DAOANG vs.

HONORABLE MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF ILOCOS NORTE

FACTS:
On March 3, 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with
the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The petition was set for hearing on April 24,
1971 and notices were served upon the Office of the Solicitor General and ordered
published in the Ilocos Times, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
On April 22, 1971, the petitioners, minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang
assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, filed an opposition to the petition for
adoption, claiming that the respondents had legitimate daughter named Estrella
Agonoy, the oppositors mother and therefore, the respondents were disqualified to
adopt under paragraph (1) Article 335 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Were the respondents spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos Agonoy
disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1) Article 335 of the Civil Code?
DECISION:
The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt are clear and unambiguous. The
children mentioned therein have clearly defined meaning in law and it does not
include grandchildren. Rule of statutory construction states that a state which is
clear and unambiguous in its face need not be interpreted. Article 174 of the Civil
Code of Spain disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants
from adopting. Under this article, the respondent spouses would have been
disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, but when the Civil Code
of the Philippines adopted the word descendants was change to children in
paragraph (1) of Article 335. Under the law now in force, having legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer
a ground for disqualification to adopt.
Wherefore, the petition is denied. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in spee. Proclamation No. 37 is affirmed. Without
pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason
Condat before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi. The court issued an order dated
February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28, 1988. Upon the
compliance of jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the hearing, the
testimonies of the private respondent together with that of her husband and one
Ma. Luz Salamento of the Department of Social Welfare and Development were
taken and admitted in the proceedings. On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered
judgment granting the petition for adoption. Subsequently, the petitioner appealed
to the Court of Appeals, and being dissatisfied with the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals, the petitioner seeks for the reversal thereof in the present petition
for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Does the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Family Code
cannot be applied retroactively to the petition filed by the private respondent?
DECISION:
Presidential Decree No. 603, the child and welfare code provides that a
petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. The
private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption for her without joining
her husband. Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of
appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such
retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested on acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

PEDRO DE GUZMAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO CENDANA

FACTS:
Respondent Ernesto Cendana, a junk dealer, was engaged in buying up used
bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan. Sometime in November 1970, petitioner
Pedro de Guzman, a merchant and authorized dealer of General Milk Company
(Philippines) Incorporation in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, contracted with respondent for
the hauling of 750 cartons of milk.
On December 1, 1970, the respondent loaded only 150 cartons on to his
trucks while 600 cartons were loaded to other truck which was driven by
respondents driver and employee. Along the McArthur highway, the 600 boxes
carried on the truck were hijacked by armed men who took with them the truck, its
driver, his helper and the cargo.
On January 6, 1971, petitioner commenced action against private respondent
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent Ernesto Cendana may under the facts set
forth, be properly characterized as a common carrier?
DECISION:
Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation,
offering their services to the public.
The occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the
control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is
necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers
against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts
or events which cannot be foreseen or are investable, provided that they shall have
complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence.
As a result, Court of Appeals reached into a decision that private respondent
Cendana is not liable for the value of the undelivered merchandise which was lost
because of an event entirely beyond private respondents control.
Accordingly, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby denied and the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 3, 1977 is affirmed.

PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO. vs. PKS SHIPPING

COMPANY
FACTS:
Davao Union Marketing Company (DUMC) contracted the services of
respondent PKS Shipping Company for the shipment to Tacloban City of 75, 000
bags of cement worth P3, 375, 000.00. DUMC insured the goods for its full value
with petitioner Philippine American General Insurance Company. The goods were
loaded aboard the dumb barge Limar I belonging to respondent.
On December 22, 1988, about 9 oclock in the evening, Limar I sank a couple
of miles off the coast of Dumagasa Point in Zambaonga del Sur, bringing down with
it the entire cargo of 75, 000 bags of cement.
Philamgen sought reimbursement from PKS Shipping of the sum paid to
DUMC but the respondent refused to pay prompting petitioner to file suit with the
Makati RTC.
The RTC dismissed the complaint after finding that the total loss of the cargo
could have been caused either by a fortuitous event, in which case the ship owner
was not liable or through the negligence of the captain and crew of the vessel and
that, under Article 587 of the Code of Commerce adopting the Limited Liability
Rule, the ship owner could free itself of liability by abandoning, as it apparently so
did, the vessel with all her equipment and earned freightage.
Philamgen interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court. Moreover, the appellate court found that the loss
of the goods was sufficiently established as having been due to fortuitous event,
negating any liability on the part of PKS Shipping to the shipper.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not a carrier is a private or common on the basis of the facts
found by a trial court or the appellate court, can be a valid and reviewable
question of law?
(2) Whether or not PKS Shipping has exercised the proper diligence
demanded for common carriers?
DECISION:

