Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Publisher:
JU Muzej /Museum Alija Izetbegovi
On behalf of the publisher:
Elvis Kondi
Author:
Zehrudin Isakovi
Editor:
Elvis Kondi
Translation:
Saba Risaluddin
Design & DTP:
Sanjin Manov, Zijah Gafi
Printed by:
BEMUST
Print run:
750
BIOGRAPHY
By Zehrudin Isakovi
Source: Dostojanstvo ljudskog izbora, Alija Izetbegovi, OKO, 2005
3
liked to recall that period in his life, and in particular the beautiful Quranic
sura Ar-Rahman which older people recall was never recited more beautifully
than by Imam Rahmanovi in the hajjis mosque opposite the City Hall. The
whole family agree that the young Alija combined the genetic features of
both his parents: physically, he resembled his mother, but in character, they
say, he was like his father. This, no doubt, helps to explain why Izetbegovi
junior broke free from parental influence at a fairly early age to live his own
life. When he was about fourteen, Izetbegovi was influenced atheist and
communist writings and his faith began to waver. Communist propaganda
was at its height in Yugoslavia just before the outbreak of World War II,
partly as a reaction against fascism, which was in its golden or rather, most
sinister age. Yet, according to the later Izetbegovi, communism did
not mean democracy red totalitarianism grew stronger to counter the
black version. Izetbegovi was attending the First Boys Grammar School,
where the communists were particularly active at the time. The school itself
was reputed to be communist according to the grapevine, some of the
professors belonged to the movement. A number of leaflets thus came into
his hands, and he was not immune to their message; he began to be in two
minds between the problems of social justice and injustice, on the one hand,
and belief in God on the other. However, even at first glance, the young
Izetbegovis doubts were aroused by the fact that the communist propaganda
portrayed God as the bad guy and religion as the opium of the people,
a way of keeping the masses so subdued and deadened that they would not
struggle to improve their lot in real life. Contrary to this, it always seemed
to Izetbegovi himself that the central message of faith, in its various forms,
was to live a moral, responsible life. Finally, after a year or two of spiritual
and philosophical vacillation, Izetbegovi returned to his faith with renewed
strength, and in a new way. Later it would seem to him that the steadiness of
his faith was in fact the outcome of his youthful doubts; it was no longer the
faith into which he had been born, a tradition he had inherited, but one he
had adopted anew. He was never to lose it again, even though later, as his
6
with the movement was in 1944, when it formed an alliance with El-Hidaja,
the imams association. As he often remarked, Alija never fully agreed with
the hojjas, critical as he was of their rigid interpretation of Islam, the result
of which, as he put it in his memoirs, was to block its inward and outward
development.
10
o the dismay of the communist authorities, once the war was over the
organization continued its operations with renewed enthusiasm. At
first, Young Muslim activists received discreet warnings, but when
they ignored them, the order was given to arrest them, and Alija Izetbegovi
spent his first spell in prison. Since he was serving out his military service in
the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia at the time, the military court
sentenced him to three years strict confinement, which he began in March
1946 and completed in 1949. While under investigation, Izetbegovi was
held in the military gaol of the Marshal Tito barracks in Sarajevo, in a cell
where half the inmates were under sentence of death. The mood among them
was sombre as they awaited a final ruling on their appeal against the death
sentence. Izetbegovis three-year sentence was regarded as fairly lenient
in the circumstances of the time, when some political prisoners received
sentences of death or long prison terms. Even so, innocent as he was of any
crime, he had to spend a thousand long days and nights behind bars. He was
sent first to Zenica to serve his time, but after only two months was transferred
to Stolac, where he spent seven months before being moved again, this
time to correctional labour on a building site near Borako Lake. As fate
would have it, here Izetbegovi found himself working on the building that
was to be a recreation centre for the UDB (State Security Authority the
Yugoslav secret police), where his udbai, the people who had interrogated
him, would later enjoy a break from duty. After Borako Lake, Alija was
moved to Sarajevo, where the ironies of fate showed that they had not done
with him. Here he and other prisoners were to build the headquarters of the
Communist Party Central Committee. Perhaps the whole idea was that the
political opponents of communism were to build its temples. The isolation
of prison was made easier for the young Izetbegovi by the loving letters he
exchanged with Halida, a girl he had known since he was eighteen and had
gone out with throughout the war. When he was sent to prison, they kept
in touch by letter, describing their feelings and expressing their respect and
11
love for each other, which separation only served to strengthen and deepen.
Alija was sent to the Hungarian border for the third and final year of his
sentence, to work on the Belje agricultural estate near Beli Manastir. There
he was put to felling trees, at which he became adept. Many years later,
Izetbegovi himself used to say that if ever he had to resort to manual labour
to earn a crust, he would choose to be a wood-cutter: of all the manual work
I have done and Ive done plenty that is the one that appeals most, he
would say. He spent that winter of 1948-1949 cutting up firewood with
a hand-saw. This physical activity, combined with enough food, enabled
him to make a full recovery by the end of the third year of his sentence.
He was 24 when he came out of prison, and looked extremely well. His
family wept with joy when they saw how strong, healthy and mentally fit he
was. No sooner had he left prison than, as expected, Alija married Halida.
He was proud of her beauty, considering her physically far more attractive
than he himself, though many women found him handsome, with his vivid
blue eyes and, despite his youth, the aura of prison martyrdom about him,
which earned him the respect and affection of those around him. Just as it
was the natural thing for him to marry Halida, so those who knew him best
fully expected him to continue his political activities. Izetbegovi renewed his
connection with the Young Muslims covertly, through Hasan Biber. Exactly
forty days after they made contact, on 11 April 1949, Biber was arrested.
During his interrogation, he was under constant pressure to reveal Alijas
renewed involvement with the Young Muslims, but he would not buckle.
The other members of the organization were still unaware of Izetbegovis
activities, so thanks to Biber, he remained at liberty, though with little time
to enjoy his freedom, as he had still not fully recovered from his three years
in prison. At his trial in July, Biber received the death sentence, which the
zealous communists carried out in October. This trial led to widespread
arrests throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and raids on the Young Muslims
organization in Mostar began, when files and the minutes of meetings were
12
13
14
t was a wonder that with all this his job, his studies, and looking after
his family Izetbegovi was also able to write extensively on matters
Islamic. In 1969 he produced a first draft of his Islamic Declaration,
producing and publishing a final version in 1970. This short work, some 40
pages, was to arouse keen interest only after the Sarajevo Trial of 1983, when
Izetbegovi was convicted for a second time, for Islamic fundamentalism.
