Article 12 full text cases: EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORATO AMBAL, G.R. No. L-52688 October 17, 1980

Doctor Balbas testified that during the period form February 1 (twelve days after the killing) to November 3,
1977, when he placed Ambal under observation, the latter did not show any mental defect and was normal (4446 tsn November 3,1977).

In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found under some flowering plants near the house of
Honorato Ambal, Felicula Vicente-Ambal, 48, mortally wounded. She asked for drinking water and medical
assistance.

Asked directly whether Ambal suffered from a mental disease or defect, Doctor Balbas replied: "Before the
commission of the crime, he was normal. After the commission of the crime, normal, but during the commission
of the crime, that is what we call "Psychosis" due to short frustration tolerance" (45 tsn).

She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her body. She was placed in an improvised hammock
and brought to the hospital where she died forty minutes after arrival thereat.

Doctor Cresogono Llacuna attended to Ambal in 1975. He found that Ambal suffered from a psychoneurosis, a
disturbance of the functional nervous system which is not insanity (65 November 15, 1977). The doctor
concluded that Ambal was not insane. Ambal was normal but nervous (68 He had no mental disorder.

On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, husband of Felicula, after entrusting his child to a neighbor, went to
the house of the barangay captain and informed the latter's spouse that he (Honorato) had killed his wife Feling.
After making that oral confession, Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and surrendered to a
policeman, also confessing to the latter that he had liquidated his wife.
The policeman confiscated Ambal's long bolo, the tip of which was broken (Exh. F). Ambal was bespattered
with blood. His shirt was torn. He appeared to be weak.
The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured by quarrels and bickerings which were
exacerbated by the fact that the wife sometimes did not stay in the conjugal abode and chose to spend the night
in the poblacion of Mambajao. The couple had eight children.
The immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel induced by Felicula's failure to buy medicine for
Ambal who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a heated alteration. Felicula told her husband that
it would be better if he were dead ("Mas maayo ka pang mamatay"). That remark infuriated Ambal and
impelled him to attack his wife (Exh. 1).
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused's counsel de oficio manifested that the defense of
Ambal was insanity.
Doctor Balbas in his report dated November 3, 1977 found that Ambal was a "passive-aggressive, emotionally
unstable, explosive or inadequate personality" (Exh. 1).

Ambal, 49, who reached Grade four, testified on November 16, 1977 or about ten months after the incident. He
said that at the time of the killing he did not know what he was doing because he was allegedly not in full
possession of his normal mental faculties. He pretended not to know that he was charged with the capital
offense of having killed his wife.
But he admitted that he knew that his wife was dead because he was informed of her death. During his
confinement in jail he mopped the floor and cooked food for his fellow prisoners. Sometimes, he worked in the
town plaza or was sent unescorted to buy food in the marketf.
He said that his wife quarrelled with him. She was irritable. he admitted that he rode on a tricycle when he
surrendered on the day of the killing. He remembered that a week before the incident he got wet while plowing.
He feel asleep without changing his clothes. At midnight, when he woke up, he had chills. That was the
commencement, his last illness.
The trial court concluded from Ambal's behavior immediately after the incident that he was not insane and that
he acted like a normal human being. We agree with the court's conclusion.
Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or
mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers escaping
punishment through a general plea of insanity. (People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87, 94.)
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability an imbecile or an insane person unless the
latter has acted during a lucid interval. *

According to the dictionary imbecile is a person marked by mental deficiency while an insane person is one
who has an unsound mind or suffers from a mental disorder. An insane person may have lucid intervals but "el
embecil no puede tener, no tiene estos intervalos de Corazon, pues en el no hay una alteracion, sino
una carencia del juico mismo" (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., p. 92.)

In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete deprivation of
intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288,292; People
vs. Renegado, L-27031, May 31,1974,57 SCRA 275, 286.)

Insanity has been defined as "a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the brain, or a
more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and
characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective
faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition" (Sec. 1039, Revised Administrative Code).

A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and who tried to vindicate his honor by taking violent measures to
the extent of killing his wife (whom he suspected of infidelity) can hardly be regarded as an imbecile
(Formigones case).

The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary (Art. 800, Civil
Code re Testamentary Succession; U.S. vs. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305, 308). The law always presumes all acts to be
voluntary. It is improper to presume that acts were executed unconsciously (People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292;
People vs. Tagasa, 68 Phil. 147, 153; U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547; People vs. Fausto, 113 Phil. 841).
When there is no proof that the defendant was not of sound mind at the time he performed the criminal act
charged to him, or that he performed it at the time of madness or of mental derangement, or that he was
generally considered to be insane his habitual condition being, on the contrary, healthy the legal
presumption is that he acted in his ordinary state of mind and the burden is upon the defendant to
overcome this presumption (U.S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218.)
Without positive proof that the defendant had lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or
during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition (U.S. vs.
Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil. 62).
A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the defense of mental incapacity, has the burden of
establishing that fact, meaning that he was insane at the very moment when the crime was committed
(People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204.)
What should be the criterion for insanity or imbecility? We have adopted the rule, based on Spanish
jurisprudence, that in order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will
at the time of committing the crime (People vs. Formigonez, 87 Phil. 658, 660)

Where the accused had a passionate nature, with a tendency to having violent fits when angry, his acts of
breaking glasses and smashing dishes are indications of an explosive temper and not insanity, especially
considering that he did not turn violent when a policeman intercepted him after he had killed his wife. (Cruz
case.)
There is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of
anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons who get into a quarrel or fight
seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a madman.
The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of the word I "crazy"
is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane", "non compos mentis," "unsound mind","idiot", or "lunatic"
(U.S. vs. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88, 91.)
The heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge is not insanity. (People vs.
Foy, 138 N.Y. 664, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 92.)
One who, in possession of a sound and, commits a criminal act under the impulse of passion or revenge, which
may temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control the will, cannot nevertheless be shielded from the
consequences of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse the commission of a criminal act,
when it is made affirmatively to appear that the person committing it was insane, and that the offense was the
direct consequence of his insanity (State vs. Strickly, 41 Iowa 232, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 94.)
The defense of insanity was rejected in a case where the accused killed by strangulation a sixteen-year-old girl,
who got leaves from his banana plants, and sliced the flesh of her legs, thighs and shoulders, cooked the flesh
and ate it like a cannibal. (People vs. Balondo, L-27401, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 155).

Being weak-minded does not necessarily mean that the accused is insane (People vs. Martin, 120 Phil. 14, 2021).
As stated in another case, the "test of the responsibility for criminal acts, when insanity is asserted, is the
capacity of the accused to distinguish between right and wrong at the time and with respect to the act which is
the subject of the inquiry. (Coleman's case,1 N.Y. Cr. Rep. 1.)
Another test is the so-called "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming defendant's knowledge of
the nature and quality of his act and his knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of the mind,
defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him to prevent himself from
doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." The commission of the crime is excused even if the accused
knew what he was doing was wrong provided that as a result of mental disease he lacked the power to resist the
impulse to commit the act. (State v. White, 270 Pac. 2d. 727, 730; Leslie Kast, 31 North Dakota Law Review,
pp. 170, 173.)
The latest rule on the point is that "the so-called right wrong test, supplemented by the irresistible impulse test,
does not alone supply adequate criteria for determining criminal responsibility of a person alleged mental
incapacity." "An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or a
mental defect. A mental disease relieving an accused of criminal responsibility for his unlawful act is a
condition considered capable of improvement or deterioration; a mental defect having such effect on criminal
responsibility is a condition not considered capable of improvement or deterioration, and either congenital, or
the result of injury or of a physical or mental disease." (Syllabi, Durham v. U.S., 214 F. 2nd. 862, 874, 45
A.L.R. 2d. 1430 [1954].)
As stated in 22 C.J.S. 203, "the general test of criminal responsibility may be stated to be the capacity to
understand the nature and consequences of the act charged and the ability to distinguish between right and
wrong as to such act, and in a majority of jurisdictions this is the exclusive test."
And, as noted in 21 Am Jur 2d. 118, the rule in the M'Naghten case exists along with the "irresistible impulse"
test or some other formula permitting a defenda
nt to be exculpated on the ground that, although he knew the act was wrong, he was unable to refrain from
committing it.

Since the broadest test suggested, which is the Durham or "Product" rule, also permits inability to distinguish
between right and wrong to be considered, even though it refuses to limit the inquiry to that topic, it would
appear that insanity which meets this test is a defense in all Anglo-American jurisdictions and that the only
controversy is over whether there are some cases in which the right-and-wrong test is not met, but in which a
defense on grounds of insanity should nevertheless be recognized. (21 Am Jur 2d 118.)
In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not substantiated by any sufficient evidence. The
presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He was not completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom
of will when he mortally wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any mental disease or defect.
The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of surrendering to the law-enforcing authorities is
incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he was going to be punished for it.
Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the authorities. Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death. The lesser penalty should
be imposed because of the presence of one mitigating circumstance and the absence of aggravating
circumstances (Art. 63[3], Revised Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's decision is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DIEGO BALONDO, G.R. No. L-27401
1969

October 31,

The Court of First Instance of Leyte found the defendant Diego Balondo guilty of the crime of murder and
sentenced him to suffer the extreme penalty of death. This case is now before this Court on automatic review of
the decision of the trial court.
On October 21, 1966 the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte filed the following information against the defendant:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Diego Balondo of the crime of murder, committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of September, 1966, in the municipality of Kawayan, Subprovince of Biliran,
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and strangle one Gloria Bulasa and inflicting upon the said Gloria Bulasa the
following injuries, to wit:
1. Liver mortis of the face, anterior abdominal wall, and anterior chest wall; 2. Semi-circular marks at the lateral
portion of the neck, both sides; 3. Circular incision around the upper third of the thigh at the level of the inferior
border of the gluteal muscles of both thighs; 4. Complete loss of the soft tissues of the thighs and legs in such
manner that only the bones of the parts mentioned were left; 5. Both feet were missing from the ankle joints
downwards; 6. All digits of the left hand were missing from the carpal-metacarpal joints downward; 7. Incised
wound from the left shoulder along the medial border of the left scapula to the inferior angle of the right
scapula, upwards along its lateral border to the right shoulder, medially towards the base of the neck posteriorly
to the left shoulder, with loss of the skin and the underlying tissues. thus causing the instantaneous death of the
aforementioned Gloria Bulasa.
That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength; that the wrong
done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing another wrong not necessary for its
commission; that means was employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural
effects of the act; that the act was committed in utter disregard of sex; and also the aggravating circumstance of
relationship, the victim being the niece of the accused.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The record shows that when this defendant was apprehended after the discovery of the dead body of Gloria
Bulasa, upon being investigated by the Chief of Police of Kawayan, he readily admitted having killed Gloria
Bulasa. His admission was reduced to writing in the Visayan dialect understood by him, and signed by him.
Subsequently, a more lengthy investigation was conducted by the Chief of Police, and again the defendant
admitted having killed Gloria Bulasa and narrated in detail how he killed Gloria Bulasa and what he did with
the body of Gloria Bulasa. The defendant was taken to the place where the crime was committed and he even
reenacted what he did with the deceased Gloria Bulasa. The statements made by the defendant in this detailed
examination by the Chief of Police, including his statements during the reenactment of the crime, were reduced
to writing, and were subscribed and sworn to by him before the municipal Judge of Kawayan. The statements
made by the defendant in his written admissions were corroborated in important details by Meliton Bulasa,
father of the victim and by Anatalio Bulasa, an uncle of the victim who both signed sworn statements before the

municipal judge. A post mortem examination of the body of the deceased Gloria Bulasa was made by Dr. Jose J.
Tupaz, the municipal health officer of Kawayan, and the injuries found by the medical officer on the body of the
deceased indicated the brutal acts committed by the defendant on his victim, as narrated by the defendant
himself in his sworn statements.
The corresponding criminal complaint was filed by the Chief of Police of Kawayan, Leyte, before the municipal
court of the said municipality. During the preliminary investigation of the case, the defendant pleaded guilty to
the charge of murder when he was arraigned. He not only admitted his guilt, but he narrated before the
municipal judge the circumstances attending the killing of Gloria Bulasa.
We have carefully examined the record of this case, and We fully agree with the findings and observations of
the trial court in its decision, as follows:
From the records and varied written admissions of the accused, Diego Balondo, that on Sept. 29, 1966, at about
6:00 o'clock a.m., he was in his farm in the barrio of Balacson, Kawayan, Subprovince of Biliran, Leyte. That
he stayed in his farm for about three hours clearing his camote plantation; that at about 9:00 o'clock in that same
day, he went home to take his breakfast; that at about 1:00 o'clock, he saw Gloria Bulasa going to the direction
of the nipa grooves of the Ayono Asilo, behind the Aglipayan church; that upon seeing her, he followed behind
surreptitiously; that upon seeing her cutting the banana leaves he told her, "why, you are here again to cut the
banana leaves?", that the late Gloria Bulasa answered, 'it is none of your business for it's the property of the
government'; that he got furious and immediately grabbed her by his left hand strangled her by the neck and
pushed her violently to the ground face downward; that he firmly held her left arm and neck; rode on her back
and pinned her down with his knees and then continuously lifting her head and smashed her face against the
mud; that he choked and buried her face in the mud for about an hour until she died.
And that when she was already dead, he lifted her from the mud and laid her flat on her back, and then he held
her by the feet, dragged her to a place from where he killed her, at a distance of thirty brazas; that he covered
the body with nipa leaves to keep her from the sunlight; that the deceased was carrying a knife for cutting the
banana leaves, and she was a niece of the accused from a second degree cousin; that he sliced and took the flesh
from the thighs, legs and shoulder by the use of the knife of Gloria Bulasa because his bolo was dull, after
which he threw the knife away; that he cut away also the feet; that he intended to slice all the flesh of the
cadaver but he was caught by the darkness of the night; that he put the sliced flesh with a piece of rattan, tied it
and brought it to his farm; that upon reaching his farm, he started to build a fire and barbecued the sliced pieces
of human flesh (roasted it) and he ate the barbecued pieces of human flesh and used it as a viand for the roasted
banana fruits; that the taste of the human flesh was bitter and poignant like a gall bladder; that he killed Gloria

Bulasa first to taste the human flesh if its good; that after doing all those atrocious acts, he went home at about
7:00 o'clock in that evening.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In passing judgment to the accused, Diego Balondo, the Court has this lamentable observation with this peculiar
case.
The spectacle of knowing a human being killed and slaughtered in this island, subprovince of Biliran, Leyte, for
unknown motivation is not a news at all in this jurisdiction because such incidents are too common and
numerous for the court to recall. But when one, like in this case, choked a maiden to death just 16 years old for
the simple reason that she was getting leaves from the banana plants of the accused to wrap local cookies, the
said accused after killing her, sliced the flesh of the legs, shoulder and the thigh, cooked those human flesh;
devoured them like an ancient cannibal; the accused, Diego Balondo went bizarrely beyond the extreme of a
carnivorous wild beast.
Counsel de officio, Atty. Justo R. Albert, in his brief for the defendant, urges that the trial court should have
subjected the defendant to some psychiatric test to determine his sanity before rendering judgment, and prays
this Court "that the judgment of the lower court be set aside and this case be remanded for trial with admonition
to the lower court to order the submission of the accused to a psychiatric test to determine his sanity." We do not
find merit in the plea of counsel de officio. We find in the record sufficient justification for the conclusion that
the defendant was not insane at the time of the commission of the crime. The defendant had made several
statements, which were reduced to writing and duly signed by him. We find that the facts and circumstances
narrated by the defendant in those different statements tally in important details. The defendant voluntarily
admitted his guilt before the municipal court during the preliminary investigation. He likewise voluntarily
pleaded guilty when arraigned before the trial court. Considering that the defendant is charged of having killed
Gloria Bulasa way back on September 29, 1966 or more than three years ago it is not possible now to
ascertain the mental condition of the defendant as of the time when he committed the crime of which he is
charged.
The trial court has correctly found that in killing the deceased Gloria Bulasa, the defendant had taken advantage
of his superior strength. This attendant circumstance qualifies the crime committed as murder, defined in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code.

We agree with the trial court that the commission of the crime by the defendant was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of (1) disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of her sex, and (2) that the
wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary
for its commission.
The trial court, however, erred when it declared that two other aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the crime; namely, that means was employed or circumstance brought about which add
ignominy to the natural effects of the act, and that the victim was the niece of the accused. We find nothing in
the record which shows that before the deceased Gloria Bulasa died she was subjected to such indignities as
would cause her shame or moral suffering. Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, the alternative
circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration only when the offended party is the spouse,
ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree
of the offended (U.S. vs. Insierto, 15 Phil, 358).
One mitigating circumstance can be considered in favor of the defendant, namely, the circumstance of his
having made a voluntary plea of guilt in court before the presentation of evidence by the prosecution.
We, therefore, find that the defendant had committed the crime of murder, with two aggravating circumstances
that should be counted against him, and one mitigating circumstance in his favor. However, for lack of the
required number of votes by the members of the Court, for the imposition of the maximum penalty of death, the
Court has resolved to modify that portion of the judgment of the trial court which imposes the penalty of death,
by imposing on the defendant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is modified. The defendant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Gloria Bulasa in the sum of P12,000.00, and to pay the costs. It is so
ordered.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABELARDO FORMIGONES, G.R. No. L-3246
November 29, 1950
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur finding the appellant guilty
of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P2,000, and to pay the costs. The following facts are not disputed.

In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao,
Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children. From
there they went to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of Binahian of the
same municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay. After about a month's stay or rather on
December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused,
without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed
his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her
death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by
her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living
room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by the people who came in response to the
shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and testified to the stabbing of
her mother by her father.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written statement, Exhibit D, wherein he
admitted that he killed The motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement he used to
have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he
suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his had become indifferent to
him (defendant).
During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of Sipocot, the accused pleaded
guilty, as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance, the defendant entered a plea
of not guilty, but did not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where
Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there was rather strange and that he behaved like an insane
person; that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners;
that at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings; that he would refused to take a bath and
wash his clothes until forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with his
fellow prisoners, or even alone by himself without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell was
opened, he suddenly darted from inside into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal
liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court rejected this same theory and we are
inclined to agree with the lower court. According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez,
who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not
imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.

In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code
are copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions
of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent and applicable. We quote
Judge Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into account, it
is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused
be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least
discernment;1 that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of
freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of
the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his
mental faculties does not exclude imputability.2
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant
had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime,
it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary,
and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the
basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate
insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition
produced by remorse at having killed his wife. From the case of United States vs. Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we
quote the following syllabus:
Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to indicate that the accused was moved by
a wayward or hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other testimony to the effect that, while in confinement
awaiting trial, defendant acted absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to establish the defense of insanity. The
conduct of the defendant while in confinement appears to have been due to a morbid mental condition produced
by remorse.

After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to the
evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as
to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five
children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of
his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take
violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that
in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions
were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a mere product of
hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to the
following effect. In addition to the observations made by appellant in his written statement Exhibit D, it is said
that when he and his wife first went to live in the house of his half brother, Zacarias Formigones, the latter was
living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant. However, after the family of Abelardo was settled in the
house, Zacarias not only frequented said house but also used to sleep there nights. All this may have aroused
and even partly confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those unfortunate beings, simple, and
even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action in picking up the body of his wife
after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor, and lying beside her for
hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one though he thought that she has betrayed him.
Although he did not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made no effort to flee and compel the police to
hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the
trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble
and expense of catching him, and insuring his conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery attended the commission of the crime. It seems that the prosecution was not intent or proving it. At
least said aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the complaint either in the justice of the peace court or in
the Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt and we therefore declined to
find the existence of this aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that the accused is feebleminded
warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph
9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely that the accused is "suffering some physical defect which thus
restricts his means of action, defense, or communication with his fellow beings," or such illness "as would
diminish the exercise of his will power." To this we may add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the

same article, that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation. The accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance to offset them, at first
we thought of the possible applicability of the provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code
for the purpose of imposing the penalty next lower to that prescribed by article 246 for parricide, which
is reclusion perpetuato death. It will be observed however, that article 64 refers to the application of penalties
which contain three periods whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties,
each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, which is not true in
the present case where the penalty applicable for parricide is composed only of two indivisible penalties. On the
other hand, article 63 of the same Code refers to the application of indivisible penalties whether it be a single
divisible penalty, or two indivisible penalties like that of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore clear that
article 63 is the one applicable in the present case.
Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Interpreting a similar legal provision the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Guevara (10 Phil. 37),
involving the crime of parricide, in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old Penal Code) which
corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice Arellano
said the following:
And even though the court should take into consideration the presence of two mitigating circumstances of a
qualifying nature, which it can not afford to overlook, without any aggravating one, the penalty could not be
reduced to the next lower to that imposed by law, because, according to a ruling of the court of Spain, article 80
above-mentioned does not contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule 5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64
of the Rev. Penal Code.) (Decision of September 30, 1879.)
Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which is inevitable and which, under the
law, must be sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional power conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of
the Penal Code; and.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby order that a proper petition be filed
with the executive branch of the Government in order that the latter, if it be deemed proper in the exercise of the
prerogative vested in it by the sovereign power, may reduce the penalty to that of the next lower.

Then, in the case of People vs. Castaeda (60 Phil. 604), another parricide case, the Supreme Court in affirming
the judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to reclusion perpetua, said that notwithstanding the numerous
mitigating circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the penalty for parricide as fixed by article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code is composed of two indivisible penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3
of article 63 of the said Code must be applied. The Court further observed:
We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has exhibited such moral turpitude as
requires life imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, we
respectfully invite the attention of the Chief Executive to the case with a view to executive clemency after
appellant has served an appreciable amount of confinement.
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the judgment of the lower court
with the modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has
undergone. Appellant will pay costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two cases above cited, and
believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be brought to the attention of the
Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to death
or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.

G.R. No. L-33211 June 29, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERNESTO PUNO y FILOMENO
This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a defense the exempting circumstance of insanity.

The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was in the bedroom with the old woman, and by Lina
Pajes, 27, a tenant of the adjoining room. They testified that Puno's eyes were reddish. His look was baleful and
menacing. Puno was a neighbor of Aling Kikay.
After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria had taken refuge, and, according to Hilaria, he
made the following confession and threat: "Huwag kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo
na umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa matanda." Or, according to Lina, Puno
said: "Pinatay ko na iyong matanda. Huwag kayong tumawag ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang
paghihigantihan ko. "
After the killing, Puno fled to his parents' house at Barrio Tugatog, Malabon and then went to the house of his
second cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at Barrio San Jose, Calumpit, Bulacan, reaching that place in the evening.
How he was able to go to that place, which was then flooded, is not shown in the record.
Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had left, notified the Malabon police of the killing.
Corporal Daniel B. Cruz answered the call. He found Aling Kikay sprawled on her bed already dead, Her head
was bloody. Her blanket and pillows were bloodstained. He took down the statements of Lina and Hilaria at the
police station. They pointed to Puno as the killer (pp. 15- 17, Record).
A medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an autopsy. He certified that the
victim had lacerated wounds on her right eyebrow and contusions on the head caused by a hard instrument, On
opening the skull, the doctor found extensive and generalized hemorrhage. The cause of death was intracranial,
traumatic hemorrhage (Exh. A).
Puno's father surrendered him to the police. Two Malabon policemen brought him to the National Mental
Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 10, 1970 (p. 14, Record). He was charged with murder in the
municipal court. He waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation.

There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the afternoon of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney
driver, entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a widow. The house was located in
the area known as Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal

On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in the
information as aggravating circumstances were evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex.

On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying: "Mangkukulam ka mambabarang mayroon
kang bubuyog". Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck her several times on the head with a hammer until
she was dead.

Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about five months after the killing, pretended that he did
not remember having killed Aling Kikay- He believes that there are persons who are "mangkukulam,"
"mambabarang" and "mambubuyog and that when one is victimized by those persons, his feet might shrink or
his hands might swan. Puno believes that a person harmed by a "mambabarang" might have a headache or a

swelling nose and ears and can be cured only by a quack doctor (herbolaryo). Consequently, it is necessary to
kill the "mangkukulam" and "mambabarang".
Puno is the third child in a family of twelve children. He is married with two children. He finished third year
high school. His father is a welder. Among his friends are drivers. (Exh- B).
Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Puno's wife, testified that on the night before the murder, Puno's eyes were reddish. He
complained of a headache. The following day while he was feeding the pigs, he told Zenaida that a bumble bee
was coming towards him and he warded it off with his hands. Zenaida did not see any bee.
Puno then went upstairs and took the cord of the religious habit of his mother. He wanted to use that cord in
tying his dog. He asked for another rope when Zenaida admonished him not to use that cord. Puno tied the dog
to a tree by looping the rope through its mouth and over its head. He repeatedly boxed the dog.
Aida Gabriel, Zenaida's elder sister, saw Puno while he was boxing that dog. Aida observed that Puno's eyes
were bloodshot and his countenance had a ferocious expression.
Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno came to their house in Barrio San
Jose, Calumpit. Ernesto was soaking wet as there was a flood in that place. He was cuddling a puppy that he
called "Diablo". He called for Teotimo's mother who invited him to eat. Ernesto did not eat. Instead, he fed the
puppy.
Ernesto introduced Teotimo to his puppy. Then, he sang an English song. When Teotimo asked him to change
his wet clothes, Ernesto refused. Later, he tried on the clothes of Teotimo's father. When told that Teotimo's
father had been dead for a couple of years already, Ernesto just looked at Teotimo.
While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again. Then he emitted a moaning sound until he fell asleep.
Ernesto was awakened the next morning by the noise caused by persons wading in the flood. Ernesto thought
they were his fellow cursillistas.
The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead of proving that puno was insane when he killed
Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified that Puno acted with discernment.
Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of the Dr. Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital, to whom
Puno was referred for treatment ten times between September 8, 1966 and July 24, 1970, testified that Puno was

an out-patient who could very well live with society, although he was afflicted with "schizophrenic reaction";
that Puno knew what he was doing and that he had psychosis, a slight destruction of the ego. Puno admitted to
Doctor Maravilia that one cause of his restlessness, sleeplessness and irritability was his financial problem (7
tsn November 4, 1970). Doctor Maravilla observed that Puno on July 4, 1970 was already cured.
Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno was first brought to that hospital on
July 28, 1962 because his parents complained that he laughed alone and exhibited certain eccentricities such as
kneeling, praying and making his body rigid. Doctor Robles observed that while Puno was suffering from
"schizophrenic reaction", his symptoms were "not socially incapacitating" and that he could adjust himself to
his environment (4 tsn January 20, 1971). He agreed with Doctor Maravilla's testimony.
Doctor Carlos Vicente, a medical specialist of the National Mental Hospital, testified that from his examination
of Puno, he gathered that Puno acted with discernment when he committed the killing and that Puno could
distinguish between right and wrong (5 tsn January 1 1, 197 1). Doctor Vicente also concluded that Puno was
not suffering from any delusion and that he was not mentally deficient; otherwise, he would not have reached
third year high school (8-19 tsn January 1 1, 197 1).
On December 14, 1970 or three months after the commission of the offense, Doctors Vicente, Robles and
Victorina V. Manikan of the National Mental Hospital submitted the following report on Puno (Exh. B or 2):
Records show that he had undergone psychiatric treatment at the Out-Patient Service of the National Mental
Hospital for schizophrenia in 1962 from which he recovered; in 1964 a relapse of the same mental illness when
he improved and in 1966 when his illness remained unimproved.
His treatment was continued at the JRR Memorial Hospital at the San Lazaro Compound up to July, 1970. He
was relieved of symptoms and did not come back anymore for medication. On September 8, 1970, according to
information, he was able to kill an old woman. Particulars of the offense are not given.
MENTAL CONDITION
... Presently, he is quiet and as usual manageable. He is fairly clean in person and without undue display of
emotion. He talks to co-patients but becomes evasive when talking with the doctor and other personnel of the
ward. He knows he is accused of murder but refuses to elaborate on it.
xxx xxx xxx

REMARKS
In view of the foregoing findings, Ernesto Puno, who previously was suffering from a mental illness called
schizophrenia, is presently free from any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms.
The seeming ignorance of very simple known facts and amnesia of several isolated accounts in his life do not fit
the active pattern of a schizophrenic process. It may be found in an acutely disturbed and confused patient or a
markedly, retarded individual of which he is not.
However, persons who recover from an acute episode of mental illness like schizophrenia may retain some
residual symptoms impairing their judgment but not necessarily their discernment of right from wrong of the
offense committed.
The foregoing report was submitted pusuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court and the order of the trial court
dated November 16, 1970 for the mental examination of Puno in the National Mental Hospital to determine
whether he could stand trial and whether he was sane when he committed the killing.
The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or knew that the killing of Francisca Col was wrong and that he
would be punished for it, as shown by the threats which he made to Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes, the old
woman's companions who witnessed his dastardly deed.
The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal maniac who had gone berserk, he would have killed
also Hilaria and Lina. The fact that he singled out Aling Kikay signified that he really disposed of her because
he thought that she was a witch.
Judge Onofre A. Villaluz said that during the trial he "meticulously observed the conduct and behavior of the
accused inside the court, most especially when he was presented on the witness stand" and he was convinced
"that the accused is sane and has full grasp of what was happening" in his environment.
The trial court convicted Puno of murder, sentenced him to death and ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim
an indemnity of twenty-two thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 509).
His counsel de oficio in this review of the death sentence, contends that the trial court erred in not sustaining the
defense of insanity and in appreciating evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex as
aggravating circumstances.

When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility, the evidence on this point must refer to
the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution (U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil.
547). Insanity should be proven by clear and positive evidence (People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204).
The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed Francisca Col because he had chronic schizophrenia
since 1962; he was suffering from schizophrenia on September 8, 1970, when he liquidated the victim, and
schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which deprives a person of discernment and freedom of will.
Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused must be deprived completely of
reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime (People vs- Formigones, 87
Phil. 658, 660).
Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is
deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will
not exclude imputability." (People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688, October 17, 1980; People vs. Renegade, L27031, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 275, 286; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292. As to "el trastorno mental
transitorio as an exempting circumstance, see I Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 15th Ed., 1974. pp. 498-504 and
art. 8 of the Spanish Penal Code.)
After evaluating counsel de oficio's contentions in the light of the strict rule just stated and the circumstances
surrounding the killing, we are led to the conclusion that Puno was not legally insane when he killed the hapless
and helpless victim. The facts and the findings of the psychiatrists reveal that on that tragic occasion he was not
completely deprived of reason and freedom of will.
In People vs. Fausto y Tomas, 113 Phil. 841, the accused was confined in the National Mental Hospital for
thirteen days because he was suffering from schizophrenia of the paranoid type. His confinement was
recommended by Doctor Antonio Casal of the San Miguel Brewery where the accused used to work as a
laborer. About one year and two months later, he killed Doctor Casal because the latter refused to certify him
for re-employment. His plea of insanity was rejected. He was convicted of murder.
In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the killing as murder. The qualifying circumstance is
abuse of superiority. In liquidating Francisco Col, Puno, who was armed with a hammer, took advantage of his
superior natural strength over that of the unarmed septuagenarian female victim who was unable to offer any
resistance and who could do nothing but exclaim " Diyos ko ".

Thus, it was held that "an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless
woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which qqqs sex and the weapon used in the act
afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself" (People vs. Guzman, 107 Phil. 1122,
1127 citing U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; U.S. vs. Camiloy 36 Phil. 757 and People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil.
446).

It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder should be imposed (Arts. 64[41 and 248, Revised
Penal Code).

Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be appreciated because the evidence does not show (a)
the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had
clung to his determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of
the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act (People vs. Ablates, L-33304, July 31, 1974,
58 SCRA 241, 247).

SO ORDERED.

The essence of premeditation "es la mayor perversidad del culpable juntamente con su serenidad o frialdad de
animo." It is characterized (1) "por la concepcion del delito y la resolucion de ejecutarlo firme, fria, reflexival
meditada y detenida" and (2) "por la persistencia en la resolucion de delinquir demostrada por el espacio de
tiempo transcurrido entre dicha resolucion y la ejecucion del hecho Premeditation should be evident, meaning
that it should be shown by "signos reiterados v externos, no de meras sospechas" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo
Penal, 1974 or 15th Ed., pp- 582-3).

G.R. No. L-32978 October 30, 1980

Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of her old age should be appreciated as
generic aggravating circumstances. Disregard of sex is not aggravating because there is no evidence that the
accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed manifest disrespect to her
womanhood (People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548; People vs. Mori, L-23511-2, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382,
404, People vs, Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De Jesus, 14 Phil. 190).
However, those two aggravating circumstances are off-set by the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender to the authorities and, as contended by counsel de oficio, the offender's mental illness (mild psychosis
or schizophrenic reaction) which diminished his will-power without however depriving him of consciousness of
his acts. (See People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, People vs. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and People vs. Formigones, 87
Phil. 658.)
Thus, it was held that la equivocada creencia de los acusados de que el matar a un brujo es un bien al publico
puede considerarse como una circunstancia atenuante pues los que tienen la obsession de que los brujos deben
ser eliminados estan en la misma condicion que aquel que, atacado de enfermedad morbosa pero consciente aun
de lo que hace, no tiene verdadero imperio de su voluntad" (People vs. Balneg 79 Phil. 805, 810).

WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua The indemnity
imposed by the trial court is affirmed. Costs de oficio.

Barredo, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRES MAGALLANO.

The Court sustains the conviction for parricide of the accused-appellant, Andres Magallano, on his own
admission that he strangled his wife to death. The defense of insanity as an exempting circumstance was not
established and did not overcome the legal presumption that a person's acts are of his own free will and
intelligence. The settled rule is that the onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as a defense and the
defense failed to discharge this burden.
The accused was charged before the Court of First Instance of Davao City with parricide for having killed his
lawful wife, Exequiela Costa, on September 29, 1968.
Upon motion by the counsel de oficio for the accused asserting the accused's insanity, the latter was referred to
the Chief of the Davao General Hospital for examination. The Director was ordered to file the necessary
petition for hospitalization of the accused if in his opinion it served the public welfare or the welfare of the
person concerned.
Pursuant thereto, after psychiatric examination of the accused conducted by Dr. Corazon San Pedro as attending
physician, the officer-in-charge of the Davao Regional Mental Hospital submitted a report to the effect that the
accused was quiet, no bizarre behavior noted. He was in good contact with his environment, recognized his
companions and was aware of the place where he was being examined. He answered questions coherently and

was relevant." She recommended however that the subject be further examined in the Regional Mental Hospital
at least once a week for further evaluation.

police went there, they found the victim's cadaver. Post- mortem findings showed that she died of "asphyxia due
to choking" and that she had been dead for more than 30 hours but less than 50 hours at the time of discovery. 3

Hence, the office of the City Fiscal moved that the regional hospital be given more time to complete its
examination and to submit a medical report on the accused's state of mind.

Crispin Orais confirmed the accused's declaration in a sworn statement before the Asst. City Attorney that the
accused confided to him that he had killed his wife by choking her with his bare hands. In his testimony in
court 4 as first witness for the prosecution, Crispin Orais declared he knew the accused who went to him on
October 1, 1968 at his house in Cabantian, Davao City and inquired about his father's whereabouts. The witness
then sent his son to fetch the father, Diego Magallano. The accused was then sweating and his face was covered
with blood. When asked about his appearance, the accused replied that he had smashed his head against a tree
as if he had lost his mind because he had killed his wife by choking her to death. The accused pointed to a place
about 50 meters away from the house of Crispin Orais as the place where the killing took place. As to his
observation on the accused's demeanor as the latter related this gruesome story, the witness remarked that the
accused was all right although there were times when he appeared out of his mind for he could not easily
answer the questions.

