skilled workers were implemented in 1976. Further, official entries decreased annually starting in
1977.
28
Detenidos 1.429 Indocumentados en Operativo Policial Sur del Lago, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Mar. 4.
27

29

in the operation assured the reader that, given the good results obtained, we have given
precise instructions to our commands, that they reactivate and intensify such operations.
These operations had resulted in even more prodigious deportations in the previous
month. In fact, in February of that year, one report stated that 1,249 undocumented immigrants
had been deported in the last three days.29 According to another press report in January of the
same year, 7,500 undocumented immigrants had been detained at a flea market in Maracaibo,
Venezuelas second largest city. Indeed, deportations had increased significantly between the
end of 1979 and the second semester of 1980, and press reports reflected a significant increase in
overall deportations. Interestingly, surveys among Colombians deported during this period
showed that a disproportionately large number of these undocumented immigrants had been
detained in the larger urban areas of the country.
Two surveys of deportees conducted in 1980 and 1979 reflected the geographic
distribution of deported Colombian immigrants.30 The surveys were conducted by the
Department of Labor and Social Security of Colombia, and by CEPAM, a prominent entity
within immigration in Venezuela that sponsored various immigration projects and research with
the help of the Catholic Church and academics in Venezuela. One survey found that 30.5 percent
of those interviewed had been deported in the capital and central regions of the country, where
most urban and industrial centers are concentrated with the exception of the countrys second
city, Maracaibo, to the west, and Ciudad Bolvar, located in the south-eastern part of the country.
The second survey found that 27.2 percent of deportees had been detained in the same regions.
These figures compare to the 18.3 percent of undocumented immigrants that registered for the
29

La Polica de Inmigracin Deport a 1.249 Indocumentados en los ltimos Tres Das, El Universal [Caracas],
1980, Feb. 11.
30
Pellegrino, Adella, Venezuela: Illegal Immigration from Colombia, Internacional Migration Review 18, 3
(Autumn, 1984): 753.

30

1980 MGE as residing in those regions. The disparity in geographic representation between the
surveys of deportees and the applicants of the 1980 MGE may reflect an intensification of
deportation procedures in urban areas located in the central and capital regions of the country. In
fact, this pattern may be indicative of the highly metropolitan nature of concern over
undocumented immigration in the country. As has been argued previously, this concern
increased significantly as the number of immigrants moving to urban centers increased in the
1970s. It should be noted, however, that the larger number of deportees detained in the central
urban regions of the country may be a result of better-developed policing capacities in these
regions, especially in comparison to rural regions to the west. Notwithstanding, as we shall see
we in a later section, opposition to undocumented immigration was often termed from a
metropolitan perspective. Further, this urbano-centric opposition to undocumented immigration
was phrased in the language of economic development and public security.
Finally, males were overrepresented in deportations of undocumented immigrants. In
fact, among deportees registered in Ccuta an important site for entries and deportations in
Venezuelanine of every ten deportees were male. This may denote the public aspect of these
deportations. That is, while a very large number of female undocumented immigrants worked in
the services sector particularly in domestic workmales tended to work in industry and
agriculture. Concerning this, Pellegrino (1984: 750) argues that the private, domestic nature of
the work done by many female undocumented immigrants may have helped shield them from the
legal consequences of their extra-legal status.31
With the economic downturn of the late 1970s, then, deportations in Venezuela became
more frequent and informal. At the same time, government officials and the Venezuelan media
31

Pellegrino (1984): 750.

31

voiced their concerns regarding undocumented immigration and the overall burdens they posed
to economic development. The blame placed on undocumented immigrants ignored the
important position these immigrants had held within the countrys model for economic
development of the 1970s. As stated in No to Venezuela (1981: 13), when faced with
economic crisis, Venezuelan governments have chosen to use [Colombian] immigrants as
scapegoats for the political problems brought about by the economic ones. As we shall see,
opposition to Colombian immigration became most acute during the final year of the decade, and
especially around the 1980 MGE. Much of this opposition was shaped by unfounded claims in
the press that speculated over the characteristics of undocumented immigration. Undocumented
immigrants were characterized as potential threats to national sovereignty, as criminal offenders,
and even as factors of economic underdevelopment. These stigmatizations, moreover, were
compounded by estimations of the alleged, unwieldy size of this group, which were published in
the media and echoed by government officials.
II. Characteristics of Colombian Immigration
Demographic and Migratory Characteristics
The size of the Colombian population in Venezuela had been an object of heated debate
in the press and government of the 1970s and 1980s. Towards the end of the 1970s, figures for
undocumented immigration alone varied between 1.5 and 4 million people. Even in 1986, six
years after the sobering results of the 1980 MGE were made public under 300,000
undocumented immigrants registered for the 1980 MGEgovernment officials and the media
estimated that one million undocumented immigrants were residing in the country.1 According to
the MGE, about 90 percent of the undocumented immigrants that registered were Colombian.
1

Bidegain (1986), 10.

32

Taking this into consideration with the previous estimates, this would result in a figure between 1
and 3.6 million, and 900,000 undocumented Colombian immigrants, in 1980 and 1986,
respectively. However, Bidegain (1987: 45) obtains a figure of around 530,000 Colombian
immigrants more or lessresiding permanently in Venezuela in 1980. According to the
DIEXs register, in 1980, 307,148 Colombian immigrants were residing legally in the country.
Adding this figure to the MGE results, we could say that around 550,000 Colombian immigrants
were living in Venezuela in 1980. Citing various sources including census figures and scholarly
estimates, Pellegrino (1986: 33) concludes that between 478,174 and 600,000 people migrated to
the country between 1971 and 1981. Even assuming that 95 percent of these immigrants were
Colombian, we would arrive at a maximum figure of 570,000 Colombians migrating to
Venezuela during that period. However, as Pellegrino (1986) has noted, it is difficult to estimate
the total size of the Colombian population in Venezuela. Even more uncertain is the number of
the undocumented Colombian immigrants in Venezuela. Such a consideration would ultimately
rely on available poll and census data, and certainly some educated guessing. It should be noted,
however, that it would be difficult to defend estimates as large as 1 to 4 million undocumented
immigrants in Venezuela.2
In order to make comparisons between the two groups of Colombian immigrants those
that registered for the MGE being subsumed by the total Colombian populationwe will look at
figures from the 1980 MGE and the 1981 Census. From the latter we may consider the
characteristics of the total Colombian population in the country. Moreover, given that no formal
identification was required to participate in the census, Pellegrino (1986: 33) notes that it should
not be assumed that undocumented Colombians were unwilling to participate in the 1981 census.
2

Pellegrino (1986), 34.

33

266,795 people over age 9 registered successfully for the 1980 MGE. Of these, 246,194,
or 92.3 percent, were Colombian. Another 6.3 percent of those registered under the MGE came
from other Latin American nations, including South and Central American countries, as well as
Caribbean countries. Within this latter group, Ecuadorians comprised 1.8 percent of the
population, Dominicans 1.6 percent, and Peruvians 1.1 percent. European immigrants comprised
1.0 of the total population registered under the MGE.
Of the 246,000 Colombians over age 9, more than three quarters, or 76.8 percent, were
between 15 and 40 years old. In contrast, the 1981 census showed the overall age distribution of
Colombians in Venezuela to lie mainly between 15 and 54 years of age, with 81.4 percent falling
within this segment. Of the former, 16.3 percent were between 15 and 20 years old, while of the
latter, 8.2 percent were between 15 and 19 years old. These figures show undocumented
Colombian immigrants to be somewhat younger than their previously registered counterparts.
39.2 percent of women registering for the MGE claimed to have children, as did 35.2 percent of
men.
In comparison to the 1981 census, gender distributions for Colombians registering for the
MGE show some differences. For every 100 Colombian women that registered, there were 119.2
Colombian men, while under the 1981 census, 91.8 Colombians, for every 100 of their national
counterparts, were male. Amongst Colombian immigrants, the 1981 census showed that while
women tended to migrate more to the capital region, men migrated to rural areas in the border
states. Moreover, the majority of Colombians registering under the MGE were living in border
states or in those near the border with Colombia. Therefore, as Pellegrino (1986: 36) has noted
Colombian immigration is a concern of rural border-states more than it is one of urban areas.

