BRITISH AUTOMATION CONFERENCE, 1965

DISCUSSION GROUP A3

Professor

B.

C.

Professor of Industrial

ROBERTS,

MA(Oxon)

Relations,

London School of Economics and Political Science

Social Change

Professor Roberts, who is currently engaged on research

into problems arising out of economic growth and
technological advance, is an authority on industrial relations
in developing countries. He has recently returned
from Japan where he made a study of industrial relations
and technological change.
He has travelled widely, has been Visiting Professor
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of
California and of Princeton, and has lectured at many
other American universities including Harvard, Chicago,
Illinois and Michigan.
Professor Roberts is Editor of the British Journal of
Industrial Relations; President of the British University
Industrial Relations Association; and author of many
publications on various aspects of his subject.

HE impact of automation on the pattern of our

society is over the long run bound to be profound. New techniques of production alter the
composition of the labour force, change the structure
of industry and commerce and ultimately affect the
organisation of society in all its aspects.
Social change is not only an inevitable consequence
of technological change : it is also a necessary condition. Unless the appropriate social changes take
place, technological development is frustrated and the
condition of society either remains or becomes stagnant. This can be seen most obviously in the underdeveloped countries. Modern technology if put fully
to use could swiftly raise the living standards of those
countries, but the extent to which they can take
advantage of this possibility is seriously limited by
social factors. The problem can also be observed at
a different level of development in an old industrial
society, such as Britain, where the strength of tradition and social conservatism have held back social
change, especially in the field of education over the
past 50 years, and as a result slowed down the pace
of technological adaptation and with it our economic
growth.
Thus the most dynamic element in the evolution of
all societies is the interaction between technological
development and social change. The "web of rules"
and the complex of institutions through which we
regulate human relations have to be continuously
adjusted as technological advances take place. Unless
we make the necessary social adjustments we shall
fall behind other societies in our rate of economic
growth and social development; or expose ourselves
to undesirable social tensions and political stresses
because we have failed to develop an adequate
system of social control. There is always a time lag
in the modifying of old behaviour patterns and the
building of new institutions, since human beings are
generally reluctant to give up established positions
of power, privilege and prestige. But why Britain,
which 200 years ago was capable of making what we
now choose to call an industrial revolution, involving
immense social changes, should find coming to terms
with modern technological developments a more
difficult task than many other countries, is a mystery
to be probed more deeply elsewhere. The speed and
smoothness with which a society is able to adapt to
the need for social change is clearly a function of
many factors, but above all it is related to the ability
of the society to overcome the resistance of those who
believe that they are likely to suffer rather than to
gain from the changes that are involved. This belief
may have no foundation in fact and be merely the
product of a fear of the unknown, but it will powerfully reinforce the opposition of those whose beliefs
are founded on a more certain knowledge that they
will lose something from change.
automation and unemployment

The social problem aroused by automation which

has so far attracted most attention and given rise to
the greatest fear is unemployment. This apprehension
has been expressed most vehemently in the United
74

