The People of the Philippines vs Que

Po Lay G.R. No. L-6791, March 29,

1954

own issue laws.The clear object of the above-quoted

provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct
as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia
legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of
a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

CRIMINAL LAW; PENAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS

IMPOSING PENALTIES, NEED BE PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL GAZETTE BEFORE IT MAY BECOME
EFFECTIVE.Circulars and regulations, especially like
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a
penalty for its violation, should be published before
becoming effective. Before the public may be bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
[People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640(1954)]

Same; Same; Same.Perhaps at no time since the

establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance than at
this time when the people have bestowed upon the
President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the
legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the
mass media of the debates and deliberations in the
Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative recordsno such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus,
without publication, the people have no means of knowing
what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated,
much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme
Court of Spain ruled: Bajo la denoroinacin genrica de
leyes, se comprenden tambin los reglamentos, Reales
decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas
de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de
su potestad.

ID.; JURISDICTION; APPEALS; QUESTIONS THAT MAY

BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TiME ON APPEAL.If as a
matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as
required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the
law there was no such circular to be violated and
consequently the accused committed no violation of the
circular, and the trial court may be said to have no
jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding whether or not raised in the court below. [People
vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640(1954)]

Tanada vs Tuvera, G.r. No. L-63915

Decision dated April 24, 1985 and
Resolution dated December 29, 2986

Same; Same; C.A. 638 imposes a duty for publication

of Presidential decrees and issuances as it uses the
words shall be published.The very first clause of
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: There shall be
published in the Official Gazette x x x. The word shall
used therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters

Same; Statutes; Fact that a Presidential Decree or

LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude
their publication in the Official Gazette as they
constitute important legislative acts, particularly in
the present situation where the President may on his

of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The

law itself makes a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must
be included or excluded from such publication.

as to whether the Courts declaration of invalidity apply to

P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their
publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar
situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic
and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
District vs. Baxter Bank.

Same; Same; But administrative and executive

orders and those which affect only a particular class
of persons need not be published.The publication of
all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general
applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption
that they have been circularized to all concerned.

Same; Same; Same; Implementation of Presidential

Decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette may have consequences which cannot be
ignored.Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of
presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is an operative fact which may have consequences
which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration x x x that an allinclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.
Same; Same; Same; Only P.D. Nos. 1019 to 1030,
1278 and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been
published. It is undisputed that none of them has
been implemented.From the report submitted to the
Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in
the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to
1030, inclusive. 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not
been so published. Neither the subject matters nor the texts
of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are
available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
been implemented or enforced by the government. [Taada
vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27(1985)]

Same; Same; Due Process; Publication of Presidential

decrees and issuances of general application is a
matter of due process.It is needless to add that the
publication of presidential issuances of a public nature or
of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It
is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law,
he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decrees and
issuances of general application which have not been
published shall have no force and effect.The Court
therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no
force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this
decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity
of those presidential decrees which were published only
during the pendency of this petition, have put the question

December 26, 1986 Decision

Statutes; Words and Phrases; The clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC refers to the
effectivity of laws and not to the requirement of

publication.After a careful study of this provision and of

the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition
and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion,
and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided"
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
This clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date, without its previous publication.

and not only to those of general application, for strictly

speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there
are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a
law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a
relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does
not affect the public although it unquestionably does not
apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a
matter of public interest which any member of the body
politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a
proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires
act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest even if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
only, and not to the public as a whole.

Same; Same; The prior publication of laws before

they become effective cannot be dispensed with.lt is
not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication
may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such
omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny
the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to
govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that
a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not
unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as
a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to
comply with it but simply because they did not know of its
existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as
is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they
can begin to operate.

Same; Same; Same.We hold therefore that all statutes,

including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Same; Same; Same.Covered by this rule are presidential
decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President
in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.

Same; Same; For purposes of the prior publication

requirement for effectivity, the term "laws" refer not
only to those of general application, but also to laws
of local application, private laws; administrative
rules enforcing a statute; city charters. Central Bank
circulars to "fill-in the details of the Central Bank Act;
but not mere interpretative rules regulating and
providing guidelines for purposes of internal
operations only.The term "laws" should refer to all laws

Same; Same; Same.Interpretative regulations and those

merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,
need not be published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative

superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed

by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the

General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential
decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was
"published" by the Marcos administration. The evident
purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on
this vital law.

Same; Same; Same.Accordingly, even the charter of a

city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to
only a portion of the national territory and directy affects
only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees
must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him
from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars
issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of
the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.

Same; Same; Prior publication of statutes for

purposes of effectivity must be made in full in the
Official Gazette and not elsewhere.At any rate, this
Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or
to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our
function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is
merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and
approved by the political departments of the government in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently,
we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of
the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the
Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for
their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or
after a different period provided by the legislature.

Same; Same; Local Governments; Internal

instructions issued by an administrative agency are
not covered by the rule on prior publication. Also not
covered are municipal ordinances which are
governed by the Local Government Code.However,
no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say,
the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be
made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the
head of a government agency on the assignments or
workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.
Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by
this rule but by the Local Government Code.

Same; Same; Laws must be published as soon as possible.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or
at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law
pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of
course, although not suggested by the parties that a law
could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as
required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to
examine at this time. [Taada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA
446(1986)]

Same; Same; Publication of statutes must be in full

or it is no publication at all.We agree that the
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since
its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere
mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title
of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the
publication requirement. This is not even substantial

La Bugal Blaan Tribal Association vs

Ramos, G.R. 127882, Jan 27, 2004
4

Same; Statutes; Statutory Construction; Executive

Order (E.O.) No. 279; There is nothing in E.O. No. 200
that prevents a law from taking effect on a date
other thaneven beforethe 15-day period after its
publication; Where a law provides for its own date of
effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by
E.O. No. 200.It bears noting that there is nothing in E.O.
No. 200 that prevents a law from taking effect on a date
other thaneven beforethe 15-day period after its
publication. Where a law provides for its own date of
effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by E.O.
No. 200. Indeed, this is the very essence, of the phrase
unless it is otherwise provided in Section 1 thereof.
Section 1, E.O. No. 200, therefore, applies only when a
statute does not provide for its own date of effectivity. What
is mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and what due process
requires, as this Court held in Taada v. Tuvera, is the
publication of the law for without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim ignorantia legis n[eminem] excusat. It would
be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

application. It is significant to note that E.O. No. 279 was

actually published in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.
From a reading then of Section 8 of E.O. No. 279, Section 1
of E.O. No. 200, and Taada v. Tuvera, this Court holds that
E.O. No. 279 became effective immediately upon its
publication in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987. [La
Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos, 421 SCRA
148(2004)]

Umali vs Estanislao, G.R. No. 104037,

May 29, 1992
Section 3 of R.A. 6965 contains the effectivity clause which
provides. This Act shall take effect upon its approval'
R.A. 6965 was approved on September 19, 1990. It was
published in the Philippine Journal, a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, on September 20, 1990.
Pursuant to the Act, an implementing regulation was issued
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Revenue
Memorandum Circular 85-90, stating that R.A. 6965 took
effect on October 5, 1990. Petitioner took exception thereof
and argued that the law took effect on September 20, 1990
instead.

Same; Same; Same; From a reading then of Section 8

of E.O. No. 279, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200, and Taada
v. Tuvera, this Court holds that E.O. No. 279 became
effective immediately upon its publication in the
Official Gazette on 3 August 1987.While the effectivity
clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is
not a ground for its invalidation since the Constitution, being
the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, is deemed written in the law. Hence, the due
process clause, which, so Taada held, mandates the
publication of statutes, is read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279.
Additionally, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200 which provides for
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines, finds suppletory

Pertinent is Article 2 of the Civil Code (as amended by

Executive Order No. 200) which provides:
'Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication either in the official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. x x x'
In the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (L-63915, December 29,
1986, 146 SCRA 446, 452) we construed Article 2 ofthe Civil
Code and laid down the rule:
'x x x: the) clause 'unless it is otherwise provided' refers to
the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of

publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.

This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date without its previous publication/

Weekly Courier, states that it is 'a newspaper of general

circulation in wi wi wi Rizal; and that the Notice of Sheriff s
sale was published in said paper on June 30, July 7 and July
14, 1968.' This constitutes prima facie evidence of compliance with the requisite publication. (Sadang v. GSIS, 18
SCRA 491). To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is
enough that 'it is published for the dissemination of local
news and general information; that it has a bona fide
subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at
regular intervals.' (Basa v. Mercado, 61 Phil. 632). The
newspaper need not have the largest circulation so long as
it is of general circulation. (Banta v. Pacheco, 74 Phil. 67)."

'Publication is indispensable in every case, but the

legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. x x x'
Inasmuch as R.A. 6965 has no specific date for its effectivity
and neither can it become effective upon its approval
notwithstanding its express statement, following Article 2 of
the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, supra,
R.A. 6965 took effect fifteen days after September 20, 1990,
or specifically, on October 5, 1990."

Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decree No. 1079 and

Act 3135 do not require that the newspaper which
publishes judicial notices should be a daily
newspaper.Petitioner also claims that the New Record is
not a daily newspaper because it is published only once a
week. A perusal of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1079 and
Act 3135 shows that the said laws do not require that the
newspaper which publishes judicial notices should be a daily
newspaper. Under P.D. 1079, for a newspaper to qualify, it is
enough that it be a "newspaper or periodical which is
authorized by law to publish and which is regularly
published for at least one (1) year before the date of
publication" which requirement was satisfied by New
Record. Nor is there a requirement, as stated in the said law,
that the newspaper should have the largest circulation in
the place of publication.

Accordingly, the Court rules that Rep. Act 7167 took effect
on 30 January 1992, which is after fifteen (15) days following
its publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya." [Umali
vs. Estanislao, 209 SCRA 446(1992)]

Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. vs.

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., 265
SCRA 72 , November 28, 1996
Mortgages; Foreclosure of Mortgage; Publication of
Notices; Words and Phrases; To be a newspaper of
general circulation, it is enough that it is published
for the dissemination of local news and general
information, that it has a bona fide subscription list
of paying subscribers, and that it is published at
regular intervals.In the case of Bonnevie v. Court of
Appeals, we had already made a ruling on this point: "The
argument that the publication of the notice in the 'Luzon
Weekly Courier' was not in accordance with law as said
newspaper is not of general circulation must likewise be
disregarded. The affidavit of publication, executed by the
publisher, business/advertising manager of the Luzon

Same; Same; Same; There was substantial

compliance with the requirements of Sec. 2 of P.D.
1079 when it was the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court who caused the publication of the notice
of sale by the newspaper selected by means of raffle.
Petitioner contends that, since it was the Executive Judge
who caused the publication of the notice of the sale and not
the Sheriff, the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage

should be deemed annulled. Petitioners contention in this

regard is bereft of merit, because Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1079
clearly provides that: "The executive judge of the court of
first instance shall designate a regular working day and a
definite time each week during which the said judicial
notices or advertisements shall be distributed personally by
him for publication to qualified newspapers or periodicals wi
wi x, which distribution shall be done by raffle." The said
provision of the law is clear as to who should personally
distribute the judicial notices or advertisements to qualified
newspapers for publication. There was substantial
compliance with the requirements when it was the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati who caused the
publication of the said notice by the newspaper selected by
means of raffle. [Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. vs.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., 265 SCRA 72(1996)]

Same; Same; Same; Prospectivity principle has been made

to apply to administrative rulings and circulars.The
prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to
administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA
142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect
adversely to a taxpayer; Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA
317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission
on Elections, which directed the holding of recall
proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v.
CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given
retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent
appointment an employee whose temporary appointment
had expired before the Circular was issued.
Same; Same; Same; Principle of prospectivity has
also been applied to judicial decisions.The principle
of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions
which, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless
evidence of what the laws mean, ** (this being) the reason
why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system **.

Co vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 444

, October 28, 1993
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal.
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines, according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. Laws
shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration
that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code:
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal **.

Same; Same; Same; Courts decision of September

21, 1987 in Que vs. People xxx should not be given
retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner
and other persons similarly situated.It would seem,
then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the
proposition that the Courts decision of September 21, 1987
in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987)i.e., that a check
issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation
is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22should not be given
retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and
other persons similarly situated, who relied on the official

opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not

fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent has

unequivocably waived his right to bail.Consequently,
having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody,
private respondent had unequivocably waived his right to
bail.

Same; Same; Same; Court sees no compelling reason

why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override
the principle of prospectivity.This is after all a criminal
action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental
doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason
why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the
principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as
hereinabove set out and discussed, negativing criminal
liability. [Co vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 444(1993)]

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Definition of

waiver.Waiver is defined as a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal
right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except
for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary
abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right
known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall
be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its
benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the
relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an
act inconsistent with claiming it.

Cui vs. Arellano University, 2 SCRA

205 , May 30, 1961
Contracts; Students and educational institutions;
Scholarships; Stipulation whereby student cannot
transfer to another school without refunding
scholarship cash null and void.The stipulation in a
contract, between a student and the school, that the
students scholarship is good only if he continues in the
same school, and that he waives his right to transfer to
another school without refunding the equivalent of his
scholarship in cash is contrary to public policy and, hence,
null and void because scholarships are awarded in
recognition of merit and to help gifted students in whom
society has an established interest or a first lien, and not to
keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige
and increase its business potential. [Cui vs. Arellano
University, 2 SCRA 205(1961)]

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What rights and

privileges may be waived.As to what rights and
privileges may be waived, the authority is settled: x x x the
doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any
character, and, since the word waiver covers every
conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may
waive any matter which affects his property, and any
alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which
belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether
secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed
by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in
the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not
infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the
waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and
does not contravene public policy; and the principle is
recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to
waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the
benefit and protection of the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished
without infringing on any public right, and without detriment

People vs. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 ,

June 05, 1991
8

to the community at large. x x x Although the general rule is

that any right or privilege conferred by statute or
guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in
derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver
will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of
others, or would be against public policy or morals and the
public interest may be waived. While it has been stated
generally that all personal rights conferred by statute and
guaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also been
said that constitutional provisions intended to protect
property may be waived, and even some of the
constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are
subjects of waiver.

principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. This

doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was
applied by the English courts and was later adopted by the
United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato
S. Punos discussion on the historical development of this
legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v.
Commission on Elections, 505 SCRA 160 (2006) is
enlightening: x x x
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The
interpretation or construction of a law by courts
constitutes a part of the law as of the date the
statute is enactedit is only when a prior ruling of this
Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor
of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith.Respondents argument that the
doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should
not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the
principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same
argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v.
Pesca, 356 SCRA 588 (2001) and again in Antonio v. Reyes,
484 SCRA 353 (2006). In these cases, we explained that the
interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes
a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is
only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to
be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied
on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex
prospicit, non respicit.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rights to

bail is another of the constitutional rights which can
be waived.We hereby rule that the right to bail is another
of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right
which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would
not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law. [People vs. Donato, 198 SCRA 130(1991)]

Ting vs. Velez-Ting, 582 SCRA 694 ,

March 31, 2009
Judgments; Stare Decisis; Legal Research; The
doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis
was applied by the English courts and was later
adopted by the United States.The principle of stare
decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on
the principle that once a question of law has been examined
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to
relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple
reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the

Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Declaration of

Nullity; Psychological Incapacity; Legal Research;
Courts should interpret Article 36 of the Family Code
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals; Far

Pesca vs. Pesca, 356 SCRA 588 , April

17, 2001

from abandoning Republic v. Court of Appeals and

Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), the Court in Ngo Te v.
Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009, 579 SCRA
193, simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent
requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the
explanation given by the Committee on the Revision
of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10SC).It was for this reason that we found it necessary to
emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals. Far from abandoning Molina,
we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent
requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation
given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the
rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.: To require the petitioner to allege in
the petition the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report
of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to
be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect
access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there
are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus,
the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent
requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the
examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts
shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial
conference. [Ting vs. Velez-Ting, 582 SCRA 694(2009)]

Same; Same; Judgments; Doctrine of Stare Decisis;

Statutory Construction; The interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law.The doctrine of stare decisis, ordained in
Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal
maximlegis interpretado legis vim obtinetthat the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction
placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and
construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the
date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of
this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance
therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non
respicit. [Pesca vs. Pesca, 356 SCRA 588(2001)]

National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson,

29 SCRA 70 , August 27, 1969
Civil law; Application of laws; Article 18 of Civil Code
explained; Term "year" as used in our laws is limited
to 365 days.Prior to the approval of the Civil Code of
Spain, the Supreme Court thereof held, on March 80, 1887,
that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a "'natural"
month or "solar" month, in the absence of 'express provision
to the contrary. Such provision was incorporated into the
Civil Code of Spain, subsequently promulgated. Hence, the
same Supreme Court declared that, pursuant to Article 7 of
said Code, "whenever months are referred to in the law, it

10

shall be understood that the months are of 30 days," not the

"'natural," "solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are
"designated by name," in which case "they shall be
computed by the actual number of days they have." This
concept was, later, modified in the Philippines, by Section 13
of the Revised Administrative Code, pursuant to which,
"month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month."
With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (RA
386) we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil
Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered
as the regular 30-day month and not the solar or civil month
with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Civil Code
merely mentioned "months, days or nights," ours has added
thereto the term "years" and explicitly ordains in Article 13
that it shall be understood that years are of three hundred
sixty-five days."

is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted return. But

how should the two-year prescriptive period be computed?
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that
when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be
equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v.
Tecson, 29 SCRA 70 (1969), we ruled that a year is
equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular
year or a leap year.
Same; Words and Phrases; Calendar Month; A
calendar month is a month designated in the
calendar without regard to the number of days it may
contain.A calendar month is a month designated in the
calendar without regard to the number of days it may
contain. It is the period of time running from the beginning
of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the
corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there
is not a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up
to and including the last day of that month. To illustrate,
one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from
January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month
from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until
February 29, 2008.

