Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Valid Waiver
People v. Ramos
FACTS: On 29 November 1982, a civilian informer came to the Narcotics Command
Office in Olongapo City and reported that a cigarette vendor by the name of "Mama
Rose" (Rosalinda Ramos) was selling marijuana at the corner of 3rd Street and Rizal
Avenue in Olongapo City. Tests buys were made using marked money. The Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) team proceeded to the place where appellant was selling
cigarettes, and arrested the latter for illegal peddling of marijuana. Ramos was requested
to take out the contents of her wallet. The four marked five-peso bills used in the test
buys were found among her possessions and were confiscated after the serial numbers
were confirmed. Search of Ramos stall yielded 20 sticks of marijuana cigarettes in a
trash can placed under the small table where Ramos displayed the wares she was
selling. Ramos was thereafter brought to the station. At the station, Ramos executed a
statement confessing to her crimes which she swore to before Assistant City Fiscal. The
marijuana sticks confiscated were sent to the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory
(PCCL) for analysis, and thereafter were confirmed to be marijuana. The defense
contends however that she assented to the invitation of the NARCOM operatives for
investigation, after search of her buri bags (which she stores the fruits that she sells)
were fruitless. She claimed that she was forced to affix her signature on the four 5-peso
bills by one Sgt. Sudiacal, purportedly to be the same money which was used to buy
marijuana from her, but which she insists was her money being saved for the rentals.
She was later brought to the Fiscals Office after investigation, where she signed a
document. She claimed she was not assisted by any counsel during the investigation,
neither during the time she signed the document at the Fiscals Office. Two informations
were filed against Ramos, one for sale (Criminal Case 5991) and the other for possession
of marijuana (Criminal Case 5990). After trial, the RTC Olongapo City (Branch 73) found
her guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5990 for violating Section 8 of RA
6425 and sentenced her to imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day and a fine of P6,000. She
was likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5991 for violating
Section 4 of RA 6425 and was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.
Ramos sought reversal of the decisions with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether Ramos waived her right against the warrantless search of the trash can,
where illegal drugs were found, under her control.
HELD: The trash can (where the contraband were found) was found under the table
where her legitimate wares were being sold. Ramos he was the only person who had
access to the trash can. The same was under her immediate physical control. She had
complete charge of the contents of the trash can under the table to the exclusion of all
other persons. In law, actual possession exists when the thing is in the immediate
occupancy and control of the party. But this is not to say that the law requires actual
possession. In criminal law, possession necessary for conviction of the offense of
possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute may be constructive as well
as actual. It is only necessary that the defendant must have dominion and control over
the contraband. These requirements are present in the situation described, where the
prohibited drugs were found inside the trash can placed under the stall owned by Ramos.
In fact, the NARCOM agents who conducted the search testified that they had to ask
Ramps to stand so that they could look inside the trash can under Ramos' papag. The
trash can was positioned in such a way that it was difficult for another person to use the
trash can. The trash can was obviously not for use by her customers. Therefore, the
twenty sticks of marijuana are admissible in evidence and the trial court's finding that
Ramos is guilty of possession is correct.
VEROY V. LAYAGUE
FACTS: Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroy are husband and wife residing in Davao City. When
Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security
System sometime in June 1988, he and his family transferred to Quezon City. The care
and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to 2 houseboys, Jimmy Favia and
Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The Veroys
would occasionally send money to Edna Soquilon for the salary of the said houseboys
and other expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys had the keys to the
interior of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit breakers were
located, was entrusted to Edna Soquilon to give her access in case of an emergency. On
12 April 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP raided Veroys
house in Davao City on information that the said residence was being used as a
safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the
caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not
have a search warrant. Permission was requested by phone to Ma. Luisa Veroy who
consented on the condition that the search be conducted in the presence of Major
Macasaet. The following day, Capt. Obrero and Maj. Macasaet met at the Veroys house
to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by Ma. Luisa. Capt. Obrero
recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing 7 live bullets in a black clutch
bag inside an unlocked drawer in the childrens room. 3 half-full jute sacks containing
printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the children's room. A search of the
children's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted
clothing, a small black bag containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of
the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted
medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom. Inventory and
receipt of seized articles were made. The case was referred for preliminary investigation
to the Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor , who was designated Acting Provincial
Prosecutor for Davao City by the DOJ through Department Order 88 (16 May 1990). In a
resolution dated 6 August 1990, the Fiscal recommended the filing of an Information
against the Veroys for violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). Hence, on 8 August 1990, an Information for
the said offense was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the
RTC Davao City). No bail was recommended by the prosecution. The fiscals resolution
was received by the Veroys on 13 August 1990. The latter filed a motion for bail on the
same day which was denied for being premature, as they have not been arrested yet.