The Production Engineer

States where it is widely, but in my opinion

erroneously, believed that automation has been
primarily responsible for, by European standards, the
extremely high level of 5 to 6% unemployment which
has prevailed during the past decade. Credence was
given to this view when, in 1962, President Kennedy
stated that 25,000 jobs per week had to be found to
take care of those being eliminated by technological
advances, and new entrants into the labour market.
This figure was substantially improved upon by the
American trades unions and the late chairman of the
American Foundation for Automation and Employment 1 who claimed that the figure of technological
job displacement was 40,000 jobs per week.
These statements, however, tend to be highly misleading, since they give the impression that unemployment has been increasing by this amount. This, of
course, is not so. The actual number unemployed
has risen in the U.S.A. from approximately three
million in 1955 to just over four million in 1965 2.
When considering the job displacement figure,
which is simply another way of measuring productivity, and therefore the greater it is the better we
should be pleased, we should bear in mind that the
rate of displacement (the rate of increase in productivity) has been only marginally greater during the
past two decades than the average over the past 50
years. Thus, so far, there is nothing new or sensationally different about the effects of automation on
the level of unemployment from the situation that
we have known over a long period.
The most important empirical fact about employment is that in all the industrial countries throughout
the world there are far more people employed than
there were 25 years ago, millions more than 50 years
ago, and many, many millions more than there were
employed 100 years ago. Significant as unemployment has been in certain periods in the past, and as
it still is today, of far, far greater social significance
has been the ability of modern industrial economies
to create productive employment.
In 1964 the number employed in the U.S.A., whose
experience I would like to consider further, since
this country is much further down the road in its use
of modern technology than any other, had risen to
over 70 million. Ten million more workers were in
jobs than had been employed in 1954. During this
period the increase in productivity had been displacing workers at a rate of rather more than 200,000
per year and new entrants to the labour force had
averaged about 750,000 3 per year. In the last few
years this figure has risen to over 1,000,000 new
entrants per year. Thus the demand for output has
had to rise by an amount that would have created
more than 1,000,000 additional new jobs a year.
The Americans did not quite succeed in achieving this
level of demand, with the result that unemployment
has increased over the decade by about 1,000,000. In
the future, with the labour force increasing by .more
than 1,000,000 each year, higher participation rates
that is, more people wishing to workand a rather
higher rate of productivity, aggregate demand will
have to be raised to increase output somewhat more
than the average of the past decade. The solution
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to the problem of achieving the level of demand

required to reach and maintain full employment is
a matter of political decision. There are difficulties
to be overcome, but these are well-known and understood and they raise no new issues of principle.
Is there any reason to think that after 150 years of
rising levels of employment we are now likely to see
a fundamental change in the capacity to create jobs
for all, or practically all who desire to work? I
think not, for several reasons. We are as yet a long
way from satisfying all our wants, even in the most
advanced societies. So long as we maintain the
capacity to make demand effective, I have no doubt
that all we can produce will be required. Even if we
were to increase our real incomes to five or six times
the present level, and on present indications this will
take 100 years, there will still be a great deal of room
for further growth. It we take much of this increase
in potential output in more leisure, the rise in the
volume of goods and services will be somewhat
slower.
changes in the structure of employment

There are certainly no grounds for the alarmist

and extreme views, again mainly expressed in the
United States, but often repeated in Britain, that
automation has resulted in a tremendous increase in
the unemployment of certain groups, namely, youth,
the unskilled, negroes, and the poorly-educated. In
fact, the evidence which has been presented in a
series of definitive studies shows that "since the midfiftiesthat is, since the American economy last came
close to what is generally accepted as full employment
the unemployment situation has not worsened
relatively for any of the groups on which attention
has been focused in the last few years. Whether we
concentrate our attention on teenagers (before 1963),
on blue-collar workers, on the unskilled, on nonwhites, on the least educated, or on workers in the
industries most affected by automationin none of
these cases has the unemployment situation
worsened relatively when we take account of the
rise in total unemployment since the mid-fifties " 4.
Professor H. A. Simon, author of easily the most
brilliant study of the social consequences of automation yet made, has pointed out that empirical
studies do not indicate that there is any "general
tendency toward either the upgrading or the downgrading of job skill requirements " 5. " The automatic
factory calls for different skills from those used on a
nineteenth-century farm. They do not appear, from
the evidence, to be either particularly lower or higher
skills "5. There is in fact no reason to believe that a
highly automated economy will not be able to employ
the range of skills and ability to be found in our
society. But we shall require a larger educational
and training effort to make full use of the human
material available.
Confident as I am that automation presents no
threat to the aggregate level of employment over the
next 50 or even 100 years, this does not mean that
there will not be any problem of technological displacement. On the contrary, in the short run there
75