Same; Same; Same; Article 18 defining "years" to

mean 365 days is unrealistic; Remedy is not judicial
legislation.Although some justices of the Supreme Court
are inclined to think that Article 13 of the Civil Code defining
"years" to mean 365 days is not realistic, the remedy is not
judicial legislation. If public interest demands a reversion to
the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this
may be done through legislative process, not by judicial
decree. [National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson, 29 SCRA
70(1969)]

Same; Same; Same; Court holds that Section 31,

Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987, being the more recent law, governs the
computation of legal periods.Both Article 13 of the
Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject
matterthe computation of legal periods. Under the Civil
Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a
regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code
of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar
months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of
1987, the number of days is irrelevant. There obviously
exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing
legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.

Primetown Property Group, Inc., 531
SCRA 436 , August 28, 2007
Taxation; Prescription; The rule is that the two-year
prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the
final adjusted return; A year is equivalent to 365
days regardless of whether it is a regular year of a
leap year.The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period

11

Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31,

Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987,
being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal
periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori. [Commissioner of
Internal Revenue vs. Primetown Property Group, Inc., 531
SCRA 436(2007)]

Private International Law; Determination of

citizenship; U.S. citizenship not lost by stay in
Philippines before independence.The citizenship that
the deceased acquired in California when he resided there
from 1904 to 1913 was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States
until 1946, and the deceased appears to have considered
himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen
of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another.

Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867 ,

November 01, 1924

Same; Validity of testamentary provisions; Meaning

of national law in Article 16, Civil Code; Conflict of
law rules in California to be applied in case at bar.
The national law indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
cannot possibly apply to any general American Law,
because there is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of
the union having its own private law applicable to its
citizens only and in force only within the state. It can
therefore refer to no other than the private law of the state
of which the decedent was a citizen. In the case at bar, the
State of California prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens,
an internal law for its citizens residing therein and a conflict
of law rules for its citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions.
Hence, reason demands that the California conflict of law
rules should be applied in this jurisdiction in the case at bar.

FOREIGN LAWS; PRESUMPTION.In the absence of

evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject
are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
(Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
POSTPONEMENT OF PROCEEDING; DISCRETION.It is
discretionary on the part of the court to postpone or not to
postpone a particular proceeding in a case, and when the
person applying for it has already been given ample
opportunity to present the evidence that he wishes to
introduce, the court commits no abuse of discretion in
denying it.
SUCCESSIONS; CONDITIONAL LEGACY; CONDITION
CONTRARY TO LAW; NULLITY OF.If the condition
imposed upon the legatee is that he respect the testator's
order that his property be distributed in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines and not in accordance with the laws
of his nation, said condition is illegal, because, according to
article 10 of the Civil Code, said laws govern his
testamentary disposition, and, being illegal, shall be
considered unwritten, thus making the institution
unconditional. [Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867(1924)]

Same; Same; Domicile; Factors considered in

determining aliens domicile in the Philippines.An
American citizen who was born in New York, migrated to
California, resided there for nine years, came to the
Philippines in 1913, and very rarely returned to California
and only for short visits, and who appears to have never
owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, shall
be considered to have his domicile in the Philippines.

Aznar vs. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95 , January

31, 1963
12

Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, et

al., 109 Phil. 629 , September 30,
1960

Same; Same; Same; Rule of resorting to the law of

the domicile in determining matters with foreign
element involved.The rule laid down of resorting to the
law of the domicile in the determination of matters with
foreign element involved is in accord with the general
principle of American law that the domiciliary law should
govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of
the owner.

1. DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; NOT

ACTIONABLE.It is the clear and manifest intent of
Congress not to sanction actions for breach of promise to
marry.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Court of domicile bound

to apply its own law as directed in the conflict of law
rule of decedents state; Application of the renvoi
doctrine.The conflict of law rule in California, Article 946
Civil Code, refers back the case, when a decedent is not
domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of domicile can not
and should not refer the case back to California, as such
action would leave the issue incapable of determination,
because the case will then be tossed back and forth
between the two states. If the question has to be decided,
the Philippine court must apply its own law as the
Philippines was the domicile of the decedent, as directed in
the conflict of law rule of the state of the decedent,
California, and especially because the internal law of
California provides no legitime for natural children, while the
Philippine law (Articles 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines makes natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them).

2. ID.; ID.; SEDUCTION AS GROUND FOR AWARD OF

MORAL DAMAGES; NATURE OF SEDUCTION
CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 2219 OF NEW CIVIL
CODE.The "seduction" contemplated in Article 2219 of the
New Civil Code as one of the cases where moral damages
may be recovered, is the crime punished as such in Articles
337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN SEDUCTION DOES NOT
EXIST.Where a woman, who was an insurance agent and
former high school teacher, around 36 years of age and
approximately 10 years older than the man, "overwhelmed
by her love" for a man approximately 10 years younger than
her, had intimate relations with him, because she "wanted
to bind" him "by having a fruit of their engagement even
before they had the benefit of clergy," it cannot be said that
he is morally guilty of seduction. [Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 109 Phil. 629(1960)]

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Philippine

law to be applied in case at bar.As the domicile of the
deceased, who was a citizen of California, was the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving
his acknowledged natural child of the latters legacy, should
be governed by the Philippine law, pursuant to Article 946 of
the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of
California. [Aznar vs. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95(1963)]

Wassmer vs. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 ,

December 26, 1964
Damages; Breach of promise to marry; When
actionable wrong.Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise
to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and

13

Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of

Appeals, 219 SCRA 115 , February 19,
1993

publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about

to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which the erring
promissor must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil Code.

Civil Procedure; Appeals; Evidence; It is the rule in

this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb
the trial court's findings as to the credibility of
witnesses.As may be gleaned from the foregoing
summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his
thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to
the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is
the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not
disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of
witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and
having had the opportunity to observe closely their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court
had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case.

Same; Same; Same; Moral and exemplary damages

may be awarded in an actionable breach of promise
suit.When a breach of promise to marry is actionable
under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be
awarded under Article 2219(10) of ,the said Code.
Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Article
2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant
clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
Pleading and practice; Affidavits; Affidavit of merits
in petition for relief must state facts constituting
defense.An affidavit of merits supporting a petition for
relief from judgment must state facts constituting a valid
defense. Where such an affidavit merely states conclusions
or opinions, it is not valid.

Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Only

questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this
Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are,
however, recognized exceptions to this rule.

Same; Trial by commissioner; Clerk of court may he

validly designated.The procedure of designating the
clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is
sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Defendants consent to
designation of commissioner not necessary where he
is in default.The defendants consent to the designation
of the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is
not necessary where he was declared in default and thus
had no standing in Court. [Wassmer vs. Velez, 12 SCRA
648(1964)]

Civil Law; Damages; The existing rule is that a breach

of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong.The existing rule is that a breach of promise to
marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code
the provisions that would have made it so.

14

Amonoy vs. Gutierrez, 351 SCRA 731 ,

February 15, 2001

Same; Same; Same; Article. 21 of the Civil Code

designed to expand the concept of torts or quasidelict in this jurisdiction grants adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books.This
notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article
21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or
quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate
and punish in the statute books.

Damages; Human Relations; Well settled is the

maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate
exercise of a persons rights is a loss without injury
damnum absque injuriafor which the law gives no remedy.
Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the
legitimate exercise of a persons rights is a loss without
injurydamnum absque injuriafor which the law gives no
remedy. In other words, one who merely exercises ones
rights does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for
damages.

Same; Same; Same; Damages pursuant to Article 21

may be awarded not because of promise to marry but
because of fraud and deceit behind itln the light of
the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is
in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by
a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise
was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful
injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.
It is essential, however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. [Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals,
219 SCRA 115(1993)]

Same; Same; Abuse of Rights; Temporary Restraining

Orders; Even if the acts of a party may have been
legally justified at the outset, their continuation after
the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious
abuse of his righthis acts constituted not only an abuse
of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been
suspended.Although the acts of petitioner may have been
legally justified at the outset, their continuation after the
issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his
right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith.
Had he not insisted on completing the demolition,
respondents would not have suffered the loss that
engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily, his acts
constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid
exercise of a right that had been suspended when he
received the TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then,
he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition.
Same; Same; Same; The exercise of a right ends
when the right disappears, and it disappears when it
is abused, especially to the prejudice of others.A
commentator on this topic explains: The exercise of a right
ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is

15

abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a

right without the spirit of justice which gives it life, is
repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot be
said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily
prejudices another x x x. Over and above the specific
precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice x
x x; and he who violates them violates the law. For this
reason, it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice
others. [Amonoy vs. Gutierrez, 351 SCRA 731(2001)]

Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in

order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Where the trial court
and the appellate court reached divergent and
irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts
and evidence of the case, the Supreme Court is left
without choice but to use its latent power to review
such findings of facts.The general rule is that we are
not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
and revising errors of law. One of the exceptions to this
general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. The
lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask
Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely
and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held
that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly
embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food
and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other
guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was
Dr. Filarts invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Reyes,

452 SCRA 532 , February 28, 2005
Actions; Human Relations; Torts and Damages;
Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria; The doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is
not esteemed in law as injury) refers to a selfinflicted injury or to the consent to injury which
precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger,
even if he is not negligent in doing so.Petitioners Lim
and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for
damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being
asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in
the process) as he was a gate-crasher. The doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not
esteemed in law as injury) refers to self-inflicted injury or to
the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of
damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed
himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. As
formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not
find application to the case at bar because even if
respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave
the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New

Same; Same; Same; Evidence; It is a basic rule in civil cases

that he who alleges proves.Another problem with Mr.
Reyess version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a
basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr.
Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his
story up. All his witnessesDanny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero
and Alexander Silvaproved only that it was Dr. Filart who
invited him to the party.
Same; Same; Same; Party Gatecrashers; A person
who did not abuse her right in asking a person to
leave a party to which he was not invited cannot be
made to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code.Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to
ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited,

16

cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19

and 21 of the Civil [Code. Necessarily, neither can her
employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs
from that of its employee.

obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to

ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and
has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is
legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom,
public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to
injure. A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,
and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A complaint based on Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has
nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes
has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against
him. These two people did not know each other personally
before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had
nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged
abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being
single at 44 years old, had a very strong bias and
prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her
associates in her work at the hotel with foreign
businessmen. The lameness of this argument need not be
belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it
has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and
conjectures.

Same; Same; Same; Principle of Abuse of Rights;

Article 19 of the Civil Code, known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and
social grievances, the object of the article being to
set certain standards which must be observed not
only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the
performance of ones duties.Article 19, known to
contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and
social grievances. Article 19 states: Art. 19. Every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. Elsewhere, we explained
that when a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of
this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must
be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also
in the performance of ones duties. These standards are the
following: act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily,
is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements
are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which
is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for
damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Bad judgment which, if

done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad
faith.The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to
leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the
circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur
on the appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims act of
personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying
from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to
a cause of action predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of

Same; Same; Same; Same; A common theme runs

through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act
complained of must be intentional.Article 20 pertains
to damages arising from a violation of law which does not

17

Bunag, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 211

SCRA 440 , July 10, 1992

consideration of one person, which calls not only protection

of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Without proof
of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lims act of by-passing
Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially
because she did inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who
told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. If at all, Ms.
Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good
intentions, cannot amount to bad faith. [Nikko Hotel Manila
Garden vs. Reyes, 452 SCRA 532(2005)]

Civil Law; Damages; Generally, a breach of promise

to marry per se is not actionable except, where the
plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the
wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.It is
true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored
rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no
standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith
of such promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to
marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has
actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the
necessary incidents thereof.

Pe vs. Pe, 5 SCRA 200 , May 30, 1962

Damages; Acts contrary to morals.Defendant won
Lolita's affection thru an ingenious scheme or trickery and
seduced her to the extent of making her fall in love with
him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the
house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach
him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his
visits to the latter's family defendant was allowed free
access because he was a collateral relative and was
considered as a member of her family, the two eventually
fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love
affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used
to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their
illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents,
defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even
from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation
proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national.
Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with
Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home.
Held:The wrong defendant has caused Lolita and her family
is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a
married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's
family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil
Code. [Pe vs. Pe, 5 SCRA 200(1962)]

Same; Same; Award of moral damages is allowed in

cases specified in or analogous to those provided in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code.However, the award of
moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous
to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to
paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for moral damages.
Criminal Procedure; Penalty; Extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of civil
liability unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist.Generally,
the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability
will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same
felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to

18

another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof.

Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist.

which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code

to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven
that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing
spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance
with pertinent provisions of law.

Same; Same; Same; The dismissal did not in any way

affect the right of herein private respondent to
institute a civil action arising from the offense
because such preliminary dismissal of the penal
action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action.In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint
for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of
the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the
dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private
respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense
because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did
not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. [Bunag, Jr.
vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 440(1992)]

Same; Same; Same; Whether wittingly or unwittingly,

it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge
to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
groom.In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not
institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his
first wifes presumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether
wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of
respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit
submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the
law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void,
marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, The
following marriage shall be void from the beginning; (4)
Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article
41.

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,

vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY,
respondent.

Same; Same; Same; Instances where a marriage can

be held outside of the judges chambers or
courtroom.As the aforequoted provision states, a
marriage can be held outside of the judges chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of
death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or
(3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn
statement to this effect.

Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Even if the spouse

present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in
order to contract a subsequent marriage.There is
nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this
provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement

Same; Same; Same; Article 8 which is a directory provision,

refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does
not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer.
Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is
the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7,
marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts

19

jurisdiction. Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers

only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not
alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court finds

respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the
law.Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted
in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable
in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and
uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondents
failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of
the law. [Navarro vs. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129(1996)]

Same; Same; Same; Where a judge solemnizes a

marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3 which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability.A priest who is
commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the
faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the
diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court
Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the
venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner,

vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO,
respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; The authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize
marriages is confined to their jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court.Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court
judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages
is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court.

Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Judges; By

citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds
for the exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Inasmuch as respondent judges jurisdiction covers the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed
with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the
exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his
misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated
a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.

Same; Same; Where a judge solemnizes a marriage

outside the courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.A priest who is commissioned
and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place
allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice
of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to

20

solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the

requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges
who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity
of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.

reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be

bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter
which involves the Courts constitutional power to discipline
judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught,
undermine the trust character of a public office and impair
the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining
authority. [Araes vs. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402(2002)]

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian

ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL,
INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO
NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent.

Same; Same; Except in cases provided by law, it is

the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.In
People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the
issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or
even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.

Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; A valid marriage

license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of
the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80 (3) in
relation to Article 58.A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio
pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional
mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an inviolable social
institution, and is the foundation of family life which shall
be protected by the State. This is why the Family Code
considers marriage as a special contract of permanent
union and case law considers it not just an adventure but
a lifetime commitment.

