Tunnel Safety

SafeT
Work package 2
D2 report V2.0
Final
Recommendations for the enhancement of

preventive tunnel safety
Version:
Author:
Novermber 2005
B.Martn (SICE)
S. Vogler (H/B)
C. Diers (H/B)
M. Martens ( TNO)
J. Lacroix ( DVR)
M. Steiner ( ASFINAG)
P.Schmitz (MRBC)
M.Serrano (ETRA)
Table of contents
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1. Abstract
The purpose of this document is to provide recommendations for the enhancement of safety in
European tunnels from the viewpoint of different parts involved in the safety chain and based in
current experiences and methodologies/ systems used around European tunnels.
These recommendations are focused on the EU Directive with the objective of making it more useful
for users, such as road authorities, tunnel operators and planners, and increase safety in tunnels.
Previous to the definition of recommendations different activities took place.
Data has been collected by different means such as internet search, bibliography review, consulting to
experts, international organisations such as UNECE, PIARC, World Road Association and others to
provide real cases experiences.
Some gaps have been identified in data collection due to lack of reliable sources, low input obtained
from other countries experiences. Thus, it is important to take into account that the recommendations
produced on the EU Directive are made on this basis.
In Chapter 5 of this report Data analysis, information related to experiences, best practices and last
technology used around Europe to improve the safety in tunnels is placed. This section is divided in
three subparagraphs each of one related to: Incident detection systems & methods, traffic management
methods and user information and communication methods as stated in the document of work where a
detailed analysis of the different systems and methods, best practices in different European countries
and recommendations are presented.
In Chapter 6 Proposal for EU guidelines general recommendations and specific ones are provided to
the Corrigendum to Directive 2004/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 on minimum safety requirements for tunnels in the trans-European road network after its deep
analysis and its comparison with the data collected.
Limitations encountered during the data analysis are stated in Chapter 7.These limitations, such as
reliability of data, insufficient data and other have been considered before establishing the
recommendations.
From the analysis of the limitations encountered some recommendations for future work are provided
in Chapter 8.
2. Objectives
The objective of this report is to provide recommendations for the enhancement of tunnel safety based
on an analysis made on current systems and methods for incident detection, traffic management and
user information and communication. That analysis concerned systems and methods for incident
detection, traffic management methods in order to enhance preventive safety in European road tunnels
and to identify information and communication methods to promote safer driver behaviour.
Recommendations for the improvement of the safety of the existing tunnels will be made taking into
account experiences and best practices in European countries. Cost of implementation and user
acceptance as criteria of selection are provided only in the cases where possible. After the evaluation it
has been checked that this is not a homogeneous criteria around Europe to establish recommendations.
Gaps in the EU Directive have been identified and proposals for enhancement are based on the
analysis of best practices and different experiences around Europe. These real cases and new
technological developments have been compared with the EU Directive always trying to follow the
international standards on safety.
To elaborate this work input from WP1 related to current state of practice in tunnel safety has been
taken into account and we expect that the output of this document will be useful for WP6 related to
Integrated tunnel safety management systems and WP7 Comprehensive guidelines on tunnels
safety.
Therefore, in this WP a detailed analysis of the current existing systems and methods for incident
detection, traffic management and user information and communication has been carried out. This
analysis mainly consisted of real case studies, references, and literature review such as SafeT WP1
documentation, the Directive 2004/54/CE on minimum safety requirements for tunnels in transEuropean networks, its corrigendum, the PIARC document about traffic incident management
systems used in road tunnels elaborated by the Committee on Road Tunnels and its Working Group
No.4 devoted to Communication systems and geometry and the UNECE recommendations on this
subject and other sources of information such as FIT Network, UPTUN project, SAFE TUNNEL etc. (
See references at the end of the document).
3. Introduction
Incident detection system forms part of the traffic incident management in road tunnels. The aim of
these safety management systems is to provide safe, efficient and orderly movement of traffic, as well
as, minimize delays and congestion under normal traffic conditions. The Traffic Incident Management
System generally consists of detection, verification and traffic / incident monitor / control devices
installed inside tunnels and along approach roadways, and traffic control plans or strategies to respond
to incidents. The level of automation and sophistication of such systems depends on the projected
Average Annual Daily Traffic Flows (AADT), complexity of approach roadways, environment,
location (urban/rural), design speeds, traffic mix (passenger vehicles, trucks, dangerous goods), tunnel
geometry and operation (single or multiple tubes, uni-directional or bi-directional traffic), and height /
width of tunnel for installation of variable message signs. Detection devices provide early warning of
traffic incidents or abnormal conditions in the tunnel, which can result in the interruption of normal
traffic flow. Verification devices and/ or traffic management methods allow tunnel operators to rapidly
confirm an incident and implement incident response scenarios to systematically close lanes or redirect
traffic to prevent secondary accidents, and in the event of a fire, implement safe and efficient
evacuation of users by means of information and communication. Incident Management System
include provisions to initiate predetermined traffic control plans to facilitate access of rescue and
emergency service response teams into the tunnel.
The application of traffic management measures can be seen as an improvement of road tunnel safety.
Subject to the specific basic conditions (upgrading an existing tunnel or planning a new tunnel) one
has to consider well, which combination of methods is best or rather possible. Additionally it depends
on various other subjects which equipment has to be recommended, for e.g. tunnel length, traffic
volumes or speed.
Human factors are other of the most important part forming part of the SafeT value chain. That is why
great importance has been given to user information and communication in this chapter and how the
different systems can prevent incidents or users wrong behaviour in case of an incident/ accident in a
tunnel.
In paragraph 5 of this report related to data analysis it can be found the information related to best
practices and last technology used around Europe to improve the safety in tunnels. This section is
divided in three subparagraphs each of one related to: Incident detection systems & methods, traffic
management methods and user information and communication methods as stated in the document of
work. In the following lines a brief description of the work done during previous tasks and that has
carried us to reach these conclusions is presented. This work done is the basis for the
recommendations presented in paragraph 9.
Objectives of Task 2.1 were to identify and recommend the most appropriate devices,
equipment, systems and techniques, currently being used in European tunnels in order to
enhance preventive safety in existing tunnels with safety deficiencies and provide
recommendations to the future ones with the aim to provide a safer environment for users and
promote safer driver behaviour. For this, it was identified the incident detection and
verification devices used in tunnels to provide operators with the information required to
implement response scenarios, devices and systems being used by operating agencies to
respond to incidents, and communicate with drivers within the tunnel. After the data analysis,
an evaluation of the better systems and methods to detect and respond to traffic incidents was
carried out based on different countries experiences, experts recommendations and literature
review. The results of this evaluation will form the basis for recommendations. Nevertheless,
it has to be contemplated that actual incident response procedures and guidelines are different
for each tunnel and need to be developed by the authority responsible for the operation of the
tunnel and the safety of the drivers using the tunnel. That is why human factors should be
reviewed along with the hardware devices, the traffic management methods, the individual
characteristics of each tunnel and the user information systems discussed in this Work
Package.
Task 2.2a was devoted to provide an overview about traffic management measures for road
tunnels in the field of preventive tunnel safety .The work consisted of the analysis of the
following topics:
-
Measures concerning construction

Regulations
Measures concerning traffic control and driver behaviour with traffic controlling
equipment
Measures concerning traffic observation
Measures concerning direct driver information
The emphasis is placed on dynamic methods in the area of preventive traffic management.
Task 2.2.b goal was to identify (based on current literature and other European projects on
tunnel safety) existing measures that have proved to mitigate the consequences of wrong
behaviour during an incident/accident or list innovative measures that may avoid wrong
behaviour or limit consequences of wrong behaviour after evaluation of driver information
and traffic management methods , control and systems that may induce safer driver behaviour
for different traffic conditions and during incidents or accident conditions . There are several
ways of defining wrong behaviour in tunnels. When identifying measures to restrict
consequences of wrong behaviour, it is important to think about what we consider to be wrong
behaviour. Only when wrong behaviour is identified, we can think about countermeasures for
this wrong behaviour. In this respect, the evaluation of methods has concentrated on wrong
behaviour during incidents and accidents, so not to wrong behaviour (driving behaviour) under
normal traffic conditions and user information and communication to prevent and/or mitigate
this wrong behaviour.
In each of these subparagraphs an evaluation of the best practices around Europe in each subject is
provided in order to serve as recommendation for future implementations in new tunnels,
refurbishments in existing tunnels and as complementary information to the EU Directive 2004/54/EC
on minimum safety requirements for tunnels in the Trans European Road Network.
All the data sources used to realise this evaluation can be found listed at the end of the document in
paragraph 10. Furthermore, other not referred literature and experiences have been used. In these cases
reference will be made within the document.
4. Data collection
As described in previous paragraphs information has been collected by different means such as
internet search, bibliography review, consulting to experts and other members to provide real cases
experiences.
Each task leader has been responsible of gathering and evaluation of the information related to its task.
Due to the different nature of each one of these tasks, a different approach has taken place.
For the incident detection systems and methods chapter, a detailed collection of documentation took
place. Nevertheless the analysed documents are most a compendium of the standards and guidelines
that are used to develop tunnel incident management systems and actual experiences with existing
systems in the respective countries and/ or cases, incident management systems currently being used
for single and multiple tube tunnels with unidirectional and bidirectional traffic flow. Limited
reference is made to the fire detection systems as they are deeply studied in FIT ( Fire in Tunnels)
project.
Data concerning traffic management methods was collected by analysing European national tunnels
guidelines and regulations (as far as obtained by SafeT members) and experiences from various
projects, supplemented by information gathered from internet search.
For the collection of data for mitigating wrong behaviour, information was gathered from research
projects as the primary source of information. Since it was the idea to assess countermeasures for
wrong behaviour, it was important to look at sources that actually contained information about the
effectiveness of the system. A simple list of availability of products would therefore not suffice.
The reliability of the sources can only be assumed when they come from international organisations
such as PIARC or UNECE and official national guidelines. New national guidelines are also reliable
and reflect somehow the best practices of a country and imply a preceding cost benefit analysis.
Different standards in different countries represent somehow the costs a country would accept.
The rest of the sources as described are referred and not referred literature and real cases experiences
which reliability cannot be assessed by us. Furthermore, mention should be made to the low input
obtained from other partners due to lack of specific information on their countries that makes us not to
have information enough to provide much reliability on the sources.
Some gaps have been identified in data collection due to the same reason mentioned before. Thus, it is
important to take into account that the recommendations produced on the EU Directive are made on
this basis.
5. Data analysis and practical examples

In this chapter results based on the analysis of data collected focusing on the technical points of the
Directive are presented with the aim to provide guidelines on best practices and point out the
limitations of the EU Directive.
In the following table it is presented the list of systems, measures and methods that have been analysed
numbered as they are presented in this paragraph.
5.1 Incident detection system and methods

5.1.1 Loop detection systems
5.1.2 Radar detectors
5.1.3 Monitoring systems (CCTV, CCVE and Automatic Incident Detection Systems)
5.1.4 Environmental and air quality monitoring devices
5.1.4.1 Carbon Monoxide (CO) Detectors
5.1.4.2 Nitrous Oxide (NOx) Detectors
5.1.4.3 Beam (Opacity)
5.1.5 Automatic Fire Detection Devices
5.1.5.1 Closed Circuit Video Equipment (CCVE and CCTV):
5.1.5.2 Linear Heat Detector
5.1.5.3 Spot Detector
5.1.5.4 Manual Fire Detection
5.2 Traffic management methods
5.2.1 Measures concerning construction
5.2.1.1 Suitable Road/Tunnel Geometry
5.2.1.2 Clear Road Markings
5.2.1.3 Hard Shoulder/Lay Bys
5.2.1.4 Separate Truck Lanes
5.2.1.5 Appropriate Lighting Level inside the Tunnel
5.2.1.6 Height Detection
5.2.2 Regulations
5.2.2.1 Dangerous Goods
5.2.2.2 Minimum Maintenance
5.2.2.3 Operational Modes
5.2.2.4 Max Speed Limit in Tunnels
5.2.2.5 Vehicles
5.2.2.6 Enforcement
5.2.3 Measures concerning traffic control and driver behaviour with traffic
controlling equipment
5.2.3.1 Classification of tunnels
5.2.4
5.2.3.2 Summary Classification of Tunnels - Evaluation

Tunnel Traffic Management
5.2.4.1 EU Directive
5.2.4.2 Tunnel Traffic Management Germany
5.2.4.3 Tunnel Traffic Management The Netherlands
9
5.2.4.4 Tunnel Traffic Management Norway

5.2.4.5 Tunnel Traffic Management Spain
5.2.4.6 Tunnel Traffic Management in Czech
5.2.4.7 Tunnel Traffic Management in Switzerland
5.2.4.8 Summary Tunnel Traffic Management Evaluation
5.2.5 Measures concerning traffic observation
5.2.6 Measures concerning direct driver information
5.3
User information and communication methods
5.3.2 Clear speed limits, trajectory control
5.3.3 Gradual transitions to tunnel
5.3.4 Tunnel lighting
5.3.5 VMS
5.3.6 Traffic lights and barriers
5.3.7 Information leaflets
5.3.8 Operator voice message
5.3.9 Remote supervision of emergency niche door
5.3.10 Assistance after accident
5.3.11 System guidance to emergency escape routes
5.3.12 Automatic radio information
5.3.13 Use of an emergency lane inside the tunnel
5.3.14 Design of emergency doors and exits
5.3.15 Camera surveillance
5.3.16 Communication between Rescue Units and Subway Operators
5.3.17 Use of mobile phone
5.3.18 Rescue Concepts for Public Tramway Transport
5.3.19 Height detection systems
5.3.20 Passenger Information Systems
5.1 Incident detection systems and methods

After a general evaluation of current incident detection techniques and systems and associated
management for centralised and decentralised tunnel control this paragraph focus on best practices
carried in European tunnels on the following concrete areas as considered the essentials to assure
safety in tunnels:
-
Loop detection systems

Radar detectors
Incident Detection Systems based on CCTV (Optical Systems)
Environmental and AQ monitoring devices
Automatic Fire detections systems
Last technical advances in different countries are showed in order to establish recommendations.
10
5.1.1 Loop Detection Systems