34

Pellegrino (1986: 34) classifies Colombian immigration in Venezuela according to three

categories:
1. Immigration flows with the most permanence in the country that reside in urban
areas, working mostly in industrial, business and services sectors.
2. Permanent immigration flows that migrate to border regions in the west and are
employed in the agricultural and ranching sectors, but also in positions of an urban
nature within these regions.
3. Seasonal immigration flows taking place during harvest time or that fulfill other
temporary needs in agriculture.
These categories are closely tied to the geographic proximity of Colombia to Venezuela.
Geographic Distribution of Colombians in Venezuela3
State or District
1971 Census
1980 MGE
1981 Census
Federal District and Miranda*
20.3
11.4
29.7
Aragua and Carabobo
4.0
6.9
9.9
Tchira and Zulia**
60.1
56.2
43.3
Barinas and Mrida**
7.1
17.0
7.1
Others
8.5
8.5
10.0
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
*Caracas is distributed across the Federal District and parts of the state of Miranda.
** Tchira, Zulia, Barinas and Mrida are all located near the border with Colombia.
Immigrants registering for the 1980 MGE represented 1.8 percent of the countrys total
population. Within the Capital region, registrants represented 1.1 percent of the local
population, within the central region 1.0 percent of the local population, and in Zulia and the
Andes to the west, 4.8 and 6.9 percent of the population, respectively. This means that a very
small number of people just over 1 percentin the capital region were undocumented before
the MGE, and within the border region that encompasses the Andean states and Zulia, the
registrants did not reach ten percent of the local population.4 Interestingly, Pellegrino (1984:
751) notes that while the Andean and coastal regions of both Colombia and Venezuela have
internal cross-border migrations, there is practically no migration from one region to another.
3

Reproduced from Pellegrino (1986), 37.

Van Roy, Ralph, Undocumented Migration to Venezuela, International Migration Review 18 (Autumn, 1983):
547.
4

35

Thus, coastal residents migrate mostly to other coastal regions, while Andean populations do so
within the Andes region. This pattern is reflected in the available data on deportations, and
Pellegrino concludes that these findings confirm that migrants tend to settle in those regions
culturally closer to their place of origin.
Socioeconomic and Occupational Characteristics
The educational level of Colombian immigrants that registered for the MGE is somewhat
lower than for the total Colombian population in Venezuela. However, Pellegrino (1986: 37)
notes that the overall educational levels of Colombians in the country are not unlike that of
Venezuelans in general.
Educational Attainment for Colombian and Venezuelan Population5
Colombians
Venezuelans
*
*
Educational Level
1980 MGE
1981 Census
1981 Census*
Illiterate and without formal education
17.1
10.5
11.0
**
Primaria
66.2
56.3
59.1
***
Secundaria
16.4
29.4
24.9
Superior
0.2
3.8
5.0
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
*For the 1980 MGE, figures represent population aged 9 or older, for the Colombian population
from the 1981 census, 5 or older, and for the Venezuelan population from the 1981 census, 7 or
older.
** Primaria includes first through sixth grades (second through seventh in the U.S.).
Preparatorio, which is the equivalent of first grade in the U.S., is not included within Primaria.
***Secundaria includes seventh through eleventh grades (eighth through twelfth in the U.S.).
Sixty-eight percent of those registered under the 1980 MGE were active members of the
countrys working population. This compared to 65.2 and 54 percent of previously registered
foreigners and Venezuelans, respectively. The active segment of the Colombian population is
higher in comparison to those born in Venezuela. 59.6 percent of Colombians in the country are
employed, in comparison to 46.2 percent of Venezuelans. These numbers are derived by dividing
5

Reproduced from Pellegrino (1986), 37.

36

the active population, age 12 and older, by the corresponding age group of the total population
and multiplying by one hundred. Moreover, from the 1981 census, Pellegrino (1986: 39) found
that 40.3 percent of Colombians were economically dependent, in comparison to 69.8 percent
of Venezuelans. This figure is derived by dividing the inactive segment of the population by the
total population, and multiplying by one hundred. The low levels of unemployment amongst
MGE registrants are significant, even in comparison to the overall foreign-born population.
Concerning this, van Roy (1983: 62) cites a poll among Colombian deportees wherein 72.5
percent of respondents spent 1 to 8 days searching for work once in Venezuela and then finding
employment, and 13.5 percent spent 9 days to one month in the same process. These figures
show that undocumented workers were quite successful in finding work once in Venezuela, and,
concomitantly, that there was a high degree of demand for their labor.
Occupational Groups for the Colombian Population6
Occupation
Professionals and Technicians
Managers, Administrators and Functionaries
Office Employees and Related Occupations
Salesmen and Related Occupations
Agriculture, Ranching, Fishing
Transportation and Communications
Miners, Quarrymen and Related Occupations
Artisans, Factory Operators and Related Occupations
Other Artisans and Operators
Service Workers, Sports and Entertainment
Undeclared or Unidentified
Total

1980 MGE
Total
%
2,232
1.22
214
0.12
2,414
1.32
4,948
2.70
28,968
15.79
675
0.37
379
0.21
62,838
34.25
30,000
16.35
43,372
23.64
7,429
4.05
183,469
100.0

1981 Census
Total
%
12,346
4.07
4,770
1.57
17,210
5.68
26,964
8.90
50,212
16.57
6,568
2.17
422
0.14
82,676
27.28
71,604
23.63
26,602
8.78
3,680
1.21
303,054 100.0

About seventeen percent of Colombian immigrants registering for the MGE worked in
agriculture, ranching or fishing, while more than fifty percent worked in industry. Further, if we
split the figures for the MGE by gender, 22.7 percent of Colombian men worked in agriculture,
6

Reproduced from Pellegrino (1986), 40.

37

ranching or fishing, while 79 percent of the women worked in services. In fact, Pellegrino (1984:
748) reports that 50 percent of working Colombians were employed in agriculture and services,
especially domestic service in urban areas. In fact, Colombian representation in the agriculture
and services sectors exceeded that of the local population, of which 32 percent were working in
similar occupations.
Compared to the overall Colombian population in Venezuela, those registered under the
MGE had very little representation in other sectors of the economy that demanded higher
qualifications.7 Van Roy (1983: 64) suggests that this may be due partly to the difficulty of
obtaining the necessary documentation for these positions, and not so much a lack of work
experience. Further, Colombians in general and undocumented immigrants tended to replace
native agricultural labor, and the Venezuelan-born population had showed decreasing
participation in this sector in the 1961 census.8 This contrasted with the growth in the urban
sector, where construction grew 9.4 percent in the 1970s, and where the tertiary sector
essentially businesses and serviceswent from 35 percent of the active population in 1950, to
50 percent in 1980.9 Interestingly, van Roy (1983: 62) argues that, given the negligible
difference in overall occupational tendencies between previously registered Colombian
immigrants and those registering for the MGE, the regularization (i.e., the switch from
undocumented to legal status) of undocumented immigrants under the MGE does not
contradict the results of the running policy of selective immigration. That is, undocumented
Colombian immigrants were working in very similar occupations as those that had entered the
country through legal channels.

Pellegrino (1986), 40.

