People vs Abella (1979)

Inmates on one side of the floor attacked the inmates on the other
side. They locked the cell so that no one could enter or get out. 14
people died. After the pleadings and trials, eventually, 37 inmates
were sentenced to death. Counsels of the accused say that TC
erred in saying that there was conspiracy among them, and SolGen
says that instead of the 37 death penalties, there should have only
been 14 death sentences. So the issue is, are they guilty of a
complex crime or not? SC held that yes, they are guilty because
based on the ruling of a precedent case delos Santos: Ruling based
on the theory that: when, for the attainment of a single purpose
which constitutes an offense and various acts are executed, such
acts must be considered only as one offense, a complex one. And in
another precedent case Lawas: the killing was held to be only one
complex offense of multiple homicide because it resulted from a
single criminal impulse and it was not possible to determine how
many victims were killed by each of the accused.
ISSUE: Are they guilty of a complex crime? HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
After a perusal of the confessions, SC finds that their
admission of guilt is corroborated by evidence of the fact
that the massacre described actually took place.
Re: argument of the counsels (2nd to the last bullet of the
facts)
Conspiracy can logically be inferred from the simultaneous
and concerted acts of the 16 raiders who, after putting down
the guard and entering the big cell, joined and combined
forces with their co-attackers, inmates of the big cell who
were waiting for the go signal to begin the attack in
pursuance of their criminal objective.
The trial court added that the acts and conduct of the
accused from the start of their aggression until the attack
was suppressed were characterized "by a swift, united and
concerted movement that could easily indicate a community
of purpose, closeness of association and concurrence of will
The accused had deliberately planned the attack as shown
by the manner in which they executed the massacre
Re: SG argument
Precedent: In the De los Santos case, which involved 2 riots
wherein 9 prisoners were killed, the 14 members of the
gang who took part in the killing were convicted of multiple
murder (a complex crime) and not of 9 separate murders.
Ruling in delos Santos was predicated on the theory that:
when, for the attainment of a single purpose which

constitutes an offense, various acts are executed, such acts

must be considered only as one offense, a complex one
Precedents to delos Santos:
People vs. Cabrera: 77 Constabularymen murdered 6
policemen and 2 private citizens and gravely wounded 3
civilians, they were convicted of multiple murder with grave
injuries, a complex crime.
People vs. Sakam: 19 Moros, forming part of a band of 100,
massacred 14 Constabularymen. They were charged and
convicted of multiple murder, a complex crime.
People vs. Lawas: When on a single occasion around 50
Maranaos were killed by a group of home guards (formerly
Constabulary soldiers), the killing was held to be only one
complex offense of multiple homicide because it resulted
from a single criminal impulse and it was not possible to
determine how many victims were killed by each of the
accused
People vs. Manantan: 80 persons stationed on both sides of
the fired at the group of riding in 5 cars. 5 persons were
charged with multiple murder, a complex crime the case as
to 3 of the accused was dismissed on the ground that their
confessions were taken after they had been tortured.
The conviction for multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder, as a complex crime, qualified by treachery
(absorbing abuse of superiority and cuadrilla and
aggravated by quasi-recidivism and evident premeditation
(offset by plea of guilty) and recidivism, as to some accused,
as shown in the record, should be affirmed.

Enrile vs Salazar (1990)

Topic: Complex crime Art. 48, Art 9 (1) (2)
Short version: Enrile was arrested. The warrant charges him, along
with 2 others with the crime of murder. They are debating on the
applicability of the Hernandez ruling to this case, and also an issue
is w/n they are guilty of a complex crime. Court said no, because
court cannot make a new crime (rebellion complexed with murder)
because that function is exclusively for congress.
Long version:

Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by officers led by Dir. Alfredo

Lim of the NBI on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon.
Jaime Salazar of the RTC of Quezon City.

The warrant charges Enrile, along with spouses Panlilio, and

Honasan with the crime of "rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder" allegedly committed during the
period of the failed coup attempt (from Nov 29 to Dec 10,
1990).
Enrile was taken and held overnight without bail at the NBI
in Taft. Next morning, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in QC, given custody to another district.
Enrile filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that he was
deprived of his constitutional rights bec (1) he was held to
answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the
statute books; (2) charged with a criminal offense in an
information for which no complaint was initially filed or
preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied
due process; (3) denied his right to bail; and (4) arrested
and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without
the judge who issued it first having personally determined
the existence of probable cause
SolGen says that the case does not fall within
the Hernandez ruling because the information in Hernandez
charged murders and other common crimes committed as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas
the current case against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder
and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not
in furtherance, of rebellion.
SolGen distinguishes between the complex crime arising
from an offense being a necessary means for committing
another (referred to in the 2nd clause of Art 48 and the
subject of the Hernandez ruling) and the compound crime
arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or
less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same
paragraph, which Hernandez was not concerned with and
therefore, should not apply.