will be important problems of redundancy. Old

industries will decline, as have textiles, coal mining
and railways during the past fifty years, and new
industries will arise. There will be a shift away
from semi-skilled factory employment and a far larger
proportion of the population will be employed in the
service trades. It is also probable that there will be
a higher proportion of the labour force employed in
technical, administrative and professional jobs. Thus
there will be changes in the occupational profile, but
if the trends of the past 50 years continue the changes
will not be sudden and violent, though over the long
run they may be considerable. Whether they will be
greater than the changes which have occurred in the
first half of this century it is difficult to tell, but it
seems unlikely on present indications. There will
also be considerable changes in the geographical distribution of the labour force, but here again is no
new situation. Though the direction of the flows
may well change, there is no evidence to indicate that
internal migration will be on a greater scale than in
the past. What is, however, absolutely certain is
that there will be little increase in the labour force
until after 1975. From then on the labour force will
begin expanding again and it should have grown
considerably by the end of the century.
The most important threat to the level of employment in Britain in the immediate future comes not
from technological displacement, but from a fall in
the relative efficiency of British industry and an
over-rapid increase in personal incomes leading to
price inflation. Unless we can conquer this problem,
we shall be compelled to continue financial measures
to protect the balance of payments that will inevitably
lead to a substantial increase in the average level of
unemployment. Failure to find a more rational way
of keeping money incomes in step with output might
compel us, like the Americans, to accept an average
level of unemployment far higher than we would
desire. It would not make much sense to blame
such an increase on technological change, although
this would certainly be a factor in the situation if it
is too slow to keep Britain competitive.
adjusting to change

If we are to avoid this dilemma we must increase

our productivity without increasing costs. Since, in
the immediate period ahead, all the calculations
indicate that we are likely to be suffering from a
shortage of manpower rather than a glut, this means
that we must get rid of the obstacles to change that
arise from the fear of unemployment. Our social
problem is to bring about an understanding that
redundancies causedby abandoning uneconomic
methodsare the only way in which a more efficient
use can be made of the manpower available. The
difficulty is to convince management and workers
that every time they restrict output in order to protect their own jobs or profits, they are jeopardising
not only other jobs but restricting, if not reducing,
over the long run their own standard of living.
The problem to be overcome is not merely one of
education and communication, as is sometimes sug76

gested. There is a genuine hardship involved when

a man or woman is called upon to give up a job in
which they have invested a considerable period of
their lives and for which they might have prepared
by years of study and training. It is impossible to
persuade a worker in this situation that he will be
better off if his job is made redundant. This may be
true for society in general, but what is true for society
as a whole may not be true for the individual. It is,
therefore, necessary for society to provide an adequate
measure of protection for those who are displaced by
technological change, or for that matter by economic
or social policy.
We took the first steps in this direction 50 years
ago with the National Insurance Acts and we have
recently taken a further step with the Severance Pay
Bill. A wealthy society may wish to go even further
than Britain has so far gone in protecting its citizens
from the personal burden of the social costs of
change.
increased education and training

Cushioning a man or woman financially is necessary, but not sufficient. Most of us need to work, since
idleness is unbearable. We must, therefore, provide
the educational and training facilities necessary to
equip everyone who desires to work with the skills
that are required under the prevailing technical conditions. This may well mean that in the future a
large part of the working population will have to
spend a much longer period of time at school, university or other educational or training institution. Retraining and refresher courses will probably become
of far greater importance as a normal feature of
working life. In these respects we have a long way
still to go. A large section of our population, in
terms of modern technology, is profoundly ignorant
and this includes a good many who occupy important posts of responsibility in management and the
professions, who have not learnt a thing since they
left school or college a long time ago. Technical
incompetence has been masked by a layer of smug
social superiority and protected by an uncompetitive
economy. As a society we will have to spend a much
larger proportion of our national income on educational, training and informational activities than we
have been accustomed to spend in the past, and even
than at present projected. We will also have to
sweep away the restrictive attitudes to training and
retraining which are a product of the 19th Century
thinking and which have no relevance to the contemporary situation. In this respect the Industrial
Training Act was a step forward, but a real breakthrough has yet to come.
Although we are likely to be short of manpower
during the next 10 years, it may be confidently predicted that the hours worked per week will tend to
fall and over the longer run the fall may be considerable. This will, of course, also offset the displacement effects of technological advance. I do
not think, however, that the fall will be dramatic
in the immediate future. It is likely that for some
time we are going to continue to prefer income to
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leisure. Thus although there may be a continued