The Veroys voluntarily surrendered to Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, but who refused to
receive them o the ground that his office has not received copies of their warrants of
arrest. In the meantime, on 15 August 1990, the Veroys were admitted to the St. Luke's
Hospital for various ailments brought about or aggravated by the stress and anxiety
caused by the filing of the criminal complaint. On 17 August 1990, Gen. Dumlao granted
their request that they be allowed to be confined at the hospital and placed under guard
thereat. Upon arraignment on 1 October 1990, the Veroys pleaded not guilty and filed a
motion for hospital confinement, which was denied. The court ordered their commitment
at the Davao City Rehabilitation Center pending trial on the merits. At the conclusion
thereof, the court issued a second order denying their motion for reconsideration. The
Veroys were returned to the St. Luke's Hospital where their physical condition remained
erratic. Gen. Dumlao informed the Veroys that he had issued a directive for their transfer
from the St. Luke's Hospital to Camp Crame on the basis of the 2 October 1990 Order.
They would proceed with their transfer pursuant to the order of the trial court, unless
otherwise restrained by the court. The Veroys filed the petition for certiorari, mandamus
and prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether the permission granted by ma. Luisa Veroy for ascertaining thereat the
presence of alleged rebel soldiers include the authority to conduct a room to room
search once inside the house.
HELD: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must
be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized
exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving
vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing). The necessity of
the permission obtained from Ma. Luisa underlines the recognition of Capt. Obrero of the
need of a search warrant to enter the house. The permission granted by was for the
purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The
permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside
the house. The police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not.
Warrantless searches were declared illegal because the officials conducting the search
had every opportunity to secure a search warrant. The items taken were, therefore,
products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are
inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions instituted against them. The offense of
illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject
thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the
subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are
prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and
no exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are
therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence
against the Veroys in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms.
Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while
there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed.
Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime.
were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant was necessary for
such seizure.
PEOPLE V BARROS
FACTS: On 6 September 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both
members of the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate
ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc,
Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were
seated at the back, saw Bonifacio Barros carrying a carton, board the bus and seated
himself on seat 18 after putting the carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus continued
and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it
being their station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat 18.
After C2C Bongyao inspected the carton, he found out that it contained marijuana and he
asked the passengers who the owner of the carton was but nobody answered.
Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao
invited Barros to the detachment for questioning as the latter was the suspected owner
of the carton containing marijuana. Upon entering the detachment the carton was
opened in the presence of Barros. When Barros denied ownership of the carton of
marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus conductor who pinpointed to Barros as the
owner of the carton of marijuana. Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of RA
6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). After trial, the trial court convicted
Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of RA 6425 as amended and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. Barros
appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the failure of the carton bearer to object to the search made in the
moving vehicle, resulting to his warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver.
HELD: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with
a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the
meaning of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The evidence secured thereby
i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure will be inadmissible in evidence "for any
purpose in any proceeding." The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained
prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are
certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to the search of moving
vehicles. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles
automobiles, trucks, etc. without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure
a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. In carrying out
warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine
checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to
physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles being limited to visual
inspection. When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search,
that either the motorist is a lawoffender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or
have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.
PEOPLE v CORREA
FACTS: On or about June 18, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused Antonio
Correa, Rito Gunida and Leonardo Dulay conspired together, not being authorized by law
to possess, sell, deliver, and transport eight (8) bundles of dried flowering tops of
MARIJUANA, a prohibited drug, wrapped in pieces of papers and plastic tapes weighing
16.1789 kilograms.On 12 July 1994, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila (Branch 35), docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-137528, indicting appellants
Antonio Correa y Cayton @ Boyet, Rito Gunida y Sesante @ Dodong, and Leonardo
Dulay y Santos @ Boy Kuba for having violated Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended. The defense, however, contends that the 3 accused were arrested
without warrant in Camarin D, Caloocan City, enroute to Dulays house to get the things
of his child allegedly rushed previously to the Metropolitan Hospital, for an alleged
charge of trafficking on 'shabu,' and were brought to the WPDC headquarters at U.N.
