ESSENCE (ESSENTIA)

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2014.

Essence (Essentia)
The substances we see around us are not simple but are composed of two principles:
essence and act of being, the former being related to esse as a potency, and the latter being
related to essentia as act. Essence (essentia) is the proper potency of the act of being (esse) and
together with this act constitutes the substance (substantia). Essence confers upon this substance
a specific manner of being and is defined as that by which a thing is what it is. It is that through
which and in which a being has its act of being (esse).1 Essence pertains truly and properly to
substance while it pertains to accidents only in a qualified sense. Aquinas writes: Just as the
term ens is applied in the absolute and proper sense only to substance, and to accidents in a
secondary, derived way, essence truly and properly pertains to the substance, and to the accidents
only in a certain way, and from a certain point of view.2 Therefore, when we refer to the
essence of something without qualification we refer to the essence of its substance, not to the
essence of its accidents.
Essence as Nature, Quiddity, and the Universal
Essence is often times referred to as a nature, a quiddity, or as a universal. Why is this
so? Alvira, Clavell and Melendo explain that as the specification of the mode of being of a
thing, the essence gives rise to a series of basic properties which give us a better understanding
of essence. These properties themselves give rise to a set of terms which refer to one and the
same reality, while differing with respect to the aspect of that reality which is considered. They
are, however, sometimes employed in an undifferentiated way in common usage.3
Essence as Nature. As the principle of operations, essence is called nature. Nature is
essence from the viewpoint of its proper activity. Nature is essence considered as the ultimate
principle of operations in a being; nature signifies the ultimate principle by which and in
accordance with which anything acts in the way that it does (while the suppositum signifies the
very thing itself to which these activities are referred). Nature is the essence considered as the
root principle of the activities of a being. It expresses the dynamic character of being. A horse,
for example, acts in one way and not in another because it has being in a determinate way,
conditioned by its essence. Thus, each nature has a corresponding type of specific operations.
Trotting, galloping, eating grass and neighing, for example, are natural to the horse because they
are operations which arise from horse nature or horseness itself. Every being explains
Dougherty, has certain powers or faculties which dispose it to act in a certain way, such as the
faculty to know, the faculty to hear, the powers of a plant for photosynthesis. No finite being acts
immediately but rather mediately through certain powers for certain acts. Yet the powers or
faculties of a being for acting are not adequate to explain a beings activities. Uniform and stable
1

De Ente et Essentia, chapter 1.

De Ente et Essentia, chapter 2.
3
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sina-Tala, Manila, 1991, p. 90.
2

patterns of activities are proper to a species because of a basic determination for such uniform
and proper activities in the very nature of the species. It is grounded in their very essence or
nature.4
Essence as Quiddity. Insofar as essence is signified by a definition, it is called quiddity or
whatness. Quiddity is a term derived from the Latin word quidditas, which is the technical
noun fashioned from quid (Latin for what). The reason is obvious observes Bittle. When we
desire to know what a particular thing really is, we ask the question What is it? And in answer
to this question we obtain a knowledge of its whatness; because, in being told what it is that
makes this thing to be just this being and not another, we find out its essential elements (essence)
in the definition given.5
A definition signifies the essence of something by means of its proximate genus and
specific difference. It gives an answer to the question What is it? The definition of man, for
example, would be rational animal. This is the metaphysical essence of man. Animal would
be the proximate genus and rationality the specific difference that separates him from all other
animals.
Essence as the Universal. Insofar as essence is known, it is possible for it to be referred
to many individuals, and for this reason it is called the universal. The essence is really present
only in individual things. However, our understanding, setting aside the characteristics which
belong to each singular thing, considers the essence as something universal, which can be
attributed to all individuals having the same mode of being. In accordance with the way of being
which the essence of this horse has in the human mind, it becomes a universal which is
applicable to all horses. This logical consideration of the essence, that is, the essence as a
universal, is what is called secondary substance.6
Essence and Esse. Though capable of being utilized in these various senses, essence
nevertheless stresses its relationship with esse, it being the principle in which the esse of a thing
4

