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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993


ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.

NARVASA, C.J.:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel and in payment of his share of the
expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on
September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum
of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the

tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."


A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against

Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the
crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to
indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the
Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21,
1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 3 i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee

the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of
the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the
judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as
guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in
a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided
as follows:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an
obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19,
1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s.
1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981,
Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No.
12) almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1,
1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have
been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the

original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of
an obligation," as follows: 4
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting authority
may reverse its administration interpretation of a statute, but that its review interpretation applies
only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all
cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after
this date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an
obligation collection will no longer be considered a valid defense.
Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101
Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new law but was merely
a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979.
From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for
reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor
General. The latter complied and, in its comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of
Albino Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To this comment,
Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties' arguments and contentions, the
Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and adjudicate the same on its merits.
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is
echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar
as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . . 5
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include:
Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine
National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment
made before effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, s
amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be
given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that
Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive
application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20
of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar
v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from
the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending
the promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519,
adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be
given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity;Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling
that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo
v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v.
Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez v.COMELEC, 193 SCRA
317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall
proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment
an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil Code,
'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"
So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in
1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the
matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People
v. Lucero (1958). 6Our decision in People v. Mapa, 7 reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came

only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the
basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of
the complete reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the
laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ."The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law
was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretation legis vim obtinet"
the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
doctrine laid down in Lucero andMacarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of
the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and where he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should
be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws,
where it is necessary that the punishment of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of
society.
So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 97973)
and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515,
527-528: 8
We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on
February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18,
1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979.
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that
enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the
DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article
4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks
forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive
application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the
obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions
enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . . .
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should
be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof.
A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited case
of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the
imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact
negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.
Thus, in this Court's decision in Taada v. Tuvera, 9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 which declared "that

presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,shall have no force and
effect," and as regards which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive

about the possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in reliance on the validity
of these presidential decrees . . ." the Court said:
. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this Court, had taken the
pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank (308
U.S. 371, 374) to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425,
442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such
broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions
of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
who have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.
Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 concerning the effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act No.
342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmea,
suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and
which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and

oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer . . ." the Court made substantially the same
observations, to wit: 11
. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that
matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be
the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its
repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and
purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being
supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may not however be
sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged
legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be compiled with. This is so as until
after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience and
respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed theirpositions, what could be
more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such
legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now
accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence is a fact must be reckoned with.
This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ
which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of
time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a
declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there
be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,
with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and
official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This
language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1953]) and
the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance

is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114,
Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).
Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military Commission No 34, 12

declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which
had resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons this Court, in Tan vs. Barrios,
190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:
In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied
prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was
promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of
conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the
Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular
cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of constitutional
rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based
on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a
retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since judgment against him is null on
account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.
xxx xxx xxx
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and commissions
during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders
issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is an operative fact that may
not just be ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those
proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before our
decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit
of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the
question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out
all the acts of the local government abolished. 13
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of
September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the

performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 should not be given retrospective
effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the
Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar
doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry
being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially different from those in the case at bar. In
the former, there was no official issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing the
special law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the defense . . . (of) an honest

misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the
present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private
lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary
of Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance may be
placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct interpretation of a constitutional or statutory
provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of the authority that
resides in as regards prosecutions for their violation. 17 Senarillos vs. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by
the respondent Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra,
no administrative interpretation antedated the contrary construction placed by the Court on the law
invoked.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in
favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala
prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and
discussed, negating criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set
aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes
1 As found by the Court of Appeals, the agreement was between Co, representing Mayflower
Shipping Corporation, and Geronimo B. Bella, representing Tans-Pacific Towage, Inc. The
expenses for refloating were apportioned chiefly between FGU Insurance and Development Bank
of the Philippines, which respectively contributed P2,329,022.00 and P1,579,000.00. SEE Rollo,
pp. 9, 20-21.
2 Otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".
3 The ruling is contained in an extended resolution on a motion for reconsideration, promulgated by
the Special Former Second Division of the Court on September 21, 1987, written for the division by
Paras, J., with whom concurred Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ. In that
resolution, the Court gave its "stamp of approval" on the decision of the Court of Appeals holding
inter alia that "It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where
dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee."
4 Emphasis supplied.
5 Exceptions to the rule of prospectivity are collated, e.g., in the textbook of retired Justice Edgardo
A. Paras (Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1984 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 22-23) viz : 1) laws
remedial in nature; 2) penal law favorable to accused, if ; after not habitual delinquent; 3) laws of
emergency nature under police power : e.g., tenancy relations (Vda. de Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 47
O.G. 4259, Valencia et al. v. Surtida et al., May 31, 1961); 4) curative laws; 5) substantive right
declared for first time unless vested rights impaired (Unson v. del Rosario, Jan. 29, 1953; Belen v.
Belen, 49 O.G. 997; Peo v. Alejaga, 49 OG 2833).
6 106 Phil. 713 and 103 Phil. 500, respectively, both involving prosecutions for illegal possession of
firearms, and both holding that appointment by the Provincial Governor or Provincial Commander
of a person as a "secret agent" or "confidential agent" "sufficiently placed him under the category of
a 'peace officer' . . . who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code is exempted from
the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearm.
7 SEE Ilagan v. People, Jan. 29, 1974, 55 SCRA 361.
8 The title of the cited Monge case is Monge, et al. v. Angeles, et al., and is reported in 101 Phil.,
563 [1957], while that of the cited Tupas case is Tupas v. Damasco, et al., reported in 132 SCRA
593 [1984].
9 136 SCRA 27, 40-41.
10 And several other rulings set forth in a corresponding footnote in the text of the decision.
11 SEE also Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 (1987) (Citing Municipality of
Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533 where the question arose as to whether the judicial nullification
of an executive order creating a municipality wiped out all the acts of the local government
abolished); Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686 (1990); Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378

