1.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS267 SCRA 408FACTSPetitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a

Filipino corporation raised their case regarding the sale of the Manila Hotel in a Special Civil
Action of Prohibition and Mandamus.Petitioner argued that the sale of the hotel should be
awarded to them in pursuant to theFilipino First policy of the Constitution. The highest bidder
during that time is Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm with ITT-Sheraton asits hotel operator. The
2 bid for the same number of shares however it was the Malaysianfirm who bid 2.42PHP higher
than the petitioner at 44PHP.While the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder is
still pending, the petitionermatched the bid at 44PHP per share and sent a managers check
issued by Philtrust Bank for33 Million pesos. Respondent GSIS refused to accept the petitioners
offer. The respondents argued that sec 10, par 2 Art XII of the 1987 Constitution is not self
executing and requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Such paragraphstates:
in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
ISSUEWhether or not sec 10, par 2 Art XII of the 1987 Constitution is self executing; and
whetheror not the petitioner as a Filipino controlled corporation is also covered by the
termqualified Filipinos of the Constitution.RULING The court ruled that Art II of the
Constitution is generally not self executing. However, if aprovision is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary orenabling legislation or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right itgrants may be enjoyed or protected, is self
executing. In case of doubt, the Constitutionshould be considered self executing. Sec 10 par 2 Art
XII of the Constitution is a mandatory,positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines orimplementing laws or rules for its enforcement.According to the
1986 Constitutional Commission proceedings, the term qualified filipinoalso includes
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. The court furtherhighlighted the
exchange of views during the sessions of the Constitutional Commissionwhen framers explicitly
provided that a qualified Filipino enterprise shall be given preferenceover a foreigner even if
such foreigner is more qualified in some aspects.
2.OPOSA VS FACTORAN
224 SCRA 792 Political Law Harmony in Nature Inter-Generational Responsibility InterGenerational Justice
A taxpayers class suit was initiated by the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI) together
with the minors Juan Antonio Oposa et al and their parents. All were duly represented. They
claimed that as taxpayers they have the right to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resources of the countrys rainforests. They prayed that a judgment be rendered ordering
Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr, his agents, representatives, and other persons acting in his
behalf to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements,
Factoran being the secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?

HELD: Yes, petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all
Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the
countrys forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or
violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action.

3.Tano vs Socrates 278 SCRA 154

Facts
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted ordinance no. 15-92 banning the
shipment of live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princessa City for a period of 5 years. In the
same light, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a resolution that prohibits the
catching, gathering, buying, selling and possessing and shipment of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years within the Palawan waters. The petitiones Airline
Shippers Association of Palawan together with marine merchants were charged for violating the
above ordinance and resolution by the city and provincial governments. The petitioners now
allege that they have the preferential rights as marginal fishermen granted with privileges
provided in Section 149 of the Local Government Code, invoking the invalidity of the abovestated enactments as violative of their preferential rights.
Issue
Whether or not the enacted resolutions and ordinances by the local government units violative of
the preferential rights of the marginal fishermen ?
Held
No, the enacted resolution and ordinance of the LGU were not violative of their preferential
rights. The enactment of these laws was a valid exercise of the police power of the LGU to
protect public interests and the public right to a balanced and healthier ecology. The rights and
privileges invoked by the petitioners are not absolute. The general welfare clause of the local
government code mandates for the liberal interpretation in giving the LGUs more power to
accelerate economic development and to upgrade the life of the people in the community. The
LGUs are endowed with the power to enact fishery laws in its municipal waters which
necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances in order to effectively carry out the enforcement
of fishery laws in their local community.
4.DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACMEPLYWOOD
& VENEER Co. INC., ETC.146 SCRA 509DATE: December 29, 1986PETITIONER: The
Director of LandsRESPONDENTS: Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer

Co.Inc., Etc.PONENTE: J. Narvasa

FACTS:The Director of Lands appealed the judgement of the Intermediate AppellateCourt which
affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabelaordering the registration in favor of
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of fiveparcels of land measuring 481, 390 sqm., acquired
from Mariano and Acer Infiel,members of the indigenous Dumagat Tribe and owners of the lotsin-questionfrom time immemorial, on October 29, 1962. This was accordingly onlyregistered on
July 17, 1982 long after the aegis of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUES: 1.
Whether or not the ruling in the case, Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome (114SRC 799) should be
overturned in light of jurisprudence.2.
Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is recognized.3.
Whether or not the provision barring private companies and associationsfrom purchasing public
alienable lands in 1973 Constitution is applicableretroactively.RULING:1.
HELD. In light of the jurisprudence traced from Carino v. Insular Govt, to
Susi v. Razon, to Herico v. Dar, the court overturned the decision onMeralco v. CastroBartolome, stating that a possession is said to beprescriptively acquired by the operation of the
Public Lands Act, uponconclusively presumed fulfillment of all the necessary conditions for
aGovernment Grant. Thus, the land in question effectively ceased to be of the public domain and
was therefore classified as private property at themoment of the sale through the continuous and
unchallenged possessionof the bona fide right t
o ownership from Meralcos predecessors
-interest.There being no law prohibiting the sale of private lands to privately heldcorporations,
the court thus overturned the decision.2.
HELD. Referring to the ruling in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, the landheld by the Infiels since
time immemorial was effectively deemed asprivate land, by the operation of the law, ipso jure.
Thus, at the moment of the sale, ACME Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., Etc. therefore, purchased
5.GUIANG VS.KINTANAR
FACTS:Petition filed on January 15, 1979 for
Certiorari
and mandamus seeking the setting aside of the decisionand the two orders subsequent thereto of
respondent judge dated August 20, 1975 and November 14,1978 and December 27, 1978,
respectively, as acts committed in grave abuse of discretion, thecompromise agreement on which
said decision was based being allegedly in contravention of theConstitution and the Public Land
Act, hence the execution thereof under the two questioned subsequentorders had no legal
basis.ISSUE: Whether or not the two orders of the respondent judge have legal basis under the
1973Constitution.HELD: The Court came to the inevitable conclusion that Section 122 of the
Public Land Act has beenamended by the 1973 Constitution by reducing the area of land
acquired under the Act that could betransferred by any purchaser, patentee or homesteader to

only 24 hectares instead of the 144 hectaresallowed under the 1935 Constitution. Now, the
compromise agreement, executed on August 20, 1975 andhere in dispute, provides for the
transfer of a total of 146 hectares. It inevitably follows then that saidcompromise agreement
contravenes not only a statute but the fundamental law of the land. Adding to itsbeing contrary to
law, which undoubtedly is also covered by the public policy expressed in theConstitution, is the
fact that private respondents, the Kintanars, already owned at the time of theagreement a lot of
29 hectares which they had acquired also from the government pursuant to the PublicLand Act. It
is of no consequence, pursuant to the same article, that petitioners, the Guiang spouses, executed
on August 21, 1975, apparently in ratification of the impugned agreement, the deeds of
salecovering the two lots already referred to and that petitioners actually received in part or in
whole themoney consideration stipulated therein, for according to the same Article 1409,
contracts contemplatedtherein, as the one the Court are dealing with, "cannot be ratified nor the
defense of its illegality bewaived." With the foregoing view the Court have taken of these cases
now before them they saw noneed to resolve the other issues discussed by the parties in their
memoranda and motions. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the herein
petition and declaring the rights of the parties to be asthey are stated above in the paragraph
preceding the penultimate one of the above opinion.
6.Isagani Cruz vs DENRFacts
: Cruz, a
noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous PeoplesRights Act
on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of
theregalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law
basicallyenumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may
include naturalresources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an allencompassing definition of ancestral domainsand ancestral lands which might even
include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and
3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs
petition was
dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain

somehow against the regalian doctrine.