K. DOUGHERTY, Metaphysics, Graymoor Press, Peekskill, New York, 1965, p. 119.

C. BITTLE, The Domain of Being: Ontology, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1941, p. 117. Christian Ferraro writes:
Quidditas una parola inventata dagli scolastici per indicare il significato della risposta alla domanda quid est?.
Dal latino passata allitaliano per translitterazione. Letteralmente allora la quiddit sarebbe la cheit (Washeit)
o coseit della cosa, il che cosa della cosa. Siccome per ci che risponde a quella domanda la ratio
significata dal nome, e questa ratio si esprime nella definizione, allora si d il nome di quiddit allessenza stessa
della cosa, in quanto significata dalla definizione(C. FERRARO, Appunti di metafisica, Lateran University Press,
Vatican City, 2013, p. 124).
6
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 91. Owens writes: The essence can exist in reality and in
the human intellect. In reality it exists in individuals, as humanity exists in millions of men. The same essence,
humanity, is found separately in every one of these many individuals. It is common to them all. The same essence,
moreover, can exist in your intellect or in the intellect of anyone else who thinks of it. In this cognitional existence it
is no longer individual but specific. It is the universal species man, or human nature in its universality. As a
universal, it represents all individual men in the one concept. It has a unity of its own as universal, just as in any
particular man it has a unity that is individual(J. OWENS, op. cit., p. 133). Ferraro writes: In quanto riferibile a
molti individui, lessenza detta universale. Infatti, nelle cose che troviamo nellambito dellesperienza, lessenza
si trova effettivamente realizzata, singolare; nellintelletto invece si trova allo stato di universalit, perch la
species risulta nellintelletto possibile come effetto dellazione astraente dalle condizioni individuali del fantasma,
operata dallintelletto agente. Luniversale esprime perci lessenza delle cose ma secondo lo stato chessa acquista
nella mente(C. FERRARO, op. cit., p. 124).
5

is received and by which it is restricted to a determinate form; essence is so called insofar as a

thing has esse in it and through it. Thus, essence has a meaning over and above that contained in
nature, quiddity, and universal as it directs our attention to that which makes things be, namely,
the act of being (esse): Essence means that through which and in which a being has its act of
being (esse).7
The Essence of Material Beings
Regarding the essence (essentia) of material (corporeal) beings (corporeal beings that are
like finite pure spirits in that they are also composed of essence and act of being [esse as actus
essendi] and also have a composition of substance and accidents, but are unlike finite pure spirits
[also called separate substances in a restricted sense] in that their essences have a composition of
prime matter and substantial form), Alvira, Clavell and Melendo explain: The definition of
every corruptible thing connotes a material element and a formal element. A kind of animal or
plant, for instance, cannot be defined without referring to both its matter and its form, since the
hylomorphic composition, which is studied in Philosophy of Nature, is necessarily present in this
kind of substance.
It can be easily seen for instance, that any definition of man which would fail to mention
either his matter or his form, that is, either his body or his soul, would disfigure his true nature. It
would be an error to define man as a soul (as Plato did), or to deny the reality of his substantial
form by saying that he is pure matter.
Of course, matter and form, which are contained in the definition of essence, do not
encompass the special characteristics present in each individual. The definition of man does not
connote the height, weight, or color of the body of the individual person, but only indicates that
every man has a soul and a body endowed with features similar to those of other persons.
Form: the Act of the Matter. The two constituent elements of the essence, namely,
matter and form, are related to one another as potency and act, respectively. This level of
composition is characteristic of all material beings, which can undergo generation and corruption
profound changes by which a being ceases to be what it was, and becomes another thing. The
subject of these changes is a potency which participated, at first, in act, and then came to
participate in another. Not any kind of act is involved here, but an act which makes it a new kind
of thing or a new individual within the same species (e.g., a man, a horse, an individual piece of
iron). The subject is prime matter, which has a corresponding first act, called substantial form
(in this context, the substantial form is called the first act in contrast to operations, which are
secondary acts, and to the act of being, which, as we shall see, is the ultimate act of a being).
Prime matter is pure passive potency, a mere capacity to receive an act. It is not
supported by any prior act (as, for instance, the power of locomotion is supported by the
substantial form, which is first act), but only by the act which it receives, namely, the
substantial form. For this reason, matter devoid of every substantial form whatsoever could never
exist. Since all reality is in some way or other through an act, a pure potency not united to an
actual principle would be a non-existent potency; it would be nothing.
7