(1991); Union of Filipino Employees v. Vivar, Jr., 205 SCRA 200 (1992); Peralta v. Civil Service
Commission, 212 SCRA 425.
12 150 SCRA 144 (1987).
13 SEE also Cruz v. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700 [1988] and Res. of February 26, 1991; and Drilon v.
Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 [1991].
14 SEE footnote 3, supra.
15 Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission punishing any person who shall expose, or cause or
permit to be exposed, to public view . . . any flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late
insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the
United States, . . .
16 14 Phil. 128, 133-134.
17 Estrella vs. Orendain, 37 SCRA 640; Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA 47.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 192074

June 10, 2014

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator MELQUIADES A. ROBLES, Petitioner,
vs.
AURORA A. SALVAA, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
An administrative agency has standing to appeal the Civil Service Commission's repeal or modification of its original
decision. In such instances, it is included in the concept of a "party adversely affected" by a decision of the Civil
Service Commission granted the statutory right to appeal:
We are asked in this petition for review filed by the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government-owned and controlled corporation, to modify the Civil Service Commissions finding that respondent was guilty only of simple
dishonesty.
1

This case developed as follows:


On May 12, 2006, then Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority, Melquiades Robles, issued Office Order No.
119, series of 2006. The order revoked Atty. Aurora A. Salvaas designation as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the LRTA
Administrative Department. It "direct[ed] her instead to handle special projects and perform such other duties and
functions as may be assigned to her" by the Administrator.
2

Atty. Salvaa was directed to comply with this office order through a memorandum issued on May 22, 2006 by Atty.
Elmo Stephen P. Triste, the newly designated OIC of the administrative department. Instead of complying, Salvaa
questioned the order with the Office of the President.
4

In the interim, Salvaa applied for sick leave of absence on May 12, 2006 and from May 15 to May 31, 2006. In
support of her application, she submitted a medical certificate issued by Dr. Grace Marie Blanco of the Veterans
Memorial Medical Center (VMMC).
5

LRTA discovered that Dr. Blanco did not issue this medical certificate. Dr. Blanco also denied having seen or treated
Salvaa on May 15, 2006, the date stated on her medical certificate. On June 23, 2006, Administrator Robles issued
a notice of preliminary investigation. The notice directed Salvaa to explain in writing within 72 hours from her receipt
of the notice "why no disciplinary action should be taken against [her]" for not complying with Office Order No. 119
and for submitting a falsified medical certificate.
7

Salvaa filed her explanation on June 30, 2006. She alleged that as a member of the Bids and Awards Committee,
she "refused to sign a resolution" favoring a particular bidder. She alleged that Office Order No. 119 was issued by
Administrator Robles to express his "ire and vindictiveness" over her refusal to sign.
10

11

12

The LRTAs Fact-finding Committee found her explanation unsatisfactory. On July 26, 2006, it issued a formal charge
against her for Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Document, Grave Misconduct, Gross Insubordination, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
13

On August 5, 2006, "Salvaa tendered her irrevocable resignation." None of the pleadings alleged that this
irrevocable resignation was accepted, although the resolution of the Fact-finding Committee alluded to Administrator
Robles acceptance of the resignation letter.
14

In the meantime, the investigation against Salvaa continued, and the prosecution presented its witnesses. Salvaa
"submitted a manifestation dated September 6, 2006, stating that the Committee was biased and that [Administrator]
Robles was both the accuser and the hearing officer."
15

16

On October 31, 2006, the Fact-finding Committee issued a resolution "finding Salvaa guilty of all the charges against
her and imposed [on] her the penalty of dismissal from . . . service with all the accessory penalties." The LRTA
Board of Directors approved the findings of the Fact-finding Committee
17

18

Salvaa appealed with the Civil Service Commission. "In her appeal, [she] claimed that she was denied due process
and that there [was] no substantial evidence to support the charges against her."
19

On July 18, 2007, the Civil Service Commission modified the decision and issued Resolution No. 071364.The Civil
Service Commission found that Salvaa was guilty only of simple dishonesty. She was meted a penalty of
suspension for three months.
20

LRTA moved for reconsideration of the resolution. This was denied in a resolution dated May 26, 2008. LRTA then
filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
21

22

23

On November 11, 2009, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the Civil Service Commissions
finding that Salvaa was only guilty of simple dishonesty. The appellate court also ruled that Administrator Robles
had no standing to file a motion for reconsideration before the Civil Service Commission because that right only
belonged to respondent in an administrative case. LRTA moved for reconsideration of this decision but was
denied.
24

25

26

27

Hence, LRTA filed this present petition.


Petitioner argues that it has the legal personality to appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission before the
Court of Appeals. It cites Philippine National Bank v. Garcia as basis for its argument that it can be considered a
"person adversely affected" under the pertinent rules and regulations on the appeal of administrative cases. It also
argues that respondents falsification of the medical certificate accompanying her application for sick leave was not
merely simple but serious dishonesty.
28

29

30

31

Respondent agrees with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner had no legal personality to file the appeal
since it was not the "person adversely affected" by the decision. She counters that Administrator Robles had no
authority to file the appeal since he was unable to present a resolution from the Board of Directors authorizing him to
do so. She also agrees with the Civil Service Commissions finding that she was merely guilty of simple dishonesty.
32

33

In its reply, petitioner points out that it presented a secretarys certificate dated July 17, 2008 and which it attached
to the petitions before the Civil Service Commission, Court of Appeals, and this court. It argues that the certificate
authorizes the LRTA and its Administrator to file the necessary motion for reconsideration or appeal regarding this
case, and this authorization has yet to be revoked.
34

35

36

Both parties filed their respective memoranda before this court on May 23, 2012 and December 6, 2012.
37