Same; Same; The withdrawal of the complaint does

not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating
respondent from disciplinary action.Respondent
judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of
Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently
held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the
complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of
exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise,
the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.
Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely
private or personal matters. They can not be made to
depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one

21

Same; Same; Same; There are several instances

recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with.There are several instances
recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least
five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license
is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with
the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicants name
for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage
license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their
status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping
and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the
source of gossip arising from the publication of their names,
the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt
them from that requirement.

time within the 5 years and continuitythat is unbroken.

Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements
must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and
a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is
based on the approximation of the requirements of the law.
The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply
with every single requirement and later use the same
missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify
their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing
a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a
license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment
to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar.

Same; Same; Same; The five-year common-law

cohabitation period, which is counted back from the
date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage.Working on the assumption that Pepito and
Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five
years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period
should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as
husband and wife where the only missing factor is the
special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other
words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which
is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the
years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivitymeaning no third party was involved at any

Same; Same; Same; Any marriage subsequently

contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse
shall be illegal and void.This is the same reason why
our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person
during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of
absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or
annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law
in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the
having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e.,
bigamy and concubinage and adultery. The law sanctions
monogamy.

22

Same; Same; Same; The subsistence of the marriage

even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make
any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as husband and wife.Even
assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact,
and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living
with each other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not
the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the
nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when
he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of
the marriage even where there was actual severance of the
filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being
one as husband and wife.

even after the death of either party but voidable marriages

can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can
assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.
Same; Same; Same; No judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. A void marriage does not require a judicial decree
to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order
of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; Void marriages can be

questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either,
in which case the parties and their offspring will be
left: as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.The
Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is
void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned

Same; Same; Same; Other than for purposes of

remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare
a marriage an absolute nullity.Other than for purposes
of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but
not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of decla- ration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such

23

previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code

connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained
only for purpose of remarriage. [Nial vs. Bayadog, 328
SCRA 122(2000)]

contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot

deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting
previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their
separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to
before him.

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO,
petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R.
SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan,
respondent.

Same; Same; Same; Legal Separation; Legal separation does

not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry, and this holds true all the more when the
separation is merely de facto.The fact that Manzano and
Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses
for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the
Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of
legal separation to live separately from each other, but in
such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise
stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie,
much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true
all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in
the case at bar.

Marriage; Marriage Licenses; Husband and Wife;

Legal Ratification of Marital Cohabitation; Requisites.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital
cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other, 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between
the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The
parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have
lived together for at least five years [and are without legal
impediment to marry each other]; and 5. The solemnizing
officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had
found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Same; Same; Same; Just like separation, free and

voluntary cohabitation with another person for at
least five years does not severe the tie of a
subsisting previous marriagemarital cohabitation
for a long period of time between two individuals
who are legally capacitated to marry each other is
merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license.Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the
Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife
for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years does
not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital
cohabitation for a long period of time between two
individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other
is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It

Same; Same; Same; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the

Law; A judge ought to know that a subsisting
previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which
would make the subsequent marriage null and void.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting
previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would
make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his
Comment, he stated that had he known that the late
Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from

24

could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to

solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the
impediment of a prior existing marriage.

contrast to the old Marriage Law, whereby the

absence of a marriage license did not make the
marriage void; The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license under the Civil Code
is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper government
official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage.Article 58 makes explicit that no marriage shall
be solemnized without a license first being issued by the
local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an
exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not
those under Article 75. Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes
it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing
more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact
that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. This
is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law, whereby the
absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage
void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the
authority granted by the State to the contracting parties,
after the proper government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage.

Same; Same; Same; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the

Law; A judge demonstrates gross ignorance of the
law when her solemnizes a void and bigamous
marriage.Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law
excuses no one has special application to judges, who,
under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be
the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And
when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the
failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
[Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1(2001)]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT,
respondent.

Same; Same; Ratification of Marital Cohabitation; The

reason for the law on ratification of marital
cohabitation, whereby no marriage license is
required, is that the publicity attending a marriage
license may discourage such persons who have lived
in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital
cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which
provides: ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary
when a man and a woman who have attained the age of
majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing

G.R. No. 179474.March 28, 2008.*

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, petitioner, vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, respondent.
Marriages; Marriage License; A marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void,
this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is
the essence of the marriage contract, in stark

25

facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to

administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that
he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications
of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage. The reason for the law, as
espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity
attending a marriage license may discourage such persons
who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing
their status.

should be strictly but reasonably construed. They extend

only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather
than the exception. Where a general rule is established by
statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former
or add to the latter by implication. For the exception in
Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man
and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and
that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years.

Same; Same; Same; The falsity of an affidavit of

marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement,
effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for
lack of a marriage license.It is not contested herein
that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without
a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of
this union, they desire to marry each other. One of the
central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the
falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the
parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year
requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio
for lack of a marriage license. We answer in the affirmative.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A strict but reasonable

construction of Article 76 of the Civil Code leaves the
Court with no other expediency but to read the law
as it is plainly writtenthe exception of a marriage
license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and
desire to marry each other.A strict but reasonable
construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other
expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The
exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only
to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil
Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period
requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading
of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is
precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation
is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For
a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this
material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the
law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes
of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article
76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state
the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official,
priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages

Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction;

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless,
the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of
the formal requisite of a marriage license, and under
the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a
general rule, should be strictly but reasonably
construed.Marriages of exceptional character are,
doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability
of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules
of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule,

26

and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that

he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and

Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24
November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.

Same; Same; Same; The question as to whether they

satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in
nature.It is noteworthy that the question as to whether
they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in
nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to
decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Under
Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this
Courts review. It is already well-settled that: The general
rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is
when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case
the administrative body, make contradictory findings.
However, the exception does not apply in every instance
that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or
administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the
Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such
findings are supported by the record or based on substantial
evidence.

Same; Same; Same; The solemnization of a marriage

without prior license is a clear violation of the law
and would lead or could be used, at least, for the
perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties, which was one of the evils that the law
sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage.The declaration of
the Civil Code that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties
marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation
of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into
without the requisite marriage license or compliance with
the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional
circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior
license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could
be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against
innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that
the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage
as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true
and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as
well. To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a
marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the
law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of
marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that
violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.

Same; Same; Same; The rule that persons dwelling

together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married does not
apply to a case which does not involve an apparent
marriage.Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption
of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no
applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak
of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the
prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. Restated more explicitly, persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in
the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married. The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still

Same; Same; Same; The falsity of the allegation in

the sworn affidavit relating to the period of the
parties cohabitation, which would have qualified

27

their marriage as an exception to the requirement for

a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for
it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by
the parties under oathif the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of
paper, without force and effect.We are not impressed
by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under
a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated
by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited
for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is
flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of
the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here,
there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of
the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of
Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified
their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a
marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers
to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the
essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a
mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as
if there was no affidavit at all.

Same; Declaration of Nullity; Prescription; An action

for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.The Republic
further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is
deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage
for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990,
notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina
Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven
years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence,
estoppel had set in. This is erroneous. An action for nullity of
marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisas marriage was
celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can
be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the
right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and
may be raised any time.
Same; Same; Common-Law Cohabitation Period; To
settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the
rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation
period under Article 76 means a five-year period
computed back from the date of celebration of
marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of a marriage.To settle all
doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the fiveyear common-law cohabitation period under Article 76
means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the
years immediately preceding the day of the marriage,
characterized by exclusivitymeaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five yearsand continuity
that is unbroken. [Republic vs. Dayot, 550 SCRA 435(2008)]

Same; Same; Same; Equity; Equity finds no room for

application where there is a law.In its second
assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument
that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because
he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit
from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must
be stated that equity finds no room for application where
there is a law. There is a law on the ratification of marital
cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76
of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent
that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is
without prejudice to their criminal liability.

28

validity of two marriages despite the main case being a

claim for death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held that the
Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO,

petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAODE CASTRO, respondent.
Civil Law; Marriages; Filiation; The validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked; Other than for
purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
The Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner
and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA
122 (2000), we held: However, other than for purposes of
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but
not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained
only for purpose of remarriage.

Same; Same; Same; Under the Family Code, the

absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a
defect in any of the essential requisites shall render
the marriage voidable.Under the Family Code, the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any
of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence
presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a
marriage license when they contracted their marriage.
Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had
been living together for more than five years. However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the
affidavit when she was asked during crossexamination, thus
ATTY. CARPIO: QBut despite of (sic) the fact that you have
not been living together as husband and wife for the last
five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the
Affidavit, is that correct? AYes, sir.
Same; Same; Same; Failure to obtain and present a
marriage license renders the marriage void ab initio.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to

Same; Same; Same; Court may pass upon the validity

of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case.In Nicdao
Cario v. Yee Cario, 351 SCRA 127 (2001), the Court ruled
that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the

29

humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with

the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicants name
for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no
scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of
paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Formal Requisites of

Marriage.As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was
solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or
the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The
pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case
are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows: Art. 3. The
formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the
solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in
the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A
marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age. Art. 4. The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). A defect in any of
the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable
as provided in Article 45. An irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Art. 35. The
following marriages shall be void from the beginning: x x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those
covered by the preceding Chapter.

Same; Same; Same; Illegitimate children may

establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners
illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation
in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children. Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. [De
Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro, 545 SCRA 162(2008)]

Remedial Law; Evidence; Disputable Presumptions;

Presumption of Regularity; Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131
of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption
that an official duty has been regularly performed,
absent contradiction or other evidence to the
contrary; The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.Under Sec.
3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the
contrary. We held, The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, petitioner, vs.

GLORIA GOO ABBAS, respondent.
30

or failure to perform a duty. No such affirmative evidence

was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records of their office,
thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of
a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage
License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to
the court. The fact that the names in said license do not
correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn
the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent
search of the records of her office.

Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same

Code.All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a
wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract
was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid
marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when
it says, The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35(2). Article 35(3) of the Family Code also
provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is
void from the beginning, except those exempt from the
license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title
I of the same Code. [Abbas vs. Abbas, 689 SCRA 646(2013)]

Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Marriage License;

Evidence; The certification of the Local Civil Registrar
that their office had no record of a marriage license
was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license.In the case of Cario v. Cario, following the case
of Republic, it was held that the certification of the Local
Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage
license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license. The case of Cario further held that the presumed
validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome,
and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid
marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the
required marriage license had been secured. Gloria has
failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that
can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued.
It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the
marriage license that would not affect the validity of the
marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent.
No marriage license was proven to have been issued to
Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiffappellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET

AL., defendants-appellees.
Husband and wife; Foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens decreed after the effectivity of the new Civil
Code; Remarriage of divorced consort.A foreign
divorce between Filipino citizens,, sought and decreed after
the effectivity of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386),
is not entitled to recognition as valid in the Philippines; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of
divorce, entitled to validity in this country.
Same; Same; Same; Innocent consort entitled to
legal separation.The marriage of the divorced wife and
her cohabitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitles the latter to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 35(3) of the Family

Code also provides that a marriage solemnized
without a license is void from the beginning, except
those exempt from the license requirement under

Same; Same; Same; Invalid divorce entitles innocent

consort to recover damages.The desertion and

31

securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles

the other to recover damages.

Husband and Wife; Judgments; Marriages; Divorce; A

divorce decree granted by a U.S. Court between a
Filipina and her American husband is binding on the
American husband.There can be no question as to the
validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent
as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce
is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being
contrary to local law and public policy.

Same; Action for alienation of affections against

parents of one consort; Absence of proof of malice.
An action for alienation of affections against the parents of
one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or
unworthy motives on their part [Tenchavez vs. Escao, 15
SCRA 355(1965)]

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as
Presiding Judge of Branch CX,
Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City, and
RICHARD UPTON, respondents.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Absolute divorce

obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the
Philippines if valid under the national law of such an
alien.lt is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept
of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Certiorari; Denial of motion to dismiss may be the

subject of a certiorari proceeding in certain cases.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is
interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. Certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the
propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court.
However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari
proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to
correct the error committed which, in such a case, is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Prohibition would then lie
since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead
with the proceedings. We consider the petition filed in this
case within the exception, and we have given it due course.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; Actions; An

American granted absolute divorce in his country
with his Filipina wife is estopped from asserting his
rights over property allegedly held in the Philippines
as conjugal property by him and his former wife.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before

32

said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended

spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering
consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional,
and not merely a formal, requirement. While in point of strict
law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in
it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written
complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that
complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding and
without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try
the case.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Succession; An American

granted absolute divorce with Filipina wife is cut off from
marital and successional rights with the latter.To maintain,
as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner
has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq.
of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to private respondent. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
[Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139(1985)]

Same; Same; Same; In prosecutions for adultery and

concubinage, the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody
else.Now, the law specifically provides that in
prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse,
and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lascivousness, no provision is
made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of
the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive
rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above
mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage.

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL,

petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAYSOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C.
VICTOR, in his capacity as the City
Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Complainant must have

the status, capacity or legal representation to do so
at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended
spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that
such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil
actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for
a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the
filing of the complaint or petition.

Criminal Law; Actions; Rule that the crime of adultery

as well as four other crimes against chastity cannot
be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse, a
jurisdictional requirement.Under Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four
other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except

33

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 344 of the

Revised Penal Code presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for adultery.This
policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved
party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. Hence,
as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is
still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for adultery. This is a logical consequence since the
raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where
the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of
the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal
case.

Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and

its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar
as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Same; Same; Same; Rule under American
jurisprudence that after a divorce has been decreed,
the innocent spouse no longer has the right to
institute proceedings against the offender is in pari
materia with ours.American jurisprudence, on cases
involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has
been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right
to institute proceedings against the offenders where the
statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the
exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where,
however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a
divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on
the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The status

and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and indubitably exist
as of the time he initiates the action.In these cases,
therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of
the complainant to commence the action be definitely
established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates
the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the
action would be determined by his status before or
subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such
capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was
acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the
institution of the case. We would thereby have the
anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very
time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Court sees no reason why

the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case
and in our jurisdiction.We see no reason why the same
doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on
the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature,
the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be
determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the
person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent
being no longer the husband of petitioner has no
legal standing to commence the adultery case.Under
the same considerations and rationale, private respondent,
being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the

Same; Same; Divorce; Fact that private respondent

obtained a valid divorce in his country is admitted
and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines.In the present case, the fact that private
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the

34

imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he

filed suit.

obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A.

The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen,
insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries,
litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his
second marriage. x x x We hold that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of
a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead
to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of
the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit
and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of
the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not
within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirit or intent.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Allegation

that private respondent could not have brought this
case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge even if true is of no legal significance or
consequence.The allegation of private respondent that
he could not have brought this case before the decree of
divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal
significance or consequence in this case. When said
respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously
knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage
vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is
decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing
spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the
reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery,
since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to
speak of The severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the
other. [Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653(1989)]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, respondent.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is unanimous

in holding that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227),
should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who
has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
We are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No.
227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who

Family Code; Marriages; Divorce; The Supreme Court

holds that paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree.This case concerns the applicability of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship,

35

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs.

MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON.
JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA,
Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch
149, respondents.

has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign

citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
Same; Same; Same; The reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.We
state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning
point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time
a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when
Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there
was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between
her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien
wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her
to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus
Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed
to remarry.

Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Nullity of

Marriage; Judgments; Foreign Judgment; The court
could modify or alter a judgment even after the same
has become executory.The court could modify or alter a
judgment even after the same has become executory
whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision
unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and
circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or
alteration transpired after the judgment has become final
and executory and when it becomes imperative in the
higher interest of justice or when supervening events
warrant it.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Before the

courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment, it must be shown that the parties opposed
to the judgment have been given ample opportunity
to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section
50 of the Rules of Court.As a general rule, divorce
decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof,
e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still
be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the
effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the
award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must
be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had
been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed
under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court.

Civil Procedure; Declaratory Relief; Requisites of a

Petition for Declaratory Relief.The requisites of a
petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the
party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination. [Republic vs. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA
114(2005)]

36

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A foreign

judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of
the justness of the claim of a party.It is essential that
there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to
properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules
of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in
personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign
judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the
justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to
proof to the contrary. [Roehr vs. Rodriguez, 404 SCRA
495(2003)]

Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Before a foreign

divorce decree can be recognized, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.A
comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as
pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. Therefore, before a
foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Before a foreign
judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence.Respondent, on the other hand, argues that
the Australian divorce decree is a public documenta
written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it
requires no further proof of its authenticity and due
execution. Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a
foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal
of a foreign country.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J.

GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Divorce; Conflict of
Laws; Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce, hence, our courts cannot grant it, and a
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad.At the outset, we
lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points
for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for
absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by
a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of
the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Proof of Foreign

Public or Official Records; Requisites.Under Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication, or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued

37

by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine

foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The burden of

proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of
a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action; Where a divorce decree is a
defense raised by a party, the burden of proving the
pertinent foreign law validating it falls squarely upon
him.The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges
the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution
or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have
the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce
was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving
the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon
him.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A partys failure to

object properly renders a foreign divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the court of another
State.Fortunately for respondents cause, when the
divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but
only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local
Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. Hence,
it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the
judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of
the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; Our courts

do not take judicial notice of foreign lawslike any other
facts, they must be alleged and proved.It is well-settled in
our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters
that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Citizenship; A

former Filipino is no longer bound by Philippine
personal laws after he acquires another States
citizenship.Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13
and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary, respondent was
no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the
legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized
citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former
states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance
to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In its

strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution
of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage; A
decree nisi or an interlocutory ordera conditional or
provisional judgment of divorceis in effect the same
as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is

38

effected.Respondents contention is untenable. In its

strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a
lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces
are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage,
while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of
divorce was procured by respondent. Respondent presented
a decree nisi or an interlocutory decreea conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected. Even after the
divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some
foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage.
Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited
by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was
granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after
proof of good behavior.

concerned; The certificate of legal capacity

mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code is
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of a foreign
nationala duly authenticated and admitted certificate is
prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part
of the alien applicant for a marriage license.Petitioner
argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by
Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together
with the application for a marriage license. According to her,
its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal
capacity to remarry. We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity
to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21
of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish
the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in
court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima
facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the
alien applicant for a marriage license.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The absence of a

certificate of legal capacity is merely an irregularity
in complying with the formal requirements for
procuring a marriage license, an irregularity which
will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated
on the basis of a marriage license issued without that
certificate.In passing, we note that the absence of the
said certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with
the formal requirement for procuring a marriage license.
Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an irregularity will not
affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a
marriage license issued without that certificate. (Vitug,
Compendium, pp. 120-126; Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the
Family Code of the Philippines, 1997 reprint, p. 17; Rufus
Rodriguez, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated,
1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family
Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; A divorce

decree does not raise a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to the civil status of the
person presenting it where no proof has been
presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree
obtained under the foreign law.We also reject the
claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a
disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his
civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been
presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree
obtained under Australian laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certificate of Legal
Capacity; The legal capacity to contract marriage is
determined by the national law of the party

39

Same; Same; Same; Same; A divorce decree does not

ipso facto clothed a divorcee with the legal capacity
to remarryhe must still adduce sufficient evidence
to show the foreign States personal law governing
his status, or at the very least, he should still prove
his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen,
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the court a
quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show
the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the
very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.

the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1,

1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12,
1994. [Garcia vs. Recio, 366 SCRA 437(2001)]

ERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs.

DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
Marriages; Family Code; Husband and Wife;
Declaration of Nullity; Divorce; The Family Code
recognizes only two types of defective marriages
void and voidable marriagesand in both cases, the
basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the
time of the marriage; Divorce contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after
the marriage.The Family Code recognizes only two types
of defective marriagesvoid and voidable marriages. In
both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the
time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court may not declare

the second marriage of a divorcee null and void on
the ground of bigamy where there is a possibility
that, under the foreign law, the divorcee was really
capacitated to remarry as a result of the divorce
decreethe most judicious course is to remand the
case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show the divorcees legal capacity to remarry.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law,
he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct
result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the
most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial
court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners
legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the
court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on
the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Research;

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, Executive Order No. (EO) 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil
v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989).Recognizing the
reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a
Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution, enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227,

40

amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present

wording, as follows: Art. 26. All marriages solemnized
outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Through the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989). In both cases, the Court
refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of
marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between
the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that
the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses.

judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether

in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;
Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides
the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An action
based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the
foreign divorce decreeif the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage.An action based on the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to
the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to
remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court
in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration
for the alien spouse (other than that already established by
the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Essentially,

the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to
have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was
included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to
have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Only the

Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Codethe alien spouse can
claim no right under this provision.Given the rationale
and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC
was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the

41

Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article

26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right
under this provision.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;

Same; The starting point in any recognition of a
foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and lawsthe foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules
on evidence, together with the aliens applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on
the alien himself or herself.The starting point in any
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice
of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within
its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country. This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his
claim or defense.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Conflict of

Laws; Recognition of Foreign Judgments; The
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily
strip such aliens of legal interest to petition the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decreedirect involvement or being
the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to
clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute
an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment.We qualify our above conclusioni.e.,
that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of alienswith the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). In other words, the unavailability
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law
have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence,
serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. * *
* To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the
foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for
the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce
obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.

Conflict of Laws; Recognition of Foreign Judgments;

In the instant case where the foreigner seeking
recognition of the foreign divorce decree attached to
his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as
the required certificates proving its authenticity, but
failed to include a copy of the foreign law on divorce,
the Court deems it more appropriate to remand the
case to the trial court to determine whether the
divorce decree is consistent with the foreign divorce
law, given the Article 26 interests that will be served
and the Filipina wifes obvious conformity with the
petition.In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or
her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of
a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of

42

Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by

(1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer
having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of
official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The
records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of
the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates
proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at
this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to
remand the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law. We deem it more appropriate to take
this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests
that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns)
obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same
time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to
ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is
made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have
the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign

judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for
extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed
above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for
the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code provides.
Same; Same; Civil Registry; While the law requires
the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry,
the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees
registrationthere must first be a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be
given res judicata effect; The registration of the foreign
divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.But
while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the
civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees
registration. The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of
the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing
the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law
when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert
and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of
the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. Evidently, the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement
of a court recognition, as it cited National Statistics Office
(NSO) Circular No. 4, series of 1982, and Department of
Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982both of which
required a final order from a competent Philippine court
before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed
the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the

Same; Same; More than the principle of comity that

is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata
effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as
the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition
and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms.More than the principle of comity that is served by
the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments

43

requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot

produce any legal effect.

parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for
hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have
not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the
petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Same; Same; Cancellation of Entries; The

recognition that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) may
extend to a foreign divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registrya petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is
not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of
Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry; The
Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by
which entries in the civil registry may be judicially
cancelled or correctedRule 108 of the Rules of Court
sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction,
may be annotated in the civil registry.Another point
we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation
of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of
a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation
of entries in the civil registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code
declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries
in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional
and procedural requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be
filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest must be made

Same; Same; Same; Same; The recognition of the

foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact.We hasten to point out,
however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a
foreign divorce decree in the civil registryone for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court)
is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can
serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which
the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured
and in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
[Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266(2010)]

Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198

, February 13, 1997
Family Code; Marriage; Psychological incapacity must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.In
Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking thru
Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that psychological incapacity

44

should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)

incapacity x x x and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso,
a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug
wrote that the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.

Same; Same; Guidelines in the interpretation and

application of Art. 36 of the Family Code.From their
submissions and the Courts own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of
the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance
of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the
state.

Same; Same; Mere showing of irreconcilable

differences and conflicting personalities in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity.On the
other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to
us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a difficulty, if not outright
refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not
physical) illness.

Same; Same; Root cause of psychological incapacity

must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychologicalnot physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully

Same; Same.The evidence adduced by respondent

merely showed that she and her husband could not get
along with each other. There had been no showing of the
gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor
its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no
incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not
psychological incapacity.

45

explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified

psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

personality structure that effectively incapacitates the

person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.

Same; Same; The incapacity must be proven to be

existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

Same; Same; Non-complied marital obligation(s)

must be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.The essential
marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family
Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides: The following are incapable of contracting marbe quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court [Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 268 SCRA 198(1997)]

Same; Same; Such incapacity must be shown to be

medically or clinically permanent or incurable.Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 , October

19, 2000

Same; Same; Such illness must be grave enough to

bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.Such illness must be
grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes.
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the

Actions; Marriage; Husband and Wife; Declaration of

Nullity; Psychological Incapacity; Words and Phrases;
Guidelines Governing the Application and
Interpretation of Psychological Incapacity; The
guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitatedwhat is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition, for indeed, if the totality of

46

evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of

psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to.In
Republic v. CA and Molina, the guidelines governing the
application and the interpretation of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code were
laid down by this Court as follows: x x x x x x x x x The
guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In
fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically
identified. What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the partys psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.

Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce

law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage, it is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Separation;
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted
in psychological incapacity but on physical violence,
moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.Neither is Article 36 to be
equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need
not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence presented
by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not
for declaring a marriage void. [Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA
755(2000)]

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There could be no

conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is
absolutely no showing that the defects were
already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they are incurable.Although this Court is
sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide
material support to the family and may have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts
does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on
his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects
were already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they are incurable.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA

324 , January 16, 1997
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriage; The prolonged
refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with
his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.If a spouse, although
physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Divorce; Article 36

of the Family Code is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves.Article 36 of the

47

causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.

Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of

procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
[Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324(1997)]

Navales vs. Navales, 556 SCRA 272 , June 27,

2008

Same; Same; Same; One of the essential marital

obligations under the Family Code is to procreate
children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is
the basic end of marriage.Evidently, one of the
essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To
procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of
the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Marriage; Declaration of Nullity; Family Code; A.M.

No. 02-11-10-SC; Let it be stressed that it is the
policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution,
and marriage as the foundation of the familythe
Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties; While
the guidelines in Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997) requiring the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to issue a certification
on whether or not it is agreeing or objecting to the petition
for annulment has been dispensed with by A.M. No. 02-1110-SC or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, still,
Article 48 mandates the appearance and active participation
of the State through the fiscal or the prosecuting attorney.
Let it be stressed that it is the policy of our Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the
family. The Constitution decrees marriage as legally
inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. The Family Code under Article 48 therefore requires
courts to order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned,
in cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, to appear on behalf of the State in order to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Indeed, only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor
or the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) will ensure that
the interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declarations of nullity of

Same; Same; Same; While the law provides that the

husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, the
sanction therefor is actually the spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any
legal mandate or court order.While the law provides
that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family
Code), the sanction therefor is actually the spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any
legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120
Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has
nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness.
Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery

48

marriage by preventing collusion between the parties, or the

fabrication or suppression of evidence. While the guidelines
in Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997) requiring the OSG to issue a
certification on whether or not it is agreeing or objecting to
the petition for annulment has been dispensed with by A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, still, Article 48 mandates the appearance and
active participation of the State through the fiscal or the
prosecuting attorney.

as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and

responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume; Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady that
is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. As all people may have certain
quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with
certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that
the intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20
(1995), the Court held that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.

Same; Same; Same; Appeals; The principle that the

factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court
does not apply when the findings of the appellate
court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary
to the admissions of the parties, fail to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion, or when there is a
misappreciation of facts.The Court finds that the
totality of evidence presented by Reynaldo, contrary to its
appreciation by the RTC and the CA, is insufficient to sustain
a finding that Nilda is psychologically incapacitated.
Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by
the CA, are binding on this Court. Such principle however is
not absolute, such as when the findings of the appellate
court go beyond the issues of the case; run contrary to the
admissions of the parties; fail to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts. Such
is the case at bar.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 36 contemplates

downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance
of and to assume basic marital obligationsmere
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is
different from incapacity rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness.Reynaldo and his
witnesses sought to establish that Nilda was a flirt before
the marriage, which flirtatiousness recurred when she
started working as an aerobics instructress. The instances
alleged by Reynaldo, i.e., the occasion when Nilda chose to
ride home with another man instead of him, that he saw
Nilda being kissed by another man while in a car, and that
Nilda allowed other men to touch her body, if true, would
understandably hurt and embarrass him. Still, these acts by
themselves are insufficient to establish a psychological or

Same; Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; Words

and Phrases; Psychological incapacity, in order to be
a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of marriageit is a malady that is so grave and permanent

49

mental defect that is serious, incurable or grave as

contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is
different from incapacity rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is
contemplated by said rule.

indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.

Indeed, Article 36 should not be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the
like.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While it is true that the
Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality, and that
there is no requirement that the defendant spouse
be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist before the nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity may be declared, still, the
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
identified as a psychological illness, its
incapacitating nature fully explained, and said
incapacity established by the totality of the evidence
presented during trial.Reynaldo also presented Clinical
Psychologist Vatanagul to bolster his claim that Nilda is
psychologically incapacitated. While it is true that the Court
relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding
of the human personality, and that there is no requirement
that the defendant spouse be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist before the nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity may be declared, still, the
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified
as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully
explained, and said incapacity established by the totality of
the evidence presented during trial. The Court finds that the
psychological report presented in this case is insufficient to
establish Nildas psychological incapacity. In her report,
Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, an
emotionally immature individual, has a borderline
personality, has strong sexual urges which are incurable,
has complete denial of her actual role as a wife, has a very
weak conscience or superego, emotionally immature, a

Same; Same; Same; Same; An admission of a good

and harmonious relationship during the early part of
the marriage weakens the assertion of psychological
defect existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage which deprived the party of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities.As admitted by Reynaldo,
his marriage with Nilda was not all that bad; in fact, it went
well in the first year of their marriage. As in other cases, an
admission of a good and harmonious relationship during the
early part of the marriage weakens the assertion of
psychological defect existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage which deprived the party of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities. In determining the import of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, the same must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from,
Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 of the Family Code that would
likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void
ab initio; or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely
voidable; or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation. These various circumstances are not applied so

50

social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her infidelity on

several occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from anti-social
personality disorder, fails to conform to social norms,
deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggressive, irresponsible
and vain. She further defined nymphomia as a psychiatric
disorder that involves a disturbance in motor behavior as
shown by her sexual relationship with various men other
than her husband. The report failed to specify, however, the
names of the men Nilda had sexual relationship with or the
circumstances surrounding the same. As pointed out by
Nilda, there is not even a single proof that she was ever
involved in an illicit relationship with a man other than her
husband.

who have to live with deviant behavior, moral

insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which,
like termites, conume little by little the very
foundation of their families, our basic social
institutionsfar from what was intended by the Court,
Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it.In hindsight, it may have been
inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as
the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by
the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds,
and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as
the most liberal divorce procedure in the world. The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its
toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral
insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was
intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket,
forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has
allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the
Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the
personality disorders of the said individuals.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A marriage, no matter how

unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.While
Reynaldo and Nildas marriage failed and appears to be
without hope of reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not
always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. A marriage, no matter how
unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. And this
Court, even as the highest one, can only apply the letter and
spirit of the law, no matter how harsh it may be. [Navales
vs. Navales, 556 SCRA 272(2008)]

Same; Same; In dissolving marital bonds on account

of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court
is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is
actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because
it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or
assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond; To indulge in imagery,
the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply
provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.The
Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the

Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te, 579 SCRA 193 , February

13, 2009
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity;
Judgments; In hindsight, it may have been
inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of
rules, as the one in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity; The unintended
consequences of Molina has taken its toll on people

51

remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample

safeguards against this contingency, among which is the
intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to
guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed
by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child
abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape. In dissolving
marital bonds on account of either partys psychological
incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of
families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with
a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume
the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that
sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of
physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are
manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it
be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of
in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity
under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a
stillborn marriage.

generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to

repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Expert Witnesses;
By the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code,
courts, despite having the primary task and burden
of decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.The parties whirlwind
relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in
January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in
May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral
pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondents, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. By the very
nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task
and burden of decision-making, must not discount but,
instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of
the parties.

Same; Same; Judgments; Legal Research; Lest it be

misunderstood, the Court is not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina in the instant caseit is
simply declaring that there is need to emphasize
other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36.Lest it be misunderstood, we are not
suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O.
Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, 484 SCRA 353 (2006), there is
need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate
once more the principle that each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or

Same; Same; Same; Same; The presentation of

expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76 (1999)
emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony
to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological
incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755
(2000) asserts, there is no requirement that the person to

52

be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally

examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or
the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. This is not to
mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that
the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough
and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist
or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to
suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a
court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent
assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the
parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the
field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious
determination of the case. The rule, however, does not
dispense with the parties prerogative to present their own
expert witnesses. [Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te, 579 SCRA 193(2009)]

explanation given by the Committee on the Revision

of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10SC).It was for this reason that we found it necessary to
emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals. Far from abandoning Molina,
we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent
requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation
given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the
rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.: To require the petitioner to allege in
the petition the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report
of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to
be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect
access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there
are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus,
the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent
requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the
examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts
shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial
conference.