Though written in Bosnia and Herzegovina, then part of Yugoslavia, the
Declaration focused not on that countrys political circumstances but on the
Islamic world, which the book treated as a coherent spiritual and even political
entity. To the apologists of the socialist system, the Declaration appeared
fundamentalist, a threat to the social system, as indeed it was, in essence:
it called for a return to authentic Islam. To the communists, fundamentalist
atheists, extolling the virtues of Islam and celebrating belief in God was heresy
of the worst kind. The Declaration was both acclaimed and challenged with
equal passion. The problem, however, was that those who took issue with it
were mainly those who were in power, and the force of argument gave way
to the argument of force. The Islamic Declaration was later translated into
seven languages, becoming one of the most widely-read political texts on its
subject at that time. Though he never said so explicitly, it would seem that as
Izetbegovi became more critical of Muslim countries, he came to see that the
Declaration was too idealistic, and to realize that there was no such thing as a
coherent Islamic world as he had viewed it; rather, that it consisted of many
different entities, each of which had its own specific problems and context,
which was particularly true of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some passages in
the Declaration were seen as a call for a polity structured on Islamic principles,
which was maliciously interpreted as an appeal by Izetbegovi to reorganize
Yugoslavia, or at least Bosnia and Herzegovina, along Islamic lines. Whatever
those who advanced such views may have claimed, it is worth noting that in
his later political activities, Alija Izetbegovi opted for a secular state, based
on the principles of modern western democracy, where religion has its place
15
these two opposites, a third way between the two poles that define all
that is human. In his recension of the book, Predrag Matvejevi wrote
that the book reveals (the authors) passionate and thrilling reflections on
Islam and its place between East and West, geographical terms taken both
literally and metaphorically, with all the contradictions they entail in the
Cold War period. More recently, Matvejevi revised this, adding that from
our current perspective, it is a moderate book, free of any integralism or
fundamentalism. He also observed that These days, after the trials endured
by Bosnia and Herzegovina, one could say that Izetbegovis approach also
included a kind of warning. If only it could have been heeded at the right
time, adding that on re-reading Izetbegovis manuscript, he seemed to see
the figure of a mild, wise man, which is how he always remembered him.
17
Intellectual maturity
18
who were pondering the merits of Islam, and who were therefore unable to
agree with the atheist postulates of a socialist or communist society that was
falling ever deeper into crisis. Despite his previous unhappy experience and
constant threats against him, Izetbegovis interest in study did not wane.
He continued writing, publishing his articles in the Takvim, the Islamic
calendar, using the initials L.S.B. as a pseudonym, taken from the initial of
his three children, Lejla, Sabina and Bakir. The articles were a series with the
general heading Problems of the Islamic Revival. The articles were later
published as a book, which received excellent reviews. For example, Prof.
Dr. Esad Durakovi, noting that the book consisted of a collection of articles
dealing with some of the issues of Islamic revival, wrote that the author, in
a kind of revolutionary zeal emphasized the importance of reinterpreting
the sources of Islam as a priority, a thread that runs through all his writings.
According to Izetbegovi, there can be a revival only in a bold return to the
fundamentals of Islam. In fact, the whole of Izetbegovis contribution to
Islamic thought, and this book in particular, reveals him as a reformer, not
so much of Islam itself as of Islamic societies and states. Many years later,
speaking at the Islamic Summit conference in Tehran in 1997, Izetbegovi
made direct reference to all the failings, as he saw them, of the countries that
called themselves Islamic, putting it in the plainest of terms: Islam is the best,
but we are not. In addition, these articles, which appeared over a thirtyyear time span and were reissued under the general title Problems of Islamic
Revival, reveal an ecumenical approach to the problems: far from expressing
religious exclusivity, the manuscript actually affirms the diversity of religions
and cultures as a blessing from God. It is true that Izetbegovi also insisted
that Islam should be on an equal footing with others in this world, saying that
his ultimate aim was, first, to conduct an objective analysis of contemporary
Islamic thought and, second, to revitalize the Islamic world and incorporate
it into the modern world on the principles of mutual respect and equality.
It is worth noting that Izetbegovis approach to the problems he studies
20
in these articles is largely essayistic rather than scholarly, which does not
prevent them from achieving objective value, as a significant and original
contribution to thought in general, not confined solely to Islam.
21
22
perhaps incorporate into the rest of the Islamic world. Though such
accusations now provoke only wry smiles, at the time the situation was
anything but amusing. On day one, Alija Izetbegovi, Omer Behmen,
Hasan engi, Ismet Kasumagi, Edhem Biaki, Husein ivalj, Ruid
Prguda, Salih Behmen, Mustafa Spahi, Demaludin Lati, Melika
Salihbegovi, Dervi \urevi and \ula Biaki were brought into the
courtroom. Almost all were known to have played a more or less significant
part in safeguarding Bosnia and Herzegovina against aggression, which to
some extent corroborates the hypothesis that the Yugoslav authorities knew
whom they were dealing with. The prosecutor was Edina Reidovi, who,
the accused were to say, conducted her case with particular zeal in what was
obviously a show trial. She based the accusation of counter-revolution
activity on Izetbegovis Islamic Declaration which, she claimed, had been
translated into Arabic, Turkish, English and German between 1974 and 1983
with the intention of posing a counter-revolutionary threat to the social order
of Socialist Yugoslavia, and published in these languages with a foreword; in
addition, with a view to creating a body of like-minded associates at home to
pose a counter-revolutionary threat to the social order in the manner and
with the aims set out in the Declaration, the accused had given copies to
numerous intellectuals Husein \ozo, Muhamed Kupusovi, Husein ivalj,
Hasan engi, Rusmir Mahmutehaji, Mehmedalija Hadi, Melika
Salihbegovi and Edhem Biaki, following which Hasan engi, Ismet
Kasumagi, Huso ivalj and Edhem Biaki had become members of the
group. Since there was no evidence to support these claims, it being
perfectly clear that the Islamic Declaration did not pertain to Yugoslavia at
all, the prosecution resorted to extorting statements from witnesses. One by
one, Muslim intellectuals and religious leaders were brought in by the secret
police and interrogated day and night. Under pressure, many signed a certain
statement, but when brought before the court to repeat what had ostensibly
been their own statement, their consciences pricked them and they refused
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26
27
Prison days
28
reverse was equally true: in his prison cell, their father thought constantly
about his family. This helped him through the moments when he had the
bitter taste of abandonment and sorrow in his throat. (My courage would
gradually fail me as the day passed, reaching its lowest point in the early
evening, when I would find it hard to fight off the onset of melancholy. It
would seem that I incautiously wrote about this to my daughter Sabina, for
one day I received a letter from her: I dont know if you used to feel this, but
in my case that feeling always comes over me as dusk falls. I have to keep
really busy to keep it, to some extent at least, at bay. Sometimes this sadness
is mingled with fear and physical weakness. I know that it has always been
somewhat difficult for me to get ready when I had to go out at that time of
day. But as soon as I was out and darkness had fallen, it would all pass. Its as
though all my fears, uncertainties and sorrows come together in that feeling,
and I would think that this is how people feel when they decide to turn to
alcohol or drugs to escape. Im telling you this because I want you to know
that I too know that feeling, in part at least, and that I can imagine how it is
for you. Prison must make it harder, just as for me the feeling of freedom in
this house helps me to get through that part of the day. Perhaps it would be
best for you to try to be doing something when it comes over you, to read
something light if you can, to do a crossword or watch TV. What I know for
sure is that its not good to think about it at those times, or to give in to those
feelings; it only makes things worse. There I go again, preaching to you, but I
wanted to make it a bit easier for you. In fact, what I would like best is for us
to be at my place at that time of day, sitting over a cup of coffee. But at least
I want you to know that I am thinking of you always, and particularly as dusk
falls. Quoted in Memoirs.) The effect of all this was to create an unusually
strong emotional bond between father and son and between father and
daughters, particularly between Izetbegovi and his son Bakir, who was
following in his fathers footsteps by becoming interested in politics and the
state of the society in which he lived. Bakir developed a keen sense for politics
30
and a strong desire to become involved. This bond between father and son
would become even more marked later, under the even greater tribulations of
the unimaginably turbulent years of war, in which Izetbegovi the elder would
play one of the key roles. Once the interrogations and the trial were over
and he had to some extent adjusted to his new living quarters, Izetbegovi
began to keep notes reflections on life and destiny, on religion and politics,
on the works he had read and their authors, and on the many other things
that came to his mind as he spent some two thousand days and nights in
prison. These notes finally amounted to thirteen A5 exercise books of minute,
deliberately illegible script, which would be published in late 1999 with the
title My Escape to Freedom. Following publication, the critics would express
the view that Izetbegovis notes shed considerable light on his personality, in
all its complexity. Prof. Dr. Enes Kari, whom UDBAs interrogators had
unsuccessfully tried to pressure into giving false testimony against Izetbegovi
and his co-accused, wrote in his review of the book that it was impossible to
read the book without becoming aware of the importance of Alija Izetbegovis
intellectual, spiritual and political biography, for these notes, written while
serving his prison sentence, fill many gaps in the mosaic that constitutes the
intellectual biography of an outstanding figure, one who had a major impact
on the final decade of the twentieth century. Kari also observed that
Escape to Freedom is in fact a refusal to allow the spirit to be quenched, and
thus a way in which its author transcended the harsh reality of prison,
becoming a quest for human freedom. It is in this blend of the personal and
the universal that the importance of Izetbegovis writings is to be found.
