Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge

Author(s): Peter D. Klein
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 16 (Aug. 19, 1971), pp. 471-482
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024845
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THE JOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME

rT

LXVIII, NO.

i6,

AUGUST 19, I97I

A PROPOSED DEFINITION OF PROPOSITIONAL

KNOWLEDGE
5 HE

of proposidefinition
of a satisfactory
development

tional knowledge is essential if an adequate theory of

knowledgeis to become possible.* This task becomes all
the more urgentbecause the attemptto develop such a definition
of propositional knowledge within the traditional threefoldconditions (true,evidentor justified,belief) has recentlybeen seriously
challenged, and every subsequent attemptto meet this challenge
has failed.1
I wish to put fortha definitionof propositionalknowledgeand
epistemoldefendit. I thinkthisdefinitiondoes make a satisfactory
ogy possible because it remains neutral in the conflictbetween
various rival epistemologicaltheories.2Neutralityis an essential
feature,for if one theorywere to claim that a certain type of
propositionis not a properobject of knowledge,and anothertheory
were to argue that such a propositionis a proper object of knowledge, both theoriesmust mean the same thing by propositional
knowledgeif theirdisagreementis to be genuine.
* This paper was written during a leave of absence financed by a Ford
Humanities Grant allocated by the Colgate UniversityResearch Council. I had
the benefitof discussingparts of this paper with ProfessorA. J. Ayer and with
my colleagues at Colgate (especially John Flynn and Hunt Terrell). In addition,
an earlier version was read at Rutgers University.
1 One series of discussions is: Edmund Gettier, "Is JustifiedTrue Belief
Knowledge?" Analysis, xxxiII.6, ns 96 (June 1963): 121-123-Roderick M. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 23.
fn 22-John Pollock, "Chisholm's Definition of Knowledge," Philosophical
Studies, xix, 5 (October 1968): 72-76; another series is Emest Sosa, "Propositional Knowledge," Philosophical Studies, xx, 3 (April 1969): 33-43-Keith
Lehrer and Thomas Paxson, Jr.,"Knowledge: Undefeated JustifiedTrue Belief,"
this JOURNAL, LXVI, 8 (April 24, 1969): 225-237-Sosa, "Two Conceptions of
Knowledge," ibid., Lxvii, 3 (Feb. 12, 1970): 59-68.
2 By "an epistemological theory" I mean a set of beliefs concerningthe types
of propositionsthat can (or cannot) be known.

47'

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472

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

AlthoughI believe the proposed definitiondoes accomplishwhat

such a definitionshould, it does not do everythingthat some may
have wished. It cannot encompassall our uses of 'S knows that p',
simplybecause thatexpressionfunctionsin so manyvariousways.
The relevantuse that I am seekingto defineoccursin the following paragraph quoted from Theory of Knowledge by Chisholm:
In Plato's dialogue,the Meno, Socratesremarks:"That thereis a
difference
betweenrightopinionand knowledge
is not at all a conjecturewithmebutsomething
I wouldparticularly
assertthatI know.
There are not manythingsof whichI wouldsay that,but thisone,
at anyrate,I will includeamongthosethatI know."[97C]The distinctionwouldseemto be obvious.If one has knowledge,
thenone
also has rightor trueopinion.But theconverseis not true:one may
haverightor trueopinionwithouthavingknowledge.
Thus,we may
have true opinion,but not
guess correctly
today,and therefore,
Or we mayhave trueopinionand neverknow
knowuntiltomorrow.
at all (p. 5).
ErnestSosa quotes Russell as saying:
It is veryeasy... to giveexamplesof truebeliefsthatare notknowledge.Thereis themanwholooksat a clockwhichis notgoingthough
he thinksit is and whohappensto look at it at themomentwhenit
is right;thismanacquiresa truebeliefaboutthetimeof thedaybut
cannotbe said to haveknowledge
("Propositional
Knowledge,"
33/4).
I cite these examples not only to illustratethe relevantuse of
'S knowsthatp', but also to underscorethe point thatpropositional
knowledgemustnot be equated withaccidentallycorrectbelief.
The traditionalanalysisof thisrelevantconceptof knowledgeis:
S knowsthatp iff(1) p is true,
(2) S believesp,
(3) p is evidenttoS.
There are counterexamplesto the traditionaldefinition,but before
discussingthemit is necessaryto make a fewcommentson the third
condition of the traditional definitionof knowledge. Chisholm
saysthatp is evidentto S if (a) it is morereasonableforS to believe
p than to withholdbeliefin p, and (b) thereis no propositioni such
that it is more reasonable for S to believe i than it is for him to
believe P.3 The second conditionis necessaryin orderto distinguish
3 Chisholm, op. cit., p. 22. Implicit in the concept of evidencyor justification
used by Chisholm and the other writers concerned with the adequacy of the
traditional definitionis the notion of a set of propositionswith relative degrees
of reasonableness relevant to some evidence. This concept of justification,although sufficientfor elucidating the justificationof empirical propositions and