reduction in the length of the basic work week, a
large part of the labour force, unless there is a remarkable change of habit, will desire to work overtime or take a second job. In the United States,
where a 37 to 40 hour week has been established for
many years, experience has shown that further reductions in hours bring a large increase in the proportion
of workers taking second jobs 6.
Although long hours reflect mainly a preference
for income over leisure, it is likely that many will
wish to follow the practice of many miners and enjoy
a three-day weekend. The four-day week has, in
fact, already been conceded to night shift workers in
the engineering industry and this is likely to become
a regular feature of other industries.
As industries become more capital intensive there
will be a growing advantage in continuing operations over a longer working day. Scarcity of labour
and resistance to night shift working may tend to
limit the trend in this direction. However, highly
automated plants may find that they are able to go
over to shift working, since the staff required to
operate a night shift might be quite small.

change in social activities

The social opposition to shift working may also be

expected to become less important with the acceptance of the four-night week. We may also expect to
see a change in our shopping and entertainment
habits. It is certain that shopping facilities and
entertainment will eventually be provided over a
much longer period of the day than has been the
case since the First World War. With rising affluence and continuous work weeks we are likely to
develop a taste for continuous entertainment. Life
will be lived round the clock and through the entire
week. The old division of the day and week, which
was a product of an old technology and supporting
social beliefs that are obviously passing, will give way
to a less restrictive and freer society. We shall
eventually see a pattern of shopping and leisure-time
activities emerging which is similar to that which
already exists in the United States. Here again restrictions, demanded by unions and often supported
by employers and imposed by the State, which grew
out of totally different conditions are now entirely
against the public interest and will become even
more so in the future. A society in which there is a
rapidly rising real income, and a real shortage of
labour, does not need to protect employment standards
by methods designed to meet the problems arising
from an economic situation dominated by heavy
unemployment and depressed wages.
Advancing technology should give workers a greater
degree of freedom to choose the pattern of hours that
suits them best. Some may prefer to work shifts,
including weekends and public holidays, for more
money and this should be possible without involving,
as at present, excessive hours of overtime. The recent agreement in the Electricity Supply Industry
may in this respect prove to be a model that others
The Production Engineer

will follow. At the present time most wage earners

enjoy two weeks' annual paid holidays; by 1970 this
will be generally three weeks and probably four weeks
before 1980. I also expect to see provision for sabbatical and educational leaves extended to a wide
range of workers.