Alija Izetbegovi used his time in prison to read and fill the gaps in his
education. He had plenty of time, and the will to spare as well (true, there
was no great choice of things to do), so that gradually, from an already solid
base, he moulded himself into a man ready for any historic challenge. Those
who read his notes from prison will be fascinated by the lucidity of his
thinking. They may recognize their own thoughts in some of his conclusions
31
or hypotheses, while others will give them an insight into the spiritual
complexities of this unusual man. Specific circumstances meant that the
First,
personality of Alija Izetbegovi developed along specific lines.
Izetbegovis faith grew still stronger during his incarceration. His infinite
devotion to God was an oasis of calm in which he always found refuge during
particularly turbulent days in prison. Second, his long spell behind bars
meant that he developed a particular feeling for freedom: what other people
take for granted, was for Izetbegovi the Holy Grail. (Much later, during
the 1992-1995 war, he would utter the words that would be so often quoted:
I swear by Almighty God that we shall not be slaves.) To this prison inmate,
to be free meant both the supreme desire and the highest responsibility a
person can have. In some of his interviews, therefore, Izetbegovi spoke of the
terrifying side of freedom which everyone who is not strong-willed enough
has felt; in fact, they do not know what to do with their freedom, and
subconsciously want to be un-free, to be captives. Third, no doubt under
the constant pressure of injustice, Izetbegovi would spend the rest of his life
fighting for justice as he saw it, both for himself and for the people and country
to which he belonged.
32
33
Freedom at last
34
35
36
odds, and besides, it seemed to him that it was in fact the time to form his
party. In his quest for like-minded associates, he went to Zagreb, where
political events had progressed further, and where he therefore hoped to find
a better reception for his ideas as indeed he did. There he met emso
Tankovi and Salim abi (who has since died). About fifteen invitees
attended a meeting in the Zagreb mosque, organized by abi, and agreement
in principle was rapidly reached to form a political party from the Muslim
cultural community, with pan-Yugoslav aspirations: Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia. Branches were soon
set up abroad as well; the idea spread like wildfire. These developments were
favoured by the crisis that was sweeping through the entire socialistcommunist camp. The Berlin Wall fell, and with it the power of the ideology
that had ruled the Eastern Bloc. On 27 March 1990, as spring was breaking,
Izetbegovi called a press conference at the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo to
announce the formation of his political party. His voice shaking somewhat
from emotion, he read out a press statement, later to be known as the
Statement by the Forty, after the number of signatories, which read as follows:
We the undersigned, faced with the crisis of Yugoslav society, which is not
only economic but also political and moral, concerned to preserve Yugoslavia
as a union of peoples and nations and interested in the unhindered
advancement of the democratic processes that have already begun towards a
free, modern state with the rule of law, desirous of encouraging this
advancement and in achieving, in such a state, not only the interests common
to all its citizens, but also those particular to us as citizens belonging to the
Muslim cultural community, have resolved to launch an initiative to found
the Party for Democratic Action (SDA), and to this end hereby announce
the sixteen programmatic principles of our political action. This was
followed by the list of principles. Though it made nominal appeal to all
citizens, it was clear from the very first paragraph that the party was to be
nationally-based: The SDA is a political alliance of the citizens of Yugoslavia
38
of Muslims, Serbs and Croats. The SDA will therefore resolutely oppose
attempts to destabilize, partition or encroach upon Bosnia and Herzegovina,
regardless of the source of these and similar ideas. The Principles drew
particular attention to the right to absolute freedom of action of all religions
on Yugoslavia. The document ended with the signatures of each of the forty:
Alija Izetbegovi, LLB, Sarajevo; Muhamed engi, BSc. Eng, Sarajevo; Dr.
Maid Hadiomeragi, dentist, Sarajevo; Dr. Muhamed Hukovi, teacher,
Sarajevo; Edah Beirbegovi, attorney, Sarajevo; Dr. acir erimovi, chief
physician, Sarajevo; Salim abi, businessman, Zagreb; Prof. Dr. Sulejman
Maovi, Faculty of Special Education, Zagreb; Prof. Dr. Fehim Nametak,
scientist, Sarajevo; Salih Karavdi, attorney, Sarajevo; Fahira Fejzi,
journalist, Sarajevo; Dr. air engi, physician, Sarajevo; Edhem Tralji,
LLB, Sarajevo; Demaludin Lati, writer, Sarajevo; Omer Pobri, musician,
Sarajevo; Dr. Sead esti, scientist, Sarajevo; Dr. Tarik Mufti, chief
physician, Mostar; Safet Isovi, performing artist, Sarajevo; Dr. emso
Tankovi, senior lecturer, Faculty of Economics, Zagreb Mirsad Veladi,
MSc.Chem.Eng., Velika Kladua; Dr. Kemal Biaki, chief physician,
Sarajevo; Abdulah Skaka, artisan, Sarajevo; Omer Behmen, BSc.Civ.Eng.,
Sarajevo; efko Omerbai, chief imam, Zagreb; Dr. Mustafa Ceri, senior
lecturer, Faculty of Islamic Studies, Sarajevo; Dr. Sulejman amdi,
scientist, Zagreb; Prof. Dr. Lamija Hadiosmanovi, Faculty of the Humanities,
Sarajevo; Dr. Halid auevi, LLB., Sarajevo; Kemal Nani, BSc.Civ.Eng.,
Zagreb; Bakir Sadovi, student, Sarajevo; Faris Nani, student, Zagreb;
Nordin Smajlovi, student, Zagreb; Husein Huski, MSc. Mech.Eng., Zagreb;
Mirsad Srebrenkovi, LLB, Zagreb; Nedad Dumhur, BSc.Chem.Eng., Banja
Luka; Fehim Nuhbegovi, businessman, Zagreb; \ulko Zuni, businessman,
Zagreb; Prof. Dr. Almasa airbegovi, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine,
Sarajevo; Prof. Dr. Ahmed Brakovi, Faculty of Economics, Sarajevo.