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PROPOSED DEFINITION

OF PROPOSITIONAL

KNOWLEDGE

473

evidentpropositionsfromreasonableones. It would be a reasonable

but not evidentbeliefthatthe next item I pick frommypocketwill
itemsin
be a Lincoln-headpennyif I believe that I have only fifty
Lincoln-head pennies and one Indian-head
my pocket, forty-nine
penny. Among the evident propositionswould be 'the probability
is .98 that the next coin will be a Lincoln-head penny' and 'the
nextitemwill be roughlyround and copper-colored'.4
A propositionwould be justifiedor evidentforS if the standard
warrantingcriteriaheld and if S had no reason to believe that the
situationwas abnormal.For example,S would be justifiedin believing that it was 5 P.M. if his watch indicatedthat time,he knew that
it had been reliable in the past, and he rememberedwinding it
recentlyand it appeared to be running.But suppose thatit is 5 P.M.,
but also that the watch had not worked for 24 hours (the second
hand moved when S turnedhis wristto look at the watch); S would
not know that it was 5 P.M. even though that belief was true and
evident.
In order to illuminate the nature of this counterexample,considera case in whichS has a true,but not evident,belief.Suppose S
believes, correctly,that the card which he has not examined and
which he just picked at random froma full deck of cards is the
six of spades. He believes that because the last time he selected
the six of spades. His true belief that it is the six of spades is not
certifiableas knowledge because, given his evidence and the way
in which he picked the card and the fact that there are fifty-two
cards in a deck, it could just as easily have been any other card.
The evidence S had is not sufficientto "grant entitlement"to
knowledge,as Sosa puts it.5
For the same reason the example just mentioned is a counterexample to the definitionof knowledgeas true,evidentbelief.It is
merelya coincidence that S's belief is correctthat it is 5 P.M. Of
to certify
course normally,the evidence S has would be sufficient
be
claim
that he
he
entitled
to
would
his belief as knowledge,and
knew it was 5 P.M. I will returnlater to the distinctionbetween
adequate for the purposes of this essay, must be amended if analytic propositions are to be counted as evident. At some time I intend to explore the
evidency of analytic propositions,but it is the class of nonanalytic propositions
that has proved troublesometo the traditional definitionof knowledge and it is
with which this article is concerned.
those difficulties
4 I am indebted to the editors of the Journal of Philosophy for pointing out a
mistake in an earlier version of this paper; I had failed to note the compatibilityof its being more reasonable for S to believe p than to withhold belief and
its being more reasonable to believe i than p.
5 "Two Conceptionsof Knowledge," p. 62.