Acting on the motion, the trial court on March 29, 1969 ordered that accused be again sent to the regional
mental hospital to be examined by an internist of that institution in collaboration with Dr. Corazon San Pedro to
determine once and for all the mental condition of the accused and to find out whether he was fit for
arraignment .
Subsequently, the officer-in-charge of the Regional Mental Hospital on May 15,1969 furnished the Court with a
resume of the psychiatric examination conducted on the accused, to wit:
In the three interviews done, 1 subject was observed to be in good contact with his environment. No odd
behavior was observed. He answered questions coherently and relevantly. No hallucinations or delusions
elicited. He is well oriented to the date, place and person. He can give his personal data and other circumstances
in his life. He can relate the event that led to his confinement in jail.
Having been satisfied that the accused was fit and ready for trial on the basis of the two medical reports, the
trial court proceeded to arraign him. With the assistance of his counsel de oficio, the accused entered a plea of
not guilty.
After trial wherein the main issue was the sanity or insanity of the accused during the commission of the crime,
the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The record shows that on October 1, 1968, the accused companied by his father voluntarily informed, and
surrendered to, the Davao City Police Department that he had killed his wife. The accused declared upon
investigation conducted by policy officers that he strangled his wife 2 to death in the early morning of
September 29, 1968 after an exchange of heated words between them stemming over his suspicion that she had
been unfaithful to him; that the following day, he went to a nearby house owned by one Peping Orais to whom
he confided the killing. The accused described to the police the scene of the crime and true enough, when the

Patrolman Noe Baita of the Davao City Police Department testified that during the investigation on October 1,
1968 the accused confessed that he killed his wife in the manner he related it to Crispin Orais and that all the
answers to his question given in the course of the examination were spontaneous and voluntary. 5
Lt. Exequeil Untalan declared that while he was in charge of the commando unit at Agdao, Davao City on
October 1, 1968, the accused accompanied by his father came to his office to confirm reports that the accused
had strangled his wife; that this surrender was registered in the police blotter after which the accused was
indorsed to the Homicide Section of the City Policy Department. 6
Lt. Rafael Panal of the Homicide Section who repaired to the scene of the crime found the cadaver of the victim
in the bushes and they brought it to the Davao City morgue where it was examined and autopsied by Dr. Abear,
Medical Officer of the Davao City Health Office. The investigation was conducted in his precinct by Noe Baita.
He observed that although the investigator had to repeat some questions for the accused to understand, the latter
was remorseful and he could talk coherently. 7
Juan Abear, a medicolegal expert connected with the Davao City Health Department was presented as witness
to confirm that he was the one who conducted the autopsy of the victim on October 2, 1968 and that the cause
of death was asphyxia due to strangulation. 8

Fiscal Josefino Fuentes, Asst. City Fiscal of Davao City testified that he was the one before whom the accused
swore to the truth of the latter's extra-judicial confession; that he himself translated to the accused all the
contents of the confession from English to Visayan, and that the accused admitted to him that he (the accused)
signed it voluntarily. 9
The defense in its attempt to prove mental disorder on the part of the accused presented evidence consisting of
the testimonies of the accused's father, his son and three neighbors.
Arturo Magallano, a son of the accused who attained 6th grade, testified that during the month of April, 1968 he
observed that his father kept saying words that were not pro- per or correct; that his father even tried to commit
suicide by almost typing his neck with a rope; that in Cabacan-Bucana, Davao after they transferred in 1968, his
father worked for a living by going fishing three times a week and that the witness himself sold the fish at a
price dictated by his farther. 10
Luisa Bacala, a 64 year old vegetable vendor and neighbor of the accused, declared that the latter used to accuse
his wife of having a paramour, that one time she saw Exequiela, the wife of the accused, selling fish in the
market when the accused arrived saying that the paramour was already around; that the accused used to run
towards the pier and his family would follow him. 11
Crispin Orais, under the same oath testified that one morning he met the accused telling him that his (accused's)
father was at Cabantian in the company of some policemen and he kept saying this many times although he had
already been assured that his father was not seen around there. 12
Diego Magallano, the father of the accused testified thus: Sometime in 1968 in the first week of April, this
witness received a telegram from the wife of the accused stating that the latter was sickly; he went to stay with
his son in Maasin, Leyte for one month during which time he observed that the latter was somewhat insane for
he kept on saying that his wife had a paramour although this statement had no basis. He had his son treated by a
quack doctor. Upon hearing about the incident that his son killed his wife, the witness went to Cabantian where
he saw his son near the dead body of his wife. The accused said he killed her for she no longer loved him. The
witness corroborated the declaration of Crispin Orais that the face of the accused was all covered with blood for
the reason, according to the accused, that he bumped his head against a tree for he wanted to kill himself. 13
Ricardo Dayala, a 64 year old vegetable vendor who claimed to be another neighbor of the accused at Davao
City stated that he was acquainted with the accused for a long time; that he used to see the accused peeping
from his house everytime the accused's wife went downstairs to get some pieces of wood for fuel and he

observed that the accused was insane, because at one time when asked some questions, the accused would talk
and laugh at the same time although sometimes the accused acted sanely. 14
After a review and analysis of the evidence on record, this Court agrees with the State's contention that the
defense has failed to prove that the accused was legally insane at the commission of the crime.
Indeed, the evidence presented by the defense does not outweigh the certifications submitted by government
psychiatric doctors who had closely observed the accused for a month and a half, 15 and found that the accused
was in good contact with his environment; that he did not manifest any odd behavior for in fact he could even
relate the circumstances that led to his confinement.
Apart from these certifications, statements in court by witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense have
pictured a mental condition on the part of the accused that is not inconsistent with sanity. The fact that a few
days after the killing incident the accused was seen sweating with his face covered with blood, as testified to by
his own father and Crispin Orais, for the reason according to accused himself that he struck his head against a
tree to end his life in atonement for his guilt in killing his wife 16 is a manifestation of remorse or self-reproach
which is but a rational feeling experienced by normal persons. As correctly observed by the prosecution, it
revealed an awareness of a wrongdoing.
Coupled with this manifestation or remorse is the appellant appellant's voluntary surrender to the police
headquarters where he executed a statement confessing his misdeed. The police officer and the City Fiscal who
separately conducted investigation of the accused observed that he was normal for he could answer their
questions coherently and intelligently and that there was no indication of abnormality on his part. The
observation of these public officials is entitled to full credence, for they have not been shown nor alleged to
have any improper or ulterior motive to misrepresent or not tell the truth about the mental condition and
behavior of the accused.
Again from accused's own evidence is the testimony of his son, that before the killing for which he stands
charged, he was working for a living through fishing three times a week and that he himself prescribed the
prices for his catch which his son brought to the market for sale. 17
While there is evidence tending to show that the accused in some instances had displayed some unusual
behavior, at most these could only be eccentricities which do not mean complete deprivation of intelligence or
discernment. The presumption of sanity is not overcome by mere abnormality of behavior. 18

"In the eyes of the law," as held in the case of People vs. Renegado, 19 "insanity exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the
least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation
of freedom of the will; mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The onus
probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance and he must prove it by clear and
positive evidence."
Over and above these is the trial judge's "keen observation of [the accused's] conduct, appearance, demeanor
and behavior in the courtroom everytime he appeared at the trial. He did not find any symptoms of insanity in
his acts or behavior for he behaved better than some of his neighbors who were around him." 20
The defense attempted to adduce expert testimony to prove the alleged insanity. The expert however was
properly excluded by the Court when he was made to answer by hypothetical questions in relation to allegations
of fact which have not been proven but were in fact disputed by the prosecution. No contribution could be made
by him since he did actually examine the accused and was being made to testify only on the contents of a book
or modern psychiatry without particular reference to the actual and proven facts regarding the mental condition
of the accused.
As to the formal offer of proof by the defense which according to counsel was denied by the trial Court, we find
from the transcript 21 that the trial Court did not in fact deny the verbal motion but made the suggestion that if
defense counsel wanted to state anything else, he could incorporate it in a memorandum. At any rate, we find
that the trial Court did make a thorough consideration of the evidence submitted by the defense.
As to the question raised by accused of the admissibility of the government doctors' medical reports as being
hearsay since their contents were not testified to in court by the said doctors, suffice it to state that these formed
part of the records, and that at the resting of the case, the defense failed to register any objection thereon when
the prosecution specifically invited the court to take judicial notice of its records.
Authorities hold that whenever evidence of acts, conduct or declarations are introduced to prove the defendant
insane, the prosecution may offer evidence of other acts, conduct and declarations during the same period to
show that he was sane more so, at the time of the commission of the crime charged and thereafter and that
the irrational acts testified to were mere lapses into which humans occasionally fall.
Premises considered, this Court finds the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide.

Accordingly, this Court affirms in toto the appealed decision sentencing the accused Andres Magallano to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua as defined and provided for in Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code with the
accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.

G.R. No. L-33281

March 31, 1930

CHIN AH FOO (alias CHAN FOO WOO) and YEE SHEE (alias YEE SUI YENG), widow of Chin Ah
Kim
vs. PEDRO CONCEPCION, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and LEE VOO.
The question for decision in this certiorari proceeding concerns the power of a Judge of First Instance, who has
in effect acquitted a man charged with murder on the plea of insanity, and who has ordered the confinement of
the insane person in an asylum, subsequently to permit the insane person to leave the asylum without the
acquiescence of the Director of Health. Otherwise stated, the factor determinative of the question has to do with
the effect, if any, of section 1048 of the Administrative Code on article 8 of the Penal Code.
On November 15, 1927, one Chan Sam (alias Chin Ah Woo), was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Manila with the murder of Chin Ah Kim. Thereafter, the trial judge rendered judgment declaring the accused
not responsible for the crime, and dismissing the case, but requiring the reclusion of the accused for treatment in
San Lazaro Hospital, in accordance with article 8 of the Penal Code, with the admonition that the accused be
not permitted to leave the said institution without first obtaining the permission of the court. In compliance with
this order, Chan Sam was confined for approximately two years in San Lazaro Hospital. During this period,
efforts to obtain his release were made induced by the desire of his wife and father-in-law to have him proceed
to Hongkong. Opposition to the allowance of the motions came from the wife and children of the murdered
man, who contended that Chan Sam was still insane, and that he had made threats that if he ever obtained his
liberty he would kill the wife and the children of the deceased and probably other members of his own family
who were living in Hongkong. These various legal proceedings culminated in Doctors Domingo and De los
Angeles being delegated to examine and certify the mental condition of Chan Sam, which they did. After this
report had been submitted, counsel for the oppositors challenged the jurisdiction of the court. However, the
respondent judge sustained the court's right to make an order in the premises and allowed Chan Sam to leave
the San Lazaro Hospital to be turned over to the attorney-in-fact of his wife so that he might be taken to
Hongkong to join his wife in that city.

Article 8 of the Penal Code, pursuant to which the trial judge purported to act in issuing his order of release,
provides that among those exempt from criminal liability are:

of the Administrative Code which requires the Director of Health to notify the Judge of First Instance who
ordered the commitment, in case the patients is confined by order of the court.

1. An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter has acted during the lucid interval.

In 1916, the Director of Health raised this same question. He then took the view that section 7 of Act No. 2122,
now incorporated in the Administrative Code as section 1048, applied to all cases of confinement of persons
adjudged to be insane in any Government hospital or other places for the insane, and that the entire discretion as
to the sanity of any patient whatever was vested by this section exclusively in the Director of Health. The
Attorney-General, who at that time was Honorable Ramon Avancea, ruled against the Director of Health,
saying that "the Legislature could not have intended to vest in the Director of Health the power to release,
without proper judicial authority, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the
provisions of article 8 of the Penal Code."

When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines as a grave felony, the court shall order
his confinement in one of the asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
Section 1048 of the Administrative Code, which, it is argued, has superseded or supplemented article 8 of the
Penal Code, provides as to the discharge of a patient from custody from a hospital for the insane the following:
When in the opinion of the Director of Health any patient in any Government hospital or other place for the
insane is temporarily or permanently cured, or may be released without danger, he may discharge such patient,
and shall notify the Judge of the Court of First Instance who ordered the commitment, in case the patient is
confined by order of the court.
An examination of article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code discloses that the permission of the court who
orders the confinement of one accused of a grave felony in an insane asylum is a prerequisite for obtaining
release from the institution. The respondent judge has based his action in this case on this provision of the law.
On the other hand, section 1048 of the Administrative Code grants to the Director of Health authority to say
when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum. There is no pretense that the Director of Health has
exercised his authority in this case, or that the head of the Philippine Health Service has been asked to express
his opinion.
Contrasting the two provisions of Philippine law which have been mentioned, it is self-evident that for section
1048 of the Administrative Code to prevail exclusively it would be necessary to find an implied repeal of a
portion of article 8 of the Penal Code. But it is a well-known rule of statutory construction that when there is no
express repeal none is presumed to be intended. The most reasonable supposition is that when the Legislature
placed the provision, from which section 1048 of the Administrative Code was derived, on the statute books, it
did so without any consideration as to the effect of the new law on article 8 of the Penal Code. It is likewise a
canon of statutory construction that when two portions of the law can be construed so that both can stand
together, this should be done. In this respect, we believe that the authority of the courts can be sustained in cases
where the courts take action, while the authority of the Director of Health can be sustained in other cases not
falling within the jurisdiction of the courts. This latter construction is reinforced by that portion of section 1048

In at least two cases, United States vs. Guendia ([1917], 37 Phil., 337), and People vs. Bascos ([1922], 44 Phil.,
204), this court has relied on article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code. The judgments in the cited cases
concluded with this order: "The defendant shall be kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital, or such
other hospital for the insane as the Director of Health may direct, and shall not be permitted to depart therefrom
without the prior approval of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo (Pangasinan)."
Due to differences in statutory provisions, the American authorities on the question are not very helpful.
However, one case has been found where the facts were practically identical with the ones before us, where the
law is much the same as Philippine Law, and where the procedure which should be followed was outlined by
the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. We refer to the case of State vs. Snell ([1908], 49 Wash., 177). In
the decision in the cited case, the court, speaking through Justice Rudkin, said:
On the 7th day of July, 1906, the relator, Chester Thompson, killed George Meade Emory in the City of Seattle,
and by reason thereof was informed against in the superior court of King county for the crime of murder. A plea
of not guilty was interposed, and the place of trial was changed to the superior court of Pierce county. The
relator was tried in the latter court before the respondent as presiding judge, and the jury be returned a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity. On the 3rd day of May, 1907, the respondent entered an order reciting that the
relator was then insane; that he had been acquitted of the crime of murder by reason of insanity; that his
discharge or going at large would be manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the community; and
committed him to the county jail of Pierce county. It was further ordered that, on the 12th day of June, 1907, the
relator should be taken from the county jail of Pierce county and transferred to the state penitentiary at Walla
Walla, to be there confined in the ward set apart for the confinement, custody, and keeping of the criminal
insane until the further order of the court and until discharge therefrom by due process of law. The relator was

committed to the county jail and thereafter transferred to the insane ward of the penitentiary in obedience to this
order, and is now confined in the latter institution. On the 19th day of February, 1908, he applied to the
physician in charge of the criminal insane at the state penitentiary for an examination of his mental condition
and fitness to be at large, as provided in section 6 of the act of February 21, 1907, entitled, "An act relating to
the criminal insane, their trial, commitment, and custody." Laws of 1907, page 33. After such examination, the
physician certified to the warden of the penitentiary that he had reasonable cause to believe that the relator had
become sane since his commitment, and was a safe person to be at large. The warden thereupon granted the
relator permission to present a petition to the court that committed him, setting up the facts leading to his
commitment, and that he had become sane and mentally responsible, and in such condition that he is a safe
person to be at large, and praying for his discharge from custody. A petition in due form was thereupon
presented to the respondent judge, after service thereof upon the prosecuting attorney of Pierce county, but the
respondent refused to set the matter down for hearing or to entertain jurisdiction of the proceeding,. . . .
Application was there-upon made to this court for a writ of mandamus, requiring the respondent to set the
petition down for hearing, and the case is now before us on the return to the alternative writ.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We are of opinion, therefore, that the procedure adopted by the relator is in conformity with the law, and the
writ will issues as prayed.
The foregoing is our understanding of the law on the subject. The following represents our deductions and
conclusions. Article 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by section 1048 of the Administrative
Code. Article 8 of the Penal Code and section 1048 of the Administrative Code can be construed so that both
can stand together. Considering article 8 of the Penal Code as in force and construing this article and section
1048 of the Administrative Code, we think that the Attorney-General was right in expressing the opinion that
the Director of Health was without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any person confined by
order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of article 8 of the Penal Code. We think also that the
converse proposition is equally tenable, and is that any person confined by order of the court in an asylum in
accordance with article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody in an insane asylum until the
views of the Director of Health have been ascertained as to whether or not the person is temporarily or
permanently cured or may be released without danger. In other words, the powers of the courts and the Director
of Health are complementary each with the other. As a practical observation, it may further be said that it is well
to adopt all reasonable precautions to ascertain if a person confined in an asylum as insane should be permitted
to leave the asylum, and this can best be accomplished through the joint efforts of the courts and the Director of
Health in proper cases.

Various defenses were interposed by the respondents to the petition, but we have not been impressed with any
of them except the ones which go to the merits. After thorough discussion, our view is that while the respondent
Judge acted patiently and cautiously in the matters which came before him, yet he exceeded his authority when
he issued his orders of December 26, 1929, and March 17, 1930, without first having before him the opinion of
the Director of Health.
The writ prayed for will issue and the temporary restraining order will be made permanent, without costs.

G.R. No. L-19605 December 19, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. DONATO BASCOS
The accused Donato Bascos was charged in an information filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
with the murder of Victoriano Romero. On arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. The proof for the
prosecution established that the accused was the one who had killed Victoriano Romero, while the latter was
sleeping. The defense was that of insanity. Following the conclusion of the trial, the presiding judge rendered
judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime of homicide, and sentencing him to seventeen years, four
months, and one day ofreclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of Victoriano
Romero in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs, provided, however, that the execution of the sentence should
be suspended in accordance with article 100 of the Penal Code, and the accused placed in a hospital for the
insane, there to remain until such time as his mental condition shall be determined.
The errors assigned in this court are to the effect that the trial court erred in making application to the present
case of the provisions of article 100 of the Penal Code, and in not making application of article 8 of the Code.
The Attorney-General reaches practically the same conclusion as counsel for the appellant. It is, therefore, for
us to determine if the plea of insanity is sustainable under article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, or if the
case falls under article 100 of the Code.
The responsibility of the insane for criminal action has been the subject of discussion for centuries. Some
criminologists, psychiatrists, and lawyers have contended with much earnestness that the defense of insanity

should be done away with completely. Indeed, in at least one State of the American Union, that of the State of
Washington, the Legislature has passed a statute abolishing insanity as a defense.
In the Philippines, among the persons who are exempted from criminal liability by our Penal Code, is the
following:

been insane for some time. The physician expressed the opinion that the accused was probably insane when
Victoriano Romero was killed. The official declaration of Doctor Montemayor in his capacity as acting district
health officer was "that this accused, according to a physical examination and investigation, is a violent maniac,
and that this mental state has continued through many years, constituting a danger both for himself and for the
community." The total lack of motive of Bascos to kill Romero bears out the assumption that the former was
insane.

An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines as a grave felony, the court shall order
his confinement in one of the asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court. (Art. 8-1.)
Article 100 of the Penal Code applies when the convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence
has been pronounced.lawphil.net
In reference to the burden of proof of insanity in criminal cases, where the defense of insanity is interposed, a
conflict of authority exists. At least, all the authorities are in harmony with reference to two fundamental
propositions: First, that the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime; and secondly, that the law presumes every man to be sane. The conflict in the decisions
arises by reason of the fact that the courts differ in their opinion as to how much evidence is necessary to
overthrow this original presumption of sanity, and as to what quantum of evidence is sufficient to enable the
court to say that the burden of proving the crime beyond a reasonable doubt has been sufficiently borne. (14 R.
C. L., 624.)

We are convinced that the accused was a lunatic when he committed the grave felony described in the record
and that consequently he is exempt from criminal liabity, and should be confined in an insane asylum.
In conformity with the recommendation of the Attorney-General, judgment is reversed, and the defendant
acquitted, with costs of both instances de officio; but the defendant shall be kept in confinement in the San
Lazaro Hospital, or such other hospital for the insane as the Director of Health may direct, and shall not be
permitted to depart therefrom without the prior approval of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Pangasinan. So ordered.

G.R. No. 87084 June 27, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUANITO Q. AQUINO

The rather strict doctrine "that when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity,
the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him," has been adopted in a series of decisions by this court. (U.
S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305; U. S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona [1910], 18 Phil., 62.) The trial judge
construed this to mean that the defense must prove that the accused was insane at the very moment the crime
was committed.

In the criminal justice systems of modem civilized nations, insanity is invariably recognized as
defense against punishment for crime. The proverbial bone of contention, however, is
ascertainment of the veracity of the claimed affliction and the determination of the degree of
aberration, as a ground for acquittal or a basis for extenuation of criminal liability. We have
situation before us in the present appeal.

a valid
in the
mental
such a

Not attempting, therefore, further elucidation of the authorities, we find it more practicable to dispose of this
case on the facts. The wife of the accused and his cousin testified that the accused had been more or less
continuously out of his mind for many years. Doctor Gonzalo Montemayor, assistant district health officer,
who, by order of the judge, examined the accused and conducted an investigation, found that the accused is a
violent maniac, and that from the information he had received from the neighbors of the accused, the latter had

Appellant Juanito Q. Aquino was charged with rape with homicide before the Regional Trial Court, First
Judicial Region, Branch 57 in San CARLOS City, Pangasinan, under the following information, to wit:
That an or about the 13th day of February, 1987, in the evening in barangay Poblacion, * province of
Pangasinan, New Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the

above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Carmelita Morado alias 'Carmen', against her will, and on
the on thereof the said accused did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike her with the
use of stone which directly cause (sic) the death of Carmelita Morado alias 'Carmen' to the damage and
prejudice of her heirs.

She died the following morning before surgical operations could be performed (TSN, p. 4 November 18,
1988, Dr. Saturnino Posadas).
A team of police officers was sent out to arrest Juanita Aquino. He was found and arrested inside the
town auditorium at around 11:00 that same evening of February 13, 1987 attending a Valentine dance
(TSN, pp. 7-8, September 15, 1988).

Contrary to Art. 335 in relation to Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code. 1
In a motion dated June 26, 1987, counsel for appellant moved for the indefinite suspension of the trial
and asked for the commitment of the accused to the National Mental Hospital. 2 In its order dated July 1,
1987, the trial court granted the motion and held in abeyance the arraignment of the accused and the
trial of the case. 3 On January 26, 1988, the National Center for Mental Health submitted the clinical case
report on the mental and physical condition of appellant. 4 He was later returned to the custody of the
court for trial and was arraigned on April 27, 1988. 5
The material and established facts of this case, as well as the points in dispute between the parties, having
been succinctly but thoroughly summarized by the Solicitor General, we are minded to quote at length
therefrom.
On the night of February 13, 1987, Armando Frias, while on duty as member of the Integrated National
Police of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, received a report that there was a victim of a crime in the clinic of Dr.
Padlan in the poblacion. He proceeded to the clinic and found the victim lying down with her head
bleeding. He asked her how she felt and when she replied that she was weak, he took her ante-mortem
statement (TSN, November 4, 1988, pp. 3-5). The victim, Carmelita Morado, 18 years old, told Frias that
she was raped and struck with a stone by Juanita Aquino, appellant herein. Frias took down her
statement which was duly witnessed by attending physician Dr. Padlan and Capt. Eddie Ramos. The
written statement was also thumbmarked by Carmelita Morado (TSN, pp. 3-5, 8, 10, November 4, 1988,
Armando Frias). Pat. Jaime Datuin and Pat. Renato Solomon were also among the people who were
present when Frias took the statement of the victim. After the victim gave her statement she shouted that
she be taken to the hospital because she was weak. (Id., p. 9). Carmelita Morado was taken to the Virgen
Milagrosa Medical Center in San Carlos City and admitted at 11:35 p.m. of that same evening in serious
condition. Dr. Saturnino Posadas, director of said Medical Center, testified that Carmelita Morado
sustained the following injuries;

Appellant was detained at the municipal jail in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. However, it was only on
February 17, 1987 that the statement of appellant was taken as the police officers waited for the parents
of appellant (TSN, pp. 3, 13-14, August 24, 1988).
Before appellant's interrogation begun, he was asked if he had a lawyer. As he had none, Armando Frias
and the Station Commander Captain Ramos fetched Atty. Liliosa Rosario of the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office to assist appellant during the investigation. Atty. Rosario, upon arrival at the office of
Frias where the investigation was to take place, interviewed appellant (supra at pp. 14-16).
At the start of the investigation, Armando Frias informed appellant of his constitutional rights, of his
right to remain silent and to counsel. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Rosario throughout the investigation
(TSN, p. 10, August 23, 1988; p. 18, August 24, 1988). After appellant signed his statement, Frias took
appellant and his counsel to the office of Judge Juan C. Austria, of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
who called the Interpreter and the Clerk of Court to read the statement and translate the same to
appellant to ensure that appellant understood what was written. Judge Austria made appellant sign the
statement in his presence (TSN, pp. 21-23, August 24, 1988).
However, after the complaint was filed but before appellant could be arraigned, a Motion to Commit
appellant to the National Center for Mental Health, as earlier mentioned, was filed by appellant's counsel
as appellant was allegedly manifesting unstable behavior with fits of violence. Appellant was duly
committed sometime in July, 1987. He was released in 1988 whereupon he was duly arraigned. Appellant
pleaded 'not guilty' and put up the defense of insanity.
To prove insanity, appellant presented Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez, a psychiatrist at the National Center for
Mental Health who was in charge of the pavilion where appellant was committed. After Juanita Aquino
was admitted to the mental hospital in July 1987, he conducted physical, mental and psychological
examinations and found him to be suffering from mental disorder classified under organic mental
disorder with psychosis (TSN, pp. 4-5, 7, May 23, 1988). Dr. Echavez was of the opinion that when

appellant Juanita Aquino committed the heinous act, the latter was totally deprived of mind (supra at pp.
15-16).
Patricio Aquino, appellant's father, also testified that his son was already mentally HI even when he was
still young. Appellant was suspended from school because he was very playful, overactive and naughty
especially with his classmates (TSN, p. 4, May 24, 1988); that appellant was cruel to his brothers and
sisters, stole his mother's jewelry which he sold for a low sum, wandered sometimes naked, and
oftentimes not coming home for extended periods of time (supra at pp. 5, 8). Appellant was previously
confined at the Mental Hospital in 1985 when he was caught wandering around naked (supra at p. 10).
Sgt. Raymundo Lomboy, the police officer charged with appellant's custody and who transferred
appellant for commitment to the National Center for Mental Health, recalled that while appellant was in
his custody, appellant acted abnormally by singing, shouting, dancing and generally disturbing the other
inmates (TSN, p. 7, July 21, 1988). After appellant was treated and released from the National Center for
Mental Health, he acted queerly by singing and shouting whenever he failed to drink his medicine
(supra at p. 15).
Appellant himself was also presented as witness, the doctor having certified that he could withstand trial.
However, the gist of appellants' testimony was to deny any knowledge of the crime, the persons, things
and events connected with it. He admitted he knew that he has some mental illness and had undergone
treatment like electric shock (TSN, pp. 5-7, 18-19, July 14, 1988).
On the other hand, the prosecution presented an array of witnesses to prove that appellant was lucid
before and after the crime was committed and that he acted with discernment.
Armando Frias testified that from the time of appellant's arrest and during the investigation, appellant
acted normally, and gave responsive answers to all the questions propounded to him (TSN, pp. 5, 9, 13-15
August 23, 1988). Frias knew appellant even prior to the incident because he worked as a laborer in the
construction of the theatre in the town proper. He believed appellant to be normal.
Angel Baysic, another member of the Integrated National Police in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan whose house
is located near the theatre being constructed, also knew appellant who worked there as a laborer and
sometimes cooked the laborer's meals. Baysic became closely acquainted with appellant and sometimes
they drank together with other laborers after work. During these times, he observed appellant to act
normally and was responsive to conversation (TSN, pp. 4-7, September 6, 1988).

Carlos Sabangon, one of the police officers who arrested appellant at the town auditorium, testified that
when appellant was arrested during the valentine dance, he was appropriately dressed and behaved
normally and in fact was just about to sit down after dancing when they arrived to arrest him (TSN, pp.
8-9, 17 September 15, 1988).
Eduardo Fernandez, a jail guard, was one on duty when appellant escaped from prison on May 3, 1987.
While appellant was confined in the provincial jail, Fernandez did not observe any queer behavior from
appellant (TSN, pp. 34- 35, 41, 43, September 15, 1988). 6
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered its verdict convicting appellant of the crime of rape
with homicide and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
in the amount of P35,000.00 as damages. 7
Appellant, through counsel, manifested his intention to appeal the judgment of conviction to the Court of
Appeals. 8 The case was, however, brought to us for review, with appellant taking the court below to task
on the following assignment of errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE AC, CUSED-APPELLANT INSANE AT THE
TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME;
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE MEDICAL
FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH AS TO THE INSANITY OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT;
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 9
The controversy boils down into one issue, that is, whether or not appellant, who has invoked insanity as
his defense, has overcome the presumption of sanity.
Sanity being the normal condition of the human mind, the prosecution may proceed in the first instance
upon the presumption that the defendant was sane and responsible when the act was committed. The
presumption is always in favor of sanity and the burden of proof of insanity is on the defense. 10 The basis
for the presumption of sanity is well explained by the United States Supreme Court in the leading case
of Davis vs, United States, 11 in this wise: "If that presumption were not indulged, the government would

always be under the necessity of adducing affirmative evidence of the sanity of an accused. But a
requirement of that character would seriously delay and embarrass the enforcement of the laws against
crime and in most cases be unnecessary. Consequently, the law presumes that everyone charged with
crime is sane and thus, supplies in the first instance the required proof of capacity to commit crime."
As we have done in a prior case, for purposes of disposing of appellant's defense it is well to restate and
keep in mind certain basic principles in law, viz: that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed
by him; that a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso) is presumed to have been done with deliberate
intent, that is, with freedom, intelligence and malice because the moral and legal presumption is that
freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person in the absence of evidence to the
contrary; that one of the causes which will overthrow this presumption of voluntariness and intelligence
is insanity in which event the actor is exempt from criminal liability as provided for in Article 12,
Paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. 12
It will readily be observed that the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant clearly reveals how the
crime charged against him was perpetrated. This confession is, however, being assailed as inadmissible in
evidence on the ground that it was executed without the assistance of counsel engaged by appellant
himself, and that he did not understand nor was he informed of his constitutional rights. 13
We do not agree with this submission. The extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence. Atty. Liliosa
Rosario, a lawyer from the then Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), assisted appellant when he
was placed under custodial investigation. The same lawyer represented him during the early part of the
trial. InPeople vs. Layuso, 14 we strongly denounced the widespread misconception that the presence of a
lawyer under the right to counsel provision of the Constitution is intended to stop an accused from saying
anything which might incriminate him. The right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion
as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an
accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Whether it is an extrajudicial statement or
testimony in open court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth. As explained in Gamboa
vs.Cruz, etc., 15 the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice
of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of persons undergoing investigation
for the commission of an offense.
The presence and assistance of Atty. Liliosa Rosario adequately precluded the possibility of extracting
from appellant any false or coerced confession or admission. Furthermore, it was shown that the
extrajudicial confession executed by appellant was explained to him in his dialect when he was brought

before Judge Juan C. Austria where such confession was subscribed and sworn to by appellant. 16 The
records also show that the validity of the extrajudicial confession is not being questioned. Only the
reliability of its contents is being placed in doubt, ostensibly because of the main submission of the
defense that appellant was insane when the crime was committed. 17 Moreover, the CLAO attorney would
not have affixed her signature in the extrajudicial confession had she known of any legal infirmity in its
execution.
Coming now to his principal submission, appellant relies heavily on the clinical case report regarding his
mental and physical condition. He stresses in his brief that the testimony of Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez,
Physician-In-Charge, Male Court Case Pavilion of the National Center for Mental Health, has explicitly
shown that appellant was supposedly insane immediately before, during and after the commission of the
crime and that the evidence adduced explicate that the mental illness of appellant is incurable and that he
has no lucid intervals. 18 He explains that the normal appearance and behavior of appellant while
testifying in court is not surprising. He says that it is due to the fact that, during that time, he was
undergoing medical treatment and his mental condition during the trial of the case where he had been
regularly taking medicine should not be confused with his mental status at the time of the commission of
the offense. 19
Appellant is clutching at straws of argument, a clear indicium of a dearth in plausible explanations. Nor
was the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe and evaluate his demeanor on the witness stand,
including his manner of testifying and the answers he also gave in his extrajudicial confession, the least
bit impressed by appellant's defense of insanity as vividly explained in his decision. And well must it be
so, for the rule is that insanity must be positively proven. The presumption, we repeat, is in favor of
sanity. The rule has consistently been that when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of
mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. 20
Now, it has long been settled that the period to which an inquiry into the mental state of the accused
should be directed is that transpiring immediately before and/or at the very moment of the act or acts
under prosecution. 21 In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least
discernment because there is complete absence of the power to discern, or there is total deprivation of the
freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The onus
probandi rests upon whoever invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance and must prove it by clear
and positive evidence. 22

Insanity itself is a condition, not a thing. It is not susceptible of the usual means of proof and to this fact is
due the unusual difficulty of making proof of its existence and measuring its effect, when once proven to
exist. As no man can look into the mind of another, the state of such mind can only be measured as the
same is reflected in the actions of the body it is created to govern. Thus, we have held that mind can only
be known by outward acts. Thereby we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and
come to determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. 23 In interpreting
these physical manifestations, scientific knowledge and experience have been resorted to by our judicial
agencies.

this jurisdiction, where mental illness has been feigned and invoked to provide a defense for the accused
in a criminal prosecution.