There was talk that the forty signatories might find themselves on the wrong
side of the law; yet things were changing, and the authorities no longer had
40
the strength for another major political trial. All that happened in reaction to
the formation of the SDA was that a series on the 1983 trial of Alija
Izetbegovi was launched in Osloboenje. The journalist who had reported
on the trial had retained the style that prevailed at that time: the same
accusations, the same way of faking them, as if nothing had happened in the
meantime. The hidden agenda of the series was to use the Izetbegovi case as
yet another way of showing what kind of political freaks were founding the
party. The authorities, who really did see the newly-emerging political actors
in this way, were convinced they would win the forthcoming elections, and
that these reminders of the reactionary plans of ex-cons and incorrigible
fanatics would merely increase their lead. They got it wrong, however. Time
would show that the people were sympathetic to the ex-cons, and were
increasingly ready to adopt their political aims as their own. Two months
after the press conference at the Holiday Inn, the Constituent Assembly of
the SDA was held at the same venue, in a packed hall, where euphoria swept
through all those present. As eye-witnesses report, the initial fear had been
replaced by defiance and resolve. The invitees included many distinguished
figures. The cameras focused in particular on Adil Zulfikarpai, a Bosnian
migr and cult figure who at the time was still living in Zrich, where he had
founded the Bosniac Institute and assembled some extremely valuable
documents on the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With others of like
mind, he had already been a signatory to a number of democratic initiatives
relating to the former Yugoslavia. He had considerable political experience,
and his presence served as a major incentive to other SDA members to
continue their political action. Izetbegovi had personally invited Zulfikarpai
to the constituent assembly. In Zrich the two had already discussed forming
the party, and had clashed over the term Muslim versus Bosniac: Zulfikarpai
held the view that the term Bosniac should be incorporated into the
programme document from the outset, while Izetbegovi agreed that the
term Muslim was not appropriate, but did not agree with the immediate use
41
42
43
44
with Tuman. Unlike Tuman, whom he did not take to, Izetbegovi liked
Mesi, and despite all the turbulent events that followed, their sincere
friendship lasted until Izetbegovis death. At their very first meeting, to
Izetbegovis horror, Tuman showed a complete lack of tact when he said,
Mr. Izetbegovi, dont create a Muslim party, thats quite the wrong thing,
because the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina are one people.
The Muslims and the Croats both feel that way. He resorted to what were
ostensibly historical arguments in support of this claim. After Izetbegovi had
heard him out with no great enthusiasm, Tuman predicted electoral defeat
for the SDA: The HDZ will get seventy percent of the vote, because it will
get all the Croat and the Muslim votes, he claimed. Izetbegovi responded
by saying that he respected his interlocutors knowledge of history, but that
he himself was somewhat better acquainted with the Bosnia of today, and
that the HDZ would get exactly 17 percent of the vote, corresponding to
the number of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was exactly what
happened at the 1990 November elections: the HDZ gained the 17 percent
of the vote represented by the Croats. But Izetbegovi returned from Zagreb
with a bitter taste in his mouth. It was the start of the unconcealed antipathy
between the two men.
46
47
Election victory
48
Failure of talks on
the preservation of Yugoslavia
50
52
53
Karadis threats
54
famous (and controversial) words: Remember, this is not our war. Later
these words would be reinterpreted to suit Tumans regime as meaning that
the Croatian struggle for independence was not Izetbegovis war, when he
really meant the very opposite. One of the manoeuvres with which attempts
were made to prevent the war spreading to Bosnia and Herzegovina was the
Serb-Muslim Accord engineered by Zulfikarpai and Filipovi. Armed
with Izetbegovis agreement, the two of them went to Belgrade for talks with
Miloevi, but the results were slim; the agreement was used to set up rump
Yugoslavia through the back door and for the Bosniacs, that simply meant
Greater Serbia. Nonetheless, this unsuccessful accord was yet another sign
of good will on the part of the Bosnians to prevent the war into which the
country was hurtling at breakneck speed. A conference on Yugoslavia was
held in The Hague in early November, but ended in total fiasco; it was now
obvious that war was inevitable. Still hoping for a miracle that might avert it,
Izetbegovi suggested that the European Community send a good will mission
to Bosnia and asked the UN to send blue helmets to prevent the conflict
already breaking out around the Bosnian borders from escalating. This was
the atmosphere in which the SDAs first Congress was held on 1 December
1991. The three-day congress was attended by 600 delegates and as many
guests, to whom Izetbegovi described the situation in his speech. Though
he, of all key participants, least wanted war, it seemed to him that it was
now inevitable, and he predicted an all-out war in which everything would
disappear in smoke and infamy. The international media would later often
quote these prophetic words.
56
57
The referendum
58
wondering if it was even possible. As things turned out, it was not; the day
was fast approaching when the choice had to be made between them. Allout war broke out in April 1992. Izetbegovi, now 67 years old, was faced
with huge new challenges and, though he was not yet aware of it, with the
most turbulent period of his life.
60
61
62
n 2 May Izetbegovi was on his way back from the Lisbon talks,
together with his daughter Sabina, Dr. Zlatko Lagumdija (at
the time deputy Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and
Nurudin Imamovi, his personal bodyguard, when he was captured by the
JNA at Sarajevo airport. After a sleepless night and dramatic negotiations,
it was agreed that UNPROFOR would escort them into the besieged city.
This was just the beginning of the four-year war with Alija Izetbegovi at its
very heart. He himself said that there was widespread fear of the Chetniks
and that the psychological framework had been dismantled. And so it was:
once battle commenced, the fear evaporated, to be replaced by defiance. As
the fighting wore on, its cost in blood kept mounting. Izetbegovi often asked
himself if the conflict could somehow have been prevented. He answered his
own question in one of his diary entries: Until Slovenia and Croatia seceded,
yes, it could; after that, no. Or rather it could have, but only at the cost of
capitulation. And slavery is the worst possible solution, worse than war. He
was to repeat, again and again, that freedom was the supreme goal in life.
Despite the open fighting all over Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was not until
20 June 1992 that the Presidency declared a state of war. This was followed
by its Manifesto appealing for active involvement in the patriotic front of
the struggle against aggression. A war government was appointed, headed
by Jure Pelivan, and charged with the existential issues of a country under
attack. Dr. Haris Silajdi was appointed as Foreign Minister, and the other
members of the government were Jusuf Puina, Jerko Doko, Ranko Nikoli,
arko Primorac, Rusmir Mahmutehaji, Alija Delimustafi, Radovan
Mirkovi, Hasan Muratovi, Tomislav Krstievi, Ugljea Uzelac, Munir
Jahi, Mustafa Beganovi, Nikola Kova, Martin Ragu and Miljenko Brki.
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over the destination in Bosnia at around midnight. Our charg daffaires and
our courier, complete with the cash, were sitting in one corner of the room,
the dealers in another. I dont know who was more scared: our people of them,
or they of us. Our people were afraid, naturally enough, that the dealers, in
typical gangster style, would go for them and grab the cash; guns cocked, they
were on high alert. Just in case, the dealers were told that guards had been
posted in the corridors and at the entrance to the embassy. The dealers kept
calling someone on their mobiles. Our man later told me, Eleven oclock
struck, then midnight, then one, two, three. We stared unblinkingly at each
other, watching every move. About dawn, they asked permission to leave
the room to check, saying something was wrong. They left, and never came
back. It remains a mystery whether they were really arms dealers whose
operation failed as a result of some unforeseen developments, or just con
men trying to get hold of some easy money. Be that as it may, General Deli
in Zenica and a group of officers waited in vain beside burning fires, waiting
from a miracle from heaven; but the miracle never came. I too had a sleepless
night, sitting up by the telephone.
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s the Bosnian war dragged on year after year, the hastily mustered
patriotic troops grew into an organized army with its own rules.