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474

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

those times when S is entitled to claim that he knows and those

timeswhen he does know. What is importanthere is that in these
special circumstancesit is merelya felicitouscoincidence that his
belief is correct.This could be formulatedin termsof a general
principle which I will call the felicitous-coincidence
principle: if
S's evidence for p and a descriptionof some of the particularcircumstancesin which S believesthatp are such that it would not be
reasonable to expect that p is true (based upon S's evidence),even
if p is true,S does not know p. Consequently,we mighttentatively
assertthat S's evidenceforhis belief thatp is not sufficiently
strong
to certifyhis belief as knowledgeif thereis some fact which,were
S to become aware of it, ought to cause S to retracthis knowledge
claim.
It may be thoughtthat the felicitous-coincidence
principle could
be satisfiedby restrictingthe set of propositionsthat rendersp
evident.The accidentallycorrect,evidentbeliefswould become uncertifiableas knowledgebecause of some defect in these propositions. For example, it could be stipulatedthat the set may neither
contain a false propositionnor render evident any false proposition.6This surelyis an improvement;it would dispose of the counterexampledeveloped above because that set does render evident
the false propositionthat the watch has been runningsince it was
last wound.
There are, however,additional counterexamplesto this strengthened definitionwhich reveal that the restrictions
remain too weak.
Ernest Sosa (loc. cit.) develops one which I will modify.Suppose
that S has been workingin an officenext to Tom Grabit'sofficefor
many years and has oftenspoken informallywith Tom, but does
not know anythingat all about Tom's personal life. One day he
sees what he takes to be Tom stealinga librarybook. S would be
justifiedin believingthat Tom did steal the book and he is correct.
But, unbeknownto S, Tom has an identical twinwho was in town
in the library on the day in question. Further,Tom h-asnever
stolen a book fromthe libraryand John,Tom's twin,is a kleptomaniac who steals books quite often.Although S has a true and
evidentbelief that Tom stole the book, it can hardlybe certifiedas
knowledge,because, given S's evidence and the particularcircumstances, it is simply a lucky coincidence that he is correct.The
felicitous-coincidence
principleis at work here.
This is a counterexampleto the improvedtraditionaldefinition,
because in this case thereis no false propositionrenderedevident
6 Two such attemptsto improve the traditional definitionwere made by Sosa,
"Propositional Knowledge," op. cit., and Lehrer-Paxson,op. cit.

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PROPOSED DEFINITION

OF PROPOSITIONAL

KNOWLEDGE

475

to S.7 That is, S has no reason to believe anythingat all about

John. It is not even reasonable for him to believe that Tom does
not have a twin brother,although it would be reasonable for him
to believe that it is highlyprobable that Tom does not have a twin
brother.But thelatteris not false.
The improved definitionremains too weak because it is concerned only with the defeat of a knowledge claim by those false
propositionsrendered evident to S; whereas there are occasions
when S's trueevidentbelieffailsto be knowledgeforreasonsthatS
had no way of anticipating.To returnto the felicitous-coincidence
principle,if thereis any circumstancesuch that,given S's evidence
for p, it is not reasonable to expect that p is true (given S's evidence), even if p is true,S does not know thatp. The circumstances
mentionedin the principleneed not be circumstancesabout which
S has any evidentbeliefs.To put the principle in a slightlydifferent manner: If thereis any true propositiond such that it and S's
evidenceforp would make it unreasonableto expect thatp is true,
S does not knowp.
Based upon these considerations,the definitionI propose is as
follows:
S knowsthatp at t1ifand onlyif
(i) p is true;
(ii) S believesp at t1;

(iii)p is evidenttos at t1;

suchthatif it becameevidentto S at
(iv)thereis no trueproposition
t1,p wouldno longerbe evidenttoS.
The firstthreeconditions(i)-(iii) have been called the "traditional"
conditions,and I will continueso to referto them.In what follows
I will assume that theyare necessaryconditionsof knowledge.For
the sake of simplicityI will referto a true propositionsuch that if
it became evident to S, p would no longer be evident to S as a
disqualifyingproposition.
7 It may be thought that there is one false propositionrenderedevident by the
propositions which render it evident that Tom Grabit stole the book, i.e., S
knows that Tom stole the book. If this were the case, not only would it appear
to trivialize the improved traditional definition,but also any other proposed
fourthcondition would fail to explicate the concept of knowledge for the definition would become merely 'S knows that p if it is not false that S does not
know that p'. However, whatever renders p evident to S would not, by itself,
render it evident that he knows p, because it would not render it evident to S
that he believes p. That is, a propositionmay be evident for S without S believing that it is. If it is evident to S, this means that it would be more reasonable
for him to believe than withhold belief; but, of course, he may not believe
that p.