38

The legal issues that will determine the results of this case are:
1. Whether the LRTA, as represented by its Administrator, has the standing to appeal the modification by the
Civil Service Commission of its decision
2. Whether Salvaa was correctly found guilty of simple dishonesty only
We grant the petition.
The parties may appeal in administrative cases involving members of the civil service
It is settled that "[t]he right to appeal is not a natural right [or] a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege,
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law." If it is not granted by the
Constitution, it can only be availed of when a statute provides for it. When made available by law or regulation,
however, a person cannot be deprived of that right to appeal. Otherwise, there will be a violation of the constitutional
requirement of due process of law.
39

40

Article IX (B), Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that the Civil Service Commission shall be "the central
personnel agency of the Government." In line with the constitutionally enshrined policy that a public office is a public
trust, the Commission was tasked with the duty "to set standards and to enforce the laws and rules governing the
selection, utilization, training, and discipline of civil servants."
41

42

Civil servants enjoy security of tenure, and "[n]o officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or
dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process." Under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of the
Administrative Code, it is the Civil Service Commission that has the power to "[h]ear and decide administrative cases
instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal."
43

The grant of the right to appeal in administrative cases is not new. In Republic Act No. 2260 or the Civil Service Law
of 1959, appeals "by the respondent" were allowed on "[t]he decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service rendered
in an administrative case involving discipline of subordinate officers and employees."
44

45

Presidential Decree No. 807, while retaining the right to appeal in administrative cases, amended the phrasing of the
party allowed to appeal. Section 37, paragraph (a), and Section 39, paragraph (a),of Presidential Decree No. 807
provide:
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative cases involving
the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary,
demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.
Sec. 39. Appeals. - (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision
within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition shall be decided within fifteen days. (Emphasis
supplied)
Additionally, Section 47, paragraph (1), and Section 49, paragraph (1), of the Administrative Code provide:
SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.(1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.

SECTION 49. Appeals.(1) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision
within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition
shall be decided within fifteen days.(Emphasis supplied)
The phrase, "person adversely affected," was not defined in either Presidential Decree No. 807 or the Administrative
Code. This prompted a series of cases providing the interpretation of this phrase.
46

The first of these cases, Paredes v. Civil Service Commission, declared:


47

Based on [Sections 37 (a) and 39 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 807], appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an
administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person or the respondent
employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The decision of
the disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. (Emphasis
supplied)
48

This ruling was repeated in Mendez v. Civil Service Commission where this court stated that:
49

A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The Philippine Civil Service Law" shows that said law does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.
....
By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found
guilty of the charges filed against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there
is no occasion for appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
50

The same ratio would be reiterated and become the prevailing doctrine on the matter in Magpale, Jr. v. Civil Service
Commission, Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone, University of the Philippines v.
Civil Service Commission, and Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.
51

52

53

54

In these cases, this court explained that the right to appeal being merely a statutory privilege can only be availed of
by the party specified in the law. Since the law presumes that appeals will only be made in decisions prescribing a
penalty, this court concluded that the only parties that will be adversely affected are the respondents that are charged
with administrative offenses. Since the right to appeal is a remedial right that may only be granted by statute, a
government party cannot by implication assert that right as incidental to its power, since the right to appeal does not
form part of due process.
55

In effect, this court equated exonerations in administrative cases to acquittals in criminal cases wherein the State or
the complainant would have no right to appeal. When the Civil Service Commission enacted the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, or the URACCS, on September 27, 1999, it applied this courts definition.
Thus, Section 2, paragraph (l),Rule I, and Section 38,Rule III of the URACCS defined "party adversely affected" as
follows:
56

Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms.


....
(l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has
been rendered.
For some time, government parties were, thus, barred from appealing exonerations of civil servants they had
previously sanctioned. It was not until the promulgation by this court of Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy on
April 29, 1999 that the issue would be revisited.
57

Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoyand Philippine National Bank v. Garcia

In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, an administrative complaint for habitual drunkenness, misconduct, and
nepotism was filed against the Vocational School Administrator of Balicuatro College of Arts and Trade in Allen,
Northern Samar. The Civil Service Commission found Dacoycoy guilty, but the Court of Appeals overturned this
finding and exonerated Dacoycoy of all charges. The Civil Service Commission then appealed the ruling of the
appellate court. This court, in addressing the issue of the Commissions standing, stated that:
58

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not
guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not
the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a
witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by
such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the
decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant
jurisprudence that "the phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to the government employee against
whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension,
demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office" and not included are "cases where the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary" or
"when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal." In other words, we overrule
prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees from administrative charges" enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service
Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing
Zone Authority and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
59

In his concurring opinion, then Chief Justice Puno summed up the rationale for allowing government parties to
appeal, thus:
In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law. For what the law
declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine
in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary.
But there is a clear policy reason for declaring these decisions final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They
are numerous for they are the usual offenses committed by government officials and employees. To allow their
multiple level appeal will doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative system and defeat
the expectation of fast and efficient action from these administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a petty
offense. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The objective
should be to eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous decisions allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity from
review, especially judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since some decisions exonerating public
officials from minor offenses cannot be appealed, ergo, even a decision acquitting a government official from a major
offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed. (Emphasis supplied)
60

The decision in Dacoycoy would be reiterated in 2002 when this court promulgated Philippine National Bank v.
Garcia. Philippine National Bank categorically allowed the disciplining authority to appeal the decision exonerating
the disciplined employee.
61