De Ente et Essentia, chapter 1.

As pure capacity for act, matter is of itself indeterminate. All its actuality and
determinateness accrues to it from the form, and for this reason, it acquires a distinct way of
being when it receives a new substantial form. Thus, matter which composes the human body
(flesh and bones) has a different configuration in a living man and in a lifeless body.
The form is the first act which affects matter so as to constitute the substance. Through
the substantial form, matter exists and forms part of one or another type of substance. Matter and
form do not exist separately. Without the form, matter would be nothing. Likewise, in the case of
bodily or corporeal substances, form cannot be without matter, since its degree of perfection does
not allow it to subsist independently, but requires a potency, a subject which supports it.
Matter and form are not themselves beings, but only principles of things. Hence, only
the composite of matter and form (the essence) is what subsists, when it is actualized by the act
of being (esse).
The Primacy of Form over Matter. The more important of the two constituent elements
of the essence of corporeal beings is the form, since matter, of itself, is pure potency and is for
the sake of the substantial form, which is act. The determining element of the essence, which
gives it a particular essence and not another, is the form, which determines matter to be this type
of matter (a human body, a plant, a mineral) with certain specific qualities.
So far we have been saying that being is restricted by the essence to a determinate way
of being. Now, we can give a more exact meaning of this truth as far as material substances are
concerned. The substantial form, as the determining principle of the essence, is what limits or
restricts the act of being. For its part, matter restricts the form to certain determinate conditions
and can, in this sense, also be considered as restricting the act of being.
The form is the principle of being (esse) of a thing (ens): forma est principium essendi,
or forma dat esse.8 Matter shares in esse by means of the form, inasmuch as it is made actual by
the form. Therefore, since generation is the acquisition of a new act of being (via ad esse) and
corruption is the loss of the act of being (via ad non-esse), composites of matter and form are
corrupted when they lose the (substantial) form from which act of being results,9 and they are
engendered when they receive a new form. Living beings, for instance, decompose when their
souls are separated from their respective bodies.
It is important to note, however, that in corporeal substances, the form does not have the
act of being in itself, but only insofar as it gives actuality to matter. The complete essence,
composed of matter and form, is what has the act of being (esse), not the isolated constituent
principles. Thus, the horse is, and not its form or its matter separately.
The case of mans substantial form is different. Being spiritual, the human soul has esse
as something of its own. Whereas in bodily beings esse only belongs to the composite, to which
it comes through the form, in man esse belongs to the soul, which lets matter share in it.

8
9

Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 27.

Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima, q. 14.

