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Department of Technology Management, Hanyang University, 17 Haengdang-dong, Seongdong-gu, Seoul 133-791, Republic of Korea
Department of Industrial Engineering, Hanyang University, 17 Haengdang-dong, Seongdong-gu, Seoul 133-791, Republic of Korea
c
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-3131, USA
d
Department of Engineering Technology and Industrial Distribution, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-3367, USA
b
a r t i c l e i n f o
a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 1 February 2011
Accepted 8 August 2011
Available online 26 August 2011
We consider a supply chain where multiple members are serially connected. The decision is to determine
the ordering quantity of a member to the next upstream member in the supply chain. The basic cost
model is similar to the newsvendor problem with additional consideration to safety stock. This paper
presents optimal approaches for coordination of the supply chain under both complete and partial
information sharing in order to maximize the total expected benet. For complete information sharing
we develop an optimal coordination algorithm. For partial information sharing, we propose an optimal
coordination algorithm based on the Alternating Direction Method and the Diagonal Quadratic
Approximation Method. A numerical example is discussed to show the optimal convergence of ordering
quantities and discuss the properties of the proposed algorithms.
& 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Supply chain
Augmented Lagrangian function
Newsvendor problem
1. Introduction
A supply chain is said to be coordinated if the entire benet of
the supply chain (SC) is maximized (Arshinder and Deshmukh,
2008). Based on the degree of decision autonomy and information
sharing among the members, SCs can be classied into unicentric
and polycentric supply chains. In a unicentric supply chain
(Stadtler and Kilger, 2005), there exists a focal company, which
has the power to request all required information (i.e., complete
information) from the members. In turn, the focal company
unilaterally makes decisions for supply chain coordination (SCC)
that all members accept without objection. The unicentric supply
chain can be found where the market is monopolized or dominated by a member in supply chain. In a polycentric supply chain
the decision authority is distributed among the members and
often there can be restrictions on how the information is shared
among the members (i.e., partial information sharing). In this case,
SCC cannot be achieved by a single member in the supply chain.
Instead all members need to participate in the decision making
process.
n
Corresponding author at: Department of Technology Management, Hanyang
University, 17 Haengdang-dong, Seongdong-gu, Seoul 133-791, Republic of Korea.
Tel.: 82 2 2220 0412; fax: 82 2 2296 0471.
E-mail addresses: ijeong@hanyang.ac.kr (I.-J. Jeong),
LEON@entc.tamu.edu (V. Jorge Leon).
1
Tel.: 1 979 845 4993.
0925-5273/$ - see front matter & 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2011.08.015
I.-J. Jeong, V. Jorge Leon / Int. J. Production Economics 135 (2012) 412419
2. Literature review
There are many tactics to achieve SCC under complete information sharing such as the return contracts, the revenue sharing
contracts, risk sharing contracts, quantity exibility contracts and
capacity allocation. In return contracts, the retailer can return the
unsold inventory fully (i.e., full return contract) or to some xed
amount (i.e., partial return contract) at agreed upon prices
(Pasternack, 1985; Emmons and Gilbert, 1998; Marvel and Peck,
1995; Kandel, 1996; Padmanabhan and Png, 1997; Lariviere,
1999). These works have been extended to consider the attitude
of decision makers to the risk (Webster and Weng, 2000; Lee and
Lim, 2005). In the revenue sharing contracts, the manufacturer
offers the retailer a low wholesale price, lower than the unit
marginal cost. The retailer shares the fraction of his revenue with
the supplier (Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo, 2004; Gan et al.,
2005). In quantity exibility contracts, the retailer can change the
ordered quantity after observing the actual customer demands
(Tsay, 1999; Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999). The capacity allocation is
another way to coordinate the manufacturer and retailers when
retailers order more than the available capacity of the manufacturer (Chachon and Lariviere, 1999, 2001).