7.CHEESMAN V IAC 193 SCRA 93G.R. No. 74833 January 21, 1991
FACTS: This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman)
toannul

for lack of consent on his part


the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residential lot andbuilding to Estelita Padilla
December 4, 1970
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were married but have been separatedsince February
15, 1981
June 4, 1974
a Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights was executed by Armando Altares,convey
ing a parcel of land in favor of Criselda Cheesman, married to Thomas Cheesman. Thomas,
although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Tax
declarationsfor the said property were issued in the name of Criselda Cheesman alone and she
assumed exclusivemanagement and administration of the property

July 1, 1981

Criselda sold the property to Estelita Padilla without knowledge and consent of Thomas
July 31, 1981
Thomas filed a suit for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction hadbeen
executed without his knowledge and consent. Criselda filed an answer alleging that the property
soldwas paraphernal, having purchased the property from her own money; that Thomas, an
American wasdisqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land and; that Estelita
was a buyer in goodfaith
During the trial, it was found out that the transfer of property took
place during the existence of theirmarriage as it was acquired on June 4, 1974
June 24
, 1982

RTC declared the sale executed by Criselda void ab initio and ordered the delivery of the
property to Thomas as administrator of the conjugal property
Thomas appealed to IAC where he assailed the granting of Estelitas petition for relief and res
olution of matters not subject of said petition; in declaring valid the sale to Estelita without his
knowledge andconsent. On January 7, 1986, IAC affirmed summary judgment decisionISSUE:
Whether or not the wife can dispose of the property in question; Whether or not Cheesman,
beingan American citizen, can question the sale HELD: Section 14, Art. XIV of 1973
Constitution provides
that: save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except toindividuals,
corpora
tions, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Thus,assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife,
he acquiredno right whatsoever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to
acquire a right orinterest in land, he was knowingly violating the Constitution.As such, the sale
to him was null and void. At any rate, Cheesman had and has NO CAPACITY TOQUESTION
THE SUBSEQUENTSALE OF THE SAME PROPERTY BY HIS WIFE ON THETHEORY

THAT IN SO DOING HEIS MERELY EXERCISING THE PREROGATIVE OF AHUSBAND

IN RESPECT OFCONJUGAL PROPERTY. To sustain such a theory would permit
indirectcontroversion of the Constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared
conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantialinterest and right over land, as
he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This isa right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.Even if the wife did use conjugal funds to make the
acquisition, his recovering and holding the propertycannot be warranted as it is against the
constitution. Consequently, Estelita is a purchaser in good faithsince she knew that Thomas
cannot intervene in the sale or disposition of the said property.DECISION: The Court
AFFIRMED the appealed decision.
8(wara ko ine kakuha kun nano)
9. YAP vs. Court of Appeals
Ramon Yap purchased a parcel of land situated in Quezon City, from the spouses Carlos
andJosefina Nery. The lot was thereupon registered in the name of Ramon Yap he also declared
theproperty in his name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon from 1966
to1992.In 1962 Ramon Yap constructed a two storey 3 door apartment building for the use of
theYap family. 1/5 of the cost of the construction was defrayed by Ramon Yap while the rest
wasshouldered by Chua Mia, the mother of Lorenzo, Benjamin and Ramon. Upon the request of
theold woman the tax declaration for real estate was placed under the name of
LorenzoYap.Lorenzo Yap died on 11 July 1970. A few month later, his heirs including Ramon
yapallowed petitioners to use one unit of the apartment building. On March 18, 1992, Ramon
Yapsold the land and his share of the 3-door apartment to his brother, his herein corespondentBenjamin Yap, for the sum of P337,500.00 pursuant to a Deed of Sale. Petitioners
advisedrespondents of the former
s claim of ownership over the property and demanded that respondents
execute the proper deed necessary to transfer the title to them. Petitioners claim that Lorenzo
requested his brother Ramon to allow the use of the latters name in the purchase, registr
ation,and declaration for tax purposes of the subject lot to which Ramon Yap consented. It was
agreedthat the property would remain registered in the name of Ramon yap until such time as
Lorenzowould have acquired Philippine citizenship but that, should Lorenzo, the lot would then
be
transferred to Lorenzos heirs upon the latters
naturalization. Both the Trial Court and theAppellate Court denied the petition and dismisses the
case.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to own the questioned property.HELD:
Petitioners were not able to prove adequately the agreement between them and therespondent.
The petition was denied and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.
10. G.R. No. L-33048 April 16, 1982EPIFANIA SARSOSA VDA. DE BARSOBIA and PACITA
W. VALLAR
, petitioners,vs.