problems of leisure

Shorter hours and more extensive holidays will

bring in their train a problem of leisure-time activities. Unless we give people the ability and the desire
to fill non-working time with creative and constructive activities, we shall see a growth of undesirable
uses of leisure. Increasing affluence allied to the
pressures generated by rapid technological change
will lead to an increase in drug-taking, crime, divorce,
and other social disorders, unless we are far more
successful than we have so far been in inculcating a
positive response to leisure opportunity in a sizeable proportion of the population.
How to achieve this result we have yet to learn.
We shall not do so unless we recognise the significance of the problem that lies ahead and prepare
now to find the solution. For many people it may
well be that paradoxically the most satisfactory way
of using increased leisure will be to take another
job. Double-jobbing, or moonlighting, as the Americans picturesquely call it, is at present regarded as
socially undesirable. The trades unions look upon
it as robbing another man of a job and the employer
as being robbed of the employee's vigour and concentrated interest in his work.
This attitude will almost certainly have to be relaxed once actual hours worked fall below 40 a week.
Studies of the factors that determine the number
of hours worked show that there are powerful psychological as well as economic reasons why some workers
prefer to work long hours. From the point of view
of the individual, the right to arrange the length of
the work week to suit his own personal needs is of
tremendous social importance. At the present time
the opportunity to work overtime to some extent
achieves this purpose, but long hours of overtime on
top of a 40-hour week have an adverse effect on
management and the worker.
The situation would, however, be different if hours
of work fell to 35 or 30 per week. Moreover, doing
two different jobs may be far less fatiguing than
doing the same job for the same total number of
hours. In fact, the effective employment of leisure
may be looked upon simply as a change in the type
of work. There is no moral reason why one should
not turn leisure activity to financial profit and there
is no moral objection to having two jobs; this is in
fact looked upon as quite normal at the level of the
Board Room in industry. I should also add that I
think the objections against overtime, which at the
present length of the work week have great force, lose
their validity when hours drop below forty. There
is no reason in principle, though there may be practical difficulties, why individual workers should not
continue to work very different total hours in the
77

future, when the nominal work week is very much

shorter than at present, as in fact they do now.
the effect of automation on industrial relations

The system of industrial relations which had become firmly established by the end of the 19th Century, and has remained almost unchanged until the
present time, is now clearly no longer appropriate
to the needs of our times. Technological advance
has made long-term planning not only feasible, but
a vital necessity. With the aid of the computer it is
possible to reconcile and harmonise investment programmes, income flows, import and export requirements and all the other ingredients that make up the
modern economic complex.
In this type of environment collective decisionmaking can no longer be a laissez-faire process. The
function of unions must, therefore, change. In the
future they have an important role to play, along
with the employers' organisations, in the process of
arriving at a national consensus on issues of economic
and social policy. This does not mean that the
unions must jettison, or even subordinate3 the interest
of their members to the interests of other social
groups; on the contrary, it is only by recognising
that under modern circumstances the bargaining role
of the unions must be exercised within the limits
imposed by the logic of the economic goals they have
accepted that they can maximise the interests of their
members.
If the unions are to discharge their functions
effectively they must create the organisational structure that will make this possible. At the one end
of the scale, they must make effective the ability of
the TUC to enter into national agreements relating
to economic development and incomes policy that
will be carried out by the constituent unions and the
rank and file membership. At the other end of the
scale, room has to be found for local bargaining and
participation in the achievement of enterprise objectives without destroying the basic requirements of
national policy.
control of wage drift
We have recently seen the TUC take a hesitant
step to meet the challenge presented by the Prices
and Incomes Board and the National Plan, but the
unions have a long way to go before it can be said
that they have developed a co-ordinated and effectively enforced national wages policy. Moreover,
little has been done so far to face up to the challenge
that comes from below. Control of "wage drift" at
the plant level has now become a major problem
that must be solved if the chronic wage-price spiral
is to be stopped. I expect, therefore, to see more
experiments in the working out of the implications
of the prices and incomes policy at the enterprise
level. Wage systems developed to reward individual
effort have now become a significant source of wage
drift and the cause of much industrial conflict. Under
modern technological conditions what are required
are wage structures and incentives that facilitate
change, adequately reward the learning of new skills
78

and the acceptance of responsibility, and continuously

encourage the co-operation of the employees with
management 7.
Productivity formulae, such as the Scanlon Plan,
which enable workers to benefit from cost savings,
and profit-sharing arrangements which permit
workers to participate in the capital gains of the
enterprise, are likely to become of increasing importance. Certain developments at present being canvassed in Germany and elsewhere on the Continent
are of special interest in this respect, since they offer
an example, that British trades unions might also
find attractive.
The most difficult problem which confronts the
Government, unions and employers at the present
time is the readiness with which workers and shop
stewards are prepared to break agreements and union
rules to win improvements in wages or working conditions. The problem of unofficial strikes has already
become great and it will become much worse in the
future until a means is found of insisting that agreements and contracts are carried out. I think it
is extremely unlikely that the unions will be able
to reassert their authority without outside assistance.