Unity of the Essence. The relationship of matter to form as potency to act explains why
the essence of composite beings is one, even though it is made up of two elements. The union of
potency with its corresponding act forms a metaphysical unity which is of a higher degree than
that formed by mere aggregation. The latter is a unity made up of a number of things already in
act, related to one another in some way. The intrinsic unity of an animal, for instance, is stronger
than that of an artifact. For this reason, the metaphysical principles which essentially constitute
an animal cannot be separated without giving rise to corruption, which is a change in nature. In
contrast, the component parts of an aggregated unity can be separated without destroying either
the nature or the whole or that of the parts.
It is the form which gives unity to the essence, since it is an act which overcomes the
indeterminate condition of matter. It does so by giving the latter a determinate degree of being,
through which all of its parts remain bound together. The various elements which form an
organic body, for instance, are united insofar as they form part of a greater unity (that of an
animal or plant) which stems from the form. Consequently, when this form is separated from
them during corruption or death, the body breaks apart and loses its unity.
Furthermore, the composite has only one substantial form. The degree of being of each
thing is determined by the substantial form. If one and the same thing would have more than one
substantial form, then it would belong simultaneously to different species. The single substantial
form confers on the composite all its perfections on the substantial level. By virtue of one and the
same substantial form, for instance, man has a body, he is a living being, and a man. If we were
to grant a plurality of subordinate substantial forms, we would destroy the substantial unity of the
composite. In man, for instance, besides the human person, there would also be a body (which
would already be a substance) and an animal. The alternative would be to assume that only the
first of these forms would give a substantial degree of being to matter and that the others would
only affect it in an accidental way.10 But if this were true, then the difference between plants and
animals, and among different species within these genera, would be no more than accidental
differences.
There is no medium or intermediary by which matter and form are united to one
another. Their union is an immediate union of potency with its own act.11 The unity of the
essence is compromised when this union is conceived in a mediate fashion, as when matter is
understood, not as pure potency, but as a certain reality which is already in act. In mans case,
this error leads to considering the body and the soul as two distinct, independent, and hardly
interacting substances.1213

10

Under the influence of the Arab-Jewish philosopher Avicebron, some philosophers of the Middle Ages (of the
Augustinian School) maintained the doctrine of multiple substantial forms in one and the same being.
11
Leibniz, following the teachings of decadent Scholasticism, held the theory of a substantial link that unites body
and soul (Cf. C. D. Boehm, Le vinculum substantiale chez Leibniz, Paris, 1938).
12
Prominent philosophers who taught dualism in man (i.e., no substantial union between body and soul) were Plato
(Cf. Gorgias, 492 e; Phaedo, 83 b-e) and Descartes (Cf. Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, VI). Cartesian dualism
had a deep influence on modern and contemporary philosophy.
13
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 91-96.

Essence in Finite Pure Spirits

Finite pure spirits (also called separated substances14 [in the restricted sense] or angels)
are beings that have a composition of essence (essentia) and act of being (esse as actus essendi),
a composition of substance and accidents, but do not have a composition in their essence of
matter15 and form. Concerning the essence in these finite pure spirits or angels, Alvira, Clavell
and Melendo write: The primacy of form over matter as principium essendi makes us
understand why there can be some types of forms which subsist without matter (spiritual
substances), whereas no matter can exist independently of a substantial form. Matter is for the
sake of the form, not the other way around.
We know by faith that apart from the human soul, whose operations reveal its
spirituality even though it is by nature ordered towards a body, there are completely spiritual
14