Avenue, where they were detained. After trial, on March 3, 1995, the lower court found
the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced to death to be
executed by the means provided by law, and to pay a fine of P 10,000,000.00, plus the
costs.
ISSUE: Whether the accused are precluded from assailing the warrantless search and
seizure, due to waiver on their part.
HELD: Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante @ "Dodong," and
Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" are precluded from assailing the warrantless
search and seizure when they voluntarily submitted to it as shown by their actuation
during the search and seizure. They never protested when the police officer opened the
tin can loaded in their vehicle, nor when he opened one of the bundles, nor when they,
together with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were brought to the police station
for investigation and subsequent prosecution. When one voluntarily submits to a search
or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is precluded from later
complaining thereof The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every
right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. Further,
they effectively waived their constitutional right against the search and seizure by their
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when they entered a plea of not
guilty upon arraignment and by participating in the trial. While the conviction of the
appellants of the crime charged is proper, we find, however, that the penalty of death
imposed by the trial court is not in accordance with the law. There being no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance which attended the commission of the offense in this case,
and considering that the quantity of the subject prohibited drug exceeded 750 grams,
the proper penalty that should be imposed on each of the appellants is reclusion
perpetua and a fine of Ten Million Pesos.
under Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of
the Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. The
constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but
admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4)
consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In cases where warrant is
necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court
must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to
effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a
warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched and the character of the articles procured. It is not controverted that the search
and seizure conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a search warrant. The
mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior
of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Herein, the police officers did not
merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had to
reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they
were able to see the cable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check.
Also, Caballes' vehicle was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine
patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with
kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon. The fact that
the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered
with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of
a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have
received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen
cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion.
Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become a
sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.
the two (2) x x x committed the crime," and appreciated the aggravating circumstances
of abuse of confidence, superior strength and treachery and thus sentenced both
accused to the supreme penalty of death.
ISSUE: Whether Formento, a deaf-mute, has given consent to the recovery of the
bloodstained pair of short, in his possession during the warrantless search.
HELD: Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are
invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or her behalf. In the present case,
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that at the time the bloodstained pair
of shorts was recovered, Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present.
Being the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have given consent.
Since he was physically present, the waiver could not have come from any other person.
Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs does not apply as the accused therein was not
present when the search was made. Further, to constitute a valid waiver, it must be
shown that first, the right exists; second, the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and third, the person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. Herein, Formento could not have consented to a
warrantless search when, in the first place, he did not understand what was happening
at that moment. There was no interpreter to assist him -- a deaf-mute -- during the
arrest, search and seizure. The point in the case Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, i.e. "as
the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority
by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful
submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely
a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law," becomes even more
pronounced in the present case, in which Formento is a deaf-mute, and there was no
interpreter to explain to him what was happening. His seeming acquiescence to the
search without a warrant may be attributed to plain and simple confusion and ignorance.
The bloodstained pair of shorts was a piece of evidence seized on the occasion of an
unlawful search and seizure. Thus, it is tainted and should thus be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Lastly, as to evidence vis-ais the case in its totality, circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicions or gives
room for conjecture is not sufficient to convict. It must do more than just raise the
possibility, or even the probability, of guilt. It must engender moral cert ainty. Otherwise,
the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails, and the accused deserves
acquittal.