On the first issue, under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, defines common
carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
Much of the distinction between a common or public carrier and a private
or special carrier lies in the character of the business, such that if the undertaking
is an isolated transaction, not a part of the business or occupation, and the carrier
does not hold itself out to carry the goods for the general public or to a limited
clientele, although involving the carriage of goods for a fee, the person or
corporation providing such service could very well be just a private carrier.
PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others,
although for a limited clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. The
regularity of its activities in this area indicates more than just a casual activity on its
part. Neither can the concepts of a common carrier change merely because
individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier. Such
restrictive interpretation would make it easy for a common carrier to escape liability
by the simple expedient of entering into those distinct agreements with clients.
On the second issue, as cited in Article 1733 of the Civil Code, it requires
common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
they carry.
The provisions of Article 1733, notwithstanding, common carriers are exempt
from liability for loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods due to any of the
following causes:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
and
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
The Appellate Court ruled that there was no way by which the barge or the
tugboats crew could have prevented the sinking of Limar I. The vessel was suddenly
tossed by waves of extraordinary height of 6 to 8 feet and buffeted by strong winds
of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of water into the barges hatches. The official
Certificate of Inspection of the barge issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the
Coastwise Load Line Certificate would attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I and
should strengthen the factual findings of the appellate court.

OLIVERAS vs. LOPEZ

FACTS:
On February 11, more than twenty-one years later after the death of Lorenzo
Lopez his heirs, Tomasa and Candido Lopez executed two deed of absolute sale in
favor of brothers Melecio Oliveras and Pedro Oliveras with their spouses. Since then,
the vendees had been paying the real property taxes and had been in possession of
their purchased properties which being planted to palay and peanuts and were
segregated from the rest of Lot 4685 by dikes.
On November 21, 1996, the counsel of the Oliveras brothers wrote the heirs
of Lorenzo demanding to partition the property so that they could acquire their
respective titles. Apparently, the Lopezes did not answer since on December 15,
1996. Herein, the Oliveras brothers and their wives filed a complaint for partition
and damages in the court of First Instance. The defendants answered, they
contended that the deeds of sale were null and void and hence, unenforceable
against them; that the complaint did not state of action and that the cause or
causes of action if any, had prescribed.
The Lower Court rendered a decision, declaring valid the deed of absolute
sales and ordered the defendants to allow the segregation of the sold portions Lot
465 by a licensed surveyor in order that the plaintiffs could obtain their respective
certificates of title over their portions of said lot.
The defendants appealed contending the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the intrinsic validity of said deeds in so far as they pertain to
sales of designated portions of an undivided, co-owned property?
DECISION:
Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, co-ownership of an estate
should not exceed the period of twenty (20) years. And, under the former article,
any agreement to keep a thing or property undivided should be for a ten-year
period only. Where the parties stipulate a definite period of in division which

exceeds the maximum allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void only as to the
period beyond such maximum.
In this case, when Candido and his mother sold definite portions of lot 4685,
they validly) sold definite portions of Lot 4685, they validly exercised dominion over
them because, by operation of law, the co-ownership had ceased. The filing of the
complaint for partition by the Oliverases who, as vendees, are legally considered as
subrogated to the rights of Candido over portions of Lot 4685 in their possession,
merely served to put a stamp of formality on Candido's otherwise accomplished act
of terminating the co-ownership.
The action for partition has not prescribed. Although the complaint was filed
thirteen years from the execution of the deeds of sale. Prescription might have
barred its filing under the general provision of Article 1144 (a) of the Civil Code,
Article 494 specifically mandates that each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Hence,
considering the validity of the conveyances of portions of Lot 4685 in their favor and
as subrogees of Candido Lopez, the Oliverases' action for partition was timely and
properly filed.