The records indubitably disclose that appellant sexually abused the victim. After consummating his
lustful desire, he violently struck the victim on the head with a stone for fear that the victim would report
him, and thereafter he left her in the belief that she was already dead. 24 The victim did not immediately
die. In the clinic of Dr. Serafin Padlan in the poblacion, Pat. Armando Friars saw the victim with her
head bleeding. He took the statement of the victim in the local dialect. 25 Thereafter, he translated the
statement to English and reduced it into writing. 26 The statement disclosed the Identity of appellant.
That same evening, the victim was still brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center where she was
treated. She was serious but still conscious, and was able to narrate to Dr. Saturnino Posadas what
happened to her. She died the following morning. 27

WHEREFORE, with the modification that the principal penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion
perpetua,and the reduction of the civil indemnity to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence, the
judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

The evidence adduced for appellant that he was insane immediately before or at the very moment the
crime was committed is too nebulous and conjectural to be convincing. While Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez of
the National Center for Mental Health described the mental illness of the accused as "organic mental
disorder with psychosis" 28 he admitted that a person suffering from insanity may know that what he is
doing is wrong. 29The same witness also testified that there is no possibility of appellant having lucid
intervals, 30 but he, however, also observed that the mental illness of appellant came on and off. 31

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ

The clinical case report also shows that appellant, when interviewed upon his admission to the mental
institution, recalled having taken 120 cubic centimeters of cough syrup and consumed about 3 sticks of
marijuana before the commission of the crime. 32 This admission substantially affirms his prior
extrajudicial confession that he was under the influence of marijuana when he sexually abused the victim
and, on the occasion thereof, killed her. 33 It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming appellant had some
form of mental illness, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his reasoning
faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and satisfactorily articulate the aforesaid
matters, sufficiently discounts any intimation of insanity of appellant when he committed the dastardly
felonies. The annals of crime are replete with documented records, and we are not without our share in

One more thing. The trial court imposed the penalty of life imprisonment on appellant. In a judgment of
conviction for a felony, the court should specify the appropriate name of the penalty, which in this case
should be reclusion perpetua and not life imprisonment, since under the scheme of penalties in the
Revised Penal Code the principal penalty for a felony has its own specific duration and corresponding
accessory penalties, unlike those generally provided for crimes in special laws.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-45130

February 17, 1937

On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an information charging Celestino
Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with the crime of murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused,
with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any
justifiable motive and with the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison, attack, assault and stab the said
Carlos Guison on the different parts of his body with a knife, thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries,
to wit:
"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the superior surace of the right lobe of
the liver; and three non-penetrating stab wounds located respectively at the posterior and lateral lumbar region,
and left elbow", which directly caused the death of the said Carlos Guison three days afterwards.
On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused. The defense counsel forthwith
objected to the arraignment on the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time

confined in the Psychopatic Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order requiring the Director of the Hospital
to render a report on the mental condition of the accused. Accordingly, Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant alientist,
rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On March 23, 1935, the case was again called for the
arraignment of the accused, but in view of the objection of the fiscal, the court issued another order requiring
the doctor of the Psyhopatic Hospital who examined the defendant to appear and produce the complete record
pertaining to the mental condition of the said defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared
before the court on March 26, 1935 for the necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution and the defense asked
the court to summon the other doctors of the hospital for questioning as to the mental condition of the accused,
or to place the latter under a competent doctor for a closer observation. The trial court then issued an order
directing that the accused be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant alienist of the Psychopatic Hospital
for his personal observation and the subsequent submission of a report as to the true mental condition of the
patient. Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his report, Exhibit 5, on
June 11, 1935. On June 28, 1935, the case was called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared before the court and
ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating that the accused was not in a condition to defend himself. In view thereof,
the case was suspended indefinitely.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant could be discharged from the
hospital and appear for trial, as he was "considered a recovered case." Summoned by the court, Dr. Fernandez,
appeared and testified that the accused "had recovered from the disease." On February 27, 1936, the accused
was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had.
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the information above-quoted
and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay
the costs.
The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following assignment of errors:
A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the accused has had dementia only
occasionally and intermittently and has not had it immediately prior to the commission of the defense.
B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case further shows that during and immediately
after the commission of the offense, the accused did not show any kind of abnormality either in behavior,
language and appearance, or any kind of action showing that he was mentally deranged.
C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that burden was on the defense to show hat
the accused was mentally deranged at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the defense did not
establish any evidence to this effect.
D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and in not acquitting him thereof.

It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino Bonoan met the now deceased
Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at
the time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech turned around and saw
the accused withdrawing his right hand, which held a knife, from the side of Guison who said, also in Tagalog,
"I will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him and then stabbed Guison thrice on the left
side. The assaultt was witnessed by policeman Damaso Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan
and took possession of the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine General Hospital where he died
two days later. Exhibit C is the report of the autopsy performed on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los
Angeles.
As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does not seem necessary to indulge in
any extended analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The defense set up being that of
insanity, the only question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the defendant-appellant was insane
at the time of the commission of the crime charged.
On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental corollaries as to the legal
presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence required, theories abound and authorities are in sharp
conflict. Stated generally, courts in the United States proceed upon three different theories. (See Herzog, Alfred
W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in Criminal Cases, p.
11 et seq.) Thefirst view is that insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance and as must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt when the commission of a crime is established, and the defense of insanity is not
made out beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the time of
committing the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the ground of
insanity (Hornblower, C. J., in State vs. Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The second view is that an affirmative verdict
of insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity is not to be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence" (10th ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is
the rule in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. vs. Higginson, 1 Car. & K., 130), and in Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia
and West Virginia. The third view is that the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt (Dais vs.
United States, 160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs. United States, 186 U. S., 413;
46 Law. ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States vs. Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No. 15,555;
United States vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This liberal view is premised on the proposition that while it is true
that the presumption of sanity exists at the outset, the prosecution affirms every essential ingredients of the
crime charged, and hence affirms sanity as one essential ingredients, and that a fortiori where the accused
introduces evidence to prove insanity it becomes the duty of the State to prove the sanity of the accused beyond
a reasonable doubt.
In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs. Bacos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).
The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed

the crime, but insanity is presumed, and ". . . when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of
mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. . . ." (U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil.,
305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We affirm and reiterate this doctrine.
In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane at the time he killed the deceased,
the obligation of proving that affirmative allegation rests on the defense. Without indulging in fine distinctions
as to the character and degree of evidence that must be presented sufficiently convincing evidence, direct or
circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the judicial mind that the accused was insane at the time of the
perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is
permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind a reasonable period both before and after that time.
Direct testimony is not required (Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo., 404; 35 S. W.,
1145; State vs. Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E., 14; People vs. Tripler, I
Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of derangement essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to
established insanity as a defense. Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts, the
motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of
sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore, cicumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffice (People vs.
Bascos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).
The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at the time of the commission of the
act for which he was prosecuted on the theory that the insanity was only occassional or intermittent and not
permanentor continuous (32 C. J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are appraised of the danger of indulging in the
preseumption ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or spasmodic insanity.We appreciate the reason forthe contrary
rule. To be sure, courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental
weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers
escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not cconcerned with
connecting two or more attacks of insanity to show the continuance thereof during the intervening period or
periods but with the continuity of a particular and isolated attack prior to the commission of the crime charged,
and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately following the commission of the act complained
of. Upon the other hand, there are facts and circumstances of record which can not be overlooked.The following
considerations have weighed heavily upon the minds of the majority of this court in arriving at a conclusion
different from that reached by the court below:.
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the prosecution, it appears that the herein
defendant-appellant, during the periods from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to January 10,
1926, was confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a disease diagnosed
as dementia prcox. His confinement during these periods, it is true, was long before the commission of the
offense on December 12, 1934, but this is a circumstance which tends to show that the recurrence of the ailment
at the time of the occurence of the crime is not entirely lacking of any rational or scientific foundation.

(b) All persons suffering from dementia prcox are clearly to be regarded as having mental disease to a degree
that disqualifies them for legal responsibility for their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico-Legal Relations by
Dr. Albert M. Barrett in Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology, vol. I, p. 613). According
to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Insular Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms of dementia prcox, in
certain peeriods of excitement, are similar to those of manic depresive psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.) and, in either
case, the mind appears "deteriorated" because, "when a person becomes affected by this kind of disease,
either dementia prcox or manic depresive psychosis, during the period of excitement, he has no control
whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if viewed under the general medico-legal classification of manicdepressive insanity, "it is largely in relation with the question of irrestible impulse that forensic relations of
manic actions will have to be considered. There is in this disorder a pathologic lessening or normal inhibitions
and the case with which impulses may lead to actions impairs deliberations and the use of normal checks to
motor impulses" (Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol, I, p. 617).
(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, at one time an interne at San
LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately preceding December 12, 1934 the date when the crime was
committed the defendant and appellant had "an attack of insomnia", which is one of the symptoms of, and
may lead to, dementia prcox (Exhibit 3, defense testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).
(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the police station on the very same day
of the perpetration of the crime, and although attempted were made by detectives to secure a statement from
him (see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was sent by the police
department to the Psychopathic Hospital the day following the commission of the crime. This is an indication
that the police authorities themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the acused, which doubt found
confirmation in the official reports submitted by the specialists of the San Lazaro Hospital.
(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio Joson, which report was made within
the first month of treatment, the defendant was suffering from a form of psychosis, called manic depressive
psychosis.We quote the report in full:
1. MENTAL STATUS:
(a) General behavior. The patient is undetective, staying most of the time in his bed with his eyes closed and
practically totally motionless. At other times, however, but on very rare occassions and at short intervals he
apparently wakes up and then he walks around, and makes signs and ritualistic movements with the extremities
and other parts of the body. Ordinarily he takes his meal but at times he refuses to take even the food offered by
his mother or sister, so that there have been days in the hospital when he did not take any nourishment. On
several occassions he refused to have the bath, or to have his hair cut and beard shaved, and thus appear untidy.
He would also sometimes refuse his medicine, and during some of the intervals he displayed impulsive acts,
such as stricking his chest or other parts of the body with his fists and at one time after a short interview, he

struck strongly with his fist the door of the nurse's office without apparent motivation. He also sometimes
laughs, or smiles, or claps his hands strongly without provocation.
(b) Stream of talk. Usually the patient is speechless, can't be persuaded to speak, and would not answer in
any form the questions propounded to him. Very often he is seen with his eyes closed apparently praying as he
was mumbling words but would not answer at all when talked to. At one time he was seen in this condition with
a cross made of small pieces of strick in his hand. He at times during the interviews recited passages in the
literature as for example the following.
"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del hombre. (Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty are
among the attributes of a dependable character.)"

( j) Insight and judgment. At his fairly clear periods he stated that he might have been insane during his first
days in the hospital, but just during the interview on January 14, 1935, he felt fairly well. Insight and judgment
were, of course, nil during his stuporous condition. During the last two days he has shown marked improvement
in his behavior as to be cooperative, and coherent in his speech.
2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:
The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found suffering from a form of physchosis,
called Manic depressive psychosis.
(Sgd.)
Assistant Alienist

TORIBIO

JOSON,

M.

D.

At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the hospital.
(c) Mood. Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times he looks anxious and rather irritable. He
himself states that the often feels said in the hospital.
(d) Orientation. During the periods that he was acccessible he was found oriented as to place and person but
he did not know the day or the date.
(e) Illusion and hallucination. The patient states that during the nights that he could not sleep he could hear
voices telling him many things. Voices, for example, told that he should escape. That he was going to be killed
because he was benevolet. That he could sometimes see the shadow of his former sweetheart in the hospital.
There are times however when he could not hear or see at all anything.

In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, another assistant
alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital, the following conclusion was reached:
I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering from the Manic Depressive form of
psychosis. It might be premature to state before the court has decided this case, but I believe it a duty to state,
that this person is not safe to be at large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a personality lacking in control,
overtly serious in his dealings with the every day events of this earthly world, taking justice with his own hands
and many times executing it in an impulsive manner as to make his action over proportionate beyond normal
acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly religious, too idealistic has taste and desires as to make him queer before the
average conception of an earthly man.
He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of realities.

(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. On one occassion he told the examiner that he could not talk in his first
day in the hospital because of a mass he felt he had in his throat. He sometimes thinks that he is already dead
and already buried in the La Loma Cemetery.
(g) Compulsive phenomena. None.
(h) Memory. The patient has a fairly good memory for remote events, but his memory for recent events or for
example, for events that took place during his stay in the hospital he has no recollection at all.
(i) Grasp of general informartion. He has a fairly good grasp of general information. He could not, however,
do simple numerial tests as the 100-7 test.

To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime, the prosecution called on policeman Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that upon
arresting the defendant-appellant he inquired from the latter for the reason for the assault and the defendantappellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55 and would pay; that appellant bought the knife,
Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had been watching for Guison in order to
kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also called and corroborated the testimony of
policeman Arnoco. That such kind of evidence is not necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during the
commission of the offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine,
University of Edinburg, said in his work on Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type
of dementia prcox, "the crime is ussually preceded by much complainingand planning. In these people,
homicidal attcks are common, because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that their
property is being taken."

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was demented at the time he
perpetrated the serious offense charged in the information and that conseuently he is exempt from criminal
liability. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-appellant acquitted,
with costs de oficio in both instances. In conforminty with paragraph 1 of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code,
the defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such other hospital for the insane as may
be desiganted by the Director of the Philippine Health Service, there to remain confined until the Court of First
Instance of Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-16381

the aid of police officers, he re-enacted the commission of the crime. He pointed to the place (near a post at
Balmes St.) where he sat waiting for Dr. Casal (Exh. F). He also demonstrated his position when he approached
the victim, as the latter walked towards his car (Exh. F-2), as well as his position and that of the victim, after the
latter fell to the ground (Exh. F-1).
The autopsy report (Exh. A) of Dr. Mariano R. de Lara, Chief MPD Medical Examiner, discloses that the
deceased sustained 18 stab wounds, the fatal ones being those described in Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of said report
and shown in the sketch (Exh. B) and the photographs (Exhs. D and D-1). According to the report, death was
due to "profuse exsanguinating hemorrhage" and "shock due to multiple slashing stab wounds."

December 30, 1961

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO FAUSTO Y TOMAS.

Antonio Fausto y Tomas, appeals from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Crim. Case No.
40937), convicting him of murder (qualified by evident premeditation) for the killing of Dr. Antonio Casal, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the deceased's heirs in the sum of
P5,000.00; and to pay the costs.
The undisputed facts of the case are: At around 11:00 o'clock in the morning of August 7, 1957, Fernando
Gonzales, while working as a bodeguero at the Pujalte Warehouse, situated at Pelaez and Balmes Streets,
Manila, heard someone moaning. Thinking that it came from inside the warehouse, he looked for it there, but
found nothing. He then went outside and there saw appellant stabbing Dr. Antonio Casal, who was lying with
face up on the ground. Being unarmed, Gonzales rushed inside the bodega to get his night stick. At about the
same time, Detective Benito Carasco of the Manila Police Department, who was then investigating one M.
Santiago at St. Joseph Hospital located nearby, heard a nun calling for a policeman, at the same time pointing to
the hospital's entrance. Responding to the call, he rushed out to the entrance and there saw appellant armed with
a knife (Exh. G), shouting "Napatay ko siya" (referring to Dr. Antonio Casal). Drawing his pistol, Detective
Carasco ordered appellant to drop the knife. After shouting once more "Napatay ko siya", appellant dropped the
knife. Detective Carasco then approached appellant, arrested him, and picked up the knife. The victim, Dr.
Casal, was sprawled on the ground covered with blood.
Detective Carasco then told the nun to call the doctor, while he took appellant behind the hospital driveway,
where they waited until an MPD mobile patrol car arrived. Thereafter, Detective Carasco brought appellant to
the MPD headquarters. Appellant was turned over to Detective Nemesio Villarta, who investigated him by
question and answer method (See Exit. E). Later, appellant was taken to the scene of the incident. There, with

At the trial, the defense owned appellant's authorship of the crime. It claimed, however, that appellant is exempt
from criminal liability, because before and on the occasion of the execution of the crime, he was insane. To
establish insanity, the defense presented evidence showing that a appellant was confined at the National Mental
Hospital, from June 27 to July 9, 1956, i.e., 1 year and 1 month before the crime was committed, during which
period, he was served and diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia of the paranoid type (See Exhs. 1 to 3),
but treatment was stopped when appellant was discharged against the advice of hospital authorities.
On October 28, 1958, the trial court, upon the defense's motion, ordered appellant's confinement at the National
Mental Hospital, for observation and diagnosis. Appellant stayed in said hospital until March 9, 1959. Dr.
Carlos Vicente, who attended to appellant in said hospital reported that appellant was suffering from
schizophrenia with brain syndrome, and that said illness existed prior to, and after the commission of the crime
in question (See Exh 6).
The defense also presented the testimony of Fr. George Haggenburg, parish priest of Guimba, Nueva Ecija,
regarding his impressions of appellant's mental condition, when the latter was employed as laborer by him in
1956, as well as the reasons for his letter (Exh. 5) sent to Dr. Francisco Santos of the Bureau of Hospitals.
Inasmuch as the defense is insanity, the only question to be determined in this appeal is, whether or not
appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime charge.
As a rule, when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of
establishing such fact rests upon him (U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305; U.S. v. Hontiveros, 18 Phil. 62; People v.
Bascos, 44 Phil. 204). The legal presumption is that a person who commits a crime is in his right mind (U.S. v.
Guevara, 27 Phil. 547; U.S. v. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218), because the law presumes all acts and omissions
punishable by law to be voluntary (Arts. 1 and 4 [1], Rev. Penal Code), and if there is no sufficient or

satisfactory evidence that the accused was mentally incapacitated when he committed the crime, the conclusion
of fact must be the same presumption established by law, i.e., that he was in right mind, and the conclusion of
law must be that he is criminally liable. The primary inquiry is, whether there has been presented sufficient
convincing evidence, direct or circumstantial, to a decree that satisfies the judicial mind that the accused was
insane at the time of the perpetration of the offense. In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time
of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind a reasonable period both before and
after that time (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87).
After a careful and thorough examination and review of all the evidence presented in this case, we find, as did
the trial court, that appellant was not mentally incapacitated when he committed the crime in question and is,
therefore, criminally liable for the offense committed by him.
(1) It appears that appellant was confined at the National Mental Hospital, for a period of 13 days, from June 27
to July 9, 1956 (1 year, 1 month, and 2 days prior to commission of the crime). He was not insane during said
confinement. On this point, the trial judge made the following findings, to which we fully agree:
Examining the evidence of record, we find first that the defendant had been confined in the National Mental
Hospital for a period of 13 days from June 27 to July 9, 1956. According to the defense witnesses, the defendant
was found then to be suffering from schizophrenia of the paranoid type. It is alleged that the defendant claimed
hearing voices and having hallucinations. It will be observed that the defense witnesses presented to
substantiate the alleged insanity are not alienist but psychiatrists. The court, without the least intention of
casting doubt on the knowledge or integrity of the diagnosis. Within such a limited period of 13 days, the Court
doubts that proper and accurate diagnosis could have been arrived at, considering that in the case of mental
disease, constant observation of the symptoms and behavior of the patient are necessary. That the patient
claimed to have heard voices or having had hallucinations is certainly a difficult matter to ascertain or verify.
One could easily feign moodiness, isolate himself from the other patients or inmates, and claim having heard
voices or seeing people. On the other hand, the defense witness Dr. Leonida Mariano affirmed that in her first
interview of the patient (the accused), the latter, not only gave his full name, but also the place where he came
from, his civil status, and his employment at San Miguel Brewery, and that he was neat in appearance and
coherent in his answers. In the second interview, the patient gave the full name of his wife and his children and
his parents. He gave information about his age, the town and province of his birth, street and number of his
residence in Manila, and gave the further statement that while there had been no tragic events in his family, he
was, however, worried by the fact that his wage of P6.50 was not sufficient to feed and maintain his seven (7)
children. The witness Dr. Mariano also affirmed that the answers given by the patient to her questions were
coherent and relevant, showing that he was intelligent; that he greeted and recognized his wife on the several

occasions that she visited him, and even asked her to secure his immediate discharge; and that he attended to his
own physical needs. Considering the above testimony of Dr. Mariano, the Court is of the opinion that the
accused, at the time of his first confinement in the National Mental Hospital, was not insane. In fact, in his
statement, Exhibit E, the defendant, relating his first confinement, revealed that he did not want to go, but
finally consented, because he was not mentally ill. If the accused was insane then, it can hardly be expected of
him to remember what had transpired then. The defense, to bolster its theory, also presented the testimony of Fr.
George Haggenburg, parish priest of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. The witness affirmed that sometime in 1957, the
defendant handed him a letter wherein he promised to give P30,000.00 if the witness would pray for him; that
one day the defendant went to see him and told him a story that at first was unintelligible, but which during his
conversation with the defendant, turned out that he wished to return to his job and needed a certificate. The fact
that the defendant had promised P30,000.00, if the good father would pray for him, is not and cannot be
considered, either by itself alone, or in conjunction with the fact of the confinement, as sufficiently indicative of
the allegedly impaired mental condition of the defendant. The latter may have made such promise in a moment
of religious excitement or fervor. And as to his story that at first was not understood by the priest, the latter
himself admitted that it was due to the attempt of the defendant to convey his ideas in English, of which
language, defendant is not conversant. It should be borne in mind, that from the time the defendant was released
from the National Mental Hospital in July 9, 1956, up to the date of the commission of the crime, he must have
been in contact with many persons. Aside from the testimony of Fr. George Haggenburg, however, there is no
other evidence in record showing that during that interval of time, the defendant had acted as one deprived of
his reason. If he had been mentally deranged, certainly such a condition could not have escaped the notice of
other persons, friends and strangers alike, not excluding his wife and members of his family.
(2) The findings of Dr. Carlos Vicente, who attended to appellant during his second confinement (by court
order) at the National Mental Hospital, on October 31, 1958 (1 year, 2 months, and 24 days after the
commission of the crime), do not indicate that defendant was deprived of reason. The trial court correctly
observed:
The defense also relies on the testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente who took charge of the accused when he was
confined in the National Mental Hospital on October 31, 1958, upon order of this court. But even accepting the
findings of Dr. Vicente on their face value, the court is of the opinion that they do not support the theory of the
defense that at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused was deprived of his reason. Aside from the
fact that the findings of Dr. Vicente were made more than one year after the commission of the crime, it will be
remembered that the accused has always been detained. During that period, he was practically without contact
with friends and relatives, he was troubled by his conscience and the realization of the gravity of the offense
committed by him, plus the thought of the bleak future of his children. All these may have produced in the

defendant morbid disposition and moodiness, that could have been interpreted as signs of mental illness. But the
very report of Dr. Vicente clearly indicate that the accused was not mentally deranged. In fact, the two
psychiatrists, Dr. Vicente and Dr. Mariano, affirmed that defendant's illness affected only his personality but not
his brain.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby by affirmed in toto, with costs against the defendantappellant. So ordered.

(3) Appellant's signed statement (Exh. E, pp. 49-51, Records) taken by Detective Nemesio Villarta, barely 3
hours after the killing, clearly shows that appellant was mentally sound. In said statement, he narrated in detail
how, after waiting for more than one year after his separation from his work at the San Miguel Brewery plant,
he made up his mind the day before the killing to see the victim (Dr. Casal) once more, this time either to get
the certification (that he was mentally sane) or to kill him. He narrated how the following morning, he boarded
a Pantranco bus from Guimba, Nueva Ecija; that once in Manila, he boarded a taxi to the St. Joseph Hospital,
where he knew the victim would be at the time visiting his patients; that he saw the victim's car parked and
waited the latter to come out; that as soon as the victim came out of the building, he approached him (victim)
and made a last appeal that he be given the certification; that when the doctor refused and became angry with
him, he decided then to kill him; and that telling the doctor to prepare for his end, he held him on the shoulder,
pulling him towards himself (appellant), at the same time thrusting at him with the knife (Exh. G).

G.R. No. L-27031 May 31, 1974

(4) Appellant's re-enacted of the crime at its scene only a few hours after he committed it, leaves no room for
doubt as to his sanity, both during and after its (the crime's) execution.
(5) Appellant had a strong motive to kill the deceased Dr. Casal, as he did. He was a laborer at the Magnolia
Power Plant of the San Miguel Brewery, earning P6.50 a day. This was the sole support of his wife and 7
children. Then suddenly he found himself out of work and committed to the National Mental Hospital on June
27, 1956, at the instance of the deceased, Dr. Casal. Several entreaties by appellant after his release from said
hospital on July 9, 1956, to convince said deceased that he was well, and to give him the necessary certification
pre-requisite to re-employment of said company, proved unavailing and futile. He, therefore, decided to
liquidate the deceased whom he believed was the cause of his unemployment.
In the circumstances, we find appellant guilty, as did the trial court, of the crime of murder, qualified by evident
premeditation (as he reflected or meditated on, and planned the killing of the deceased one day before said
killing, and pursued his plan to a successful conclusion). 1 The aggravating circumstance of treachery was
present in the commission of the crime, as the attack on the deceased, although frontal, was too sudden and
unexpected, giving the latter no chance to offer any defense whatsoever (People v. Noble, 77 Phil. 93), but this
is offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender (People v. Fontabla, 61 Phil. 589) and, therefore,
cannot be taken into account for purposes of aggravation or increase of the penalty.lawphil.net

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LORETO RENEGADO y SENORA

On September 4, 1966, Mamerto de Lira, a teacher of the "Tiburcio Tancinco Memorial Vocational School,"
died at the Calbayog City General Hospital from a stab wound inflicted upon him a few days before, more
particularly, on August 29, within the premises of the school by Loreto Renegado, an employee of the same
institution. As a result, the City Fiscal of Calbayog City filed with the local Court of First Instance an
Information against Loreto Renegado for "Murder with assault upon a person in authority," which, as amended,
reads:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 1966, at about 9:30 A.M., in Calbayog City, Philippines, and within
the premises of the Tiburcio Tancinco Vocational School and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court; the
above-named accused armed with a sharp-pointed double bladed weapon, with decided intent to kill, with
assault upon a person in authority; the deceased being at the time a public school teacher of the Tiburcio
Vocational School and therefore a person in authority; and at the time was in the lawful performance of his
duties as such or on the occasion of such performance and, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with his weapon Mamerto de Lira, who,
as a result thereof, sustained stab wound on his abdomen which caused his death. (p. 11, original record)
The Hon. Jesus N. Borromeo who conducted the trial of the case found the accused guilty as charged and
pursuant to Articles 148 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 48 thereof, sentenced him to
"suffer the supreme penalty of death; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Mamerto de Lira in the amount of
P6,000.00; and to pay the costs." (p. 94, ibid) The case is now before Us on automatic review.
We find the following facts duly established by the evidence of the prosecution: .
The Tiburcio Tancinco Memorial Vocational School is run by the national government in the City of Calbayog,
and for the school year 1966-67 its principal was Mr. Bartolome B. Calbes, and in his absence, Mr. Felix U.
Tingzon was authorized to act as officer-in-charge (Exhibit E). The deceased Mamerto de Lira was a classroom

teacher of mathematics in said school with daily classes from Monday to Friday, starting at 7:10 o'clock in the
morning till about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon with vacant periods in-between (Exhibit D) while accusedappellant, Loreto Renegado, was a clerk in the same institution whose duties included the following: 1. To type
correspondence, memorandum, circulars of the Head of the school. 2. To help type test questions of teachers for
every periodical test. 3. To help type reports of the schools. 4. To help type handout of the teachers. 5. To file
and account records of the school. 6. To mail some reports, prepared form like Form 137 and mail it, etc.
(Exhibit F)
A periodical test was scheduled on September 2, 1966, and the teachers were instructed to submit their
questions for approval and cutting of the stencil for mimeographing purposes by August 25 and 26. 1
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of Friday, August 26, 1966, appellant Renegado was in the school
canteen and other persons present at the time were teachers Natividad Boco, Mrs. Alviola, and Mrs. Benita Tan,
and some students. On that occasion Lira entered the canteen and seeing Renegado he requested the latter to
type the stencil of his test questions for the examination set for September 2. Renegado answered that he had
much work in the principal's office and that typing test questions was not among his duties. Lira reminded
Renegado of the instructions of the principal that he could be asked by the teachers to type their test questions
especially if the teacher concerned had no knowledge of typing, and Lira finished his remark stating: "you can
finish your work if you only will sit down and work." At this remark, Renegado became angry and as he
stepped out of the canteen he boxed with his fist a cabinet which belonged to Mrs. Alviola. Seeing the hostile
attitude of Renegado, Lira followed the latter outside of the canteen and asked Renegado if he was challenging
him. Renegado did not answer but quickly left the place. 2
On his way out of the school premises, later that afternoon, Renegado passed by the guardhouse where he met
security guard, Primitivo Velasco, and Renegado told the latter: "Friend, I will be sad if I could not kill
somebody," and having learned about the altercation between Renegado and Lira, Velasco placed his arm
around the shoulder of Renegado and pacified him with these words: "Loreto, do not do that because that is a
little trouble, you might be able to kill someone and you will be separated from your family." 3 Also on that
afternoon before leaving the school, Renegado met Basilio Ramirez, another employee, to whom he recounted
his altercation with Lira and ended up saying: "I am going to kill him." Basilio Ramirez, however, advised
Renegade: "Padi, do not take that to the extent because to kill a person is not good, think of your family, you
have many children." 4
In the evening of that Friday, August 26, there was a dance at the school premises and on that occasion
Renegado was seen cycling around the school several times, 5 and Renegado inquired from security guard,

Nicomedes Leonor, if Lira was at the dance. Leonor informed Renegado that the teacher was not around and at
the same time advised Renegado thus: "Choy, do not attend to that small trouble and we have families. Have
patience because we have families." 6 Another teacher, Arturo Querubin, likewise saw Renegado that evening
acting in a suspicious manner and sensing the state of mind of Renegado because of the incident which
happened earlier in the afternoon, Querubin approached Renegado, advised him to "calm his temper," and told
him "remember, you have plenty of children, please be calm." 7
Came Monday morning, August 29, and at around 9:00 o'clock, Erlinda Rojo, a bookkeeper in the school, met
accused Renegado in the office of the principal. Renegado inquired from Erlinda about his salary loan, and
during their conversation, the school janitor called the attention of the two to some boys quarreling near the
school's shop building and Renegado remarked: "stab him"; to those words Erlinda replied: "That is the case
with you. Your intention is to stab. If that is your attitude, there will be nobody left on earth, they will all die,"
to which Renegado countered: "So that the bad persons will be taken away and eliminated," and after that
exchange of remarks Renegado left the room. 8
That same morning, past 9:00 o'clock, which was his vacant period, Lira went to the school canteen, seated
himself at the counter, and ordered a bottle of "pepsi cola" from the girls who were then serving, namely,
Venecia Icayan and Lolita Francisco. At about 9:30 while Lira was drinking his "pepsi cola" Renegado entered
the canteen and seeing Lira with his back towards him, he immediately and without warning stabbed Lira with a
knife hitting the latter on the right lumbar region. The wounded Lira turned around holding his abdomen and
raised a chair to ward off his assailant who was poised to stab him for the second time. Renegado tried to reach
Lira but he was blocked by Mrs. Tan who shouted "Stop it, Loreto, don't anymore." Because of the intervention
of Mrs. Tan and the screaming of the girls inside the canteen, Renegado desisted from continuing with his attack
and left the canteen. 9 During that incident, Felix Tingzon was also in the canteen having a snack with a guest
and although he did not actually see the very act of stabbing, he saw however that when Renegado entered the
canteen Lira was beside the counter and had his back towards appellant Renegado. 9a
Lira was brought to the Calbayog City General Hospital and was attended by Dr. Erlinda Ortiz who performed
an operation on him. Dr. Ortiz found that the weapon of the assailant entered through the right lumbar region of
the victim and penetrated the right lower lobe of the liver. Notwithstanding the medical attention given to Lira,
the latter died on September 4, 1966, from "hepatic insufficiency" caused by the stab wound which perforated
the right lower lobe of the liver resulting in internal hemorrhage. 10
Appellant Renegado asks Us not to believe the above-given narration of the witnesses for the prosecution and
submits instead his own version of the incident as follows:

At about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon of Friday, August 26, he was in the school canteen for a snack and on that
occasion Lira arrived and approached him with a bunch of papers and told him to type the stencil of his test,
questions; he answered that he could not do the work because he was busy in the principal's office; Lira got mad
and pointing his finger at him said: "The question with you is that the work that you can do in a day you finish it
in so many days, because you stroll only in the office and keep on sleeping."; scared by the aggressive mood of
Lira, he went out of the canteen, but Lira followed him and, overtaking him near the door, boxed him on his
stomach; he told Lira that he was not fighting back, however, Lira angrily shook his fingers at him and said:
"don't show yourself to me, I will kill you with maltreatment"; he proceeded to the office of the principal and
informed the latter about the incident but the principal advised him not to mind Mr. Lira and to go ahead with
his work; later, in the afternoon he went home; the following morning, Saturday, he was in his house repairing
the "pantao" or wash stand and on that occasion spouse Lourdes and Feling Renegado came to the house and
they talked about the incident between him and Lira; Lourdes Renegado suggested the filing of a complaint
against Lira but he replied he was not taking the matter seriously and, at any rate, he was resigning from his job;
on Monday, August 29, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning he went to his work in the school as usual; upon
reaching the school, he proceeded to the room of Miss Rojo to get some papers on which he was working, and
then he returned to his room; at about 9:30, he went to the canteen for a snack and on the way, he was "singing,
whistling, and tossing a coin in his hand"; before reaching the canteen, he saw Lira and Manuel Cordove
conversing and when the two parted, Lira went to his room; upon reaching the canteen, he went to the counter
(see Exhibits 3 and 3-A), and while he was there standing, Lira arrived, stood beside him, elbowed him, and
said in a loud voice: "Ano ka?"; he turned around to face Lira and the latter banged on the counter the folders he
(Lira) was carrying; Lira then placed his right hand inside his pocket, pulled with the other hand a chair and
pushed it at him; he became confused and remembered that on Friday afternoon Lira threatened to kill him if he
(Lira) would meet him again; after a while he saw Mrs. Tan standing before him and heard her say: "Loreto,
don't do that"; upon hearing those words, "he regained his senses" and only then did, he realize that he had
wounded Lira; he became panicky, left the canteen, proceeded home, and informed his wife that he had
wounded a person; he then called for a tricycle, looked for a policeman, and surrendered to the
latter. 11
To corroborate his testimony that in the morning of the stabbing incident he was ahead of Lira in the school
canteen, appellant called to the witness stand Manuel Cordove who declared that on Monday morning after he
and Lira had conversed and parted, Lira proceeded to his (Lira's) office while he went to his own room and on
the way he passed by Renegado who was then standing by the door of the canteen and greeted him; after a short
while he heard shouts from the canteen and he learned that Renegado had stabbed Lira. 12 Another witness,
Lourdes Renegado, testified on the conversation between her and her brother-in-law, the herein appellant, on
Saturday morning, and she tried to impress the court that appellant Renegado had dismissed from his mind his

altercation with Lira and as a matter of fact on the following day, Sunday, she met Renegado who had just come
from church and was on his way to attend a cockfight. 13Appellant's wife, Elena de Guia, also took the witness
stand and declared inter alia that when her husband returned home on Friday afternoon and narrated to her the
occurrence at the canteen she suggested that a complaint be filed against Lira but her husband said: "never
mind"; in the evening of that same day, Friday, her husband invited her to go with him to the school dance,
however, she excused herself because of the children; on Monday morning, August 29, her husband reported for
work at the school as usual and before leaving the house he told her that he was returning about 9:00 o'clock for
his "merienda"; her husband returned later in the morning only to tell her that he had stabbed someone; upon
hearing the news she cried out: "Oh my God what have you done to us?", and he replied: "I would not have
done that had he not bullied me, he purposely did it to me, that is why I was hurt."; after that, her husband left
the house to surrender to the police. 14
On the basis of the testimony of appellant, his counsel-de-oficio, Atty. Roberto C. Alip, in his well-written brief
pleads for an acquittal with the argument that accused should be exempt from criminal liability "because at the
precise time that the prosecution claims de Lira was stabbed, accused lost his senses and he simply did not
know what he was doing." 15 To bolster his argument on the mental condition of appellant, defense counsel
directs Our attention to that portion of the evidence showing that sometime in June of 1950 Renegado was
"clubbed" on the forehead by Antonio Redema and was treated by Dr. J.P. Rosales for head injuries (Exh. 4-A),
and as a result of that incident Redema was charged with and convicted of "frustrated murder" in the Court of
First Instance of Samar on July 21, 1950; 16 that the head injury of appellant produced "ill-effects" because since
that particular occurrence appellant would have fits of violent temper such as maltreating his wife and children
for no reason at all, and for which he would ask forgiveness from his wife because "he lost his head." 17
For purposes of disposing of appellant's defense it becomes necessary to restate certain basic principles in
criminal law, viz: that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him; 18 that a felonious or criminal
act (delito doloso) is presumed to have been done with deliberate intent, that is, with freedom, intelligence, and
malice 19 because the moral and legal presumption is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal
condition of a person in the absence of evidence to the contrary; 20 that one of the causes which will overthrow
this presumption of voluntariness and intelligence is insanity in which event the actor is exempt from criminal
liability as provided for in Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing act,
that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete
absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will, mere abnormality of

the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. 21 The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as
an exempting circumstance and he must prove it by clear and positive evidence. 22
Applying the foregoing basic principles to the herein appellant, his defense perforce must fail.
By his testimony appellant wants to convey that for one brief moment he was unaware or unconscious of what
he was doing, that he "regained his senses" when he heard the voice of Mrs. Tan telling him: "Loreto, don't do
that," and only then did he realize that he had wounded Lira. That, to Us, is incredible. For it is most unusual for
appellant's mind which was in a perfect normal state on Monday morning, August 29, to suddenly turn blank at
that particular moment when he stabbed Lira. Appellant himself testified that he was acting very sanely that
Monday morning, as shown by the fact that he went to the canteen in a jovial mood "singing, whistling, and
tossing a coin in his hand"; he saw the persons inside the canteen namely Venecia Icayan, Lolita Francisco,
Benita Tan, Felipe Tingzon and a guest of the latter (all of whom, except the last one, testified for the
prosecution); he noticed the arrival of Lira who banged his folders on the table, elbowed him, and said in a loud
"ano ka"; he saw Lira put his right hand inside his pocket and with the other hand push a chair towards him; he
became "confused" because he remembered that Lira threatened to kill him if he would see him again; at this
point he "lost his senses" and regained it when he heard the voice of Mrs. Tan saying: "Loreto, don't do that",
and he then found out that he had wounded Lira. If appellant was able to recall all those incidents, We cannot
understand why his memory stood still at that very crucial moment when he stabbed Lira to return at the snap of
finger as it were, after he accomplished the act of stabbing his victim. His is not a diseased mind, for there is no
evidence whatsoever, expert or otherwise, to show that he is suffering from insanity or from any other mental
sickness which impaired his memory or his will. The evidence shows and the trial court did find that appellant
is a perfectly normal being, and that being the case, the presumption is that his normal state of mind on that
Monday morning continued and remained throughout the entire incident..
The testimony of appellant's wife, Elena, that her husband at times manifests unusual behaviour, exempli gratia:
lashing at his children if the latter refuses to play with him, tearing off the mosquito net if not properly tied,
"executing a judo" on her person, boxing her, and so on and so forth, is not the evidence needed to prove a state
of insanity. At most such testimony shows that appellant Renegado is a man of violent temper who can be easily
provoked to violence for no valid reason at all. Thus in People vs. Cruz, this Court held that breaking glasses
and smashing dishes are simply demonstrations of an explosive temper and do not constitute clear and
satisfactory proof of insanity; they are indications of the passionate nature of the accused, his tendency to
violent fits when angry, and inasmuch as the accused was not deprived of the consciousness of his acts but
was simply obfuscated by the refusal of his wife to live with him, his conviction for parricide was proper. 23