The partial information sharing in SCC is a challenging issue
but a little effort has been reported in the literature. Karabati and
Sayin (2008) considered the information sharing issues among a
single supplier and multiple buyers where the supplier offers
quantity discounts. The considering problem was the Stackelberg
type model. Chu and Leon (2008) proposed a distributed SCC
procedure for single warehouse multiple retailers problem under
413
3. Model development
Consider a supply chain of a manufacturer and a retailer (i.e.,
MR problem) with a Newsvendor-type problem. Let Y be the
customer demand with f(y) and F(y), the probability density
function (PDF) and cumulative density function (CDF) of demand,
respectively. The retailer sells items with the retail price, p per
unit and orders Q quantity to the manufacturer with the wholesale
price, c per unit. The manufacturer produces items with m unit
cost. Without loss of generality, we assume that m o c and c op.
For the problem setting of the traditional Newsvendor problem,
the expected prot of the retailer is
Z Q
GR Q pcQ p
Fydy
0
414
I.-J. Jeong, V. Jorge Leon / Int. J. Production Economics 135 (2012) 412419
Qi
n
Pn+1
pi+1
Qi-1
Q2
pi
p3
Q1
Y, f(y),F(y)
p2
p1
i1
i1
i1
n1
X
i2
st:
Qi Z1 ai Qi1 ,
pi
Qi Qi1
Fydy
i 2,. . .,n1
k2
Fydy
st:
Qi,i 1 Qi,i ,
i 1,. . .,n1
Qi,i Z 1 ai Qi1,i ,
i 2,. . .,n1:
The objective function can be divided into independent members problems. However the constraints cannot be separated by
members due to the coupling constraint (7). The constraint (7)
implies that two adjacent members must agree on the same order
quantity. The constraint (8) is a local constraint of safety stocks
for member i.
To solve the problem (6)(8), it is decomposed into subproblems requiring only the information available to the corresponding decision maker. We introduce the Lagrangian multiplier ui
associated to the ith constraint of constraint (7). The augmented
Lagrangian function can be constructed as follows:
Z Qi,i Qi 1,i
n1
X
L pn pn 1 Qn1,n
pi Qi1,i pi 1 Qi,i pi
Fydy
Z
k2
i2
Q1,1
Fydy
i 2,. . .,n1:
i 2,. . .,n2
i n1
n1
X
ui Qi,i 1 Qi,i
i1
n1
X
1
Q
Qi,i 2
2 i,i 1
i1
Qin
i
Y
1 ak Q1n ,
i 2,. . .,n1:
i 2,. . .,
k2
1
Q1,2 tQ1,1 t 12 :
2
10
I.-J. Jeong, V. Jorge Leon / Int. J. Production Economics 135 (2012) 412419
11
415
n
n
t 1pi ai Fai Qi1,i
t 1 0
1 1 ai 2 Qi1,i
19
n
n
t 1 1 ai Qi1,i
t 1
Qi,i
Proof. If the solution satisfying Eqs. (14) and (15) does not satisfy
Qi,i t 1 Z1 ai Qi1,i t 1, the optimal solution exists along
Qi,i t 1 1 ai Qi1,i t 1.
Let
Q Qi1,i t 1
and
Qi,i t 1 1 ai Q then the objective function is
Z ai Q
Fydy
max LQ pi Q pi 1 1 ai Q pi
0
ui1 tQ ui t1 ai Q
1
1
Q Qi1,i1 t2 Qi,i 1 t1 ai Q 2 :
2
2
20
2
Also the above solution is global optimal since @ L=@Qn1,n
t 1 1o 0.
The rst derivative of L(Q) on Q gives the result of Eq. (19) and
the equation gives the global optimal solution since
@2 L
1 1 ai 2 pi ai 2 f ai Q o 0:
@Q 2
&
1
1
Qi1,i t 1Qi1,i1 t2 Qi,i 1 tQi,i t 12
2
2
st:
Qi,i t 1 Z1 ai Qi1,i t 1:
14
15
16
@L
pi pi FQi,i t 1Qi1,i t 1
@Qi1,i t 1
ui1 tQi1,i t 1Qi1,i1 t 0
17
u2 1 u2 0 Q2,3 1Q2,2 1
416
I.-J. Jeong, V. Jorge Leon / Int. J. Production Economics 135 (2012) 412419
6.1. ADM based algorithm for the odd number of member problem
Step 0. Set t 0.