Presence and speed monitoring using wire loops installed in slots cut in roadway pavement at periodic
intervals. Loops sense vehicle presence by changes in inductance as the vehicle passess over the
embedded loop. Speed is measured between consecutive loops. Loops are also used for traffic
counting. Loop detection systems are commonly installed in tunnels meeting the design parameters for
Incident Management Systems within Europe, Japan and the United States. The locations of the loop
detection systems vary from tunnel entrance/exits only to equal spacing throughout the full length of
the tunnel with a recommended maximum spacing of 100 meters ( in Spain it is accepted a maximum
spacing of 500 meters, in Germany the maximum spacing is 300 m throughout the tunnel). The loop
detection system continually provides tunnel traffic flow information to the operators located in the
Control Center. Installation of a second loop adjacent to the presence loop can be used to provide
accurate vehicle speed information. Analyzers for inductance presence and speed loops must be
located in the tunnel near loops.
These analyzers require periodic maintenance to provide accurate information for the incident
detection system. Maintenance requires tunnel closures.
Experience with loop detection systems in tunnels indicates that they provide accurate incident alarms
during peak traffic conditions and catch up situations. Stalled vehicles or traffic slow downs are not
easily identified by loop detection systems during off peak or low traffic conditions.
Provide information on distance between loops in each country and indicate in which countries loops
are used for incident detection.
5.1.2 Radar detectors
Radar detectors are devices installed at the tunnel ceiling or sidewall to monitor speed and passage and
/ or presence, and inter-vehicle distance measurement when activated by a vehicle passing through its
beam and reflecting a signal back toward the source.
Radar detectors are being used in tunnels in France, Spain and Germany to detect vehicle speed and
distance between vehicles. Microwave beams are transmitted toward the vehicles in the tunnel and
reflected back toward the radar detection system receiver. The detector measures the rebound time of
the reflected signal and calculates the speed of the vehicle using the Doppler Principle. Radar detectors
also measure vehicle presence and count. In general, radar detectors are installed above traffic lanes in
the tunnel. Ultrasonic detection systems are similar to radar detection systems except that sound waves
are used to generate the energy beam instead of microwave. The sound waves are affected by ambient
noise inherent in tunnels and as a result these units are not used. Problems occur when systems are not
maintained. Sensitivity of radar detectors must be adjusted for tunnel cross-sections to avoid false
alarms. [10]
5.1.3 Monitoring systems (CCTV, CCVE and Automatic Incident Detection Systems)
Video surveillance equipment including automatic incident detection (AID) cameras installed in
tunnels, centrally located video monitors located at a central location, pan/tilt/zoom equipment, video
11
switchers, video recording equipment (VCR), AID software, AID processing equipment and
communication network transmitting video signals between cameras and monitors.
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), Closed Circuit Video Equipment (CCVE) and Automatic Incident
Detection (AID) are both mandatory systems for class I and II tunnels in the tunnel directive [4] while
they are recommendable or optional for the rest. National regulations in Germany, Spain France, UK,
Norway, the Netherlands and Austria do not contain specific references for AIDs but CCTV is
regulated depending on tunnel features, see FIT report [1]
AIDs represent a recent evolution of CCTV systems, which extends the surveillance capability of the
latest to the automatic detection of incidents. In the following, the use of these systems is described.
Closed Circuit Video Equipment (CCVE) including, cameras are installed in tunnels meeting the
design parameters for Incident Management Systems to monitor traffic conditions. Advances in
camera designs and technology have improved video system transmission, display and data recording,
provided black/white and colour video imaging, minimized the effects of vehicles headlights
(blooming), and reduced equipment sizes to allow CCVE systems to be used in uni-directional and bidirectional tunnels. Camera installations in tunnels have been used to provide vehicle count and speed
data to incident management systems. This information is being used to prosecute drivers exceeding
tunnel speed limits and is envisioned as a deterrent in preventing accidents caused by vehicles
tailgating. CCVE Systems are also used to provide incident verification.
Camera and associated hardware, including pan/tilt/zoom equipment and environmentally controlled
enclosures are decreasing in size. The smaller space requirements are allowing CCVE Systems to be
used in existing tunnels and tunnels with limited cross sections. Camera spacing requires line-of-sight
visibility to provide video coverage of the tunnel interior. Spacing is affected by horizontal and
vertical tunnel curvature, mounting height and location, and type of equipment selected. Camera
locations can vary from 30 to 150 meters. New technology is available for use with new and existing
tunnel cameras, and CCVE Systems to provide automatic incident detection (AID). Image processing
problems have been experienced with currently available systems. System capabilities are continually
improving as technology and software advances. Video processing hardware to detect incidents can be
provided with new cameras and attached to existing cameras to interface with computers located in the
Control Center. Software algorithms are currently available to detect stopped vehicles, congestion and
changes in traffic patterns, direction of vehicle travel, speed and occupancy. AID systems provide
accurate traffic information during off peak or low traffic volume conditions and can be expected to
provide smoke detection based on visibility within the tunnel, and fire detection based on thermal
imaging in the near future. AID systems are currently being used in many European countries ( e.g.:
Spain, Germany, Norway).
Typically, AID traffic-monitoring systems consist of two main subsystems. The first part is the video
processing hardware between the camera and the remote monitor. The video processing hardware can
be installed on existing cameras. The standard composite video signal is sent to the remote front-end
monitoring equipment using existing or new transmission cables (coaxial or fiber optic). The second
part of the AID monitoring system consists of the computer workstation located at a central location.
This workstation receives alarms and data from the video processing hardware and provides the
operator interface. The computer workstation may also be integrated with the Traffic Management
12
System. The video processing hardware runs the software algorithms processing the video data. The
sophistication of the video processing algorithms varies between manufacturers.
Software algorithms for the detection of smoke and fires using CCVE systems are not currently
operationally proven. To date none of the video imaging systems can be relied upon to provide reliable
fire detection systems within tunnels. Smoke detection using CCVE Systems is currently available and
is based on light obscuration principle, which results from a decrease in light level sensed at the
camera lens. Fire detection must identify flickering light reflection characteristics of the flame, which
is more complicated than the detection for smoke.
The processing of video data depends upon the quality of the video signal from the camera. Variations
in light and shadows, blooming and smearing of the image will degrade the performance. Tunnel noise
and low quality video transmission cables will also degrade system performance.
Thermographic imaging is currently being used at the Mount Blanc Tunnel to monitor traffic
approaching the tunnel to detect overheating vehicles. Any vehicle triggering an alarm will be stopped
outside the tunnel.
5.1.4 Environmental and air quality monitoring devices
The following devices are currently being used to monitor environmental conditions and air quality
inside vehicular tunnels:
5.1.4.1 Carbon Monoxide (CO) Detectors that measure the concentration of carbon
monoxide are used to provide continuous monitoring of the tunnel air quality and are normally
installed along tunnel roadways, and in the tunnel exhaust air duct where full and semitransverse ventilation systems are used. CO output levels of modern combustible engines is
decreasing due in part to improvements in technology and mandates by regulating agencies
throughout the world to reduce the levels of global pollution. As a result, the dependence on
monitoring CO to control tunnel ventilation systems is also decreasing in some parts of the
world. The use of CO detection systems in tunnels is being evaluated in some European
countries. In Germany CO detection systems are not required in tunnels below an altitude of
800 m above sea level. Opacity detectors spaced every 150 meters are provided to monitor
tunnel visibility levels for these tunnels. CO detection systems are currently required in the
United States for all tunnels with mechanical ventilation systems to provide automatic air
quality control systems for normal traffic conditions.
5.1.4.2 Nitrous Oxide (NOx) Detectors are normally installed along the roadway to provide
continuous monitoring of the tunnel air quality. NOx detectors in some countries are used in
tunnels that have a high percentage of diesel-fueled vehicles.
5.1.4.3 Beam (Opacity) Detectors measure the visibility along the roadway and are used in
tunnels that have a high percentage of diesel-fueled vehicles. Light emitters and receivers are
installed on opposite walls of the tunnel. Under normal conditions all the light transmitted is
absorbed by the light sensitive device within the receiver. As the visibility in the tunnel
decreases the light intensity received also decreases. An alarm is transmitted when the light
intensity level received decreases below a predetermined threshold level.
Single unit opacity detectors installed outside the active travel lanes continuously monitor
visibility within road tunnels using the scattered light principle. Air drawn from the tunnel and
fed into the opacity detector measures the intensity of light scattered within the sampling cell
13
using a reference light beam from an internal light source. An alarm is generated when the
light intensity is reduced below a predetermined threshold level.
5.1.5 Automatic Fire Detection Devices
Devices installed in the tunnel to automatically detect fires along the roadway. Systems include spot
detectors and linear heat detection system.
Automatic Fire Detection Devices are not object of this paper as they are studied in FIT network.
Nevertheless a brief description of the most common systems is presented:
5.1.5.1 Closed Circuit Video Equipment (CCVE and CCTV): See Incident Detection
Systems
5.1.5.2 Linear Heat Detector (Automatic Detection System): Distributed Temperature
Sensors (DTS). Linear temperature sensor cables installed in tunnels, usually mounted above
travel lanes, that automatically actuate an alarm at a designated temperature or designated
temperature gradient.
5.1.5.3 Spot Detector (Automatic Detection System): Equally spaced combination rate-of
rise/fixed temperature detectors mounted above tunnel travel lanes to detect gradual and rapid
changes in temperature and activate an alarm at preselected set points.
5.1.5.4 Manual Fire Detection: Manual fire alarm pull stations installed at periodic intervals
in the tunnel. Manual pull stations are located in SOS / Refuge Stations or Tunnel Sidewall
Niches which automatically transmit a signal to the Control Center when activated.

This chapter deals with the following traffic management methods:
Measures concerning construction
Regulations
Measures concerning traffic control and driver behaviour with traffic controlling
equipment
Tunnel Traffic Management
Measures concerning traffic observation
Measures concerning direct driver information
5.2.1 Measures concerning construction
Tunnels are part of a road. The traffic terms in tunnels have to be basically the same as on roads.
Nevertheless Tunnels are special sections of a road which costs a lot of money for construction,
maintenance and operation. Relating to tunnels one has to consider special requirements in view to
traffic safety and operation safety.
14
5.2.1.1 Suitable Road/Tunnel Geometry

Suitable road geometry is a basic precondition for a safe traffic flow. The earliest possibility to get
influence on tunnel safety with a view to the traffic management is in the planning stage before
building the tunnel.
Number of Tubes and Lanes
The EU Directive [12] gives main criteria for deciding whether to build a single or a twin-tube tunnel:
traffic volume and safety
percentage of heavy goods vehicles
gradient and length.

In any case, for tunnels in the design stage, a 15-year forecast shows that the traffic volume will
exceed 10000 vehicles per day and lane, a twin-tube tunnel with unidirectional traffic shall be in place
at the time when this value will be exceeded. [12]
Directional traffic could be much safer than bidirectional traffic (depending on the equipment). Also
twin-and more tube tunnels offer much higher safety potential in the event of a fire or other incidents.
Cross Sections
The EU Directive gives no information about suitable cross-sectional geometry. Adequate lane widths
could minimise the occurrence of accidents in one-directional and bi-directional road tunnels and offer
better access for rescue services in case of an accident.
Experiences of the past are the reason for actual new guidelines in Germany [13]. Among other new
regulations the BMVBW (Federal Ministry of Transport) gave some recommendations for a procedure
to select tunnel cross sections. New criteria are that anomalous traffic situations like heavy traffic,
planed maintenance, unplanned incidents like break down cars or accidents have to be considered in
the decision for a tunnel cross section. It provides also the evidence of the usefulness of emergency
lanes (hard shoulders).
Significant parameters in the procedure are
Chosen method of construction
Number of lanes per direction
Length of the tunnel
Average gradient in ascending section
Average percentage of freight transport
AADT (Average annual daily traffic)

Regular Cross Sections for tunnels in Germany are shown below.
15
German regular cross section for tunnels (RAS-Q/RABT 2003) [13]
In Norway the tunnel cros-sections are designated according to the total width of the road surface ( see
following figure)
16
The vertical clearence requirements in tunenls is 4.6 m except for pedestrian and cycle tunnels. The
vertical clearence specifications apply to the vertical distance measured on the carriageway boundary.
Normal cross-sections will be in excess of this to allow for:
Extra clearence for subsequent road resurfacing
Normal tolerance for tunnel linings, water and frost protection/concrete linings ( total
deviation= 0.1 m)
Requirements for vertical clearance including kerbstone
Normally the tunnel cross-section will also include space for traffic signs and technical instalations.
The need for extra width locally mmust be considered in each individual case. The minmum height for
technical equipment must be 4.8 m above the carriageway. For laterally-mounted equipment such as
traffic signs etc, the clearence must be individually determined. With consideration to emergency exits
laterally mounted signd should be placed such that the minimum height below the sign is at least 2.0
m.
Gradients
In addition to the choice of a cross section (which should not differ from the cross section outside the
tunnel) the slopes are important in terms of safety. It is necessary to define a maximum and a
minimum respectively for transverse gradient and longitudinal gradient.
The maximum longitudinal gradient according to the EU Directive is 5%, unless no other solution is
geographically possible.
5.2.1.2 Clear Road Markings
The EU Directive gives no precise information about road markings.
To give a clear orientation for drivers in approach of the tunnel and inside the tunnel road markings
are necessary. Inside the tunnel a clear demarcation between road and sidewalk is essential, this can be
realized with road markings in combination with retro reflecting elements. There are different
regulations in Europe concerning the colour of retro reflecting elements in road tunnels (for example:
Austria: red and white, Germany, Spain: white).
Experiences in Germany with retro reflecting elements in road tunnels showed that the elements got
dirty very quick and therefore lost luminance. Because of the high costs for cleaning the retro
reflecting elements Germany reconsider whether it would be less expensive to use active elements
which could be adjusted to the degree of staining.
Furthermore clear road markings are essential in tubes with bi-directional traffic to separate the
vehicles. The separation can be improved by haptic markings or special retro reflecting nails.
17
5.2.1.3 Hard Shoulder/Lay Bys

If possible and if the costs are acceptable a hard shoulder should be planned. The advantages of a hard
shoulder in a tunnel tube are:
in case of broken down vehicles the traffic flow will not be disturbed and
therefore limiting the risk of rear-end collisions,
in case of an accident rescue services have better access to the scene of accident.
At least (if the realization of a hard shoulder is too expensive or there is not enough space) there
should be lay bys subject to the tunnel length.
Distance between lay bys:
EU Directive: max. 1000m for new bi-directional tunnels longer than 1500m where traffic
volume is higher than 2000 vehicles per lane
Germany:
max. 600m (in case of bi directional traffic across from each other to give the
possibility to turn)
Sign indicating a lay by (EU-Directive)
Regular length and width of a lay by (RABT2003)
In Norway distance between lay-bys is determined by the tunnel category . The location will depend
upon the local circumstances including rock mechanics and geometric considerations. Further,
consideration must be made to designing niches for several purposes ( e.g.: technical room, pump
station, etc.). deviations in location should be within +- 50 m for emergency lay-bys and +- 100 m for
turning points.
In the following table normal distances between lay-bys are showed:
18
According to the Directive the feasibility and effectiveness of the implementation of lay-bys shall be
evaluated for existing bi-directional tunnels.
In this context it should be mentioned that a lay by was exactly the spot that enabled and motivated the
truck driver in the Mont Blanc tunnel inferno to stop because he was aware that his vehicle was on
fire. In these cases it could be better to try to get outside the tunnel with the burning vehicle (as it is
mandatory in rail tunnels). To guarantee adequate user behavior it is necessary to inform drivers ( see
point 5.3 on User information and communication) how to react in critical situations. Nevertheless lay
bys are useful because of the above mentioned benefits.
5.2.1.4 Separate Truck Lanes
Separate truck lanes can be useful in case of high percentage of lorries. They can
help to harmonize the traffic flow. Also in case of an installed height control a
separate truck lane could be beneficial. If you have to stop a detected vehicle it is
possible to stop only the traffic on the separate truck lane so that the other lanes
are not affected.
Another way to separate trucks from passenger transport is to establish a temporary use. But you have
to take into account that it could be a logistic problem because alternative routes for trucks or areas
where the trucks can wait until passing the tunnel is allowed for trucks are needed.
The Czech tunnel guideline [14] gives an example how to indicate restricted lanes by variable traffic
signs (see chapter Restricted Lane in this report).
5.2.1.5 Appropriate Lighting Level inside the Tunnel
Inside the tunnel the field of vision for the driver is a narrow defined area. Because of that in contrast
to roads outside the tunnel- the estimation of distances and speed are more difficult.
An appropriate lighting level inside the tunnel and especially in the beginning of the tunnel can
minimize these effects.
An important task is to achieve the above-mentioned objectives in daytime, especially when the sun
shines because of the wide difference between inside and outside the tunnel. The following
photometric characteristics are considered important for appropriate tunnel lighting:
pavement and bottom part of tunnel walls luminance level,

evenness of the luminance distribution over the pavement,
glare reduction,
light flickering reduction.
5.2.1.6 Height Detection
In order to protect the tunnel construction and equipment and for safety reasons a
height detection should be installed if the tube has a limited height.
19
To this purpose a vehicle height detection electronic system could be installed.