The nearest and dearest of many combatants suffered a terrible
fate: deportation, injury, rape, murder... In some of the places where Bosniacs
were massacred, entire families were wiped out. These traumatic events filled
people with anger at the enemy, and in some cases their rage gave rise to
the desire for revenge. One can understand their mental state, but a proper
army cannot be ruled by emotion; it was vital to prevent retaliation from
becoming the norm. The only person who seemed able to do this was Alija
Izetbegovi, whose authority was unquestioned among the troops, and that
is what he tried to do. He seized every opportunity not only to encourage the
men to keep on fighting, but also to make them aware of the moral aspect
of the Bosnian struggle. He insisted that they refrain from killing civilians
and from damaging or destroying Orthodox and Catholic places of worship.
When he was told by David Owen and Thorwald Stoltenberg, in August
1993, that BiH Army troops had committed atrocities against Croat civilians
in the village of Doljani near Jablanica, Izetbegovi wrote to General Rasim
Deli asking him to take immediate action: A few days ago I asked over
the telephone for an investigation into accusations by the HVO (Croat
Defence Council) that a unit of our troops had committed an atrocity by
massacring a number of civilians of Croat nationality in the village of
Doljani near Jablanica. I have not yet received a report on the matter, and
it is important you inform me of the results of the investigation and let it
be known publicly. Use every opportunity to warn our men that they must
uphold the laws of war. Do not hesitate to punish the offenders severely, and
do not hesitate to let it be known publicly. Despite these warnings, some
BiH Army troops undoubtedly committed atrocities against Serb and Croat
civilians. One known case is that of the village of Grabovica in Herzegovina,
where members of the Bosnian army killed 27 Croat civilians. Izetbegovi
ordered an immediate inquiry into the case, and promptly forwarded the
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which sadly killed 57 people. In addition, Izetbegovi often toured the free
territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, unhesitatingly flying in dilapidated,
insecure helicopters, giving rise to stories of his legendary courage. Wherever
he landed in free territory, he was greeted as an unchallenged leader. This
war-time enthusiasm was comparable with the struggles of Latin Americas
revolutionary idealists; and indeed, in his beret adorned with the fleur-de-lis
symbol of the Bosnian army, to some people he looked like a modern-day
Che Guevara or Tito.
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Visiting Jeddah
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with the old ways of diplomacy, the conference ran along twin tracks: official,
and behind-the-scenes. Amir Musa, Egypts foreign minister, Pakistans
minister Mohammad Sattar, Irans foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati and,
of course, Prince Salman, set the tone for the two-day conference. I learned
that President Turgut Ogal of Turkey was in Ankara, following the events in
Jeddah. On the first evening, a draft resolution was produced, to be adopted
the following day, but it was too mild and general, with no commitments or
timelines. Silajdi and airbegovi paced nervously about the hotel room,
disappointed by the billion Muslims. All of a sudden the telephone rang:
Velayati was calling. By next day the draft had been fundamentally reworked.
We were happy with the result and were waiting for the resolution to be
adopted when we learned that Lord Owen, international mediator at the
talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina, had walked angrily out of the conference,
clearly unhappy with the new draft resolution. The Muslim countries were
calling upon the United Nations to lift the arms embargo by 1 February 1993,
failing which they would cease to observe it... Before our departure our hosts
arranged for us to perform umra. We donned the ihram and set off for Mecca.
Every idea one has of the Kaba from seeking images and reading descriptions
of it pale into insignificance when one sees the real thing. I caught my first
glimpse of it from the street, through the forest of columns. We came out at
the portico near the garden of Zamzam. Some pilgrims recognized me and
began chanting, Bosnia, Bosnia. I found a corner and prayed two rakaats,
the impressive height of the Kaba before me. O Lord, help my unfortunate,
isolated people, so far from their centre, I prayed silently, before beginning the
rituals as instructed by the Arab guide, who chased off the surprised pilgrims
in front of us. Bosnia, Bosnia, may Allah help our brothers from Bosnia cried
the weeping Muslims from every corner of the world. The next day we took
off on our journey home. In the lounge at Jeddah Airport, Prince Salman,
who had come to see us off, came over to me and said in an undertone, Mr
President, permit me to tell you that before we left for the airport, Al Gore
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called me from America and told me that the US was going to reconsider
its position in regard to the embargo on the transfer of arms to Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Bill Clinton, Governor of the state of Arkansas, had just
won the presidential election, and was soon to take over the leadership of
the worlds only superpower, with Al Gore as his vice-president. The US did
indeed gradually change its policy towards the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia, and
later took over the initiative from Europe.
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uring the course of the many talks on the future of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which continued almost throughout the war,
Izetbegovi met not only Muslim leaders but practically every other
major statesman of the day. Some even came to besieged Sarajevo, including
Frances President Mitterrand, as did many officials from international
organizations and US officials, three of whom came to a tragic end on the
slopes of Sarajevos Mt Igman. Izetbegovi did not hesitate to express his
sharp criticism of the Wests policies towards the crisis. He had the impression
that the international community had not worked out a clear plan for Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and therefore wrote to the UN General Assembly on several
occasions, calling for urgent military action against Karadis and Miloevis
troops, or alternatively to allow their victims to defend themselves, by lifting
the arms embargo. Europes governments remained irresolute, however.
Izetbegovis mood during the final third of the Bosnian war is perhaps best
illustrated by his speech at the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) summit in Budapest on 5 December 1994. These are
some passage from that speech: Recent events in our country have filled me
with bitterness, so I shall be brief and to the point. There is really something
ironic in the fact that as I stand before this forum of an organization founded
twenty years ago for security and cooperation, and has those two great words
in its very title, I have to speak about things that are the very opposite: about
insecurity and non-cooperation... One gentleman, a senior official, told the
world and the people threatened with slaughter and annihilation, with cynical
indifference, that the Serbs had won as if this was a football match, and he
was blowing the final whistle... From the outset, Paris and London have
acted as the patrons of Serbia, blocked the Security Council and NATO, and
thereby prevented every move to end the Serb war of aggression... What
is happening in Bosnia is a clash between democracy and the most heinous
forms of nationalism and racism. Our opponents recognize only one nation
theirs, they recognize only one religion theirs; only one political party.
Everything that is not theirs is condemned to extinction. Even cemeteries are
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being ploughed up. Read the latest report by the UN Special Rapporteur, Mr.
Mazowiecki, about what is happening in the territories held by the aggressor.
I would ask the gentlemen working so hard to make a state out of the monster
that calls itself Republika Srpska and some of those gentlemen are sitting
in this very hall whether they will next turn their hand to having that
republic recognized and its creators sitting here with us next time. I would
ask those gentlemen whether they are preparing to have that entity, founded
on violence and genocide, invited to join the family of civilized nations...
In a war of liberation, there is some intangible quantity that resists analysis.
This is why military and political analysts from the West keep getting their
forecasts wrong. Our people are fighting for their liberty, and more for their
very survival. Such a struggle is usually a hard one, but also one that is hard
to lose. Not one war of liberation has been lost in the past fifty years, and I
see no reason why ours should be. No one and nothing can force 150,000
soldiers to lay down their arms. I recommend you all take that into account,
both for our sake and for yours. I hope that the friends of Bosnia will not hold
these words against me; and as for the rest, after all thats not my concern.