Ibid, 43.
9
Ibid, 44.
8

38

According to the 1981 census figures, while there was a higher tendency for women to
migrate to the capital region, men were more likely to be found in the border states to the west of
the country. On this, Pellegrino (1986: 39) reports that 78.6 percent of women registering under
the MGE declared to be working as service workers, and many were employed as domestic
workers. Specifically, 32.4 percent of domestic workers were foreign-born women, and of these
83 percent were Colombian.10 The employment prospects of these domestic workers, in general,
were more promising than for Colombian men, especially seeing as shelter, food, and other
necessities were provided by their patrons. Concerning this, following are some monthly salary
figures earned by Colombian workers according to the most common economic sectors they
represented:11
Domestic Work (Women)
Agricultural Workers and Fishing (Men)
Construction Workers (Men)
Specialized Industrial Workers (Men)
Garment Industry Workers (Women)

Bs. 1,000-1,500
Bs. 500-1,000
Bs. 1,500-2,000
Bs. 3,000-5,000
Bs. 1,000-1,500

$ 250-375
$ 125-250
$ 375-500
$ 750-1250
$ 250-375

The salaries of Colombian workers employed outside of the agricultural sector were not
unlike those accorded to the population in Venezuela as a whole. However, the salaries of
Colombian agricultural workers were significantly lower than those accorded the countrys total
population. Thus, while 47.7 percent of the agricultural work-force earned less than Bs. 1,000,
66.5 percent of Colombian agricultural workers earned the same amount. Moreover, while 91.6
percent of the countrys agricultural work-force made Bs. 3,000 or under, a similar percentage of
the Colombian agricultural work-force in the country, 89.8 percent, made Bs. 2,000 or under. In
other words, while 16 percent of all agricultural-sector workers in Venezuela earned more than

10

Ibid, 45.
Reproduced from Pellegrino (1986), 47. Dollar figures are based on the 1980 exchange rate of Bs. 4 to the dollar
and were added by the author.
11

39

Bs. 2,000, only 3.8 percent of Colombian workers employed in the same sector earned the same
amount. These figures show a pattern of lower-pay for Colombian workers employed in the
agricultural sector in comparison to the overall Venezuelan population working in the same
sector. The lower-wages accorded Colombian workers evidenced the economic role of these
immigrants as cheap laborers for the countrys agricultural sector.12
The Undocumented Immigrant in Venezuela
In her section on the Image of Migration, Anzola (1983: 120) states that migration, as
in the other instances of interaction between the two countries [Colombia and Venezuela],
oscillates along an axis of cooperation and conflict. That is, immigration is treated as an
instance of cooperation when Colombians are contracted through legal channels to work in
Venezuela. However, when it concerns the thousands of Colombians that, not having obtained
the necessary visa, cross the border surreptitiously, the topic of immigration becomes
conflictive. Specifically, in the latter instance the image of the undocumented immigrant is
imbued with an aspect of illegality that leads to the automatic stigmatization of those falling
under this category. Indeed, Berglund and Hernndez (1985: 85) remark that, exempting their
personal characteristics and formation, [undocumented immigrants] are marginalized for the
simple fact of being undocumented. Because of the invisible nature of these migration flows,
the image of the undocumented Colombian immigrant can come to represent a problematic
factor when it is formulated in opposition to Venezuelas model for economic development. In
this context, the undocumented immigrant is deemed undesirable for his or her poverty and

12

The figures are cited from Pellegrino (1986: 49). The figures for the Colombian work-force were extracted from
the 1981 census, while those concerning the total working-population in Venezuela were taken from the Random
Survey of Homes carried out in 1980 and 1981 by the OCEI.

40

alleged lack of knowledge and, for this reason, he or she tends to be resented (Berglund and
Hernndez 1985: 86).
However, as we saw earlier, although undocumented immigrants are stigmatized for their
alleged socioeconomic characteristics, the reality of the undocumented Colombian immigrant is
one of economic exploitation. This vulnerable group of immigrants is often seen by powerful
economic actors and the Venezuelan government as an essential source of cheap labor that is
beneficial to the process of economic development. In his report on Los Indocumentados
Colombianos (1972), Norman Gall informs that although the Venezuelan government was well
aware of the invasion of Colombian conuqueros, or agricultural workers, it stood by passively
and reasoned that the nature of their work was unacceptable to Venezuelans who refused to live
and work in the isolated areas of the countrys western frontier.13
In spite of this, Colombian immigration was often stigmatized due to its undocumented
flows, whether in the press, by government officials, or by the average Venezuelan. Ultimately,
these negative characterizations of undocumented immigration are formulated in the language of
economic development. However, other forms of stigmatization include attributions of crime,
general lawlessness and even disease to this clandestine group of immigrants. Moreover, the
immigrant problem is compounded by the over-inflated figures that allegedly quantify their
size. Before getting too far into this discussion, however, we should step back a little and start
again with a clear definition of the undocumented in Venezuelan immigration.
Pellegrino (1986: 30) elaborates on the definition of the word undocumented in
Venezuela (indocumentados). In practice, the term refers to anyone residing in the country that
did not enter with a transient or resident visa (Transente and Residente). However, also
13

As cited in Berglund and Hernndez (1985), 63.

41

included are those that entered the country as tourists and did not subsequently regularize their
status. Didonet (1983) examines these latter sources of undocumented immigration.
Among undocumented immigrants, a considerable number of people had entered the
country with tourist visas acquired before leaving their home countries. People applying for
these visas could be classified according to two encompassing groups. The first represented more
affluent applicants that had the means to not only finance their trip to and stay in Venezuela, but
could also vouch for the necessary financial assets. Given that these immigrants benefited from a
more secure financial situation, many people in this group could count on returning to their home
countries in the event of an unfavorable migration experience. In contrast, another group of
tourists was constituted by immigrants who, in order to secure the financial means with which
to pay for their journey to Venezuela, underwent a long and costly preparation before emigrating.
Didonet (1983: 413) surmises that this group of people would have made recourse to loans and
other sources of capital, such as the liquidation of social benefits attached to their particular form
of employment these were probably less promising than those occupied by the previous, more
affluent groupin order to accrue the financial resources necessary to embark on a costly
journey to Venezuela. We can surmise the break from their native societies to be more acute than
for the previous group of more affluent tourists. Moreover, the likelihood of return to their
countries of origin is significantly impeded by their scarce financial resources and lack of
professional work experience.
Yet another group of undocumented immigrants had originally entered the country with
Border Identification Cards. These identification cards were generally granted to a select group
of agricultural and industrial workers from Andean countries (mainly Colombia) in search of
work in the border regions closest to Colombia. The majority of these immigrants overstayed

42

their visas and had subsequently been unable to renew them.14 Finally, a sizable group of
immigrants entered the country with fraudulent documentation, while yet another group made
their entries through green paths (caminos verdes), or beaten trails that cut across unsettled
parts of the Colombo-Venezuelan border. These were the same green paths mentioned in the
earlier section on the enganche of undocumented workers from Colombia.
Didonet (1983: 415) makes an interesting distinction between these last two groups. He
claims that the label without papers is applicable mostly to Colombian immigrants and less so
to the other groups of nationals entering the country through extra-legal means. This is so, he
explains, because undocumented immigrants proceeding from other countries would have
needed the necessary documentation to pass through the countries along their journey to
Venezuela. In fact, Didonet states that these fraudulent visas were often issued at Venezuelan
consulates, and that ad hoc means of document forgery were also available. It is possible that
Didonets claims regarding the label without papers do not apply to all undocumented
Colombian immigrants, but its a likely distinction that should be taken into consideration,
especially given the cultural proximity between Colombians and Venezuelans living in border
regions, and thus the ease the former would have had in blending into Venezuelan society.
The vast majority of undocumented immigrants in the country were comprised by
Colombian citizens. However, when it comes to quantifying the size of these flows, figures
generally skew the balance of undocumented and documented, alleging the former to reach well
into the millions and painting an unbalanced and generally stigmatized image of the presence of
Colombian immigrants in the country. In this way, undocumented immigration and Colombian
immigration are inter-twined and mutually defined through marginalizing claims of a crime14

Didonet (1983), 414.

43

ridden, disease-infested and generally unskilled (even backwards) Colombian population in the
country. In reality, again, these flows were considered essential to the economic model of the
country. As we already saw, within the Venezuelan model for economic development of the
1970s, these workers provided much-needed cheap labor for the agricultural sector of the
economy. Ultimately, then, stigmatization of undocumented immigration hides the reality of a
system of labor exploitation that preyed on their vulnerable situation by displacing blame for a
situation of economic decline onto the very same immigrants that the Venezuelan economy had
come to depend on. As we shall see in the next section, such stigmatization became most acute
surrounding the 1980 MGE.