People v. Kalubiran
FACTS: Nestor Kalubiran was arrested on 12 July 1985, in Dumaguete City, by Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) elements. His arrest was the result of a "buy-bust" operation in
which Pat. Leon Quindo acted as the buyer while the other team members lay in wait to
arrest Kalubiran at the pre-arranged signal. Quindo approached the accused-appellant,
who was with a group of friends in front of the Gamo Memorial Clinic, and asked if he
could "score," the jargon for buying marijuana. Kalubiran immediately produced two
sticks of marijuana, for which Quindo paid him a previously marked P5.00 bill. Quindo
then gave the signal and Cpl. Levi Dorado approached and arrested Kalubiran. Dorado
frisked the accused-appellant. He recovered the marked money and found 17 more sticks
of marijuana on Kalubiran's person. The other team members, namely M/Sgt. Ranulfo
Villamor and Sgt. Ruben Laddaran, came later in a jeep, where they boarded Kalubiran to
take him to the police station. The 19 sticks of marijuana were marked and then taken to
the PC Crime Laboratory, where they were analyzed, with positive results. Kalubiran
contended however that one Quindo approached and frisk him on the same night, and
found nothing on him. However, he was called back by one Villamor, who told him at gun
point to board the jeep and taken to PC headquarters, then to the police station. He was
released the following day with the help of a lawyer. After trial, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Dumaguete City found Kalubiran guilty as charged and sentenced him to life
imprisonment plus a P20,000 fine. Kalubiran appealed. Issue; Whether Kalubiran should
be made to answer for the 19 sticks of marijuana found in his possession during his
arrest.
HELD: Kalubiran was arrested in flagrante delicto as a result of the entrapment and so
came under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorizing a warrantless arrest of
any person actually committing a crime. The search was made as an incident of a lawful
arrest and so was also lawful under Section 12 of Rule 116. In addition to the Rules, there
is abundant jurisprudence justifying warrantless searches and seizures under the
conditions established in the case. However, Kalubiran was accused only of selling the
two sticks of marijuana under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act when he should also
have been charged with possession of the 17 other sticks found on his person at the time
of his arrest. It is unfortunate that he cannot be held to answer for the second offense
because he has not been impleaded in a separate information for violation of Section 8
of the said law.
People v Malmstedt
FACTS: In an information filed against the accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead was
charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended.Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for
the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in
1982 and 1985. In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his
arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in
that place for two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the accused
went to Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada. At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that
same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First
Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a
temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose
of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover,
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The group
composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set
up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and
inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The two (2) NARCOM officers
started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who
was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the
bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other
identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring
out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a
pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four
(4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to
open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish,
a derivative of
marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted
from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2)travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear
was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were
bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers
had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.Accused was then
brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for
further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and
they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the
hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the
PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a
prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against
accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised
the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was
planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags
were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom
he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the
same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they
decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that
they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
FACTS:Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers went to Zamora and Pandacan
Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling
something to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner,
identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that
there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten
more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police
headquarters where he was charged of possession of prohibited drugs.
ISSUE:Whether the search of Espanos home after his arrest does not violate against his
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Ruling:The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense . . .
Petitioners arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagrante as
a result of a buy bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information
received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area. The police officer saw
petitioner handling over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they
searched him and discovered two cellophane of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore,
lawful and the two cellophane bag of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence,
being fruits of the crime.
ISSUE:Whether the white crystalline seized under his Unit without valid search warrant
an inadmissible in evidence.
HELD:The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless
search under the exception, the same must be limited to and circumscribed by the
subject, time and place of the arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned
only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him
are limited to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense. With respect to the time and place of the warrantless
search, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid,
the search must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately
thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested, or the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control.
It must be stressed that the purposes of the exception are only to protect the
arresting officer against physical harm from the person being arrested who might be
armed with a concealed weapon, and also to prevent the person arrested from
destroying the evidence within his reach. The exception therefore should not be strained
beyond what is needed in order to serve its purposes.
As a consequence of the illegal search, the things seized on the occasion thereof
are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. They are regarded as having
been obtained from a polluted source, the fruit of a poisonous tree. However, objects
and properties the possession of which is prohibited by law cannot be returned to their
owners notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. Thus, the shabu seized by the
NARCOM operatives, which cannot legally be possessed by the accused under the law,
can and must be retained by the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
FACTS: Prior to 20 November 1996, Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the Regional Trial
Court of Zambales issued a warrant for the conduct of a search and seizure in the
residence of Antonio C. Estella at Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, Zambales.
In the morning of 20 November 1996, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Buloron,
then Intelligence and Investigation Officer, together with SPO1 Jose Arca and several
other members of the Provincial Special Operation Group based in Burgos, San
Marcelino, Zambales proceeded to Masinloc. They coordinated with the members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) in Masinloc and sought the assistance of Barangay
Captain Rey Barnachea of Baloganon, Masinloc for the enforcement of the search
warrant. Barangay Captain Barnachea accompanied the police officers to Purok Yakal,
Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, the place mentioned in the search warrant. On their way
to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw Estrella sitting on a rocking chair located about 2
meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella, the latter's brother, and being rented
by Estrella's live-in partner, named Eva. They approached Estrella and introduced
themselves as police officers. They showed Estrella the search warrant and explained the
contents to him. SPO1 Buloron asked Estrella if indeed he had in his possession
prohibited drug and if so, to surrender the same so he would deserve a lesser penalty.