Thank you. Izetbegovi often had the impression that people were actually
waiting for the government in Sarajevo to suffer a military defeat. This
gave rise to a profound sense of bitterness which, as in this speech at the
OSCE summit, he was unable to conceal. In their autobiographies, western
mediators such as David Owen or Richard Holbrooke described Izetbegovi
as a man with whom it was very difficult to negotiate. He found it hard to
reach a decision, and even when he did, it was uncertain whether he would
soon change his mind. He was not (eerily) easy-going as was, say, Miloevi,
who would somewhat craftily draw the line between life and death for the
people in the field over a whisky. Nor was he a fanatical historical idealist like
Franjo Tuman, who dreamed of making Croatia into a state with the most
territory (as a banate) it had ever had, whatever the cost. Nor did Izetbegovi
have the backing of a powerful army to help him in the negotiations. All
he had was legality, justice and the truth but these are the very issues that
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become relative in times of war, when the force of argument has to face the
arguments of force. As a result, during the negotiations he had to resort
to tactics to such an extent that he got on the nerves of those impatient
careerists, the international mediators. Nonetheless, when all is weighed in
the balance, most of them held Izetbegovi in high regard. It was obvious to
them that as regards his policies and his military opponents, the other parties
to Bosnia and Herzegovinas crisis, he was a moral giant. They saw him as a
serious man who all his life had been ready to go to gaol for his ideals. True,
the war was the greatest test of the moral side of Izetbegovis personality,
as recognized in particular by Western intellectuals, with whom Izetbegovi
seems to have more success than with politicians. The French philosopher
Bernard Henry Levy was entranced by Izetbegovi the man, as he wrote in
Le Monde, and in 1995 El Mondo proclaimed him man of the year after the
signing of the Dayton Agreement. Several universities bestowed honorary
doctorates on him, and his understanding of politics gave him the standing of
a man who had advanced democracy. He received a medal from the Center
for Democracy in Washington, an award from the Crans Montana Forum
for the advancement of democracy, and many more accolades at home and
abroad. For his part, when asked what he thought about the worlds statesmen
after all those meetings, Alija Izetbegovi replied, These people are usually
surrounded by pomp, by police guards, by everything that gives the masses
the impression that they are outstanding figures. However, they are perfectly
ordinary, and some are even extremely average. All we politicians are more
or less the same. Except for a few individuals, there is no one I could say I
admire. Of course, there are those I like; I like Clinton, for example, because
of his easy-going ways, a kind of general attitude. Perhaps Im not putting
it well, I simply have the impression that he is a good man and, if I were an
American voter, I would vote for him. Kohl is an exceptional man, I have also
met Mitterrand three times, and then Chirac... They are not great men, but I
couldnt say of any of these leaders that they were below average.
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n his 1995 New Year message to the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Izetbegovi said, The war must not last a single day longer than it has
to, but nor shall we, can we accept peace at any cost. We shall therefore
negotiate wherever we can, but wage war if we must. As it turned out, they
had to continue waging war for another ten months. For 1 March, Bosnia
and Herzegovinas Independence Day, Izetbegovi gave a speech in the
Army Centre in Sarajevo, ending with these words: Our goal is a Bosnia of
free people, a Bosnia in which people and their rights will be respected. We
counter the concept of mononational, monoreligious, single-party parastates
in the plural with our concept of a free and democratic Bosnia. We
counter hatred and intolerance with democracy and tolerance... Every nation
has its promised land. Our promised land is Bosnia. I appeal you to fight for
it, and win! And so it was. Many historians were to say that it was at the
end of March 1995 that the BiH Army won the crucial battle to liberate Mt.
Vlai, above Travnik. No fewer than 21,000 combatants took part in this
huge operation, led by General Mehmed Alagi, commanding officer of the
Seventh Corps. As well as liberating 51 sq. km. of territory and bringing about
a major strategic shift in that part of the theatre of war, the battle was also
psychologically significant as the first great victory in a series of victories by
the BiH Army in the closing stages of the war. Let it not be forgotten that it
was achieved by Seventh Corps troops, with considerable assistance from the
Supreme Commands Seventh Muslim, Fourth Muslim and Guards Brigades.
Inevitably, there were casualties. Some law Murphys, probably says
that it is always the best that are taken. No one knows why, but so it turned
out on 28 May 1995, when a helicopter carrying Dr. Irfan Ljubljanki, acting
Foreign Minister, and his escort was shot down. Irfan was also a personal
friend of Izetbegovis, who valued him as a brave and honest man, and
he took the untimely death of his minister particularly hard. I dont like
telephone calls. Ever since the war broke out, they have never brought good
news. That morning it was 28 May 1995 I was called at about six oclock
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by General Deli, who said in a voice that boded no good, I have some very
sad news for you. He paused for a moment before going on: Last night a
helicopter of ours, carrying Minister Ljubljanki, was shot down over the
Knin krajina... By about noon it became known that our entire delegation,
returning from a visit to the Cazin krajina, had been killed. The four-member
delegation included not only Minister Ljubljanki but also the deputy justice
minister, Dr. Dr. Izet Muhamedagi, Dr. Mensur aboli, an official from our
Embassy in Zagreb, and Major Fadil Peki, Dr. Ljubljankis bodyguard. The
three-man Russian crew, who had been flying the helicopter on that risky
course for substantial danger money, were also killed.
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nd then, in July, came the final and most appalling twist in the spiral
of Bosnian misfortunes Srebrenica, the unprecedented massacre
of between eight and ten thousand Bosniacs and four times as
many bereaved. The Serb troops carrying out these operations were under
the direct command of General Ratko Mladi, charged by the prosecution in
The Hague with the genocide of the Bosniacs in this region. While the battle
was still going on, Mladi and Karadi were unconcernedly playing chess
as they waited for the bloodletting to be completed. There is absolutely
no doubt that as well as the Serb troops, the UN forces that were supposed
to be safeguarding Srebrenica, also bear some of the responsibility for the
massacre. At the time Srebrenica came under attack, it was a demilitarized
zone supposedly under the protection of UN forces, and most of the Bosniacs
had handed over their arms as required, somewhat naively believing that
they would be protected by UNPROFOR in the event of a large-scale Serb
attack. However, there was no reaction, and in vain Izetbegovi sent letters
to all and sundry, including Clinton himself. It would later become more
or less certain that the UNs seniormost officials, headed by Yasushi Akashi
and Boutros Boutros Ghali, had blocked any UNPROFOR reaction. The
Bosnian political and military authorities also bore their share of responsibility
for the tragedy of Srebrenica, as Izetbegovi himself was aware, writing in his
memoirs: When a tragedy of this scale occurs, no one is innocent. Every
one of us is to blame for allowing a world in which Srebrenica was possible.
Everyone has to believe that he or she could have done more. I am not
entirely happy with the actions of the Army at certain critical points, it seems
to me that they worked their way around some of the Chetnik positions. The
soldiers believe they did everything in their power in the circumstances. In
Srebrenica itself, conflict was constantly smouldering between the civilian
and military authorities. In any case, the unanimity that was needed was
lacking. This was in part the result of the psychological situation in a town
that was surrounded and where living conditions were incredibly difficult.
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Given the usually moderate tone of his notes, this passage makes it clear that
Izetbegovi believed the local military and civilian authorities were partly
responsible for the poor organization of the resistance to Mladis troops.