ISSUE: Is Enrile, along with co-accused, guilty of a complex crime or

not?
HELD: No.
RATIO:
Court says that there is one reason why Art 48 cannot be
applied in this case. If murder were not complexed with
rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately, the
following penalties would be imposable: (1) for the crime of
rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor

and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its

maximum period to death. In other words, in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not
be imposed upon him. However under Art 48, the penalty
would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of
a single aggravating circumstance. So if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, the provision
would be unfavorable to the movant.
Re: held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist
in the statute books
In the context of Hernandez, Enrile is charged with
something in the RPC: simple rebellion
Re: denied right to bail
As they are being charged only of the crime of simple
rebellion which is bailable before conviction, that must now
be accepted as a correct proposition.
The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes
committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed absorbed.

Obiter:
The SC noted that there may be a need to modify the rebellion law.
Considering that the essence of rebellion has been lost and that it
is being used by a lot of opportunists to attempt to grab power.
Dissent and concurring:
Fernan, C.J.

Hernandez should not be interpreted as an all embracing authority

for the rule that all common crimes committed in furtherance of
rebellion are absorbed (by rebellion). Hernandez has served the
purpose for which it was applied by the court in 1956 during the
communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our
society in 34 yrs have far-reaching effects on the all embracing
applicability of the doctrine. The court should have differenciated
acts which are indispensable, and acts which are merely necessary.
A crime which is indispensable to the commission of another must
be an element of it, but one which is merely necessary is not.
Separate:
Melencio-Herrera
Agree that Hernandez remains good law, but takes exeption that
habeas corpus in not the remedy. Had the Information filed charged
merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition could have
been plausible. But that Information charged Rebellion complexed

with Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not
exist in our statute books.
CONTINUING CRIME
Parulan vs. Director of Prisons (1968)
Facts:
-Parulan was serving life imprisonment (commuted to 20 years by
the Pres of the Phil) in Muntinglupa. In Oct 1964, he was transferred
to Fort Bonifacio. He escaped in the same month, but was
recaptured in Manila.
- He was prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence,
penalized under RPC157. In 1966, CFI Manila found him guilty and
sentenced him accordingly.
- He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the
Director of Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered to
release immediately and without delay the body of the petitioner
from unlawful and illegal confinement. Parulan saw his
confinement illegal because the sentence of conviction imposed
upon him for the crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized
under RPC157, was rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his
person and of the offense with which he was charged.
Issue:
W/N the CFI of Manila with jurisdiction to try and decide the case
and to impose the sentence upon Parulan for evasion of service of
sentence
Held & Ratio:
Yes. In transitory crimes or continuing offenses, acts material to the
crime occur in one province and some in another, in which case,
the rule is settled that the court of either province where any of the
essential ingredients of the crime took place has jurisdiction to try
the case.
- In some crimes, although the elements thereof for its
consummation occurred in one place, yet by the very nature of the
offense committed, the violation is deemed to be continuing.
- some crimes under 1st class: estafa or malversation, abduction
- some crimes under 2nd class: libel, kidnapping and illegal
detention (deprivation of liberty is continuing), and evasion of
service of sentence (the act of the escapee is a continuous or series
of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an
unintermittent force, however long it may be)
- Crime is not consummated after the convict has escaped from
confinement, for as long as he continues to evade the service, he is
deemed to continue committing the crime and may be arrested

without warrant at any place where he may be found; Sec6 (c) Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Court (one of the instances when a
person may be arrested without warrant is where he has excaped
from confinement) supports this
Umil vs. Fidel V. Ramos (1991)
8 petitions for habeas corpus consolidated
Facts for case I (Umil vs. Ramos):
- In Feb 88, The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital
Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) verified that the man (Dural) being
treated for a gunshot wound in St. Agnes Hospital was the member
of the NPA Sparrow Unit responsible for killing 2 CAPCOM soldiers
the day before. He was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the
gunman.
- Dural was charged with the crime of Double Murder with Assault
Upon Agents of Persons in Authority. Defendant Bernardo Itucal, Jr.
was included as defendant in the amendment of the information.
- On 6 Feb 88, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with SC on
behalf of Roberto Umil, Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The writ was
issued on 9 Feb, and the hearing started.
- On 26 Feb, however, Umil and Renato were release after they had
posted bail before the Pasay RTC where charges for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them. Since the writ of
habeas corpus does not lie in favour of an accused in a criminal
case who has been released on bail, Umil and Renatos petition has
been rendered moot and dismissed.
Issue:
W/N Dural was illegally arrested
Held & Ratio:
No. Although Durals arrest was not one of those mentioned in Sec5
of Rule 113 as his arrest came a day after the shooting incident, it
was justified because he was arrested for being a member of the
NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion is a
continuing crime together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal
to commit rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in
furtherance of or in connection with, so his arrest without warrant is
justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested.
-Under Sec5 (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, an arrest
without a warrant is justified when the person is caught in flagranti
delicto (caught red-handed), or when an offense has just been
committed and the person making the arrest has personal

knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has

committed it.
- His arrest was more an act of capturing him to suppress rebellion,
than for the purpose of immediately persecuting him in court for a
statutory offense. So the arrest need not follow the usual procedure
in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by
a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
- Dural was eventually tried and found guilty of the charge and
sentenced accordingly. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer
available to him. Whatever may be said about the manner of his
arrest, the fact remains that he was in court when a complaint was
read to him, and to this he pleaded not guilty. The irregularity of his
arrest is not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon
a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.
(I think yung case#1 lang talaga ang kailangan. Sa cases I-V lahat
NPA, subversion. Sa cases VI and VII, hindi na continuing crime.
Here's case II para makita niyo...)
FACTS for case II:
- Rogelio Ramos, NPA member who surrendered to the military,
informed them about the operations of the CPP and NPA. He
identified some of former comrades and pointed a certain house
occupied by Renato Constantino as safehouse of the National
United Front Commission (NUFC) of CCP-NPA. The house
- When apprehended at the house, Buenaobra admitted that he
was an NPA courier and had with him letters to Constantino and
other members of NPA.
- Roque, in charge of finance of the NUFC, admitted ownership of
subversive documents found in her sisters house. She also had
ammunition and a grenade but no permit for them.
- As there was no contention that petitioners are officers of NUFC,
it must be deemed admitted. As officers and/or members, their
arrest without warrant was justified for the same reasons earlier
stated in Dural, and Roques arrest was additionally justified as she
was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions
without license to posses them.
CRUZ, J., Dissenting and Concurring:
Subversion as a continuing offense to justify an arrest without
warrant of any person at any time as long as authorities say he has
been placed under surveillance on suspicion of the offense is a
dangerous doctrine.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:

Dural was charged with double murder. If he had been guilty of

subversion (the offense for which he was supposedly arrested
without warrant), then he should have been charged with it.
A warrantless (or citizens) arrest is not possible in case of
subversion in the absence of any overt act that would justify the
authorities to act. Subversion means knowingly, wilfully, and by
overt acts affiliate[ing] [oneself] with, becom[ing] or remain[ing] a
member of the CCP The military could not have known that
Dural, when he was taken, was a member of the NPA because he
was not performing any overt act that he was truly a rebel. Overt
act is made up of [e]very act, movement, deed and word
indicating intent to accomplish a criminal objective. Dural, when he
was arrested, was lying in a hospital bed. This is not the overt act
contemplated by law.
Warrantless arrest may be exercised only in the most urgent cases
and when the guilt of an offender is plain and evident
PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, and CESAR O. MANCAO
vs. Secretary HERNANDO PEREZ
May 1, 2001: In response to an "angry and violent mob armed with
explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs stones, and other
deadly weapons" attempting to break into Malacanang, GMA issued
proclamation No. 38 (Declaring State of Rebellion in the NCR) &
General Order No. 1 (Directing the AFP and the PNP to Suppress the
Rebellion in the NCR).
Subsequently, 4 petitions (1. Lacson et al, 2. Defensor-Santiago, 3.
Lumbao, 4. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino) were filed before the
Court, assailing said declaration and the warrantless arrests
allegedly carried out under it. Petitions 1-3 similarly filed for
prohibition and mandamus, contending that they were under
imminent danger of being arrested.
May 6, 2001: GMA lifted the state of rebellion in the NCR, rendering
said instant petitions moot and academic. Secretary of Justice
denies having issued orders for specific "warrantless arrests" in
connection with the rebellion. Petitioners have many remedies they
can avail of to protect themselves from warrantless arrest, making
the resort to the instant petition unnecessary.
There are other reasons for dismissal of the petitions at bar:
GR No.147780 (Lacson, Aquino, Mancao)
Premature, as it asks the Court to stop enjoin proceedings against
the petitioners-- proceedings which have not even been filed yet.

