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An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is governed by Rule 70 of the

Rules of Court, Section 1 of which provides:


SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of
any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right
to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may,
at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person
or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with
damages and costs. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of Romullo vs. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound


Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No. 180687, October 6, 2010, the court ruled
that [a]n unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of
which lies with the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.
(Emphasis supplied)

The lone issue to be resolved here is who, between petitioner and respondent, have
the better right to the physical possession of the disputed property.

A complete relief can be afforded in the suit.

Respondent accuses petitioner of employing fraudulent means and pretenses in


procuring his signature in the said deed as he never consented to its execution. He
further denies appearing before the Notary Public and that the Community Tax
Certificate Number appearing on the document was not his.
It can readily be inferred that petitioner is primarily asserting his ownership over
the subject property. It should be reiterated, at the point of being repetitive, that in
an unlawful detainer case, the only issue to be resolved is who between the parties
is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute. Clearly,
Petitioner Tan had overwhelmingly established her right of possession by virtue of
the deed of sale and the Torrens title.
Going over the allegations in the complaint, it is clear that respondents action for
unlawful detainer is based on petitioners possession by mere tolerance. From the
time the title to the property was transferred in the name of respondent, petitioners
possession was converted into one by mere tolerance of the owner. The
forbearance ceased when respondent made a demand on petitioner to vacate the lot.
Thenceforth, petitioners occupancy had become unlawful.
In the case of Malabanan vs. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc., G.R. No. 163495, May
8, 2009, [a] person who occupies the land of another with the latters tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
In the case of Dizon vs. CA, G.R. No. 116854, November 19, 1996, the highest
court said that [w]ell-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is
possession de facto or physical or material possession and not possession de
jure. So that, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, as in this
case, the court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of
possession especially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter. It cannot
dispose with finality the issue of ownership such issue being inutile in an
ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of possession. This is why the
issue of ownership or title is generally immaterial and foreign to an ejectment
suit. (Emphasis supplied)

The disputed property in this case is covered by a TCT issued in the name of
Carolyn T. Tan. The court further explained in the Dizon case that such certificate
of title is a conclusive evidence of [their] (her) ownership. It does not even matter
if their title is questionable, because this is only an ejectment suit. Thus, as owner,
Ms. Tan is entitled to possession of the property from the time the Respondent and
her deceased spouse sold the property to her. The latter's possession ceased to be
legal from that moment.
Recently, in the case of Go vs. Looyuko, G.R. No. 196529, July 01, 2013, [t]he
Court has consistently upheld the registered owners superior right to possess the
property in unlawful detainer cases. It is an age-old rule that the person who has a
Torrens Title over a land is entitled to its possession. It has repeatedly been
emphasized that when the property is registered under the Torrens system, the
registered owners title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally
attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer. It has even been held
that it does not even matter if the partys title to the property is questionable.
The courts decision was a reiteration of its previous ruling in Arambulo vs.
Gungab, G.R. No. 156581, September 30, 2005, when it held that the registered
owner is preferred to possess the property subject of the unlawful detainer case.
The age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to
possession thereof.
The TCT of Petitioner Tan is, therefore, evidence of indefeasible title over the
property and, as its holder, she is entitled to its possession as a matter of right.

This Court has defined the term "cause of action" as follows:


A cause of action has been defined by the Supreme Court as an act or
omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligations of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in
violation of said legal right. (Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios, et
al., L-1539, Dec. 30, 1947)

A reading of the complaint in this case will readily impress one that no
ultimate facts which may constitute the basis of plaintiffs-appellants rights
which had been violated are alleged. Neither are there allegations of ultimate
facts showing acts or omissions on the part of the defendants-appellees
which constitute a violation of the rights of plaintiffs-appellants.