44

III. Opposition to Colombian Immigration and the 1980 Matrcula General de Extranjeros
The 1980 Matrcula General de Extranjeros1
The Matrcula General de Extranjeros took place between August 23rd and December 23rd
of 1980. The terms of the implementation of the 1980 MGE had been established by the passage
of Presidential Decree 616 in May of that year. However, the execution of the 1980 MGE had
been previously anticipated by the signing of the Andean Instrument for Labor Migrations, in
1977. This instrument set the conditions for the passage of provisional identity documents for
citizens of the member countries of the Cartagena Agreement, which Venezuela joined in 1973.
The countries that had signed the agreement in 1969 were Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Chile and
Peru. While Chile had been an original member country, it abandoned the agreement in 1976.
The MGE applied to undocumented immigrants who were legally employed and residing
in Venezuela before May 23rd of 1980. It required that applicants present a form of national
identification (e.g., a passport or national identification card, birth certificate) and proof of
employment, which could be either a document from the employing company certifying the
applicants occupation, or in the case of domestic workersan informal, notarized note from
the domestic employer vouching for the applicants occupation.
The details of the registration of nationals of countries outside of the Cartagena
Agreement were left unspecified. In contrast, citizens of the Cartagena-Agreement countries
would be issued temporary identity cards (visa de transente) that could be renewed upon
expiration, one year after their issuance. More permanent visas could be issued for Andean
immigrants with proof of residence predating September 1978, when the Andean Instrument for
Labor Migrations went into effect. Further, the temporary identification provided by the MGE
1

The details of the 1980 MGE were gathered from various journal articles, including Pellegrino (1986), van Roy
(1983), and Didonet (1983).

could be exchanged for a resident visa after two years of residence in the country. The
Department of Interior Relations was put in charge of the overall process of the MGE, while the
particular logistics involved were overseen by the Central Office for Computational Statistics.
Applicants would direct themselves to the DIEX offices across the country where they could take
part in the registration process. However, despite the efforts in place to regularize the status of
the nations undocumented immigrants, the MGE had a secondary formal purpose.
A second phase would follow the registration processes conclusion in late December,
and called for the detainment and deportation of any undocumented immigrants that had failed to
register for the amnesty.
Operation Return as the second phase of the MGE was calledwas carried out by the
main national policing bodies, including the Disip, which has functions related to the
maintenance of national security; the PTJ, which is similar to the FBI; the National Guard; and
the numerous local police departments across the country. While the government of Colombia
awaited the deportation of some 250,000 undocumented immigrants, a very small number of
undocumented immigrants were detained during the second phase of the MGE. In fact,
ironically, nine of every ten undocumented persons detained during this phase turned out to be
Venezuelan nationals that lacked proper documentation at the time of arrest. A few days after the
commencement of Operation Return it was reported that, of the 250,000 persons that were
identified, only 100 were undocumented.2
Indeed, as van Roy (1983: 47) has noted before, the governments implementation of the
MGE established the mechanisms for a rather tolerant amnesty program. Practically everybody
that applied for the amnesty was successfully registered. Further, while the initial number of
2

Slo 100 Indocumentados entre 250 Mil Personas Identificadas, El Nacional [Caracas] 1980, Dec. 30.

46

immigrants applying for the MGE was significantly low, as the weeks passed by, their
suspicions diminished, and the number of registrants increased considerably.3 Given the
insignificant number of undocumented immigrants detained after the commencement of the
second phase of the MGE, we can conclude that the majority of the undocumented population in
Venezuela was successfully registered.4 The picture of undocumented immigration captured by
the 1980 MGE thus represents a relatively dependable source of information regarding this group
of immigrants. However, while the MGE functioned as a general amnesty for undocumented
immigrants, the more particular purposes of the MGE can be gleaned from a closer look at the
decree that called for its passage.
Presidential Decree 616 stated that,
the presence in the territory of the Republic of a sizable group of foreigners not meeting
the corresponding legal requirements [for their stay] can create a factor of disruption of the
public order and security and can upset the goals of the international community, with respect to
the observance of the individual and social rights of the human being.
The first part of this declaration focuses on the challenges to the public order and security of
the nation posed by the presence of a large group of undocumented immigrants. Crime and
national security concerns were raised regularly within discussions of undocumented
immigration, in the press and in government, particularly around the time of the MGE. In
contrast, the second part of the decree concerns the vulnerable position of undocumented
immigrants, which stems from the difficulty of observing the Human Rights of this clandestine
group of immigrants. Sincere discussion of the human rights of undocumented immigrants was
overshadowed by the disparaging assertions made in the press and in government concerning the
negative implications of the presence of such a large, undocumented group of immigrants.
3

Van Roy (1984), 544.

Van Roy, Ralph, La Poblacin Clandestina en Venezuela: Resultados de la Matrcula General de Extranjeros,
Migraciones Internacionales en las Amricas, ed. Van Roy, Ralph (Caracas: CEPAM, 1983): 47.
4

47

Indeed, the MGE had important implications for the public awareness of undocumented
immigration. As a practical consequence, the MGE provided the details that were necessary for a
clearer understanding of undocumented immigration in the country.
While the stated purposes of the MGE were to address the greater social and public
security implications posed by the presence of a sizable group of undocumented immigrants, its
results paved the way for a more positive perception of undocumented immigration in the
country. Didonet (1983: 429) surmises that the purpose of the 1980 MGE was, primarily, to
create an informational base that would quantify the number and [type of] occupational
structures in Venezuela towards which undocumented immigrants had directed themselves.
Theoretically, the information provided by the 1980 MGE could then be used as a real base for
the formulation of new instruments and policies concerning immigration. Furthermore,
Didonet argues that the steps taken to regularize the situation of undocumented immigrants in the
country were not intended as a solution to the immigrant problem as much as it was a method
of quantification of the economic conditions that characterized this group. However, it cannot be
denied that as a practical and unexpected consequence, the MGE put some closure to public
concern over undocumented immigration. In particular, the sobering figures for undocumented
immigration established by the MGE served in large part to temper public consternation over the
unwieldy numbers defended by the countrys DIEX, the press and other influential sources
within the discussion of immigration in Venezuela. For the first time since the beginning of the
period of mass immigration in the 1970s, the Venezuelan public had a dependable template with
which to construct an understanding that went further than press reports, which were typically
sensationalist, and that until now have been the only source of information concerning [the

48

undocumented] population. 5 Indeed, up to this point, public perception of undocumented

immigration had been largely defined by statements made in the press and in government
concerning the characteristics of these flows.
Discussion of Colombian Immigration in the Media and in Government
In his study on the Influence of the Press on Public Opinion concerning Immigration,
van Roy (1983: 368) remarks that,
within a democratic system, government has to confront and compete with other
institutions interested in the formation and capture of public opinion, mainly with those who, like
the mass media, have the easiest and most direct reach over that (public) opinion.
Van Roy (1983: 370) lists several trends the author poses these trends as hypotheseswithin
the discussion of immigration in the media that reflect the principal characteristics of this process
of formation and capture of public opinion. The study focuses on two newspapers that are read
mainly by the popular classes of society, and the trends that surface in their discussion of
immigration are telling of the nature of public awareness of the topic:
1. Immigration tends to be identified with Colombian immigration. Colombian
immigration received considerable attention during the period of the study (19771980). Surprisingly, European immigration received little mention during this time.
The overwhelming majority of immigration to Venezuela in the 1940s and 1950s was
European, and their flows had been central to the discussion of economic
development in the country.
2. Immigration tends to be conceived and identified as illegal immigration. This is
evident even at the beginning of the period in question.
3. Immigration is valorized negatively. To illustrate this point, the author lists the
various problems associated with immigration in the media at the time, which
include: lack of basic services; rise in criminal activities; competition for scarce
employment opportunities; loss of national identity; threats to national sovereignty;
capital losses through remittances. Amongst these predominates the topic of national
security, via the concept of territorial sovereignty, though the lack of social services
and crime are also prevalent in the medias discussion of immigration.

Van Roy (1983), 48.