Ting vs. Velez-Ting, 582 SCRA 694 , March

31, 2009
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Declaration of
Nullity; Psychological Incapacity; Legal Research;
Courts should interpret Article 36 of the Family Code
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals; Far
from abandoning Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), the Court in Ngo Te v.
Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009, 579 SCRA
193, simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent
requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the

Same; Same; Same; Same; The intendment of the law

has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or ingly, we reverse the trial courts
and the appellate courts rulings declaring the marriage

53

between petitioner and respondent null and void a [Ting vs.

Velez-Ting, 582 SCRA 694(2009)]

gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly

established. [Suazo vs. Suazo, 615 SCRA 154(2010)]

Suazo vs. Suazo, 615 SCRA 154 , March 12, 2010

People vs. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 ,

September 28, 1954

Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Annulment of

Marriage; Psychological Incapacity; Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability; It must be
confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.Santos v. Court of
Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995) declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.

BIGAMY; MARRIAGE CONTRACTED DURING THE

EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE is VOID AB
INITIO; No JUDICIAL DECREE is NECESSARY TO
ESTABLISH ITS INVALIDITY.A subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his espouse
is illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial
decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. A prosecution
for bigamy based on said void marriage will not lie. [People
vs. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845(1954)]
People vs. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 , February 28, 1957
MARRIAGE LAW; NULL AND VOID MARRIAGES;
JUDICIAL DECREE TO ESTABLISH INVALIDITY, NOT
NECESSARY.A subsequent marriage contracted by any
person during the lifetime of his first spouse is illegal and
void from its performance, and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its invalidity as distinguished from
mere annulable marriages. (People vs. Mendoza, L-5877,
September 28, 1954.) [People vs. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033(1957)]

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no

requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity.A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,
343 SCRA 755 (2000), further clarified that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should
be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it
is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a
petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of
evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its

Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499 ,

August 19, 1986
Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Marriage;
Nullity of marriage; Proof that first marriage was
vitiated by force, not necessary in an action for a
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by the second

54

husband; Reason.There is no need for petitioner to

prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming this to be
so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art.
85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she
married respondent she was still validly married to her first
husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID
(Art. 80, Civil Code). [Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA
499(1986)]

98 Pha 677), whiie the rights to the inheritance of a person

who died after the effectivity of the New Civil Code shall be
governed by the New C4vii Code (Del Prado v. Santos, 18
SCRA 68).
Marriages; A second marriage (civilj contracted after
a first marriage (Muslim rites) by a man with another
woman is ittegal and voidThere is no dispute that the
marriage of Talina Bianong to Maning Yap was vaiid and that
the second marriage contracted by the latter with Nancy Yap
was iiiegal and void pursuant to Act 3613 of the Philippine
Legislature, the Marriage Law which was in foree when the
two marriages were celebrated.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Introducing

evidence about existing prior marriage, not
necessary as the first marriage though void, still
needs a judicial declaration of such fact; Womans
marriage to second husband void; Case at bar.
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about
the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time
they married each other, for then such a marriage though
void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration
of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would
still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel);
accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent
would be regarded VOID under the law. [Wiegel vs. SempioDiy, 143 SCRA 499(1986)]

Yap vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 ,

October 28, 1986

Same; Succession; Where a man dies leaving his

surviving spouse and children by his first marriage
and his spouse and ckildren by his second marriage,
the children by tke second marriage are natural
children by legal fiction and entitled to inherit after
the conjugal estate is divided equally between the
decedent and the 1st wife. Tke2nd wife is not
entitled to inheritPursuant to these provisions, the net
remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains after money
claims filed by creditors against the intestate estate of
Maning Yap approved by the lower eourt have beeii paid by
the administratrix should be equally divided between
Maning Yap and Talina Bianong as their shares. The one-half
share of Maning Yap would then comprise his intestate
estate to be distributed among his heirs.

Successiorty; Eights to inheritance of a person who

died after the new Civil Code took effect skall be
governed by said Code.We have accordingly ruled that
the rights to the inheritance of a person who died before the
ef fectivity of the New Civil Code shall be goveraed by the
Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws and by the Rules
of Court (See Vidaurrazaga v. Court of Appeals, 91 PhiL 492;
Canales v, Arrogante, 91 PhiL 9; and Morales, et al v. Yaftez,

Same; Same; Same.Under the law of succession in the

New Civii Code, Maning Yaps iegai heirs are Taiina Bianong,
her chiidren Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap and the children of
Nancy Yap by Maning Yap namely: Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap,
Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap. Talina Bianong, the first wife
had not lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her
husband. She is entitled to share in Maning Yaps estate
upon his death (Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615). On the

55

other hand, Nancy Yap, the second wife cannot inherit from
Maning Yap because their marriage was void ab initio. (Art.
83, New Civil Code; People v. Mendoza, 95 PhiL 845)
However, Nancy Yaps children by Maning Yap have the
status of natural children by legal fiction and are considered
compulsory heirs of the late Maning Yap. (Articles 89 and
997, New Civil Code).

conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the

absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void.

Same; Same; How to divide intestate estate where

decedent has also children by a second marriage.
Considering the foregoing, the estate of Maning Yap which is
one-half (1/2) pro indiviso of the net rfrmainder of the
conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage (Articles
142 and 185, New Civil Code), the other half being the share
of Talina Bianong, should be distributed as follows: a. To the
legitimate children, Shirley Yap and Jaime Yapone-half
(1/2) of the resulting net estate to be divided equally
between them pursuant to Article 888 of the New Civil Code;
b. To the legitimate widow Talina Bianongone-fourth (1/4)
of the net estate taken from the free portion or disposable
half of the estate pursuani to Article 999 in relation to Article
897 of the New Civil Code; and c. To the natural children by
legal fictionManing Yap, Jr., Julian Yap, Jasmin Yap and
Samuel Yapthe remaining one-fourth (1/4) of the net
estate to be shared equally between them pursuant to the
first and third paragraphs of Article 895 in relation to Article
983 of the New Civil Code. [Yap vs. Court of Appeals, 145
SCRA 229(1986)]

Same; Same.In fact, the requirement for a declaration of

absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and
void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the
nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries
again cannot be charged with bigamy.

Same; Same.That Article 40 as finally formulated

included the significant clause denotes that such final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be
obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one
can conceive of other instances where a party might well
invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action
for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an
action for the custody and support of their common children
and the delivery of the latters presumptive legitimes. In
such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not
be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the
instance where a party who has previously contracted a
marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into
another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is
required by law to prove that the previous one was an

Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572

, September 17, 1993
Marriages; A marriage though void still needs a
judicial declaration of such fact under the. Family
Code even for purposes other than remarriage.
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the

56

absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a

final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

said Article is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not

prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws. This is particularly true
with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has
not shown any vested right that was impaired by the
application of Article 40 to his case.

Same; Actions; Declaration of nullity of marriage

carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of
property, custody and support of children, etc. There
is no need of filing a separate civil action for such
purposes.Based on the foregoing provisions, private
respondents ultimate prayer for separation of property will
simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus,
petitioners suggestion that in order for their properties to
be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for
that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly
provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage,
one of which is the separation of property according to the
regime of property relations governing them. It stands to
reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity
of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with
jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the
couples properties. Accordingly, the respondent court
committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J. [Domingo vs.
Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572(1993)]

Same; Same; Remedial Law; The retroactive

application of procedural law is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected.The fact that procedural statutes may somehow
affect the litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14
SCRA 674 [1965]).
Same; Same; Same; Respondent was given an
opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage
when he and Ongkiko were married for the second
time. His failure to secure a marriage license on
these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and
bad faith.Respondent passed the Bar examinations in
1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the
time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with
Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any
marriage license. Any law student would know that a
marriage license is necessary before one can get married.
Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in
his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the
second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on
these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad
faith.

Atienza vs. Brillantes, Jr., 243 SCRA 32 ,

March 29, 1995
Civil Law; Family Code; Article 40 is applicable to
remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date
of the first marriage.Article 40 is applicable to
remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first
marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code,

57

Courts; Judges; Respondent failed to meet the

standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.It is evident that respondent failed to meet
the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession. While the deceit employed by respondent
existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial
Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De
Castro began and continued when he was already in the
judiciary.

logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.A

prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It
must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon
which the criminal action is based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would
necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.
Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or
intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal
action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the
latter action may proceed. Its two essential elements are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

Same; Same; A judge, in order to promote public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in
the performance of his judicial duties and in his
everyday life.The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that
the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his
judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private
individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is
also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the
performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life.
These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be
overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat
in the judiciary. [Atienza vs. Brillantes, Jr., 243 SCRA
32(1995)]

Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; A party who

raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential
elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in
the information, considering that the prosecution has
not yet presented a single evidence on the
indictment or may not yet have rested its case.A
prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt
or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency
of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the
further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises
a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically
admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have
been adequately alleged in the information, considering that
the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on
the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A
challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground
of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of
the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.

Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis, 336 SCRA 747 ,

July 31, 2000
Criminal Procedure; Prejudicial Questions; Elements;
Words and Phrases; A prejudicial question is one
which arises in a case the resolution of which is a

58

Same; Same; Bigamy; Family Code; Article 40 of the

Family Code requires a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage before a party may
remarry.Article 40 of the Family Code, which was
effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage,
requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication
of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the
accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the
marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack
of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no
judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second
marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that
bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its
elements concurtwo of which are a previous marriage and
a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it
not been for the existence at the material time of the first
marriage.

to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for

themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such
authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of
the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts
a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
Same; Same; Same; Elements.People v. Dumpo, 62
Phil. 246 (1935). The elements of bigamy are: (1) the
offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage
has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead; (3) that he contracts a
subsequent marriage; (4) the subsequent marriage would
have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
The exception to prosecution for bigamy are those covered
by Article 41 of the Family Code and by PD 1083 otherwise
known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, which provides that penal laws relative to the
crime of bigamy shall not apply to a person married x x x
under Muslim Law where the requirements set therein are
met. See also Sulu Islamic Association v. Malik, 226 SCRA
193 (1993); Merced v. Diez, 109 Phil. 155 (1960).

Same; Same; Same; Parties to a marriage should not

be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority.
Respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to
invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution
for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too.
Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a
subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by
simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even
enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite
usually the marriage licenseand thereafter contract a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of
nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage
is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions
on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova: (P)arties

Same; Same; Same; Concubinage; The pendency of a

civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not
a prejudicial question in a prosecution for
concubinage or bigamy.Parties should not be permitted
to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the
same must be submitted to the determination of competent
courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. No
matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an
element is, the intervention of the courts must always be
resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code
requires a final judgment, which only the courts can
render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who

59

contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration

of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case
may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a
civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for
concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial
question. This ruling applies here by analogy since both
crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.

party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will

also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial
declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be
subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal
intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time
he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against
this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity
would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a
second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage.
Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be
permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal
action against him.

Same; Same; Same; Ignorance of Law; The legality of

a marriage is a matter of law and every person is
presumed to know the law.Ignorance of the existence
of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully
invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage
knowing that the requirements of the law have not been
complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal
impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code.
The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every
person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not
obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered
into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to
belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay
his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his
own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity
of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense
when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the
criminal case.

Mercado vs. Tan, 337 SCRA 122 , August 01,

2000
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Family Code; Jurisprudence
regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity
of the previous marriage has been characterized as
conflicting; Under the Family Code, a declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense.Jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has been
characterized as conflicting. x x x x x x x x x In Domingo v.
CA, the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of
nullity was still necessary for the recovery and the
separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the
affirmative, the Court declared: The Family Code has
settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is
now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the

Same; Same; Same; A marriage though void still

needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any
party can marry again, otherwise the second
marriage will also be void.In the light of Article 40 of
the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can
not be said to have validly entered into the second
marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void
still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any

60

protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her

marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.

prejudicial question in the criminal case. [Mercado vs. Tan,

337 SCRA 122(2000)]

Same; Same; Same; Absent that declaration, Court

holds that one may be charged with and convicted of
bigamy.The statutory mooring of the ruling in
Mendoza and Aragonthat there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriagehas been cast
aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is
now necessary before one can contract a second marriage.
Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged
with and convicted of bigamy.

Ty vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 86 ,

November 27, 2000
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Bigamy; Where the
second marriage of a person was entered into in
1979, before Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499
(1986), during which time the prevailing rule was
found in Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977),
People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954) and People v.
Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957), there was no need for
a judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack
of license and consent, before such person may
contract a second marriage.A recent case applied the
old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case.
In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal
trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage.
The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he
was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got
pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we
applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since
the second marriage took place and all the children
thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and
the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant
to prevailing jurisprudence at that time. Similarly, in the
present case, the second marriage of private respondent
was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the
prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon.
The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack
of license and consent, there was no need for judicial
declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second

Same; Same; Same; By contracting a second

marriage while the first was still subsisting,
petitioner committed the acts punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.Petitioner
contracted a second marriage although there was yet no
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he
instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared
void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint
charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage
while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

Same; Same; Same; Fact that he subsequently

obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the
first marriage was immaterial.That he subsequently
obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already
been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively
encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a

61

marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private

respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.

raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She

argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate
court from giving her defense due consideration and weight.
She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the
inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution,
outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and
private respondent had complied with all the essential and
formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the
requirement of a valid license in the first of the two
ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the
celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the
ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same
parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites
served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The
appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside
this possible defense of the defendant below which
undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which
was not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But
we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the
absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit
from what the CA calls his own deceit and perfidy.

Same; Same; Same; Family Code; The provisions of

the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied
where to do so would prejudice the vested rights of a
party and of her children.We find that the provisions of
the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights
of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of
Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there
be impairment of vested rights.
Same; Same; Same; Marriage Licenses; That a
marriage license was used legally in the celebration
of the civil ceremony does not detract from the
ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the
same parties to the marriage, for the latter rites
served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first.
In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of
petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not
quite prepared to give assent to the appellate courts finding
that despite private respondents deceit and perfidy in
contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from
her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil
effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married
private respondent using the marriage license used three
years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner
now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner
claimed as untruthful private respondents allegation that he
wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed
we find there was a marriage license, though it was the
same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the
civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony
was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner
contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to
recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical
marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to

Same; Same; Same; Damages; Our laws do not

comprehend an action for damages between husband
and wife merely because of breach of a marital
obligationthere are other remedies.Like the lower
courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be
awarded in the present case, but for another reason.
Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held
valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as
legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages
from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for
annulment of their marriage which caused her mental
anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation
and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer,
we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife
damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would
make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not

62

common sense, militates against such incongruity.

Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for
damages between husband and wife merely because of
breach of a marital obligation. There are other remedies. [Ty
vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 86(2000)]

Same; Same; Same; Same; Court is clothed with

sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the
two marriages in this case, as the same is essential
to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to
the subject death benefits of the deceased.It is
clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in
this case, as the same is essential to the determination of
who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of
the deceased.

Cario vs. Cario, 351 SCRA 127 , February

02, 2001
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Property; For
purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but
not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such
instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not
be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A valid marriage license is

a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof,
subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage
void ab initio.Under the Civil Code, which was the law in
force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license
is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject
to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the two

marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property
regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by
the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family
Code on Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage.Accordingly, the declaration in the instant
case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second
marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The
fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without
first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio. One of the effects of the declaration
of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the

63

spouses according to the applicable property regime.

Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the
applicable property regime would not be absolute
community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather,
be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage.

Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Evidence; The

certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a
public officer in custody thereof, is admissible as the
best evidence of its contents.This being the case, the
certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public
officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best
evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly
indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner
and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be
accorded the full faith and credence given to public
documents.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Article 148 of the

Family Code, the properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to
the co-ownership.Under Article 148 of the Family Code,
which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubine, relationships where both man and woman are
married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same
married man,x x x In this property regime, the properties
acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and
salaries earned by each party belong to him or her
exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the
home, children and household, or spiritual or moral
inspiration, are excluded in this regime. [Cario vs. Cario,
351 SCRA 127(2001)]

Same; Same; Same; Same; There is absolutely no

requirement in the law that a marriage contract
needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a
condition precedent for the validity of a marriage;
The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all the
requisites for its validity are present.The marriage
contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive
evidence as to the existence of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of
any record of the marriage, especially considering that there
is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage
contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a
condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere
fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate
the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present. There is no evidence presented by the defense that
would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the
self-serving testimony of the accused himself.

Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 272 ,

February 18, 2004

Same; Same; Same; Same; A declaration of the

nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment
insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.

64

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the

nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family
Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of
the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar
as the States penal laws are concerned.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The requisites for

the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family
Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting
parties and their consent freely given in the presence
of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of
the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and
marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally
declare their agreement to marry before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two
witnesses).Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas
lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for
the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code
into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and
their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing
officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer,
marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the
parties personally declare their agreement to marry before
the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two
witnesses). Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under
any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38
may contract marriage. [Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals, 423
SCRA 272(2004)]

Same; Same; Same; Same; Bigamy; A marriage

contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage
is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance
of criminal [Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA
272(2004)]
liability for bigamy; Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code penalizes the mere act of contracting a second
or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.As a second or subsequent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas
would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of
a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain
reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or
a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.

Jarillo vs. People, 601 SCRA 236 , September

29, 2009
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Husband and Wife; Prejudicial
Questions; Penalties; He who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of
the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity.
It is true that right after the presentation of the

65

prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of

the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the
petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriages to
Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial
question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by
the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings.
The RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the CA
struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis (336
SCRA 747 [2000]), the Court categorically stated that: x x x
as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy,
and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended
on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration
of nullity. x x x x x x x x x x The reason is that, without a
judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent
was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married
man at the time he contracted his second marriage with
petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the
civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil
case is not essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x

moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without

the previous one having been judicially declared null and
void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated
because at the time of the celebration of the second
marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet
been declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would
a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioners marriage to
Uy make any difference. As held in Tenebro, [s]ince a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate
that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage. Same; Same; Penalties; Prescription; Crimes
punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in
fifteen years.Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is classified
under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article
90 thereof provides that [c]rimes punishable by other
afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years, while
Article 91 states that [t]he period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents x x x.

Same; Same; Same; Annulment of Marriage; The

moment a person contracts a second marriage
without the previous one having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy is already
consummated because at the time of the celebration
of the second marriage the previous marriage which
has not yet been declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction is deemed valid and
subsisting.The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity
of petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be
considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The

Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Burden of Evidence;

The party who raises a fact as a matter of defense,
such as prescription, has the burden of proving it.
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous
marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription began to
run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as
a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The
defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in
support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the
same, it remains self-serving. Thus, for petitioners defense

66

of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to

adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already
obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.

any reference to the periods into which it might be

subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered
only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence. [Jarillo vs. People, 601 SCRA
236(2009)]

Same; Same; Same; Same; The prescriptive period

for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from
the day on which the said crime was discovered by
the offended party, the authorities or their agents, as
opposed to being counted from the date of
registration of the bigamous marriage.As ruled in
Sermonia v. Court of Appeals (233 SCRA 155 [1994]), the
prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be
counted only from the day on which the said crime was
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their
[agents], as opposed to being counted from the date of
registration of the bigamous marriage. Since petitioner
failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription
began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore,
ineffectual.

Montaez vs. Cipriano, 684 SCRA 315 ,

October 22, 2012
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements of; It is essential in
the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the
first marriage.The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
(a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage
has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of
the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential
in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.

Same; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law; The

Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within
the sound discretion of the court to determine the
minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within
the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided.The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides
that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without
first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to
the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence
Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the
court to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without

Same; Same; The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity

of the first marriage would not change the fact that she
contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of
the first marriage.At the time respondent contracted the
second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it
had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the abovementioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change
the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was

67

properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential

elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
[Montaez vs. Cipriano, 684 SCRA 315(2012)]

Same; Evidence; Where is there "well-founded belief'

that spouse is dead.In the case at bar, the Court
considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by
respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable
or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he
arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's
departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or
of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's
contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of
inhabitants, to look for her there.

Republic vs. Nolasco, 220 SCRA 20 , March

17, 1993
Marriages; Art. 41 of the Family Code has stricter
requirements before absent spouse may be declared
presumably dead.Under Article 41, the time required for
the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4)
years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry.
Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter
standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code
merely requires either that there be no news that such
absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally
considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of
the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand,
prescribes a "well founded belief' that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted.

Same; Same; Same.There is no analogy between Manila

and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and
Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the
Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350)
kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a
major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of
somehow bumping into one particular person therewhich
is in effect what Nolasco says he didcan be regarded as a
reasonably diligent search.
Same; Same; Same.The Court also views respondent's
claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as
to her personal background even after, she had married
respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to
locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged
letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent
claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost
these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.

Same; Same.As pointed out by the Solicitor-General,

there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code: "1.
That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the
present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee
is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee."

Same; Same; Same.Neither can this Court give much

credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had
inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering
that respondent did not identify those friends in his
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the
prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is
good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its

68

nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not

synonymous with credibility. As noted before, there are
serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if
admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to
show that the missing spouse had chosen not to
communicate with their common acquaintances, and not
that she was dead.

assist to a determination probably founded in truth.

Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the
doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight
degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination
probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating
to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity
and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men,
and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends
to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light
on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate
question of his death.

Same; Policy of doctrine of presumptive death must

not be circumvented for spouse's convenience.By
the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the
simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the
conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the
policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that
respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before
the trial court in the same proceeding. [Republic vs.
Nolasco, 220 SCRA 20(1993)]

Same; Same; Same; Whether or not the spouse

present acted on a well-founded belief of death of
the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
drawn from a great many circumstances occurring
before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries
made by present spouse.The belief of the present
spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the
absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive
or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted
on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance
of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the
inquiries made by present spouse.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 477 SCRA 277

, December 09, 2005
Civil Law; The Family Code; Declaration of Absence;
The spouse present is burdened to prove that his
spouse has been absent and that he has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage.The spouse present is, thus,
burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that
he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is
meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that
es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos
racionales.

Same; Same; Same; Court warned against collusion

between the parties when they find it impossible to
dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal
means.Although testimonial evidence may suffice to
prove the well-founded belief of the present spouse that the
absent spouse is already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco, the
Court warned against collusion between the parties when
they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through

Same; Same; Same; Belief may be proved by direct

evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend
even in a slight degree to elucidate the inquiry or

69

existing legal means. It is also the maxim that men readily

believe what they wish to be true. [Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 477 SCRA 277(2005)]

because it does not appear that he possessed property

brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no
property during his married life with the petitioner. The rule
invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which
permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the
fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years
had been established. This presumption may arise and be
invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a
special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and
submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently
of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of
death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of
an action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no
right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the
petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a
prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for
the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus,
42 Phil. 880), for the petition does not pray for a declaration
that the petitioners husband is dead, but merely asks for a
declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been
unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at
securing a declaration that the petitioners husband is dead,
such a pretension cannot be granted because it is
unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the
petitioners husband is presumptively dead. But this
declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the
petitioners situation, because such a presumption is already
established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect,
even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie
presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason
that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or
declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a
case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The
latter must decide finally the controversy between the
parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or
establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights
and obligations arise or may arise; and once such

Valdez vs. Republic, 598 SCRA 646 ,

September 08, 2009
Civil Procedure; Question of Law; Question of Fact; A
question of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
set of facts; on the other hand, a question of facts
exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.We discuss a
procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may
directly appeal to this Court from a decision of the trial court
only on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one
hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain set of facts; on the other hand, a question of
fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are
not disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct
application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed
facts.
Civil Law; Presumption of Death; The Court explained
that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court
proceedings independent of the settlement of the
absentees estate.The Court explained that presumption
of death cannot be the subject of court proceedings
independent of the settlement of the absentees estate.

Same; Same; A judicial declaration that a person is

presumptively dead, because he had been unheard
from in seven years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach
the stage of finality or become final.The petition is
not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw,

70

controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such right or

status determined, or such particular fact established, by a
final decree, then the judgment on the subject of the
controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a
party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res
judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare
instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear
that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively
dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years,
being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary
proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final.
Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because
he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be
made in another proceeding to have such particular fact
finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person
presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in
seven years, cannot become final and executory even after
the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal
may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and
remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a
declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no
benefit to the petitioner.

Civil Code that applies, proof of well-founded belief is not

required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply
with this requirement since the Family Code was not yet in
effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment
of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion.
The Family Code itself states: Art. 256. This Code shall have
retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws.
Same; Same; To retroactively apply the provisions of
the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit wellfounded belief will, ultimately, result in the
invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid
at the time it was celebrated.To retroactively apply the
provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit
well-founded belief will, ultimately, result in the
invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the
time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable
and would go against the objectives that the Family Code
wishes to achieve. In sum, we hold that the Petition must be
dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofios
death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same
presumption having arisen by operation of law. However, we
declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at
the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and,
therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid. [Valdez vs.
Republic, 598 SCRA 646(2009)]

Same; Same; Under the Civil Code, the presumption

of death is established by law and no court
declaration is needed for the presumption to arise.
Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is
established by law and no court declaration is needed for
the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have
taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be
presumed dead starting October 1982.

Republic vs. Cantor, 712 SCRA 1 , December

10, 2013

Same; Evidence; Considering that it is the Civil Code

that applies, proof of well-founded belief is not
required.At the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio,
there existed no impediment to petitioners capacity to
marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of
Article 83 of the Civil Code. Further, considering that it is the

Civil Law; Family Law; Declaration of Presumptive

Death; The Family Code was explicit that the courts
judgment in summary proceedings, such as the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be
immediately final and executory.The Family Code was

71

explicit that the courts judgment in summary proceedings,

such as the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be
immediately final and executory. Article 41, in relation to
Article 247, of the Family Code provides: Art. 41. A marriage
contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of
contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. Art. 247. The
judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory. [underscores ours] With the judgment being final,
it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to an
appeal, the dispositions and conclusions therein having
become immutable and unalterable not only as against the
parties but even as against the courts. Modification of the
courts ruling, no matter how erroneous is no longer
permissible. The final and executory nature of this summary
proceeding thus prohibits the resort to appeal.

certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question

any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction that transpired. As held in De los Santos v.
Rodriguez, et al., 22 SCRA 451, 455 (1968), the fact that a
decision has become final does not automatically negate the
original action of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus in connection with orders or processes issued by
the trial court. Certiorari may be availed of where a court
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, and where the ordinary remedy of
appeal is not available.
Civil Law; Family Law; Declaration of Presumptive
Death; Before a judicial declaration of presumptive
death can be obtained, must be shown that the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the present spouse had a well-founded belief
that the prior spouse was already dead.Before a
judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it
must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the present spouse had a wellfounded belief that the prior spouse was already dead.
Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4)
essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive
death: 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the
present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee
is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; While

jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made
from the trial courts judgment, an aggrieved party
may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction that transpired.While jurisprudence tells us
that no appeal can be made from the trial courts judgment,
an aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition for

Same; Same; Same; Article 41 of the Family Code

places upon the present spouse the burden of
proving the additional and more stringent
requirement of well-founded belief which can only

72

be discharged upon a showing of proper and honestto-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not
only the absent spouses whereabouts but, more
importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead.Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to
the old provision of the Civil Code which it superseded,
imposes a stricter standard. It requires a well-founded
belief that the absentee is already dead before a petition
for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. We
have had occasion to make the same observation in
Republic v. Nolasco, 220 SCRA 20 (1993), where we noted
the crucial differences between Article 41 of the Family Code
and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit: Under Article 41, the
time required for the presumption to arise has been
shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a
judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the
spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family
Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article
83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no
news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is
generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other
hand, prescribes as well founded belief that the absentee
is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted. Thus, mere absence of
the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack
of any news that such absentee is still alive, failure to
communicate or general presumption of absence under the
Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from
the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon
the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and
more stringent requirement of well-founded belief which
can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not
only the absent spouses whereabouts but, more

importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is already

dead.
Same; Same; Same; The law did not define what is
meant by well-founded belief; Its determination, so
to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis.The law
did not define what is meant by well-founded belief. It
depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its
determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis.
To be able to comply with this requirement, the present
spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent
spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort
(not a mere passive one).
Same; Same; Same; In view of the summary nature of
proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of ones
spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this
Honorable Court in locating the whereabouts of a
missing spouse must be strictly complied with.The
Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in
nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied the strict
standard approach. This is to ensure that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent
the laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts
and should ensure that the stricter standard required by the
Family Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals (Tenth Div.), we emphasized that: In view of the
summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the
Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
ones spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this
Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating
the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly
complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of the

73

Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to

remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing
spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those
who cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of
the Family Code for relief because of the xxx summary
nature of its proceedings.

issuance) is also for the present spouses benefit. It is

intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which
might come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry
sans the courts declaration. Upon the issuance of the
decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively
dead, the present spouses good faith in contracting a
second marriage is effectively established. The decision of
the competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her
good faith and his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage
is effectively negated. Thus, for purposes of remarriage, it is
necessary to strictly comply with the stringent standard and
have the absent spouse judicially declared presumptively
dead. [Republic vs. Cantor, 712 SCRA 1(2013)]

Same; Same; Same; Since marriage serves as the

familys foundation and since it is the states policy
to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution, marriage should not be permitted to be
dissolved at the whim of the parties.The application
of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if
we consider the States policy to protect and strengthen the
institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as the
familys foundation and since it is the states policy to
protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution, marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved
at the whim of the parties. In interpreting and applying
Article 41, this is the underlying rationale to uphold the
sanctity of marriage. Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 203
SCRA 750 (1991), reflected this sentiment when we
stressed: [The] protection of the basic social institutions of
marriage and the family in the preservation of which the
State has the strongest interest; the public policy here
involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following
basic state policy: The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution.

Republic vs. Albios, 707 SCRA 584 , October

16, 2013
Civil Law; Marriages; Limited Purpose Marriages;
Words and Phrases; In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular
purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as limited purpose marriages. A
common limited purpose marriage is one entered
into solely for the legitimization of a child. Another is
for immigration purposes.The institution of marriage
carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of
availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a
particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as limited purpose marriages. A common
limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the
legitimization of a child. Another, which is the subject of the
present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law
is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the

Same; Same; Same; For purposes of remarriage, it is

necessary to strictly comply with the stringent
standard and have the absent spouse judicially
declared presumptively dead.The requisite judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and
consequently, the application of a stringent standard for its

74

time of their marriage, and it attempts to filter out those

who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.

that the parties must be capable of intelligently

understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding
should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.

Same; Same; Same; A marriage is a sham if the

bride and groom did not intend to establish a life
together at the time they were married.In 1975, the
seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, established the principal test for determining the
presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled
that a marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not
intend to establish a life together at the time they were
married. This standard was modified with the passage of
the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA),
which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that
the marriage was not entered into for the purpose of
evading the immigration laws of the United States. The
focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to
establish a life together, to determining the intention of
evading immigration laws. It must be noted, however, that
this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and,
therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or
existence of a marriage.

Same; Same; Marriages in Jest; A marriage in jest is a

pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as
a joke, with no real intention of entering into the
actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound;
Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated,
defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a
complete absence of consent.In ruling that Albios
marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized
such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest
is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual
marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the
parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed
by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a
relation. It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real
and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever,
hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in
jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of
consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties
have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or
for any purpose. [Republic vs. Albios, 707 SCRA 584(2013)]

Same; Same; Same; Under Article 2 of the Family

Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely
given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer.Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an
essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall
render a marriage void ab initio. Under said Article 2, for
consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made
in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A freely given
consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in
the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the
Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in

Same; Same; A marriage may, thus, only be declared

void or voidable under the grounds provided by law;
There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition
of foreign citizenship; Therefore, so long as all the
essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the

75

grounds provided by law, it shall be declared

valid.The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of
the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and
family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage
might have no real intention to establish a life together is,
however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into
in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the
nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage
may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a
marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than
what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all
the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.

law, may validly support a marriage. [Republic vs. Albios,

707 SCRA 584(2013)]
Same; Same; No other misrepresentation or deceit
shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to
annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the
sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed
circumstances.Neither can their marriage be considered
voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the
Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46
of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1)
nondisclosure of a previous conviction involving moral
turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by
another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted
disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism,
or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall
constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of
evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the
listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the
ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or
innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party
because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the
sham marriage.