Very relevant to the case now before Us in U.S. vs. Ramon Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil. 62, where the
appellant was accused of serious physical injuries committed on his wife, mother-in-law, and sisters-in-law. The
accused Hontiveros pleaded insanity as a defense, and claimed that immediately before the incident he had
intermittent fever at intervals of a few hours during which he lost consciousness and after he regained
consciousness he found himself outside of the house and heard voices commanding him to surrender his
weapon, and he came to know that he had wounded his wife, his mother-in-law and sisters-in-law. The Court
sustained the conviction of the accused holding:
In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented a few moments prior to or
during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal condition of mind.It is improper to
conclude that he acted unconsciously in order to relieve him from responsibility on the ground of exceptional
mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proven .... Acts penalized by law are always
considered to be voluntary, unless the contrary be shown, and by this rule of law Ramon Hontiveros, by
inflicting upon the offended parties the respective wounds, is considered to have been in a normal, healthy,
mental condition, and no weight can be given to the defendant's allegation of insanity and lack of reason, which
would constitute an exceptional condition; nor, for lack of evidence, can his state of mind be deemed to have
been abnormal." (p. 65, emphasis supplied)
The next point raised by the defense is that the testimonial evidence of the prosecution comes from "biased,
partial, and highly questionable sources," and is not to be believed. 23
Appellant claims that it is highly improbable for a person who intends to kill someone to reveal his plan to
others such as what the prosecution witnesses Velasco and Ramirez testified that Renegado told them on Friday
afternoon that he was going to kill Lira. It may be true that ordinarily one would keep to one's self such a
hideous plot, but the workings of the human mind are at times mysteriously incomprehensible, and to a man
like the herein appellant who is pictured by his own evidence to be one of violent disposition, it was natural for
him to blurt out his outraged feelings and his evil design to his two co-employees in the school because the
incident with Lira was still fresh in his mind at the time.
Appellant also contends that the prosecution witnesses are biased and partial. We find that contention
unjustified. The mere fact that the witnesses of the People were employees, students, and teachers in the school
is no reason to consider their declarations biased in the absence of satisfactory proof that any of them had
personal motives if his own either to favor the deceased or prejudice the herein appellant. In assessing the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the trial judge found no sufficient evidence proving hostility towards
the herein appellant or any notable relationship of friendship with the deceased, and We see no valid reason for

discrediting His Honor's findings in this regard. Time and again this Tribunal has stated that the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses are not to be disturbed for the trial judge is in a better position to
appreciate the same, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behaviour and manner
of testifying during the trial, unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case; in
the case at bar, there is no such showing. 24 The rule is so, because as rightly said, the opportunity to observe the
demeanor and appearance of witnesses in many instances is the very touchstone of credibility. 25

over his plan and listen to the advice of his co-employees and of his own conscience, and such length of time
was more than sufficient for him to reflect on his intended revenge.

As a last issue, appellant claims that the court a quo erred in holding the appellant guilty of "murder with
assault upon a person in authority." 26

Third, the killing of Lira is complexed with assault upon a person in authority. A teacher either of a public or of
a duly recognized private school is a person in authority under Art. 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Commonwealth Act No. 578. 29

The zeal of appellant's counsel-de-oficio in pursuing all possible lines of defense so as to secure the acquittal of
his client or at least to minimize his liability is truly laudable. However, predicated on the credible and impartial
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses the judgment of the trial court finding the accused guilty as charged is
to be sustained for the following reasons:
First, the killing of Mamerto de Lira is qualified by evident premeditation. The circumstance of evident
premeditation is present because on that very Friday afternoon immediately after the incident at the canteen
appellant Renegado, giving vent to his anger, told his co-employee, Ramirez, and the security guard, Velasco,
that he was going to kill Lira. That state of mind of appellant was evident once more when he went to the school
dance that same Friday evening and was seen cycling around the school premises several times, and he asked
another security guard, Nicomedes Leonor, if Lira was at the dance. On the following day, Saturday, appellant
met Mrs. Benita Tan to whom he confided that had he seen Lira the night before he would surely have killed
him. And on Monday morning, knowing the time of Lira for a snack (tsn, Nov. 17, 1966, p. 307), appellant
armed himself with a knife or some bladed weapon which by his own admission on cross-examination was his
and which he used for "cutting bond paper" (tsn. ibid, p. 299), proceeded to the canteen at around 9:30 o'clock,
and seeing the teacher Lira with his back towards him, without much ado, stabbed Lira from behind hitting the
victim on the right lumbar region. Appellant's attempt to show that he does not remember how the weapon
reached the canteen is of course futile, preposterous as it is. (tsn. ibid, pp. 299-300) There is no doubt that the
act of appellant in bringing with him his knife to the canteen on Monday morning was the culmination of his
plan to avenge himself on Lira for the remark made by the latter on Friday afternoon. Evident premeditation
exists when sufficient time had elapsed for the actor to reflect and allow his conscience to overcome his
resolution to kill but he persisted in his plan and carried it into effect. 27 Here, appellant Renegado had more or
less sixty-four hours from the Friday incident up to 9:30 o'clock of Monday morning within which to ponder

Second, treachery attended the killing of Lira because the latter, who was unarmed, was stabbed from behind,
was totally unaware of the coming attack, and was not in a position to defend himself against it. There is
treachery where the victim who was not armed was never in a position to defend himself or offer resistance, nor
to present risk or danger to the accused when assaulted. 28

The defense claims, however, that while it is true that Mamerto de Lira was at the time of his death a teacher of
the Tiburcio Memorial Vocational School run by the national government, he was not stabbed while in the
performance of his duties nor on the occasion of such performance. According to the defense counsel, the
motive of the assault is important to determine whether or not the assault falls under Art. 148 of the Revised
Penal Code; 30 in the instant case it is clear that the underlying motive for the assault was not that Renegado was
asked to type the test questions of the teacher Lira but that the latter made insulting and slanderous remarks to
the herein appellant. This contention of the defense is incorrect. The assault or attack on Lira was committed on
the occasion of the performance of the duties of the latter as a teacher because: as narrated in the early part of
this Decision, Lira was scheduled to give a periodical test on September 2, 1966, and was required to submit
his, test questions for approval and mimeographing by August 25 and 26; Lira asked appellant Renegado to
prepare the stencil of his questions inasmuch as he was not versed with typing; appellant was duty bound to
type said stencil under the memorandum-circular enumerating his duties as a clerk of the school; appellant
refused the request of Lira under pretext that he had much work in the principal's office and furthermore
that typing test questions for teachers was not among his duties; Lira reminded Renegado that the principal gave
necessary instructions for that purpose, and ended up with the remark: "you can finish your work if you only
will sit down and work"; Lira's remark was neither insulting nor slanderous but more of a reminder to Renegado
that if he would sit down and work he could finish all the work that had to be done; as a teacher of the school,
Lira had the authority to call the attention of an employee of the institution to comply with his duties and to be
conscientious and efficient in his work; it was Renegado's violent character, as shown by his own evidence,
which led him to react angrily to the remark of Lira and conceive of a plan to attack the latter. Under these
enumerated facts, We conclude that the impelling motive for the attack on Mamerto de Lira was the
performance by the latter of his duties as a teacher.

In Justo vs. Court of Appeals, wherein the offended party was a district supervisor of the Bureau of Public
Schools, the Court held that the phraseology "on occasion of such performance" used in Art. 148 of the Revised
Penal Code signifies "because" or "by reason" of the past performance of official duty, even if at the very time
of the assault no official duty was being discharged, inasmuch as the evident purpose of the law is to allow
public officials and their agents to discharge their official duties without being haunted by the fear of being
assaulted or injured by reason thereof. 31
Inasmuch as the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority and the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender is offset by the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the penalty of
DEATH imposed by the trial court is pursuant to Article 48 in relation to Articles 148 and 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. The court a quo, however, in its decision recommends to the President of the Republic the
commutation of the death penalty toreclusion perpetua, and the Solicitor General * concurs with such
recommendation. On the part of the Court, for lack of ten votes for purposes of imposing the death sentence, the
penalty next lower in degree, reclusion perpetua, is to be imposed.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the conviction of appellant Loreto Renegado for murder with assault on
a person in authority and We sentence him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Mamerto de Lira in the sum of twelve thousand (P12,000.00) pesos 32 and to pay the costs. Decision
modified.

petition for hospitalization of the accused if in his opinion it served the public welfare or the welfare of the
person concerned.
Pursuant thereto, after psychiatric examination of the accused conducted by Dr. Corazon San Pedro as attending
physician, the officer-in-charge of the Davao Regional Mental Hospital submitted a report to the effect that the
accused was quiet, no bizarre behavior noted. He was in good contact with his environment, recognized his
companions and was aware of the place where he was being examined. He answered questions coherently and
was relevant." She recommended however that the subject be further examined in the Regional Mental Hospital
at least once a week for further evaluation.
Hence, the office of the City Fiscal moved that the regional hospital be given more time to complete its
examination and to submit a medical report on the accused's state of mind.
Acting on the motion, the trial court on March 29, 1969 ordered that accused be again sent to the regional
mental hospital to be examined by an internist of that institution in collaboration with Dr. Corazon San Pedro to
determine once and for all the mental condition of the accused and to find out whether he was fit for
arraignment .
Subsequently, the officer-in-charge of the Regional Mental Hospital on May 15,1969 furnished the Court with a
resume of the psychiatric examination conducted on the accused, to wit:

G.R. No. L-32978 October 30, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRES MAGALLANO
The Court sustains the conviction for parricide of the accused-appellant, Andres Magallano, on his own
admission that he strangled his wife to death. The defense of insanity as an exempting circumstance was not
established and did not overcome the legal presumption that a person's acts are of his own free will and
intelligence. The settled rule is that the onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as a defense and the
defense failed to discharge this burden.
The accused was charged before the Court of First Instance of Davao City with parricide for having killed his
lawful wife, Exequiela Costa, on September 29, 1968.
Upon motion by the counsel de oficio for the accused asserting the accused's insanity, the latter was referred to
the Chief of the Davao General Hospital for examination. The Director was ordered to file the necessary

In the three interviews done, 1 subject was observed to be in good contact with his environment. No odd
behavior was observed. He answered questions coherently and relevantly. No hallucinations or delusions
elicited. He is well oriented to the date, place and person. He can give his personal data and other circumstances
in his life. He can relate the event that led to his confinement in jail.
Having been satisfied that the accused was fit and ready for trial on the basis of the two medical reports, the
trial court proceeded to arraign him. With the assistance of his counsel de oficio, the accused entered a plea of
not guilty.
After trial wherein the main issue was the sanity or insanity of the accused during the commission of the crime,
the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.

The record shows that on October 1, 1968, the accused companied by his father voluntarily informed, and
surrendered to, the Davao City Police Department that he had killed his wife. The accused declared upon
investigation conducted by policy officers that he strangled his wife 2 to death in the early morning of
September 29, 1968 after an exchange of heated words between them stemming over his suspicion that she had
been unfaithful to him; that the following day, he went to a nearby house owned by one Peping Orais to whom
he confided the killing. The accused described to the police the scene of the crime and true enough, when the
police went there, they found the victim's cadaver. Post- mortem findings showed that she died of "asphyxia due
to choking" and that she had been dead for more than 30 hours but less than 50 hours at the time of discovery. 3

Juan Abear, a medicolegal expert connected with the Davao City Health Department was presented as witness
to confirm that he was the one who conducted the autopsy of the victim on October 2, 1968 and that the cause
of death was asphyxia due to strangulation. 8

Crispin Orais confirmed the accused's declaration in a sworn statement before the Asst. City Attorney that the
accused confided to him that he had killed his wife by choking her with his bare hands. In his testimony in
court 4 as first witness for the prosecution, Crispin Orais declared he knew the accused who went to him on
October 1, 1968 at his house in Cabantian, Davao City and inquired about his father's whereabouts. The witness
then sent his son to fetch the father, Diego Magallano. The accused was then sweating and his face was covered
with blood. When asked about his appearance, the accused replied that he had smashed his head against a tree
as if he had lost his mind because he had killed his wife by choking her to death. The accused pointed to a place
about 50 meters away from the house of Crispin Orais as the place where the killing took place. As to his
observation on the accused's demeanor as the latter related this gruesome story, the witness remarked that the
accused was all right although there were times when he appeared out of his mind for he could not easily
answer the questions.

The defense in its attempt to prove mental disorder on the part of the accused presented evidence consisting of
the testimonies of the accused's father, his son and three neighbors.

Patrolman Noe Baita of the Davao City Police Department testified that during the investigation on October 1,
1968 the accused confessed that he killed his wife in the manner he related it to Crispin Orais and that all the
answers to his question given in the course of the examination were spontaneous and voluntary. 5
Lt. Exequeil Untalan declared that while he was in charge of the commando unit at Agdao, Davao City on
October 1, 1968, the accused accompanied by his father came to his office to confirm reports that the accused
had strangled his wife; that this surrender was registered in the police blotter after which the accused was
indorsed to the Homicide Section of the City Policy Department. 6
Lt. Rafael Panal of the Homicide Section who repaired to the scene of the crime found the cadaver of the victim
in the bushes and they brought it to the Davao City morgue where it was examined and autopsied by Dr. Abear,
Medical Officer of the Davao City Health Office. The investigation was conducted in his precinct by Noe Baita.
He observed that although the investigator had to repeat some questions for the accused to understand, the latter
was remorseful and he could talk coherently. 7

Fiscal Josefino Fuentes, Asst. City Fiscal of Davao City testified that he was the one before whom the accused
swore to the truth of the latter's extra-judicial confession; that he himself translated to the accused all the
contents of the confession from English to Visayan, and that the accused admitted to him that he (the accused)
signed it voluntarily. 9

Arturo Magallano, a son of the accused who attained 6th grade, testified that during the month of April, 1968 he
observed that his father kept saying words that were not pro- per or correct; that his father even tried to commit
suicide by almost typing his neck with a rope; that in Cabacan-Bucana, Davao after they transferred in 1968, his
father worked for a living by going fishing three times a week and that the witness himself sold the fish at a
price dictated by his farther. 10
Luisa Bacala, a 64 year old vegetable vendor and neighbor of the accused, declared that the latter used to accuse
his wife of having a paramour, that one time she saw Exequiela, the wife of the accused, selling fish in the
market when the accused arrived saying that the paramour was already around; that the accused used to run
towards the pier and his family would follow him. 11
Crispin Orais, under the same oath testified that one morning he met the accused telling him that his (accused's)
father was at Cabantian in the company of some policemen and he kept saying this many times although he had
already been assured that his father was not seen around there. 12
Diego Magallano, the father of the accused testified thus: Sometime in 1968 in the first week of April, this
witness received a telegram from the wife of the accused stating that the latter was sickly; he went to stay with
his son in Maasin, Leyte for one month during which time he observed that the latter was somewhat insane for
he kept on saying that his wife had a paramour although this statement had no basis. He had his son treated by a
quack doctor. Upon hearing about the incident that his son killed his wife, the witness went to Cabantian where
he saw his son near the dead body of his wife. The accused said he killed her for she no longer loved him. The
witness corroborated the declaration of Crispin Orais that the face of the accused was all covered with blood for
the reason, according to the accused, that he bumped his head against a tree for he wanted to kill himself. 13

Ricardo Dayala, a 64 year old vegetable vendor who claimed to be another neighbor of the accused at Davao
City stated that he was acquainted with the accused for a long time; that he used to see the accused peeping
from his house everytime the accused's wife went downstairs to get some pieces of wood for fuel and he
observed that the accused was insane, because at one time when asked some questions, the accused would talk
and laugh at the same time although sometimes the accused acted sanely. 14
After a review and analysis of the evidence on record, this Court agrees with the State's contention that the
defense has failed to prove that the accused was legally insane at the commission of the crime.
Indeed, the evidence presented by the defense does not outweigh the certifications submitted by government
psychiatric doctors who had closely observed the accused for a month and a half, 15 and found that the accused
was in good contact with his environment; that he did not manifest any odd behavior for in fact he could even
relate the circumstances that led to his confinement.
Apart from these certifications, statements in court by witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense have
pictured a mental condition on the part of the accused that is not inconsistent with sanity. The fact that a few
days after the killing incident the accused was seen sweating with his face covered with blood, as testified to by
his own father and Crispin Orais, for the reason according to accused himself that he struck his head against a
tree to end his life in atonement for his guilt in killing his wife 16 is a manifestation of remorse or self-reproach
which is but a rational feeling experienced by normal persons. As correctly observed by the prosecution, it
revealed an awareness of a wrongdoing.
Coupled with this manifestation or remorse is the appellant appellant's voluntary surrender to the police
headquarters where he executed a statement confessing his misdeed. The police officer and the City Fiscal who
separately conducted investigation of the accused observed that he was normal for he could answer their
questions coherently and intelligently and that there was no indication of abnormality on his part. The
observation of these public officials is entitled to full credence, for they have not been shown nor alleged to
have any improper or ulterior motive to misrepresent or not tell the truth about the mental condition and
behavior of the accused.
Again from accused's own evidence is the testimony of his son, that before the killing for which he stands
charged, he was working for a living through fishing three times a week and that he himself prescribed the
prices for his catch which his son brought to the market for sale. 17

While there is evidence tending to show that the accused in some instances had displayed some unusual
behavior, at most these could only be eccentricities which do not mean complete deprivation of intelligence or
discernment. The presumption of sanity is not overcome by mere abnormality of behavior. 18
"In the eyes of the law," as held in the case of People vs. Renegado, 19 "insanity exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the
least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation
of freedom of the will; mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The onus
probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance and he must prove it by clear and
positive evidence."
Over and above these is the trial judge's "keen observation of [the accused's] conduct, appearance, demeanor
and behavior in the courtroom everytime he appeared at the trial. He did not find any symptoms of insanity in
his acts or behavior for he behaved better than some of his neighbors who were around him." 20
The defense attempted to adduce expert testimony to prove the alleged insanity. The expert however was
properly excluded by the Court when he was made to answer by hypothetical questions in relation to allegations
of fact which have not been proven but were in fact disputed by the prosecution. No contribution could be made
by him since he did actually examine the accused and was being made to testify only on the contents of a book
or modern psychiatry without particular reference to the actual and proven facts regarding the mental condition
of the accused.
As to the formal offer of proof by the defense which according to counsel was denied by the trial Court, we find
from the transcript 21 that the trial Court did not in fact deny the verbal motion but made the suggestion that if
defense counsel wanted to state anything else, he could incorporate it in a memorandum. At any rate, we find
that the trial Court did make a thorough consideration of the evidence submitted by the defense.
As to the question raised by accused of the admissibility of the government doctors' medical reports as being
hearsay since their contents were not testified to in court by the said doctors, suffice it to state that these formed
part of the records, and that at the resting of the case, the defense failed to register any objection thereon when
the prosecution specifically invited the court to take judicial notice of its records.
Authorities hold that whenever evidence of acts, conduct or declarations are introduced to prove the defendant
insane, the prosecution may offer evidence of other acts, conduct and declarations during the same period to

show that he was sane more so, at the time of the commission of the crime charged and thereafter and that
the irrational acts testified to were mere lapses into which humans occasionally fall.
Premises considered, this Court finds the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide.
Accordingly, this Court affirms in toto the appealed decision sentencing the accused Andres Magallano to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua as defined and provided for in Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code with the
accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.

"Contrary to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code."

At the arraignment, the accused refused to enter a plea. Pursuant to the Rules, the trial court entered a "not
guilty" plea for him. At the initial hearing of the case on May 5, 1994, the accused's counsel manifested that his
client had been observed behaving in an abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. Thus, the Court called the
accused to the stand but he refused to answer any of the questions propounded by the court. Hence, on the same
date, the Court issued an Order[2] directing the transfer of the accused to the National Center for Mental Health
(NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation to determine his fitness to stand trial. CODES
The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he was suffering from a form of psychosis
known as schizophrenia. The accused was detained at the hospital and was administered medication for his
illness. On June 19, 1996, after more than two (2) years of confinement, the accused was discharged from the
NCMH and recommitted to the provincial jail as he was already found fit to face the charges against him. [3]

[G.R. No. 132319. May 12, 2000]

y

At the resumption of the hearing, a reverse trial was conducted. The accused proceeded to adduce evidence on
his claim of insanity at the time he committed the offense.

What distinguishes man from beast is his intellect. Man's action is guided and controlled by his mind. Law is
designed for rational beings as it is based on our inherent sense of right which is inseparable from reason. Thus,
when man's reasoning is so distorted by disease that he is totally incapable of distinguishing right from wrong,
he loses responsibility before the law. In the case at bar, we are asked to resolve whether or not the accused,
invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the crime he committed.

As culled from the testimonies of the accused, his mother-in-law AVELINA MIRADOR, and his daughter
LILIFER MADARANG, the following facts were established: The accused and Lilia Mirador were legally
married and their union was blessed with seven (7) children. The accused worked as a seaman for sixteen (16)
years. He was employed in a United States ship until 1972. In 1973, he worked as a seaman in Germany and
stayed there for nine (9) years, or until 1982. Thereafter, he returned to his family in Infanta, Pangasinan, and
started a hardware store business. His venture however failed. Worse, he lost his entire fortune due to
cockfighting.[4]

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
MAGNO, accused-appellant.

vs. FERNANDO

MADARANG

Accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO was charged with parricide for killing his wife LILIA
MADARANG in an Information[1] which reads:
"That on or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion, municipality of Infante, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with evident
premeditation and treachery, armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack and stab LILIA M. MADARANG, his legitimate wife, inflicting upon her stab wound 4 1/2
inches by 1 1/2 inch(es)long and 3/16 of an inch wide, located just below the left clavicle 1 3/4 inch(es) lateral
to the supra-sternal notch, and plowed along the interpace slightly coursing upward and posteriorly and stab
wound 1 inch in length, gaping and 3 1/2 inch(es) deep, located at the right arm at its medial aspect, coursing
upwards and medially towards the apex of the right axilla which caused her instantaneous death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of Lilia M. Madarang."

In the latter part of July 1993, the accused, his wife Lilia and their children were forced to stay in the house of
Avelina Mirador as the accused could no longer support his family. Moreover, Lilia was then already heavy
with their eight child and was about to give birth.[5]
On September 3, 1993, at about 5:00 p.m., the accused and Lilia had a squabble. The accused was jealous of
another man and was accusing Lilia of infidelity. In the heat of the fight and in the presence of their children,
the accused stabbed Lilia, resulting in her untimely demise.[6]
AVELINA MIRADOR was then in the pigpen when she heard the children of the accused shouting and crying
inside her house. She called out to them and asked what was wrong. She received no reply. Her nephew barged

into the house and brought out the children one at a time, leaving the accused with Lilia. While passing by
Avelina, her nephew warned her: "You better run." Avelina then saw the accused emerge from the house holding
a bolo. She scampered for safety.[7] yacats

Hence this appeal.

The appellant insists that at the time he stabbed his wife, he was completely deprived of intelligence, making
his criminal act involuntary. His unstable state of mind could allegedly be deduced from the following:

She declared that during the period that the accused and his family stayed in her house, she did not notice
anything peculiar in accused's behavior that would suggest that he was suffering from any mental illness.
Neither did she know of any reason why the accused killed his wife as she never saw the two engage in any
argument while they were living with her.[8]

First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Hence, he was completely unaware of his acts that fateful
day and must have committed the crime without the least discernment.

The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident. He could not remember
where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one of the
hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned about her death.
He, however, was not aware of the cause of her demise. He claimed that he did not know whether he suffered
from any mental illness and did not remember being confined at the NCMH for treatment.[9]

Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved he was then afflicted with schizophrenia. He cited
the testimony of Dr. Tibayan that a schizophrenic may go into extremes -- he may be violent and destructive, or
very silent and self-focused. The appellant exhibited his violent tendencies on that fateful day. He killed his
wife and Avelina and her nephew were so frightened that they ran away at the sight of him holding a bolo. He
did not seem to recognize anybody and could have turned to anyone and inflicted further injury. He avers that
this is peculiar only to persons who are mentally deranged for a sane person who just committed a crime
would have appeared remorseful and repentant after realizing that what he did was wrong.

DR. WILSON S. TIBAYAN, a resident doctor of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), declared
that the accused was committed to the NCMH on July 4, 1994 upon order of the court. The NCMH conducted
three (3) medical and psychiatric evaluations of the accused during his confinement therein. Based on the first
medical report, dated August 2, 1994,[10] the accused was found to be suffering from insanity or psychosis,
classified as schizophrenia. Dr. Tibayan explained that schizophrenia is a mental abnormality characterized by
impaired fundamental reasoning, delusions, hallucinations, preoccupation with one's thoughts, poor self-care,
insight and judgment, and impaired cognitive, social and occupational functions. The patient may be incapable
of distinguishing right from wrong or know what he is doing. He may become destructive or have a propensity
to attack any one if his hallucinations were violent. [11] A schizophrenic, however, may have lucid intervals
during which he may be able to distinguish right from wrong.[12] Dr. Tibayan opined that the accused's
mental illness may have begun even prior to his admission to the NCMH and it was highly possible that he was
already suffering from schizophrenia prior to his commission of the crime. [13]
By December 21, 1994, as per the second medical report, the accused was still suffering from schizophrenia.
After one and a half years of confinement, the third psychiatric evaluation of the accused, dated May 27,
1996,[14] showed that his mental condition considerably improved due to continuous medication. The accused
was recommended to be discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to jail to stand trial.[15] olanski

Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion that there was a high possibility that he was already
suffering from insanity prior to his commission of the crime on September 3, 1993.[17] The defense posits
that his mental illness may have been caused by his loss of fortune. His hardware business, which he started
through 16 years of working as a seaman, went bankrupt. He ended up virtually dependent on his mother-in-law
for his family's support and all these may have been beyond his capacity to handle. haideem
The appellant further contends that the fact that he and his wife never engaged in a fight prior to that fateful day
should be considered. The marked change in his behavior when he uncharacteristically quarreled with his wife
on that day and suddenly turned violent on her confirms that he was mentally disturbed when he committed the
crime.
Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill Lilia who was scheduled to give birth to their eighth
child three (3) days prior to the killing. Unless overpowered by something beyond his control, nobody in his
right mind would kill his wife who was carrying his child. Jealousy, the appellant posits, is not a sufficient
reason to kill a pregnant spouse.
We find these arguments without merit.

The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the presumption of sanity at the time he
committed the offense. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an offense. The
insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed with the
faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that which renders human actions laudable or
culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An insane
accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No purpose of criminal law is served
by punishing an insane accused because by reason of his mental state, he would have no control over his
behavior and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the future.[18]
A number of tests evolved to determine insanity under the law. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the traditional
test is the M'Naghten rule of 1843which states that "to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." The M'Naghten rule is a cognitive measure of
insanity as the accused is required to know two things: the nature and quality of the act, and that the act was
wrong. This rule has been criticized for its ambiguity. It was debated whether the word "wrong" referred to
moral or legal wrong. The importance of the distinction was illustrated by Stephen [19] as follows: A kills B
knowing that he is killing B and it is illegal to kill B but under an insane delusion that God has commanded him
to kill B to obtain the salvation of the human race. A's act is a crime if the word "wrong" means illegal but it is
not a crime if the word "wrong" means morally wrong. The word "know" was also assailed as it referred solely
to intellectual reason and excluded affective or emotional knowledge. It was pointed out that the accused may
know in his mind what he is doing but may have no grasp of the effect or consequences of his actions.
[20]
MNaghten was condemned as based on an obsolete and misleading concept of the nature of insanity as
insanity does not only affect the intellectual faculties but also affects the whole personality of the patient,
including his will and emotions. It was argued that reason is only one of the elements of a personality and does
not solely determine man's conduct.[21] kirsten
Subsequently, M'Naghten was refined by the "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming
defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of
disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him to
prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." Thus, even if the accused knew that what
he was doing was wrong, he would be acquitted by reason of insanity if his mental illness kept him from
controlling his conduct or resisting the impulse to commit the crime. This rule rests on the assumption that there
are mental illnesses that impair volition or self-control, even while there is cognition or knowledge of what is
right and wrong.[22] This test was likewise criticized on the following grounds: (1) the "impulse" requirement is
too restrictive as it covers only impulsive acts; (2) the "irresistible" requirement is also restrictive as it requires

absolute impairment of the freedom of the will which cases are very rare; (3) it will not serve the purpose of
criminal law to deter criminals as the will to resist commission of the crime will not be encouraged, and; (4) it is
difficult to prove whether the act was the result of an insane, irresistible impulse. [23]
Then came the Durham "product" test in 1954 which postulated that "an accused is not criminally responsible
if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect."[24] Critics of this test argued that it gave too
much protection to the accused. It placed the prosecution in a difficult position of proving accused's sanity
beyond reasonable doubt as a mere testimony of a psychiatrist that accused's act was the result of a mental
disease leaves the judge with no choice but to accept it as a fact. The case thus becomes completely dependent
on the testimonies of experts.[25]
Then came the ALI "substantial capacity" test, integrated by the American Law Institute (ALI) in its Model
Penal Code Test, which improved on theM'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests. The new rule stated that a
person is not responsible for his criminal act if, as a result of the mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.[26] Still,
this test has been criticized for its use of ambiguous words like "substantial capacity" and "appreciate" as there
would be differences in expert testimonies whether the accused's degree of awareness was sufficient.
[27]
Objections were also made to the exclusion of psychopaths or persons whose abnormalities are manifested
only by repeated criminal conduct. Critics observed that psychopaths cannot be deterred and thus undeserving
of punishment.[28] barth
In 1984, however, the U.S. Congress repudiated this test in favor of the M'Naghten style statutory formulation.
It enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act which made the appreciation test the law applicable in all
federal courts. The test is similar to M'Naghten as it relies on the cognitive test. The accused is not required to
prove lack of control as in the ALI test. The appreciation test shifted the burden of proof to the defense, limited
the scope of expert testimony, eliminated the defense of diminished capacity and provided for commitment of
accused found to be insane.[29]
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is
required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused
is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the
power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties
will not exclude imputability.[30]

The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual
means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a
person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused
requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by
a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception
of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. [31] The testimony or proof
of the accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the
offense with which he is charged.[32] Jksm
In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was committed to
the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often accompanied by hallucinations
and delusions. Formerly called dementia pracecox, it is the most common form of psychosis.
[33]
Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior apparent
in aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often
ambivalently directed. The interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusions and
hallucinations. In the most disorganized form of schizophrenic living, withdrawal into a fantasy life takes place
and is associated with serious thought disorder and profound habit deterioration in which the usual social
customs are disregarded.[34] During the initial stage, the common early symptom is aloofness, a withdrawal
behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would seem preoccupied and
dreamy and may appear "faraway." He does not empathize with the feelings of others and manifests little
concern about the realities of life situations. The schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of rejection and an
intolerable lack of self-respect. He withdraws from emotional involvement with other people to protect himself
from painful relationships. There is shallowness of affect, a paucity of emotional responsiveness and a loss of
spontaneity. Frequently, he becomes neglectful of personal care and cleanliness. [35] A variety of subjective
experiences, associated with or influenced by mounting anxiety and fears precede the earliest behavioral
changes and oddities. He becomes aware of increasing tension and confusion and becomes distracted in
conversation manifested by his inability to maintain a train of thought in his conversations. Outwardly, this will
be noticed as blocks or breaks in conversations. The schizophrenic may not speak or respond appropriately to
his companions. He may look fixedly away, or he may appear to stare, as he does not regularly blink his eyes in
his attempt to hold his attention.[36]
None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms
associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure,
the record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to

that fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the appellant was already
suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also declared that schizophrenics have lucid
intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing right from wrong.[37] Hence the importance of
adducing proof to show that the appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the offense.
Although the appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing incident, the
evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also
proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Evidence on
the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution.[38] Chiefx
In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish his claim of insanity at
the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the appellant was completely of
unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime. The arguments advanced by the
appellant to prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one, his claim that he has absolutely no
recollection of the stabbing incident amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with facility. The fact
that Avelina and her nephew were frightened at the sight of the appellant holding a bolo after he killed his wife
does not, by any stretch of imagination, prove that the appellant has lost his grip on reality on that occasion.
Neither is the appellant's seemingly non-repentant attitude immediately after he stabbed his wife an indicium of
his alleged insanity. Even criminals of stable mental condition take this non-remorseful stance. Similarly, that
the appellant and his wife were never seen quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself prove the
appellant's unstable mental condition. Neither can it be said that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a
pregnant spouse. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where lives had been terminated for the flimsiest
reason.
The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that he lost his business and became totally dependent on
his mother-in-law for support. We find this, however, purely speculative and unsupported by record. To be
sure, there was no showing of any odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant after he lost his fortune
and prior to his commission of the crime that may be symptomatic of his mental illness. In fact,
the appellant's mother-in-law declared that during the time that she knew the appellant and while he lived in
her house, she did not notice anything irregular or abnormal in the appellant's behavior that could have
suggested that he was suffering from any mental illness.
An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He admits committing the crime
but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at the time of its commission. Hence, the accused is tried
on the issue of sanity alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial

on the issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the crime.[39] As the appellant, in the case at bar,
failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed his wife, we are constrained
to affirm his conviction.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting the appellant of the crime of parricide is
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