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476

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Now several points about the proposed definitionbecome immediatelyobvious. First, (i) follows from (iv) and is thereforeno
longerrequired as a condition.For if p were false,therewould be a
disqualifyingproposition,namely -.p, and hence, if S knows that
p, p mustbe true.In fact,if one assumesthatS believesthosethings
which are evident,(ii) and (iii) are implied by (iv), for (iv) asserts
thatp is alreadyevidentto S, and, if it were,S would believe p. But
for the sake of the argumentin thispaper, I will continueto use (i),
(ii), and (iii) as separate conditionsof propositionalknowledgebecause it is condition (iv) that is probably most suspect, and in
defendingit I cannotassumewhatfollowsfromit.
A few more commentsabout the thirdcondition.In spite of its
uglinessI will use the expression'the evidencyof p'. A proposition
is evidentto S at t1 if it is more reasonable forS to believe p at t1
(given his evidenceforit) than to withholdbelief in p and thereis
no more reasonablepropositionforS to believe at tl. A proposition
may be evident yet false. It may be evident to S. but fail to be
evident to S2, because S, knows somethingthat S2 does not know,
for example. In that sense evidency is person-relative,but it is
person-neutralin the sense that, whatevermakes p evident to Si,
that and that alone would make p evident to S2. Evidencycannot
be definedin a more specificmanner because the conventionsof
evidencywill varydependingupon thenatureofp.
But what of counterexamples?Let us look firstat those which
attack the definitionfor being too weak. None of the counterexamples discussedso far work against this definition,for in each
case thereis a disqualifyingproposition:'The watch is not working
now' and 'Tom, who has neverbeforestolena book,has an identical
twin,kleptomaniacbrother,John,who was in the libraryon the
day in question'. In otherwords,what shows that S does not have
knowledge in each of the previous cases is a true proposition
describingthe circumstances
mentionedin the felicitous-coincidence
principle. If the proposed conditionsof knowledgeare too weak,
it must be possible for S to fail to know that p even though the
four conditions are fulfilled.But if p is evident to S and yet
S does not know that p, there must be some true proposition d
which showsthat in thiscase the evidenceS has forp is insufficient
to warrantcertification
of S's beliefas knowledge.The trueproposition d would disqualifyS's belief as knowledgeonly if it were such
as to make p no longer evident (given S's evidence alone), and,
characterof evidency,d would be such
because of the person-neutral
that if it became evidentto S, p would no longerbe evident.Hence,

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PROPOSED

DEFINITION

OF PROPOSITIONAL

KNOWLEDGE

477

there can be no counterexamplesto show that the definitionis

too weak.
A purportedcounterexampleshowingthat the conditionsare too
strongwould have to show thatS knowsthatp even thoughthereis
a disqualifyingproposition.However, as a rough and ready reply
it could be pointed out that if there were such a disqualifying
proposition,p would no longerbe evidentto the giverof the counterexample,G, and hence the giver of the counterexamplewould
findhimselfin the absurd position of claimingthat S knowsthatp
but he himselfdoes not knowthatp.
I said a momentago that this was a rough and ready reply,but
the situation is more complicatedthan I just implied. The above
response is valid only if the disqualifyingpropositiond is a disqualifyingpropositionforboth S and G. If it were,then,of course,
if d were evidentto G, p would no longer be evident to him, and
hence he could no longerclaim that S knows thatp, implyingthat
he knows that p and, thereforethat p is evident to him. But suppose that d is not a disqualifyingpropositionforboth S and G, but
only forS. Ought we still assertthat S knows that p? Consider the
followingcase. Suppose that the gas tank of S's car is one-fourth
full and that S sees that his gas gauge reads "1/4," remembersthat
the gauge has been reliable in the past, and consequentlybelieves
that the tank is one-fourthfull. The three traditionalconditions
of knowledge are fulfilled.Now let us suppose that the giver of
the counterexample,G, knows that the gauge is not working,but
that he has sufficiently
strongevidence,which S does not have, so
that the claim that the tank is one-fourthfull remains evident to
him. He may have checkedthe gas in the tank throughsome other
method. Now, since S does not have this additional evidence,the
disqualifyingpropositiond, 'the gas gauge is not workingproperly'
would serve as a disqualifyingpropositionfor S but not for G.
Now G must maintain in spite of d that S knows that the tank is
empty.That is, the giver of the counterexamplemust believe that
thereis a disqualifyingpropositiond, forS, but not forhim,which
is such thatS still knowsthat the tank is empty.Is G correct?
In some sense of 'know',S does know that the tank is one-fourth
full. He "knows," but for the wrong reasons. But in the relevant
sense, he does not know because he only happens to have a true
belief and it is merelyan accident (in this case) that his belief is
correct.According to the felicitous-coincidence
principle, S does
not know that the tankwas one-fourth
full. Of courseany given disqualifyingpropositiond need not disqualifyall of S's evidenceas it