In that case, the bank charged Ricardo V. Garcia, Jr., one of its check processors and cash representatives, with
gross neglect of duty when he lost P7 million in connection with his duties. Both the Civil Service Commission and the
Court of Appeals reversed the bank and exonerated Garcia from all liability.
This court, however, upheld Philippine National Banks right to appeal the case. Citing Dacoycoy, this court ruled:
Indeed, the battles against corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance will be seriously undermined if we bar appeals
of exoneration. After all, administrative cases do not partake of the nature of criminal actions, in which acquittals are
final and unappealable based on the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy.
Furthermore, our new Constitution expressly expanded the range and scope of judicial review. Thus, to prevent
appeals of administrative decisions except those initiated by employees will effectively and pervertedly erode this
constitutional grant.
Finally, the Court in Dacoycoy ruled that the CSC had acted well within its rights in appealing the CAs exoneration of
the respondent public official therein, because it has been mandated by the Constitution to preserve and safeguard

the integrity of our civil service system. In the same light, herein Petitioner PNB has the standing to appeal to the CA
the exoneration of Respondent Garcia. After all, it is the aggrieved party which has complained of his acts of
dishonesty. Besides, this Court has not lost sight of the fact that PNB was already privatized on May 27, 1996.
Should respondent be finally exonerated indeed, it might then be incumbent upon petitioner to take him back into its
fold. It should therefore be allowed to appeal a decision that in its view hampers its right to select honest and
trustworthy employees, so that it can protect and preserve its name as a premier banking institution in our
country. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 021600 published on
December 29, 2002, which amended the URACCS, to allow the disciplining authority to appeal the decision
exonerating the employee:
62

Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms.


....
(l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has
been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision exonerating the said employee.
Subsequent decisions continued to reiterate the rulings in Dacoycoy and Philippine National Bank.
In Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania, this court explained the rationale of allowing the Civil Service
Commission to appeal decisions of exonerations as follows:
63

That the CSC may appeal from an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals reversing or modifying its resolutions
which may seriously prejudice the civil service system is beyond doubt. In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy[,]
this Court held that the CSC may become the party adversely affected by such ruling and the aggrieved party who
may appeal the decision to this Court.
The situation where the CSCs participation is beneficial and indispensable often involves complaints for
administrative offenses, such as neglect of duty, being notoriously undesirable, inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, and the like, where the complainant is more often than not acting merely as a witness
for the government which is the real party injured by the illicit act. In cases of this nature, a ruling of the Court of
Appeals favorable to the respondent employee is understandably adverse to the government, and unavoidably the
CSC as representative of the government may appeal the decision to this Court to protect the integrity of the civil
service system.
The CSC may also seek a review of the decisions of the Court of Appeals that are detrimental to its constitutional
mandate as the central personnel agency of the government tasked to establish a career service, adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and courtesy in the civil service, strengthen
the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. Nonetheless, the right of the CSC to appeal
the adverse decision does not preclude the private complainant in appropriate cases from similarly elevating the
decision for review.
64

Then in Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan, this court declared:


65

At the outset, it should be noted that the Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the central personnel
agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of
those appointed to the civil service. Thus, the CSC, as an institution whose primary concern is the effectiveness of
the civil service system, has the standing to appeal a decision which adversely affects the civil service. We hold, at
this juncture, that CSC has the standing to appeal and/or to file its motion for reconsideration.
66

The right to appeal by government parties was not limited to the Civil Service Commission.
In Pastor v. City of Pasig, this court ruled that the City of Pasig had standing to appeal the decision of the Civil
Service Commission reinstating a city employee to her former position, despite the city government having
reassigned her to another unit.
67

In Geronga v. Varela, this court ruled that the Mayor of Cadiz City had the right to file a motion for reconsideration of
a decision by the Civil Service Commission exonerating a city employee on the ground that "as the appointing and
disciplining authority, [he] is a real party in interest."
68

69

In Department of Education v. Cuanan, this court ruled that the Department of Education "qualifie[d] as a party
adversely affected by the judgment, who can file an appeal of a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case."
70

71

There are, however, cases, which sought to qualify this right to appeal.
In National Appellate Board v. Mamauag, an administrative complaint for grave misconduct was filed by Quezon City
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles against several members of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The Central Police
District Command (CPDC) of Quezon City, upon investigation, dismissed the complaint. Dissatisfied, Judge Angeles
moved for a reinvestigation by then PNP Chief Recaredo Sarmiento II.
72

PNP Chief Sarmiento issued a decision finding the accused police officers guilty of the offenses charged. Some were
meted the penalty of suspension while others were dismissed from service. Upon motion for reconsideration by
Judge Angeles, Chief Sarmiento modified his ruling and ordered the dismissal of the suspended police officers.
One of the officers, Police Inspector John Mamauag, appealed the decision with the National Appellate Board of the
National Police Commission. The National Appellate Board, however, denied the appeal. Mamauag appealed the
denial with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the National Appellate Board and
ruled that it was the Philippine National Police, not Judge Angeles, which had the right to appeal the decision of PNP
Chief Sarmiento, as it was the party adversely affected. The National Appellate Board then appealed this decision
with this court.
This court, while citing Dacoycoy, declared that Judge Angeles, as complainant, had no right to appeal the dismissal
by CPDC of the complaint against Mamauag. It qualified the right of government agencies to appeal by specifying the
circumstances by which the right may be given, thus:
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the
case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be
one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result
where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an
active participant in prosecuting the respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy,
the Court declared:
To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought before the Court of Appeals, the Civil
Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission
can be likened to a judge who should "detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for
review."
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and
became an advocate. Its mandated function is to "hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought
before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and
agencies," not to litigate. (Emphasis supplied)
73

The ruling in National Appellate Boardwas applied in Montoya v. Varilla, Pleyto v. PNP-CIDG, and Ombudsman v.
Liggayu.
74

75

76

The present rule is that a government party is a "party adversely affected" for purposes of appeal provided that the
government party that has a right to appeal must be the office or agency prosecuting the case.
Despite the limitation on the government partys right to appeal, this court has consistently upheld that right in
Dacoycoy. In Civil Service Commission v. Almojuela, we stated that:
77