Same; Same; Marriages entered into for other

purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided
that they comply with all the legal requisites, are
equally valid.Motives for entering into a marriage are
varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate
on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any
attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of
their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions. The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they
see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no
children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus,
marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money,
status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid
cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by

Same; Same; No less than our Constitution declares

that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State; The Supreme Court cannot leave the
impression that marriage may easily be entered into
when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as
easily nullified when no longer needed.No less than
our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This
Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily

76

be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and

just as easily nullified when no longer needed. [Republic vs.
Albios, 707 SCRA 584(2013)]

acquired by both of them through their actual joint

contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions.When the common-law
spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when
they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and
wife), only the property acquired by both of them through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to
be equal. The share of any party who is married to another
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid
marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited
in the manner already heretofore expressed.

ANTONIO A.S. VALDES, petitioner, vs.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102,
QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M.
GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents.
Civil Law; Family Code; In a void marriage, regardless
of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code.The trial court correctly applied the law. In a
void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148,
such as the case may be, of the Family Code.

Same; Same; The first paragraph of Article 50 of the

Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5)
of Article 43 relates only by its explicit terms, to
voidable marriages and exceptionally, to void
marriages under Article 40 of the Code.The rules set
up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled),
are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that
exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of
Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3),
(4) and (5)of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to
voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages
under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of
a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior
void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.
The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the
philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are
inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is

Same; Same; Property acquired by both spouses

through their work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership.Under this property
regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal
co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family household.
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the
couples separate property are not included in the coownership.
Same; Same; When the common-law spouses suffer
from a legal impediment to marry or when they do
not live exclusively with each other, only the property

77

ALAIN M. DIO, petitioner, vs. MA.

CARIDAD L. DIO, respondent.

necessary to establish their nullity. [Valdes vs. Regional Trial

Court, Br. 102, Quezon City, 260 SCRA 221(1996)]

Civil Law; Family Law; Property Relations; In a void

marriage, regardless of its cause, the property
relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code.The Court has ruled in
Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, 260 SCRA 221
(1996), that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the
property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148
of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to
union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred
by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.

LOREA DE UGALDE, petitioner, vs. JON DE YSASI,

respondent.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Conjugal Partnership;
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership; Compromise
Agreements; Judgments; A court order approving the
spouses separation of property results in the
termination of the conjugal partnership of gains; A
judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the
force and effect of any other judgment, and
conclusive only upon parties thereto and their
privies, and not binding on third persons who are not
parties to it.The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil
Case No. 4791 approving the parties separation of property
resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of
gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.
Hence, when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No.
3330, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and
respondent was already dissolved. Petitioner alleges that
the CFI had no authority to approve the Compromise
Agreement because the case was for custody, and the
creditors were not given notice by the parties, as also
required under Article 191 of the Civil Code. Petitioner
cannot repudiate the Compromise Agreement on this
ground. A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all
the force and effect of any other judgment, and conclusive
only upon parties thereto and their privies, and not binding
on third persons who are not parties to it. [De Ugalde vs. De
Ysasi, 547 SCRA 171(2008)]

Same; Same; Same; Elements of Article 147 of the

Family Code to apply.For Article 147 of the Family Code
to apply, the following elements must be present: (1) The
man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each
other; (2) They live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife; and (3) Their union is without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void.
Same; Same; Same; Article 50 of the Family Code
does not apply to marriages which are declared void
ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.It is clear
from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the
Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab
initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45
of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code
does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be

78

declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the

properties of the parties.

Civil Law; Paternity and Filiation; Civil Code

provisions invoked by the parties have been
superseded or at least modified by the corresponding
articles in the Family Code.We find that this case must
be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules
because the parties have been overtaken by events, to use
the popular phrase. The Civil Code provisions they invoke
have been superseded, or at least modified, by the
corresponding articles in the Family Code, which became
effective on August 3, 1988.

Same; Same; Same; In both instances under Articles

40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by
absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a
complete separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage.Article
45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable
marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until they
are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an
action for annulment. In both instances under Articles 40
and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains
unless the parties agree to a complete separation of
property in a marriage settlement entered into before the
marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition
and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment
could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
[Dio vs. Dio, 640 SCRA 178(2011)]

Same; Same; Same; Open and continuous possession

of the status of an illegitimate child now also
available as evidence of filiation.While the private
respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents
mentioned in the first paragraph (which are practically the
same documents mentioned in Article 278 of the Civil Code
except for the private handwritten instrument signed by
the parent himself), he insists that he has nevertheless
been in open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, which is now also admissible as evidence
of filiation.
Same; Same; Same; The illegitimate child is now also
allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.It
must be added that the illegitimate child is now also allowed
to establish his claimed filiation by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, like his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

DOROTEA, VIRGILIO, APOLINARIO, JR.,

SULPICIO & DOMINADOR, all
surnamed UYGUANGCO, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Judge SENEN
PEARANDA and GRACIANO BACJAO
UYGUANGCO, respondents.

Same; Same; Same; Action of private respondent under the

second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code is now
barred because of his alleged fathers death in 1975.The

79

problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since

he seeks to prove his filiation under the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred
because of his alleged fathers death in 1975. The second
paragraph of this Article 175 reads as follows: The action
must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Court expresses the hope

that the parties will arrive at some kind of
rapprochement based on fraternal and moral ties if
not the strict language of the law.Considering that the
private respondent has, as we see it, established at least
prima facie proof of his alleged filiation, we find it
regrettable that his action should be barred under the said
article. But that is the law and we have no choice but to
apply it. Even so, the Court expresses the hope that the
parties will arrive at some kind of rapprochement, based on
fraternal and moral ties if not the strict language of the law,
that will allow the private respondent an equitable share in
the disputed estate. Blood should tell. [Uyguangco vs. Court
of Appeals, 178 SCRA 684(1989)]

Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent no

longer allowed at this time to introduce evidence of
his open and continuous possession of the status of
an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation
through any of the means allowed by the Rules of
Court or special laws; Reason.It is clear that the
private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to
introduce evidence of his open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged
filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of
Court or special laws. The simple reason is that Apolinario
Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on
the claim of his alleged sons illegitimate filiation.

TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, vs.

PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL,
respondent.
Actions; Filiation; Parties; Real Parties in Interest; A
legitimate child has the requisite standing to initiate
an action to cancel the birth certificate of one
claiming to be a child of the formers mother.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rationale of the

rule explained.In her Handbook on the Family Code of
the Philippines, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy explains the
rationale of the rule, thus: It is a truism that unlike
legitimate children who are publicly recognized, illegitimate
children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and
without the legitimate family being aware of their existence.
Who then can be sure of their filiation but the parents
themselves? But suppose the child claiming to be the
illegitimate child of a certain person is not really the child of
the latter? The putative parent should thus be given the
opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this,
he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.

Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue,

because Article 171 of the Family Code states that the
childs filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in
special circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the
legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral attack. This
argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite
standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is
one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

80

The interest of respondent in the civil status of petitioner

stems from an action for partition which the latter filed
against the former. The case concerned the properties
inherited by respondent from her parents.

presumption of regularity, the specific facts that

there were already irregularities regarding the Birth
Certificate itself, such as it was not signed by the
local civil registrar, and that the alleged mothers
signature therein was different from her other
signatures, as well as such other circumstance
showing that the latter is not the real mother,
sufficiently negate such presumption.While it is true
that an official document such as petitioners Birth
Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific
facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of
the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such
presumption. First, there were already irregularities
regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the
local civil registrar. More important, the Court of Appeals
observed that the mothers signature therein was different
from her signatures in other documents presented during
the trial. Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of
petitioner show that Hermogena is not the formers real
mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogenas
pregnancy, such as medical records and doctors
prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact,
no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy of
Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of her
supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even
if it were possible for her to have given birth at such a late
age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own
home, when her advanced age necessitated proper medical
care normally available only in a hospital. [Babiera vs.
Catotal, 333 SCRA 487(2000)]

Same; Same; Family Code; Article 171 of the Family

Code applies to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child, i.e., to
declare that such child is an illegitimate child, but
not to an action to establish that such child is not the
wifes child at all.Article 171 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the present case. A close reading of this
provision shows that it applies to instances in which the
father impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child. The
provision, however, presupposes that the child was the
undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges
and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner.
In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that
petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to
establish that the former is not the latters child at all. Verily,
the present action does not impugn petitioners filiation to
Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is
no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
Same; Same; Birth Certificates; Prescription; An
action to cancel a persons Birth Certificate for being
allegedly void ab initio does not prescribe, and the
prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the
Family Code does not apply.This argument is bereft of
merit. The present action involves the cancellation of
petitioners Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her
legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article
170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to
nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it
was allegedly void ab initio.

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR
MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE,

Same; Same; Same; While it is true that an official

document such as a Birth Certificate enjoys the

81

REPRESENTED BY HIS
MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA
PROLLAMANTE, respondents.

intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of

his deceased natural father, or mother x x x. In neither of
these situations has it been thought necessary for the
plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment.
The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution
proceedings the other persons who might take by
inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of
heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Recognition; That

the two causes of action, one to compel recognition
and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in
one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.That
the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the
other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is
not new in our jurisprudence. As early as [1922] we had
occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43 Phil. 763
[1922]) wherein we said: The question whether a person in
the position of the present plaintiff can in any event
maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a
natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in
the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this
court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always
that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct
causes of action are present in the particular case. In other
words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the
action to compel acknowledgment should have been
instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to
the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief
in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so
peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to
require that a rule should be here applied different from that
generally applicable in other cases. x x x The conclusion
above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by
this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our
prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and
the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural
child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who
has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain
partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance
against his coheirs x x x; and the same person may

Civil Law; Family Code; Filiation; Paternity; DNA

Testing; Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the modern
and scientific ways available; fortunately, we have
now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing.Parentage will
still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately,
we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing. The University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI)
DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct
DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The
analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other
from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged
father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule
on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that
courts should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said
result is to deny progress.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Certiorari;
Grave Abuse of Discretion; Where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must

82

JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO (as heir of the

late Carlos Puno), petitioner, vs. PUNO
ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by
JESUSA PUNO, respondent.

be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a

positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. The special civil action for certiorari is
a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the rule is
when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed
while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction
being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every
error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction
and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In
such a scenario, the administration of justice would not
survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects
the wisdom or legal soundness of the decisionnot the
jurisdiction of the court to render said decisionthe same is
beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision
of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error
subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act
complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or
agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the
aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the said Rules. [Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 460 SCRA
315(2005)]

Paternity; Evidence; Birth Certificates; Baptismal

Certificates; A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that
the putative father had a hand in the preparation of
the certificate; A baptismal certificate can only serve
as evidence of the administration of the sacrament
on the date specified but not of the veracity of the
entries with respect to the childs paternity.A
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is
no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no
authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on
the information of a third person. As correctly observed by
the CA, only petitioners mother supplied the data in the
birth certificate and signed the same. There was no
evidence that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as his
son. As for the baptismal certificate, we have already
decreed that it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but
not of the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs
paternity.
Same; Same; Succession; Upon the death of a
shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become
stockholders of the corporation and acquire the
rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder
of the corporationthe stocks must be distributed first to
the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the

83

stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation;

During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable
owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly
appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to
the stock.Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do
not automatically become stockholders of the corporation
and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as
shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be
distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the
transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the
corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides
that no transfer shall be valid, except as between the
parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the
corporation. During such interim period, the heirs stand as
the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or
administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with
the legal title to the stock. Until a settlement and division of
the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held
by the administrator or executor. Consequently, during such
time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled to
exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder. Thus,
even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to
establish that he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still
not be allowed to inspect respondents books and be
entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any
showing in its transfer book that some of the shares owned
by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only
be possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and
has participated in the settlement of the estate of the
deceased.

estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased

must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the latter.
The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir
to a decedents estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary
civil action, as in a case for the recovery of property. The
doctrine applies to the instant case, which is one for specific
performanceto direct respondent corporation to allow
petitioner to exercise rights that pertain only to the
deceased and his representatives. [Puno vs. Puno
Enterprises, Inc., 599 SCRA 585(2009)]

MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ,

ANSELMO A. CRISTOBAL and ELISA
CRISTOBAL SIKAT, petitioners, vs.
EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO
CRISTOBAL, JOSE CRISTOBAL, HEIRS
OF NORBERTO CRISTOBAL and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Even if the original
complaint filed by petitioners before the RTC is denominated
as Annulment of Title and Damages, the Court finds it
practicable to rule on the division of the subject property
based on the rules of succession as prayed for in the
complaint, considering that the averments in the complaint,
not the title are controlling.While the title of the complaint
alone implies that the action involves property rights to a
piece of land, the afore-quoted prayer in the complaint
reveals that, more than property rights, the action involves
hereditary or successional rights of petitioners to their
deceased fathers estate solely, composed of the subject
property. Thus, even if the original complaint filed by

Same; Same; Same; A determination of whether a

person, claiming proprietary rights over the estate of
a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must
be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the
latter.Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination
of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights over the

84

petitioners before the RTC is denominated as Annulment of

Title and Damages, we find it practicable to rule on the
division of the subject property based on the rules of
succession as prayed for in the complaint, considering that
the averments in the complaint, not the title are controlling.

Parent and Child; Filiation; Words and Phrases; Any

other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
Special Laws, may consist of the childs baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in
which the childs name has been entered, common
reputation respecting the childs pedigree, admission
by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.The initial fact that needs to be
established is the filiation of petitioners with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal. Article 172 of the Family Code
provides: Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and Special Laws, may consist of the childs
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in
which the childs name has been entered, common
reputation respecting the childs pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Appeals; Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are

conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court;
Exceptions.Although it is settled that in the exercise of
the Supreme Courts power of review, the findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the
Supreme Court, there are recognized exceptions to this rule,
namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
facts are conflicting; (6) when in making the findings the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellee
and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion. Since exceptions (4) and (11) are
present in the case at bar, this Court shall make its own
determination of the facts relevant for the resolution of the
case.

Same; Same; Baptismal certificate is one of the

acceptable documentary evidence to prove filiation
in accordance with the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence.The baptismal certificates of Elisa,
Anselmo, and the late Socorro were presented. Baptismal
certificate is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to
prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31
January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,

85

attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901,
1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all
destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.

an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to

Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner shall be obliged
to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand
at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned. In Budlong v. Bondoc, 79
SCRA 24 (1977), this Court has interpreted said provision of
law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible. It
cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil
Code explicitly declares: Noprescription shall lie in favor of
a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.

Succession; Extrajudicial Partition of Estate; Without

the participation of all persons involved in the
proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not
binding on said persons.As to the validity of the Deed
of Partition of the subject property executed by the private
respondents among themselves to the exclusion of
petitioners, the applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, which states: The fact of the extrajudicial
settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in
the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement
shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof. (Italics supplied) Under the
said provision, without the participation of all persons
involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is
not binding on said persons. In the case at bar, since the
estate of the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is composed
solely of the subject property, the partition thereof by the
private respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial
settlement of Buenaventura Cristobals estate. The partition
of the subject property by the private respondents shall not
bind the petitioners since petitioners were excluded
therefrom.

Filiation; Where both parents deaths occurred

before the enactment of the New Civil Code in 1950,
all the children of the first marriage and the children
of the second marriage shall share equally in the
subject property in accordance with the Old Civil
Code.It appears that the 535 square meters subject
property was a conjugal property of Buenaventura Cristobal
and Donata Enriquez, the second wife, as the property was
purchased in 1926, during the time of their marriage. Upon
the deaths of Buenaventura in 1930 and Donata in 1936,
both deaths occurring before the enactment of the New Civil
Code in 1950, all the four children of the first marriage and
the four children of the second marriage shall share equally
in the subject property in accordance with the Old Civil
Code. Absent any allegation showing that Buenaventura
Cristobal left any will and testament, the subject property
shall be divided into eight equal parts pursuant to Articles
921 and 931 of the Old Civil Code on intestate succession,
each receiving 66.875 square meters thereof.