Even during the war, and especially after it, rumours began to spread that
Srebrenica had been exchanged for some other territory, and had fallen
victim to the overall strategy of the authorities in Sarajevo. In this regard,
there is a telling passage in Izetbegovis memoirs in which he writes that in
the prevailing circumstances, as early as 1993 he regarded the evacuation of
Srebrenica as the rational solution. In the town itself, the situation was
extremely bad in every regard. Food ran out from time to time, and the lack of
salt was a daily problem... Given the difficult situation, the idea of exchanging
Srebrenica and evacuating the town was often put forward, but rejected. This
was on the advice of the political and military leadership in Srebrenica, who
believed that the town could be defended. It seemed to me that the situation
would be untenable in the event of a large-scale enemy attack, and I was in
favour of evacuation, but did not insist on it. As far as I recall, the soldiers
were not in favour of evacuation either. It is still unclear what the mosaic
of responsibility for the tragedy of Srebrenica will look like. The relevant
documents have not yet all been studied, not all the witnesses have been
heard, and there are conflicting opinions. Even now, however, it is true to
say that Izetbegovi himself did not feel responsible, believing he had done
everything in his power. If a full investigation is every carried out, it will no
doubt reveal the truth, one way or the other.
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citizens of Sarajevo will not go unpunished. We shall carry out air strikes on
Karadis positions. He sounded very determined. Izetbegovi was too
excited to sleep that night. He talked with the rest of the delegation, which
included Miro Lazovi and Kreimir Zubak, until late into the night, and was
woken early next morning, 30 August, by someone hammering on the door:
it was Izetbegovis bodyguard. Great news, Mr. President! Theyve begun
attacking the Chetnik positions. The sky over Sarajevo is red from the strikes
on the hills around. This was some of the best news to be heard during
the war. The Bosnian delegation later learned that the western allies had
also carried out strikes on other Serb positions around Bosnia. In addition,
the Bosnian army, now in alliance with the Croatian army and the HVO,
achieved some significant victories in 1995, which seriously undermined
the negotiating position of the Serb side. The last major operation by the
Bosnian army was in western Bosnia between 13 September and 12 October,
involving about 16,000 combatants, when Kulen Vakuf, Bosanska Krupa,
Otoka, Bosanski Brod, Klju, Sanica and Sanski Most were all liberated.
This marked the beginning of the end of the war, which was finally to end
with the initialling of the Peace Agreement in Dayton on 21 November 1995.
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I have done all kinds of jobs in my long life: as a prisoner, I dug soil, carried
plaster, felled trees, and later, as a free man, ran a building site, represented
clients in court, and wrote articles. But my most difficult job has been
negotiations. To negotiate means to make decisions; and to make decisions is
the hardest thing that can be forced on an unfortunate human being. My
problem was that I could neither achieve peace nor run a good war. The
negotiations were held in an atmosphere of blackmail, with a sword hanging
over Bosnias head. The people, under attack and outnumbered by a better
equipped enemy, were suffering terribly, but the peace that was on offer was
always contrary not only to my principles, but to elementary justice. I would
have been hard for me to accept such a peace, but still harder to go back
home with the message that the war was to continue. My dilemmas were
painful ones. I felt as though I were being crucified. With these words,
Izetbegovi began his Dayton diary, admitting to himself what many others
had observed: he disliked taking decisions, and would dither endlessly before
making up his mind. But this time, there was no escape; the entire
international community, led by the Americans, agreed on one thing a
peace agreement of some kind simply had to be reached. The compromises
that would have to be made would surely be painful. And while for the Serbs,
and to some extent the Croats (at least those represented by Tuman), the
word meant a few percent more or less territory, the odd institution here or
there, the Bosnians were playing for justice, morality and peoples lives. The
other parties, Miloevi above all, followed by Tuman, had chosen war, but
it had been forced on the Bosnians and their president. The moral aspect was
thus important only to one side, not to the other two. They had factored in
their haggling over territory in advance, where peoples lives were for the
most part nothing but small change collateral damage as the two great
men sought to achieve their greater-state ambitions. Ten days before the
talks began, at an SDA executive committee meeting, Izetbegovi set out the
objectives of the Bosnian party in sixteen points. Roughly speaking, they
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called for the country to remain one, for the presence of international peace
implementation troops, the prosecution of war crimes, and no giving up
Brko. This was the bottom line. But as they would later see, he who sups
with the devil... The exhausting talks soon began at the Wright Patterson
military base. The starting-point was the Contact Group plan, the partition of
the country, 51:49 in favour of the Federation, and a weak central government,
the responsibilities of which had yet to be determined. Izetbegovi described
the atmosphere on the first day: Official luncheons are the scene of forced
smiles, vanity, artificiality and pretence, all seasoned with food you dont like.
Such lunches were an integral part of the protocol at the Dayton talks, and
whenever I could, I avoided them. It was at an official lunch at the Hope
Hotel that the talks officially began it was 1 November 1995. Our delegation
consisted of myself, Haris Silajdi, Kreimir Zubak, Jadranko Prli, Miro
Lazovi, Ivo Komi, and Muhamed airbegovi, with Kasim Trnka, Kasim
Begi and Demil Sabrihafizovi as legal advisers. Lunch was followed by a
plenary session at which Warren Christopher, Carl Bildt, Tuman, Miloevi
and Izetbegovi spoke. On day two of the talks, 2 November, the Bosnian
delegation met Tuman, with Holbrooke as mediator, to discuss issues around
the formation of the Federation and its accompanying problems. On 3
November, Izetbegovi had a meeting with the foreign ministers of France,
Germany, Great Britain and Russia. All four delegations stressed the
importance of the talks and offered the assistance of their governments in the
peace process. Izetbegovi also had his first Dayton meeting with Slobodan
Miloevi, which he recorded as follows: I am not sure I know Miloevi that
well, but it often seemed to me that he and his politics were two different
things. I found it hard to reconcile what he was doing with the impression I
had of him as a man. He is not a rebarbative figure. True, he is always a little
drunk or seems to be and in the mood to chat. It looks as though he
believes what he says. I have no doubt he is brave, but I would not say he is
two-faced. A split personality, perhaps, but that is something else. However,
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it seems that the other, evil side of his personality is the stronger, so that
Miloevi inevitably generates evil. A detail from the Dayton talks may
illustrate this contradictory view. After lengthy, long-drawn-out talks, he
suddenly changed his position on Sarajevo one day, largely accepting our
demands. As we left the room, he said to Silajdi and me: Its easy for you,
youve got Sarajevo, and now I need a helmet against those idiots. He was
referred to Krajinik and Koljevi, who were in another building impatiently
awaiting the outcome. I dont think he was putting on an act. On the
contrary, I think that was what he really thought about the people around
Karadi. The next few days were mainly taken up with talks on finetuning the structure of the Federation, with a succession of international
mediators and officials from Croatia, Mato Gani and Gojko uak. On day
seven Izetbegovi had a private meeting with Holbrooke, at which they
agreed that some progress had been made over the Federation, but not even
a millimetre of progress over Sarajevo. The Serbs were demanding that the
city be divided, while the Americans wanted a District of Columbia or
federal model, in which Sarajevo... would become an independent enclave
governed by representatives of all three ethnic groups, with a unified police
force. Izetbegovi met mainly with the Americans. The Serbs again tabled a
range of overpasses, underpasses, bypasses and the like, all designed with the
sole purpose of retaining as much of the territory they had seized as they
could and ensuring that it was nationally exclusive. The ceremonial signing
of the Agreement on the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was held on
10 November, at which Izetbegovi said, I shall call this a historic day; I shall
leave it to the historians in some remote future to judge its significance. They
will judge it, not on what is said today, but on what is done. I would rather
call today the day of our resolve or the day of our hope, as Secretary of State
Christopher has just said. As Izetbegovi relates, when Tuman spoke, he
treated the Federation as a state and referred to its relations with Croatia. I
didnt like Tuman. He behaved rather like an upstart, and his protocol was
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which Tuman had already agreed to, and perhaps even spoke of a pure
Baranja. It will happen, with or without you, Tuman had apparently told
Zubak, to which Zubak replied, Without me, then. The eighteenth day of
talks was crucial to the entire negotiations: Miloevi had decided to
surrender Sarajevo. Here is how Holbrooke described this momentous
event: Early Saturday afternoon, I asked Miloevi to take a short walk
around the inner compound. I complained bitterly that his behavior was
going to cause a breakdown of the talks, and concentrated on Sarajevo.