VICTORIANO T. CUENCO,
respondent.
FACTS:Sought to be reviewed herein is the judgment dated August 18, 1970, of the Court of
Appeals, renderedin CA-G.R. No. 41318-R, entitled "
Victoriano T. Cuenco, Plaintiff-appellant, vs. Epifania Sarsosa Vda.de Barsobia and Pacita W.
Vallar, Defendants- appellees
, " declaring Victoriano T. Cuenco (now therespondent) as the absolute owner of the coconut land
in question.The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (on the northern side) of two adjoining
parcels of coconut landlocated at Barrio Mancapagao, Sagay, Camiguin, Misamis Oriental (now
Camiguin province), with anarea of 29,150 square meters, more or less. The entire land was
owned previously by a certain LeocadiaBalisado, who had sold it to the spouses Patricio
Barsobia (now deceased) and Epifania Sarsosa, one of the petitioners herein. They are Filipino
citizens. On September 5, 1936, Epifania Sarsosa then a widow,sold the land in controversy to a
Chinese, Ong King Po, for the sum of P1,050.00 .Ong King Po took actual possession and
enjoyed the fruits thereof. On August 5, 1961, Ong King Po sold the litigatedproperty to
Victoriano T. Cuenco (respondent herein), a naturalized Filipino, for the sum of
P5,000.00.Respondent immediately took actual possession and harvested the fruits therefrom. On
March 6, 1962,Epifania "usurped" the controverted property, and on July 26, 1962, Epifania
(through her only daughterand child, Emeteria Barsobia), sold a one-half (1/2) portion of the land
in question to Pacita W. Vallar, theother petitioner herein .On September 19, 1962, respondent
filed a Forcible Entry case against Epifaniabefore the Municipal Court of Sagay, Camiguin. The
case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since, asthe laws then stood, the question of
possession could not be properly determined without first settling thatof ownership. On
December 27, 1966, respondent instituted before the Court of First Instance of MisamisOriental
a Complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of the litigated land, against Epifania
andPacita Vallar (hereinafter referred to simply as petitioners).Issue: Whether or not Victoriano
T. Cuenco ), a naturalized Filipino is the rightful owner of the land afterbuying it from Ong King
Po, a Chinese.HELD: The trial Court rendered judgment:1. Dismissing the complaint with costs
against plaintiff (respondent herein).2. Declaring the two Deeds of Sale, Exhibits A and B,
respectively, inexistent and void from thebeginning; and3. Declaring defendant Pacita W. Vallar
as the lawful owner and possessor of the portion of land shebought from Emeteria Barsobia (pp.
57, 67, Record.)The respondent appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed the the
aforementioned Decision and decreedinstead that respondent was the owner of the litigated
property.The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed. In lieu thereof, The Court renders
judgment: (a) Declaring the plaintiff-appellant Victoriano T. Cuenco the absolute owner of the
land in question, withthe right of possession thereof;(b) Ordering the defendants-appellees to
restore the possession of said land to the plaintiff;(c) Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim;(d)
Condemning the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 representing the latter's
sharefrom the sale of copra which he failed to receive since March, 1962 when he was deprived
of hispossession over the land, and which defendants illegally appropriated it to their own use
and benefit, pluslegal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid; plus P2,000.00
representing expenses andattorney's fees;(e) Sentencing the defendants to pay the costs.