San Tommaso le chiama, queste sostanze, sostanze separate e anche talvolta, seguendo gli arabi,
intelligenze. Le sostanze separate sidentificano con gli enti spirituali personali che, attendendo alla loro funzione
di messaggeri inviati da Dio, nella nostra fede cattolica ricevono genericamente il nome di angeli(C. FERRARO,
op. cit., p. 130).
15
Giving a critique of the universal hylomorphism advocacy of so-called spiritual matter in finite pure spirits,
Ferraro writes: Certi autori, tra i quali san Bonaventura, hanno contestato questa verit, rivendicando anche alle
sostanze separate la composizione di materia e forma. Questa dottrina si chiama ilemorfismo universale. Le
principali argomentazioni a favore della medesima girano fondamentalmente attorno a tre affermazioni: il principio
di mutabilit la materia, il principio del patire la materia, il principio dellappartenenza a un genere e quindi della
definibilit la materia (Quaeritur ergo primo, utrum in Angelo sit compositio ex diversis naturis, scilicet ex
materia et forma. Et quod sic, ostenditur [tra altri motivi]: Per rationem mutationis (). 2. Per rationem actionis et
passionis (). 4. Per naturam essentialis compositionis[S. BONAVENTURA, In II Sent., d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, a. 1; in
Opere, ed. Quarachi, propre Florentiam 1885, 89-90]. Sono molti gli autori che tuttora difendono una simile
dottrina). Questa materia non sarebbe una materia quantitativa, come corrisponde allente corporeo, bens una
materia sottile, propria degli spiriti.
C nel fondo di questa tesi una grande verit: un qualcosa, in quanto in atto non pu essere in potenza; cos,
una forma, proprio in quanto in atto, non pu essere soggetto. Il problema la conclusione che si tira fuori a partire
da questo fondo di verit, motivata da una superficiale comprensione della natura propria delloperazione intellettiva
nonch della materia stessa e da una interpretazione unilaterale dellessere soggetto.
Riguardo alla materia, una distinzione fra materia sottile e materia quantificata impossibile e improcedente.
Infatti, tutte le cose che includono materia nella propria composizione devono convenire nella materia per il
semplice motivo che, di per s, la materia non ha nessuna determinazione. Ora, evidentemente impossibile che una
medesima materia riceva due forme opposte, come sono quella spirituale e quella corporale, a meno che non le
riceva in diverse parti. Ma le parti nella materia suppongono la divisibilit e questo richiede le dimensioni, vale a
dire la quantit: e allora sarebbe anche quantificata la materia delle sostanze spirituali le quali non sarebbero gi
spirituali bens corporee.
Riguardo allintelletto, chiaro che lintelletto non riceve le forme delle cose come le riceve la materia.
Quando una forma ricevuta in una materia, risulta concretizzata, si rende particolare; quando una forma invece
ricevuta nellintelletto, allora risulta astratta, si rende universale. Mentre la materia contrae, lintelletto amplifica.
Questo vuol dire non solo che lintelletto un recettore distinto dalla materia ma, molto pi ancora, che
diametralmente opposto alla materia. La operazione intellettiva positivamente e totalmente immateriale. Pertanto
impossibile che una sostanza totalmente intellettiva sia materiale.
Riguardo poi alla definizione, evidente lerrore del parallelismo gnoseologico lerrore cio di trasferire
direttamente sul piano del reale le strutture delle nostre rappresentazioni. Non detto infatti che ad ogni
composizione mentale o nozionale corrisponda direttamente una composizione reale nella cosa. Per esempio:
quando dico colore bianco, non c nella cosa una composizione fra il colore e il bianco. C composizione
mentale, ma non reale. Pertanto il mero fatto di definire richiamandosi alla struttura nozionale di genere e differenza
non permette di fare il passaggio ulteriore didentificare il genere con la materia e la differenza con la forma(C.
FERRARO, op. cit., pp. 128-129).

creatures, namely, the angels.16 The essence of a purely spiritual substance is simple, being
identical to its form, which receives the act of being in itself as something of its own.
The lack of composition in their essence does not, however, imply that spiritual
creatures are totally simple, since only God is absolutely simple. Just like everything created, the
pure spirits are composed at least of essence and the act of being, since they have a limited mode
of being. They are creatures, and if they were to lack this composition they would be identical
with the Subsistent Esse, whose essence is his very act of being. St. Thomas explained: If there
are some forms not received in matter, each one of them will certainly be simple inasmuch as it
lacks matter. However, since any form restricts or limits the very act of being, no one of them is
the act of being; rather, each of them is something which has the act of being (esse).17
Besides, all angels perform operations (knowledge and love) which are really distinct
from their act of being and from their substance. Consequently, there is also a composition of
substance and accidents in them.18

16

The existence of angels is part of divine Revelation; nevertheless, it has been a belief of other people outside the
Judeo-Christian tradition. For instance, Aristotle, in his explanations about the universe, affirmed the existence of
spiritual beings acting as intermediate movers between the Prime Mover and the world (Cf. Metaphysica, book XII,
ch. 8).
17
In Boethium de Hebdomadibus, lect. 2.
18
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 96-97.