49

To this last list of problems associated with immigration I would add the purported size of the
undocumented population. Figures for undocumented immigration were heavily discussed in the
press and, although no reliable sources for estimation were available at the time the next census
would not take place until 1981the government and media did not hesitate in publishing
figures estimating up to four million undocumented immigrants. In particular, the magnitude of
these figures compounded the already negative public opinion of immigration by overestimating,
to a large degree, the extent of the source of problems listed by van Roy. Further,
overestimation of these figures helped create a tainted image of Colombian immigration as
being largely undocumented. Therefore, discussion of the size of the undocumented population is
the first issue that will be considered in this section.
I will also consider the role of territorial sovereignty within the discussion of
undocumented immigration in the press and in government. This topic is central to these
discussions, given both its historical recurrence and, particularly, the geopolitical interests that
are played out within this context. The issue of territorial sovereignty has a strong economic
component, namely via the oil resources that have dominated more-recent territorial disputes
between Colombia and Venezuela.
Finally, I will also discuss the role of economic development within the discussion of
undocumented immigration. This is arguably the most influential topic within these discussions.
Questions regarding the worsening of unemployment levels, overuse of social services and
wage-competition are part of the discussion of economic development and undocumented
immigration. Interestingly, such stigmatizations highlighted the public nature of these
problems, particularly within an urban context. This emphasis facilitated public reception of

50

the stigmatizing discussion of undocumented immigrants by formulating the immigrant

problem within a highly public sphere.
The Size of the Invasion
As stated in Pellegrino (1986: 33), in 1974 the Venezuelan press began to publish figures
concerning immigration in the country that were, in some instances, picked up by officials in
government. These figures were introduced under a climate of rising concern over
undocumented immigration flows. The rise in concern resulted largely from the increasing
concentration of immigrants in urban areas, as well as from an upsurge in immigration in
Venezuela. Estimations of the size of these undocumented flows oscillated between one and four
million undocumented immigrants and were echoed by various sources in the press and in
government until the final days of the 1980 MGE. In fact, while figures for undocumented
immigration released by the DIEX estimated 800,000 undocumented Colombian immigrants
present in the country in 1976, these estimations increased considerably towards the end of the
decade, reaching a high point in 1980.6 Towards the end of the 1980 MGE, newspapers
headlined the overwhelming Colombian representation within undocumented flows, which
surpassed 90 percent.7 Given general disbelief over the number of undocumented immigrants
reflected by the MGE figures, these headlines fed into a general perception of Colombian
immigration as being largely undocumented.
Early in 1980, a newspaper article in El Nacional headlined the estimations of the
director of Alien Control of the DIEX over the size of undocumented immigration in Venezuela.
The headline claimed that One Million Undocumented [Immigrants] Have Entered the Country
in Less than a Year. The immigration official indicated that this recently-settled group added to
6
7

Didonet (1983), 408.

El 90 por Ciento de los Matriculados son Colombianos, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Dec. 22.

51

the two million undocumented immigrants already present in the country.8 As the article
unfolded, the director unleashed a string of vituperative comments concerning undocumented
immigration (more on this later). The following day, the daily El Nacional headlined a picture of
an Ecuadorian immigrant at work: the title read Three Million Undocumented Immigrants,
citing the same official quoted in the opening lines of this paragraph.9 These figures were again
repeated later in the year during the final days of the MGE, though this time by different
immigration official. Indeed, the persistence of such figures evidenced the degree to which they
had been cemented in the public sphere.10
The previous front-page article continued in the back page of that days edition. The
headline there read The State Impotent before Undocumented [Immigration], highlighting the
unwieldy size of these flows. Given the size of government estimates of undocumented
immigration, the reader might assume that, confronted with an overwhelming number of
immigrants, the governments ability to respond to this problem and to the problems that
were generally ascribed to undocumented immigrationwas largely rendered ineffective. As we
shall see ahead, these inflated figures had become so persistent by the time of the 1980 MGE
that, faced with the sobering results of the MGE, many government officials, the media and
general populace were unable and unwilling to accept their disproval. In fact, following the
conclusion of the MGE, one press article reported that it is said that [the results of the MGE],
owe in part to the fact that many landowners encouraged their Colombian workers to abandon
the country and return after the conclusion of the [MGE].11 Such rumors of efforts to subvert

Un Milln de Indocumentados han Ingresado al Pas en Menos de un Ao, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Feb. 10.
Tres Millones de Indocumentados, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Feb. 11.
10
El 90 por Ciento de los Matriculados son Colombianos, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Dec. 22.
11
Indocumentados Son los Venezolanos, El Nacional [Caracas], 1981, Jan. 8.
9

52

the goals of the governments census reflected the general incredulity in the unexpectedly low
numbers of immigrants registering under the MGE.
Such incredulity over the actual number of undocumented immigrants had become
apparent in the final days of the MGE, as the press and government officials struggled to account
for the gaping difference between their estimates of undocumented immigration and the figures
reflected in the MGE. Following the conclusion of the first phase of the MGE, immigration,
police, military and other official authorities on both sides of the Colombo-Venezuelan border
were gearing up for a decisive round of country-wide deportations of undocumented immigrants
from the Venezuelan side. In fact, the colossal gap between long-asserted figures for
undocumented immigration in Venezuela and the actual number of immigrants that had
registered under the MGE led the Colombian government to issue a series of diplomatic pleads
to the Venezuelan government that it not undergo an unbridled and massive deportation of
immigrants.12 Foreseeing the logistic consequences posed by a massive return of Colombian
immigrants, the Colombian government erected camps near the Venezuelan border handle the
resettlement of returning Colombians. The impending flood of immigrants created a tense
atmosphere in both countries that led to numerous articles in the press evidencing the charged
nature of these events. In fact, the Colombian government repeatedly warned the Venezuelan
authorities of the international and diplomatic consequences of their actions. These events, if
anything else, reflected the degree to which the bloated estimates of undocumented immigration
had taken hold of the Venezuelan and Colombian governments. Ironically, for both governments,

12

Colombia Prepar Plan de Emergencia para encarar expulsin masiva de indocumentados, El Nacional
[Caracas], 1980, Dec. 24; Tensa Expectativa en Colombia y Honda Preocupacin en Venezuela, El Nacional
[Caracas], 1980, Dec. 4.

53

the majority of the undocumented persons arrested by the Venezuelan authorities in the wake
of the MGE turned out to be unsuspecting Venezuelans lacking papers to prove their citizenship.
Colombian Immigration and Territorial Sovereignty
Territorial disputes between Venezuela and Colombia date back to the secession of
Venezuela from Gran Colombia. Even after the independence wars of South America,
Venezuela and Colombia continued to be joined under Gran Colombia. Only a decade later, in
1830, did Venezuela secede from this union. Since that time, territorial boundaries have been
the subject of recurring negotiations but never have been settled to the satisfaction of both
nations.13 More recently, however, territorial disputes between the two countries have centered
around geopolitical interests in the Gulf of Venezuela. Territorial sovereignty over these waters
has long been contested. Despite the long history of territorial disputes between Colombia and
Venezuela, the recent controversy stemmed from the development of international shelf
boundary law since the end of World War II.14 That is, concern over maritime borders
emerged with the doctrine established by President Truman that claimed that every country was
the owner of the riches contained in the marine subsoil adjacent to its territorial coasts.15
In particular, George (1988: 143) explains that the recent territorial dispute commonly
termed the diferendowas driven by the discovery in the 1960s of substantial offshore oil
fields located in the area in question. In essence, this discovery petrolized the conflict, adding
potentially significant economic interest to already strongly felt legal and patriotic convictions in
both countries. Although bilateral conventions were established to discuss a solution to the
ongoing dispute, they had little success in reaching any final agreement on the matter. The
13

George, Larry N., Realism and Internationalism in the gulf of Venezuela, Journal of Interamerican Studies and
World Affairs 30 (Winter, 1988-1989): 143.
14
George (1988-1989), 143.
15
Samper (1981), 18.

54

discord that characterized these conventions permeated throughout Venezuelan (and Colombian)
society. As we shall see, government officials and influential economic actors made statements
tying the presence of undocumented immigrants to concerns over the territorial dispute. In their
view, undocumented immigrants from Colombia posed a real threat to national security interests
namely those concerning sovereignty over the gulf watersof the country.
Concerns in the media over an invasion of undocumented Colombian immigrants date
back to the beginning of the 1970s. In fact, in 1970 a journalist writing in the pages of the
newspaper El Nacional said that,
I must denounce the campaign that has been forwarded to attribute to the
Colombian workers that come to this country in search of work, the condition of subjects
organized diabolically by the state to invade the country.16
The following year, one could read that,
as evidenced by the recent incidents between Colombia and Venezuela, just as was
painfully shown by the war between Honduras and El Salvador such [undocumented]
migrations on a large scale can create international tensions.17
A year later, in 1972, bilateral conventions that had been initiated during the previous decade to
discuss the details of the territorial dispute were suddenly terminated. These conventions were
again restored in 1974, only to be abrogated for another period of time and then revived at the
end of the decade. During that time, concerns over territorial sovereignty were again posited
within discussions of undocumented immigration.
In 1980, the Venezuelan National Guard set into motion a colonization project that aimed
to populate the countrys frontier regions to the west. The project was titled Frontier Service
(Servicio de Fronteras). In an interview with El Nacional, the commanding general of the

16

No Title Available, El Nacional [Caracas], 1970, Mar. 24.