January 20, 1927 G.R. No. 26361

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. CRISPINO MANCAO and CIRIACO AGUILAR
This is an appeal taken by Crispino Mancao and Ciriaco Aguilar from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu convicting them, in accordance with the complaint, of the crime of homicide, and sentencing each of
them to fourteen years, eight months and one day reclusion temporal, with accesories of the law, to indemnify,
jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Roberto Villela in the sum of P1,000, and each to pay one-half of
the costs.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court in its
judgment, to wit: (1) The lower court erred in giving too much weight to the testimony of Baldomero Villela
and Eusebio Villela, aged 15 and 14 years, respectively, and in basing its judgment upon said testimony; (2) the
lower court also erred in not holding that the evidence for the defense preponderates and is more worthy of
credit than that for the prosecution; (3) the lower court likewise erred in not finding that, in view of the evidence
presented by both parties, the accused are at least entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt; (4) the lower court
erred in not holding that the accused Ciriaco Aguilar is mentally deficient and is, therefore, not criminally
liable, and, (5) the lower court erred in sentencing the accused instead of acquitting them as it should have done
in view of the absence of incriminating evidence.
The prosecution and the defense are agreed that Hilaria Dejan, upon her death, left personal property, cattle and
real property, the latter consisting of corn fields, some of which were in the possession of Roberto Villela who
had leased them. The probate of the will of said deceased Hilaria Dejan, wherein she bequeathed one-half of her
property to her nephew Roberto Villela and her niece Josefa Billones, having been denied and proceedings for

the administration of the property left by her having been instituted, Crispino Mancao was appointed
administrator thereof on June 26, 1916. Roberto Villela refused to deliver the lands in his possession to the
administrator, alleging that the products of the same were to go to the deceased's creditors. On January 31,
1918, Crispino Mancao, as administrator of the property of the intestate estate of Hilaria Dejan, was cited to
appear before the Court of First Instance to explain why almost all the deceased's property did not appear in the
inventory.
As to the disputed facts, the prosecution tried to prove the following: In the afternoon of August 10, 1925,
Crispino Mancao, accompanied by three men and several women, approached Graciana Sedimo, Roberto
Villela's tenant, and inquired if there was still corn to be harvested and divided between her and Roberto Villela
by virtue of the lease. The unharvested and undivided portion of the corn field having been pointed out to them,
the accused Crispino Mancao ordered the persons with him to begin harvesting said corn. In view of Crispino
Mancao's actions, Graciana Sedimo ordered her nephew Baldomero Villela to notify Roberto Villela of the
matter. Upon arriving at the corn field Roberto Villela asked the harvesters who ordered them to harvest the
corn. Crispino Mancao, who was in the corn field, replied that he was the one who ordered them to do so and
started towards Roberto Villela. The latter then asked the former if he had an order from the court to harvest the
products. Crispino Mancao struck him with a bamboo stick and said: "This is the order." Roberto Villela dodged
the blow and snatched the cane. Having been deprived of his bamboo stick, Crispino Mancao took hold of his
bolo and attempted to strike Roberto Villela which the latter warded off with a stick he had in his hand. Crispino
Mancao continued to strike Roberto Villela inflicting but slight wounds. Upon being attacked, Roberto Villela
rushed at Crispino Mancao and a hand to hand fight ensued, in the course of which they fell down and the
former succeeded in disarming the latter. After getting up, they continued to fight, Crispino Mancao receiving a
wound on his right hand and another on the right calf, and seeing that he was getting the worst of it, shouted for
help. A men dressed in khaki immediately appeared upon the scene and struck Roberto Villela a blow on the
thigh as a result of which he fell to his knees. While in this position another man, wearing an undershirt,
approached and, after striking him twice on the thigh, ran away. Crispino Mancao then took hold of Roberto
Villela by the hands and while thus held, the accused Ciriaco Aguilar struck him with his sickle in the back as a
result of which Roberto Villela fell to the ground unconscious. Upon Graciana Sedimo and the boy Baldomero
Villela shouting for help, Crispino Mancao left the place and at about 6:30 in the evening presented himself to
the councilman of the barrio, Victor Bienvenido, carrying a bolo in his belt, and informed the latter what had
happened. The justice of the peace of Alonguisan, Cebu, accompanied by the chief of police, upon investigation
at the scene of the combat, found the stick Exhibit A, and Roberto Villela's belt which had been slit with a sharp
instrument. Upon examination of Roberto Villela's body which had been taken to Graciana Sedimo's house, he
found a wound caused by a sharp instrument on the right side of the forehead; a small wound on the right side
of the throat just below the Adam's apple; a large wound above the left knee; two wounds below the left knee,

one over the other; a deep wound on the spine which almost completely severed the lumbar region; five deep
wounds in about the same place and a wound in the palm of the left hand. Conscious of the seriousness of his
condition and the hopelessness of living, Roberto Villela made a declaration which is contained in Exhibit C.
The wounded man died on August 26, 1925 as a result of said wounds.
The defense tried to prove that while the accused and his companions were harvesting the corn on Hilaria
Dejan's land on the afternoon of August 10, 1925, Roberto Villela approached and inquired: "Who ordered the
harvesting of the corn?" that the accused Crispino Mancao replied: "I did it by order of the court and not of my
own accord," and at the same time Roberto Villela drew his bolo and attempted to strike Crispino Mancao a
blow on the neck which the latter succeeded in warding off, only striking the brim of his hat; that Roberto
Villela continued to strike him and he defended himself by means of the stick which he had, but in spite of it he
received a wound on the left hand, the stick falling from his hand; that once unarmed Crispino Mancao rushed
at Roberto Villela and grasped him in order to take the bolo from him; that in doing so Crispino Mancao took
hold of the blade of Roberto Villela's bolo, wounding the first and second fingers of his right hand; that in the
course of the fight both fell to the ground, and as Roberto Villela was the taller and stronger of the two, he
succeeded in pinning Crispino Mancao to the ground, who shouted for help; that the other accused Ciriaco
Aguilar approached and said: "What have you done to him, he has done you no wrong;" that as Roberto Villela
did not pay any attention to him the accused Ciriaco Aguilar struck him on the back with a sickle which he
carried; that as Roberto Villela still did not mind him notwithstanding the wounds he had received on his back,
the accused put the sickle around the former's left thigh and pulled it, forcing him to incline and free Crispino
Mancao; that while Roberto Villela was on top of Crispino Mancao he continued kicking Ciriaco Aguilar who
wounded him on the right thigh with his sickle; that one of the bolo blows of Ciriaco Aguilar aimed at Roberto
Villela hit Crispino Mancao wounding him below the right knee; that Crispino Mancao had no bolo at the time;
that the accused Ciriaco Aguilar is an epileptic and as such is susceptible to fits which deprive him of his reason
and attempt to commit suicide or homicide without being aware of it; that, at times, due to his affliction, the
accused Ciriaco Aguilar speaks at random, particularly when talking for any length of time.
Of the five assignments of error, four relate to findings of fact made by the trial court, and the fifth to the
conclusion of law based upon said findings of fact.
A careful and detailed examination of the oral and documentary evidence presented by both parties, and the
consideration given the antecedents of the case and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
criminal act, convince us that the accused Crispino Mancao was the instigator and aggressor, Roberto Villela
having done nothing but to defendant himself, first disarming the former of his stick with which he was
assaulted, and later of his bolo which he used after having been assaulted, and later of his bolo which he used

after having been deprived of his stick. Roberto Villela might have had the advantage in the fight had not one of
Crispino Mancao's laborers, dressed in khaki, come to his rescue, upon his cry for help, and struck Roberto
Villela on the thigh; then, another man wearing an undershirt who stuck Roberto Villela several times on the left
knee; and, lastly, the accused Ciriaco Aguilar who struck Roberto Villela several blows on the back with his
sickle, one of which nearly severed his spine in the lumbar region which later caused his death.
The allegation of self-defense made by the accused Crispino Mancao is groundless. The evidence sufficiently
proves that he carried a stick and a bolo while Roberto Villela was unarmed. The latter refused to surrender the
lands belonging to the intestate estate of the deceased Hilaria Dejan which were in his possession. And in view
of this and of the fact that it did not appear in the inventory presented by Crispino Mancao, as administrator,
that he was in possession of said lands, the court cited him to appear and explain his side of the matter, and
ordered him to take the necessary steps to obtain possession of said lands. Crispino Mancao ordered the
harvesting of the corn on said lands without any judicial order that effect, knowing full well that Roberto Villela
would object to his doing so. Crispino Mancao's behaviour showed that he was ready to face the consequences
of his act. In this state of mind he undoubtedly became annoyed upon being asked by Roberto Villela, on the
afternoon in question , if he had an order from the court to harvest the corn, and he replied by striking said
Roberto Villela with a stick, saying that was the order of the court.
While it is true that the wounds which caused Roberto Villela's death were not inflicted by Crispino Mancao but
by his coaccused Ciriaco Aguilar, yet said Crispino Mancao having been the instigator and aggressor, and
having called his harvesters to his aid, among them the said Ciriaco Aguilar, he wanted them to carry out, as in
fact they did, the criminal act started by him and, therefore, he is liable not only for his own acts, but also for
the acts of those who aided him.
Neither can the defense of lack of free will of the accused Ciriaco Aguilar, who is an epileptic, be sustained.
While Ciriaco Aguilar, as an epileptic, was susceptible to nervous attacks that may momentarily deprive him of
his mental faculties and lead him to unconsciously attempt to take his own life and the lives of others,
nevertheless, it has not been shown that he was under the influence of an epileptic fit before, during, and
immediately after the aggression.
For the foregoing, we arrive at the conclusion that the said accused are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the
crime imputed to them, each being criminally liable as principal for having taken direct part in the commission
of the crime.

Wherefore, and no error being found in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts,
with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 130210. December 8, 1999] PEOPLE OF

vs. RALPH VELEZ DIAZ alias JIMBOY, accused-appellant.

THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

FRANCIS BART FULACHE, eleven (11) years old, was found dead at Bulacao Bridge, Cebu City, on 4
December 1996. Subsequently, for his death, Ralph Velez Diaz alias "Jimboy" was charged before the Regional
Trial Court[1] of Cebu City with murder in relation to RA 7610.
On 3 December 1996 at around 8:00 oclock in the evening Francis Bart Fulache and his 10-year old
brother Felbart went to Pier 3 to defecate. They were with 30-year old Ralph Velez Diaz, a friend Francis Bart
knew from the hantakan, a gaming place near their store. Francis Bart then invited his brother Felbart to go with
them to Pier 4 but the latter was not inclined so he went home.
Francis Bart did not return home that evening. But Felbart was not alarmed as his brother was used to
going around and doing anything he wanted to without telling him nor asking permission from their
parents. However when Francis Bart still failed to show up in the afternoon of the next day their parents got
worried and started searching for him.[2]
Meanwhile, at noontime of the same day, SPO2 Ramon Villar received a report that a body of a boy
between ten (10) to twelve (12) years of age was found dead at the Bulacao Bridge. The body was in a
sickening state of nudity and physical abuse. The face was covered with a big stone in an apparent attempt to
hide the body.After the routine taking of photographs the body was brought to the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes
for a post-mortem examination.[3]
The autopsy conducted by the PNP Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, revealed that the cause of
death was intracranial hemorrhage, extensive, with skull fracture, traumatic. [4] The examination also disclosed
contusions, abrasions and lacerations all over the boys body the most prominent of which was the comminuted
and depressed fracture on his head. There were, quite notably, multiple lacerations in his rectum.[5]
With respect to the injuries in the boys rectal area, Dr. Cerna opined that a blunt
instrument like a male organ in full erection could have caused them. He claimed that in an attempt to avoid any

violation of his rectum the boy could have suffered more pain considering his soft and tender skin and the
violation would necessarily result in hemorrhage which could cause instantaneous death.[6]
On 4 December 1996 while the Fulache family continued their search for Francis Bart a couple by the
name of Degamo claimed the body of the young victim in the belief that it was their missing son Joseph
Johnson Degamo. After two (2) days however, their missing son came home so the Degamos returned the body
to the funeral parlor. What was good news for the Degamos was bad news for the Fulaches. The body now back
in the funeral home turned out to be their Francis Bart.Bartolome Fulache, father of the Fulache boys, identified
the corpse after hearing over the radio that the cadaver of a boy remained unclaimed at the Cosmopolitan
Funeral Homes.[7]
On 9 December 1996 at around 1:00 oclock in the morning a person acting suspiciously but unknown to
the Fulache spouses went to the wake. There he created a spectacle of himself by reciting poems for Francis
Bart and singing the theme song from the movie The Lion King, and giving emphasis to the word
surrender.Bartolome Fulache reported to the authorities the unusual behavior of their "uninvited guest." The
police immediately went to the Fulache residence to observe the person. They invited him to their headquarters
for further observation and questioning. He went with them voluntarily. He was identified later as herein
accused-appellant Ralph Velez Diaz.
Before conducting their investigation the police authorities as well as a certain Atty. Abellanosa [8] apprised
accused-appellant of his constitutional rights inCebuano, a language known to accused-appellant, in the
presence of men from the media [9] who themselves affixed their signatures in the sworn statement of accusedappellant to attest to the fact that he was duly informed of his rights under the Constitution. The investigation
proceeded where accused-appellant revealed his sexual perversity by narrating in detail how he perpetrated the
ghastly crime against Francis Bart.
But this extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant was however declared inadmissible by the trial
court on the ground that Atty. Abellanosa who assisted accused-appellant during the custodial investigation was
not an independent counsel of the accused as required under the Constitution.[10]
The following day, between 11:00 oclock in the morning and 12:00 noon, a reenactment was made at the
scene of the crime. Those present were accused-appellant Ralph Velez Diaz, Felbart Fulache, police officers
Monilar,
Montebon
and
Tumakay,
and
people
from
the
ABS-CBN, Sun
Star
Daily, Freeman andSuperbalita. There accused-appellant demonstrated, with Felbart as victim, sexually abused
Francis Bart and later killed him. The reenactment was published in the 11 December 1996 issue of the Sun

Star Daily, but because only an unauthenticated photocopy of the newspaper was presented in court, it was
likewise declared inadmissible in evidence. But the trial court nevertheless took judicial notice thereof.
On his part, accused-appellant sought to establish the defense of insanity by presenting Dr. Wilson
Tibayan, a government physician connected with the National Center for Mental Health. The doctors testimony
however did not help accused-appellants case because although he admitted having initially categorized
accused-appellant as insane, the doctor eventually diagnosed accused-appellant to be afflicted
with pedophilia, a mental disorder not synonymous with insanity. He explained that pedophilia is a sexual
disorder wherein the subject has strong, recurrent and uncontrollable sexual and physical fantasies about
children which he tries to fulfill, especially when there are no people around. He claimed, however, that despite
his affliction the subject could distinguish right from wrong. In fact, he maintained that pedophilia could be
committed without necessarily killing the victim although injuries might be inflicted on the victim in an effort
to repel any resistance.
Also worthy of note was Dr. Tibayans testimony that accused-appellant had disclosed to him that
his pedophilic acts were done in revenge as he himself as a child was also a victim of sexual abuse. Finally, Dr.
Tibayan declared that accused-appellants affliction had a very low prognosis thus making him very dangerous
to society.
On 11 April 1997 the court a quo found accused-appellant Ralph Velez Diaz guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder in relation to sexual abuse (sodomy) of a child, attended by treachery. He was sentenced to
death and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P250,000.00 as moral
damages,P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P40,000.00 as reimbursement for funeral expenses.[11]

beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and (b) imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death. It is the
contention of accused-appellant that if he is guilty his guilt would only be for homicide and not murder as the
qualifying circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation are absent.
The contention is untenable. We agree with the trial court that the crime committed by accused-appellant
was murder even in the absence of the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation because treachery and
abuse of superior strength were present - either of which qualified the crime to murder.
"There is treachery or alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. [12] In the instant case,
treachery characterized the killing of eleven (11)-year old Francis Bart. Well-settled is the doctrine that the
killing of children who by reason of their tender years cannot be expected to put up a defense is considered
attended with treachery even if the manner of attack is not precisely shown. [13] Thus, the killing of Francis Bart
must be deemed ipso facto qualified by treachery by reason of his inherent defenselessness. [14]
Likewise, there is a clear case of abuse of superior strength given the blatant inequality of strength
between the victim and accused-appellant. [15] However, this cannot be appreciated even as a generic aggravating
circumstance being necessarily absorbed in treachery.[16]

The trial court was convinced that notwithstanding the exclusion of the extrajudicial confession of
accused-appellant and the absence of any eyewitness to the crime, there were enough pieces of circumstantial
evidence to support his conviction, to wit: (a) the testimony of 10-year old Felbart that he saw his brother last
alive in the company of accused-appellant; (b) the physical evidence of sexual abuse through sodomy
committed against the victim; (c) the exculpatory plea of insanity which only tended to negate liability but was
an admission of guilt; (d) the reenactment of the crime by accused-appellant the details of which could not have
been known to anybody but himself; and, (e) the fact that accused-appellant voluntarily confessed to the crime
without any evidence of coercion, duress or intimidation exerted upon him.

Anent the second assigned error, we agree with accused-appellant that he should not be meted the supreme
penalty of death. A careful scrutiny of the records shows that the Information charged him only with murder
qualified by treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation. It failed to mention the
commission of sexual abuse or sodomy on the victim. The Information designated the crime as murder in
relation to RA 7610, but as a rule, what controls is not the designation of the offense but its description in the
complaint or information.[17] The real nature of the criminal charge cannot be determined from the caption or
preamble of the information or from the mere reference to a particular provision of law alleged to have been
violated because they are conclusions of law. On the contrary, it is determined by the actual recital of facts in
the complaint or information. The technical name given by the fiscal appearing in the title of the information
does not determine the character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the information. [18] Thus, even
if there is positive proof of sexual abuse accused-appellant cannot be convicted therefor as it was not so alleged
in the information.

The case is now before this Court for automatic review pursuant to Art. 47, par. 2 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended by RA 7659. Accused-appellant submits that the trial court erred in (a) finding him guilty

We cannot share the view of the Solicitor General that the trial court did not apply the provisions of RA
7610 in imposing the death penalty but merely made reference to them as sexual abuse, which was established

to have been committed by accused-appellant. He contends that the sodomy could be considered as an
aggravating circumstance for adding ignominy to the crime as the sexual abuse certainly augmented the wrong
done to the victim thus unduly increasing his pain.
We do not agree. The trial court was clear in declaring that [c]onsidering the aggravating circumstance
of alevosia and the seriousness of the sexual assault on the victim (in itself a heinous crime), this court after a
soul-searching and prayerful consideration has arrived at a firm resolution to impose the maximum penalty of
death."[19] Moreover, "ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and
obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime." [20]Thus, for ignominy to be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in the instant case, it must be shown that the sexual assault on Francis Bart was done by accusedappellant to put the former to shame before killing him. This is clearly not the case here for accused-appellants
intention was shown to be the commission of sexual abuse on the victim as an act of revenge for his similar
experience as a child. Surely, the killing was done to eliminate the only witness to his crime.

The civil indemnity for the death of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 is upheld in accordance with
recent jurisprudence,[23] as well as the award of actual damages in the amount of P40,000.00 representing
funeral expenses. The award of P250,000.00 as moral damages is excessive warranting its reduction
toP100,000.00 considering that the purpose of the award is to compensate the heirs for injuries to their feelings
and not to enrich them. Similarly, the amount ofP100,000.00 as exemplary damages is reduced to P25,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the 11 April 1997 Decision of the RTC-Br. 15, Cebu City, is MODIFIED . Accusedappellant Ralph Velez Diaz is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua instead of death. He is also ordered to pay the legal heirs of Francis Bart Fulache the amount
ofP50,000.00 as death indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P40,000.00 as reimbursement for funeral expenses. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

We should not be misunderstood for our failure to hold accused-appellant responsible for committing
sexual abuse on his victim despite strong evidence in support thereof. We have no choice as our hands are tied
by the failure of the public prosecutor to file the appropriate information for accused-appellants sexual assault
on the victim.
G.R. No. 125334 January 28, 1998
The defense, invoking the doctrine of parens patriae, also appeals to this Court for the psychiatric
examination and evaluation of accused-appellant if indeed he is found to have committed the crime
charged. The defense emphasizes the fact that accused-appellant was institutionalized twice within a
considerable period in the National Center for Mental Health; consequently, there is no certainty that he was
sane when he committed the crime imputed to him.
We cannot grant the request. When accused-appellant was committed to the National Center for Mental
Health, he was not diagnosed as insane but was suffering from pedophilia. Thus, there is no doubt in our mind
that he was sane during his two-year confinement in the center, pedophilia being dissimilar to insanity.
A defendant in a criminal case who interposes the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of
establishing that fact, i.e., he was insane at the very moment when the crime was committed. [21] He must prove it
by clear and positive evidence.[22] In the instant case, the defense of insanity as an exempting circumstance was
not established and did not overcome the legal presumption that a person's acts are of his own free will and
intelligence. The settled rule is that the onus probandirests upon him who invokes insanity as a defense, and the
defense failed to discharge this burden. Thus, the conviction of accused-appellant no doubt is in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRESENCIO TABUGOCA

This is an automatic review of the joint decision 1 rendered by Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan,
Isabela in Criminal Cases Nos. 2386 and 2387 finding accused-appellant Cresencio Tabugoca guilty of two
counts of rape committed against his very own daughters and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in the first case and the death penalty in the second.
In two informations simultaneously filed on January 20, 1995 in the aforesaid trial court, accused-appellant was
accused of raping his daughters in two separate incidents. The information in Criminal Case No. 2386 charges
him as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of March, 1992 in the municipality of Naguilian, province of Isabela, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, by means of force, intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge with his own
daughter JACQUELINE A. TABUGOCA, a girl of 14 years old (sic), against the latter's will and consent. 2
The information in Criminal Case No. 2387 alleges:
That on or about the 9th day of December, 1994, in the municipality of Naguilian, province of Isabela,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge with
his own daughter JINKY A. TABUGOCA, a girl of 12 years old (sic), against the latter's will and consent. 3
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty when duly arraigned separately on the two indictments with the assistance
of counsel de officio. 4 After a consolidated trial on the merits, on March 15, 1996 the court a quo rendered the
decision now under mandatory review. 5 The commission of the two felonies was found by the lower court to
have been attended by the aggravating circumstances of relationship and intoxication purposely sought by
accused-appellant to embolden him to commit the same.
In Criminal Case No. 2386, accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
directed to indemnity Jacqueline Tabugoca in the sum of P50,000.00. In Criminal Case No. 2387, wherein the
crime charged was committed after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 on December 31, 1993, 6 he was
condemned to suffer the capital punishment of death and ordered to indemnify Jinky Tabugoca in the sum of
P50,000.00.
The trial court arrived at the conclusion that, beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant had committed the
crimes charged on the bases of the testimonies of the victims, as corroborated by the medical reports, and the
testimony of the physician who examined them.
The respective complainants in Criminal Cases Nos. 2386 and 2387, namely, Jacqueline Tabugoca and Jinky
Tabugoca, are the daughters of accused-appellant. 7 This was not denied by him. He even expressly declared
during his testimony that Jacqueline 8 and Jinky 9 are his daughters.
Complainant Jacqueline testified that she and her three younger sisters, Janet, Jinky and Jewel, lived under the
sole care of their father after their mother died on August 28, 1991. While she and her sisters were sleeping in
their house at Barangay Roxas, Naguilian, Isabela at around 10 o'clock in the evening of March 28, 1992, she

was roused by her father who asked her to scratch his back. It turned out, however, that accused-appellant had
other intentions that night aside from relief from his itchy discomfort.
While Jacqueline was thus scratching her father's back, he told her to stay and wait for a while. Without any
intimation, accused-appellant then removed her shorts and underwear and made her lie down beside him.
Jacqueline could only cry at this point. As soon as she was completely disrobed, accused-appellant inserted his
penis into her vagina. With his manhood inside his daughter, accused-appellant warned her not to tell anyone of
his dastardly act if she would not want to be harmed (makaala ka kaniak). Complainant was so petrified
with fear that she did not even dare ask her father why he was sexually molesting her. 10
Jacqueline was twelve years and three months old at the time of the incident, she having been born on
December 27, 1979. 11
Because of the incident, Jacqueline harbored ill-feelings against her father, and she reportedly became the
object of gossip by her classmates in school. 12 However, she did not tell anyone about her ordeal at the hands of
her own father until she learned that the same misfortune had befallen her sister, Jinky.
In Criminal Case No. 2387, complainant Jinky declared in the court below that her father tried to rape her in the
early morning of December 9, 1994. While she was cleaning some articles in their house, accused-appellant
approached her and then took off his clothes. He then ordered Jinky to lie down and he removed her shorts and
panty. Thereafter, he inserted his penis into her vagina. Jinky cried and complained to her father that she was in
pain. Accused-appellant explained that it is ordinary to feel pain because it was her first time to experience
coitus.
After a while, he did not persist anymore in his sexual pursuit. Appellant lay down beside Jinky and told her
that they will continue the following day. At dawn of December 10, 1994, accused-appellant made another
attempt to carnally molest Jinky. This time, however, Jinky resisted, thereby causing appellant to just lie down
and leave her alone. 13
Jinky was only 12 years and nine months old at the time of the incident, she having been born on March
5,1982. 14
Later, on the same day, while Jacqueline and Jinky were watching television at their grandmother's house
nearby, Jinky confided to her grandmother about the sexual abuses of her father against her. Upon hearing the

revelations of her sister, Jacqueline also disclosed to her grandmother her own experience with her father two
years before. 15

The above findings suggest that full penetration was not successful although attempts were done based on the
swelling vulva of the victim.

The victims' grandmother, Perlita Alejandro, forthwith brought her granddaughters to the police authorities and
then to the Municipal Health Officer of Naguilian for physical examination. The two were examined on
December 12, 1994 by Dr. Maryann M. Fontanares. 16

During her testimony in court, Dr. Fontanares explained that the lacerations found on Jacqueline's hymen were
the result of sexual intercourse which happened approximately on the date alleged. She added that, aside from
the swelling of Jinky's labia, she also found out that they were tender and reddish. 19

For Criminal Case No. 2386, with respect to Jacqueline, the doctor reduced her findings into a medico-legal
certificate 17 attesting as follows:

After the examination, Jacqueline executed a criminal complaint 20 for rape against accused-appellant, while
Jinky charged accused-appellant with frustrated rape in her own criminal complaint. 21

LEGAL FINDINGS: 1. PE findings: essentially normal except for the anxiety that the victim exhibited

At the trial, accused-appellant raised the defense of his having been completely unaware of what transpired on
March 28, 1992 and on December 9, 1994 as he was very drunk on those occasions.

2. Internal Examination : multiple healed lacerations/scars at 3, 5, 6 and 9 o'clock positions of the hymen.
According to him, he does not know if he had sexually assaulted his daughter, Jacqueline. He only came to
know of the complaint of Jacqueline against him after the policemen who arrested him on December 10, 1994
told him thereof. On the same day, Jacqueline allegedly informed him that he was drunk on March 28, 1992, but
he claimed that he could not recall if indeed he drank liquor that day. He then surmised that perhaps he did
drink liquor based only on the supposed statement of Jacqueline. 22

: introitus admits two fingers with ease

. . . no other findings
noted . . .
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Impression : The above findings suggest that the victim was forcibly abused and the incident, the first one
happened long ago based on the healed scars of the hymen.
For
Criminal
Case
18
certificate of the doctor states:

No.

2387,

regarding

Jinky,

LEGAL FINDINGS:
1. The vulva is edematous although the hymen is intact. . . . no other findings noted . . . .
RECOMMENDATIONS:

the

medico-legal

With regard to the complaint of Jinky, accused-appellant similarly declared in the lower court that he drank
liquor in their house on December 9, 1994, Again, he claimed that he could not recollect the ensuing events
after he had finished drinking. He was allegedly merely in formed by the arresting policemen on December 10,
1994 that Jinky was accusing him of attempted rape.
Jacqueline, on cross-examination, stated that her father smelled of liquor and may have taken some drinks at the
time of the incident. 23 On the part of Jinky, she testified in turn that her father was drunk on the night of
December 9, 1994.24
Accused-appellant claimed that he learned to drink liquor after his wife died on August 28, 1991. Prior to his
wife's death, he was not used to drinking alcoholic beverages. He later resorted to alcohol whenever he would
remember his deceased wife, but he allegedly drank only once in a while.
Accused-appellant also opined that Jacqueline and Jinky must have filed their respective complaints in order to
get back at him for castigating or whipping them whenever they committed mistakes.

In view of the gravity of the crimes charged and of the penalty imposable therefor, we patiently considered and
thoroughly deliberated on all the arguments and defenses presented by defendant-appellant not only in his brief
but even in his memorandum before the trial court, with all the possible implications and possibilities thereof,
no matter how specious and ridiculous some of them may appear to be. We have likewise taken into account the
socio-economic status and the apparent intellectual level of accused-appellant as may be gleaned from the
record.
After much thought and reflection, we find no reason to depart from the judgment of the court a quo.
On its own, the defense presented by accused-appellant before the lower court is pitifully and completely
unavailing. In law and in truth, he neither denied the charges against him nor raised any absolutory cause in his
defense. His feeble excuse of having been under the influence of liquor in order to disclaim knowledge of his
felonious acts does not inspire belief al all. The defense did not even comply with the evidentiary elements
whereby he could claim intoxication as a mitigating circumstance. The categorical and untraversed testimonies
of his daughters as to how he committed the bestial outrage, and their identification of accused-appellant as
their defiler, remain uncontroverted and fully establish the charges.
Accused-appellant's pretext that he could not remember the events of March 28, 1992 and December 4, 1994 is
rendered more effete in light of the arguments in his memorandum 25 submitted before the lower court. There, he
claimed exemption from criminal liability on the ground of insanity brought about by intoxication, invoking
therefor some dicta in American jurisprudence.
We have held that the law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity has necessarily the consequent burden of proving it. 26 Further, in order that
insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete depreciation of intelligence in the
commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not preclude imputability. 27
Accused-appellant has utterly failed to overthrow the presumption of sanity. The defense did not present any
expert witness, any psychiatric evaluation report, or any psychological findings or evidence regarding his
mental condition at the time of the commission of the offenses. Accused-appellant's charade of amnesia is
evidently a desperate gambit for exculpation. Yet, amnesia, in and of itself, is no defense to a criminal charge
unless it is shown by competent proof that the accused did not know the nature and quality of his action and that
it was wrong. Failure to remember is in itself no proof of the mental condition of the accused when the crime
was performed. 28

Also in the same memorandum, accused-appellant posits that he cannot be prosecuted for rape in Criminal Case
No. 2386 because the criminal complaint of Jinky only accuses him of frustrated rape. With such a charge, he
argues that the trial court's jurisdiction to punish him is limited only to said offense and cannot cover
consummated rape.
This is a meritless argument. When it is said that the filing of the complaint by the offended party in cases of
rape is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding, but it is not
the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The court's jurisdiction is vested in it by
the Judiciary Law. 29 Since the penalty for the rape in Criminal Case No. 2387 is properly within the jurisdiction
of the regional trial court, 30 then Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela may hear and try the
offense charged in the information and impose the punishment for it.
In People vs. Bangalao, et al., 31 we convicted an accused of rape committed against a minor as charged in
theinformation, despite the allegation in the complaint that the rape was committed through force and
intimidation, on this ratiocination:
It must be borne in mind that complaints are prepared in municipalities, in most cases without the advice or help
of competent counsel. When the case reaches the Court of First Instance, the Fiscal usually conducts another
investigation, and thereafter files the information which the results thereof justify The right and power of the
court to try the accused for the crime of rape attaches upon the filing of the complaint, and a change in the
allegations thereof as (to) the manner of committing the crime should not operate to divest the court of
jurisdiction already acquired.
In his brief, 32 accused-appellant contends that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution. In support of this lone assignment of error, he seeks to capitalize, among others, on the failure of
Jacqueline to immediately report the crime. Such failure, appellant contends, renders doubtful the truth of her
accusation.
The failure of complainant Jacqueline to immediately report the incident to the authorities does not necessarily
cast doubt on the credibility of the charge in Criminal Case No. 2386. It is a settled decisional rule that delay in
reporting a rape case committed by a father against his daughter due to threats is justified. 33 In the numerous
cases of rape that have reached this Court, we find that it is not uncommon for young girls to conceal, for some
time, the assaults on their honor because of the rapist's threat on their lives. 34

In many instances, rape victims simply suffer in silence. With more reason would a girl ravished by her own
father keep quiet about what befell her. Furthermore, it is unfair to judge the action of children who have
undergone traumatic experiences by the norms of behavior expected of mature individuals under the same
circumstances. 35
In People vs. Melivo, 36 we declared that:
. . . Delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the
victim. A rape victim's actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. It is this fear,
springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build a climate of extreme psychological terror,
which would, he hopes, numb his victim into silence and submissiveness. Incestuous rape magnifies this terror,
because the perpetrator is a person normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim. Furthermore,
in incest, access to the victim is guaranteed by the blood relationship, proximity magnifying the sense of
helplessness and the degree of fear.

Mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino family invent a charge that
would only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their own family and make them the object of gossip
among their classmates and friends. It is unbelievable that Jacqueline would fabricate a serious criminal charge
just to get even with her father and to empathize with her sister. The sisters would not contrive stories of
defloration and charge their own father with rape unless these stories are true. For that matter, no young Filipina
of decent repute would falsely and publicly admit that she had been ravished and abused considering the social
stigma thereof. 37

This Court further trenchantly observed in the same decision that:

At their tender age, Jacqueline and Jinky needed sustenance and support from their father. They certainly were
aware that they would be deprived of a provider once their accusations against him are proven. In fact, the
consequences of filing a case of rape are so serious that an ordinary woman would have second thoughts about
filing charges against her assailant. It requires much more for a thirteen-year old or a twelve-year old provincial
lass to devise a story of rape, have her private parts examined, subject herself to the indignity of a public trial
and endure a lifetime of ridicule. Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological
depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would at the least put her own father for the rest of his
remaining life in jail and drag herself and the rest of her family into a lifetime of shame. 38

In all of these and other cases of incestuous rape, the perpetrator takes full advantage of his blood relationship,
ascendancy and influence over the victim, both to commit the sexual assault and to intimidate the victim into
silence. Unfortunately for some perpetrators of incestuous rape, their victims manage to break out from the
cycle of fear and terror. In People vs. Molero we emphasized that "an intimidated person cowed into submitting
to a series of repulsive acts may acquire some courage as she grows older and finally state that enough is
enough, the depraved malefactor must be punished.

Thus, the unfounded claim of evil motives on the part of the victims would not destroy the credibility reposed
upon them by the trial court because, as we have held, a rape victim's testimony is entitled to greater weight
when she accuses a close relative of having been raped her, as in the case of a daughter against her
father. 39 Furthermore, the testimony of the victim who was only twelve years old at the time of the rape as to
the circumstances thereof must be given weight, for it is an accepted rule that testimonies of rape victims who
are young and of tender age are credible. 40

We cannot therefore expect young Jacqueline to disregard the threat to her life and immediately cry rape in the
face of the threats of her father and his constant presence in their home.