11.LEE VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
The case under consideration is a petition for review on
certiorari
of the decision of the Court of Appeals nullifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, in
Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, pertaining to Lot 398, Capiz Cadastre, covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 3389.Sometime in March 1936, Rafael, Carmen, Francisco, Jr., Ramon,
Lourdes, Mercedes,Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel, Rizal and Jimmy, all surnamed
Dinglasan sold toLee Liong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an approximate area of
1,631 square meters,designated as Lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389,
situated at thecorner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City.However, in 1948, the former
owners filedwith the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee Liong for
annulment of sale and recovery of land. The plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale because of
theconstitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of private agricultural
land,including residential, commercial or industrial land. Rebuffed in the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that
granting thesale to be null and void and can not give title to the vendee, it does not necessarily
followtherefrom that the title remained in the vendor, who had also violated the
constitutionalprohibition, or that he (vendor) has the right to recover the title of which he has
divested himself by his act in ignoring the prohibition. Then the same owners filed an action for
the recovery of the land and the heirs of Lee Liong filed a motion to dismiss it but the trial court
denied it. OnSeptember 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the
Regional Trial Court,Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 of the Capiz
Cadastre, formerlycovered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389 of the Register of Deeds of
Roxas City. OnJanuary 25, 1995, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for annulmentof judgment in Reconstitution Case No. 1928, alleging that the Regional Trial
Court, Roxas Cityhad no jurisdiction over the case. Issue: Whether or not the sale of land to
aliens is violable under the 1935 Constitution.The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the
land to an alien did not validate thetransaction, for it was still contrary to the constitutional
proscription against aliens acquiringlands of the public or private domain. Although ownership
of the land cannot revert to theoriginal sellers, because of the doctrine of
pari delicto
, the Solicitor General may initiate anaction for reversion or escheat of the land to the State,
subject to other defenses, as hereafter setforth. The constitutional proscription on alien ownership
of lands of the public or private domainwas intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of
non-Filipinos. In this case, however,there would be no more public policy violated since the land
is in the hands of Filipinos qualifiedto acquire and own such land. The Court REVERSES and
SETS ASIDE the decision of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 36274. In lieu thereof, the
Court sets aside the order of reconstitution of title in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional
Trial Court, Roxas City, anddismisses the petition, without prejudice.
12. FILOMENA GERONA DE CASTRO,
petitioner,vs.
JOAQUIN TENG QUEEN TAN, TAN TENG BIO, DOLORES TAN, ROSARIO TAN HUA

ING,and TO O. HIAP,
respondents.FACTS:Review on certiorari of the order of the former Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon dismissing petitioner'saction for annulment of contract with damages.In 1938,
petitioner Filomena Gerona de Castro sold a1,258 sq. m. residential lot in Bulan, Sorsogon to
Tan Tai, a Chinese. In 1956, Tan Tai died leavingherein respondents

his widow, To O. Hiap, and children Joaquin Teng Queen Tan, Tan Teng Bio,Dolores Tan and
Rosario Tan Hua Ing. Before the death of Tan Tai or on August 11, 1956, one of hissons, Joaquin,
became a naturalized Filipino. Six years after Tan Tai's death, or on November 18, 1962,his heirs
executed an extra-judicial settlement of estate with sale, whereby the disputed lot in its
entiretywas alloted to Joaquin.On July 15, 1968, petitioner commenced suit against the heirs of
Tan Tai for annulment of the sale foralleged violation of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting the
sale of land to aliens.ISSUE: Whether the heirs are not allowed to inherit the land owned by Tan
Tai because the sale of theland to him violated the 1935 Constitution prohibiting the sale of land
to aliens.HELD: Except for respondent Tan Teng Bio who filed an answer to the complaint,
respondents moved todismiss the complaint on the grounds of (a) lack of cause of action, the
plaintiff being in
pari delicto
withthe vendee, and the land being already owned by a Philippine citizen; (b) laches; and (c)
acquisitiveprescription. The court
a quo
dismissed the complaint, sustaining the first two grounds invoked by themovants.Independently
of the doctrine of
pari delicto,
the petitioner cannot have the sale annulled andrecover the lot she herself has sold. While the
vendee was an alien at the time of the sale, the land hassince become the property, of respondent
Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Philippine citizen, who isconstitutionally qualified to own land. The
litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino.
It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Laches also militates against petitioner's cause.
She soldthe disputed lot in 1938. She instituted the action to annul the sale only on July 15, 1968.
What the Courtsaid in the cited
Sarsosa
case applies with equal force to the petitioner.... it is likewise inescapable thatpetitioner Epifania
had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction of inexcusable
neglect, she should be held barred from asserting her claim to the litigated property.Respondent,
therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property.The appealed order
isaffirmed.
13.REPUBLIC VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 75042 November 29, 1988FACTS:This is an appeal from the 1) decision
*
of the FIRST CIVIL CASES DIVISION of the then IntermediateAppellate Court dated May 13,
1986, in AC G.R. No. 01410 entitled the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOPOF Lucena, represented
by

Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, applicant-appellee vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al

., Oppositors-appellants, affirming the decision
**
of the then Court of FIRST INSTANCE of Quezon,9th Judicial District, Branch 1, dated
November 4, 1980 in Land Registration Case No. N-1106 entitledthe ROMAN CATHOLIC
BISHOP of Lucena, represented by
Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, applicant vs. the Director of Lands and the Director, Bureau of Forest
Development
, oppositors, ordering the registrationof title to the parcel of land designated, as lots 1, 2 and 3 of
plan PSD-65686 and its technicaldescriptions, and the parcel of land described in plan PSU112592 and its technical description, togetherwith whatever improvements existing thereon, in
the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena and 2) its resolution Dated June
19,1986, denying appellant's "Motion for Reconsideration forlack of merit." On February 2,
1979, the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr.Jose T. Sanchez, filed
an application for confirmation of title to four (4) parcels of land. Three of saidparcels,
denominated as Lots 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of plan PSU-65686 are situated in Barrio
Masin,Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province. The fourth parcels under plan PSU-112592
is located inBarrio Bucal (Taguan), same municipality and province. In behalf of the Director of
Lands and theDirector of the Bureau of Forest Development, the Solicitor General filed an
Opposition on April 20,1979, alleging therein among others, that the applicant did not have an
imperfect title or title in fee simple to the parcel of land being applied for. At the initial hearing
held on November 13, 1979, only theProvincial Fiscal in representation of the Solicitor General
appeared to interpose personal objection to theapplication. Hence, an Order of General Default
against the whole world was issued by the Court a quoexcept for the Director of Lands and the
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development. For his part, theFiscal in a Manifestation dated
July 22, 1980, said 'the State will not adduce evidence in support of itsopposition and will submit
the instant case for
decision. Accordingly
, the court ordered the registrationof the four parcels together with the improvements thereon "in
the name of the ROMAN CATHOLICBISHOP OF LUCENA, INC., a religious corporation sole
duly registered and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines." A reconsideration
of the aforequoted Decision was sought by Appellant Republic of the Philippines, but for lack of
merit, its motion for reconsideration was denied on June 19,1986, by Resolution of the First Civil
Case Division, Intermediate Appellate Court which resolution readsin full: Considering appellant
Republic of the Philippines "Motion for reconsideration" filed on June 4,1986; the Court
RESOLVED to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit, grounds raisedtherein
having all been considered in the decision.ISSUE: Whether or not the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Lucena, as a corporation sole is qualified to applyfor confirmation of its title to the four (4)
parcels of land subject of this case.HELD: In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the
ruling of this Court in
14. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES
MARIO B.LAPIA AND FLOR DE VEGA
FACTS:On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their

residence with atotal area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo
Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At thetime of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born
Filipino citizens.On February 5, 1987,the spouses filed an application for registration of title of
the two (2) parcels of land before the RegionalTrial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This
time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizensand have opted to embrace Canadian
citizenship through naturalization.An opposition was filed by theRepublic and after the parties
have presented their respective evidence, the court
a quo
rendered adecision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question
.
On appeal, respondent court affirmedthe decision of the trial court based on the following
ratiocination: In the present case, it is undisputed thatboth applicants were still Filipino citizens
when they bought the land in controversy from its formerowner. For this reason, the prohibition
against the acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply.In justice and equity, they are
the rightful owners of the subject realty considering also that they had paidfor it quite a large sum
of money.Issue: Whether or not a foreign national can apply for registration of title over a parcel
of land which heacquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who
has complied with therequirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141).Held:
The Court disagreed on the petition to seek to defeat respondents' application for registration of
titleon the ground of foreign nationality.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated: As could begleaned from the evidence
adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish grant
or possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the
privaterespondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-interest derived
title from an oldSpanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant (b) the "concession
especial" or especial grant; (c)the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the
"titulo de compra" or title by purchase;and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or possessory
information title, which could become a "titulogratuito" or a gratuitous title (Director of Forestry
v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basisof their claim is possession, by themselves
and their predecessors-in-interest,
since time immemorial
.Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which
provides:Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship and who has thelegal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a
transferee of a private land up to amaximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of
urban land, or one hectare in the case of ruralland, to be used by him as his residence. In the case
of married couples, one of them may avail of theprivilege herein granted; Provided, That if both
shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall notexceed the maximum herein fixed.In case
the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be
entitledto be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which,
when added to thosealready owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein
authorized.The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the
instant case sincesaid requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom

compliance therewith is tobe submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied,
that the requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court prior to the
approval of an application forregistration of title. An application for registration of title before a
land registration court should not beconfused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the
register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the
application for registration has become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the
time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied
with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is submitted tothe office of the
register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior tothe
issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the approval of
theapplication for registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued. The petition
isDISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
15. Ramirez v. Vda. De RamirezG.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
Facts: The deceased was survived by his spouse, 2 grandnephews, and his companion. The
administratorsubmitted a partition to the court which divided the estate into 2: one-half would go
to the widow insatisfaction of her legitime; the other half, which is the free portion, would go to
the grandnephews;
however, 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the widows usufruct and the remaining 2/3 with
a
usufruct in favor of the companion.The grandnephews opposed the substitution on the ground
that the 1
st
heirs are not related to thesubstitutes within the 1
st
degree.Issue: Whether the fideicommissary substitution is valid if the substitutes are related to
the companionwithin one degree.Decision: SC ruled that the fideicommissary substitution is
void. The substitutes (grandnephews) are notrelated to the companion within one degree. In
effect, the SC ruled that one degree means onegeneration and not one designation. So,
it follows
that the fideicommissary can only be either a childor a parent of the 1
st
heir.
16.LLANTINO V. CO LIONG CHONG
Short summary: Chinese national entered a contract with Filipinos for lease of a land in
Catanduanes for 60 years. Court held that the lease is valid. Anyways, Chinese national later was
naturalized to a Filipino.
Facts
-Llantino Sps entered a lease contract over a commercial residential (ano ba talaga?) in
Catanduanes w/ Co Liong Chong (who later became Juan Molina).
-lease contract: for a period of 60 years
-Llantino wanted to get back the property from Molina, saying that it was to expire soon. Molina
counters that the lease was for 60 years, that he already build a commercial building on it and

that in any case, he is already a Filipino

-Llantino sps filed COMPLAINT TO QUIET TITLE W/ DAMAGES
-TC: ruled for MOLINA
WON the lease contract is invalid because at the time of execution, he was Chinese? YES (being
Chinese actually irrelevant)
GR: LEASE CONTRACT W/ ALIENS ALLOWED
-there's no option for Molina to buy the said property
-no scheme to circumvent the Consti prohibition
-Sps admitted that Molina merely wanted to lease the land (and not buy it from them)
-nothing to prevent Llantino sps from disposing their title to land to any qualified party, but
subject to the right of Molina to the lease
Ratio why allowed: since alien's stay in RP is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights
such as a lease contract which is not prohibited by the constitution
IF THERE'S AN OPTION TO BUY THE PROPERTY
GR: INVALID
X: if the alien subsequently acquires Philippine Citizenship
X (to valid lease contracts w/ aliens): If there are circumstances attendant to its execution which
are used to circumvent the constitutional prohibition
-example: Option to buy + lease contract lasts for more than 50 years
virtual transfer of ownership: the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy
the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi, jus abutendi)
Even if the lease contract was virtually a transfer of ownership, it would be a moot point because
Molina became a naturalized citizen of RP, thus, has capacity to own land
17 PLDT V MTC 190 SCRA 717
18 TAKAD V SECRETARY OF DEPT OF ENERGY 281SCRA380