Las Migraciones Espontneas se Convierten en Sensitivo Problema de Amrica Latina, El Universal [Caracas],
1971, May 25.
17

55

National Guard, Eduardo Loaiza Giordano, exposed the details of the project.18 The current goals
of the National Guard, explained the commanding general, were to convert the natural barriers
into authentic means of rapprochement and affirmation of sovereignty, through development
and productivity. This development and productivity referred to the particular aims of the
proposed project. These aims, explained the general, were twofold:
first is a security matter, to prevent the clandestine entry of people and things into the
country. Secondly, to prevent any trespassing of the frontier for alternate reasons, as is the
settlement of nationals from neighboring countries that in the future could be turned into
populations that would be difficult to control.
The project would be carried out with the help of married national guardsmen that would
essentially settle the frontier region and sustain themselves through agricultural work and even
cattle ranching. This settlement model constituted a series of civic-military nuclei for
development, alongside which would be integrated other farmers and ranchers. The project
would ultimately constitute a base for a stable and permanent future population. Unlike the
pioneers of the North-American west, the national guardsmen would ultimately construct
permanent settlements that in turn would spawn other local communities. Driven by a common
cause of securing the frontier region of the country, these groups would be connected by
economic trade, integrating the communities through networks of commerce with just prices.
Throughout its development, careful oversight of the project would be carried out by the national
government. The governments commitment to this project was reasserted a month and a half
later, when the president of the republic announced that we aim, above all, to develop the
frontier regions, to guarantee the presence, both military and civilian, of Venezuelans.19 This
was necessary, he later explained, because we have the best intention of serving the greater and

18
19

Colonizaremos las Fronteras, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Nov. 4.

Los que no se Acogieron a la Matrcula Tienen que ser Sancionados, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Dec. 28.

56

supreme interests of the country, [particularly] its defense and territorial integrity. Such
statements concerning national security concerns and territorial sovereignty had been
pronounced before in the press, particularly with regards to the ongoing diferendo dispute.
Speaking before a class of national guardsmen, the president of Fedecmaras the
nations preeminent business conglomerate warned about the dangers posed by a large number
of undocumented immigrants residing in the country. These immigrants, he warned, posed a
threat to the very integrity of the nationality. Later in his speech, he added that, Fedecmaras
maintains that the Gulf of Venezuela forms an inalienable part of the Venezuelan territory.20
The reference to the nationality (i.e., the Venezuelan nationality) was common in the
government and media around the time of the 1980 MGE. In particular, leading officials,
economic and intellectual figures argued that with mass immigration the country faced an
erosion of its nationality. The particular nature of that nationality, of course, was never clearly
elaborated. Rather, it was defined in direct opposition to Colombians. As one writer put it,
the penetration of the Colombian man in the frontier brings [with it] political
dispositions, social conduct and cultural traits already surpassed by the Venezuelan
population.21
These statements were generally formulated within the context of national and territorial
integrity. Thus, the previous statements were headlined by the title Tchiran Campesinos Wake
Up to the Colombian National Anthem. The Venezuelan military responded to such concerns
over the undocumented immigrant invasion with the reassurance that they would be ready to
respond to any threats to national security. One article summarized statements by vice-admiral
Elio Jos Zambrano, who stated that,
20

El Presidente de Fedecmaras en el V Curso de Comando y Estado Mayor de las FAC Reiter sus
planteamientos de control de inmigrantes ilegales, El Nacional [Caracas], 1979, Mar. 18. In Daz & Gmez (1983:
163).
21
Con el Himno Nacional Colombiano Despierta el Campesino Tachirense, El Nacional [Caracas], 1979, Jul. 4.

57

The Venezuelan authorities, both military and civilian, have the adequate means to
neutralize any actions, on behalf of conglomerates of undocumented foreigners that may put the
country in danger.22
Such reassurances evidenced deep-rooted concerns over the challenges to national sovereignty
posed by undocumented immigration.
On the final eve of 1980, Colombian politicians voiced their concerns over the political
consequences of the massive deportation of undocumented immigrants that would follow the
MGE. These politicians warned that such an operation could create an unfavorable climate for
the solution of the diferendo dispute.23 They protested that, in the wake of the media and
government campaign to stigmatize undocumented immigrants, a general hysteria had
overtaken the Venezuelan public. The day that the newspaper El Nacional reentered circulation,
on January 2nd, the front-page of that days edition featured an article by Venezuelan councilor
Jos Alberto Zambrano Velasco.24 The headline read, The Diferendo and the Repatriation of
Undocumented Immigrants Are Two Different Things. In particular, the councilor explained
that the issue of undocumented immigration was a question of national sovereignty, adding
that deportees had been treated in the most humane manner with the fullest observance of
[their] Human Rights. Despite his reassurances, however, abuses were reported during the
second phase of the MGE. The councilor, however, concluded his statements saying that, this
good treatment [of undocumented immigrants] should be the object of the most cordial
recognition.
Colombian Immigration and Economic Development
22

Las Autoridades Estn Preparadas para Neutralizar Cualquier Accin en Perjuicio del Pas, El Nacional
[Caracas], 1979, Oct. 20. In Daz & Gmez (1983: 174).
23
Deportacin de Indocumentados Afectara Negociaciones sobre el Diferendo, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980,
Dec. 31.
24
El Diferendo y La Repatriacin de Indocumentados Son Dos Aspectos Diferentes, El Nacional [Caracas], 1981,
Jan. 2.

58

As has been argued in this paper, undocumented Colombian immigrants offered cheap
labor that was essential to the Venezuelan model for economic development of the 1970s.
However, as economic depression set in at the end of that decade, media and government
discussion of undocumented immigration became more frequent, especially starting in 1979.
Deportation procedures became more aggressive around this time, particularly those to
Colombia. The general spike in concern over undocumented immigration was fueled by fears
over the economic downturn, as well as the governments inability to stem economic
deterioration. In effect, Colombian immigration came to be seen as a scapegoat for the nations
problems. This passing of blame was formulated in various ways. For example, the deficit in
social services was often blamed on mass undocumented immigration. Leading economic,
governmental, and intellectual figures argued that undocumented immigrants brought disease
into the country, which in turn resulted in abusive use of the health system by these
immigrants. Another concern was that, as cheap laborers, undocumented immigrants were
displacing Venezuelan workers, resulting in an increase in national unemployment. In fact,
despite fears of a rise in unemployment due to undocumented immigration, the unemployment
rate decreased in the 1970s though it increased again in 1979reaching its lowest level in
Venezuelan history at 4.3 percent, early in 1978.25 Government officials and the press also
protested that immigrants were importing underdevelopment by adding to the number of urban
poor that constructed make-shift homes, particularly along the valley walls of the capital region.
Sometimes, however, concerns over immigration were voiced through unarticulated epithets that
were nonetheless economic in character.

25

Flores, A.L., et al., The Impact of Migration in the Receiving Countries: Venezuela (Geneva: CICRED, 1992), 32.

59

An offensive string of comments concerning undocumented immigration was voiced by

the director of the office of Foreigner Control (Control de Extranjeros) of the DIEX during an
interview with the newspaper El Nacional. The director, Fermn Mrmol Len, lamented that,
while he did not want to necessarily imply that there was a condition of xenophobia,
unfortunately these illegal flows have created a situation that worries those of us that occupy
posts in government.26 According to his statements, when an official program to import female
domestic workers had been tested before, once the workers statuses were regularized they
would leave their work and devote themselves to prostitution. The article summarized his
comments, which apparently claimed that undocumented immigrants contributed to the growing
deterioration of social services; they have increased crime, and we can now add to these
[problems] sanitary factors, such as the importation of contagious diseases. In sum, he stated
that these undocumented flows were importing scum and underdevelopment. To make matters
worse, he informed the reader that 35 percent of the Venezuelan population was comprised by
foreigners, and that there were 3 million undocumented immigrants in the country. Of course,
such comments were not notable for their singularity. In fact, following the conclusion of the
1980 MGE, one journalist asked the commanding general of the National Guard whom the
reader has heard from beforewhether there had been a drop in criminal activities,
[particularly] robberies, contraband, and drug trafficking, as a result of the recently instated
second phase of deportations.27 The general replied, vaguely, that more details would be
divulged in the following week.