More than ten years have passed since the Court first recognized in Dacoycoy the CSCs standing to appeal the CAs
decisions reversing or modifying its resolutions seriously prejudicial to the civil service system. Since then, the ruling
in Dacoycoy has been subjected to clarifications and qualifications but the doctrine has remained the same: the CSC

has standing as a real party in interest and can appeal the CAs decisions modifying or reversing the CSCs rulings,
when the CA action would have an adverse impact on the integrity of the civil service. As the governments central
personnel agency, the CSC is tasked to establish a career service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service; it has a stake in ensuring that the proper
disciplinary action is imposed on an erring public employee, and this stake would be adversely affected by a ruling
absolving or lightening the CSC-imposed penalty. Further, a decision that declares a public employee not guilty of the
charge against him would have no other appellant than the CSC. To be sure, it would not be appealed by the public
employee who has been absolved of the charge against him; neither would the complainant appeal the decision, as
he acted merely as a witness for the government. We thus find no reason to disturb the settled Dacoycoy
doctrine. (Citations omitted)
78

Indeed, recent decisions showed that this court has allowed appeals by government parties. Notably, the government
parties right to appeal in these cases was not brought up as an issue by either of the parties.
In Civil Service Commission v. Yu, this court allowed the Civil Service Commission to appeal the Court of Appeals
decision granting the reinstatement of a government employee whose appointment had been revoked by the
Commission.
79

In National Power Corporation v. Civil Service Commission and Tanfelix, the National Power Corporation had
previously filed an administrative complaint against one of its employees, Rodrigo Tanfelix, resulting in his dismissal
from service. When the Civil Service Commission exonerated Tanfelix and the Court of Appeals affirmed the
exoneration, the National Power Corporation was allowed to appeal.
80

These cases, however, allowed the disciplining authority to appeal only from a decision exonerating the said
employee. In this case, respondent was not exonerated; she was found guilty, but the finding was modified. This
court previously stated that:
If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the
employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the
same.
81

Dacoycoy, Philippine National Bank, and the URACCS failed to contemplate a situation where the Civil Service
Commission modified the penalty from dismissal to suspension. The erring civil servant was not exonerated, and the
finding of guilt still stood. In these situations, the disciplinary authority should be allowed to appeal the modification of
the decision.
The LRTA had standing to appeal the modification by the Civil Service Commission of its decision
The employer has the right "to select honest and trustworthy employees." When the government office disciplines an
employee based on causes and procedures allowed by law, it exercises its discretion. This discretion is inherent in
the constitutional principle that "[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives." This is a principle that can be invoked by the public as well as the government office employing the public
officer.
82

83

Here, petitioner already decided to dismiss respondent for dishonesty. Dishonesty is a serious offense that
challenges the integrity of the public servant charged. To bar a government office from appealing a decision that
lowers the penalty of the disciplined employee prevents it from ensuring its mandate that the civil service employs
only those with the utmost sense of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.
Honesty and integrity are important traits required of those in public service. If all decisions by quasi-judicial bodies
modifying the penalty of dismissal were allowed to become final and unappealable, it would, in effect, show tolerance
to conduct unbecoming of a public servant. The quality of civil service would erode, and the citizens would end up
suffering for it.
During the pendency of this decision, or on November 18, 2011, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service or RACCS was promulgated. The Civil Service Commission modified the definition of a "party adversely
affected" for purposes of appeal.

Section 4. Definition of Terms.


....
k. PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in an administrative case has
been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision reversing or modifying the original
decision. (Emphasis supplied)
Procedural laws have retroactive application. In Zulueta v. Asia Brewery:

84

As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are certain recognized exceptions, such as when they
are remedial or procedural in nature. This Court explained this exception in the following language:
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided. But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL
in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
....
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure,
which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against
the retrospective operation of statutes.
Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without express provision to that
effect. Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases pending at the time of their enactment. In fact, statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be applied on actions undetermined at the time of their effectivity.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. (Emphasis supplied)
85

Remedial rights are those rights granted by remedial or procedural laws. These are rights that only operate to further
the rules of procedure or to confirm vested rights. As such, the retroactive application of remedial rights will not
adversely affect the vested rights of any person. Considering that the right to appeal is a right remedial in nature, we
find that Section 4, paragraph (k), Rule I of the RACCS applies in this case. Petitioner, therefore, had the right to
appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission that modified its original decision of dismissal.
Recent decisions implied the retroactive application of this rule. While the right of government parties to appeal was
not an issue, this court gave due course to the appeals filed by government agencies before the promulgation of the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
In Civil Service Commission v. Clave, the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) found one of its
employees, Aurora M. Clave, guilty of simple neglect of duty. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the GSISs
findings. The Court of Appeals, however, while affirming the Civil Service Commission, reduced the penalty. Both the
GSIS and the Civil Service Commission were given standing to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals.
86

In GSIS v. Chua, the GSIS dismissed Heidi R. Chua for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of service. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the GSIS, but the Court of Appeals, while affirming
the findings of the Commission, modified the penalty to simple misconduct. The GSIS was then allowed to bring an
appeal of the modification of the penalty with this court.
87

Thus, we now hold that the parties adversely affected by a decision in an administrative case who may appeal shall
include the disciplining authority whose decision dismissing the employee was either overturned or modified by the
Civil Service Commission.
The offense committed was less serious dishonesty, not simple dishonesty

Dishonesty has been defined "as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of integrity
. . . ." Since the utmost integrity is expected of public servants, its absence is not only frowned upon but punished
severely.
88

Section 52, Rule IV of the URACCS provides:


Section 52. Classification of Offenses. Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into
grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.
A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:
1. Dishonesty - 1st Offense Dismissal
....
In Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, this court explained the rationale for the severity of the penalty:
89

It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is that dishonesty,
in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged.
The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave
misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in
office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and
well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of
dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he
is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the
victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract
his evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty
inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the
service. (Emphasis supplied)
90

However, on April 4, 2006, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 06-0538 or the Rules on the
Administrative Offense of Dishonesty.
Resolution No. 06-0538 recognizes that dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from service. It,
however, also recognizes that "some acts of Dishonesty are not constitutive of an offense so grave as to warrant the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service."
91

92

Recognizing the attendant circumstances in the offense of dishonesty, the Civil Service Commission issued
parameters "in order to guide the disciplining authority in charging the proper offense" and to impose the proper
penalty.
93