Extrajudicial Partition of Estate; Prescription; The

action for partition is imprescriptible.As the
extrajudicial settlement executed by the private
respondents in February 1948 did not affect the right of
petitioners to also inherit from the estate of their deceased
father, it was incorrect for the trial and appellate court to
hold that petitioners right to challenge the said settlement
had prescribed. Respondents defense of prescription against

Laches; Doctrine of Stale Demands; Words and

Phrases; Laches is the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or declined to assert it; The doctrine of
stale demands would apply only where for the reason

86

of the lapse of time, it would be inequitable to allow

a party to enforce his legal rights.Respondents
defense of laches is less than convincing. Laches is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does
not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally
an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right,
which has become under the circumstances inequitable or
unfair to permit. In our view, the doctrine of laches does not
apply in the instant case. Note that upon petitioner Elisas
knowledge in 1994 that the title to the subject property had
been transferred to the private respondents to the exclusion
of herself and her siblings from the first marriage of
Buenaventura Cristobal, petitioners filed in 1995 a petition
with their barangay to settle the case among themselves
and private respondents, but since no settlement was had,
they lodged a complaint before the RTC on 27 March 1995,
to annul private respondents title over the land. There is no
evidence showing failure or neglect on their part, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier. The doctrine of stale demands would
apply only where for the reason of the lapse of time, it would
be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.

Damages; Nominal damages is adjudicated in order

that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated
and invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying
the plaintiff for any loss suffered.Considering that (1)
petitioners were unlawfully deprived of their legal
participation in the partition of the subject property; (2) this
case has dragged on for more than a decade, and (3)
undoubtedly, petitioners sustained injury but the exact
amount of which, unfortunately, was not proved, we find it
reasonable to grant in petitioners favor nominal damages.
Nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated and invaded by defendant,
may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose
of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. Where
these are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a
wrong but simply in recognition of the existence of a
technical injury. The amount to be awarded as such
damages should at least be commensurate to the injury
sustained by the petitioners considering the concept and
purpose of said damages. Such award is given in view of the
peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons extant
in the present case. [Cruz vs. Cristobal, 498 SCRA 37(2006)]

MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ,

ANSELMO A. CRISTOBAL and ELISA
CRISTOBAL SIKAT, petitioners, vs.
EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO
CRISTOBAL, JOSE CRISTOBAL, HEIRS
OF NORBERTO CRISTOBAL and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Same; Same; In the absence of any strong or

compelling reason, the Supreme Court is not
disposed to apply the doctrine of laches to prejudice
or defeat the rights of an owner.Absence any strong
or compelling reason, this Court is not disposed to apply the
doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an
owner. Laches is a creation of equity and its application is
controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be
used to defeat justice or perpetuate an injustice. Neither
should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners
of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently
registered in the name of another.

87

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Even if the original

complaint filed by petitioners before the RTC is
denominated as Annulment of Title and Damages,
the Court finds it practicable to rule on the division
of the subject property based on the rules of
succession as prayed for in the complaint,
considering that the averments in the complaint, not
the title are controlling.While the title of the complaint
alone implies that the action involves property rights to a
piece of land, the afore-quoted prayer in the complaint
reveals that, more than property rights, the action involves
hereditary or successional rights of petitioners to their
deceased fathers estate solely, composed of the subject
property. Thus, even if the original complaint filed by
petitioners before the RTC is denominated as Annulment of
Title and Damages, we find it practicable to rule on the
division of the subject property based on the rules of
succession as prayed for in the complaint, considering that
the averments in the complaint, not the title are controlling.

petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the

respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion. Since exceptions (4) and (11) are
present in the case at bar, this Court shall make its own
determination of the facts relevant for the resolution of the
case.
Parent and Child; Filiation; Words and Phrases; Any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
Special Laws, may consist of the childs baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in
which the childs name has been entered, common
reputation respecting the childs pedigree, admission
by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.The initial fact that needs to be
established is the filiation of petitioners with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal. Article 172 of the Family Code
provides: Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and Special Laws, may consist of the childs
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in
which the childs name has been entered, common
reputation respecting the childs pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Appeals; Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are

conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court;
Exceptions.Although it is settled that in the exercise of
the Supreme Courts power of review, the findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the
Supreme Court, there are recognized exceptions to this rule,
namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
facts are conflicting; (6) when in making the findings the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellee
and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the

88

Same; Same; Baptismal certificate is one of the

acceptable documentary evidence to prove filiation
in accordance with the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence.The baptismal certificates of Elisa,
Anselmo, and the late Socorro were presented. Baptismal
certificate is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to
prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31
January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901,
1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all
destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.

Extrajudicial Partition of Estate; Prescription; The

action for partition is imprescriptible.As the
extrajudicial settlement executed by the private
respondents in February 1948 did not affect the right of
petitioners to also inherit from the estate of their deceased
father, it was incorrect for the trial and appellate court to
hold that petitioners right to challenge the said settlement
had prescribed. Respondents defense of prescription against
an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to
Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner shall be obliged
to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand
at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned. In Budlong v. Bondoc, 79
SCRA 24 (1977), this Court has interpreted said provision of
law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible. It
cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil
Code explicitly declares: No prescription shall lie in favor of
a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.

Succession; Extrajudicial Partition of Estate; Without

the participation of all persons involved in the
proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not
binding on said persons.As to the validity of the Deed
of Partition of the subject property executed by the private
respondents among themselves to the exclusion of
petitioners, the applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, which states: The fact of the extrajudicial
settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in
the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement
shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof. (Italics supplied) Under the
said provision, without the participation of all persons
involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is
not binding on said persons. In the case at bar, since the
estate of the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is composed
solely of the subject property, the partition thereof by the
private respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial
settlement of Buenaventura Cristobals estate. The partition
of the subject property by the private respondents shall not
bind the petitioners since petitioners were excluded
therefrom.

Filiation; Where both parents deaths occurred

before the enactment of the New Civil Code in 1950,
all the children of the first marriage and the children
of the second marriage shall share equally in the
subject property in accordance with the Old Civil
Code.It appears that the 535 square meters subject
property was a conjugal property of Buenaventura Cristobal
and Donata Enriquez, the second wife, as the property was
purchased in 1926, during the time of their marriage. Upon
the deaths of Buenaventura in 1930 and Donata in 1936,
both deaths occurring before the enactment of the New Civil
Code in 1950, all the four children of the first marriage and
the four children of the second marriage shall share equally
in the subject property in accordance with the Old Civil
Code. Absent any allegation showing that Buenaventura
Cristobal left any will and testament, the subject property
shall be divided into eight equal parts pursuant to Articles

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921 and 931 of the Old Civil Code on intestate succession,

each receiving 66.875 square meters thereof.

or defeat the rights of an owner.Absence any strong

or compelling reason, this Court is not disposed to apply the
doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an
owner. Laches is a creation of equity and its application is
controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be
used to defeat justice or perpetuate an injustice. Neither
should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners
of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently
registered in the name of another.

Laches; Doctrine of Stale Demands; Words and

Phrases; Laches is the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or declined to assert it; The doctrine of
stale demands would apply only where for the reason
of the lapse of time, it would be inequitable to allow
a party to enforce his legal rights.Respondents
defense of laches is less than convincing. Laches is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does
not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally
an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right,
which has become under the circumstances inequitable or
unfair to permit. In our view, the doctrine of laches does not
apply in the instant case. Note that upon petitioner Elisas
knowledge in 1994 that the title to the subject property had
been transferred to the private respondents to the exclusion
of herself and her siblings from the first marriage of
Buenaventura Cristobal, petitioners filed in 1995 a petition
with their barangay to settle the case among themselves
and private respondents, but since no settlement was had,
they lodged a complaint before the RTC on 27 March 1995,
to annul private respondents title over the land. There is no
evidence showing failure or neglect on their part, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier. The doctrine of stale demands would
apply only where for the reason of the lapse of time, it would
be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.

Damages; Nominal damages is adjudicated in order

that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated
and invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying
the plaintiff for any loss suffered.Considering that (1)
petitioners were unlawfully deprived of their legal
participation in the partition of the subject property; (2) this
case has dragged on for more than a decade, and (3)
undoubtedly, petitioners sustained injury but the exact
amount of which, unfortunately, was not proved, we find it
reasonable to grant in petitioners favor nominal damages.
Nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated and invaded by defendant,
may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose
of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. Where
these are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a
wrong but simply in recognition of the existence of a
technical injury. The amount to be awarded as such
damages should at least be commensurate to the injury
sustained by the petitioners considering the concept and
purpose of said damages. Such award is given in view of the
peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons extant
in the present case. [Cruz vs. Cristobal, 498 SCRA 37(2006)]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF

THE MINOR,EDWIN VILLA Y
MENDOZA.LUIS E. SANTOS,JR.and

Same; Same; In the absence of any strong or

compelling reason, the Supreme Court is not
disposed to apply the doctrine of laches to prejudice

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EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitionersappellants vs. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.

of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which

they may have after the adoption, except that the law
imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of
adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered
as descendants of the adopter. [Santos, Jr. vs. Republic, 21
SCRA 379(1967)]

Civil law; Adoption; Relatives by blood or affinity are

not prohibited from adopting another.There is no
provision in the law prohibiting relatives, by blood or by
affinity, from adopting one another. To say that adoption
should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted
are related to each other, except in those cases enumerated
in Article 338 of the Civil Code, is to preclude adoption
among relatives, no matter how far removed or in whatever
degree that relationship might be, which is not the policy of
the law.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF

STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA,
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
Parents and Children; Adoption; Names; It is both of
personal as well as public interest that every person
must have a name.For all practical and legal purposes, a
mans name is the designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which he lives and is best known.
It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a
person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as
the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience
of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or
dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public
interest that every person must have a name.

Same; Interest and welfare of child to be adopted

should be paramount consideration.The interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount
consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary and designed to provide homes, care and education
for unfortunate children, should be construed so as to
encourage the adoption of such children by persons who can
properly rear and educate them.
Same; Elder sister may adopt a younger brother.The fact
that the adoption in this case will result in dual relationship
between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be
the son of the adopting elder sister, should not prevent the
adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of
law.

Same; Same; Same; The name of an individual has

two partsthe given or proper name and the
surname or family name; The given name may be
freely selected by the parents for the child, but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or
proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given
or proper name is that which is given to the individual at
birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The surname or family name is that which
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected

Same; Same; Relationship established by adoption is

limited to adopting parents.The relationship
established by the adoption is limited to the adopting
parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except
as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot
be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals

91

by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.

Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino

custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Adoption is

defined as the process of making a child, whether
related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the
rights accorded to a legitimate child; The modern
trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to
establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but
also as an act which endows the child with a
legitimate status.Adoption is defined as the process of
making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.
It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that which
results from legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern
trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to
establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as
an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. This
was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a
State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that
adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility,
and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted
child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, secures these rights and
privileges for the adopted.

Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Adoption

statutes, being humane and salutary, should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent
purposes of adoption.It is a settled rule that adoption
statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.
The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary
and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these
noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 10 of the Civil
Code which presumes in the interpretation of
application of law that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail was intended to
strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid
an injustice which may apparently be authorized by
some way of interpreting the law. Art. 10 of the New
Civil Code provides that: In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. This
provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary
so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice
when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may
apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the
law.

Same; Same; Same; An adopted child is entitled to all

the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother.Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption,
it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided
by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any
kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father
and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with
the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family

Same; Same; Same; Same; Since there is no law

prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father to use, as middle name her mothers
surname, the Court finds no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.Hence, since there is no law
prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural

92

father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers

surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed
to do so. [In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia, 454 SCRA 541(2005)]

the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for

adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under
any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First,
the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of
petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are
not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third,
petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each
other.

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF

MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM,
petitioner.

Same; Same; Domestic Adoption Act of 1998

(Republic Act No. 8552); A foreigner adopting
together with his or her Philippine spouse must meet
the qualifications set forth in Republic Act No. 8552,
and the requirements on residency and certification
of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot be
waived.The fact that Olario gave his consent to the
adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not
suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must
comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1)
he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with
the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living
in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to
the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must
maintain such residency until the adoption decree is
entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own
country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the
adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of
these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the
aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the
legitimate children of petitioner.

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF

MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM,
petitioner.
Adoption; Husband and Wife; Husband and wife must
jointly adopt.It is undisputed that, at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being
joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse
but to affirm the trial courts decision denying the petitions
for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7,
Article III of RA 8552 reads: SEC. 7. Who May Adopt.The
following may adopt: x x x Husband and wife shall jointly
adopt, except in the following cases: x x x The use of the
word shall in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is
in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority
over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses. The law is clear.
There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried
at the time the petitions for adop- tion were filed, must
jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only
by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario,

Same; Effects; Even if emancipation terminates

parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a

93

legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a

legitimate child.Adoption has, thus, the following
effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological
parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee
as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter
and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from
the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited
to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child
is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee
to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore,
even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the
adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter
with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear
the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive
support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the
legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the
adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child,
enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled
such as support and successional rights.

But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara (270 SCRA 206

[1997]): We are not unmindful of the main purpose of
adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of
the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed
liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat
said purpose. The law must also be applied with
compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the
fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and
education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court
is not in a position to affirm the trial courts decision
favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and
it cannot be modified without violating the proscription
against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the
law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the
respondent-spouses petition for adoption. Petitioner, being
married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We
cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.
Same; Husband and Wife; Dissolution of Marriage;
The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage
between the spouses is of no momentit is not
equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage; Since, at
the time the petitions for adoption were filed, the petitioner
was married, joint adoption with the husband is mandatory.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent
events would show that joint adoption could no longer be
possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his
marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court. We
disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage
between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not
equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and
unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the
marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still
subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that
since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is

Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation;

While the Court is not unmindful of the main purpose
of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the
welfare of the children, regrettably, the law is clear
and it cannot be modified without violating the
proscription against judicial legislation.We are
mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane
and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to
be of paramount consideration. They are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate,
needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

94

mandatory. [In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,

Monina P. Lim, 588 SCRA 98(2009)]

definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the

same.

LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitionerappellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA
BEDIA, respondents-appellees.

Same; Same; Same; The father and mother, being the

natural guardians of unemancipated children, are
duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their
custody and company.The father and mother, being the
natural guardians of unemancipated children, are dutybound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company. The childs welfare is always the paramount
consideration in all questions concerning his care and
custody.

Civil Law; Family Code; Parent and Child; The right of

custody accorded to parents springs from the
exercise of parental authority.The right of custody
accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental
authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law
is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume
control and protection of their unemancipated children to
the extent required by the latters needs. It is a mass of
rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for
the purpose of the childrens physical preservation and
development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and
the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental
authority, there is no power, but a task; no complex of
rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust
for the welfare of the minor.

Same; Same; Same; Only in case of the parents

death, absence or unsuitability may substitute
parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.The law vests on the father and mother
joint parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the
parent present shall continue exercising parental authority.
Only in case of the parents death, absence or unsuitability
may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent.
Same; Same; Same; Private respondents
demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred
over the grandparents.We find the aforementioned
considerations insufficient to defeat petitioners parental
authority and the concomitant right to have custody over
the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not
been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private
respondents demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over
the grandparents. The latters wealth is not a deciding
factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the
present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy.
The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for

Same; Same; Same; Parental authority and

responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized
by law.Parental authority and responsibility are
inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except
in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship
and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution.
When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another,
such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is
given is merely temporary custody and it does not
constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a

95

his minor son from birth up to over three years when he

took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not
be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to
the childs custody. While petitioners previous inattention is
inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot
be construed as abandonment. [Santos, Sr. vs. Court of
Appeals, 242 SCRA 407(1995)]

herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the

Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. where we held that
the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the
petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed
to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at
the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or
impaired by the enactment of a new law.

CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner,

vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN,
respondents.

Same; Same; Same; Rule that statutory changes in

procedure shall apply to pending actions cannot be
applied where it will affect vested rights.Even
assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the
Family Code in question is procedural in nature, the rule that
a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect
pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of
the act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive
that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings
taken before it goes into effect, since procedure must be
governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of
procedure arises especially where vested rights may be
prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds
no proper application to the instant case since it will
ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent
and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both
of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in
court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the
provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that
private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
[Tayag vs. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 665(1992)]

Succession; Action; Action to compel recognition and

a claim to inheritance may be joined in a single
complaint.Applying the foregoing principles to the case
at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint filed
by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor
Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is
actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein
the same may be considered as one to compel recognition.
Further, that the two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be
joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
Same; Same; Statutes; Where a complaint for
recognition was filed before the Family Code took
effect, the same should be resolved under the
provisions of the New Civil Code.Under the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the
right of action of the minor child has been vested by the
filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil
Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We

96