The electronic system is interconnected with a dynamical road signalling system or traffic lights. If the
height limit is exceeded, the driver has to be informed ( see paragraph 5.3 related to User Information
and Communication) about the violation before entering the tunnel. If a lay by is not available or the
vehicle driver continues driving towards the tunnel entry, the relevant traffic lane (or direction) has to
be closed immediately.
In case of stopping the traffic because of an overheigth vehicle congestions occur often. Congestions
are always critical because the end of the queue is a potential risk for rear-end collision accidents.
Warning the drivers in approach of the congestion and reduce the speed by dynamic traffic signs is a
good measure to prevent rear-end accidents.
5.2.2 Regulations
5.2.2.1 Dangerous Goods
In case of accidents and in case of fire relating to dangerous goods, situations may appear which can
not be handled by the fire brigade. The risk of loosing a lot of lifes and high dimension of damage
during an incident with vehicles carrying dangerous goods has low expected frequency but a high
level of negative effects.
It is strongly recommended to make an investigation of risk analysis if some alternative routes exist.
The German RABT2003 recommends two official investigation methods to get a decision for
restrictions for transport of dangerous goods in road tunnels:
Project ERS2 OECD / PIARC [15]
Parts of the Swiss regulations (Richtlinien fr Verkehrswege: Beurteilungskriterien II zur

Strfallverordnung StFV , BUWAL August 2001) [16]
These methods / studies could be helpful and for future there should be ambitions to create a common
European procedure.
To consider the transport of heavy goods there are also possibilities in the traffic management to
reduce the impacts of accidents with dangerous goods:
permissions only for special times (e.g. at night when traffic volumes are low),
escorts by police (or other services) possibly by creating convoys (space for waiting vehicles
is needed),
restrictions in case of high traffic density with automatic rerouting,
manual registration by mobile phone or automatic detection of vehicles with dangerous goods
for the fire brigade to be prepared.
The Norwegian System TunSafe [17] is an automatic system based on detectors and cameras at each
end of the tunnel. The specific electronic signature of vehicles is used to recognise vehicles entering
and leaving the tunnel. The system knows the number of vehicles and what kind of vehicles are in the
tunnel at any time. In case of an accident the system provides the following information for the fire
brigade and tunnel operators:
20
large vehicle count both directions

small vehicle counts both directions
wind strength and direction
pictures of large vehicles in the tunnel
The pictures of the large vehicles could be used to check if vehicles with dangerous goods are in the
tunnel.
Picture taken from the TunSafe leaflet, Datainstrument AS [17]
The Austrian legislation for transport of dangerous goods itemise two classes. Subject to the kind of
dangerous substances in Austrian class A tunnels it is mandatory to use special warning lights at the
vehicle, in class B tunnels it is mandatory that an accompanying vehicle drives behind the vehicle with
dangerous goods. [18]
Class A
Tunnel, including portals, length between 1000 m and < 5000 m
Class B
Tunnel, including portals, length more or equal to 5 000 m
In The Netherlands there are two categories of tunnels. The differences between these two categories
are which dangerous goods substances are forbidden to transport through category I and category II
tunnels. [19]
5.2.2.2 Minimum Maintenance
Reliable technical devices are essential for tunnel safety. To guarantee the operability a minimum
maintenance at regular intervals should be established.
21
5.2.2.3 Operational Modes

For tunnels with more than one lane one has to consider which operational modes should be allowed.
Multiple operational modes give more flexibility in various situations like closure of a tunnel tube
because of an accident or maintenance, varying traffic loads subject to daytime.
For the design work, it is always necessary to consider whether the tunnel with uni-directional traffic
can be used temporarily for bi-directional traffic. If the structural configuration allows this regime, and
the traffic regime is designed in this way, lane signals are placed in both directions so that switching to
the bi-directional regime is possible.
The Westerschelde road tunnel in The Netherlands is designed for one way traffic in two tubes in
normal case. The first time maintenance work was done in tube 1, there was two way traffic in tube 2,
and an accident occurred. Now, there is a guideline that during such activities, heavy goods vehicles
are prohibited in the two way tube.
This example shows that it could be critical to allow trucks in bi-directional tubes, especially trucks
which are extra-wide must be prohibited in every case. It should depend on traffic volumes etc. if
trucks should be prohibited in bi-directional traffic (risk analysis!). It is very important to inform the
tunnel user appropriately that the tube is operated bi-directional, especially in the case that bidirectional traffic is not the normal operational mode. The experiences of the police of the Elbe Tunnel
in Germany showed that no more accidents occurred in bi-directional modes than in one-directional
modes.
5.2.2.4 Max Speed Limit in Tunnels
With the reflection between the impacts of the traffic quality and the economic approach it is mostly
acceptable to reduce the regular speed limit in relation to the normal road. Some speed limits around
Europe are here presented:
Germany
80 km/h
Spain
80 km/h
Belgium
No specific regulation. Geberally, it is the same speed as open air but with
some execptions ( e.g.: the tunnel of COINTE, in Lige, which is in declivity
and where all the cars are limited to 80 Km/h even if it is an express way with
a normal maximum speed of 120 km/h.
Norway
Same as on open roads, for tunnels with high traffic volumes: 70 km/h
5.2.2.5 Vehicles
Another preventive measure is to create regulations to guarantee high quality of the status and
equipment of vehicles. Because this issue is irrespective of traffic management measures it is not
further investigated in this report.
22
5.2.2.6 Enforcement
To ensure that the regulations are followed by users it is important to create an enforcement structure /
system.
In Germany irregular checks by the police are arranged. Additionally automatic detectors for
surveying speed limit, dangerous goods vehicle, control of separation distance between vehicle should
be discussed.
In Norway Automatic Speed Cameras are used.
A very promising measure was established in Austria, the so called section control. This system
consists of
Speed surveillance depending on the vehicle category
Maximal allowed speed per vehicle category
Triggering speed (maximal allowed speed) for law enforcement remotely changeable
Automatic adaptation to new defined speed limits
Monitoring of the red light for closed lanes or tunnels
Monitoring of lanes which are closed for trucks
Ghost driver detection; image triggering and alarms
Comparing detected license numbers with a license number list of stolen vehicles
Site overview
Statistics; vehicle categories, average speed, etc

Based on first experiences in Austria with this system it was found that the number of accidents
decreased. Also the average speed could be reduced (see figure below).
No Section Control
Traffic Speed
Section Control
Traffic Speed
70-95 km/hr
55-75 km/hr
Figure 1.
Accidents-injuries-fatalities in the Vienna Kaisermhlentunnel before and after Section Control.
Note: Data provided by Machata, K. and Stefan, C. of KfV, Drawing by Khoury, G of FSD-SafeT-IC
23
5.2.3 Traffic control and driver behaviour with traffic controlling equipment
There exist several measures concerning traffic control and driver behaviour which enhance traffic
safety, for example:
Traffic signs displaying speed limit
Traffic signs displaying overtaking ban for trucks
Traffic signs displaying a mandatory distance between trucks
Lane direction control signals for supporting the driver in using the right lanes
Moveable barriers to guarantee that drivers using the right lanes
Traffic signs displaying the mandatory use of headlights
Traffic signs displaying the radio station (for messages in case of an incident)
Subject to the general conditions not every tunnel needs sophisticated technical traffic equipment. So
it is reasonable to distinguish between tunnel classes.
The following chapters give an overview about classification of tunnels regarding traffic management,
traffic management equipment and traffic management measures. One has to differentiate between the
essential flow regulation by static traffic signs and traffic management which uses dynamic signs like
variable message signs, traffic lights, etc. in dependency of the actual situation. Static traffic regulation
will not be discussed in detail in the following.
5.2.3.1 Classification of tunnels
For the purpose of a standard appearance it is necessary to define standard equipment for traffic
management. A standardization of traffic devices enhances the acceptance and comprehensibility for
tunnel users.
The traffic management equipment and management measures have to be well adapted to the type of a
tunnel. So it is reasonable to find parameters for a classification of tunnels in the field of traffic
management.
EU Directive
The current Directive on minimum safety requirements for tunnels in the Trans-European Road
Network establishes five levels of equipment which are based on two parameters: traffic volume
(annual average daily traffic (AADT) trough a tunnel per lane) and tunnel length.
In the field of traffic management the following elements subject to the tunnel class (I to V)
are listed:
Class I
Class II
2000 AADT
500-1000 m
> 1000 m
Class III
500-1000 m
Class IV
> 2000 AADT
1000 3000 m
Class V
>3000 m
24
Classification in Belgium: No specific regulation. In Brussels region all the tunnels longer than
300 m are equipped with ventilation.
Classification in Germany: The German Guideline RABT 2003 differentiates in the field of
traffic management between three classes. The class depends on length, traffic volume and
maximum speed.
class 3
class 2
class 1
Diagram to determine the traffic management equipment (RABT 2003)
The Diagram shows that every tunnel in Germany has to be equipped with a minimum of traffic
management devices (definition tunnel: length > 80m).
Subject to the basic conditions of the tunnel a higher or lower equipment class would be more
appropriate:
25
- low probability of traffic incidents or emergency lane in tunnel -> lower class,
- bad visibility conditions, considerable gradient, need of rerouting -> class 1,
- traffic control section next to tunnel portal can lead to a modified equipment.
Classification in Norway: The classification system in Norway links tunnel geometry with
necessary safety equipment. The classification complies with the EU Directive.
The traffic volume is normally given in AADT (Annual Average Daily Traffic volume).
AADT is the total annual traffic divided by 365 and is given as the total traffic volume in both
directions. The tunnel category is determined according to the estimated traffic volume twenty years
after opening, AADT(20). Where the traffic volume varies throughout the day or over the year, or
where there is considerable uncertainty in calculating AADT(20), the tunnel category may be based on
selected criteria. The chosen category must be approved by the Directorate of Public Roads.
The tunnel categories are based upon traffic volume and tunnel length. (See Figure). The tunnel
categories are the basis for a specific cross-section, number of traffic lanes, need for emergency laybys and turning points together with safety equipment.
Following figure applies to tunnels longer than 500 m. Initially, the cross-section is also selected
according to this figure for shorter tunnels except that the width of the shoulder at the open road may
be extended throughout the tunnel. Tunnels with a single lane (AADT< 300 on county roads) are
defined as Tunnel Category A. Different cross sections apply for each category [36]
26
Classification in Spain: Spain follows the EU Directive and the French legislation,
respectively.
Classification in Czech: The basic classification in the Czech guideline depends on traffic
volume and tunnel length:
According to the Czech guidelines a tunnel should be equipped in the following categories:
Minimum equipment for short tunnels;
Minimum equipment;
Basic equipment;
Extended equipment.
The equipment also depends on the overall traffic solution of the area or line; the final
solution is also given by contingent requirements for bi-directional traffic in one tunnel tube,
and by the general safety concept. The equipment selection can be made using the following
figure with considering the following criteria,
Tunnel length (aggregated length of several successive tunnels),
traffic intensity,
maximum speed.
27
Deviations in the equipment can be affected by specifics of the given solution. The subject of
assessment can be, according to the Czech Guideline, for instance:
The parameter of the roads before and after the tunnel, for example at-grade intersections
before and after the tunnel, TLS controlled intersections,
characteristics of the sections in the tunnel, e.g. the tunnel traffic clearance, radio of curves,
uphill or downhill gradient,
existence of lay-bys and emergency bays,
possibility of by-passing the tunnel section,
anticipated accident rate;
traffic flow composition, and other parameters.
5.2.3.2 Summary Classification of Tunnels - Evaluation

A Classification of road tunnels is useful to establish standardised traffic management equipment. The
current classification in the European Directive is based on the following parameters:
tunnel length,
traffic volume.
National Guidelines like for example the Czech and the German guidelines have additional parameters
which are helpful to find suitable traffic management equipment.
28
5.2.4 Tunnel Traffic Management

5.2.4.1 EU Directive
In the field of traffic management equipment the EU Directive gives advices concerning Tunnel
closing equipment. The given information is not specific and describes only the function and not the
specific design of the equipment. The EU Directive says Any variable message signs shall have clear
indications to inform tunnel users of congestion, breakdown, accident, fire or any other hazards.
The only signs shown in the EU Directive concerning traffic management are lane signals and they do
not yet exist in international legal instruments:
5.2.4.2 Tunnel Traffic Management Germany:

As explained above there are three classes of traffic management equipment in the German Guideline
RABT 2003.
o
Minimum Equipment: The traffic management equipment for class 3 tunnel is shown
below. Variable signs are framed black. The left column of signs shows the normal mode
(no incident), the right column shows a tunnel closure.
29
With this stage of equipment it is possible to close the tunnel entry in case of an incident.
o
Basic Equipment: The traffic management equipment for class 2 tunnel is shown below.
Variable signs are framed black. The left column of signs shows the normal mode (no
incident), the right column shows a tunnel closure.
With this equipment it is possible to close the tunnel and to reduce the speed in approach of
the tunnel.
30
o Extended Equipment: The traffic management equipment for class 1 tunnel is

shown below. The black boxes and the white rectangles are variable message signs
with possible displays beside.
With this equipment the following measures are possible:
Tunnel closure
Lane closure
Speed reduction subject to the situation
Warning against incidents in general, congestion, construction works, bi directional

traffic
31
Bi directional traffic in one tube

o
Additional traffic management tools: There exist several systems which could be
combined with tunnel traffic management. All systems listed below can optimise
traffic flow and therefore enhance safety and reduce the probability of accidents.
Automatic Rerouting: An Automatic rerouting system is a proper instrument
to control traffic flows. In case of high traffic volumes on a tunnel route and
therefore increased risk of accidents, the traffic load can be metered.
Automatic rerouting could also be used if the tunnel is closed.
Example foran automatic rerouting system displaying the normal route
Example for rerouting the traffic in case of an incident
32
Traffic control system in approach of the Elbtunnel, Hamburg
Traffic Control Systems: To guarantee that the drivers can react very early
in case of heavy traffic, bad weather conditions, congestions and incident
/accidents adjacent traffic control systems might be useful. Traffic control
systems with variable message signs in close range of tunnels may react on
varies situations to harmonize the traffic flow. Measures can be to reduce
speed, to warn against congestion or bad weather conditions or other irregular
situations.
Otherwise tunnel operators can react on situations detected by the adjacent
traffic control systems, especially when the system has algorithms to predict
traffic volumes or congestion detectors behind the tunnel.
33
Ramp Metering: When vehicles try to merge onto an already crowded road,
everyone must brake and accelerate to jockey for space, quickly causing
traffic flow to break down. Ramp meters control the frequency and the
spacing of merging vehicles, minimizing speed disruptions and accident risks
at the merge, which improves overall traffic flow.
Drivers waiting on the ramp for the green light to release them into the traffic
flow may not appreciate that a computer constantly adjusts light cycles
according to traffic flow both on the mainline and on the ramp. Pavement
sensors provide traffic volumes and speeds to a software program that varies
ramp release rates. The software is responsive to real-time traffic conditions.
Especially in case of access roads in areas of roads leading to a tunnel a ramp
metering system can contribute to safety.
Ramp metering motorway A5 junction Friedberg, Hessen (source: Heusch/Boesefeldt GmbH)
Control of Separation Distance between Vehicles