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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

does in this case in order to make p no longer evident to S. Then

d would not make accidental the connection between all of S's
evidence for p and p, but, if the evidence that d does disqualify
is essentialfor the evidencyof p to S, then the connectionbetween
the remainingevidence and the truthof p becomes insufficiently
his beliefas knowledge.He would no doubt retract
strongto certify
p if d were to become evidentto him. If d disqualifiedan essential
part of the evidenceforp thatS has, S would not know thatp. On
the other hand, if d does not disqualifyan essential part of the
evidence S has forp, then it would not be a disqualifyingpropositionas defined.
In spite of what I have just claimed,namely,that if the disqualifyingpropositionwere such that it disqualifiedsomethingessential,
S would not know thatp, it may be thoughtthat theremightstill
be some counterexampleslurkinghere. I would like to deal with
one possible counterexample,the strongestthat I know of,in order
to reinforcethe above quite general argumentto show that the
definitionis not too strong.
ConsiderMr. Jones,who goes to thehouseof an acquaintanceM

for the firsttime. He sees some flowerson the mantelpiece, and

throughoutthe evening the various guests and M commenton the
flowers.Their commentscohere. Later Mr. Jones discoversthat M is
a magician and delights in fooling his guests by creatingsome extremelycleverlydevised illusions of flowerson a mantel. Suppose
furtherthat on the nightin question M was not up to his old tricks.
In this example pi is 'there are flowerson the mantel' and di is 'M
is a magician'.8
Now, wlhat about this case? Did Jones know P,? First, let me point
out that our intuitions are likely to diverge here, because this is so
artificial and unusual a case.
We might believe that Jones did know that P,. Our argument
would run as follows: proposition d1 does not disqualify P,; it does
so only in conjunction with d1', where d1' equals 'M was up to his
old tricks last night'; d1' is made evident by d1. But d1' is false;
hence the conjunction d1'-dl is false, and there is no proposition

that is both true and evidentand disqualifiesP. Hence the defini-

tion is upheld, and this is not a counterexample, because Jones

knew P, and there is no disqualifying proposition.

This response is incorrect,however,because d1 does justifya

propositionthat is both true and evident and does disqualifyP,,

namely, dl": 'dl' is highly probable'. If it became evident to Jones

8 A counterexample similar to this one was suggested to me both by A. J.

Ayerand by Marc Cohen.