Accused-appellant also faults the trial court for not duly appreciating the testimony of Jinky to the effect that he
only attempted to rape her and then desisted after she felt some pain. In relation to this, appellant maintains that
there was no rape in Criminal Case No. 2387 because of the absence of lacerations on Jinky's vagina as found
after medicolegal examination.

Accused-appellant next asserts in his brief that Jacqueline filed her complaint in Criminal Case No. 2386 only
out of sympathy with, and by way of revenge for what her father had done to, her younger sister. We find it
opportune to discuss, together with this contention, the lame excuse of the defense before the trial court that
Jacqueline and Jinky filed their complaints because they suffered beatings from accused-appellant. We find that
the motive imputed to the sisters are grossly implausible and insufficient to make them falsely charge their own
father. It is highly inconceivable that they would claim having been raped just because their father spanks them
whenever they commit mistakes.

It is axiomatic in criminal law that in order to sustain a conviction for rape, full penetration of the female genital
organ is not required. It is enough that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ within the labia of the
pudendum of the female organ. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without
rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices to warrant conviction for rape. The rupture of the hymen or
laceration of any part of the woman's genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for rape. Thus, a finding that
the victim's hymen is intact and has no sign of laceration does not negate a finding that rape was committed. 41

Jinky, being young and unschooled in the ways of the law, may have entertained the notion that complete penile
penetration is necessary when she declared that her father only attempted to rape her. She was, of course, not in
any position to legally distinguish consummated from attempted rape. This matter concerns a conclusion of law
addressed to the judgment of the courts. The declaration of Jinky that her father inserted his penis into her
vagina and the finding of swelling in her labia are enough to prove that rape was committed as these are telltale
signs of entry into the vaginal lips.

In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former's moral ascendancy and influence over the
latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. That ascendancy or influence necessarily flows from the father's
parental authority, which the Constitution and the laws recognize, support and enhance, as well as from the
children's duty to obey and observe reverence and respect towards their parents. Such reverence and respect are
deeply ingrained in the minds of Filipino children and are recognized by law. Abuse of both by a father can
subjugate his daughter's will, thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants.

Accused-appellant contends in his memorandum that the prosecution failed to prove the employment of force
and intimidation against complainants in both criminal cases. Corollary to his reliance on the absence of force
or intimidation, he asseverates in his brief that the absence of resistance from Jinky suffices to hold that the
sexual intercourse was voluntary. The defense then begs for this Court's liberality in considering that Jinky was
moved to engage in copulation by a spirit of adventurousness.

Thus two forms of intimidation under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code were recognized in Matrimonio,
that is (1) threats and (2) overpowering moral influence. Accused-appellant exercised such moral influence over
herein complainants. Being the victims' father, accused-appellant had that moral ascendancy and influence over
his daughters which, in itself, was sufficient to intimidate and force them to submit to his desires. 46 The fact that
no resistance was offered by Jinky did not in any way qualify the coitus as freely consented to by her. Judging
accused-appellant's threats and intimidation in the context of Jinky's understanding at the time of the rape, it can
readily be concluded that her will to resist was overcome by her father's strong parental authority.

There is no doubt that the appellant had carnal knowledge of his two daughters. The fact of sexual intercourse
was indubitably shown by the testimonies of the complainants, the medical report and testimony of Dr.
Fontanares, and even by the alternative submission of appellant that his sexual intercourse with Jinky was
consensual. Clinging to his vain hope for acquittal, he then claims that the element of force or intimidation
essential in rape is lacking in the cases filed against him.
In direct refutation of appellant's theory, we once again declare that in incestuous rape, it is not necessary that
actual force and intimidation be employed. It is sufficient that the accused exercised a pervasive influence and
control over the victim. 42 Even if there was no violence employed in the sexual congress, the moral influence of
appellant over the complainant suffices to constitute it into the crime of rape. 43
In People vs. Mabunga, 44 where we convicted the accused for raping his thirteen-year old daughter, we held
that:
. . . Hence, even assuming that force or intimidation had not been actually employed, the crime of rape was
nevertheless committed. The absence of violence or offer of resistance would not be significant because of the
overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the father over the daughter which takes the place of violence
and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by an accused having no blood relationship with the
victim.
The rationale for such a ruling can be found in our discourse in People vs. Matrimonio 45 to the effect that:

As we held in the aforecited case of Mabunga, in rape the manner, form and tenacity of resistance of the victim
therein are dependent on a number of factors, among which are the age and size of the victim, as well as of the
aggressor himself; the degree of actual force and intimidation employed; and, of utmost importance, the
relationship between the rapist and his prey. Complementary thereto, we ruled in People vs. Navarrete 47 that
It must be emphasized also that considering the relationship between father and daughter, the degree of force or
intimidation need not be the same as in other cases of rape where the parties involved have no relationship at all
with each other; because the father exercises strong moral and physical control over his daughter.
Parenthetically, we digress to observe that for rape to exist it is not necessary that the intimidation employed be
so great or of such character as could not be resisted. It is only necessary that the intimidation be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's
perception and judgment at the time of rape and not by any hard and fast rule. It is therefore enough that it
produces fear fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would
happen to her at the moment or thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident.
Intimidation would also explain why there are no traces of struggle which would indicate that the victim fought
off her attacker. 48
With the previous beatings Jinky received from accused-appellant, resistance could not have been expected
from her. She dared not risk another whipping from her father should she defy his advances. Coupled with the

respect demanded from Jinky by her father no matter how unreasoning, the gap between their ages, and Jinky's
own youthful immaturity, the lack or resistance from Jinky becomes easily understandable. And, if resistance
would after all be futile because of continuing intimidation, as in the strong moral dominance of accusedappellant, then offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault as to make the victim's participation in
the sexual act voluntary. 49
The insistence of accused-appellant that Jinky consented to his advances is downright ridiculous. It is hard to
believe that a daughter would simply give in to her father's lascivious designs had not her resistance been
overpowered. 50 If Jinky had consented to the sexual intercourse, she would have kept it to herself and not
denounce it immediately as rape. Jinky's crying during the sexual act, and her evasion of her father's advances
the following day, belie his pretense that she voluntarily participated in the intercourse. There is no showing
whatsoever that complainant Jinky is a sexually perverted woman or one of extremely loose morals.
Consent obtained by fear of personal violence is no consent at all. Though a man puts no hand on a woman, yet
if by the use of mental and moral coercion the accused so overpowers her mind out of fear that as a result she
dare not resist the dastardly act inflicted on her person, accused is guilty of the crime imputed to him. 51 On the
other hand, it is hard to accept that Jinky was that audacious as to seek and satisfy worldly pleasures from her
own father. To citeNavarrete again, no daughter in her right mind would voluntarily submit herself to her own
father unless there was force or intimidation, as a sexual act between a father and a daughter is extremely
revolting.
On the matter of the imposable penalties in the crime of rape when attended by modifying circumstances, it is
opportune to make some clarifications in light of succeeding amendments to Article 335 of the Code. With
respect to simple rape, whether in the original codal provision or after the amendments thereto, the penalty
being the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua is not affected by the presence of ordinary mitigating
or aggravating circumstances. However, under the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 4111 consisting
of the so-called "qualified" form of rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
or when an attempted or frustrated rape is accompanied by homicide, for which the penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death, the presence of generic mitigating or aggravating circumstances will determine whether the
lesser or the higher penalty will be imposed. 52
Republic Act No. 7659 has added seven more attendant circumstances which, in effect also create other variants
of "qualified" rape punishable with the single indivisible penalty of death. In line with the immediately
preceding observation, the presence of ordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances would be of no
moment since the death penalty shall be imposed regardless of the number of any of them. 53 The only possible

basis for a reduction of such penalty under the rules for graduating penalties under the Code is the presence of
a privileged mitigating circumstance.54
Now, it used to be the accepted doctrine that in crimes against chastity, such as rape, relationship was always
aggravating. 55 However, among the "qualifying" circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 is the
situation when the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim. Obviously, in such a factual milieu, relationship having been used as an element in that
"qualified" form of rape, the same circumstance cannot be used again to aggravate the penalty to be imposed on
the offender. 56
In the case at bar, therefore, relationship cannot be applied as an aggravating circumstance. However, we are
persuaded to affirm the attendance of intoxication as an aggravating circumstance on the additional finding that
it was habitual on the part of accused-appellant. Indeed, he admitted in his memorandum 57 that he took liquor to
forget the memory of his wife ever since she died on August 28, 1991. Such admission, together with the
declarations of his daughters and his own testimony in court that he was also inebriated on the two occasions
when he separately raped the victims, reasonably yields the inference that accused-appellant was a habitual
drunkard.
Yet, even on the remote assumption ex gratia argument that intoxication can be considered as a mitigating
circumstance in his favor, its presence would not affect the two penalties imposed by the court below. Being
indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death must be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. The rule, however, is slightly
different with respect to the civil liability.
On this point, we note that the lower court did not award moral and exemplary damages to either Jacqueline or
Jinky Tabugoca. Having suffered wounded feelings and social humiliation, 58 Jacqueline is entitled to an award
of moral damages therefor. 59 In view of the presence of an aggravating circumstance, exemplary damages
should also be awarded to her. 60 An appellate proceeding in a criminal case, whether at the instance of the
accused or by mandatory provision of law, throws the whole case open for review, hence this modification by
reason of the oversight of the trial court.
On the other hand, while Jinky is entitled to actual or compensatory damages, no moral damages may be
awarded to her because no sufficient evidence was introduced in the court a quo which would have entitled her

thereto. 61However, exemplary damages call be awarded to her since she has been correctly granted
compensatory damages and the offense against her was committed with an aggravating circumstance. 62
WHEREFORE, the judgment of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 2386 and 2387 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-appellant Cresencio Tabugoca is
further ordered (1) in Criminal Case No. 2386, to pay Jacqueline Tabugoca the additional amounts of
P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (2) in Criminal Case No. 2387, to
pay Jinky Tabugoca the further amount of P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
Two Members of the Court voted to impose on appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659,
upon the finality or this decision, let the records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Office of the
President of the Philippines for possible exercise of the pardoning power.

The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife, but that he loved her
dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for assaulting them.
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged, were not
voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-37673

It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the defendant had a quarrel over a
glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight, and when
he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the commission of the
crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the afternoon he had a severe
stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was then when he fell asleep. The defendant
states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held
his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come
down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him
that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As
his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.

March 31, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. POTENCIANO TANEO

Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores, municipality of Ormoc,
Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors were entertained in the
house. Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep
and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop
him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to
attack his father after which he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant, died
five days later as a result of her wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he was sentenced by the
trial court to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum
of P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.

In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a motive for
committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not known to
us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden away and inaccessible
to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme moral perversion may lead a man commit a
crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. But under the special circumstances of the
case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the
fact that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under whose protection he lived,
besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the
evidence presented, we find not only a lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts
complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that considering
the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of an hallucination and
not in his right mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the deceased was direct result of the
defendant's act performed in order to inflict it. Nevertheless we may say further that the evidence does not
clearly show this to have been the case, but that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody saw how the

wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his wife. He only seemed to have heard her
say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the
defendant at the door of the room as he was coming out. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his
wife but he was defending himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in
desperation, he stabbed himself.

After trial the court below found the defendant guilty of parricide and considering in his favor the mitigating
circumstances of obfuscation and lack of instruction, sentenced him to suffer fourteen years and eight months
and one day of cadena temporal with the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay the costs. From this
judgment the defendant appealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the courts finds that the
defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be confined
in the Government insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds that his liberty
would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

The appellant's argument in his favor is that he was in a state of somnambulism when he attacked his wife. We
do not think that this theory can serve as a defense in the present case. By order of the trial court the defendant
was placed under observation for some time by Dr. Luis B. Gomez, but the doctor apparently did not discover
any somnambulism on the part of the defendant. A defense of that character must be proven and such proof is
lacking in this case.

G.R. No. L-33877 February 6, 1931

The defense that the offense charged was committed by the accused during the prevalence of or in a state of
somnambulism has been recognized; but the latest holding of courts is to the effect that it does not constitute a
defense other than that embraced in a plea of insanity. (Wharton's Criminal Law, Vol. 1, p. 574.)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JUAN N. GIMENA,DefendantAppellant.

We can find no error in the decision of the court below and the appealed judgment is therefore affirmed with the
costs against the appellant. So ordered.

The defendant Juan N. Gimena is charged with the crime of parricide. It appears from the evidence that on the
morning of April 9, 1930, in the municipality of Ronda, Province of Cebu, the defendant helped his father-inlaw, Gregorio Diana, in cleaning bamboo. After having finished the cleaning he went home and upon arriving
there he found his wife Crispina Diana and a child 2 weeks of age sleeping together on the floor. Shortly
afterwards Gregorio Diana heard his daughter, the defendant's wife, cry for help. He went to the defendant's
house which was close to his own and there found the defendant attacking Crispina with a bolo. With the
assistance of Teodulo Gimena, a brother of the defendant, Gregorio succeeded in disarming the defendant and
tied him to a post of the house. The matter was then reported to the authorities and the justice of the peace, the
chief of police, a sanitary inspector and a policeman appeared on the scene. The justice of the peace asked the
defendant why he had attacked his wife and received the answer that it was because she had given the sum of
P2.70 to one Apolinar Sereno whom he, the defendant, suspected of illicit relations with the wife. A few hours
later on the same day Crispina Diana died and the examination subsequently made disclosed ten wounds in
different parts of her body.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

March 21, 1905, G.R. No. 1749

THE UNITED STATES vs. FORTUNATO ODICTA

In a complaint dated October 16, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Capiz charged Fortunato Odicta with the crime
of parricide. The complaint stated that on the morning of the 4th of said months the defendant, without any
reason therefor, killed his wife, Juliana Obafial, his two children, Honorato and Maria, and the young man
named Martin Abuna, 15 years of age, who lived in the house of defendant, in the barrio of Matangcong, town
of Sigma, Province of Capiz; all contrary to law.
The trial was had in pursuance of the aforesaid complaint, and as a result of the evidence adduced in same the
court sentenced the defendant to the death penalty, without stating anything as regards the costs.

Notwithstanding the fact that the defendant did not appeal, this case has been brought here en consulta in
accordance with the law.

By these facts duly proven in the case and from the testimony of the eyewitnesses the execution of the grave
crime of triple parricide and murder becomes evident.

From the evidence adduced during the trial, it is fully proven that Fortunato Odicta, between 3 and 4 o'clock on
the morning of said day, killed his wife, Juliana Obafial, his two children, Honorato and Maria, and the young
man, Martin Abuna; that the bodies of the two children and this young man were found inside of the defendant's
house, and also three fighting cocks which had been killed; that outside of the house, and near the kitchen of the
adjoining side of the house, the corpse of his wife, Juliana, was found, due to the fact that before her death she
ran from her house to the fact that before her death she ran from her house to call for help at the adjoining house
of Nicasio Castillo and there fell dead near the kitchen; that, according to the autopsy held by the physician on
the body of Juliana, there was a large and deep wound below the left armpit; that the wound was of a serious
nature and was a mortal wound; that the one wound in the neck of the child Honorato, and the two wounds on
the neck of the child Maria and the one on the right shoulder, and the wound found on the neck of the young an,
Martin Abuna, were also of a serious and mortal nature; that these wounds were inflicted with a bolo; and that
two bolos stained with blood were found on the floor of the house.

"He who shall kill his father, mother, child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any other of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be punished as a parricide with the penalty of cadena perpetua to death." (Art.
402 of the Penal Code.) Taking for granted that the young man, Martin Abana, was killed while asleep, because
the attack was made between 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning, it is undeniable that the crime was accompanied by
the circumstance of treachery and must be designated as murder, as defined by article 404 of the Penal Code.
This designation, however, does not appear in the complainant.

The owner of the adjoining house, Nicasio Castillo, awoke on the morning of that day because of cries coming
from Juliana Obafial, who was asking for help because her husband had attacked her and her children. Nicasio
Castillo, because of fear, did not open the door of his house, but, on the contrary, fastened it and then through a
crack in the door he saw the defendant with a bolo in his hand and heard him address to his wife the following
words, "That one you have received is enough'" and then the woman fell down dead. He stated that he did not
know the reason why the defendant committed the murders; that the defendant was not in the habit of getting
drunk and he did not notice that he was drunk that morning; that he did not notice that the defendant left his
house the night before, nor did he hear any quarrel between the husband and wife; that his house was very near
the house of defendant and that through fear the latter would try to come into his house he cried out for help to
the other residents of the barrio; that the inhabitants of the barrio came immediately in reply to his cries.
The defendant was turned over to three physicians for examination and these doctors in their report (folio 58)
stated that the defendant was 28 years of age and that his constitution, although well organized, was lymphatic;
that his body and head were normal, without any defects; that the functions of his circulatory, digestive, and
nervous systems were also normal; that he was somewhat emaciated as a result of the crime which he
committed; that he did not have any direct hereditary antecedents of insanity; that from their examination they
did not find any symptoms of mental derangement, and that they therefore believed that Fortunato Odicta in the
commission of the crime was not actuated by insanity but from other motives, which they could not specify,
which any sane person might have in committing such a crime, as, for instance, intoxication.

The defendant, Fortunato Odicta, is the sole principal in the commission of these crimes and was found guilty
of said crimes. When he was asked if he was guilty of the crimes charged against him he answered that he
pleaded guilty to any crime which they might charge him with, because he committed it while he was drunk and
without knowing what he was doing. In a sworn statement the defendant declared that he drank too much tuba,
perhaps fifteen glasses; that he drank first in his own house and then in the field among the cocoanut
plantations, and for this reason he became intoxicated and did not know what he was going, but that he was not
in his right mind. He did not know whether, when he returned to his house, he slept there or not; he stated,
however, that when he arrived at his house he did not find his wife there; that on account of the state which he
was in he lay face downward and wept over the death of his children.
Against the statements of the accused to the effect that he was drunk on the morning of the occurrence there are
the statements of the municipal president, Nicasio Castillo, Atanasio Sarmiento, Dionisio Navarra, and the
physician, Mariano Venecio. Some of these witnesses state that they saw and spoke to the defendant after the
occurrence and they affirm that he was not drunk then, and that he was not in the habit of getting drunk at all.
These statements are very contradictory to the statements of the defendant.
It being evident that the defendant was the sole principal in the commission of these crimes, there remains only
the question as to whether in the case there is any circumstance which should exempt him from liability, since
the reason for the commission of said horrible crimes does not appear. From the evidence adduced during the
trail it appears that the defendant was in a healthy condition; that his mental condition was normal, and the legal
presumption, therefore, is that he acted in his right mind, and it was the duty of the defense to show that he was
suffering from mental derangement or in a fit of insanity. This has not been shown, however, and therefore the
defendant must be considered guilty and criminally liable for the crime of parricide. The attorney for the
defense asks that the defendant be acquitted, because he is exempt from liability. He bases this petition on the
ground that the crimes were committed while Fortunato Odicta was in a state of somnambulism, aking to

insanity. if it had been proven in the case that the defendant when he committed these crimes was really asleep,
or in a state of somnambulism, or unconscious of his acts, then instead of coming under paragraph 1 or article 8
of the Penal Code this case would come under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code, because a
sumnambulist does not act voluntarily and therefore his acts do not constitute a crime. But nothing of his
appears proven in the case, and therefore we must take into consideration that the defendant, while in his right
mind and reason, willfully killed all the members of his own family.
In the commission of the crime we must consider the presence of the aggravating circumstance of superior force
provided for in paragraph 9 of article 10 of the Penal Code. This aggravating circumstance is, however,
counterbalanced by the special extenuating circumstance provided for in article 11 of the Penal Code, because
of the low grade of intelligence of the deceased. We must also take into consideration the circumstance of
intoxication, not habitual, provided for in paragraph 6 of article 9 of the same code, since the defendant
affirmed when he pleaded guilty that he was drunk at the time he killed the members of his family and did not
know what he was going, and there is no legal reason why this statement should not be taken into consideration
as against the statement of the other witnesses who saw him several hours after the crime had been committed
and who assert that this defendant was not drunk and that he was not in the habit of getting drunk. These
statements show that the intoxication, which to a degree dominated and influenced the defendant to commit the
crime, was not habitual with him.
Therefore the losser of the two indivisible penalties provided by law should be imposed on him. By virtue, then,
of the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that with a reversal of the judgment below Fortunato Odicta
should be sentenced to the penalty of cadena perpetua with the accessories two and three of article 54 of the
Penal Code, without having to pay any indemnification on account of the relationship which the defendant bore
to the deceased, and to pay the costs in both instanced.
This case to be returned to the court below with a certified copy of this decision and of the judgment which
shall be rendered in accordance herewith. So ordered.
September 27, 1939

G.R. No. 46539

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VALENTIN DOQUEA

The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, for having killed Juan Ragojos by stabbing him in the breast with a knife on November 19, 1938, in
the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. The court, after trying the case, held that the accused acted with
discernment in committing the act imputed to him and, proceeding in accordance with the provisions of article
80 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99, ordered him to be sent to the
Training School for Boys to remain therein until he reaches the age of majority. From this order the accused
interposed an appeal alleging that the court erred in holding that he had acted with discernment and in not
having dismissal the case.
On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly thirteen years, nine months and five days old. The incident
that gave rise to the aggression committed by him on the deceased is narrated in the appealed order as follows:
Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 19, 1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos and one
Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual,
Province of Pangasinan. The herein accused, who was also in said yard, intervened and, catching the ball,
tossed it at Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. For this act of the accused, Juan Ragojos chased him
around the yard and, upon overtaking him, slapped him on the nape. Said accused then turned against the
deceased assuming a threatening attitude, for which the reason said deceased struck him on the mouth with his
fist, returning immediately to the place where Epifanio Rarang was in order to continue playing with him. The
accused, offended by what he considered an abuse on the part of Juan Ragojos, who was taller and more robust
than he, looked around the yard for a stone with which to attack the now deceased Juan Ragojos, but finding
none, he approached a cousin of his named Romualdo Cocal, to ask the latter to lend him his knife. Epifanio
Rarang, who had heard what the accused had been asking his cousin, told the latter not to give the accused his
knife because he might attack Juan Ragojos with it. The accused, however, succeeded in taking possession of
the knife which was in a pocket of his cousin's pants. Once in possession of the knife, Valentin Doquea
approached Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him another blow with his fist, to which the deceased
answered that he did not want to do so because he (Juan Ragojos) was bigger that the accused. Juan Ragojos,
ignorant of the intentions of the accused, continued playing and, while he was thus unprepared and in the act of
stopping the ball with his two hands, the accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he carried.
The order also contains the following conclusions and findings of fact which we are not at liberty to alter, not
being called upon or authorized to do so, in view of the nature of the appeal before us, by section 138 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3:

Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doquea committed the crime in question, he was a
7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was
one of the brightest in said school and was a captain of a company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the
time he was studying therein he always obtained excellent marks, this court is convinced that the accused, in
committing the crime, acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences of his act, and
so also has this court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf during the trial of this case.

Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari against the Honorable Judge Ignacio Almodovar of
the City Court of Legaspi, Branch 1, Legaspi City, raising beautiful questions of law which We are tasked to
resolve. Considering the issues and arguments raised by petitioner, We impleaded the People of the Philippines
as party respondents herein in a resolution dated 17 September 1986 (p. 41, Rollo).

The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the appealed order, convinces us that the appeal taken from
said order is absolutely unfounded, because it is error to determine discernment by the means resorted to by the
attorney for the defense, as discussed by him in his brief. He claims that to determine whether or not a minor
acted with discernment, we must take into consideration not only the facts and circumstances which gave rise to
the act committed by the minor, but also his state of mind at the time the crime was committed, the time he
might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of
reasoning he could have had at that moment. It is clear that the attorney for the defense mistakes the
discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for
lack of intention which, as a mitigating circumstance, is included among other mitigating circumstances in
article 13 of said Code. The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability
of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the
very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behaviour of said minor, not only before and
during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial (U.S. vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155). This
was done by the trial court, and the conclusion arrived at by it is correct.

Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and
three other children in their backyard in the morning of 29 October 1984. They were target-shooting a bottle cap
(tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In
the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death.

Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.

On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed, raising two (2) issues, to wit:

The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows:

After conduct a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age and because
the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident. The victim's parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice,
which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide through reckless Imprudence. The
information dated 9 October 1985 was consequently filed, which narrated in part:
. . . the above-named accused, who is over 9 years but below 15 years of age and acting with discernment, did
then and there, without taking the necessary precautions to prevent and/or avoid accident or injuries to persons,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate and cause to be fired, in a reckless and imprudent manner, an air
rifle with .22 caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt operated thereby hitting as a result of said carelessness
and imprudence one TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at the left side of the body with its pellet, causing injuries
which directly caused his untimely death; . . . (p. 8, Rollo)

I WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND
G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA vs. HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR

II WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT
THAT IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE BARANGAY LUPON. (Petition, p. 3, Rollo)
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a corollary controversy with respect to the
first issue raised is evident, that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the position of the petitioner that "discernment" connotes

'intent' (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that
case We held that the allegation of "with intent to kill . . ." amply meets the requirement that discernment should
be alleged when the accused is a minor between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism in saying
that:
If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in the information that the accused acted
with discernment and willfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in a reckless and
imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is an inherent contradiction tantamount to failure of the information to
allege a cause of action or constitute a legal excuse or exception. (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo)
If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasioffense under Article 265 of the RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are two different concepts. We agree
with the Solicitor General's view; the two terms should not be confused.
The word "intent" has been defined as
(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as
is essential to such intent;. . .; the design resolve, or determination with which a person acts.' (46 CJS Intent p.
1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom and
intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term discernment, as used in Article
12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen
years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong . . . (Emphasis supplied) p. 583
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While
both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desired of one's act while the
latter relates to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may not intend to
shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same
person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a

minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done.
He may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the
undesirable result of his negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note the basic
reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete
absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the
accused. 1 In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert 2 has stated:
The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human
acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because ... the infant 3 (has) no intelligence,
the law exempts (him) from criminal liability. (Emphasis supplied)
lt is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal
act. On the other hand, minors above nine years of appeal but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt.
However, they are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which presumption may be rebutted if it could
be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted
with discernment. " 4 The preceding discussion shows that "intelligence" as an element of dolo actually
embraces the concept of discernment as used in Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the aforecited case
of People vs. Doquena, supra. It could not therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes
'intent' for they refer to two different concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a distinct element
of dolo as a means of committing an offense.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence,
freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains
as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be
possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be
criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor
over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A
reading of the said Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase "Any person. . ." without any
distinction or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos.
In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words "intent" and "discernment" used under the law, he
cites the case of People vs. Nieto, supra. However, petitioner failed to present the qualifying sentence preceding
the ruling he now invokes, which reads:

That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the information that she. . ."with the intent
to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously push one Lolita Padilla . . ." into a deep place of
the Pearanda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died right then and
there.' This allegation clearly conveys the Idea that she knew what would be the consequence of her unlawful
act of pushing her victim into deep water and that she knew it to be wrong. (Emphasis supplied)
From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the words "intent" and "discernment." What We
meant was that the combined effect of the words used in the information is to express a knowledge, on the part
of the accused Nieto, of the wrongness or rightness of her act. Hence, petitioner may not validly contend that
since the information now in question alleged "discernment", it in effect alleged "intent." The former may never
embrace the Idea of the latter; the former expresses the thought of passivity while the latter signifies activity.
Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction, it is contended by the petitioner that the case against him
should have first been brought before the Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1508,
Section 2(3). He submits that, considering his entitlement to a two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance
due to his minority, P.D. 1508 applies to his case because the penalty imposable is reduced to not higher
than arresto menor from an originalarresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium as prescribed in
Article 365 of the RPC. This is not correct. The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the
penalty imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed (People vs. Caldito, 72
Phil. 263; People vs. Purisima, 69 SCRA 314; Dioquino vs. Cruz and People vs. Savellano, 116 SCRA 451).
The same principle applies in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 day , or a fine exceeding P 200.00; ... (emphasis
supplied)
Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that drafted P.D. 1508 has said:
The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.' One should therefore consider the penalty provided for by law or
ordinance as distinguished from the penalty actually imposed in particular cases after considering the attendant
circumstances affecting criminal liability. 5

The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore rule that, in construing Section
2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter should be considered.
Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered.
The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has been corrected long before. As intimated in the case
ofRoyales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not
jurisdictional.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
Temporary Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED to the
lower court for trial on the merits. No cost. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 177756 : March 3, 2008]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SALVADOR
"ADOR", Accused-Appellant.

NIETO

CABALSE

For review is the Decision1 dated 31 October 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02006,
which affirmed the Decision2 dated 15 September 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City,
Branch 46, in Criminal Cases No. U-10586 and No. U-10587, finding herein appellant Salvador Nieto y
Cabalse @ "Ador" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape in both cases committed against
AAA,3 a mental retardate with a mental age of five years and three months, and sentencing him in each case to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify AAA in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages with the modification for an additional award of moral damages
amounting to P50,000.00.
On 13 March 2000, appellant was charged in two separate Informations with the crime of rape, as defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, 4 committed
against AAA on 30 December 1999 and 3 January 2000, respectively. The two Informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. U-10586
The undersigned accuses SALVADO NIETO alias "Ador," of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:

That on or about [3 January 2000] at Brgy. xxx, [Municipality of] xxx, [Province of] XXX, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force, did then and there wilfully
(sic), unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with AAA, a mentally retardate with mental age of
five (5) years and three (3) months, without her consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice.

that somebody to be the herein appellant, who was also their neighbor. According to AAA, the appellant
approached her, fooled her and pulled her out of their house and brought her to the nearby farmland. In the
farmland, the appellant removed all his clothes. He likewise undressed her. When they were both naked, the
appellant started to fondle her breasts. Thereafter, the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. As a result,
she felt so much pain in her private part.9

CONTRARY to Art. 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353.5

Criminal Case No. U-10587
The undersigned accuses SALVADOR NIETO Y CABALSE, alias "Ador," of the crime of RAPE, committed as
follows:
That on or about [30 December 1999] at Brgy. XXX, [Municipality of] XXX, [Province of] XXX and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force, brought and carried at the
ricefield AAA, a mentally retardate with a mental age of five (5) years and three (3) months, did then and there
wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said AAA, without her consent and
against her will, to her damage and prejudice.

Again, on the night of 3 January 2000, while AAA's grandmother was in Manila, the appellant went to their
house. Initially, appellant struck up a conversation with her. When the appellant learned that AAA's
grandmother went to Manila and that only the two of them were in the said house, the appellant began to force
her to have sexual intercourse with him. She resisted, but the appellant was much stronger than her; hence,
despite her resistance, appellant succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina. 10
AAA revealed her harrowing experience in the hands of the appellant to her sister, DDD, and brother, EEE. Her
brother cried when she told him about her ordeal; but, her sister was brave enough to tell their mother what had
happened to AAA.11

CONTRARY to Art. 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353.6

AAA, accompanied by her sister and aunt, went to the police station to report the rape incidents that happened
to her on 30 December 1999 and 3 January 2000. They also went to the hospital in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, where
AAA was physically examined by Dr. Francisco Llamas.12

When arraigned on 17 April 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to the
charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

During her cross-examination, AAA disclosed that she had been previously raped, five times, by one Arsenio
Corpuz when she was still living in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.13

The pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove its allegations are the testimonies of the following
witnesses: AAA, the victim; SPO3 Maximiano Balelo, Chief Investigator of the Pozorrubio Philippine National
Police (PNP); Dr. Francisco Llamas, Medico-Legal Officer of the Pozorrubio Community Hospital; and Ruby
Martinez Bell, the psychologist at the Philippine Mental Health Association, Inc., Baguio-Benguet Chapter.

SPO3 Maximiano Balelo corroborated the testimony of AAA. He admitted that AAA was brought to him for
investigation on 6 January 2000. He took the statements of AAA and those of AAA's sister and aunt. AAA told
him that she was sexually abused by the appellant on two occasions. The first rape incident happened on 30
December 1999 and the second was on 3 January 2000. 14 The statements15 of AAA, her sister and aunt were
reduced into writing. He recorded the rape incidents report in the Police Blotter under Entry No. 02858.16

AAA was already 24 years old when the alleged first rape incident happened. Her parents BBB and CCC were
already separated.7 Since the separation, she started to live with her grandmother in Barangay XXX,
Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, up to the present. AAA only reached Grade II because of her
illnesses.8
In her testimony, AAA stated that on the night of 30 December 1999, while she was alone at the house of her
grandmother, who was in Malokiat, Pangasinan at that time, somebody entered their house. She then recognized

Dr. Francisco Llamas, the Medico-Legal Officer of Pozorrubio Community Hospital affirmed that he physically
examined AAA on 6 January 2000. On the basis of such examination, he said that he did not find any physical
injury on AAA's head and neck. He noticed, however, that there were some hyperemic or red areas on AAA's
breasts. AAA also had a healed laceration on her hymen at the 6:00 o'clock position. He concluded that the said
laceration could have been caused by a blunt object, possibly an erect penis, which was inserted into AAA's

vagina. He further stated that AAA's healed laceration was already a day old. 17 He also reduced his findings into
writing as evidenced by the Medico-Legal Report.18
Ruby Martinez Bell, the psychologist who examined 19 AAA to determine her mental condition, was also
presented by the prosecution to prove the allegation that AAA is indeed a mental retardate. The said
psychologist declared that she gave AAA a Stanford-Binet Test, Draw-a-Person Test, Bender-Gestalt Test and
Vineyard Social Maturity Scale and she even attempted to give AAA a Sentence Completion Test, but AAA
could not do it as she could not understand the same. Based on the result of the psychological tests, she
concluded that AAA belonged to the severely mentally retarded category with an Intelligence Quotient (I.Q.) of
30 and an I.Q. level equivalent to that of a five-year-and-three-month-old child. She further stated that on the
basis of the different tests she gave to AAA, she noticed that AAA was unable to comprehend those tests.
Although she can recognize some common objects, she cannot, however, do much in terms of reasoning and
definition of abstract terms.20
On the part of the defense, it presented the testimony of the following witnesses to prove that it was impossible
for the appellant to have raped AAA on 30 December 1999 and 3 January 2000, namely: Calixto Parocha;
Ernesto Salvatierra; CCC, the father of the victim; Dominador Nieto, the brother of the appellant; Leticia Nieto,
the sister-in-law of the appellant; and herein appellant.
The testimonies of Calixto Parocha, Ernesto Salvatierra and CCC focused on the rape incident that happened to
AAA while she was still in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, which was allegedly committed by Arsenio Corpuz. The
aforesaid witnesses admitted that their statements before the trial court were given in connection with the rape
incident that happened in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, and not on the matters that transpired in Barangay XXX,
Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX.21 Obviously, the testimonies of these witnesses are irrelevant insofar
as this case is concerned.
According to Dominador Nieto, on the night of 30 December 1999, he was at the barangay dance party acting
as a guard because he was a member of the barangay Civilian Volunteers Organization. He claimed that the
appellant was also at the said party because he was the barangay electrician and he was there to fix the lightings.
Both of them went there at about 7:00 p.m. and they stayed there until 3:00 a.m. of 31 December 1999. And
from that period, there was never an instance that the appellant left the dance party. However, in his crossexamination, he admitted that the place where the dance party was held was only one kilometer away from the
place where the rape incident happened.22

Leticia Nieto testified that she is the wife of Melecio Nieto, the brother of the appellant. She stated that on 3
January 2000, the appellant went to their house at around 6:00 p.m. in order to compute the cost of the materials
for the construction of the terrace and main door of their house. The appellant also had dinner with them at
around 8:00 p.m. and stayed there until 11:00 p.m. After that, the appellant went home. She likewise stated that
their house was only 20 meters away from the house of the appellant and 100 meters away from the house of
the complainant.23
Appellant was the final witness presented by the defense. The justification offered by him by way of
exculpation was both denial and alibi. He denied having seen AAA on 30 December 1999 and 3 January
2000; thus, it was impossible for him to have committed the offenses he was charged with. He maintained that
on 30 December 1999, he was at the barangay dance hall. Being the barangay electrician, he was designated to
install the sound system and the lights to be used at the dance party. He went there at around 7:00 p.m. and
stayed there until 3:00 a.m. of 31 December 1999. Further, on 3 January 2000, he testified that he was at his
brother's house located about 20 meters away from his house. His brother is Melecio Nieto, the husband of
Leticia Nieto. He stated that he went to his brother's house at around 6:00 p.m. to talk about the cost of the
materials to be used in constructing the terrace and main door of his brother's house. He even ate dinner there at
around 8:00 p.m. He stayed there until 11:00 p.m. and then he went home.24
During his cross-examination, he affirmed that the dance hall where he was on 30 December 1999 was only a
kilometer away from the house of the complainant. A tricycle could reach the said house as it was near the road.
By walking, he could reach the said house in about an hour. Likewise, he admitted that the house of his brother
was more than 100 meters away from the house of the complainant and the house of the latter was about 80
meters away from his house.25
After trial, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision on 15 September 2000, finding the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape in both cases. The decretal portion of the aforesaid Decision reads,
thus:
The records of this case were originally transmitted before this Court on appeal. Pursuant to People v.
Mateo,27 the records were transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.
In his brief, the appellant's lone assignment of error was, the court a quo gravely erred in finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.28

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, taking into consideration the assignment of error stated by the appellant in
his Appellant's Brief and after a thorough study of the records of the case, rendered a Decision on 31 October
2006, affirming the conviction of the appellant for two counts of simple rape with the modification for an
additional award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in each case. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:

A: The brother of the wife of my father fooled me also, sir.