One of the most occurring accidents is the rear-end-collision. To prevent this risk of accidents it might
be useful to control and to enforce the separation distance between vehicles.
An interesting example is the one from the Mont Blanc and Frejus tunnel in which a blue lightening
every 150 m was established to indicate the minimum separation distance ( www.unece.org) but it was
found that the users had difficulties to understand the purpose of the blue lightening . Furthermore one
has to take into account that the minimum separation distance vary with the speed of a vehicle and
fixed lightening only could indicate the distance for a certain speed.
5.2.4.3 Tunnel Traffic Management The Netherlands
General
1. A traffic management system shall be applied:

for tunnels without an emergency lane;
if this is needed for maintenance;
if the other tunnel tube must be used for escape;
if a risk analysis shows the need for this.
34
2. For maintenance the CROW guidelines for working at Highways shall be used
These guidelines prescribe that for bi-directional roads with 3 or more drive lanes per direction a
traffic management system must be applied. It is assumed that the traffic intensity on a 3-lane bidirectional road is too large for a safe manual blocking.
On bi-directional roads with 2 lanes per direction it is assumed that a safe manual blocking is
possible and allowed, if and only if it is certain that there will be no traffic jam.
At normal conditions blocking of a drive lane of a 2-lane bi-directional road will cause traffic
jams. If a traffic intensity of more than 2000 till 2200 vehicles per hour on both drive lanes is
merged on one drive lane under unfavorable conditions (for instance at lateral obstruction or a
disorderly situation) blocking of a drive lane of a 2-lane bi-directional road will cause a traffic
jam, if a traffic intensity of more than 1400 till 1500 vehicles per hour on both drive lanes is
merged at one drive lane.
It is recommended to apply a traffic management system before and inside 2-lane bi-directional
road tunnels with an expected traffic intensity of more than 1500 vehicles per hour.
3. The reduction of the number of drive lanes for the handling of incidents shall take place before
the entrance of the tunnel (and never inside the tunnel!). The narrowing shall be visible at a
large distance for the on-coming traffic.
4. Because of the crucial character, traffic management systems shall be connected to a UPS
(Uninterrupted Power Supply) to prevent sudden loss of traffic information (for instance
during blocking of drive lanes at a car breakdown, an incident or an accident).
Tunnels without an alternative energy supply to guarantee the long term and permanent power
supply, will (after being disconnected from the public power supply) suffer a loss of power after
the operation period of the UPS.
Traffic Detection
1. Automatic traffic detection is needed in tunnels where the tunnel design forces people to
escape by the parallel traffic tube when a calamity occurs.
2. Automatic traffic detection is needed in combination with traffic jam detection systems.
3. Automatic traffic detection is needed in tunnels with operation.
A tunnel operator cannot permanently survey the traffic in a tunnel. Automatic traffic detection
enables to react fast and react and anticipate on the changes in the traffic flow.
For tunnels with a traffic management system for traffic measures not meant for maintenance, an
automatic traffic detection system is needed in the case of high traffic intensities, and also in the
absence of an emergency lane.
For tunnels with low traffic on average, automatic traffic detection could be left out because the
tunnel user can be warned in good time in case of a breakdown or incident.
Besides, in tunnels with low traffic the possibility exist to warn the tunnel operator via the
intercom without getting the driver in danger.
35
5.2.4.4 Tunnel Traffic Management Norway

The tunnel traffic management system is based on the following concept.
a) < 5000 AADT: all tunnels have a double red light. If an extinguisher is lifted the tunnels
should be closed with a red signal. The traffic Control Centre (5 in Norway) can operate the
signals (however there are problems with drivers passing red signals because they believe they
are out of order).
b) 5000-10000 AADT: there should be a gate that can be operated from the control centre.
c) > 10000 AADT will usually have video surveillance and traffic management system based on
red crosses and yellow and green arrows above the roadway.
The TunSafe system mentioned in a previous chapter (Dangerous Goods) also provides a preventive
traffic management feature. The system detects traffic volume and speed. By analyzing the speed of
every vehicle entering the tunnel TunSafe can operate variable message signs.
5.2.4.5 Tunnel Traffic Management Spain
Spain follows the EU Directive and the French legislation, respectively.
5.2.4.6 Tunnel Traffic Management in Czech
Minimum Equipment of Short Tunnels

Quotation: Czech Guideline:
Minimum equipment is usually designed for tunnels with lengths up to 200m and low traffic intensity
( 1000 equivalent vehicles per 24 hours).
This equipment comprises following permanent traffic signs:
Maximum speed
No Overtaking
Tunnel
Turn on the Lights
End of all prohibitions
or other traffic signs following from the traffic solution:
No Vehicles over Height Indicated
Overtaking by Goods Vehicles Prohibited
The basis for designing traffic signalling is the TS65 Guidelines for traffic signalling on roads, and
further the SN 01 8020 Traffic signs on roads is used. With the minimum equipment it is not
possible to affect traffic without additional measures carried out directly on site, e.g. stopping or
diverting the traffic.
36
Minimum Tunnel Equipment

Minimum equipment has to be installed in the other tunnels (see figure below):
37
Basic Equipment
A possible example of the basic equipment for the TC and TB category tunnel is shown in this
chapter.
38
Extended Equipment
Extended equipment is mostly used for the TA safety category tunnels. In this particular case lane
signals, a number of other variable traffic signs, and an array of traffic signs for alternation of traffic
between tunnel tubes. An example of the extended equipment is shown below.
39
Additional traffic management tools

Restricted Lane
In the cases when it is necessary in a city, for instance for harmonisation of traffic stream, to ban
lorry riding in a certain traffic lane/lanes in certain time intervals, it is necessary to use the VTS type
of the informational sign Restricted Lane with a symbol of the traffic sign No. B4. The traffic sign
No. IP21a of the retro reflective type is placed on the clearance profile sides, see below
40
Information Display
The ID provides up-to-the-minute information on special, extraordinary and emergency states in the
tunnel and on adjoining road sections to road traffic participants. This information contributes to
improving safety and fluency of traffic, increasing utilisation of infrastructure, but also diminishing
environmental impacts on the surroundings and reducing time and power The ID provides brief and
valuable information. If activation of information is not necessary, no information without meaning or
having a meaning but undesirable should be visible. If information is activated, no undesirable
symbols should appear.
Examples of possible information:
ROAD WORK 500 M AHEAD
OIL ON PAVEMENT, SECTION LENGTH 1 KM
BLACK ICE BEHIND TUNNEL
PILSEN DIRECTION CLOSED
COLUMN OF VEHICLES 200 M AHEAD etc.
ID for tunnels of the TA and TB safety categories are placed:
Before tunnel, at a distance allowing the route change;
At tunnel portal;
Inside tunnel.
Before a tunnel, at a distance allowing the route change drivers are informed about the situation in
the tunnel and about a possibility to use an alternate road. The use of this information display is
recommendatory. At portals, information is provided which explains, for example, that drivers have to
wait in front of the tunnel and must not leave this space despite previous disobeying traffic rules so
that they do not increase probability of causing collision situations.
Inside a tunnel, similar information is provided as that at portals. ID are installed inside the tunnel
approximately after 500 m, in a sufficient advance (e.g. 100 m) of advance signal lights. It is advisable
to repeat the ID information at least twice.
Following imaging technologies are permitted in tunnels and on adjacent road sections:
Optical fibres (limited number of legends);
Light-emitting diodes (LED);
Back-lit liquid crystals (LCD);
Bi-stable turning elements
There is a requirement for the equipment within one tunnel section to be of the same technological
type (LCD, bi-stable elements, ).
41
Dimensions of the boards are given by the clearance profile. Boards with maximally 36
alphanumerical symbols, with body size of minimally 240 mm, are used in tunnels. They are installed
above the roadway. In the portal section, unless the clearance profile is restricted, maximally three-line
boards with sixteen symbols are permitted. An example of a three-line board installed at a tunnel
portal is shown in the figure below.
Mobile IDs (see the TS154) are recommended for solving special or extraordinary situations. These
can be positioned to any place, beyond the clearance profile, as needed an accident, acute service
action etc. Legends are modifiable according to the immediate need.
5.2.4.7 Tunnel Traffic Management in Switzerland

An interesting example for separation distance control is the HGV metering system at the St. Gotthard
Road Tunnel in Switzerland /10/.
By metering the HGV before entering the tunnel a minimum distance between HGV could be
achieved. Every 20 to 60 seconds a HGV can pass through the halt towards the tunnel. This preventive
traffic management measure reduces the average fire load in the tunnel.
Further on an alternating one-way traffic was introduced for HGV in the St. Gottard and San
Bernadino Tunnel.
5.2.4.8 Summary Tunnel Traffic Management Evaluation
The extent of traffic management depends on tunnel classification and on tunnel structure (3 and 4
tubes, contra-flow tubes ...). Further on traffic management systems can be operated in several modes:
manual by operators, semiautomatic or automatic.
42
Based on the enquiry made for this report one can say that the standards for traffic management
equipment are very inhomogeneous in the member states.
Additional traffic management methods which are not specific to tunnels could benefit safety, like
systems harmonizing traffic before and after the portals.
5.2.5 Measures concerning traffic observation
Traffic management systems are based on traffic data. There are several methods to get these data:
Visual observation by operator,
CCTV-cameras (closed circuit television),
Inductive detection loops,
SDS (speed discrimination system) in combination with a CCTV system,
Section control (individual vehicle tracking in a section of a tunnel by means of a video

camera and a laser scanner),
Well trained tunnel operators,
Well equipped control centres.
To have observers in the tunnel could be an option but a better overview would be granted by a video
system. If you have observers in the tunnel you only have a special section which can be observed.
And it is more expensive, too.
More information on this subject can be fount in paragraph 5.1 related to Incident Detection Systems.
5.2.6 Measures concerning direct driver information
Direct driver information can be realised as follows:
A warning message will be transmitted on the standard radio frequencies or by means of RDS.
A warning message with instructions on how to act will be transmitted to the navigation
devices inside the vehicles.
A warning message will be transmitted to mobile phones of drivers inside a tunnel (this
implies the obligation for drivers to turn on their mobile phone, on entering a tunnel and could
only be an additional measure because the tunnel operator could not control the operational
availability of the mobile phones).
Use of an intercom system (in case traffic has (partly) already stopped.
More information on this subject can be found in next paragraph 5.3 related to User information and
communication.
43
5.2.7 Conclusion
There are not enough sources concerning effectiveness of traffic management methods easily available
in the internet. The USA Government had established a database with information about ITS Projects
and their effectiveness /12/. A similar cost benefit database in Europe would be helpful for all member
states. More analyses should be carried out concerning effectiveness of traffic management measures
and these analyses should be published in a database.
Because of different basic conditions of every tunnel a traffic management measure could be more or
less effective. Software simulation tools can help decision-makers to analyse traffic management tools
before implementation. There are several software tools using macro- and microscopic traffic models.
For the Elbe Tunnel in Germany some traffic management measures were successful tested by traffic
simulation ( more information related to Elbe Tunnel can be found in SafeT website
www.safetunnel.net ).
The development in the field of traffic management is a living process and therefore a permanent
network of traffic management experts could be very helpful to supply the Commission with actual
information.
44
5.3 User information and communication methods