While inside the hut, Estrella surrendered to the team 2 cans containing dried marijuana
fruiting tops. One can contained 20 bricks of fruiting tops. The team searched the hut in
the presence of Estrella and his live-in partner. They found a
ISSUE: Whether the search undertaken inside the hut was valid.
HELD: The police authorities cannot claim that the search was incident to a lawful arrest.
Such a search presupposes a lawful or valid arrest and can only be invoked through
Section 5 (Arrest without warrant; when lawful), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which provides that "A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When
an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 Rule 112." Never was it
proven that Estrella, who was the person to be arrested, was in possession of the subject
prohibited drug during the search. It follows, therefore, that there was no way of knowing
if he had committed or was actually committing an offense in the presence of the
arresting officers. Without that knowledge, there could have been no search incident to a
lawful arrest. Assuming arguendo that appellant was indeed committing an offense in the
presence of the arresting officers, and that the arrest without a warrant was lawful, it still
cannot be said that the search conducted was within the confines of the law. Searches
and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 12 (Search incident to
lawful arrest), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that
"A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant." However, the scope of the search should be limited to the area within
which the person to be arrested can reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or she
can destroy. The prevailing rule is that the arresting officer may take from the arrested
individual any money or property found upon the latter's person that which was used
in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may provide the
prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in
evidence in the trial of the case.
FACTS: In the evening of October 19, 1996, Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo of Tarlac
PNP held a briefing for which his office received a tip that two drug pushers, riding a
tricycle would be making a delivery that night. The team installed a checkpoint in
Barangay Salapungan to apprehend such suspects. At about 1:00 in the morning, the
police officer flagged down a tricycle. It had two female passengers who were identified
as the accused Agpanga Libnao and co-accused Rosita Nunga. In front of them is a black
bag and the two behaving uneasy, the officers invited them to Kabayan center. Upon
reaching Kabayan center, they opened the bag with the presence of the accused. Inside
were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The
leaves were suspected to be marijuana. The accused denied the accusation against
them. Appellant capitalizes on the absence of warrant of arrest. But their arguments was
failed to impress the court. The accused was convicted on violation of RA 4659.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of the accused against illegal and unwarranted arrest
and search were violated by the police officers who arrested both of them.
HELD:The general rule is that search may be conducted by law enforcers on the
strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, section 2
of the 1987 constitution. In the case at bar, the warrantless search is not bereft of a
probable cause. It is also clear that at the time of the apprehension, she was committing
a criminal offense. She was delivering a prohibited drugs. One of the instances a police
officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when a person is when a person to
be arrested is caught in flagrante delicto. The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket
prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only againt "unreasonable"
searches and seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless
authorized by a validly searched warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the
fundamental protection accorded by search and seizure clause is that between persons
and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to
issue such warrants.
PEOPLE V MUSA
FACTS:Mari Musa was found guilty of selling marijuana in violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.-On December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Belagra, the leader of a NARCOM team
based at Calarian, ZamboangaCity, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance
and test buy on Mari Musa of Suterville,Zamboanga City. Information received from
civilian informer was that Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. So Sgt.
Amado Ani proceeded to Suterville, in company with a NARCOM civilian informer, to the
house of Mari Musa. The same civilian informer had also described to him the
appearance of Mari Musa. Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of
Musa, while therest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places
about 90 to 100 meters from MariMusa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on
between Ani and suspect Musa from where he was.Ani approached Musa, who came out
of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani
gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, Musa went backt o his
house and came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried
marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that the
contents were marijuana,Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right
hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani
joined Belarga's team and returned to the house.
ISSUE:WON the plastic bag marijuana it contains is admissible.
HELD:It has been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain
view" doctrinewill not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of
the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the object. Stated differently, it must
be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence
of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. In the instant case, the appellant
was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked
money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and
found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their
"plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM
agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the
plastic bag. Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one
corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant
what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and
found the marijuana.