legal action on strikes

In these circumstances it seems to me fairly certain that there will be a stiffening of the law regarding strikes. There are a number of different paths
that might 'be followed. The making of collective
agreements into collective contracts would be one
possibility; another would be to make strikes illegal
during the period of an agreement and to set up
labour courts to deal with issues of interpretation.
Another would be to penalise unofficial strikers
through loss of accumulated rights in social security
benefits and severance pay. In addition to these
possible sanctions against wanton strikes, we are
likely to see a much more vigorous policy of official
intervention pursued through the Ministry of Labour
conciliation service.
Thus I am certain that in this and other respects
we shall see more legal regulation of our system of
industrial relations than has been the case in the past.
Legal restriction will not, however, of itself prevent
industrial conflict. Its justification lies in the efforts
it would compel unions and employers to make to
avoid the imposition of legal sanctions. A change
in the law would also reflect the social judgment
that a strike is no longer acceptable under modern
conditions as a method of resolving disputes between
employers and workers, except under very limited
circumstances.
It is clear that the Government can no longer
maintain the fiction that its role is simply to maintain a balance between employers and unions and to
see that the fight is fair. The implications of contemporary economic and technological developments
are that the Government has a positive role to play
to ensure that social goals are reached. Employers
and trades unions share a common interest with the
Government whatever its party colour in seeing
The Production Engineer

that plans and policies in which they have participated are carried out. The new model therefore
assumes that employers and unions, management and
workers, can significantly narrow their area of conflict and that this can be done to the advantage of
the interests of both sides as well as to the advantage
of the community as a whole. The new pattern of
industrial relations involves a good deal more than a
new legal framework; it also involves a new style of
trades unionism and management, and a new style
of politics.
Automation is likely to make the enterprise much
more significant as a social unit in the future. Technological advance is making possible much larger
units of organisation and capital employed is leading
to a growing emphasis on the unity of the enterprise. The authoritarian style of management is
less likely to be successful under the technological
and social conditions of the future than it has been
in the past. Better educated, economically more
independent employees, whose actions are of critical
significance to the achievement of the goals of the
enterprise, will have to be given an appropriate
recognition of their role and an opportunity of selffulfilment.
In short, technological advance is making industry
less like the classic mass production plan satirised by
Chaplin in his film Modern Times, in which man is
completely subordinated to the conveyor belt. Technological developments are eliminating much of the
moronic repetitions and drudgery, and freeing
workers for more responsible and more demanding
jobs. Some of the new types of work will involve
less physical, but more mental, stress and strain. However, workers are in a far better position under the
new conditions of employment to ensure that their
role is appreciated by management. This means, to
use the terminology of Douglas McGregor, that the
advance of technology is pushing management from
style X to style Y8. That is to say, management
will only be able to secure the effective co-operation
of subordinate employees by recognising that they
must be granted a status that is related to their
function and responsibility. I therefore expect to
see a substantial development of "status agreements"
which give workers long-term security of employment, the fringe benefits enjoyed by the staff and a
share in the capital accumulation of the enterprise.
joint consultation
I also expect to see a revival of interest in joint
consultation. Interest in consultative committees as
a means of softening the exercise of managerial
authority by the provision of more information has
greatly declined since it reached its high point in
the immediate post-war years. The cause of this
decline has been twofold. On the one hand^ full
employment has greatly enhanced the power of the
shop steward and stimulated a tremendous growth
of plant bargaining. On the other hand, management has become much more conscious of the need
to consult continuously and to improve the quality
of supervision and personnel management. Thus
The Production Engineer

both workers and management appear to have lost

interest in joint consultative committees and have preferred to accept a cash payment as the quickest solution to a conflict. When money bargaining is
effectively brought under control and there is less
freedom to break agreements, some form of works
council with wider and more specific functions may
well be found to be necessary by management and
unions.
I also think that we will eventually see a change
in company law that will require employees to be
given specific rights to be represented on the board
of directors of public companies, as is already the
case in some countries.