The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. 30 In view thereof, the appellate court forwarded to this Court the records
of this case.

Q: Who is Jolin-jolin?cralawred

COURT: Who raped you?cralawred

A: Jolin-jolin raped me, sir.

A: The husband of the sister of my father, sir.

On 11 July 2007,31 this Court resolved to accept the present case and notify the parties that they may file their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired. Both the Office of the Solicitor General and the appellant
manifested that they were adopting their respective briefs dated 30 May 2002 and 24 January 2002, filed before
the appellate court, respectively, as their supplemental briefs.

ATTY. FLORENDO: You are referring to Arsenio Corpuz, am I correct?cralawred

After a meticulous review of the records of the present case, this Court finds no reason to reverse the judgment
of the trial court and the appellate court.

Q: In other words, Arsenio Corpuz raped you also while you were in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija?cralawred

There appears to be no controversy that the victim in this case is a mental retardate. Such fact was proven by the
testimony of Ruby Martinez Bell, the psychologist who examined AAA to determine her mental condition, and
by the psychological report she prepared. The series of psychological tests she gave to AAA revealed that the
latter is a mental retardate. AAA belonged to the severely mentally retarded category with an I.Q. of 30 and an
I.Q. level equivalent to that of a five-year-and-three-month-old child. 32 Thus, the only issue left for this Court's
resolution is the credibility of the victim's testimony as regards the fact of sexual congress between her and the
appellant.
The appellant averred that the testimony of AAA should be disregarded, as there are serious and inexplicable
discrepancies in material details in the said testimony; hence, there is doubt as to its credibility. The
discrepancies referred to by the appellant were embodied in the following testimony of the victim during her
cross-examination regarding an alleged prior rape incident with another person, thus:
Q: Madam Witness, will you tell us of your experience while you were in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija?cralawred
A: I lived in Cuyapo. What happened there is another thing.
Q: You said that what happened there is another thing, will you tell us what is that another thing?cralawred

A: Yes, sir.

A: Yes, sir, he raped me.

Q: How many times did Jolin-jolin or Arsenio Corpuz fuck you?cralawred
A: Five times, your Honor.
Q: That five times that Jolin-jolin or Arsenio Corpuz fucked you, was it on the same day or on different days?
cralawred
A: Different dates but successive nights, your Honor.
Q: Did you mother come to know what Jolin-jolin did to you in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija?cralawred
A: When I was already in [Brgy. xxx], sir.
xxx
Q: [The appellant] is a relative of your father, am I correct?cralawred

A: My grandparents are the relatives of [the appellant] and they are neighbors, sir.
Q: And because of what Jolin-jolin did to you in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, you cannot forget that anymore?
cralawred
A: I always remember it, sir.
Q: That is why whenever you see [the appellant] you remember what happened to you in Cuyapo?
A: I can also remember what he did to me, sir.
Q: Eventhough [the appellant] did not really fuck you you said he fucked you because of what happened
to you in Cuyapo, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.33 (Emphases supplied.)
The aforesaid argument raised by the appellant is untenable.
Sexual crimes where the culprit denies culpability is actually a test of credibility. The issue of credibility has,
time and again, been settled by this Court as a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because
of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses'
deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Absent any
substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial court's assessments and conclusions, the
reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings, particularly when no significant facts and
circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected
the outcome of the case. 34 The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are
sustained by the Court of Appeals.35
In the present case, no cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of the trial
court with respect to the assessment of AAA's testimony.
As can be gleaned from the records of this case, this Court notes that the testimony given by AAA before the
trial court can be characterized as categorical and straightforward. She was able to describe before the court a
quo how she was ravished by the appellant on 30 December 1999 and 3 January 2000. She even demonstrated

the sexual act by spreading her two legs and placing her finger to her vagina. 36 And during her testimony, she
positively identified the appellant as the person who had raped her on the aforesaid dates. 37 The straightforward
narration of AAA of what transpired, accompanied by her categorical identification of appellant as the
malefactor, sealed the case for the prosecution. 38 Further, it was not shown that she had been motivated by any
ill desire that would make her testify falsely against the accused. Moreover, having the mental age of a fiveyear-and-three-month-old child would even bolster her credibility as a witness considering that a victim at such
tender age would not publicly admit that she had been criminally abused and ravished unless that was the truth.
For no woman, especially one of tender age, practically only a girl, would concoct a story of defloration, allow
an examination of her private parts and thereafter expose herself to a public trial, if she were not motivated
solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished to avenge her honor and to condemn a grave
injustice to her.39
More so, hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.
And when the unwavering and forthright testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings,
there is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been
established.40 In this case, Dr. Llamas's medical findings showed that AAA's hymen had a day-old healed
laceration at the 6 o'clock position, which, according to Dr. Llamas, could have resulted from sexual
intercourse. Thus, the said medical findings, together with the straightforward testimony of AAA, even
strengthen her claim of sexual violation by appellant.
The appellant cannot find protection in the discrepancies in the victim's testimony during her cross-examination
to relieve him from culpability. As the Court of Appeals opined in its Decision, thus:
The Court notes that the prior alleged rape is not relevant in the present case. The previous rape, if it indeed
occur (sic), cannot in anyway prove that [appellant] did not rape AAA. Moreover, considering the mental age
of the victim and the tenor of questions asked during the cross-examination, it is understandable why
AAA gave the apparently conflicting answers. What is important is that during her direct examination,
she testified that [appellant] had sexual intercourse with her.41 (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears emphasis that in the victim's testimony during her cross-examination, she admitted that Arsenio Corpuz,
also known as "Jolin-jolin," raped her five times at the time when she was still in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She
also affirmed that "Jolin-jolin" was a relative of her father. She emphasized, though, that what happened in
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, was "another thing." On the other hand, when she testified as regards the rape incident
that had happened to her in Brgy. XXX, Municipality of XXX, province of XXX, she revealed that it was the
appellant who had raped her twice. The first rape incident was on 30 December 1999 and the second rape

incident happened on 3 January 2000. She also said that the appellant was a relative of her grandparents.
With the said testimony of the victim, it cannot be said that she only filed a case against the appellant because of
what had happened to her in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, and that she was just confused as to the identity of her
assailant.
As this Court previously stated, AAA positively identified the appellant as the person who had raped her on 30
December 1999 and 3 January 2000. Her narration of the rape incidents was categorical and straightforward.
Therefore, despite the imagined discrepancies in her testimony during her cross-examination, it is beyond cavil
of doubt that the appellant was the real perpetrator of the crime of rape against AAA.
Hence, this Court agrees in the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court that the testimony of AAA
was credible and deserves full faith and credit.
In stark contrast to the simple but clear declarations of AAA, all that the appellant stresses in his defense are
denial and alibi.
It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can
scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the
crimes attributed to him.42 The defense of alibi is likewise unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all
defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing
proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. 43 Secondly, alibi is
unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness. 44Lastly, in order
that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere else during the
commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere
within the vicinity of the crime scene.45
In the case at bar, the appellant denied that he had raped AAA. He avowed that on the 30 December 1999, the
date of the first rape incident, he was at the barangay dance party because, being the barangay electrician, he
was tasked to set up the sound system and the lightings. On 3 January 2000, the date of the second rape
incident, he claimed to have been in the house of her brother to compute the cost of materials to be used in the
construction of the terrace and main door in his brother's house. Such claims of the appellant were corroborated
by other defense witnesses.
This Court notes that the witnesses who corroborated the testimony of the appellant that he was somewhere else
during the commission of the rapes were his brother, Dominador Nieto, and sister-in-law, Leticia Nieto.

Because they were his close relatives, we cannot give credence to their testimonies. The testimonies of close
relatives and friends are necessarily suspect and cannot prevail over the unequivocal declaration of the
complaining witness.46
The appellant also failed to present convincing proof that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis during the aforementioned dates when the separate acts of rape were committed.
Surprisingly, the appellant himself, as well as Dominador Nieto, admitted before the trial court that the place
where the dance party was held on 30 December 1999 was only one kilometer away from the place where the
rape incident happened. The appellant even affirmed that a tricycle could reach the said house as it was near the
road. And by walking, he could reach the house in about an hour. He likewise admitted that the house of his
brother where he stayed until 11:00 p.m. on 3 January 2000 was only more than 100 meters away from the
house of the complainant and the house of the latter was only about 80 meters away from his
house.47 Therefore, the appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
In sum, the straightforward testimony of AAA, as well as her unwavering and positive identification of her
defiler and tormentor, corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Francisco Llamas, was sufficient to convict
the appellant. Besides, the appellant's flimsy and self-serving defenses of denial and alibi were not able to
destroy the truthfulness and the credibility of AAA's testimony. Thus, this Court is convinced that the trial court
and the appellate court correctly convicted the appellant of the crime of simple rape 48 in both cases, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua.49
As to the damages. The award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of
rape.50 Thus, this Court affirms the award of P50,000.00 in each case as civil indemnity given by the trial court
to the victim.
As regards the award of exemplary damages, Article 2230 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from
fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
In this case, there being no aggravating circumstance that can be considered, as it is not even alleged in the
information, the award of exemplary damages by the lower courts would have to be deleted.

With respect to moral damages, case law requires automatic award of moral damages to a rape victim without
need of proof because from the nature of the crime it can be assumed that she has suffered moral injuries
entitling her to such award. This award is separate and distinct from civil indemnity, which case law also
automatically awards upon proof of the commission of the crime by the offender. 51 Thus, this Court finds the
award of moral damages by the appellate court in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02006
dated 31 October 2006 finding herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape
committed against AAA, a mental retardate with a mental age equivalent to a five-year-and-three-month-old
child, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, is
hereby AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary damages awarded by the lower
courts is deleted for want of legal basis. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 110405. January 2, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VIRGILIO TAEDO, BERLITO LACHICA, and
DANILO MERCADAL,accused-appellants.
On 25 April 1982, at 6:00 o'clock in the evening, the brothers Domingo and Dominador Nepal passed by
the store of Merly Pelago in Barangay San Isidro, General Luna, Quezon. At the store were Barangay Captain
Pacito Agoncillo, Ruben Agoncillo, Eleno Agoncillo, Jesus Lachica and a certain Konsehal Francisco. They
were having a drinking spree. Berlito Lachica and Danilo Mercadal were also with the group of the barangay
captain but were not drinking.
Domingo was called by Ruben Agoncillo while Dominador went to the adjoining house of Nemesio del
Mundo. While inside the house, Dominador heard shouts of women emanating from the store. He rushed to the
store and saw Jesus Lachica kicking Ruben Agoncillo with his brother Domingo pacifying them. Dominador
then saw Danilo Mercadal carrying a bolo and about to hack Domingo when the latter swiftly got hold of a
piece of wood and drove Danilo away. Berlito Lachica, also armed with a bolo, followed his brother-in-law
Danilo who was heading towards the mountain.

At about 7:00 o'clock that evening, as Domingo and Dominador were about to leave, they were asked by
Ruben who was already drunk to accompany him to Barangay Captain Pacito Agoncillo to complain. Agoncillo
had left the group earlier. But the Nepals just left Ruben with a certain Boy Revadavia before they proceeded
home.
Domingo was walking ahead followed by Dominador some 4 meters behind when Virgilio Taedo, Berlito
Lachica, Jesus Lachica, Enrico Gepaya and Mercurio Lemina, all armed with bladed weapons, suddenly
emerged from a banana grove and from Nuestro Taedo's house nearby which was well-lit as there was an
electric light coming from the balcony. Danilo boloed Domingo and hit him on the right side of his head
causing the latter to stagger backwards. At that juncture, Virgilio, Berlito, Jesus, Mercurio and Enrico
surrounded Domingo. Then Virgilio gave Domingo a final thrust with his balisong.
With his brother completely at the mercy of his assailants, Dominador shouted for help. It was all in vain.
Mercurio and Gepaya encircled Domingo and then it was all over. The malefactors disappeared leaving
Domingo prostrate on the ground. He was bleeding profusely from the hacking wounds he sustained, including
one which went through his chest lacerating his right lung.
Maxima Remuyan, mother of Domingo, who was about five meters away, saw Domingo assaulted by the
accused who were all armed and seemed to have come from all directions. Maxima cried out for help but her
son was already slain when those who responded arrived.
Virgilio Taedo, Berlito Lachica, Danilo Mercadal, Mercurio Lemina, Jesus Lachica and Enrico 'Boy'
Gepaya were charged with murder with the information alleging conspiracy, treachery and evident
premeditation.
Except for Virgilio Taedo, all the accused testified in court and disavowed any involvement in the killing
of Domingo.
Accused Jesus Lachica alleged that while he was in the store of Merly Pelago drinking with Pacito
Agoncillo, Francisco Luistro and Eleno Agoncillo, he heard Ruben Agoncillo berating his son-in-law Danilo
Mercadal. So he told Mercadal to leave and then he asked Ruben what the trouble was. But Danilo snapped at
him saying that it was none of his business. This angered Jesus, prompting him to kick Danilo. Jesus denied any
participation in the slaying of Domingo, claiming that he was in the store of Merly Pelago until 10:00 o'clock
that evening.

Accused Berlito Lachica corroborated the statement of his father Jesus. Berlito testified that at around 6:00
o'clock in the evening of 25 April 1982 he stopped at the store of Merly Pelago to buy cigarettes. There he saw
his father drinking so he decided to wait for him until 10:00 o'clock.
Accused Danilo Mercadal likewise disclaimed complicity in the killing of Domingo. According to Danilo,
he went to Merly Pelago's store to retrieve some dinner plates which Merly had borrowed earlier. He said that
Ruben Agoncillo arrived at the store drunk and tried to hit him, so his father-in-law, Jesus Lachica, intervened
and told him to leave the store. Obeying his father he left with his wife for home.
Accused Virgilio Taedo presented Myrna Barretto, a barangay health worker, to testify in his defense.
According to Myrna, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 25 April 1982, Virgilio went to her house to ask
medicine for his stomach ache. After taking the emital syrup[1] given him, Virgilio rested in her house. Later, at
8:30, she heard Domingo shouting, "all brave men, come out!" Then a woman cried out for help. Myrna did not
go out of the house to investigate because according to her she was afraid. The next day she learned that
Domingo had been killed. She claimed that Virgilio Taedo could not have participated in the killing because he
was with her in her house the whole night..
Defense witness Sofio Pollo pointed to Mercurio Lemina and Enrico Gepaya as the assailants of Domingo.
Pollo claimed to have witnessed the incident and recounted that at around 8:00 o'clock that evening, while he
was inside his house, he heard Domingo shouting, "lumabas ang barako, lumaban ng patayan!" Then, according
to him, he saw Mercurio and Enrico, armed with a tagad and bolo respectively, approach Domingo. Enrico then
hacked Domingo on the head causing the latter to fall. Mercurio likewise hit Domingo with his tagad. Sofio
Pollo belied the participation of accused Virgilio Taedo, Danilo Mercadal, Berlito Lachica and Jesus Lachica
stressing that they were not at the locus criminis.
On 14 December 1990 the trial court rendered a decision the decretal portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered CONVICTING the accused (MERCURIO LEMINA, DANILO
MERCADAL, VIRGILIO TAEDO, BERLITO LACHICA, JESUS LACHICA and ENRICO 'BOY' GEPAYA)
of the crime of MURDER as charged in the information and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby
sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor to TWENTY (20)
YEARS of reclusion temporal. To indemnify the heirs of deceased Domingo Nepal in the amount of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) and to suffer the accessory penalties of the law.
Accused Mercurio Lemina, a detention prisoner, is hereby credited in full of his preventive imprisonment. [2]

Of the accused only Virgilio Taedo, Berlito Lachica, Jesus Lachica and Danilo Mercadal appealed their
conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending their appeal, however, Jesus Lachica died on 27 March 1991 at the
New Bilibid Prison Hospital. Parenthetically, the appellate court in a resolution of 8 August 1991 declared the
criminal and civil liabilities of Jesus Lachica extinguished pursuant to Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code, and
deemed his appeal closed and terminated.
On 14 January 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with the modification that
accused-appellants be sentenced toreclusion perpetua and ordered them to indemnify the heirs of Domingo
Nepal in the amount of P50,000.00. Accordingly, it certified the case to us for review pursuant to Rule 124, Sec.
13, of the Rules of Court.[3]
Accused-appellants assign the following errors: (1) the misappreciation of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses; (2) the declaration of their culpability for murder; and, (3) the declaration that the
prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of murder.
Appellants argue that their conviction was based entirely on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Had the testimonies of the defense witnesses been considered, there would have been no evidence to sustain a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They also contend that the trial court misappreciated the testimony of
prosecution witness Maxima Remuyan and that of defense witness Sofio Pollo. Maxima testified that she was
then 4 meters away when she heard her son Domingo utter the words, "tama na Mer, tama na Boy," referring to
Mercurio Lemina and Enrico Boy Gepaya, thus corroborating the statement of Sofio Pollo that there were only
3 men fighting, i.e., Lemina, Gepaya and victim Domingo Nepal.
There is no merit in the appeal. It is settled that findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the
credibility of witnesses command great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe their
demeanor while they testified in court.[4] There is no reason for us in this case to depart from this established
rule. We agree with the People that the lower court did not disregard the testimonies of the defense witnesses. It
simply found their testimonies unbelievable while those of the prosecution witnesses credible. Furthermore,
appellants rely heavily on their alibis. This Court has consistently ruled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses,
and for it to prosper the accused has the burden of proving that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time
of commission and that it was physically impossible for him to be there. [5] The defense failed to satisfy these
requirements in the case at bar.
As regards the averment of appellants that the lower court misappreciated the testimonies of both
prosecution witness Maxima Remuyan and defense witness Sofio Pollo, we find the same unacceptable. The

fact that Maxima heard her son call out the names of Mercurio Lemina and Enrico Gepaya during the assault
does not preclude the participation of the other accused. She categorically named the persons she saw ganging
up on her son. Thus
Q. Who are those persons who ganged up (on) your son?

conformably with Art. 248 in relation to Art. 14, par. 16, of the Revised Penal Code, they are each sentenced
to reclusion perpetua together with its accessory penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of Domingo Nepal in the
amount of P50,000.00. Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

A. Jesus Lachica, Berlito Lachica, Danilo Mercadal, Mercurio Lemina, Virgilio Taedo and Boy Gepaya. [6]
Appellants also argue that assuming their participation in the killing of Domingo Nepal is established, the
crime committed can only be homicide and not murder. They contend that alevosia cannot be appreciated since
the fatal assault was the result of a casual encounter with the accused having no time to reflect on their modus
operandi; in addition, the evidence presented by the prosecution does not show how the aggression took place
or how the killing began and developed.
We are not moved. The records speak eloquently of the manner by which Domingo was slain. His
assailants hid behind the banana grove as well as in the house of Nuestro Taedo where they waited for their
quarry. Upon seeing him they all came out from their hiding places and simultaneously assaulted Domingo with
their bladed weapons. Surprised and outnumbered, Domingo was easily overcome by the coordinated moves of
the felons who made sure that he would not be able to put up a shred of defense. Thus the killing could not be
described as the result of a casual encounter. [7]Treachery may be considered to have attended the killing. As we
have repeatedly held, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.[8]
The trial court as well as the appellate court correctly ruled that treachery qualified the killing of Domingo
Nepal to murder committed by the accused in conspiracy with one another. Thus, according to the trial court
The crime committed by all the accused is murder qualified by treachery. The concerted action of the armed
attackers who lay in wait at that place for the unsuspecting victim to pass by, unarmed, insured the killing
without any risk to the assailants. It rendered the victim completely unable to defend himself. Abuse of superior
strength and nighttime, although present, are deemed absorbed by alevosia (People v. Orongan, G.R. No. L32751, 21 December 1988).
ACCORDINGLY, the conviction of accused-appellants VIRGILIO TAEDO, BERLITO LACHICA and
DANILO MERCADAL by the courts a quo for MURDER qualified by treachery is AFFIRMED and,

[G.R. No. 105556. April 4, 1997] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO
SAN JUAN, accused-appellant.

Rape is horrible and nauseating. The crime is even more disgusting and infuriating when the victim is a mental
retardate who is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.

The Facts - Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented four witnesses: (1) the offended party
and complainant AAA, who gave an account of the rape; (2) the victims father BBB, an eyewitness to the
crime; (3) Dr. xxx, who testified on the mental condition of the victim; and (4) Dr. xxx, who testified on the
results of his medical examination of the victim.
Their testimonies were summarized by the trial court as follows:
BBB, father of victim AAA, substantially testified that his daughter AAA who is 26 years old is mentally
retarded. That on September 30, 1988 between the hours of 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening while he was by the
window of his house tending to his grandchild in the cradle, he was watching his daughter AAA fetching water
from a communal water system located in front of his house. That he has been keeping watch of his daughter
AAA because he received news that the accused often called her. That after a while, he noticed that AAA was
no longer in (sic) the faucet so he started to look for her. That he went to the residence of his nephew about 10
meters away from the faucet but failed to find AAA there. That he returned home and accompanied by his son
CCC, they proceeded to a vacant house owned by the sister of the accused about 3 to 4 meters away from his
house and saw the accused on top of the body of his daughter AAA with the accuseds penis inserted inside the
sex organ of his daughter AAA. That AAAs dress was raised up to the shoulder and the hands of the accused
were on the breast (sic) of AAA. That when the accused noticed them, the accused rose up, put on his brief and

short pants and jumped out of the window. That he and his son CCC chased the accused but the accused
jumped over the fence and they failed to overtake him. That he returned to the house where he found AAA and
the accused and asked AAA to go home. That because of his anger, he slapped AAA and the latter revealed to
him that she was often threatened by the accused, placed his arms around her neck and admonished not to
shout. (sic) That AAA informed him that the accused had sexually abused him (sic) about five (5) times. That
he went to the house of the eldest sister of the accused where the accused was but the latter did not come out so
he went home. That after a while, accused called him and invited him to the store. That he followed and while
they were walking, he told the accused, Traidor kang kapitbahay and the accused boxed him twice. That he fell
down to the ground and the accuseds brother-in-law approached and kicked him. That his children came to his
assistance but the accused threw stones to (sic) his children. That he brought his daughter AAA to the xxx
District Hospital and then to the xxx Police Station. That AAA was examined by the NBI.
xxx

xxx

xxx

AAA, substantially testified that in the afternoon of September 30, 1988, she saw the accused in front of his
house. That the accused approached her and asked her to go with him to an empty house. That the accused told
her that if she will not go with him, her parents, brothers and sisters will die. That inside the empty house, the
accused embraced her and asked her to lay (sic) down. That the accused removed her panty and inserted his
penis inside her organ. That she felt painful (sic). That accused raised her upper clothes and embraced her
tightly and had sexual act with her. That her father saw them through the window of the accused and the
accused ran away. That her father slapped her and brought her home. That the empty house is near the house
of the accused and near the public faucet. That she told the accused not to remove her panty but the accused
continued removing her panty. That she could not resist because the accused was on top of her and her hands
were not free to move. That the accused touched her breasts and her sex organ and she resisted because it was
painful and told the accused she dont like (sic). That the accused raped her several times before the incident at
bar. That while the accused was performing sexual act with her, she resisted and told the accused Wag na ho
and she slapped his arms. That she did not continue to struggle while the accused was doing the sexual act
because she felt weak and her arms were painful and the accused held her hands.
On redirect, she said that she affixed her thumbmark on the complaint.
On Courts clarificatory question, she said that she attended school and reached up to Grade V. That she cannot
write her name without sample from where she could copy. That she do (sic) not know her age and do (sic) not
know when she was born.
DRA. XXX, Psychiatrist and Officer-in-Charge of the Neuro-Psychiatric Service of the NBI, testified that she
examine (sic) and evaluate (sic) mentally sick people referred to their section by the Medico Legal Section of
the NBI. That she conducted examination and made evaluation on the mental condition of the victim AAA
when she was referred to their department by their Medico Legal Section. That victim AAA is premature or
childish in her ways and her mental age is only of a five (5) years and ten (10) months old child. That her
speech is delayed and she is playful. That she can also be taught to do something and relay things that she has

experienced or happened (sic) to her. That victim is suffering from mental retardation. That she prepared a
Neuro-Psychiatric Evaluation Report. That psychological test was conducted by xxx who concluded that AAA
is within the mentally retarded group with a mental age of five years and ten months.
DR. XXX, Medico Legal Officer of the NBI, substantially testified that he conducted examination on the person
of the victim. That he did not find physical injuries on the body of the victim on account of lapse of time. That
he found old healed hymenal laceration which under the normal course could be caused by fully erected (sic)
male organ. That the old hymenal laceration was inflicted for a long time. That he prepared the Living Case
Report.
On cross-examination, he said that the old healed hymenal laceration could have been inflicted more than three
months ago. That hymenal laceration could also be caused by instrumentation, horse or bicycle riding and
masturbation.[6]

Version of the Defense

Against the prosecutions theory that AAA was raped by Accused-appellant Rodolfo San Juan in the empty
house of his elder sister, the defense relies on denial, claiming that the accused-appellant spent almost half the
day drinking tuba with his brothers-in-law and that, when he went to his sisters house that afternoon, he slept on
the floor because he was already very tipsy. He claims not to have seen anybody else there.
The defense presented three witnesses, to wit: the accused himself, his brother-in-law Domingo Jubilla,
and Purificacion Roldan. Their testimonies were summarized by the trial court as follows:
Accused (herein appellant San Juan) substantially testified that on September 30, 1988 from 9:00 in
the morning, he was in his house and had a drinking spree with his brothers-in-law Domingo Jubilla,
Jaime Jubilla, Jr. and Boy Jubilla up to 4:00 in the afternoon. That at about 4:00 in the afternoon, he left his
companions and went to a nearby fence and answered to the call of nature. That the fence where he urinated is
about 1 1/2 arms length to the place where his companions where (sic). That because he was drunk, he was not
able to return to his companions and he went to the house of his sister which is about two arms length from
where his companions were. That he was drunk that he could not stand without support or hold on solid thing
and cannot recognize the things before him (sic). That upon entering the house of his sister, he almost stumbled
down. That the house of his sister has no partition and the windows are made of glass and visible to the place
where they had a drinking spree. That the house is also visible to the house of AAA which is about two arms
length away. That he had not seen AAA. That the communal water system is near the house of his sister and
about 1 1/2 arms length from the place he urinated. (sic) That while urinating, he heard voices of people
coming from the communal water system. That he fell asleep at about 4:00 in the afternoon and woke up
between 5:00 and 6:00 in the same afternoon. That when he woke up, he went home and noticed BBB and
CCC in their yard. That when he reached home, he took a bath and changed his clothes to go to his stall at the

talipapa in xxx. That it is not true that he raped AAA. That it is not also true that he was on top of AAA and
inserted his sex organ inside her private part. That he was then sleeping. That there was no occasion that (sic)
BBB confronted him on that day. That there was a misunderstanding that existed between him and BBB and/or
his children in the past because they envy (sic) him since their (accused) financial standing improved. That
there are (sic) times that they fought with each other that resulted to (sic) bodily harm/physical injuries.
PURIFICACION ROLDAN substantially testified that on September 30, 1988 between 5:00 and 6:00 in the
afternoon she was at the artesian well located along the roadside fetching water. That there were many people
fetching water at that time. That she the accused sleeping in the house of his (accused) sister located about two
meters away from the faucet with the door and windows opened. (sic) That the accused was sleeping because
he was drunk. That she saw AAA entered (sic) the house and stood (sic) inside the house and after about 30
seconds, her (AAAs) father and CCC arrived and took her. That the house of the sister of the accused and the
house of AAA is around four to five meters away. That after AAA was brought home, there was altercation
between AAAs father BBB and the accused. That they had a long time grudge and she saw them having heated
argument on the New Year of 1988.
DOMINGO JUBILLA substantially testified that on September 30, 1988 at 9:00 in the morning he was in the
house of the accused at xxx, Metro Manila on occasion of the baptismal party of the child of his (witness) elder
brother Renato alias Boy held in the house of the accused because his brother do (sic) not own yet a
house. That upon arriving in the house of the accused, he, his elder brother, the accused and the latters elder
brother had a drinking spree at the terrace of the house of the accused that lasted up to 5:00 in the
afternoon. That at 5:00 in the afternoon, they left the accused sleeping in the house of his sister about one
house away to (sic) the house of the accused. That he know (sic) that the accused was sleeping because they
located him upon his (accused) wife (sic) request and found him sleeping inside his sisters house. That upon
seeing the accused sleeping, they prepared to leave and go home. That they left the house of the accused at
about 5:30 in the afternoon. That while in the house of the accused, he saw BBB and AAA in their house
looking out their window.[7]

The Trial Courts Ruling Granting full credence and probative weight to the prosecution witnesses
testimonies, the trial court, on September 2, 1991, rendered its Decision convicting the appellant, viz.:
In sum, the Court is convinced beyond doubt of the existence and commission of the offense. AAAs mental
deficiency, her lack of sufficient discretion, judgment and moral courage to seriously resist was taken advantage
of by the accused who is experienced in the ways of life.
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rodolfo San Juan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in
the complaint, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law and to pay the costs.

Accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party the sum of P20,000.00.[8]
SO ORDERED."[9]

The Issues Ultimately, the errors assigned by the appellant may be reduced to the single issue of credibility of
witnesses.

The Courts Ruling The appeal is unmeritorious.

Credibility of Witnesses
In deciding this appeal, the Court is guided by three well-entrenched principles in
reviewing rape cases, to wit:
(a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge;
considering that, in the nature of things, only two (2) persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the
testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and
(c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.[12]
The foregoing principles involve questions of fact and credibility of witnesses -- particularly that of the
offended party.
In a long line of cases, it has been held that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. These are the
most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face
of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be
expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to
disbelieve. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts
or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect
the disposition of the case. [13] After a thorough scrutiny of the records of the case at bench, the Court finds that
the trial court did not err in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of AAA and the other prosecution
witnesses which it characterized as clear, positive and convincing.[14]

Complaining Witness Credible

The mere fact that 26-year old AAA had the mental development of a child 5 years and 10 months old
does not lessen her credibility, since she has shown her ability to communicate her ordeal clearly and
consistently. Her steadfast account of the rape both on direct and cross-examination are replete with details that
jibe on material points. Moreover, her testimony, taken together with her fathers, paints a convincing picture of
the whole sordid incident. Her positive identification of Rodolfo San Juan as the one who raped her is credible
because she knew and recognized Appellant San Juan, her neighbor.
Furthermore, AAAs mental age lends credence to her testimony. Considering her childlike naivet and
innocence, it is indeed highly unlikely for her to testify so tenaciously and convincingly on the details of the
rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of appellant. It has been held that no woman
especially one who is of tender age would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private
parts and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a public trial, if she is not motivated solely by the desire to
have the culprit apprehended and punished.[15]

No Fixed Reaction to a Shocking Crime

help. The Court ruled there that (w)hile it may be true that Rosaleo Cagado acted in a rather odd manner, he
could not be faulted for being indecisive. There is no standard rule by which witnesses to a crime may react
thereto. (Emphasis supplied.) In the present case, that Eyewitnesses BBB and CCC had probably been shocked
into inaction at the sight of Appellant San Juan raping AAA should not detract from the credibility of their
testimonies.
Nonetheless, it should be observed that BBB and his son subsequently recovered from their shock and
sprang in pursuit of the appellant. This may be gleaned from the testimonies of both father and daughter. AAA
testified to the following:
Corollarily, in stating that he watched the rape for one or two minutes, BBB did not necessarily determine
the duration on the basis of a timepiece. He merely gave an estimate of what then felt to him to be one or two
minutes. His subjective sense of time under such distressful circumstances cannot be deemed exactly accurate.
Equally bereft of merit is the argument of the defense that AAAs testimony is incredible. Appellant
contended that her alleged cries for help would have been heard by the people fetching water from the artesian
well just three or four meters from the nearby house. But as the Solicitor General astutely and correctly states,
(b)eing a mentally retarded woman, and in a state of shock and surprise, AAA may have mistaken her plea for
help as loud outcries albeit in truth, her voice was muffled. [24] Her voice could have been silenced by
shock. This was supported by the fact that at no instance did AAA testify that her mouth had been covered by
appellant.

The defense assails the credibility of BBB and AAAs testimonies by asserting that some portions thereof
are at odd (sic) with natural human experience. [16] BBB allegedly saw the appellant raping his daughter for one
or two minutes, yet he and his son [17] who was then with him did not stop the alleged rape or utter a word of
outrage.[18] Appellant argues further that [i]f it were true that she was raped and shouted for help, then the
people present in the artesian well fetching water should have heard her considering that the well is only 3 or 4
meters away from the place of the incident. Experience has proved beyond cavil that when a lady is being
abused, she will shout on the top of her voice to attract the attention of the persons around the vicinity to lend a
helping hand. This is specially true in the present case considering that AAA never testified that the appellant
covered her mouth during the incident.[19]

Parenthetically, that the rape took place in a house with people nearby does not diminish the credibility of
AAAs rape charge. In a long line of rape cases, the Court has held that rape can be committed even in places
where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises and even inside a house where
there are other occupants or where other members of the family are also sleeping. Lust is no respecter of time
and place.[25]

After a thorough study of the records in this case, the Court is convinced that the reaction of BBB and his
son, CCC, when they witnessed the rape of AAA, is not contrary to human experience as to be
unbelievable. We have repeatedly ruled that the workings of the human mind placed under a great deal of
emotional and psychological stress (such as during rape) are unpredictable, and different people react
differently. There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange,
startling, frightful or traumatic experience -- some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into
insensibility.[20]

The defense submits that Dr. xxx, the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who conducted the medical
examination on the victim, x x x ruled out the commission of rape on the date complained of and alleged in the
Information instituted by the Fiscal. The victim was examined on October 1, 1988 whereas, the alleged
commission of the rape took place on September 30, 1988. And Dr. xxx found out that the injury in the hymen
of the victime (sic) was inflicted more than three (3) months before the medical examination. [26]

In People vs. Villaruel,[21] Appellant Villaruel assailed Eyewitness Rosaleo Cagados supposed unusual
behavior in just watching appellant assault his victim instead of putting a stop to it, or at least calling for

Hymenal Laceration Not Vital to Proving Rape

This argument does not defeat AAAs assertion that Appellant San Juan raped her that fateful
afternoon. We reiterate the well-settled doctrine that x x x lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual
intercourse. Moreover, the fact that hymenal lacerations were found to be healed round edge and that no
spermatozoa was found does not necessarily negate rape. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of

rape. For that matter, in crimes against chastity, the medical examination of the victim is not an indispensable
element for the successful prosecution of the crime, as her testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict
the accused thereof,[27] as in this case. The fact that AAA had an old, healed hymenal laceration only gives
credence to her testimony that she was raped several times before by the appellant.[28]

Mental Retardate Incapable of Giving Consent

The mere fact that AAA was mentally retarded, the defense argues, should not work against the appellant
as the former is a normal person after all. [29] In support of this contention, the defense cites the testimony of
prosecution witness and psychiatrist, Dr. xxx:
Fiscal xxx: (To the witness)
Q

We would like to solicit your opinion on this matter whether a person although 26 years old but with a
mental state of 5 years and 10 months child, can resist seriously a sexual abuse on her person?