5.3.1 Introduction
If we want to identify measures for mitigating wrong behavior it is important to keep in mind the
behavior we want to mitigate. By identifying wrong behavior, safety measures follow.
If we want to know what wrong behaviour is, it is sensible to first distinguish the different phases
involved in driver behaviour during incidents.
The three stages of emergency behaviour of road users that have been identified (in chronological
order, Canter 1990 [25]) are:
-
the interpretation stage. People see, hear and smell things in their surroundings and based on this
information they try to interpret what is going on. This does not always have to be a conscious
process, if people do not see things in their surroundings that worry them, they may just do their
thing without a conscious interpretation of the information. However, if there are clear cues that
something is wrong, this process gets more explicit. Since this is the first step in the process
towards action (or passivity), it is of crucial importance to provide the necessary information in
order to allow people to make correct interpretation.
the decide what action to take stage. Based on the interpretation of the situation, people decide
what to do next. Because during accidents or disasters, the information people receive is
oftentimes ambiguous it may be very hard to properly decide what the best action is. Also here,
any information that is non-ambiguous that may help people make the right decision needs to be
provided. However, the number of hints that someone needs before to realise that something is
wrong differs largely from person to person.
the deal with the emergency stage. In this stage people either tackle the crisis (which can be done
in various ways), they interact with other people, escape or they remain passive (not action is also
a way of dealing with the emergency, even we do not consider this an appropriate action). One
important aspect of this stage is that people are unlikely to produce acts under emergencies that
they would or could not produce under normal circumstances.
For engineering purposes, the 3 stages of behaviour are defined slightly differently, as Recognition,
Response and Movement times. The Recognition stage directly matches the first stage described by
Canter [25], the Response stage includes all actions other than movement to the exit, and thus overlaps
somewhat with Canters second stage. The Recognition and Response stages are often referred to as
pre-movement time, although this is slightly misleading as movement may occur. The distinction is
that the movement is not directed to evacuation, but to other activities. An interrelation of the three
stages is given in Figure 1.
45
Recognition
Pre-movement
Interpretation phase
Pre-movement
Response
Decision what to do next
Movement
Deal with the emergency
Fig 1. Interrelation of the three stages in peoples emergency behaviour
Due to the great individual differences in reaction pattern, it is difficult to predict behaviour when a
catastrophe occurs. However, describing all types of behaviour shown at disasters may also learn us a
lot about the necessary countermeasures in order to avoid this wrong behaviour. The
countermeasures have to be adapted to the diversity of human reactions and behaviour. This is a
challenge also when security measures and emergency preparedness plans are to be developed
(Steyvers et al., 1999) [35].
In general it can be stated that accidents are primarily caused by the failure of road users in flowing
traffic. Therefore special attention has to be put on the listing of these wrong behaviour patterns. In
consequence special meaning should be given to the prevention of these "wrong behaviour patterns as
well as the care during the conversion. When assessing all types of countermeasure that are already
available, we can start by stating that the general literature regarding human behaviour in crisis
situations emphasises the following aspects:
It is vital to make people realise quickly the seriousness of a critical situation.
It is important to get people to abandon existing mind-sets and adapt their behaviour to a new
situation
Clear instructions are needed to ensure that people evacuate the site by another route than they
used to enter it.
Of course then the question still is: How do we do this? Though pretty much is known about causes of
accidents, countermeasures are still not sufficiently efficient. What are the reasons that drivers do not
properly respond to warning messages? Why do drivers not behave according to traffic rules that
assure greater safety on the roads? Are they not aware of risk or is the risk not important to them?
Perhaps we could agree with Lehto (1998) [29] when he mentioned that a new perspective on hazard
communication places less emphasis on perceptual issues emphasised in the past (e.g. legibility,
contrast, or conspicuity) but more on measuring and predicting comprehensibility, risk perception, and
behavioural propensities as a function of factors such as message length and explicitness, user
experience, cost of compliance, and past behavioural patterns. Edworthy (1998) [27] believes that
people will decide whether or not to comply with a warning or more generally, to show safety
behaviour if the perceived benefits of compliance appear to outweigh the costs. A person confronted
with the hazard is weighing the potential benefits of appropriate safety behaviour against the costs that
might be incurred in doing so. They are thus making a utility judgement which presents a cost-benefit
analysis informed by the cues coming from the hazard, the individual, and from other sources. Here
we are also facing the problem of risk communication (e.g. warning, traffic sign), namely the
perception and interpretation of risk. There are numerous biases connected to risk, e.g. scale
46
compression, underestimation of risk associated with familiar activities, optimism bias1 (= tendency
for people to give lower risk estimates for themselves than for others), etc. Nevertheless - contrary to
expectations - research evidence (Ayres et al., 1998) [19] suggests that behavioural choice is not
closely related to subjective risk. There are other considerations that are more important, e.g.
pedestrians make riskier street crossings if it is raining. It seems that often the costs of compliance
with the warning or safety rule influence whether people will comply with them. It must be also
mentioned that the inter-subject variability in risk perception is too high to provide a reliable basis for
rational decisions and to reliably predict differences in behaviour [19]. Ayres et al. (1998) believe that
instead of making decisions about acceptable levels of risk, people may seek effective ways of acting.
Following Gibson (1979) [28] they proposed that by perceiving affordances2, people can choose
responses without involved conscious thought about possible consequences and the chances. They are
broadening the term to also include aspects of more complex situations, e.g. driving safety. Perception
of affordances does not require that risk is perceived. If affordances and not risk perception is
important, then the likelihood of consequences should be more important than their severity, because
affordance is related to whether an action can be done successfully rather than what will happen if it
fails. Warning about highly probable consequences of a certain action should therefore be more
efficient than warning for an unlikely though more dangerous event. Regarding tunnels, the relatively
low probability of dangerous accidents in them could be one of the causes of non-compliance with
traffic rules. On the other hand, perceived affordances of undesired behaviour should be reduced.
Publicized and enforced regulations could reduce the perceived likelihood of successful driving (e.g.
without penalties). According to Ayres et al. (1998) in some situations it is possible to reduce
perceived affordance by demonstrating personal short-term consequences or to focus directly on
behavioural change (e.g. by increasing the attractiveness of a desired behaviour with incentives).
Simply, risk communication campaigns are not enough, though they are much less expensive than
other measures. They are good for informing people about hazards, but only in combination with
enforcement and other measures they could change drivers behaviour toward greater safety.
5.3.2 Clear speed limits, trajectory control
If single cars exceed the speed limit, the harmonious flow of traffic is disturbed and the drivers
endanger themselves, their passengers and other road users. The consequences are too small safety
margins and other potential risks. In order to overcome this problem, the speed limits should be
indicated at a sufficient distance before the tunnel, and speed limits should be adjusted to the lay-out
of the tunnel and not standard the same as the open road before. Trajectory control would be advisable
in case of extreme speeds. With trajectory control, speed is not only measured at a single location, but
rather over the entire tunnel stretch. An example of trajectory control in a tunnel is for example Liege
in Belgium. In order to have a better effect, it is wise to indicate that there is trajectory control.
Speed control and trajectory control are primarily needed in case that there is an expectation of a high
occurrence of speed exceedance, not necessarily in all tunnels.
5.3.3 Gradual transitions to tunnel
Older, anxious and less experienced road users are inclined to reduce the driving speed under the
officially allowed speed when entering the tunnel (due to the lateral narrowing caused by the tunnel
1
There is evidence that the optimism bias is due more to pessimism about others than to optimism about self when risk
judgments are compared with objective risks (after Ayres et al., 1998).
Gibson (1979) suggested that we perceive objects or features of our environment in terms of affordances, or the uses to
which they can be put. The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes,
either for good or ill.
47
wall and the dark tunnel entrance). This is definitely a misconduct and leads to non-acceptance,
reduction in safety and possibly even to aggression with other road users. It endangers the safety
margin and it makes it nearly impossible (or sometimes even dangerous) to overtake them.
In order to overcome this, several things can be done. The first thing is to use a gradual transition from
the open road to the tunnel. This means that in case that there is no emergency lane inside the tunnel, it
is better not to remove the emergency lane close to the start of the tunnel wall, but to do this some
hundreds of meters earlier. This provides drivers time to adjust their speed to the new situation. Also,
people tend to change their lateral position in case of less lateral space, so they move somewhat more
to the centre. By gradually removing the emergency lane, and by slowly introducing the tunnel wall,
the effects on driving behaviour are limited and if effects are present, they are more gradual.
5.3.4 Tunnel lighting
Road users need to perceive all relevant visual information from a sufficient distance in order to
anticipate the driving situation in time. When entering a tunnel, a possible reduction in ambient
luminance may cause problems in perceiving crucial visual information inside the tunnel. Due to this
limited perception, crucial information may be missed resulting to dangerous situations. The eye
adaptation process and the quantity of straylights which limits the visual perception of obstacles
inside a tunnel are the two main factors that influence the drivers behaviour when entering tunnels.
A slow eye adaptation process occurs when the luminance levels are low. The eyes need some time to
get adjusted to this lower luminance level and in this time period only objects with a luminance not far
below the adaptation level outside the tunnel can be perceived. In extreme cases this decrease in
luminance can be so large and sudden that for some time nothing can be perceived at all (Schreuder,
1964) [33]. This phenomenon is more intense when entering long tunnels, since then the luminance
level is generally lower than outside and there is no extra light from the other end (exit) of the tunnel.
The overall situation is possible to lead to serious problems if there is other traffic or an obstacle in
front of the driver, which cannot be detected due to this delay in the adaptation process.
The reduced perception of the driver results in an increased uncertainty of what to expect when
entering the tunnel. Contrary to the small number of experimental studies on the effect of lighting in
tunnels, a lot of practical experience has been gathered through the years. Several commissions were
established in order to integrate knowledge and come to general practical guidelines (CIE, 1990) [26] ,
(Schreuder, 1996) [34]. These reports can help designers when choosing appropriate luminance levels
for specific tunnels, since these guidelines take all kinds of variables such as traffic intensity and road
category into account. Counterbeam lighting, often used in Dutch tunnels, is always mentioned as an
effective measure to overcome dark tunnel entrances. Also, decreasing the luminance in front of the
tunnel (by special screens or trees) also helps the transition from bright to dark. At night time, the
luminance at the entrance can be lower than during daylight conditions.
5.3.5 VMS
People have a reason to be at a certain place and time. An individual, for example, who has driven into
a road tunnel, is determined to come out on the other side. This behaviour can be critical in crisis
situations if drivers continue to enter the tunnel or try to pass an incident in order to drive out at the
other end (as was originally planned). VMSs can help in two ways. On the one hand they can provide
(by means of green arrows) that the situation is safe, so people know that it is safe to enter the tunnel
(avoiding reduction of speed or hesitations). On the other hand, VMS can be used to reduce speed (in
case of an upcoming traffic jam), close a lane and can even be used for extra information
(argumentation sign).
48
Visual alert messages and announcements need to be authoritative, straightforward and intuitive. In
this we can talk about a lot of different measures. On the one hand this could be visual measures like
traffic signalling not allowing you to enter the tunnel (e.g. red crosses above the lanes), but also all
sorts of pictograms. When using variable message signs in road tunnels it is advisable to design
pictograms so as to be in a position to convey the fire warning to all passengers no matter what their
nationality is. This also goes for hints regarding closed tunnels and traffic jams as a consequence of
fires which should be given early enough before the tunnel entrances using pictograms that are
harmonized on European level.
Sometimes, for specific tunnels specific safety measures may be required. In the 6.6 km long
Westerscheldetunnel in the Netherlands, specific measures were required in case of a calamity in one
of the tunnel tubes. The tunnel consists of two separate tubes with each two different traffic lanes. Due
to financial constraints a separate evacuation tube for pedestrians will not be built. In order to allow
evacuation of road users to the other tunnel tube, transverse connections have been built between the
two tubes. Since the cross-section of a tube does not allow any toom for an emergency lane or a
pedestrian lane along the side of the road, car drivers escaping on foot from the unsafe tube will enter
the road in the safe tunnel tube. Conflicts between moving traffic and escaping car drivers can result in
another unsafe situation. In order to minimise this unsafety, some safety measures were evaluated
(Martens, Koster and Lourens, 1998) [31], namely moving all traffic to the right lane and preparing
the traffic for pedestrians or bringing all traffic to a complete stop. It turned out that it was not possible
to stop people by means of warnings (stop, accident and read lights). It was very well possible to
divert people from the lane, and using a variable message sign with an indication of running pedestrian
prepared road users for pedestrians inside the tunnel. Also, the driving speed was reduced on the right
driving lane (although people did not reduce their speed to 30 km/h as was indicated on the signs).
This has been installed in the Westerscheldetunnel. An example is given in Figure 2 (people first see
sign a, then b and then c).
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig 2. The warning signs as installed in the Westerscheldetunnel (only used for emergency situations).
5.3.6 Traffic lights and barriers

Only using traffic lights to close a tunnel causes problems. One reason is that on motorways red light
is not expected in particular. Therefore the red light before the tunnel is simply not noticed and
following drivers continue to enter the tunnel. This is also shown in various movies and films taped in
real tunnel entrances.
The problem of missing the red light, recognition and observance in Austria is governed by the
ASFINAG already since the year 2001. In the context of a working group consisting of tunnel experts
of the ministry of transport, ASFINAG, traffic planners and traffic psychologist from the board of
trustees for road safety (KfV), a package of measures has been tied. The result was incorporated into
the ASFINAG guideline "design guideline of tunnel before-portal ranges". This guideline is already
converted Austria far in the course of the modernization of existing tunnel as well as tunnel new
buildings.
49
As primary object to the approach of the tunnel the notice of the red light as well as the acceptance of
the red light of traffic signalling was identified within the range of the tunnel portal. It has been seen
that drivers continue to enter a tunnel even though the red light is on. The effect of a signalling and/or
an advance notice is best if it only sends a strong signal to the driver if necessary, this means, if there
is something unexpected. The announcement has to be repeated because of securing the message. To
assure that the red light will be observed it is necessary to bring the reason for the red light in form of
information to the driver.
The advance notice of the traffic light signalling devices takes place once at 1000 m before the first
traffic light and once more 250 - 400 m before the first traffic light. The advance notice is equipped
with two yellow signal lights which switch, in the case of traffic light is another than green, to
pulsating yellow/green light.
A traffic light signalling device is attached before each tunnel in two different distances (rd. 200 m
before the portal and secondly RD. 15 - 40 m before the portal) in particularly bright and large
execution (LED execution, diameter 300 mm).
On the same level as the portal traffic light (15 - 40 m before the tunnel) an electronic, freely
programmable LED information board with a size of 3 x 1 m is directly attached over the roadway. In
succession the road user is informed by the tunnel control room about the reason for restriction of
traffic in the tunnel in the form of text modules already pre-programmed. As an example the
announcements: "special shipment", "breakdown in the tunnel", "ghost drivers", "accident" is
mentioned.
Also, physical barriers should be put in front of the tunnel in order to physically stop people from
entering the tunnel.
5.3.7 Information leaflets
Since within the EU it was also felt that road users did not have enough knowledge about how to
behave in tunnels in case of an emergency, the EU leaflet (best behaviour in tunnels) was developed.
Here, an example of its content is provided (see Figure 3) (although there are plans within PIARC to
change its content).
In the education and training of truck and car drivers, the specific situation arising in break-downs,
traffic jams, accidents and fires in tunnels should be dealt with particularly, and the correct behaviour
for tunnel users should be pointed out.
50
Fig 3. The EU tunnel leaflet.
51
The EU leaflet is not too widespread throughout European countries, although it is available through
some firms and initiatives.
Of course, just handing out these leaflets does not mean that people can effectively use this
information. In a TNO driving simulator experiment (done for UPTUN), the effectiveness of this
folder was tested. The study showed that only about 60% of the drivers switch off the engine
spontaneously, after reading the leaflet this increases to 70% (only with the help of the operator this
number rises to 100%). Also, time passing after coming to a stop was longer if people did not read the
leaflet and were shortest if people heard the operator voice. Not too many people use the radio to get
additional information, not even after reading the leaflet. The most crucial action, that is getting out of
the vehicle (or stating one would), is highly affected by the statement of the operator. Whereas 65%
of the people indicate they would want or try to leave the vehicle, with 75% of the people who read
the leaflet, this number increases to 94% after the operator announcement. So reading the leaflet
already improves the situation somewhat compared to not getting any additional information.
However, with the help of an operator'
s voice, performance improves even more. This leads to more
people doing the right thing, but also to getting into action more quickly.
Some people specifically mentioned that they planned to walk back to the entrance of the tunnel
instead of using the emergency doors, which they were required to do, especially people without any
additional information. Since all subjects already drove the tunnel 3 times before and had a chance to
see the exits inside the tunnel on ride 4 as well, apparently some people still want to use the tunnel
entry as an exit. In the last group, in which it is specifically mentioned by the operator, no-one
mentioned this. This indicates that it is indeed a matter of receiving the appropriate information. Also,
the use of radio information is difficult, even though some people specifically mentioned that they
knew they had to use the radio for specific messages, they forgot what frequency (a specific frequency
is mentioned in the leaflet). So in case there would be a radio message, it should be broadcasted via all
radio channels.
What remains an important area is that quite some people indicate they do not have an idea of how to
handle in the given situation (even in the condition with leaflet and operator). This means that there is
a lot of uncertainty in the case of accidents or incidents in tunnels, and even though there is an
operator voice, even though people read the leaflet, there is still uncertainty how to behave. Keeping
this in mind, it would be wise to add via the emergency exits to the announcement leave the tunnel.
This is something we have to be aware of in the near future: even though designers may think that all
information needed is there, this may not be enough for the road users. Information provided needs to
be over-complete, with if possible a repetition of the messages. Also, people with visible official status
should be sent inside the tunnel in order to help people make the right decisions. Also, as was also
discussed in the PIARC committee, we need to have people with an exemplary behavioural function,
for instance professional drivers. Since these people drive tunnels more often than the average driver,
their behaviour might influence other road users to do the same.
In order to promote the correct behaviour in road traffic tunnels, information campaigns on behaviour
in cases of break-downs (most common event in road tunnels), traffic jams, accidents and fire in
tunnels should be implemented.
If a burning vehicle is detected early and the burning develops slowly (as often is the case with a
burning car), the fire often can be extinguished by means of the fire extinguishers available in the
tunnel. A study prepared by PIARC showed for example that in France, about 40% of all fires
occurring in tunnels could be extinguished by that way, an intervention of the fire brigade was not
necessary.
Using the fire extinguishers that existed in the tunnels immediately leads to a fire alarm for the tunnel
at the moment when the extinguisher is taken away from its rack. Moreover, this also displays to the
monitoring station exactly where the fire occurs in the tunnel. The learners should be explained this
52
fire detector function of the fire extinguishers during their training in the driving schools, so that they
use purposeful the fire extinguishers of the emergency station in the tunnel in the case a fire originates
at their vehicle. If in the case of vehicles transporting dangerous goods the fire has already seized the
loading, the drivers presently are not allowed to intervene any more. Therefore, in these case of fires, it
is absolutely essential that a fire is reported by the drivers as soon as possible indicating the kind and
quantity of the dangerous good. This is the only way for the fire brigade to prepare precisely and from
the very beginning the appropriate fire extinguishing and rescue measures that are specifically
designed for this kind of dangerous goods.
In Germany, leaflet and a brochure (Fig. 4-6) were produced disseminated by the Federal Ministry of
Transport, Housing and Building. The leaflet was produced in 2002, the brochure is quite new, dated
August 2004. It does not only contain advice related to the behaviour in tunnels in case of fire, but also
very useful information regarding the equipment and engineering of tunnels. The recommendations are
more or less the same as in the EU leaflet, since the EU leaflet is based on the German one.
Fig. 4 Information from Federal Ministry of Transport, Housing and Building.
53
Fig. 5
54
Fig 6.
5.3.8 Operator voice message