Even if informations were to be filed later, the Court cannot enjoin

criminal prosecution under the Rules of Court.
Petitioner's prayer to declare hold departure orders against them
void ab initio-- must be made in the proper proceedings.
Writ of habeas corpus is not called for, as its purpose is to relieve
petitioners from unlawful restraint.
GR No. 147781 (Defensor-Santiago)
In filing for mandamus, the legal right of the petitioner to the act
which is compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamus cannot
be issued unless the right to relief is clear.
GR No. 147799 (Lumbao)
Petitioner claims that the declaration of a state of rebellion is an
encroachment on the separation of powers, specifically judicial
power to interpret what took place on May 1, 2001. Court said in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Hon. Zamora, the necessity of
calling out the armed forces is not always quantifiable and that the
President may rely on means not available to the judiciary to make
the decision to do so.
GR No. 147810 (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino)
Not a real party-in-interest, as it is a juridical person and cannot be
placed under arrest, and the petition did not allege the impending
arrests of its members. Even if petition construed as declaratory
relief, it cannot be upheld because original actions to the SC do not
include declaratory relief unless it involves ambassadors, public
ministers, and consuls.
WHEREFORE all 4 petitions were dismissed, and the respondents
enjoined from arresting the petitioners in the 1st 3 petitions without
warrant, in connection with the events of May 1, 2001.
DISSENT: Kapunan
Right against unreasonable searches and seizure is an
indispensable freedom. Petitioners seek restraining orders and/or
injunction against their impending warrantless arrests.
Facts relating to the impending arrest of opposition leaders and
police officers:
Apr 25, 2001: Estrada was arrested in connection with the criminal
case for plunder, and was arrested after a skirmish between his

supporter and several police officers. After that day and the
succeeding days, pro-Estrada supporters gathered at EDSA. The
petitioners were among many of the political figures who spoke
before the crowd.
Apr 28, 2001: Estrada brought to Veteran's Medical Center, from
where he would be transported to Fort Sto. Domingo.
May 1, 2001: EDSA crowd decided to march to Malacanang. As they
were being dispersed, a melee erupted, hurting several police
officers and rallyists. AFTER the crowd was dispersed, GMA issued
Proclamation 38 and General Order 1, exercising her powers as
Commander in Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines.
After the proclamation, several leaders of the opposition were
ordered arrested (without warrant).
Issue: WERE THE ARRESTS/IMPENDING ARRESTS ILLEGAL?
Proc. 38 & GO1 were based on Article VII, Sec 18, which granted
GMA the power to call out armed forces in the case of 1) lawless
violence, 2) rebellion, 3) invasion. In case of rebellion/invasion, a)
writ of habeas corpus may be suspended, b) the Philippines or part
thereof may be placed under martial law. The term "state of
rebellion" has NO LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE, as the president is NOT
required to declare it.
If the intent of the declaration of a state of rebellion is to conduct
warrantless arrests, it is effectively martial law (but even matrial
law can authorize the President to do so).
WHEN ARE WARRANTLESS ARRESTS LEGAL?
Rules of Court: Rule 113, Sec. 5.
"A police officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it, and
xxx
In cases filing under par. a) and b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to
the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with sec. 7 of Rule 119."

A warrantless arrest is only justified when a police officer is

confronted with circumstances that are a basis for a finding of
probable cause of the commission of an offense and that the
person arrested is probably guilty of that offense. The petitioners
were arrested without warrant for acts of rebellion; their arrest was
based supposedly on Sec 5 of rule 113, and the following:
UMIL VS. RAMOS (1990)
"The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offences committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct
assault against the State and are in the nature of continuing
crimes."
Reliance on Umil is misplaced (there was also dissent against it
because it reaffirmed a case in the Marcos regime of martial law,
and cannot apply now). The arrests upheld because the petitioners
were members of CPP, NPA, etc. The petitioners in this case are not
members of an outlawed organization for overthrowing the
government. There must be an overt act constitutive of rebellion
taking place in the presence of the arresting officer (see Art 134 of
the RPC).
US vs. SAMONTE defines "in [the arresting officer's] presence" as
"when such a officer or person sees the offense, even though at a

distance, or hears the disturbance created thereby and proceeds at

once to the scene thereof, or the offense is continuing, or has not
been consummated, at the time the arrest is made."
This requirement was not met in the arrests on May 1, 2001.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING: Gutierrez
"To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine of continuing offense
is, to give a license for the illegal detention of persons on pure
suspicion."
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING: Feliciano
The doctrine of "continuing crimes" cannot be involved for
weakening and dissolving the constitutional guarantee against
warrantless arrest, especially when the crime does not consist of
acts with a definite beginning and end.
DISSENTING: Sandoval-Gutierrez
Warrantless arrest not justified under Rule 113, sec. 5, because the
petitioners cannot be considered "to have committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" at the time
they were arrested.