Arbitrary determine ui t, i 1,2, :::,n1.
Arbitrary determine the solutions of odd numbered
members
Q2,1 t, Qn1,n t, Qi 1,i t and Qi1,i t.
Step 1. Obtain new solutions for even numbered members,
Qi 1,i t 1 and
Qi1,i t 1using Eqs. (11), (13), (16) and (17) and Theorem 3.
Step 2. Obtain new solutions for odd numbered members,
Qi 1,i t 1 and
Qi1,i t 1using Eqs. (11), (13), (16) and (17) and Theorem 3.
Step 3. If Qi,i 1 t 1 Qi,i t 1, i 1,2,. . .,n1 then stop.
Otherwise set ui t 1 ui t Qi,i 1 t 1Qi,i t 1,
i 1,2,. . .,n1
and increase t by 1 and go to Step 1.
The information ows of ADM is shown in Fig. 2.
For example, when n5, the decision for each members can be
separated when the decision of members are grouped {1,3,5} and
{2,4}. Once the order quantities for {1,3,5} are given to {2,4},
members of {2,4} can make decision on their own order quantities
independently. In general, if we group odd numbered members as
one group, even numbered members as another group, the
problem can be separated as independent member problems.
In terms of information sharing, note that stock inventory rates
are kept locally and the selling price are shared between the
adjacent members. Also the demand information (i.e., CDF of
customer demand) must be shared among all the members in the
supply chain in order to determine optimal ordering quantities.
Sharing the information of customer demand is a well known
strategy to alleviate the so called Bullwhip Effect in a supply
chain. The Bullwhip effect is the phenomenon that the amplication of order quantity and inventory level increases from the
downstream to the upstream of a supply chain.
The DQAM based algorithm starts with an arbitrary solution of
all members in the problem. Since all the adjacent solutions are
i 1,2,. . .,n1:
I.-J. Jeong, V. Jorge Leon / Int. J. Production Economics 135 (2012) 412419
417
Fig. 3. Information ows of DQAM for a general n-serial supply chain problem.
120
100
80
Q
60
7. Numerical example
40
20
Q1n
p1 p5 1 a2 1 a3
Center
0
11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
i
Fig. 4. Ordering quantities of the retailer and the center of ADM for example.
120
97:47,
100
80
Q
Retailer
60
40
Center
20
Manufacturer
0
11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
i
Fig. 5. Ordering quantities of the center and the manufacturer of ADM for
example.
418
I.-J. Jeong, V. Jorge Leon / Int. J. Production Economics 135 (2012) 412419
140
250
120
200
100
Manufacturer
Supplier
150
80
Q
100
60
50
40
Manufacturer
20
0
Supplier
1
11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
1 15 29 43 57 71 85 99 113 127 141 155 169 183 197 211 225 239
l
Fig. 9. Ordering quantities of the manufacturer and the supplier of DQAM for example.
i
Fig. 6. Ordering quantities of the manufacturer and the supplier of ADM for
example.
Compared to ADM, DQAM requires more iterations to converge and lesser updates of the Lagrangian multipliers. However
the interaction method among members of ADM is more complicated than DQAM. In ADM, members must be partitioned into two
groups and interactions are performed group by group iteratively.
Meanwhile, in DQAM, members interact with adjacent members
simultaneously and independently.
In terms of information sharing, ADM and DQAM methods are
similar. In ADM and DQAM, only the selling price is shared
between two adjacent members the ordering quantities are communicating. However, members in DQAM must maintain and
update the reference point locally during the solution procedure.
8. Conclusion
Fig. 7. Ordering quantities of the retailer and the center of DQAM for example.
250
Center
Manufacturer
200
150
100
50
1 15 29 43 57 71 85 99 113 127 141 155 169 183 197 211 225 239
l
Fig. 8. Ordering quantities of the center and the manufacturer of DQAM for
example.
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ordering quantities placed to upstream, which causes the Bullwhip
effect.
I.-J. Jeong, V. Jorge Leon / Int. J. Production Economics 135 (2012) 412419
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