The resolution classifies dishonesty in three gradations: (1) serious; (2) less serious; and (3) simple. Serious
dishonesty is punishable by dismissal. Less serious dishonesty is punishable by suspension for six months and one
day to one year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. Simple dishonesty is punishable by
suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense, six months and one day to one year for the
second offense, and dismissal for the third offense.
94

95

96

The medical certificate respondent submitted to support her application for sick leave was falsified. The question
remains as to whether this act could be considered serious dishonesty, less serious dishonesty, or simple dishonesty.
According to the Civil Service Commissions finding in its resolution:
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish that the medical certificate submitted by Salvaa was
spurious or not genuine as the physician-signatory therein, Dr. Blanco[,] testified that she did not examine/treat the
appellant nor did she issue a medical certificate on May 15, 2006 since she was on sick leave of absence on that

particular day. Worthy [of] mention is that the appellant never bothered to submit any evidence, documentary or
otherwise, to rebut the testimony of Blanco.
Thus, the Commission rules and so holds that the appellant is liable for Dishonesty but applying the aforementioned
CSC Resolution No. 06-0538, her dishonest act would be classified only as Simple Dishonesty as the same did not
cause damage or prejudice to the government and had no direct relation to or did not involve the duties and
responsibilities of the appellant. The same is true with the falsification she committed, where the information falsified
was not related to her employment. (Emphasis supplied)
97

In Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit, this court previously ruled that "it is the general policy of this Court to sustain the
decisions of administrative authorities not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their
presumed knowledge ability and even expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce." The same case also
stated that:
98

99

. . . . we reaffirmed the oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded not only
respect but also finality when the decision and order . . . are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. The findings off acts must be respected, so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or preponderant.
100

Petitioner insists that respondent committed serious dishonesty when she submitted the falsified medical certificate.
Under Section 3 of Resolution No. 06-0538, serious dishonesty comprises the following acts:
Section 3. Serious Dishonesty. The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the
commission of the dishonest act would constitute the offense of Serious Dishonesty:
a. The dishonest act causes serious damage and grave prejudice to the government.
b. The respondent gravely abused his authority in order to commit the dishonest act.
c. Where the respondent is an accountable officer, the dishonest act directly involves property, accountable
forms or money for which he is directly accountable and the respondent shows an intent to commit material
gain, graft and corruption.
d. The dishonest act exhibits moral depravity on the part of the respondent.
e. The respondent employed fraud and/or falsification of official documents in the commission of the
dishonest act related to his/her employment.
f. The dishonest act was committed several times or in various occasions.
g. The dishonest act involves a Civil Service examination, irregularity or fake Civil Service eligibility such as,
but not limited to, impersonation, cheating and use of crib sheets.
h. Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
Simple dishonesty, on the other hand, comprises the following offenses:
Section 5. The presence of any of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the dishonest act
would constitute the offense of Simple Dishonesty:
a. The dishonest act did not cause damage or prejudice to the government.
b. The dishonest act had no direct relation to or does not involve the duties and responsibilities of the
respondent.

c. In falsification of any official document, where the information falsified is not related to his/her
employment.
d. That the dishonest act did not result in any gain or benefit to the offender.
e. Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
This court previously ruled that "[f]alsification of an official document, as an administrative offense, is knowingly
making false statements in official or public documents." Respondent, in her defense, states that she merely relied
on her Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO) advice that it was going to issue her a medical certificate after she
had gone to the hospital complaining of hypertension. She maintains that she did not know that her medical
certificate was falsified. We do not find this defense credible.
101

102

Respondent knew that she was not examined by Dr. Blanco, the medical certificates signatory. She knew that she
would not be able to fully attest to the truthfulness of the information in the certificate. Despite this, she still submitted
the certificate in support of her application for leave.
The Civil Service Commission, however, found that the medical certificate was falsified. Dr. Blanco repudiated the
certificate. Respondent did not present any evidence to defend its validity. Her application for sick leave, therefore,
should not have been granted since it was unaccompanied by the proper documents. The Commission correctly
found respondent guilty of dishonesty.
However, it would be wrong to classify this offense as simple dishonesty.
By law, all employees in the civil service are entitled to leave of absence for a certain number of days, with or without
pay. Under Section 1, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code,
government employees are entitled to 15 days of sick leave annually with full pay.
103

The grant of sick leave with pay is an exception to the principle of "no work, no pay," i.e., entitlement to compensation
only upon actual service rendered. As such, applications for leave must be properly filled out and filed accordingly.
Section 16, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code provides the rules for an
application for sick leave:
SECTION 16. All applications for sick leaves of absence for one full day or more shall be on the prescribed form and
shall be filed immediately upon the employee's return from such leave. Notice of absence, however, should be sent to
the immediate supervisor and/or to the office head. Application for sick leave in excess of five days shall be
accompanied by a proper medical certificate.
Respondents application for sick leave, if approved, would allow her to be absent from work without any deductions
from her salary. Being a government employee, respondent would have received her salaries coming from
government funds.
Since her application for sick leave was supported by a false medical certificate, it would have been improperly filed,
which made all of her absences during this period unauthorized. The receipt, therefore, of her salaries during this
period would be tantamount to causing damage or prejudice to the government since she would have received
compensation she was not entitled to receive.
This act of causing damage or prejudice, however, cannot be classified as serious since the information falsified had
no direct relation to her employment. Whether or not she was suffering from hypertension is a matter that has no
relation to the functions of her office.
Given these circumstances, the offense committed can be properly identified as less serious dishonesty. Under
Section 4 of Resolution No. 06-0538, less serious dishonesty is classified by the following acts:
Section 4. The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the dishonest act
would constitute the offense of Less Serious Dishonesty:

a. The dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the government which is not so serious as to qualify
under the immediately preceding classification.
b. The respondent did not take advantage of his/her position in committing the dishonest act.
c. Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
We hold, therefore, that respondent Atty. Aurora A. Salvaa is guilty of less serious dishonesty.
A final note
The records showed that respondent tendered her irrevocable resignation on August 5, 2006. Petitioners acceptance
of respondents resignation was not mentioned in any of the pleadings. However, the resolution by the Fact-finding
Committee stated that "[o]n 16 August 2006, the Office of the Administrator received the resignation." On the issue
of whether respondents resignation mooted its proceedings, it concluded that:
104