political effects
The changes that technological advance and associated economic developments are having on our
system of industrial relations will also greatly alter
the pattern of British politics. There are already
clear indications that the relationships between the
unions and the Labour Party and the employers and
the Conservative Party are no longer as close as they
used to be. Nor are Party differences as wide. The
problems that confront Britain today and tomorrow
will not be solved by the nostrums advocated by the
doctrinaires of either party. Modern technology is
producing a consensus over a growing area of decision-making in the fields of economic, industrial and
social policy-making. At the same time, the class
structure of society on which our party system has
been based is being rapidly eroded by the factors
that have made modern technological development
possible. The line is no longer to be drawn, as
Marx drew it, between those who own property and
those who do not. The social problems of technological change are remarkably similar in all advanced
industrial societies, whether the system of property
ownership is mainly private as in, Western Europe
and America, or public as in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. Ideological and social conflicts are
now taking a new shape as we struggle to master the
consequences of modern technology, but the basic
issues remain the same. What we are concerned with
is to define anew the extent of liberty and regulation;
the rights of the individual and the institutional
arrangements necessary under modern conditions to
maintain a healthy society.
The full effect of the factors discussed in this
Paper on social change will only be apparent a century from now. We shall then be able to look back
and see clearly the social impact of the computer
and associated technology on our economic, legal,
political and industrial relations systems. At the
present time it is difficult to do much more than
hazard guesses. What is necessary now is a considerable technological advance in our ability to
predict the rate and direction of technological change
and its social consequences. We are putting a far
greater research effort into developing technological
hardware than we are into the social response this
will evoke. The social costs are rarely taken into
79

 I - , - ! ?

account when major investment decisions are being

taken, mainly because they often don't figure in the
balance sheet of the decision-makers, but also because
the information is not available. We could know a
great deal more than we do if we put more resources

into the social sciences. My plea that we should

do this is not merely, or even mainly, based upon
humanitarian considerations, but that it would lead
to the much more efficient development and use of
our technological knowledge and its application.

REFERENCES
1. JOHN T. DUNLOP (Ed.), "Automation
and
Technological Change", p. 1.
2. " Monthly Labor Review", Bureau of Labor Statistics,
U.S. Department of Labor.
3. "Manpower Report of the President", March 1964.
4. R. A. GORDON, "Has Structural Unemployment
Worsened?" Report No. 234, Uniyersity of California,
Institute of Industrial Relations.
5. HERBERT A. SIMON, "The Shape of Automation for
Men and Management", 1965.

6. MARCIA GREENBAUM, " The Shorter Work Week ",

New York 1963.
7. See DENNIS PYM, "Is there a future for wage incentive
schemes?", "British Journal of Industrial Relations". Vol.
II No. 3, and R. B. MCKERSIE, "Wage payment
methods of the future", "British Journal of Industrial
Relations", Vol. I, No. 2.
8. "The Human Side of Enterprise", Proceedings of the Fifth
Aniversary Convention of the School of Industrial
Management, M.I.T. Cambridge, Mass. 1957.

THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NON-DESTRUCTIVE TESTING

This Conference, which is being sponsored by the Canadian Council for NonDestructive Technology, will be held at the Mount Royal Hotel, Montreal, from
21st-26th May, 1967.
An invitation has been received for British authors to submit Papers, and
copies of "Notes for the Guidance of Authors" can be obtained from the Secretary
of the British National Committee for Non-Destructive Testing, Redfields Home
Farmhouse, Church Crookham, Aldershot, Hants. Synopses, not exceeding 400
words, are required in Canada by April 30th, .1966, and the final Paper by
November 30th, 1966. It is requested that authors send a copy of their synopsis to
the British National Committee so that the British contribution to this important
Conference may be co-ordinated.

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The Production Engineer