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PROPOSED

DEFINITION

OF PROPOSITIONAL

KNOWLEDGE

479

that it was highlyprobable thatM was up to his old tricks,then it

would no longer be evidentto him that therewere flowerson the
mantel. Hence this is not a counterexample,because the fourth
conditionis not fulfilledand Jonesdoes not know thatpi.
But suppose thatsomeonewere to claim thatJonesdid know that
Pi even thoughd," is a disqualifyingpropositionforpl. Would he
be correct?I thinknot; forwhat d1" assertsis that,in thisparticular case, even though the standard criteria hold, they are not
reliable. Therefore this example is not essentiallydifferentfrom
manyof the casespresentedearlier.In thosecases thereasonwhythe
subject's belief was not certifiableas knowledgewas simply that,
although the standardwarrantingcriteriaheld, in those particular
cases the criteriawere not reliable. The felicitous-coincidence
principle again holds.
If one were to insistthat Jones did know Pl, even though there
is a disqualifyingproposition,one would not only have to reject
the felicitous-coincidence
principle; one would also be forced to
accept the following rather awkward result: Jones did know Pi
before d1" became evident,he no longer knew P, afterit became
evident (because p was no longer evident), and then, finally,he
knew p, again afterit became evident that M was not up to his
old tricks.A much more plausible renderingof the situation is
this: Joneswould have been justifiedin assertingthathe knew that
Pi (although he would have been mistaken) before dl" became
evidentto him; afterit became evidenthe would have been justified
in assertingthat he did not know Pi (and he would be correct);
and finally,afterhe learned thatM was not up to his old tricks,he
would be justifiedin assertinghe knew Pi (and he would be correct).There are manyoccasionswhen we are entitledto claim that
we know that p, although we later findout we were mistaken,for
it would seem that we are entitled to claim that we know that p
whenever we believe p and are justified in believing that the
standardwarrantingcriteriaforjudgmentslike p are fulfilledand
are justifiedin believingthat the situationis not abnormal.But of
coursewe maybe entitledto claim thatwe know thatp and be mistaken in the claim, if either the standard criteriado not hold or
the particularsituation is not such that the standard criteriaare
sufficient
warrantingcriteria.9
9 Lehrer-Paxson present and dismiss a definitionof knowledge similar to the
one developed here. They reject the definition because of a counterexample
similar to the Jones case.

Suppose I see a man walk into the library and remove a book from the
library by concealing it beneath his coat. Since I am sure the man is Tom

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It would seem that those who insist that Jones knew that Pi
before d," became evident fail to distinguishbetween those occasions when S is entitledto claim that he knows that p and those
occasions when such a claim is correct.His claim would be correct
onlywhen thefournecessaryconditionsof knowledgewerefulfilled.
I said earlier that a good definitionof propositionalknowledge
would have to remain neutral with regard to the disputes among
rival epistemologicaltheories; and it may be thought that the
fourthconditionis so strongthat it prejudices the issues in favor
of one or anotherformof skepticism.Some may believe that the
definitionis so strongthat:
I. If the definition
wereaccepted,S could neverknowthatp, becauseS couldneverknowthatthefourthconditionwas fulfilled.
II. If the definition
were accepted,S would not be warrantedin
assertingthathe knewthatp, becauseS would neverbe warrantedin asserting
thatthe fourthconditionheld.
III. If the definition
were accepted,it would neverbe true thatS
knowsthathe knowsthatp becausehe couldneverknowthatthe
fourth
condition
held.
Now if any one of these formsof skepticismwere implied by the
definition,it would lose its neutralityand, hence, would not be
Grabit, whom I have often seen before when he attended my classes, I
report that I know that Tom Grabit has removedthe book. However,suppose
furtherthat Mrs. Grabit, the motherof Tom, has averred that on the day in
question Tom was not in the library,indeed, was thousands of miles away,
and that Tom's identical twin brother, John Grabit, was in the library.
Imagine, moreover,that I am entirelyignorant of the fact that Mrs. Grabit
has said these things. The statementthat she has said these things would
defeat any justification I have for believing that Tom Grabit removed
the book, according to our present definitionof defeasibility.Thus, I could
not be said to have nonbasic knowledge that Tom Grabit removed the
book (228).
But the situation is not quite that simple. I grant that it appears that this is
a case of S's knowing,but I do not grant that the claim 'Tom's mother said . . .'
to disqualifyS's knowledge claim. If we couple what Tom's
is, by itself,sufficient
mother said with the proposition 'what mothers say in situations like this is
generally reliable', then, if the conjunction of the two propositions is a disqualifying proposition,S would not know that Tom stole the book. That is, if
Tom's mother said that John stole the book and mothers' statementsare generally reliable, it is only a felicitous coincidence that S's belief is correct.For
if mothers' statements are generally reliable in these situations, it is highly
probable that John, and not Tom, stole the book and it is merely a lucky
coincidence that S's belief is correct because the propositions that render p
evident to S are equally compatible with the highlyprobable denial of p.