Some issues can be set aside or fudged, I said, but Sarajevo must be settled
in Dayton. Okay, he said with a laugh, I wont eat today until we solve
Sarajevo. A short while later, while I was chatting with Hill and Clark, the
door to my suite opened without warning, and Miloevi walked in. I was in
your neighborhood and did not want to pass your door without knocking, he
said, smiling broadly. Clearly, he had something important to tell us. Okay,
okay, he said as he sat down. The hell with your D.C. model; its too
complicated, it wont work. Ill solve Sarajevo. But you must not discuss my
proposal with anyone in the Serb delegation yet. I must work the technology
later, after everything else is settled. I tell you, he continued, Izetbegovi
has earned Sarajevo by not abandoning it. Hes one tough guy. Its his.... As
he talked, Miloevi traced on a map with a pen the part of Sarajevo he was
ready to give to the Muslims. Immediately Chris Hill objected; it was a huge
concession, but it was not all of the city. Miloevi had retained for the Serbs
Grbavica, a key area across the river from the center of town. Although a
dramatic step forward, Miloevis proposal did not quite unify Sarajevo.
When Hill pointed this out, Miloevi exploded. Im giving you Sarajevo, he
almost shouted at Christ, and you talk such bullshit! We told Miloevi that
while his proposal was a big step in the right direction, it was likely Izetbegovi
would reject it. Hill and I went immediately to see the Bosnian President.
Izetbegovi did not acknowledge the importance of the offer, but focused
solely on its defects. Sarajevo without Grbavica cannot exist, he said with
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passion. The area that Miloevi wanted to retain for the Serbs jutted directly
into the center of the city and was known to Western journalists as Sniper
Alley. Still, we all recognized that the negotiations over Sarajevo had entered
a new phase. Taking a detailed street map of Sarajevo, Hill, Clark, and I went
back to Miloevis suite. We began examining every road and every terrain
feature. Miloevi seemed flexible; Hill predicted after the meeting that if we
stuck to our position we would get all of Sarajevo the next day. Feeling
suddenly encouraged, we adjourned with our hopes soaring. And that is how
Sarajevo was won. Izetbegovis one great goal had been achieved. After this,
Miloevi also agreed to arbitration over Brko, and with a few more details,
the agreement was almost ready. On 20 November, agreement was reached,
and the document was formally initially in the presence of the US President.
It was then signed in Paris on 14 December. Peace had been established in
Bosnia.
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he war had ended, but not the problems. The implementation of the
Dayton Peace Agreement encountered major difficulties. The lack of
clarity of some of its provisions was exploited by each side interpreting
them in their own way. Izetbegovi and his associates concentrated mainly
on the struggle to strengthen the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its
central institutions, the return of refugees, and bringing those accused of war
crimes to justice. Major outstanding problems concerned the arbitration
for Brko and the reunification of Mostar. Izetbegovis man for Brko was
Dr. Ejub Gani, and for Mostar, Safet Oruevi, a man whose heroic struggle
had saved part of the city during the war. Both projects were concluded
with relative success after a few years: Brko became a district, and Mostar,
though somewhat dysfunctional, is a reunified city, with which its people are
increasingly at ease. The resolute struggle to reconstitute the multiethnic
Izetbegovis health deteriorated
state also began to produce results.
immediately after Dayton; he had a heart attack, leaving hospital at the end
of March 1996. Yet this was the beginning of ill health that was to dog
him, with ups and downs, until the end of his life. The Bosnian Presidents
capacity to continue working was seriously restricted. Even so, he found
the strength to exercise power for a few more years. He was often invited to
conferences in various parts of the world. In America, he received an award
for the advancement of democracy; in the East, he was as well respected as
during the war. But Izetbegovi did not see his presence at meetings and
conferences as a mere formality; something in him, probably that Bosnian
defiance resulting from the bloody war, compelled him to a critical sense
of detachment. In the West, he defended Islam; in Muslim countries, he
defended the West. In the West, he was an easterner; in the East, a westerner
but in both, he was a Muslim. It is perhaps no exaggeration to conclude
that Izetbegovi was in fact one of the worlds best qualified figures on this
subject, an old one to him. Let us not forget that Izetbegovi had met probably
every relevant political and many intellectual figures of East and West, of
Islam and Christianity, at specific, historic moments for his country, when
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cities are cleaner than ours. Human rights in the West are at a higher level,
and social welfare for the poor and the less able is better organized. Most
westerners are responsible and punctual that is my experience with them. I
am also aware of the dark side of their progress, and I do not lose sight of it.
Islam is best that is true; but we are not the best. Those are two things that
we often confuse. Instead of hating the West, let us compete with it. Does not
the Quran exhort us to do just that: Compete in doing good. With the help
of our faith and learning we can create the strength we need. True, it is a hard
and tiring path, it is difficult to climb a mountain, the mountain the Quran
speaks of, but there is no other way. So let us set up education foundations
everywhere. Let not one of our children be left without an education. Rich
Muslim countries should help the poorer in this important task. Let us do it
today, or immediately convene a special conference on the subject. Some
people think we can gain the advantage by terrorism. This is a fallacy that is
becoming dangerously widespread. Terrorism is the reflection of our current
disempowerment, and the possible cause of our future impotence. It is not
only immoral, it is counterproductive. It is immoral, because it kills innocent
people; and it is counterproductive, because it has never resolved anything.
Terrorism has been rejected by every serious political movement in the past.
In my view, the Quran explicitly forbids it with that well-known phrase: to kill
an innocent person is akin to killing the whole of humankind. Sadly, there
are people who forget this. And now, a few words of Bosnia, my country.
I have referred to East and West. Bosnia lies on the boundary between these
two worlds, on the Great Frontier, as we like to say. Every tenth Bosniac
was killed in the recent war. So do not allow another injustice to be done to
Bosnia. Tell everyone that for you, Bosnia is a holy land, for it is soaked in the
blood of innocent people, your brothers in faith. His speech was followed
by silence in the hall; his words had made a deep impression. Self-criticism is
not so common at such conferences, which are usually about hypocrisy and
eulogies, with others blamed for every problem.
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ten years. It was 15 October 2000. I dont like partings, but I felt no sadness,
he wrote in his memoirs. Summing up his life, he wrote: If I were offered
the chance of another life, I would refuse. But if I had to be born again, I
would choose the life I have had. He continued his political activities at the
SDA offices, principally writing his memoirs and receiving guests. Almost
every world statesman who came to Bosnia and Herzegovina included a visit
to Izetbegovi in his agenda. Soon, however, disease overpowered his body,
and Alija had to go to hospital. As though preparing himself for death, one by
one all his current and former friends came to visit, along with a number of
world figures such as US President Bill Clinton and Turkeys Prime Minister
Erdogan, who made a special landing in Sarajevo to visit his friend in hospital.
Alija Izetbegovi died on 29 October 2003. That day and the next, it was
as though the skies had fallen on Bosnias capital city. Long queues of people
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with numerous delegations from every
corner of the world, wanted to pay their last respects. Alija Izetbegovi was
buried in the Shahids cemetery at Kovai in Sarajevo.
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