26

Un Milln de Indocumentados Han Ingresado al Pas en Menos de Un Ao, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Feb.
10.
27
No Afectar a la Produccin Agropecuaria la Deportacin de Indocumentados, El Nacional [Caracas], 1981,
Jan. 9.

60

The new period of mass immigration of the 1970s took off following the rise in OPEC
prices in 1973. By the following year, an increased concentration of immigrants in urban areas
particularly in Caracasled to a climate of growing concern within government over the
economic implications of this trend and the role of undocumented immigration.28 As stated
before, this concern led to estimations in the press and in governmentover the size of
undocumented immigration. Oftentimes, concerns over these flows pointed to their contribution
to the growing size of the barrios, or shanty-towns, that surrounded Caracas and other urban
areas. Thus, referring to the deportation roundups that followed the MGE, one article reported
that as always, these types of actions were stepped up in the poor barrios of the belt that
surrounds the city.29 The writer explained that, while some immigrants went to Venezuela in
search of employment opportunities,
others came to add to the numbers of unemployed persons, or to add to the street
workers such as buhoneros, in order to support their families, which are almost always numerous
in size, and were unable to find a place to live. Thus they moved on to the ranchos of the belt of
misery.30
The direct effects undocumented immigrants have on unemployment were repeated in other
press articles. One illustrative piece titled 5 thousand undocumented immigrants expulsed from
the country, reported the statements of a Caracas police chief who claimed that many of the
deported immigrants were detained while they devoted themselves to the construction of
ranchos.31 Moreover, one hundred percent of the [deportees] lacked any employment
whatsoever.
28

Pellegrino (1986), 33.

Patrullas Combinadas Buscan a Los Indocumentados, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Dec. 28.
30
A buhonero is a street vendor. Buhoneros generally setup tent in a very informal fashion, oftentimes with an
umbrella and display table. In Caracas they can be found mostly in the downtown area and other popular shopping
districts. The term rancho can be translated as a shack. These residential structures generally consist of exposed
brick and tin roofs and are the homes of the numerous poor residents of the citys barrios.
31
Sacados del Pas 5 Mil Indocumentados, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Feb. 12.
29

61

These concerns have a strong public aspect. In particular, many figures in government
and in the media pointed to Caracas numerous barrios in formulating their concerns over
undocumented immigration. Due to their prominent location within the capitals landscape
many lie along the valley walls of the capital regionthese barrios are visible throughout most
of the city. Moreover, the buhoneros occupy a very public space within the Venezuelan
economy. That is, they are generally located throughout the citys busiest shopping districts and
in the heavily-frequented downtown area. The public aspect of the buhoneros and barrios, then,
and their positioning within the media and government discussion of immigration highlights a
central aspect of opposition to Colombian immigration. The prevalence of these topics in the
discussion of immigration mirrors their physical prominence along visible areas of the countrys
urban centers. Through the invocation of the images of barrios and buhoneros, opposition to
undocumented immigration was imbued with a strong public aspect that contributed to its
entrenchment in Venezuelan society.

62

Epilogue
Undocumented immigration has attracted considerable attention in Venezuelan politics
since the 1970s. In August of 1987, the governments of Venezuela and Colombia collided over
the issue of territorial sovereignty. Earlier that month, the Colombian navy sailed a frigate into
disputed territory in the Gulf of Venezuela, in what came to be knows as the Caldas incident.
While the dispute over gulf waters remained unsettled until two years later, the press and
government in both countries took the opportunity to vent their frustrations over the issue.
Protesting what was often termed an invasion of sovereign territory, government officials and the
Venezuelan press asserted that the Gulf of Venezuela belonged to Venezuela. Not surprisingly,
the media did not pass the opportunity to comment on the issue within the context of
undocumented immigration.
In particular, undocumented immigration was yet again stigmatized for the negative
implications it held for territorial sovereignty and economic development, and undocumented
Colombian immigration was particularly associated with the importation of guerrilla fighters and
general criminality into Venezuelan territory. According to various editorials in the press, it was
feared that Colombian immigrants could represent a potential group of insurgents that would put
the countrys national security in peril. One editorial at the time stated that, we are worried that
part of this population is organized as a fifth column and that it occupies key positions in the
national economy, including transportation, gas stations, nursing positions and domestic
service.1 Added to these concerns were fears over the entry of guerrilla fighters. These concerns
were sometimes accompanied by estimations of the undocumented Colombian population in

Nos Preocupa, El Universal [Caracas] 1987, Aug. 16.

Venezuela, though these estimates were not as unwieldy as the ones published in the press
around the time of the 1980 MGE nor were they cited as regularly as before.
Just recently, the question of whether to allow the entry of Colombian immigrants fleeing
the current period of civil unrest in Colombia was raised within the context of refugee law. In
1999, Venezuelan president Hugo Chvez received criticism from Human Rights organizations
concerning his treatment of Colombians fleeing the war in their country. As had been established
by various press reports, these Colombian refugees were essentially detained at the border and
deported back to Colombia, without any juridical consideration of their refugee status. The
Venezuelan government deported these refugees without due process despite the countrys
commitment to the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees, which had been established through
the United Nations.2
To this day the issue of undocumented immigration in Venezuela continues to be relevant
to politics in the country. Early in 2004, owing to recent cross-border incidents between
Colombian paramilitaries and guerrillas and the Venezuelan government, current Venezuelan
President Hugo Chvez remarked on the origins of crime in Zulia, a state in western Venezuela
that borders on Colombia. According to the president,
we have been hit by common delinquency, subversion, contra-subversion, paramilitaries
and drug-dealing. All of that comes from Colombia; that was not born here and it has shocked us
a lot.3
The nature of these statements and their disregard for Colombian immigration, however, were
contradicted by an amnesty implemented by the government of Hugo Chvez later that year.

Feldmann, Andreas, & Olea, Helena, New Formulas, Old Sins: Human Rights Abuses Against Migrant Workers,
Asylum Seekers, and Refugees in the Americas, presented Nov. 4th, 2003, at a workshop for the Human Rights
Program of the University of Chicago.
3
Latinnews.com, Chvez Chides Colombia over Border Control, 2004, 8 Jan., http://www.latinnews.com.

64

In February of 2004, a general amnesty for undocumented immigrants was implemented

in Venezuela. According to the governments Department of Information and Communications,
Presidential Decree 2823 authorized the amnesty in order to resolve the problems faced by
foreign residents in the country for many years now, [especially] given that a long time has
passed since programs of this type were last carried out.4 While the amnesty was purported to
register 3 million foreign-born persons, in reality some 200,000 undocumented immigrants were
actually registered. That is, a large number of the people applying for this amnesty were
Venezuelan citizens and residents whose national identification cards had expired. At the same
time, however, anyone who wished to apply for naturalization could do so under the amnesty.
Further, Decree 2823 states that the application for naturalization would be processed within 6
months, though for citizens of Spain, Portugal, or any Latin American countries the application
would be processed in less than four months. Before the amnesty, many of these people were
simply unable to afford or unwilling to paythe fees that applied to renovate their ID cards.5
Thus, the government made the process free to all applicants, providing informal registration
tables which were setup throughout the country in public spaces. Further, a large number of new
computers were purchased to expedite the registration process.
This amnesty came just half a year before the recent referendum on the presidential
office, and many applicants were understandably relieved to have their identification documents
updated and regularized before the referendum. On the other hand, the press and opposition
protested that the amnesty was a campaign ploy to register new voters that would allegedly vote

Ministerio de Comunicacin e Informacin, ONIDEX Regularizara a 3 Millones de Extranjeros que Viven en

Venezuela, 2004, 16 Feb., http://www.minci.gov.ve/.
5
Ministerio de Comunicacin e Informacin, ONIDEX Regularizara a 3 Millones de Extranjeros que Viven en
Venezuela, 2004, 16 Feb., http://www.minci.gov.ve/.