In the preliminary phase of a fire, peoples behaviour is characterised by insecurity, misinterpretations,
indecisiveness, while they search for information that can confirm the crisis situation (Paulsen, 1991).
People do not interpret ambiguous information well. There is also an issue, whether people decide to
leave their cars depending on its value or other valuable belongings in it.
In his evacuation study, Boer (2002) [21] had people evacuate in a real tunnel under experimental
conditions. Two operator announcements were made. The first, issued after approximately 5 minutes,
was always the same, explosion hazard. After another two minutes the second announcement was
leave the tunnel or leave the tunnel via the emergency exits".
In most tests, the tunnel was already deserted when the second announcement came, but in Test 6,
there were still people present during the second announcement. Perhaps they failed to hear the first
announcement. We refrain from drawing any conclusion about the effect of the second
announcement. In his study, Boer claimed that considering that the first announcement was already
effective, the addition "via the emergency exits" was probably not required.
From the TNO driving simulator study it was found that the operator voice (two messages: please
switch off the engine, I repeat switch off the engine, and later: Please go to the emergency exits, I
repeat go to the emergency exits) helped people in taking action. However, even with the
announcement, there was 1 person who did not evacuate (although all persons did switch off the
engine). He claimed that he did not want to panic and thought it was wiser to just wait for what else
would be happening. This means that even an operator voice is not enough. The positive thing is that
people responded faster and more people responded (compared to without the operator voice).
55
In the case a fire breaks out, instructions in several languages such as requests to escape immediately
from the tunnel or to prevent more vehicles from entering into the tunnel, should be foreseen via the
public broadcast system. The use of pictograms indicating instructions are also recommended.
In the case of rail or subway tunnels, vehicles need to be equipped with facilities for a voice
communication between the train conductor and an operating unit. Emergency information needs to be
transmitted priority-based.
The passengers shall be informed at the stations and inside the trains about operational disturbances
that might take a longer time to be put in order. Passengers have to be especially informed about
substitute transportation or redirections.
From the UPTUN driving simulator study it was shown that even though some people understand that
they have to handle, they do not know what is going on. This may also leas to inefficient behaviour.
Also one person in that study specifically mentioned that he wondered if he was supposed to
extinguish the fire or not. Data from real accidents state that people stay in their cars as long as they do
not realise the threat of a real fire (MontBlanc and Tauern)
From the UPTUN project it is shown that without any prior information, only 60% of the drivers turns
off the engine after coming to a complete stop for minutes in a tunnel. With extra information (reading
the EU leaflet) this increases to 70% and to even 100% if the operator tells them to do so. This already
indicates that people need extra guidance in extra-ordinary situations.
It is recommended that an operator voice message is pre-recorded so that the operator does not have to
think about what to say, and it sounds like a strict and sound voice (if it were real life it could be that
people would hear stress in the operator voice).
The operator voice will not avoid all specific behaviour found in tunnels. There is some behaviour that
is found at accidents such as turning inside a tunnel or driving backwards in case of fires. Although
this is anecdotal, it has been reported at various tunnel sites. One of the examples of a driving turning
inside a two-directional tunnel was taped on video. Video-images are shown in Figure 2.
56
Fig 2.
What was on the mind of a driver trying to turn around his car in a tunnel with one way traffic. This
dangerous and prohibited behaviour is caused either by limited awareness of risk or prevailing influence
of some other motives. This time due to circumstances and kind behaviour of truck driver everything
ended happily. But cameras in tunnels registered a number of dangerous behaviours. (Source:
www.dars.si)
Although it is also stated in the EU leaflet that one should never try to turn around inside a tunnel, this
behaviour is shown in real life. People tend to turn around in case of a smoke development if the
visibility is less than 10 meters inside the tunnel. However, these values (10 meters) have been argued
by experts.
In general this type of behaviour is more likely to be expected in a tunnel with 2-way traffic. In case of
an accident in a one-directional tunnel, the traffic lanes will be blocked and there is no room to turn
around. However in this case some people tend to back up and drive backwards out of the tunnel.
Again, this is only possible in case there is no other traffic blocking the lanes.
5.3.9 Remote supervision of emergency niche door
The analysis of data reflect that the emergency call cab is often frequented but no emergency call had
been set off (e.g. because of fear of a language barrier). A remote supervision of the emergency niche
door may be a remedy. An automatic program should activate a rescue procedure after opening the
niches door.
5.3.10 Assistance after accident
In accidents help is often rendered after a long time. Many tunnel users try to do their best to get
through the accident scene without activating a direct rescue procedure as well as to contact the tunnel
control center, and safeguarding opposite the victims.
In case of fire development the manual fire alarms outside the emergency niches (standard in Austria)
are not used properly. Furthermore delete attempts with fire extinguishers existing in the sectors of the
emergency cabins are often omitted. Immediately informing the control centre in the first phase of fire
development and following instructions can prevent worse situations.
57
Even though it is commonly understood in the tunnel world that people who leave their
vehicle should always leave it unlocked, it is not something that is known to the public. In
the evacuation project of Boer it was found that some people lock the car and some do not,
basically showing that there is no clear idea on how to leave the vehicle. That people did not
now know to lock it or not was also mentioned in the questionnaire of the TNO driving
simulator study. Experiments from Boer (2002) [21]show that some time is lost after people leave
the vehicle (with some people taking immediate action but then stay hanging around on the road.
Some others go directly to the emergency exit but then when they get there they lose time hanging
around in the emergency exits. There are even some people that go to the exits and then come back
(to lock the car, to see what is going on, just like they wonder if they did not overreact). Some
difference in behaviour between women and men has been pointed out as well, especially in fire
conditions (Steyvers et al., 1999) [35]. Womens first reaction is usually to warn the other people and
they try to get out helping their relatives. However, they will not proceed to any actions for reducing
the risk, for example to start putting out the fire. Men are more willing to return to the fire area, more
so during the day than the night, more with than without smoke, and more with than without
experience. Also, old people are more willing to take part in the fire extinguishing process than
younger people. However this is actually a process that you want to avoid for heavy fires. It is very
hard to extinguish a car fire (even a small one) since normally it is under the hood (you never reach
the source) and if you open the hood this is very dangerous since you add oxygen to the fire. It may
also not be a wise idea for people to go back to the fire scene in order to put out the fire or to help
others. This should be only done by well trained firemen. People, who have come out of the fire area
safely and who are willing to return to the danger zone to help other people mostly will use routes
familiar to them. Only few will use routes that are unfamiliar to them.
This could be avoided by having tunnel authorities present in the tunnel, instructing people
what to do. Since in most cases users are likely to miss significant parts of the initial announcements,
it is important to provide this guidance in addition to the operator voice. Proulx et al (1999) [32]cite a
building evacuation exercise where 72% of the occupants failed to recall the contents of the
announcements.
Another factor that may prevent people from responding is fear. In the TNO driving simulator study,
some people said that they did not take any action since they did not want to panic. They basically
decided to remain inactive in order to remain quite. Actually this is a type of behaviour that works
against you: the fear results from the feeling that something bad is going on, but then you try to fight
this fear by not doing anything.
Also, if people realise the danger too late, the smoke may already have surrounded the vehicle (as was
the case for the UPTUN driving simulator experiment). It happened that only closed the windows to
keep the smoke outside. Only when the smoke thickened and people started to realise that something
serious was going on, they could not see anymore where to go (because of the smoke) or they were too
afraid that the smoke is toxic so they stayed in the vehicle. This means that proper guidance and more
than one information channel is extremely important.
Authoritative guidance is imperative in the evacuation phase of an event. Reinforcing the perceived
need of users (drivers and passengers) to respond requires that guidance come at least from two
independent corroborating sources, i.e. a public address and uniformed employee taking control. It is
suggested that repetitive announcements be made, also in other languages to reach passengers from
other nations. Also, the people providing the guidance should be clearly identifiable as authorities,
should be recognizable (all the same jackets) and they should receive sufficient training for doing their
job.
58
5.3.11 System guidance to emergency escape routes

Normally, when driving through a tunnel, people do not pay attention to emergency facilities. In case
of a large accident, people may not know that there are emergency exits. Secondly, people do not
notice the emergency exits in dense smoke, which was observed in the evacuation studies in dense
smoke by Boer. Even when they put their hands on the wall they may just walk across an exit. This
was seen in the evacuation studies.
Even though there are (although not in all) emergency rescue exits or emergency lay-bys available to
bring people into safety, people tend to go for that which is safe. From real life observations it is
known that if people can see the entrance, they just walk backwards. In the UPTUN TNO driving
simulator study, some people also claimed to walk back to the tunnel entrance. This is strange in a
sense since people had driven the tunnel 3 times before so they would have been able to see that were
emergency doors available.
In another evacuation tunnel is was found that even though most people claim to go to the entrance
again, not everyone really does that when brought under smoke and evacuation conditions. Then
oftentimes emergency doors are also used.
Loudspeaker announcements in the tunnel itself may not be understood in the road tunnels because of
the traffic noise from moving traffic and the sound reflection occurring as a consequence. To the
contrary, the noise level in case of a traffic jam in the tunnel is lower and a better comprehensibility of
the announcements can be expected. In the same way, road users before the closed tunnel entrances
can also be informed via the loudspeakers on the reason for the closing of the tunnel.
Placing sound beacons as a form of auditory guidance should help people get to the emergency exits
(Boer & Withington, 2004) [24]. Sound beacons are developed in order to overcome the problem with
people passing the emergency exit in dense smoke. One of the early systems available was the
SoundAlert system. In some tests they showed that 90% of the users were able to find the exits with
the help of the sound beacons. However, the system is not really self-explaining since it has a rather
mechanical sound. Users need to have a proper instruction and the system only gets this effective after
people have had a demonstration (example of the sound) of the system. Another study showed that is
people did not get any instruction, the system is not helpful anymore and it may even scare people off
(it sounds like there might be a broken machine up there). A more self-explaining sound (some type of
bell after which a voice speaks: Exit here and then another bell) really improves the performance up to
over 90%. All subjects also exited at the nearest exit compared to 55% for the non-self-explaining
sound.
All tunnels, in which the natural radiowave propagation is insufficient, should be equipped with
specific communication technology. In particular tunnels of a length exceeding 600 m are to be
equipped with communication technology.
Loudspeaker systems are recommended in the tunnels themselves as well as also with message sign
systems before tunnel entrances or in separated cross cuts (for cases of evacuation).
In addition to sound beacons alone, a new system was developed for the UPTUN project specifically.
MRSL'
s research has been concerned principally with researching and developing a proof-of-concept
audio-visual evacuation support system, which has a number of innovative features, and which has
been designed to have a very low installation and maintenance cost overhead. This is entirely
consistent with the UPTUN programmes cardinal aims of providing feasible, high effectiveness
59
tunnel upgrading options with wide application potential. The system utilises a unique, contactless
method of providing electrical power and bi-directional data communications to a sequence of audiovisual beacons located at regular intervals throughout the tunnel. Each of the beacons behaves in a
fail-safe manner, responding to power loss or intentional initiation, with a capability of dynamic
direction assignment to individual or groups of wayfinding beacons. The system also, importantly,
includes provision to detect fires and monitor the critical build-up of heat and toxic combustion
products throughout the escape route. The system concepts have been successfully demonstrated, and
the next stage would involve further design refinement and subsequent commercial exploitation. The
related UPTUN programme task and deliverable are 3.2: Development of an Evacuation Support
System. A summary of MRSLs research programme activities within UPTUN is given in Annex 1.
The system exploits a unique,
distributed inductive power transfer
and signalling technique, to provide
a simple, low cost installation
potential with high operational
reliability.
Within any tunnel safety system design, there is a "cascade" of steps by importance:
Prevention of accidents
Mitigation of incident impacts
Provide a "fair chance" of escape
Facilitate rescue by third parties
MRSL'
s research objective has been to investigate and develop a proof-of-principle system to aid
guidance and evacuation through smoke, and hence provide at least a fair chance of self-escape. Any
evacuation support system must in this regard:
Significantly increase speed of egress.
Be useful in conditions of low visibility.
Present unambiguous directional information.
Make use of visual, audible and tactile cues.
Be intuitive, with no prior training or exposure expected.
Accommodate differences in layout, culture and language.
Possess high integrity, preferably fail-safe operation.
Not rely on tunnel lighting and power being present.
60
Further to the above requirements, the ability to initiate or reinforce the initial evacuation response
could be useful. Any tunnel evacuation support system is inevitably responding to low frequency,
high severity events and it must be assumed that:
All or most tunnel occupants will be naive, with a lack of emergency experience and preparedness.
Delays in emergency response and initiation of an evacuation could well be significant.
That this could impact on available residence time to evacuate before reaching critical toxicity and
thermal tolerance limits.
Within a developed fire situation, disorientation, panic and widely varying behaviour can be
anticipated.
On balance, it was considered that the future introduction of tunnel evacuation support systems, unless
prescribed by legislation, would very much depend on system standardisation, system effectiveness
and minimising costs of ownership. To this end, building in added-value functions, such as a fire
detection and environmental monitoring capability, was perceived to increase the likelihood of takeup. Hence a key decision was made that the MRSL system should support dual roles of wayfinding
and guidance support through smoke, together with providing a multipoint tunnel environmental
monitoring and fire detection capability. The system was also to be independently powered, easy to
install and maintain, of fail-safe design, and have low ownership cost.
The research has involved a wide-ranging review of behavioural, human factor and physiological
issues associated with evacuation. Much useful information and direction has been gained here
through dialogue with Workpackage members. A major area of review has involved orientation,
vision and guidance technologies, and assessing the relative value of various guidance methods. This
has included acoustic, visual and tactile methods, offering both continuous or discrete guidance aids.
The emphasis has been on optical wayfinding methods research, although in nil visibility, sound
localisation techniques are important. Other issues considered alongside the various guidance
methods have included costs and feasibility of retrofit, fitness for purpose, and anticipated occupant system behaviour.
Against the various wayfinding techniques assessed, the following observations and conclusions can
be made:
Walkways with passive life-line or handrails provide a low cost but effective fall-back
option.
Self-powered LED strip lighting has high cost implications and was discounted.
Illumination methods have a varying ability to meet normal (unobscured) conditions and
conditions of optical obscuration from smoke.
Distributed techniques such as electroluminescent conductors and optical fibre lighting are not
fail-safe, i.e. once the cable is broken, illumination is lost. They also have a limited smoke
penetration capability. Laser light visibility is also greatly affected by smoke.
BRE (UK) and other test data suggested that high intensity LED (light emitting diode) pictograms
could be useful. A large direction arrow was used in the MRSL prototype system. In the system
development stage, TNO work on arrow visibility was taken into account along with observations
from mining and other hazardous industries. The scope to use future ultra-high brightness LED
technology for increased smoke penetration and visibility was taken into account along with provision
of speech and other auditory signal support. The system incorporates an inbuilt dual-range CO sensor
for fire detection and subsequent irrespirable atmosphere exposure monitoring of tunnel occupants.
Precision temperature sensing was also incorporated to facilitate monitoring and assessment of the
local environment regarding heat exposure of rescuers and evacuating personnel.
61
Development of the highly innovative contactless, single-wire, inductive charging and telemetry
scheme involved a significant research overhead. However, this was justified by the major installation
and reliability benefits that would be gained by this approach. High standards of engineering design
have been used, including the use of dedicated, low power, RISC-based microprocessors and
reliability-centred software development techniques. These are considered essential to any safetycritical tunnel system. Equally, application flexibility has been accorded a high priority, and the
system software should accommodate variations in tunnel scale and design.
The specific design features of the system can be summarised as follows. Each beacon is
independently powered by an internal battery that is inductively charged from a line carrying a high
frequency current, which couples contactlessly through each unit. There are no direct connections,
each unit is isolated and significant cost and reliability benefits are anticipated from not having to use
multicore cables and multipole connectors in the system. The single charging line, which can be
kilometres in length, is also used to send and receive commands from individual units or groups of
beacons. This provides a real-time facility to monitor environmental conditions and call alerts at each
beacon, together with (potentially) a capacity to update direction information, responding to the
development of a fire. Each unit is fitted with a precision temperature sensor and a dual range carbon
monoxide (CO) sensor, providing an ability to detect fires and then subsequently monitor fire
situations throughout the tunnel or structure. The use of a high fire withstand, ceramic clad wire is
proposed for the charging line, which could in principle also provide tactile cues. The overall strategy
has been to reduce beacon cost and installation complexity so as to allow beacons to be relatively
closely spaced, and to provide a near continuous sequence of guidance cues, even where tunnel
refuges or intermediate exits are relatively widely spaced. The MRSL system could also in principle
provide an excellent platform to incorporate acoustic instruction and guidance information. With
further commercial development, this proof-of-concept system is considered to have application
potential across the generality of Europes road, railway and metro tunnels.
5.3.12 Automatic radio information
In the driving simulator study, only about 25% of the subjects tried to use the radio to get additional
information. Also after reading the EU leaflet about best behaviour in tunnels (that mentions the radio
as a source of information) this just increased to 33%. Somehow people are not aware of the
possibility that this is an information source and that there can be an up-to-date message about the
current situation. Again, even if this was mentioned in a leaflet they read just before doing the test,
they still did not use this. People (if they thought about the radio) also mentioned that they forgot the
radio station to tune to.
It might also be the case that people think that they could not receive any radio messages inside the
tunnel, and may therefore be reluctant to use the radio. If possible tunnel authorities should have the
possibility to break into peoples radios and CD-players to provide specific messages. This should be
interrupted at sufficiently loud sound level (if someone has the radio on low sound volume, the
message should be much louder) and the messages should be very short, strict and urgent, so there is
no room for misinterpretation (is this my tunnel or not?).
5.3.13 Use of an emergency lane inside the tunnel
This offers some more room for counteracting mistakes. In case there is an accident, people can use
this lane to get out of the way, and emergency rescue services may have an easy access to the fire or
accident location. Also a car with a breakdown situation will not increase the chances of accidents.
62
However the presence of an emergency lane could also be used by people to drive out backwards or to
turn inside the tunnel. If there is an emergency lane present is should always be made clear that there
is no driving backwards or turning under any conditions.
5.3.14 Design of emergency doors and exits
Emergency doors should be clearly visible and identifiable. Also, they should be appealing, for
instance by making them in green colors (like the emergency exit sign) and having them lit
appropriately. The color green also indicates safety.
People do not like to enter doors they do not know, which is always the case in emergency doors.
Behind doors there could be danger such as high tension or dangerous machinery. In a study dealing
with evacuation of ship interiors (Boer, 1998; Boer & Vredeveldt, 1999) [23], 15% of the people
walked passed a door that was clearly marked with an arrow and a fleeing person, despite quite
circumstances. An arrow across the floor was effective, since then only 5% of the people walked
passed the door. In tunnels it could be recommended to use such an arrow on the floor, pointing to the
centre of the door and having a length of about 1 meter. A very good description of recommendations
for signing, design and lighting of emergency doors is provided in Boer & Varkevisser (2002) [22].
5.3.15 Camera surveillance
One of the measures that has been taken in most higher priority tunnels is camera monitoring. Even
though this is not a measure fighting wrong behaviour as such, it provides the opportunity to detect
wrong behaviour and hopefully take the appropriate action.
In the Lincoln tunnel near Manhattan, they are currently investigating the feasibility of a new traffic
metering system for the merge points. This system uses traffic signals to control the flow of merging
buses. Traffic metering can increase traffic flow and reduce delays. This is a step before fighting
wrong behaviour that is still worth mentioning, since it may prevent congestion in tunnels and possible
accidents. Currently they are also installing electronic readers at various locations to help monitor bus
movements and more accurately identify breakdowns and travel time, allowing them to make more
informed routing decisions for these busses. They also plan an Intelligent Transportation System for
the Lincoln Tunnel that will integrate traffic management functions and automate activities such as
incident detection, customer information and inter-agency coordination. Such approaches will help
manage the XBL as reliably and efficiently as possible.
It is of extreme importance that the tunnels have a smooth traffic flow rate and the mechanisms to
quickly respond to any emergency events. In some tunnels this is achieved partly through an
information system that automatically collects traffic data such and speed and density of traffic. This
information is relayed to a safety and control office to allow quick and effective control of vehicles
entering, inside and exiting the tunnel. Some tunnels also feature cameras for the instantaneous
detection of non-moving vehicles to supplement the fire alarms, air quality detectors and other traffic
management systems that usually determine incidents and intervention response.
The interaction of traffic control plants and tunnel control equipment are of particular importance.
During the conceptual design it has to made certain, that in the case of event, the tunnel possesses
highest priority and that the essential information , e.g. the tunnel closure, without time delay by a far
away traffic management center, are converted on location through the local tunnel control equipment.
63
The ASFINAG has an Austria-wide redundant transmission network on SDH basis which connect the
control centers with the individual tunnel systems. Audio communication, data and video traffic are
transported in real time about this system about far distances.
Within the individual tunnel systems there exist two from each other completely independent GigabitEthernet-rings which process the complete Backbonetraffic. Depending on the size of the individual
tunnel systems Sub Etnernet rings with 100Mbit are subordinated under the Backbone, in particular
for emergency calls, which represent the ACCESS level. Due to the coupling of the Subrings at both
sides a high availability up to applications is given in each case.
As transport-laminated for applications excluding IP with UDP and TCP uses. Applications on the
tunnel IP net are:
1) Field bus systems which handle the communication over minutes IEC60870-104 among
themselves and to the superordinate instrumentation servers
2) Videosystems
3) Emergency call systems, which are following the emergency call protocol Standard, published
from the ASFINAG, named SIPa. SIPa is based on the international open Standard SIP,
developed from the Internet Task Force Organisation (IETF). It allows to transport tunnel
Information data and voice about one Protocol and about one Hardware - this reduce hardware
and costs in the tunnel.
4) The communication on control technology level between the field bus systems and the control
technology servers as well as control applications which access on the control technology
servers. When maintenance in an individual tunnel takes place the use of Wireless Lan for
wireless access via service notebooks on the individual systems is possible.
5) Other Applications
All mechanisms of the IP net infrastructure are able to handle over the central management systems
and can set off in the case of an error Traps via SNMP to a superordinate alarm management.
As mechanisms of the IP net infrastructure Layer-2 and Layer-3 Switches are used as well as router.
The ASFINAG had published a lot of Standards in communication technology for motorway
Applications. This is a very important Part for the future to guarantee the safety in tunnel systems and
degrees the complexity of the systems.
5.3.16 Communication between Rescue Units and Subway Operators
In Berlin, the fire-fighters or the police can latch into the radio antennae system of the BVG. By doing
so, they can communicate practically in an independent way, since several frequencies are assigned to
the BVG private mobile radio, for police and the fire-fighters. Inside the tunnel, the communication is
handled via the BVG slot antenna. This system produced good results. However, a new digital radio
communication system is being planned. Some tests have already been carried out.
The Hamburg, the elevated railway ("Hochbahn") also disposes of radio communication opportunities
of its own within the tunnel. Here, initially no voice communication opportunities with the rescue
workers, the police and the fire-fighters were foreseen. About 1 years ago, the BOS channel was
introduced using the IGNIS system. This channel allows a communication between all parties among
one another, this is rescue workers, fire fighters and elevated railway. Although the radio coverage is
64
intensely controlled again and again, radio deadspots are still detected from time to time. That was the
case for example during rescue exercises in 1999 when the rescue forces in the station and at the
emergency exit were unable to communicate. This also relates to the fact that the BOS channel does
no longer come up to present-day needs. As yet, the German Federal States have not yet taken any
decision as to what frequency is to be allotted to the digital BOS channel in future within Germany nor
on a European level. For the time being, there is no chance to carry out modernisations, since the
technical specifications for the future BOS-Funk are not yet cleared. There is no discussion however
on the fact that in future there still needs to be a joint radio channel.
In Hanover, the discussion on future digital or analogue radio systems hampers a fast improvement of
the radio systems of STRA. Radio communication during rescue measures for example will always
be handled via STRA walkie-talkies, as is the case for Berlin.
In Stuttgart, problems were detected regarding the radio coverage or, respectively, the "BOS-Funk".
Here, too, there is a need to clarify regarding the future radio systems. Moreover, there is a big need
for action regarding the improvement of radio supply.
5.3.17 Use of mobile phone
In the UPTUN driving simulator study, some people indicated they would use their phone to call 112
(emergency alarm service). However the idea of emergency phones in tunnels is that if some-one uses
that phone, immediate localisation is possible. It might be that people are not aware of this
information, but even if they were they might prefer staying in their own car. This makes it hard for
the person from the general emergency alarm service (not tunnel specific) to understand exactly where
people are and what is going on. The phones would have led to immediate contact with the operator of
that tunnel. This may also not be known to the public.
In Hamburg, mobile phones are not regarded as an appropriate tool for the information transfer such as
among rescue forces working with one another. It is much more an additional opportunity for the
passengers to call the attention of the public transport employees to the situation. In the future, the
mobile phone will certainly not replace the safety broadcast channel, even if the tunnel is covered in
terms of radio communication.
Compared to this, the situation in Hanover is somewhat different. With the exception of the firefighters, all of the safety forces have been equipped with mobile phones. This is how it also comes to a
relief of the private mobile radio of the STRA (Public Transport System of the City of Hanover),
which before was much used up to capacity, since it was used both by the fire-fighters as well as the
employees.
As a result of other experiences made, relying exclusively on the mobile phone for rescue measures
seems to be no good advice. So, for example, in the field of road construction in connection with the
installation of telephones along German federal motorways, people assumed that installing telephones
could be abandoned in the medium term. Now there are new findings available saying that in big
traffic jams for example, the mobile networks broke down within seconds, since many conductors
used their mobile phones at the same time. And they used their mobiles not primarily for assistance
reasons but in order to change appointments. It is for this reason that a separate high-capacity safety
radio systems and more powerful networks have to be set up.
Telephone companies are providing coverage for Cellular (Mobile) Telephones within existing and
new tunnels. At many locations the same or separate leaky coaxial antenna cables or antennas are
65
being used to provide two-way and one-way communication for the cellular, AM/FM Radio
Rebroadcast and Two-Way Radio Communication Systems. Fixed signage installed outside or inside
the tunnel indicating telephone numbers for reporting incidents are increasing the use of cellular
telephones as a manual incident detection system. Some countries automatically direct all telephone
emergency calls to the designated Emergency Control Center to minimize the burden at the Control
Centers that are responsible for the day-to-day operations of the tunnel. [10]
5.3.18 Rescue Concepts for Public Tramway Transport
The demands brought forward by BOStrab (Regulations regarding tramway engineering and
operation) as regards leaving the vehicle in a safe way are as follows:
-
36, section 9
In passenger trains, there need to be installations by means of which the passengers are able to
initiate an emergency braking procedure. On tracks without a safety space and in tunnels, using
these installations outside stations must lead to an emergency stop only at the next station.
43, section 6
Doors must be kept closed. In emergency cases, however, passengers must be in a position to
open them.
In this context, the following questions were discussed:

How is the situation in subterranean local public transport to be assessed regarding concepts of
enabling the passengers to save themselves or of being saved by rescue forces? Are there
special previsions to be taken for disabled persons?
The results of the discussion showed that many cities already embarked on developing detailed action
plans for emergency cases. An action plan for the fire department, a joint action plan and joint fire
alarm drills are also of supreme importance. In Hamburg, the fire department may also use vehicles
which allow to carry out genuine fire exercises. The rescue plans and action plans for the specific
stations are being elaborated in cooperation with the fire department. In order to guarantee a quick
access to the stations, a big portion of the newly built stations are equipped with a safe for fire
department purposes, older stations are retrofitted. The fire-fighters can open these safes by key, see
from the fire detector panel where the fire is burning and pick up the keys necessary for the access to
the scene of the fire. The intensive co-operation and joint exercises with the fire department are a key
factor for an efficient and successful fire protection concept.
The rescue concept of public transport is such that the bridging of the emergency braking avoids a
forced stop of the trains in the tunnel sections between two stops. The burning vehicle is driven into
the next station. This requires only a few minutes since the distances between the stations are small.
As a rule, there is a sufficient number of emergency escape routes which are of a sufficient size to
allow also several hundred persons to escape from fully occupied trains within short time out of the
station and into fresh air.
66
The overall rescue concept of public transport is devised in two steps:

(1)
Self-saving concept
Until the fire-fighters arrive, the passengers and staff rely on themselves for their own rescue. Public
transport intents at that stage to have the burning train enter the next station. There, the passengers can
leave the train in good lighting and visibility conditions. Then they can proceed with their escape out
of the tunnels into fresh air through the staircases.
In case the vehicles remain unmanoeuvrable in the tunnel, the conductors are asked to organise the
escape in an orderly way. In subways, part of this job is also activating the device to produce a short
circuit with which all trains are fitted in order to render the power conductor without energy. In the
case of vehicles operating in city railway and subway traffic, the conductors have to call the central
control centre via radio communication to arrange for the deactivation of the electricity feeding.
Through the deactivation of the electricity feeding, the emergency lighting activates itself and provides
for a better orientation while escaping. The behaviour in that kind of situations as well as the relevant
sequence of action in cases where the passengers and staff have to save themselves, are part of the
training which the conductors receive from their employers.
(2)
Saving persons through others, i.e. rescue forces etc.
The measures necessary for saving persons through others, i.e. rescue forces etc., need to be well
coordinated between public transport operators and the rescue organisations. This requires detailed
action and alarm plans of the institutions concerned. Moreover, joint section patrols (fire inspections)
have to be carried out as well as emergency exercises, in order to have the mutual opportunities and
procedures known and synchronised in cases when third persons are needed for rescue operations in
tunnels.
In North Rhine-Westphalia, for these cases the Law on Fire Protection and Assistance after Accident
which became effective in 1998, has to be considered. This law stipulates that fire inspections are
compulsory. Defects detected during these fire inspections need to be settled immediately.
The Riksvei 4-Nitedal tunnel (Norway) is equipped with a redundant ring of industrial Ethernet
switches. The Ethernet ring has a total length of over 5km and is used as the communications medium
to control the ventilation, illumination, traffic control signs and emergency telephones.
The control station is based at the road traffic central unit in Oslo. The system comprises 11 remote
I/O cabinets, four programmable logic stations and 15 video cameras.
The communications backbone is 100Mbps Ethernet in a redundant ring. Single-mode fibre is installed
to ensure that the network to handle the amount of data transmitted and also to future-proof the
installation as technology advances.
Ethernet has many advantages over traditional field buses; the primary advantage relates to the vastly
enhanced data throughput. This enables extensive use of video cameras in conjunction with the more
common control equipment, all connected to the backbone ring through Ethernet ring switches.
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Throughput can be further enhanced by implementing QoS (Quality of Service). This gains bandwidth
by prioritising data into different queues; up to eight different levels of priority are available in
OnTime switches used in the installation. This contrasts with the more common low and high priority.
These switching features work in unison with switch criteria such as learning; where the unit learns
each destination and source address for each packet.
The connection between each switch is by single mode fibre configured to form a ring. The main
feature of the ring is the ability of the system to detect a fibre or link failure and re-route data in the
opposite direction. This process takes 30ms, a virtually seamless process that ensures important
signals will not be lost. In this application, 18 ring switches automatically handle this aspect of critical
network service. The ability of the network to monitor, detect and recover from this type of network
failure rapidly is a major benefit to any communications infra-structure. However, if failures do occur,
operators and engineers have to be made aware of their occurrence despite the network covering up
the immediate effects of network breakage. Use of SNMP enables pro-and re-active network fault
analysis. Network function data can be linked to a SCADA system thus enabling graphical
representation of a network that operators can understand the problem regardless of network
knowledge or training.
The use of video is increasing in traffic control and surveillance systems demanding increased network
activity. Increased bandwidth should not necessarily cause concern if the network configuration is
correctly engineered. As discussed, packet priorisation can assist network throughput.
In addition, Multicast techniques can also diminish overall network load. Multicast is when data is
sent out to multiple devices on a network by a host. This can be referred to as one-to many or manyto-many. Network bandwidth can be kept to a minimum as data is routed to unique devices rather than
broadcast to all devices. To enhance networks further the Internet Group Management Protocol
(IGMP) can be used.
OnTime switches can act as IGMP servers. In principle, when a video camera has traffic for a
destination, '
join'information is sent to switches containing relevant addresses. The switches then
direct traffic to the required ports using multicast filtering. Therefore, the total traffic amount is kept to
a minimum. Finally, when a camera or device has finished sending video, a '
leave'message is sent to
the required switches so data is not sent to redundant devices.
Apart from the requirement for a fast fail-over, the industrial switches supplied for the project were
specified from -40 to +70C operational temperature range. The power consumption also had to be
compatible with an UPS system.
5.3.19 Height detection systems