[I]n the response of the Administrator to the letter of resignation filed by Respondent there was no unconditional
acceptance of the same. In fact it was specified therein that her resignation is "without prejudice to any appropriate
action on any malfeasance or misfeasance committed during her tenure[."]There can [sic] be no other conclusion
from the above that her resignation does not prevent the administration from proceeding with any charge/s
appropriate under the circumstances. (Emphasis in the original)
105

Resignation from public office, to be effective, requires the acceptance of the proper government authority. In
Republic v. Singun, this court stated:
106

Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender,
renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete
and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act
of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.
....
In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective. Without
acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office. Resignation to be effective must be accepted by
competent authority, either in terms or by something tantamount to an acceptance, such as the appointment of the
successor. A public officer cannot abandon his office before his resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is
subject to the penal provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. The final or conclusive act of a resignations
acceptance is the notice of acceptance. The incumbent official would not be in a position to determine the acceptance
of his resignation unless he had been duly notified therefor. (Emphasis supplied)
107

If there was evidence to show that petitioner did not, in fact, accept respondents resignation, her resignation would
have been ineffective. Respondents continued absence from her post would have been deemed abandonment from
her office, of which she could be criminally charged.
Although the response of Administrator Robles was not attached to the record, it can be concluded from the
resolution of the Fact-finding Committee that he accepted the resignation, albeit with the qualification that it be
"without prejudice to any appropriate action on any malfeasance or misfeasance committed during her tenure."

108

The qualified acceptance of Administrator Robles, however, did not affect the validity of respondents
resignation. Section 1, Rule XII of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998, as
amended by Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1999, requires:
1wphi 1

Sec. 1. Resignation. The following documents shall be submitted to the Commission for record purposes:
a. The voluntary written notice of the employee informing the appointing authority that he is relinquishing his
position and the efffectivity date of said resignation; and,

b. The acceptance of resignation in writing by the agency head or appointing authority which shall indicate
the date of effectivity of the resignation.
An officer or employee under investigation may be allowed to resign pending decision of his case without prejudice to
the continuation of the proceedings until finally terminated.
The qualification placed by Administrator Robles on his acceptance does not make respondents resignation any less
valid. The rules and regulations allow the acceptance of resignations while the administrative case is pending
provided that the proceedings will still continue.
We also note that the unauthorized absences were incurred after the issuance of Office Order No. 119.
Atrespondents refusal to comply, she was administratively charged, which prompted her resignation from office. If
there were irregularities in the issuance of Office Order No. 119, what respondent should have done would be to
occupy the new position and then file the proper remedies. She should not have defied the orders of her superiors.
Because of her resignation on August 5, 2006, any modification as to the service of her suspension became moot.
Her permanent employment record, however, must reflect the modified penalty. Considering that she is also a
member of the Bar, this court furnishes the Office of the Bar Confidant with a copy of this decision to initiate the
proper disciplinary action against respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated November 11, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP. No. 104225 and Resolution No. 071364 dated July 18, 2007 of the Civil Service Commission is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that respondent, Atty. Aurora A. Salvaa, is found guilty of Less Serious Dishonesty. The Civil
Service Commission is DIRECTED to attach a copy of this decision to respondent's permanent employment record.
Let a copy of this decision be given to the Office of the Bar Confidant to initiate the proper disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Aurora A. Salvaa.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO


Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL
PEREZ
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA


Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 8-35.

Id. at 61.

Id. at 13.

Id. at 14.

Id. at 13-14.

Id. at 63.

Id. at 65.

Id. at 67.

Id. at 66-67.

10

Id. at 68-71.

11

Id. at 68.

12

Id.

13

Id. at 74-75.

14

Id. at 17.

15

Id.

16

Id., citing manifestation, rollo, pp. 72-73.

17

Id., citing resolution, rollo, pp. 76-88.

18

Id. at 90.

19

Id. at 17.

20

Id. at 91-100.

21

Id. at 101-129.

22

Id. at 130-137.

23

Id. at 138-152.

Per Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella,
Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Associate Justice Arcangelita M. RomillaLontok.
24

25

Rollo, pp. 37-57.

26

Id. at 227-234.

27

Id. at 58-59.

28

Id. at 21-23.

29

437 Phil. 289 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

30

Rollo, pp. 21-23.

31

Id. at 23-31.

32

Id. at 253-255.

33

Id. at 255-258.

34

Id. at 265-270.

35

Id. at 265, citing secretarys certificate, rollo, p. 60.

36

Id. at 265-266.

37

Id. at 272-294.

38

Id. at 313-340.

Bello v. Fernando, 114 Phil. 101, 103 (1962) [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L., En Banc], citing Aguilar v. Navarro, 55
Phil. 898 (1931) [Per J. Villamor, En Banc]; Santiago v. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397 (1947) [Per J. Feria, En
Banc].
39

Spouses De la Cruz v. Ramiscal, 491 Phil. 62, 74 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division]. See also
United States v. Yu Ten, 33 Phil. 122 (1916) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc]; Phillips Seafood (Philippines)
Corporation v. Board of Investments, G.R. No. 175787, February 4, 2009, 578 SCRA 69, 76 [Per J. Tinga,
Second Division]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 259 (1999) [Per J. Buena, Second Division].
40

See also mandate of Civil Service Commission in Presidential Decree No. 807, otherwise known as the
Civil Service Decree, promulgated on October 6, 1975.
41

42

Pres. Dec. No. 807 (1975), art. II, sec. 2.

43

Pres. Dec. No. 807 (1975), art. IX, sec. 36.