65

to strike down a recall on the presidents term. This concern was not entirely unfounded, though
it is possible that the naturalization process was delayed for many of the amnestys applicants.
Indeed, concern over undocumented immigration continues to be a lively topic in
Venezuelan politics. Though the particular focus of opposition to Colombian immigration
changes with the political climate especially depending on the condition of diplomatic relations
between Colombia and Venezuelaseveral themes are commonly repeated, including crime,
disease, wage-competition, and a general subversion of national legal standards. Like in the 1980
MGE, the current Venezuelan government posed undocumented immigration to its advantage,
this time offering citizenship to thousands of undocumented and documented immigrants in what
may have been an attempt to bolster its support in Venezuela, especially in the face of an
impending referendum on its term. In fact, the governments contrastive position on
undocumented immigration here legitimizing its presence, there blaming the group for various
reasonsreflects the vulnerability of this group to the whims of government policy and to the
public perception under its influence. In fact, the 1980 MGE, the model for economic
development of the 1970s, and the recent amnesty reflect a common aspect. That is, that the
vulnerable role of undocumented Colombian immigration was and continues to be phrased in the
strategic language of the political interests of the Venezuelan government.

66

Bibliography
Texts and Journal Articles
Berglund, Susan, and Hernndez Calimn, Humberto H. (1985). Los de Afuera: Un Estudio
Analtico del Proceso Migratorio en Venezuela, 1936-1985. Caracas: CEPAM.
Bidegain, Gabriel (1986). Inmigrantes: Mito o Realidad? Revista sobre Relaciones Industriales
y Laborales, 18, 9-27.
Bidegain, Gabriel (1987). Las Migraciones Internacionales en Venezuela: Bibliografa para Su
Estudio. Caracas: UCAB.
Castao, Juanita (1983). La Legislacin Migratoria Colombiana y Andina: Un Marco Necesario
para el Estudio de la Migracin entre stos Pases. Cardona Gutierrez, Ramiro, et al.,
Migracin de Colombianos a Venezuela (pp. 65-99). Bogot: Editorial Carrera.
Chen, Chi-Yi, Picouet, M., and Urquijo, J. (1982). Los Movimientos Migratorios Internacionales
en Venezuela: Polticas y Realidades. Revista sobre Relaciones Industriales y Laborales,
10-11, 11-47.
Didonet, Matthew (1983). La Inmigracin Clandestina y la Poltica Inmigratoria en Venezuela.
In Instituto de Altos Estudios de Amrica Latina, Migraciones Latinas y Formacin de la
Nacin Latinoamericana (pp. 405-430). Caracas: Universidad Simn Bolvar.
Feldmann, Andreas, and Olea, Helena (2003). New Formulas, Old Sins: Human Rights Abuses
Against Migrant Workers, Asylum Seekers, and Refugees in the Americas, presented
Nov. 4th, 2003, at a workshop for the Human Rights Program of the University of
Chicago.
Flores , A. Lauricella, Chen, Chi-Yi, and Kosinski, Leszek A. (1992). The Impact of Migration
in the Receiving Countries: Venezuela. Geneva: CICRED.
George, Larry N. (1988-1989). Realism and Internationalism in the Gulf of Venezuela.
Journal Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30, 4, 139-170.
Gmez, Alcides and Daz, Luz M. (1986). La Moderna Esclavitud: Los Indocumentados en
Venezuela. Bogot: Editorial Oveja Negra.
Pellegrino, Adela (1986). Los Indocumentados en la Inmigracin Colombiana en Venezuela.
Revista sobre Relaciones Industriales y Laborales, 18, 29-55.
Pellegrino, Adela (1989). Historia de la Inmigracin en Venezuela, Siglos XIX y XX. Caracas:
ANCE.
Pellegrino, Adella (1984). Venezuela: Illegal Immigration from Colombia. Internacional
Migration Review 18, 3, 748-66.
Samper, Ernesto P., Torres V., Javier, Merlano M., Jorge, Tarazona de Nio, Lucia, Rivas,
Helga, and Ruiz H., Hernando (1981). No a Venezuela. Bogot: ANIF.
Schloeter, Maryluz, Surez, Mara Matilde, and Torrealba, Ricardo (1983). Selective Latin
American migration in Venezuela: the Case of Sidor. In Marks, Arnaud F., & Vessuri,
Hebe M.C. (Eds.), White Collar Migrants in the Americas and the Caribbean (pp. 199234). Leiden, Netherlands: Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology.
Van Roy, Ralph (1983). La Influencia de la Prensa en la Opinin Pblica ante la Inmigracin. In
Instituto de Altos Estudios de Amrica Latina. In Instituto de Altos Estudios de Amrica
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Caracas: Universidad Simn Bolvar.

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Van Roy, Ralph (1983). La Poblacin Clandestina en Venezuela: Resultados de la Matrcula

General de Extranjeros. In Van Roy, Ralph (Ed.), Migraciones Internacionales en las
Amricas (pp. 47-66). Caracas: CEPAM.
Newspapers
El Nacional (Caracas)
El Universal (Caracas)
Websites
http://minci.gov.ve/
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68

Appendix A
Newspaper Headlines Cited
Bolsa de Trabajo para Inmigraciones Selectivas Propuesta en Fedecmaras, El Nacional, 1976,
Sep. 12.
Colombia Prepar Plan de Emergencia para encarar expulsin masiva de indocumentados, El
Nacional, 1980, Dec. 24.
Colonizaremos las Fronteras, El Nacional, 1980, Nov. 4.
Con el Himno Nacional Colombiano Despierta el Campesino Tachirense, El Nacional, 1979, Jul.
4. In Daz & Gmez (1983: 167).
Deportacin de Indocumentados Afectara Negociaciones sobre el Diferendo, El Nacional, 1980,
Dec. 31.
Detenidos 1.429 Indocumentados en Operativo Policial Sur del Lago, El Nacional, 1980, Mar. 4.
El 90 por Ciento de los Matriculados son Colombianos, El Nacional, 1980, Dec. 22.
El Diferendo y La Repatriacin de Indocumentados Son Dos Aspectos Diferentes, El Nacional,
1981, Jan. 2.
El Presidente de Fedecmaras en el V Curso de Comando y Estado Mayor de las FAC Reiter sus
planteamientos de control de inmigrantes ilegales, El Nacional, 1979, Mar. 18. In Daz & Gmez
(1983: 163).
En 60 Das Censo de Indocumentados, El Nacional, 1980, Feb. 12.
Indocumentados Son los Venezolanos, El Nacional, 1981, Jan. 8.
La Polica de Inmigracin Deport a 1.249 Indocumentados en los ltimos Tres Das, El
Universal, 1980, Feb. 11.
Las Autoridades Estn Preparadas para Neutralizar Cualquier Accin en Perjuicio del Pas, El
Nacional, 1979, Oct. 20. In Daz & Gmez (1983: 174).
Las Migraciones Espontneas se Convierten en Sensitivo Problema de Amrica Latina, El
Universal, 1971, May 25.
Los que no se Acogieron a la Matrcula Tienen que ser Sancionados, El Nacional, 1980, Dec. 28.
No Afectar a la Produccin Agropecuaria la Deportacin de Indocumentados, El Nacional, 1981,
Jan. 9.
Nos Preocupa, El Universal 1987, Aug. 16.
Patrullas Combinadas Buscan a Los Indocumentados, El Nacional, 1980, Dec. 28.
Reunin en Ccuta, El Nacional, 1980, Mar. 5.
Sacados del Pas 5 Mil Indocumentados, El Nacional, 1980, Feb. 12.
Slo 100 Indocumentados entre 250 Mil Personas Identificadas, El Nacional 1980, Dec. 30.
Tensa Expectativa en Colombia y Honda Preocupacin en Venezuela, El Nacional, 1980, Dec. 4.
Tres Millones de Indocumentados, El Nacional, 1980, Feb. 11.
Un Milln de Indocumentados han Ingresado al Pas en Menos de un Ao, El Nacional, 1980, Feb.
10.
Venezuela Decidi Retirarse de Comit Intergubernamental para Migraciones Europeas, El
Nacional, 1966, Oct. 9.
Visa de Transente y Cdula de Identidad a Extranjeros que se Hayan Registrado, El Nacional,
1980, Nov. 4.
No Title Available, El Nacional, 1970, Mar. 24.

69