In most tunnels in the Netherlands (e.g. Coentunnel near Amsterdam), a height detection system is
used. At a sufficient distance before the tunnel, a height detection system checks truck. If the truck is
found to be too large, the truck driver is stopped by the tunnel operator and asked to leave the
motorway at the next exit in order to avoid the truck from getting stuck. The operator center gets in
automatic alarms and need to respond by direct voice contact with the truck driver.
To increase the tunnel security the implementation of height detection systems can be advised. On the
one hand the damage of the tunnel and/or in particular the tunnel mechanism is avoided (lighting and
ventilation), and on the other hand it prevents the event that load is stripped off by the truck and
endangers following traffic.
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With the rising traffic intensity and number of lanes the problem with monitoring and filtering the
over-high vehicles rises. In Austria HDS exist in optical form in the access area of the tunnels. The
height control takes place in sufficient distance to a parking area (about 250 m). There an electronic
information board is alternating signing: "extent limit" and "truck "). This parking area is equipped
with a telephone mechanism to tunnel control room, a video monitoring and a loudspeaker, so that the
truck driver can receive further instructions.
5.3.20 Passenger Information Systems
In public transport tunnels (rail, subway and tram), passenger information systems with the aim of
preventive traffic education should include:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
Advertising Spots
Advertising spots regarding safety enjoy a high degree of attention. They can, however, also
suggest the impression that the intention of these spots is to conceal a lack of fire protection
measures of the operational business.
Newsletters for the customers by the public transportation service
Some public transportation services disseminate an own newspaper to their passengers every
month and free of charge. This includes among others also short articles dealing with safety,
such as for example the behaviour in the case of a fire as well as other topics of current
interest.
Safety Brochure
In Hamburg a safety brochure is published which informs all passengers about safety
equipment that are available in the trains and at the stations. So for example, guidelines are
given of how to employ fire extinguishers and where to obtain further information. The
brochure is very well accepted among the passengers.
Information of Elderly Persons
Three to four years ago, Hamburg began to invite people living in old people'
s homes to come
and visit public transport companies. The elderly people were taken immediately to the spot,
that is they were not only taken to the headquarters or the central control station, but also to
the stations themselves. There the respective installations were explained to them. This
procedure proved to be very efficient. The elderly people sent in thank-you-letters and
expressed their appreciation. They were surprised at the safety measures employed in the
subway and in local traffic and felt much safer after visiting the public transport companies.
Cologne and Dsseldorf very deliberately approach elderly citizens. The intention is to
explain very cautiously and politely and with the necessary care what they have to do in an
emergency case. During these events, topics such as "How can I leave the subway, if the train
stops?", "How do I activate modern facilities such as elevators leading to the stations?" or
"How do I avoid panic?" are discussed.
Information for School Children
In Hanover an information programme was installed for school classes (2nd and 3rd class)
which is very well accepted among school children. In many cases, there are lots of advance
reservations made for these events. Here, the children are taught which are the dangers in
subway traffic, which is the correct way to behave as for example not jumping off the train,
moving properly and according to the rules and safety advices.
Built-in Multimedia Readout System in the Vehicles
Multimedia systems are already employed, so for example in Hamburg in the DT4 vehicles.
These are monitors which display above all advertisements but also information on the
company and safety advice.
Display Systems in Stations
69
(h)
In the case of a fire, the right information is given to the passengers in the right moment this
needs to be guaranteed. False information can generate disasters.
New Communication Facilities
New communication facilities in public transport are still in an early development phase. The
communication facilities available today are not yet sufficiently used, which is also due to the
fact that it is not yet known to which extent they are really accepted by the passengers. These
facilities also entail consequences which nobody had expected, such as the dramatic reduction
in the degree of vandalism since these "info-screens" were built into the trains.
70
6. Proposal for EU guidelines

Comparing the collected data on best practices for incident detection systems, traffic management and
user information and communication in tunnels in existing tunnels around Europe with the EU
Directive on safety in tunnels some gaps have been identified. In the following lines some
recommendations on how the EU Directive could be improved in order to increase safety in tunnels
are proposed.
6.1 General recommendations

1. Responsible parties under the EU Directive should establish a live assessment committee
based on a permanent working group.
2. Responsible parties under the EU Directive should be encouraged to reach the level of safety
of the EU Directive in small tunnels with special characteristics, where applicable.
6.2 Incident detection systems and methods

1. Tunnel designers and authorities should establish an Incident and fire detection systems
database.
2. Tunnel authorities should provide an evaluation of the different incident and fire detection
systems compatibility.
3. Tunnel authorities should consider communication such as voice communication between
control centre operators and motorists.

1. All the responsible parties under the EU Directive should provide more precise parameters or
methods on how to make a decision about the number of tubes and lanes.
2. All the responsible parties under the EU Directive should define a minimum lane width and
cross-sectional geometry.
3. All the responsible parties under the EU Directive should define a maximum and minimum of
the transverse gradient.
4. All the responsible parties under the EU Directive should be more specific in the design of
road marking elements.
71
5. The Directive should be more precisely on how to evaluate the effectiveness of lay-bys for
existing tunnels.
6. The EU Directive should list parameters which help to make a decision concerning the
usefulness of separate truck lanes.
7. The EU Directive should be more specific about parameters like speed, location and
percentage of HGV when planning traffic management equipment.
8. The EU Directive should standardize the minimum equipment for traffic management.
6.4 User information and communication

1. The lighting level in the transient area should be according to light conditions outside, so that
the lighting level should be adjustable and differ between daytime and nigh time conditions.
2. The training and equipping of emergency services should be specified how often they should
be done (Link to Article 4.6)
3. The operator should have access to pre-recorded messages, bilingual if applicable and one in
English.
4. All the responsible parties under the EU Directive should describe short messages for
accidents, with clear statements.
5. All member states of the EU Directive should be encouraged to have certification processes
for tunnels with its correspondent inspectors. (link to article 7)
6. All member states of the EU Directive should include specific requirements for combi tunnels.
7. All member states of the EU Directive should provide additional and reinforced measures to
ensure safety, in case that emergency walkways are not applicable. (Link to the 2.3.1
Directive)
8. All member states of the EU Directive are encouraged to provide specifications about the
design (colour, form, lighting) of the emergency escape door. (Link to the 2.3.9 Directive)
9. All member states of the EU Directive should consider physical barriers application in order to
close the tunnel after consultation with emergency services (Link to the 2.15.1. Directive)
10. All member states of the EU Directive should consider sound beacons in the tunnels for
indicating emergency exists. (Link to the 2.15.1 Directive)
11. All member states of the EU Directive should be more specific in the information stated for
appropriate speeds and distance. (Link to the Article 3.9)
72
12. All member states of the EU Directive should include co-operation between different
emergency rescue services (medical, personnel, fire brigades, police) in the full scale exercise.
(Link to the point 5 in Annex II)
13. All member states of the EU Directive should be encouraged to include behavioural messages
for RDS codes.
14. All member states of the EU Directive should be encouraged to transmit each frequency to a
break system in a tunnel and the possibility to give a vocal message.
15. All member states of the EU Directive should encourage users not to use the mobile phones in
case of incident/accident inside a tunnel and add a parallel system of communication for all
the emergency services.
73
7. Limitations
As it has been mentioned before, this WP deals with only one of the parts that integrate the safety
chain in a tunnel. The analysed documents are mostly a compendium of the standards and guidelines
that are used to develop tunnel incident management systems and actual experiences with existing
systems in the respective countries and /or cases, incident management systems currently being used
for single and multiple tube tunnels with uni-directional and bi-directional traffic flow on motorways.
This WP reviews incident detection, traffic management and user information methods.
In order to have more valuable results in the establishment of recommendations information on best
practices and last technological developments has been asked to be provided by other members in the
consortium. Not a significant response has been obtained as most of the European countries work
under the same requirements, established by EU Directive or in some cases using other countries
regulations, more restrictive than the ones from each country. This is the case of Spain, where
regulation applying safety in tunnels is very poor and for the engineering projects it is used the
Directive and the French regulation.
Therefore, the evaluation of the different systems and methods is quite subjective in the sense that
actual incident detection procedures and guidelines, traffic management and user information are
different for each tunnel and need to be developed by the authority responsible for the operation of the
tunnels and the safety of the personnel using the tunnel. For this, human factors must be reviewed
along with the hardware devices, the traffic management methods and the user information and
communication systems discussed in this Work Package for each individual case.
74
8. Recommendations
For future work a more detailed analysis taking into account cost effectiveness, user acceptance and
friendliness for the operator, response time, etc. should be realized in order to have more feasible
criteria for evaluation.
Due to lack of time and resources this evaluation has not been able to be carried as it was planned.
Higher compromise from other partners (countries) involved in the project would have been necessary
and good for the project result.
Nevertheless, at this stage of the project we consider that SafeT network has done a very important
and useful work which will result in an improvement of safety in tunnels around Europe. We consider
that SafeT network or a similar consortium where different agents of all parts of the safety chain and
international organisms discuss together the best practices and new technological developments and
adaptations to establish recommendations should be kept in order to update the information here
presented which is continuously changing. EU Directive should be a live document opened to
changes.
Apart from the global recommendations here presented, dynamic recommendation adapted to each
case must be established by the authorities responsible of the tunnels.
75
9. References
[1] WP3 Report: Fire safe Design, Road Tunnels, Public Draft document, FIT European Thematic
Network, September 2003, available at http://www.etnfit.net
[2] Best Practice Manual on Operation and Maintenance of Tunnels, PIARC C5: Road tunnel
operation, Working group 1: Operations, December 2003
[3] Tunnel standard description, SICE: internal document
[4] Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the council on minimum safety
requirements for tunnels in the Trans-European Road Network, European Commission,
December 2002
[5] Integral Unification of tunnels monitoring, paper 2211, Lorenzo Espinosa Romn,
Proceedings of the 10th World Congress on Intelligent Transportation Systems and
Services , November 2003, Madrid
[6] Tneles: equipamiento y seguridad, Extraordinario 2000 Tneles, Revista Carreteras.
[7] Seguridad en los tneles de carreteras, RACE/RACC, Seguritecnia, Septiembre 2001
[8] La seguridad en los tneles y el factor humano, Rafael Lpez Guarga, Revista Rutas
[9] El transporte de mercancas peligrosas a travs de los tneles de carretera, Resumen del
proyecto de investigacin conjunta OCDE, PIARC, Jess Leal Bermejo et al, Revista
Rutas
[10]Traffic Incident Management systems used in road tunnels, October 2002 , PIARC
Road tunnels Committee-working Group 4- communications systems and geometry
[11] SafeT Proposal, www.safetunnel.net
[12]Directive 2004/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on
minimum safety requirements for tunnels in the trans-European road network, Official
Journal of the European Union
[13] RABT 2003, Richtlinien fr die Ausstattung und den Betrieb von Straentunneln,
Forschungsgesellschaft fr Straen- und Verkehrswesen
[14]Road Tunnel Equipment Technical Specification, Ministry of Transport of the Czech
Republic Road Department
[15]Tunsafe Leaflet
[16]www.are.admin.ch
[17]www.gotthard-strassentunnel.ch
[18]www.benefitcost.its.dot.gov
[19]Ayres T.J., Wood C.T., Schmidt R.A. & McCarthy R.L. (1998) Risk Perception and Behavioral
Choice. In: M. R. Lehto (Ed.). Hazard Communication. Mahwah: LEA, 35-52
[20]Boer, L.C. (1998) Improved Signposting for the Evacuation of Passenger Ships (Report TNO
1998 C 081) Soesterberg: TNO Human Factors, the Netherlands.

[21]Boer, L.C. (2002) Behaviour by motorists on evacuation of a tunnel (Report TM-02-C034).
Soesterberg: TNO Human Factors, the Netherlands.
[22]Boer, L.C. & Varkevisser, J. (2002) Lijnverlichting op de vluchtroute in tunnels [Glow cable as
escape lighting in tunnels] (Report TNO TM - 01 - C016). Soesterberg: TNO Human Factors, the
Netherlands.
[23]Boer, L.C. & Vredeveldt, A, (1999) Trouver son chemin: comportement des passagers et
systmes de guidages [Way-finding behaviour and technical guidance systems]. Revue
Navigation, 1999, vol 47, no 188, p 428-439.
[24]Boer, L.C. & Withington, D.J. (2004) Auditory guidance in a Smoke-filled Tunnel. Ergonomics,
47, 1131-1140.
76
[25]Canter, D. (1990) Fires and Human Behaviour, 2nd edition, pub. David Fulton, London.
[26]CIE (1990) Guide for Lighting of Road Tunnels and Underpasses. Publication CIE 88-1990.
Vienna, Austria: Commission Internationale de lEclairage.
[27]Edworthy, J (1998)Warnings and hazards: An integrative approach to warnings research.

International Journal of Cognitive Ergonomics, 2, pp. 3-18.
[28]Gibson J.J. (1979) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Comp.
[29]Lehto M.R. (1998). Foreward: Special Issue on Hazard Communication. In: M. R. Lehto (Ed.).
Hazard Communication. Mahwah: LEA, 1-2.
[30]Martens, M.H. (Ed.) (2004) Human Factors Aspects in Tunnels: Tunnel User Behaviour
and Tunnel Operators. Deliverable 3.3, UPTUN project. UPgrading of existing TUNnels.
Project No: GRD1-2001-40739 (333
).
[31]Martens, M.H., Koster E.R. & Lourens, P. (1998) Westerscheldetunnel:
Verkeersveiligheid tijdens calamiteiten met evacuatie [Westerschelde tunnel: Traffic
safety during calamities with evacuation] (Report 1998 C 033) Soesterberg: TNO Human
Factors, the Netherlands.
[32]Proulx G et al (1999), Assessment of photoluminescent material during office occupant
evacuation, Internal Report 774. Ottawa (CA): Institute for Research in Construction,
National Research Council
[33]Schreuder, D.A (1964) The Lighting of Vehicular Traffic Tunnels. Centrex Eindhoven, The
Netherlands.
[34]Schreuder, D.A. (1996) Lighting for Safety [Openbare verlichting voor verkeer en veiligheid).
London, UK: Thomas Telford
[35]Steyvers, F. J. J. M., de Waard, D., & Brookhuis, K. A. (1999). Aspects of human behaviour in
tunnel fires a literature review International Tunnel Fire & Safety Conference, Rotterdam 1999
[36] Road Tunnels Manual. Norwegian Public Roads Administration website.
77

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SafeT

Recommendations for the enhancement of

Measures concerning construction

5. Data analysis and practical examples

5.1 Incident detection system and methods

5.2.3.2 Summary Classification of Tunnels - Evaluation

5.2.4.4 Tunnel Traffic Management Norway

5.1 Incident detection systems and methods

Loop detection systems

5.1.1 Loop Detection Systems

5.2 Traffic management methods

5.2.1.1 Suitable Road/Tunnel Geometry

Number of Tubes and Lanes

traffic volume and safety

percentage of heavy goods vehicles

gradient and length.

Chosen method of construction

Number of lanes per direction

Length of the tunnel

Average gradient in ascending section

Average percentage of freight transport

AADT (Average annual daily traffic)

German regular cross section for tunnels (RAS-Q/RABT 2003) [13]

5.2.1.3 Hard Shoulder/Lay Bys

therefore limiting the risk of rear-end collisions,

Sign indicating a lay by (EU-Directive)

Regular length and width of a lay by (RABT2003)

pavement and bottom part of tunnel walls luminance level,

To this purpose a vehicle height detection electronic system could be installed.

Project ERS2 OECD / PIARC [15]

Parts of the Swiss regulations (Richtlinien fr Verkehrswege: Beurteilungskriterien II zur

restrictions in case of high traffic density with automatic rerouting,

large vehicle count both directions

Picture taken from the TunSafe leaflet, Datainstrument AS [17]

5.2.2.3 Operational Modes

Speed surveillance depending on the vehicle category

Maximal allowed speed per vehicle category

Automatic adaptation to new defined speed limits

Monitoring of the red light for closed lanes or tunnels

Monitoring of lanes which are closed for trucks

Ghost driver detection; image triggering and alarms

Statistics; vehicle categories, average speed, etc

Traffic signs displaying speed limit

Traffic signs displaying overtaking ban for trucks

Traffic signs displaying a mandatory distance between trucks

Moveable barriers to guarantee that drivers using the right lanes

Traffic signs displaying the mandatory use of headlights

Diagram to determine the traffic management equipment (RABT 2003)

Minimum equipment for short tunnels;

Tunnel length (aggregated length of several successive tunnels),

existence of lay-bys and emergency bays,

possibility of by-passing the tunnel section,

anticipated accident rate;

traffic flow composition, and other parameters.

5.2.3.2 Summary Classification of Tunnels - Evaluation

5.2.4 Tunnel Traffic Management

5.2.4.2 Tunnel Traffic Management Germany:

o Extended Equipment: The traffic management equipment for class 1 tunnel is

With this equipment the following measures are possible:

Speed reduction subject to the situation

Warning against incidents in general, congestion, construction works, bi directional

Bi directional traffic in one tube

Example foran automatic rerouting system displaying the normal route