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PROPOSED

DEFINITION

OF PROPOSITIONAL

KNOWLEDGE

48I

acceptable. The definitionmust allow for the formsof skepticism

involved in I, II, and III, but it ought not to implythem.
In reply to I, let me simplypoint out that the fourthcondition
is not "S knows that thereis no disqualifyingproposition."S can
know that p withoutknowing-or for that matter,without even
considering-whetherthereare any disqualifyingpropositions.The
condition merelyassertsthat his evidence must be such that there
are no disqualifyingpropositions.A personsupportingthe skeptical
position of I-typemust show that forsome reason thereis always a
disqualifyingproposition for any particular type of proposition
which he held was not a possible object of knowledge.
In replyto II, it must be pointed out that S would be warranted
in assertingor believingthat he knew thatp, if it is evidentto him
that there is no disqualifyingpropositionfor p. Although that is
never beyond any conceivable doubt, on many occasions it would
be beyond any reasonable doubt. Those are the occasions mentioned earlier when S is entitled to claim that he knows that p.
A skeptic supportingthe position involved in II would have to
show that thereneverare such occasions.
Finally, the statement'S knows that he knows that p' would
be truewheneverthefollowingare true:
1' 'S knowsthatp' is true; (see replyto I)
2' S believesthathe knowsthatP;
3' 'S knowsthatp' is evidentto S; (see replyII)
4' There is no disqualifyingpropositionfor'S knowsthatp'.

It seems quite clear that these conditions could be fulfilled;or

rather,the definitionitselfdoes not rule out the possibilitythat
theseconditionsare fulfilled.
I said earlier that any good definitionof knowledgewould have
to be acceptable to all the rival epistemologicaltheorists,and I
have just shown that mine would be acceptable to threeformsof
skepticismand theirrivals.I cannot show thatit will be acceptable
to all of the other rivals,but I can at least make this claim more
plausible if I can show my definitionto be acceptable to Descartes
and his critics,since the differences
thereseem to be about as serious
as possible.
The Cartesians believe that it is possible to legitimatelyquestion what we ordinarilytake to be evidentclaims,forexample,that
thereis now a piece of paper in frontof me. These are dubitable,
not because we have some evidence against any particular such

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482

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

claim, but because our methods of detcrminingwhether such

in need of confirmapropositionsare true or false are tlhemselves
tion. The anti-Cartesians,on the other hand, argue that the
methodsare adequate. Now I do not wish to get involved in the
particular disputes between Descartes and his critics.Nor do I
wish to detail the claims of each rival epistemology.But I do want
to show that,given thisproposeddefinitionof propositionalknowledge,theissue can be joined an-dperhapssettled.
Cartesian doubt, in its strongform,must grant that a certain
propositionp is evident,given all the standard testsforp, but yet
it mustmaintainthat it remainspossible to doubt thatwe know p.
Whereas the anti-Cartesiansseem to be maintainingthat, if p is
evidentas a resultof all the standardtestsbeing applied to p, then
it becomesgratuitousto doubt thatwe know thatp.
The issue, then, can be put as follows: Is there a disqualifying
propositionfor all those propositionswhich we ordinarilytake to
be beyonddoubt true?Will, forexample,any of the followingserve
as a disqualifyingproposition?
1.PerhapsI am dreaming
now.
2. I havebeendeceivedbefore,
so perhapsI am beingdeceivednow.
otherthanmaterialobjectsmaybe causingour percep3. Something
tions,forexample,an evilgenius.
4. PerhapsI am mad.
Now as I mentionedabove, I do not propose to get involvedat this
timein the dispute over the truthof any of the above propositions.
What I wish to point out is that the proposed definitionof propositional knowledge does not prejudge the issue at all, in favor of
either the Cartesiansor the anti-Cartesians.In fact,it clarifiesthe
issues by focusingattentionon the considerationssurroundingthe
possibilityof theexistenceof such a disqualifyingproposition.10
The definitionof propositionalknowledgethat I have proposed
seemsto meet all the necessaryconditionsof any such attemptand,
in addition, seems to provide a procedure for evaluating various
epistemologicaltheories.
PETER D. KLEIN

LivingstonCollege,RutgersUniversity
10 Let me add thatthe disputebetwcenthe Cartesians
and theanti-Cartesians
of (iii) to S renders
couldbe viewedas a disagreement
overwhethertheevidency
(iv) evidentto S.

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