She has a mental age of 5 years old, but she can be placed in equal footing to a normal person. (TSN,
December 17, 1990, p. 13).
The defense then quotes from her cross-examination as follows:

Q Now if your actual age is 26 but your mental age is 5 years old only, is there still coherency (of) action or
intelligence in the answer that you can extract from the subject?
A

Yes, that would be equivalent to her mental age (TSN, December 17, 1990, p. 24).
xxx

xxx

xxx

Now, in laymans language, please explain to us your findings on the subject that she is coherent.

Coherent is tama ang sinasabi (TSN, December 17, 1990, pp. 25-26).
Dr. xxxs testimony, that AAA was coherent and able to communicate her perceptions on the stand, cannot
in any way support the submission that she was a normal person capable of giving lawful consent to a sexual
intercourse. The defense overlooked well-entrenched doctrines laid down by this Court, to wit:
The issue x x x that a mentally retarded woman could not have given valid and legal consent to the sexual act is
not new. In the case of People vs. Manlapaz, 88 SCRA 704, We held that the victim, 13 years old at the time of
the commission of the act but with the mentality of a 5-year old child, is incapable of giving rational consent to
the carnal intercourse. And in the case of People vs. Gallano, 108 SCRA 405, the judgment of conviction by the
trial court was affirmed by Us because complainant DDD, who was then 31 years old at the commission of the
act but had the mentality of a 7-year old child, is a retardate or one mentally ill, such that she was incapable of

offering any effective or real resistance to appellants sexual assault (p.407, Id.). x x x Her mental condition was
such that she would not resist sexual advances because she was so deprived of reason to make any effective
resistance. Hence, by being so deprived, the act is made possible in the same way when there is active
resistance but same is overcome by force and threat, which is the essence of the crime of rape (p. 413, Id).
Assuming that complainant x x x voluntarily submitted herself to the bestial desire of appellant still the crime
committed is rape under paragraph 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. This is so even if the
circumstances of force and intimidation, or of the victim being deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious are
absent. The victim has the mentality of a child below seven years old. If sexual intercourse with a victim under
twelve years of age is rape, then it should follow that carnal knowledge with a seventeen-year old girl whose
mental age is that of a seven year old child would constitute rape. [30] (Underscoring supplied.)
In any case, Dr. xxxs assertions support the earlier conclusion regarding the admissibility of AAAs
testimony in view of the quality of her perceptions and her ability to communicate these to the court.

No False Accusation of Rape

The contention of the defense that the complaint was initiated merely because of the long time grudge by
BBB on (sic) the appellant,[31] deserves scant consideration. We reiterate that it is unnatural for a parent to use
her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrasment and even stigma. It
is plainly inconceivable that BBB would expose his mentally retarded daughter AAA, whom he had loved and
cared for through the years, to the travails and indignities accompanying a rape trial out of mere spite for his
neighbor Rodolfo San Juan over some petty spats. Indeed, it is improbable that a father would prejudice his
own daughter if he was not motivated by an honest desire to have the culprit punished.[32]
Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the evidence for the prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that Appellant Rodolfo San Juan is guilty of the crime of rape. This conclusion is
reached pleno jure. However, the indemnity of P20,000.00 awarded by the trial court to AAA must be
increased to P50,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[34]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the questioned Decision of the trial court, finding Appellant
Rodolfo San Juan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and imposing on him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED. The indemnity in favor of Complainant AAA is
hereby INCREASED to fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 129792. December 21, 1999]

JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE TIOPE and ELISA

PANELO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and
CRISELDA R. AGUILAR, respondents.

Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvels Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners
Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the stores branch manager, operations manager, and
supervisor, respectively. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar (ZHIENETH).
In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvels
Department Store, Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the payment and
verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked
behind her. She then beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body pinned by
the bulk of the stores gift-wrapping counter/structure. ZHIENETH was crying and screaming
for help. Although shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the assistance of the people around in
lifting the counter and retrieving ZHIENETH from the floor.[3]
ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was operated on. The
next day ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter communicated with CRISELDA by writing
on a magic slate. The injuries she sustained took their toil on her young body. She died fourteen
(14) days after the accident or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital bed. She was six years old.[4]
The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained.
After the burial of their daughter, private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the
hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses [6] which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to
pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for damages.
Petitioners primarily argue that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the factual findings and conclusions
of the trial court.They stress that since the action was based on tort, any finding of negligence on the part of the
private respondents would necessarily negate their claim for damages, where said negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury sustained. The injury in the instant case was the death of ZHIENETH. The proximate cause
was ZHIENETHs act of clinging to the counter. This act in turn caused the counter to fall on her. This and
CRISELDAs contributory negligence, through her failure to provide the proper care and attention to her child
while inside the store, nullified private respondents claim for damages. It is also for these reasons that parents
are made accountable for the damage or injury inflicted on others by their minor children. Under these
circumstances, petitioners could not be held responsible for the accident that befell ZHIENETH.

The two issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to
negligence; and (2) in case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to private
respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to exercise
due and reasonable care while inside the store premises.
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. [15] It
is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if
happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or
unexpected by the person to whom it happens.[16]
On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. [17] Negligence is the failure to observe, for
the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.[18]
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs
when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and
which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.[19]
The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith,
[20]
thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
[21]

We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETHs death could only
be attributed to negligence.
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger
posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure
the safety of the stores employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have
done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence
required of a good father of a family.

Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children
below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In his book,[28] former Judge
Cezar S. Sangco stated:
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without
discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like
exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age,
unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict
and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age
is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of
discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a
rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be
conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.[Emphasis supplied]
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter,
no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if
that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis
of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence [29]on record
reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an inverted L, the counter was heavy, huge,
and its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not
secured.[30]
CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to
CRISELDAs waist, later to the latters hand. [31] CRISELDA momentarily released the childs hand from her
clutch when she signed her credit card slip.At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for
CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she
was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from
CRISELDA.[32] The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not
loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the
hospital that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her.

[G.R.

No.

29396.

November

9,

1928.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PRAXEDES AYAYA,

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; INJURY CAUSED BY MERE ACCIDENT WITHOUT FAULT OR
INTENTION OF CAUSING IT. A married woman who, to free her son from the imminent danger of being
strangled by the door which her husband was attempting to shut, thrust her umbrella in the opening of said door
and jabbed her husband with the point thereof, thereby causing an injury to his left eye, which is supposed to
have been the cause of his death, is not criminally liable, pursuant to article 8 of the Penal Code, because the act
performed by her does not involve any criminal liability. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November
30, 1888.)

Jose Fajardo, the chief of police of Pagbilao, Tayabas, was informed by a policeman that one Benito de la
Cruz was drunk, wounded, and vomiting in his house in said municipality. Said chief of police went to the
place and found Benito, the deceased, lying in bed with a wound on his left eyelid, and unconscious, for he
did not answer the questions put to him. When his wife, the defendant Praxedes Ayaya, was questioned as
to the cause of that wound, she replied that it was due to the fact that she herself had jabbed her husband
with an umbrella. Health officer Victoriano Litonjua was then called, and upon examining Benito, found
he had a wound on the left upper eyelid which was bleeding; that his pupils were dilated and, from the
odor of his breath and from his vomiting, it appeared that Benito was drunk.
In the defendants sworn statement she states, among other things, that at about 8 oclock at night on
January 15, 1928, she, with her husband Benito de la Cruz, and her son Emilio, drank tuba in the store of
one Felicidad Losloso; that afterwards they went to a cinema; that while returning home and without any
warning, her husband, who was drunk, gave her a blow which she dodged; that then her husband went
home, preceding her and her son and when they arrived at the house they found the door closed; that she
and her son pushed the door and attempted to open it, but her husband, who was inside, prevented it; that
then the door gave way somewhat and her son Emilio succeeded in putting his head between the opening
of the door and the wall and;n order to prevent the door from crushing him, she pushed it; that Benito then
poked his head out of the opening of the door and when she saw him, she jabbed him with the umbrella
she carried; that she does not know where she jabbed him although she thinks it was in the body; and that
when she and her son finally succeeded in entering the house, they found that Benito was already in bed

with a wound in the forehead. The accused herself, in her testimony in her own behalf, substantially
repeated what she had declared before the justice of the peace of Pagbilao, stating, however, that when the
door was opened and her son put his head between the opening of the door and the wall, in order to
prevent the door from crushing her sons head, she jabbed her husband with her umbrella with a downward
motion, though she could not tell if she touched him or not. She stated, furthermore, that she did not know
how the wound in her husbands forehead was caused. This point of the defendants testimony has not
been contradicted by any evidence to the contrary; rather it has been corroborated by her son Emilio de la
Cruz
who
also
testified
at
the
trial.
On the other hand, it appears from the testimony of the defendant and of her son that the husband and wife
did not quarrel in the street while returning home on the night in question, and, moreover, that during the
marriage they lived together in peace with no disagreements between them, either on or before the date of
the incident.
In view of the fact that there is no eyewitness of the act herein prosecuted, with the exception of the
defendant and her son Emilio de la Cruz, we are compelled to accept the declaration of the defendant that
she jabbed her husband with her umbrella in order to prevent the door from closing and crushing her sons
head which was inserted between said door and the wall of the house. Said defendant, explaining what
took place, says in part: "When the door was ajar my son went in, and then my husband pushed it and as I
saw that he was about to crush my sons head, I jabbed my husband with the point of the umbrella
downwards to prevent him from crushing my sons head." We find nothing improbable in this statement
and if we add to this the absence of any reasonable motive to prompt said defendant to injure her husband,
we are compelled to conclude that in thrusting her umbrella in the opening of the door in question, she did
so to free her son from the imminent danger of having his head crushed or being strangled; and if she thus
caused her husbands injury, it was by a mere accident, without any fault or intention to cause it. This
being so, we believe that she incurred no criminal liability in accordance with article 8, No. 8, of the Penal
Code, because, it being a licit act to free her son from the grave danger threatening him, and the fact of
having touched the left eye of her husband, who was behind the door, with the end of her umbrella, does
not make her criminally liable. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1888.)

.R. No. L-33154 February 27, 1976

PEOPLE
OF
vs.
ANGEL REYES Y ALCANTARA

THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jose Garcia and his cousin, the deceased Norberto Flores, were on
their way to the place where they drive a taxi, which was near their respective residences.
Along the way, they stopped awhile and joined a group of people watching and observing an insane
person. While thus engaged, two men, one of whom was the accused Angel Reyes, approached them and
inquired about a certain Oscar Solomon, who lives in that place. Thereupon, the deceased Norberto Flores,
approached the accused and asked for a cigarette light but the latter struck him with a karate chop to the
stomach using the side of his open palm, at the same time poking a gun on them saying: "Ang sama ng
porma ninyo." The accused and his companion appeared to have taken liquor as they had alcoholic breath.
Thereafter, Jose Garcia and the deceased Norberto Flores, went to the house of the latter and stayed by the
door, while the accused and his companion proceeded to look for Oscar Solomon.
Immediately after the accused and his companion had left, Jose Garcia together with the deceased
Norberto Flores, Ernesto Bautista and Isagani Reyes went to Police Precinct, where they reported and
complained about the "gun-poking" incident.
While inside the investigation room, the accused tried to settle the matter with Jose Garcia. Meanwhile,
Conchita Flores, mother of the deceased Norberto Flores, arrived. She refused to settle the case with the
accused and soon they shouted at each other. The accused said to Conchita Reyes: "Ayaw ninyong
paareglo gusto ninyo cuarta, cuarta." Thereafter, the accused Angel Reyes approached Norberto Flores,
who was seated on a chair in front of the table of the investigator'. Det. Domingo Gomez of the MPD, and
sat on the edge of the table, about two feet away from the deceased Norberto Flores. He uttered bad words
and said: "I will shoot you now", and immediately, pulled his gun from his waistline and shot Norberto
Flores, who was then seated, stooping and smoking, hitting the said Norberto Flores in the abdomen which
gunshot wound caused his death a few hours thereafter.
Upon review of the records, We find that the appellants contentions are devoid of merit. As correctly
observed by the trial court, his testimony that he accidentally shot the victim defies belief because the
shooting of the victim was preceded by his threatening words. Besides, had it really been accidental, then
the natural tendency of the accused would have been to immediately give help to his unfortunate victim
and even to plead and express his regret to the mother of the deceased. But such was not the case. After

shooting the victim, the accused still aimed his gun at the prostrate body on the floor, which prevented the
mother of the victim, Conchita Flores, from going to the side of her son.

Furthermore, as pointed out by the Solicitor General in his belief, appellant's claim of accidental shooting
is negated by the following facts: (1) a revolver is not prone to accidental firing if it were simply being
handed over to the deceased as appellant claims because of the nature of its mechanism, unless it was
already first cocked and pressure was exerted on the trigger in the process of allegedly handing it over If it
were uncooked, then considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver. Either way,
the shooting of the deceased must have been intentional because pressure on the trigger is necessary to
make the gun fire, cocked or uncooked; (2) even assuming for the sake of argument as correct the
appellant's pretense of merely handing the firearm over to the deceased, the barrel or muzzle is never
pointed to a person, a basic firearms safety rule which appellant should know as a police officer; the proper
handling of the gun dictates the handing over of the same, butt first. It is indeed, strange, why in the case at
bar the appellant allegedly handed over the gun to the deceased with the barrel or muzzle of the gun
pointed to the latter, instead of handing it over butt first.

may be pointed out that in the present case, provocation and obfuscation cannot be considered as two distinct
and separate circumstances but should treated as one, having arisen from the same incident. 9 Voluntary
surrender may not also be credited to the appellant because the fact that he did not try to escape or did not resist
arrest after he was taken into custody by the authorities does not amount to voluntary surrender. 10 A surrender
to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities. Here, the accused after shooting the deceased was immediately disarmed and placed under arrest.
There is, therefore, no voluntary surrender to speak of because the appellant was in point of fact arrested. 11
As to the alleged lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed the same cannot likewise be
considered in favor of appellant. His clear intention to kill the deceased may be inferred from the fact that he
used a deadly weapon and fired at the deceased almost point blank, thereby hitting him in the abdomen and
causing death.

G.R. No. L-11439

October 28, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EDUARDO ELICANAL, Defendant-Appellant.

Moreover, after his arrest the appellant refuse to give any statement to the police. Such conduct of the appellant
strongly argues against his claim of accidental shooting. He could have easily explained the matter to the Police.
But he did not. This is another circumstance that casts doubt upon his claim of accidental shooting.
We find, therefore, no error in the trial court's conclusion that the shooting of the deceased was not accidental
but intentional.

As to the mitigating circumstances of (a) sufficient provocation; (b) passion and obfuscation; (c) drunkenness;
(d) voluntary surrender; and (e) lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, which the appellant claims to have
attended the commission of the crime, We find the contention to be without merit.
Since the alleged provocation 7 which caused the obfuscation 8 of the appellant did not come from the deceased
but from the latter's mother, Conchita Flores, the same may not, be appreciated in favor of appellant. Besides, it

RULING: As we have already intimated, before a force can be considered to be an irresistible one, it must
produce such an effect upon the individual that, in spite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument
and, as such, incapable of committing a crime. It must be such that, in spite of the resistance of the person on
whom it operates, it compels his members to act and his mind to obey. He must act not only without will but
against will. Such a force can never consist anything which springs primarily from the man himself; it must be a
force which acts upon him from the outside and by means of a third person. In order that one may take
advantage of subdivision 10 of article 8 and allege with success that he acted under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, it must appear that the threat which caused the uncontrollable
fear related to a crime of such gravity and so imminent that it might safely be said that the ordinary run of men
would have been governed by it. And the evil threatened must be greater than, or at least equal to, that which he
is compelled to cause. The legislature by this enactment did not intend to say that any fear would exempt one
from performing his legal duty. It was intended simply to exempt from criminal responsibility when the threat
promised an evil as grave, at the very least, as that which the one threatened was asked to produce. Viada in his
commentaries on this subdivision of article 8 of the Penal Code gives this illustration:

Certain evil-minded persons seize me and threaten me with death If I do not set fire to a neighbor's house; if I
perform the act under such threat, as grave as it is imminent, I would fall within the exemption from criminal
responsibility provided for in this number; but if the same persons threatened to lay waste my forest if I do not
kill my father my act would not come within the exemption for the reason that the evil with which I was
threatened was much less than that of killing my father.
The evidence fails to establish that the threat directed to the accused by the chief mate, if any, was of such a
character as to deprive him of all volition and to make him a mere instrument without will of his own but one
moved exclusively by him who threatened. Nor does the threat appear to have been such, or to have been made
under such circumstances, that the accused could reasonably have expected that he would suffer material injury
if he refused to comply. In other words, the fear was not insuperable. Indeed, it is doubtful if any threat at all in
the true sense was made; certainly none of such serious nature as would justify an illegal act on the part of the
accused

A2C Serafin Artizona, a soldier, assigned at the lst Regional Narcotics Command, Baguio City, testified that on
December 4, 1985, he was assigned by his immediate chief Major Florencio Junio to compose a team to entrap
accused Dante Marcos in the Holy Ghost Proper (Hearing of April 28, 1986; TSN, pp. 13-14; Records, pp. 1415). Thereafter, together with the confidential informer they went to the Holy Ghost Proper. He was also
accompanied by the back-up team strategically positioned within the vicinity, namely Major Junio, Maximo
Peralta, Freddie Cortel and Philip de Vera (Hearing of April 28, 1986; TSN, pp. 14-15; Records, pp. 15-16).
Once at the Holy Ghost Proper, he was introduced by the confidential informer as a buyer of marijuana to the
accused who was then standing at the stairway together with his companion. After a while, they were asked to
proceed to the second floor (Hearing of April 28, 1986; TSN, pp. 20-22; Records, pp. 21-23). He then ordered
ten (10) kilos of marijuana priced at seven hundred pesos per kilo (P700.00). The accused left the room to get
the stuff, and returned with a light blue sack and gave it to him. After inspecting the contents of the aforesaid
sack, he gave the prearranged signal to his companion by spitting through the window. Accordingly, the backup team went inside the house. Meanwhile, he introduced himself to the accused as a NARCOM agent (Hearing
of April 28, 1986; TSN, pp. 16-17; Records, pp. 17-18). Eventually, the accused was arrested while his
companion was able to evade the arrest. He also testified that he did not execute any affidavit to support his
complaint against the accused (Heating of April 28, 1986; TSN, p. 18; Records, p. 19).

G.R. No. 83325 May 8, 1990

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANTE MARCOS y SIBAYAN
Major Florencio Junio, Commanding Officer of the First Narcotic Regional Unit, Baguio City, acting upon an
information given by a confidential informer that accused-appellant Dante Marcos was selling marijuana at the
Holy Ghost Hill Proper, Baguio City, organized on December 4, 1985 a "buy bust" operation team composed of
A2C Serafin Artizona who was to pose as the buyer of the prohibited stuff, with Major Junio, Maximo Peralta,
Freddie Cortel and Philip de Vera providing the back-up support (Rollo, pp. 58-59). The testimony of this team
which eventually apprehended the accused, constitutes the major part of the prosecution's evidence
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses:
Lt. Carlos V. Figueroa, a forensic chemist at the PC Crime Laboratory, Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet,
testified that on January 2, 1986, he received a request for laboratory examination dated December 16, 1985
(Hearing of March 18, 1986; TSN, p. 3; Record, p. 4) for nine (9) bundles of marijuana stuff, weighing 9.2
kilos. He examined the same by means of the Duquenois-Levine test and the thin-layer chromatography test.
Both tests showed that the bundles were positive for marijuana (Hearing of March 18, 1986; TSN, p. 4;
Records, pp. 5-6).

Pat. Maximiano Peralta, an investigator of the lst Narcotics Regional Unit, testified that on December, 1985, he
was a member of the back-up team of A2C Artizona who negotiated with the accused. He rushed to the house
when Major Junio who posted himself near the house of accused gave the prearranged signal that the accused
was already held by A2C Serafin Artizona (Hearing of January 14, 1987; TSN, pp. 31-32; Records, pp. 32-33).
Inside the house, he saw Artizona holding the accused. He further disclosed that the sack contained ten (10)
bundles of marijuana weighing more or less 9-1/2 kilos (Hearing of January 14, 1987; TSN, pp. 33-34; Records,
pp. 34-35). Moreover, he testified that he was the one who prepared the affidavit of arrest and other supporting
papers (Hearing of January 14, 1987; TSN, pp. 34-35; Records, pp. 35-36).
With the presentation of the oral testimonies of the witnesses by the prosecution and the documentary evidence
which consist of: (a) Letter-request for laboratory examination dated December 16, 1985, signed by Murphy
Bugtong, Chief of Narcotics Division, Baguio City Police Station (Exhibit "A", Original Record, p. 195); (b)
Blue sack which contained marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B" -"B-10", ibid., p. 196); (c) Chemistry Report
(Exhibit "C", ibid., p. 197); (d) Sketch (Exhibit "D", ibid., p. 198); (e) Joint Affidavit (Exhibit "E", ibid., p.
199); as well as the physical evidence, the prosecution rested its case.

On the other hand, the defense presented the accused Dante Marcos as its principal witness who vehemently
denied the accusation against him and claimed instead that the sack of marijuana belonged to a certain Roland
Bayogan.
He testified that he was a security guard of the Freeport and Vito Security Agency and an Architectural drafting
student at the University of Baguio. He was boarding at the ground floor of No. 23-C Sumulong St., a twostorey boarding house owned by Melita Adase (Hearing of August 24, 1987; TSN, pp. 2-3; Records, pp. 74-75).
On December 4, 1985, he went to his class until 2:30 p.m. Thereafter, he went to his boarding house and
reviewed for his last subject at 3:30 p.m. (Ibid., pp. 4-5; 15; Records, pp. 76-77; 87). However, while reviewing,
Roland Bayogan, a student from Kalinga-Apayao who was occupying a room on the second floor (Ibid., p. 4;
Records, p. 76) knocked at his door and asked him to go to his (Roland's) room to entertain his visitors as he
was to go somewhere for a while. Accordingly, he went to Roland's room, and there met Roland's visitors, an
American, a Filipino and a Negro boy. He was introduced to the three visitors and then Roland left (Ibid., pp. 57; Records, pp. 77-79). Ten (10) minutes after, Roland returned carrying a big sack which he brought near the
bed which was hidden from his view by a curtain. Roland then called for the Negro boy who in turn called for
the American. When the American saw the contents of the sack he overheard him say, "Okay , I'll pay it," at the
same time brought out his money as he emerged from behind the curtain (Ibid., pp. 7-8; Records, pp. 79-80). He
testified that as Roland was sitting on his bed he was called by the Filipino visitor, who held the former. He was
also called by the same visitor who held his hands saying, "Relax lang kayo, this is NARCOM." He saw the
Negro boy jump out of the window while panicked-stricken Roland tried to free himself from the hands of the
Filipino, but the Filipino visitor pulled them both outside the door. When they were near the stairs Roland was
able to free himself. Roland ran downstairs and fled. Suddenly, he heard a shot. The Filipino held on to him
while the American went back to the room and got the sack. Later, accompanied by the Filipino and the
American, they were met by two male persons at the foot of the stairs. He was pulled inside a vehicle and
brought to the police station. He further declared that once inside the said vehicle, he heard one of them say,
"Hindi ito talaga ang target natin, iyong nakatakbo." (Hearing of August 24, 1987; TSN, pp. 8-10,; Records, pp.
80-82). He further stated that A2C Serafin Artizona was not one of the visitors of Roland Bayogan. He and Pat.
Peralta were never at the boarding house during the incident. He also claimed that the sketch of the place as
presented by A2C Artizona is erroneous (Ibid., p. 12; Record, p. 84) and insisted that his only purpose in going
to the room of Roland Bayogan was to entertain the latter's visitors.
On cross examination, the accused admitted that he came to know Roland Bayogan only on November 15,
1985. Their relationship was casual and he had been to the room of Bayogan for the second time only on
December 4, 1985, the day of the incident.

Renato Padua, a law student at the Baguio Colleges Foundation, testified and corroborated the testimony of the
accused that at about 3:30 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of December 4, 1987, he was reading in the second floor of No.
23-D Holy Ghost Proper, about 1.5 meters from No. 23-C where the accused Dante Marcos lived (Hearing of
March 11, 1987; TSN, pp. 1-5; Record, pp. 49- 53); that on the said afternoon he heard a commotion at 23-C
which was followed by successive stamping of feet going down to the first floor. He went out from his room
and stayed at the porch of his boarding house. Later, he saw Roland Bayogan, a boarder of 23-C running toward
a small alley (Ibid., pp. 7-10; Record, pp. 55-58). Meanwhile, he saw two persons who were then standing fire a
shot into the air (Ibid., p. 1 0; Record, p. 58). Thereafter, the two men came down to 23-C and met the accused
(Ibid., p. 11; Record, p. 59). At the same time, the accused was being held by a certain man followed by an
American holding a sack. Finally, they boarded a jeep and then left (Ibid., pp. 11-14; Records, pp. 59-61).
Lastly, the defense presented Raul Bayangdan an AB-BSE student at Baguio Colleges Foundation, a board mate
and province mate of the accused. He testified that he has been a boarder at the first floor of 23-C Holy Ghost
St. from June 1984 to March 1986. He corroborated the testimony of the accused as to the boarders of that
house including Roland Bayogan and his sister Anita. He declared that he came to know about the incident from
Melita Adasen and Renato Padua, a neighbor, when he went home from school. He also learned that Roland
Bayogan ran away and never returned. He asserted that he has no knowledge of the incident except that which
has been told to him (Hearing of February 8, 1988; TSN, pp. 2- 9; Records, pp. 94-100).
The trial court gave more weight to the evidence of the prosecution and found the accused-appellant Dante
Marcos guilty as charged.
Hence, this appeal.
On October 28, 1988, accused-appellant through his counsel filed his brief (Rollo, p. 35), while on May 19,
1989, the appellee's brief was filed (Rollo, p. 54).
The crucial issue of this case is whether or not there is instigation or entrapment of the accused.
Appellant contends that there was an instigation or even frame up and not a real entrapment. The "buy-bust"
operation team who went to the place does not know the accused. In fact, the alleged buyer had to be
introduced. There was no marijuana yet when the authorities came or when the alleged poseur buyer came to
buy the prohibited drug. Thus, the accused was not about to commit a crime or committing a crime.
The contention is without merit.

The testimony of Artizona, the poseur buyer, was clear and convincing and demonstrated that the accused
needed no instigation or prodding to commit a crime he would not otherwise have committed. Noteworthy is
the fact that the accused, as gathered from the records, had a ready supply of marijuana for sale and disposition
to anyone willing to pay the price asked for the prohibited material. Thus, the acts of the arresting officers here
constituted entrapment, a process not prohibited by the Revised Penal Code (People v. Sanchez, G.R. No.
77588, May 12, 1989; People v. Borja G.R. No. 71838, February 26, 1990).
It must be noted that in instigation, where the officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure
an accused into committing an offense, which he otherwise would not commit and has no intention of
committing, the accused cannot be held liable. But in entrapment, where the criminal intent or design to commit
the offense charged originates from the mind of the accused and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the
commission of the offense, the accused cannot justify his conduct. Instigation is a "trap for the unwary
innocent." Entrapment is a trap for the unwary criminal (Cabrera v. Judge Pajares, Adm. Mat. R-278-RTJ & R
309-RTJ, May 30, 1986, En Banc, Per Curiam, 142 SCRA 124).
In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker while executing his
criminal plan. On the other hand, in instigation the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into
committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal (People v. Natipravat, infra). Entrapment is no bar
to prosecution and conviction while in instigation, the defendant would have to be acquitted (People v. Lapatha,
167 SCRA 159).
The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the means
originate from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In
instigation, the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the
idea and carries it into execution. The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability.
Instigation does (Araneta v. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 534 [1986]).
The mere fact that the authorities deceived the appellants into believing that the former were buyers of heroin
does not exculpate the latter from liability for selling the prohibited drugs. The police can legitimately feign
solicitation to catch criminals who habitually engage in the commission of the offense (People v. Natipravat,
145 SCRA 483 [1986]).
Moreover, as noted by this Court, the defense that the accused was framed by the apprehending officer can be
easily fabricated and not acceptable for accused being a drug pusher or seller almost always uses such defense.
(People v. Francia, 154 SCRA 694 [1987]). For the defense of having set up or framed up to prosper, the

evidence adduced must be clear and convincing. Like alibi, it is a weak defense, that is easy to concoct and is
difficult to prove (People v. Nabunat, No. 84392, February 7, 1990, First Division, Gancayco, J.).
But the more important consideration is the fact that the appellant was positively identified by the prosecution
witnesses. This should prevail over his denial and inadmission of having committed the crime for which he was
charged, since greater weight is generally accorded to the positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses than
the accused's denial (People v. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 52 [1986]; People v. Khan, 161 SCRA 406 [1988]; People v.
Marilao, G.R. No. 71681, September 5,1989). As between the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses
and the negative statement of the accused, the former deserves more credence (People v. Melgar, G.R. No.
75268, 157 SCRA 718; People v. Marilao, G.R. No. 71861, September 5, 1989). Moreover, even if the appellant
denied the participation in the crime, his presence during the negotiation and actual delivery indicates a
common purpose with other accused to sell marijuana (People v. Natipravat, supra).
In the case at bar, the findings of the trial court are as follows:
On the other hand, the accused's pretension that he went to Roland's room that afternoon of December 4, 1985
only to entertain the latter's visitors lacks appeal to reason. Considering his own admission that he met Roland
only on November 15, 1985; that he had gone to Roland's room only once before December 4, 1985; that they
are not even townmates as Roland is from Kalinga-Apayao while the accused is from Pinged Sabangan Mt.
Province, there is simply no discernible special relationship between them that could have moved Roland to
pick on the accused as his surrogate to entertain his visitors. What is more, the accused had a scheduled
examination at 3:30 o'clock for which he had to review. Why should he accede to Roland's request and thereby
lose precious time he badly needed for his review? To top it all, even as Roland had already returned to attend to
his visitors, the accused still did not leave. The Court is thus inclined to believe that Roland and the accused
were together that afternoon because both were engaged in the illegal trafficking of marijuana.
It must be pointed out that ownership and possession are not indispensable elements of the crime. The mere act
of selling or even acting as broker in the sale of marijuana and other prohibited drugs consummates the crime
(People v. Madarang, 147 SCRA 123 [1987]).
Furthermore Artizona's testimony was corroborated by the "buy-bust" operation team especially Pat. Maximo
Peralta who confirmed that appellant was truly a marijuana dealer. The commission of the offense of illegal sale
of marijuana requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction (People v. Macuto, G.R. No. 80112,
August 25, 1989). In the case at bar, the appellant handed over the blue sack containing the ten kilos of
marijuana upon the agreement with Artizona to exchange it for money. The circumstances show that there was

an agreement between the poseur-buyer and the appellant to consummate the sale. The fact that the appellant
returned with the amount of marijuana corresponding to the aforesaid price suffices to constitute if not sale,
then delivery or giving away to another and distribution of the prohibited drug punishable under Section 4,
Article 11 of Republic Act 6425 (People v. Rodriguez, April 25, 1989, G.R. No. 81332; People v. Tejada, G.R.
No. 81520, February 21, 1989). What is important is the fact that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from
the appellant and that the contents were presented as evidence in court. Proof of the transaction suffices (People
v. Macuto, supra).
Neither can the appellant aver that no consideration or payment was made. In the case of People v. Tejada,
supra, this Court held that so long as the marijuana actually given by the appellant was presented before the
lower court the absence of the marked money does not create a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence (People v.
Teves, G.R. No. 81332, April 25, 1989). Recently, this Court ruled:
It is true that police officers did not have the amount of P1,600 with them to buy marijuana from the appellants
during the incident. Be that as it may, it was not indispensable for their operation. Sgt,. Raquidan went through
the motion as a buyer and his offer was accepted by the appellant who produced and delivered the marijuana.
There was no need to hand the marked money to the appellants in the payment thereof. The crime was
consummated by the delivery of the goods. (People v. Galtongo-o, 168 SCRA 716 [1988]).
The alleged contradiction in the date of the affidavit or the fact that prosecution witnesses Artizona and Peralta
did not know the number and owner of the raided house will not impair their testimonies. There is no cogent
reason for the witnesses to know the number nor the owner of the house at Holy Ghost Hills in Sumulong Street
because Artizona who posed as a buyer was accompanied by a confidential informer, who was familiar with the
place. It has been ruled that contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses not on material points
is not fatal (People v. Pulo, 147 SCRA 551 [1987]). The doctrinal jurisprudence has consistently held that minor
contradictions are to be expected but must be disregarded if they do not affect the basic credibility of the
evidence as a whole (People v. Ancheta, 148 SCRA 178; People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483; People v.
Reriodica, Jr., September 29, 1989).

Conversely, the actuations of the appellant during his arrest during which he did not make a protest, indicates
his Unusually submissive stance of the appellant after his entrapment and absence of vigorous protest when he
was arrested, destroy his alleged innocence (People v. Madarang, supra).
Appellant failed to show that the police officers were actuated by any improper motive in testifying as they did.
There is nothing in the records to suggest that the arrest was motivated by any reason other than the desire of
the police officers to accomplish their mission. Courts generally give full faith and credit to police officers for
they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner (Rule 131, Section 5(m), Rules of Court;
People v. Lamong et al., G.R. No. 82373, April 17, 1989; People v. Gamayon, 121 SCRA 642; People v.
Policarpio, 158 SCRA 85; People v. Patog, G.R. No. 69620, September 24, 1989; People v. Natipravat, supra;
People v. de Jesus, supra). As such, their testimonies cannot be discredited where no motive is shown why they
would frame up the appellant (People v. Ranola, April 12, 1989, No. 71752; People v. Line, 71 SCRA 249
[1976]).
Well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of the witnesses' testimonies are
accorded great weight and respect on appeal because the trial judge has first hand opportunity to examine and
observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during the giving of their testimonies (People v. Rodriguez,
G.R. No. 81332, April 25, 1989; People v. Tejada, supra; People v. Abonada, G.R. No. 50041, January 27, 1989;
People v. Turla, G.R. No. 70270, November 11, 1988; People v. Aboga, 147 SCRA 404 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.