44

Rep. Act No. 2260 (1959), sec. 36.

45

Rep. Act No. 2260 (1959), sec. 36.

Paredes v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. Nos. 88177 and 89530, December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 84, 98
[Per J. Paras, En Banc]; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 95575, December 23, 1991, 204
SCRA 965 [Per J. Paras, En Banc]; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 97381, November 5,
1992, 215 SCRA 398 [Per J. Melo, En Banc]; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing
Zone Authority, G.R. Nos. 107370-71, September 16, 1993, 226 SCRA 522 [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc];
University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 108740, December 1, 1993, 228 SCRA
207 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc]; Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission, 311 Phil. 340 (1995) [Per J.
Kapunan, En Banc].
46

47

G.R. Nos. 88177 and 89530, December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 84 [Per J. Paras, En Banc].

48

Id. at 98.

49

G.R. No. 95575, December 23, 1991, 204 SCRA 965 [Per J. Paras, En Banc].

50

Id. at 965-968.

51

G.R. No. 97381, November 5, 1992, 215 SCRA 398 [Per J. Melo, En Banc].

52

G.R. Nos. 107370-71, September 16, 1993, 226 SCRA 522 [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].

53

G.R. No. 108740, December 1, 1993, 228 SCRA 207 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].

54

311 Phil. 340 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].

See Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc] on its discussion of
incidental powers by government instrumentalities that are necessarily implied even in the absence of a
constitutional provision.
55

56

See People v. Velasco, 394 Phil. 517, 554 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc] wherein this court stated:
". . . . as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before
the Court of Appeals."

57

366 Phil. 86 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, En Banc].

58

Id.

59

Id. at 104-105.

60

Id. at 116-117.

61

437 Phil. 289 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

Id. at 295-296, citing Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 376 Phil. 191 (1999) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second
Division].
62

63

456 Phil. 273 (2003) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].

Id. at 291-292, citing Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, 437 Phil. 289 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Division].
64

65

497 Phil. 594 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, En Banc].

Id. at 600-601, citing Civil Service Commission v. Tinaya, 491 Phil. 729, 735 (2005) [Per J.
SandovalGutierrez, En Banc]; Lazo v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 108824, September 14, 1994,
236 SCRA 469, 472 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]; See also Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, 485 Phil.
182, 195-196 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
66

67

431 Phil. 843 (2002) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

68

570 Phil. 39 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].

69

Id. at 49.

70

594 Phil. 451 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].

71

Id. at 459.

72

504 Phil. 186 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].

73

Id. at 200.

74

595 Phil. 507 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].

75

563 Phil. 842 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].

76

G.R. No. 174297, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 134 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

77

G.R. No. 194368, April 2, 2013, 694 SCRA 441 [Per J. Brion, En Banc].

78

Id. at 465-466.

79

G.R. No. 189041, July 31, 2012, 678 SCRA39 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

80

G.R. No. 152093, January 24, 2012, 663 SCRA 492 [Per J. Abad, En Banc].

Civil Service Commission v. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011, 655 SCRA 214, 234 [Per J. Brion, En
Banc].
81

82

Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, 437 Phil. 289, 296 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

83

CONST. (1987), Art. XI, Sec. 1.

84

406 Phil. 543 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

Id. at 551, citing Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 521, 754-755 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban,
En Banc]; Hosana v. Diomano, 56 Phil. 741 (1927) [Per J. Villa-Real, En Banc]; Guevarra v. Laico, 64 Phil.
144 (1937) [Per J. Villa-Real, En Banc]; China Insurance & Surety Co. v. Far Eastern Surety & Insurance.
Co., 63 Phil. 320 (1936) [Per J. Recto, En Banc]; Sevilla v. Tolentino, 66 Phil. 196 (1938) [Per J. Abad
Santos, En Banc]; Tolentino v. Alzate, 98 Phil. 781 (1956) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc]; Gregorio v.
85

CA, 135 Phil. 224 (1968) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc]; Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 589 (1995)
[Per J. Puno, Second Division]; MRCA, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 259 Phil. 832 (1989) [Per J. Grino-Aquino,
First Division]; People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 (1946) [Per J. Feria, En Banc].
86

G.R. Nos. 194645 and 194665, March 6, 2012, 667 SCRA 556 [Per Curiam, En Banc].

87

G.R. No. 202914, September 26, 2012, 682 SCRA 118 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

Office of the Ombudsman v. Torres, 567 Phil. 46, 57 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division], citing Blacks
Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. (1990).
88

89

414 Phil. 590 (2001) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].

90

Id. at 600-601.

91

Civil Service Commission, Resolution No. 06-0538 (2006), Third Whereas Clause.

92

Civil Service Commission, Resolution No. 06-0538 (2006), Fourth Whereas Clause.

93

Civil Service Commission, Resolution No. 06-0538 (2006).

94

Civil Service Commission, Resolution No. 06-0538 (2006), Sec. 2(a).

95

Civil Service Commission, Resolution No. 06-0538 (2006), Sec. 2(b).

96

Civil Service Commission, Resolution No. 06-0538 (2006), Sec. 2(c).

97

Rollo, p. 99, Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 071364 (2007).

98

248 Phil. 886 (1988) [Per J. Sarmiento, En Banc].

99

Id. at 891.

100

Id.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Torres, 567 Phil. 46, 58 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division], citing Civil
Service Commission, Resolution No. 991936 (1999), Rule IV, Sec. 52 (A) (1) and (6).
101

102

Rollo, p. 318.

103

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 9, Sec. 60.

104

Rollo, p. 78.

105

Id. at 84.

106

572 Phil. 140 (2008) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].

Id. at 150-151, citing Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 194 Phil. 624 (1981) [Per J. Guerrero, First Division];
Reyes v. Atienza, 507 Phil. 653 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]; Martin and Martin,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW200 (1987); Re:
Administrative Case for Falsification of Official Documents and Dishonesty against Randy S. Villanueva, 556
Phil. 512 (2007) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
107

108

Rollo, p. 84.