TRINIDAD vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff and petitioner filed with the Court of First
Instance an action for partition of four parcels of land, claiming that he was the son
of the deceased Inocentes Trinidad. Patricio Trinidad, the father of the deceased,
owned four parcels of land, which he left to his three children. The defendants
Lourdes and Felix refused to give the demand of Arturio Trinidad which causes him
to file a case. The court rendered judgment in his favor, however, the Appellate
Court reversed the ruling of the lower court on the ground that he was not able to
present sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married.
The plaintiff filed a petition for review.
ISSUE:
In the absence of a marriage contract, how may marriage and filiation be
proven?
DECISION:
Article 267 of the Civil Code provides that, in the absence of a record of
birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate
filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. In this case, although he failed to present the marriage contract due to
destruction of the records, he presented enough evidence to prove marriage and
filiation. He presented two witnesses who testified that a wedding occurred on May

5, 1942; that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the
marriage; that one of the witnesses attended his baptismal party and petitioner
presented his baptismal certificate in which Inocentes and Felicidad was named as
his father and mother.

BALOGBOG vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio
Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961. They had an
older brother Gavino who died in 1935 predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private
respondents brought an action for partition and accounting against the petitioners,
claiming that, they were entitled to the two-third share in the estate of their
grandparents. Petitioners denied knowing the private respondents and alleged that
their brother Gavino died single in their parents residence.
On July 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment
in favor of private respondents. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The
petitioners filed a petition for review.
ISSUE:
Are the respondents the legitimate children of Gavino and Catalina?
DECISION:
Yes, Article 267 of the Civil Code provides that, in the absence of a record of
birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate
filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and

special laws. In this case, the private respondents proved,

evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929
children, Catalina testified that private respondents are her
Balogbog and was recognized by Gavinos family and by the
children.

through testimonial
and they had their
children by Gavino
public as legitimate

BINGCOY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIANO AND AGUSTIN

FACTS:
That on or about the middle of July 1948, petitioners attacked private
respondents at their residence in Barrio Bongbong, Municipality of Valencia,
Province of Negros Oriental, shot at their hogs and chickens and seriously
threatened to shoot the said respondents if they did not leave their house and their
lands. That being ignorant, harmless and incapable of protecting themselves, the
private respondents ran away and thus the petitioners got into the possession and
control of the above-described land and refused to surrender the same despite
repeated amicable request made upon them by the private respondents in order to
avoid judicial litigation.
And so, on May 31, 1952, private respondents filed a complaint for Recovery
of Property in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental.
On July 25, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private
respondents because of sufficient evidence on record proving that ownership over
the parcels of land was vested to them as prior possessors in good faith.

Unable to agree with the decision of the trial court, petitioners appealed
therefrom to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
If appellees are not entitled to inherit from Juan Cumayao, have they acquired
ownership over the parcels of land in question?
DECISION:
Appellees took possession of the parcels of land left by Juan Cumayao,
peacefully, continuously, adversely, openly and in the concept of owners up to
1948, or for a period of 22 years, by introducing improvements thereon like abaca
plants and coconut trees, harvesting fruits thereof, declaring the same for taxation
purposes and paying the corresponding realty taxes therefor.
Under Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, title to land by
prescription, 10 years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the
owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for 10
years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever way such
occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant
or possessor of such land a full and complete title.
Under Book III of the Civil Code of the Philippines, entitled Different Modes of
Acquiring Ownership and notably, Title V thereunder is denominated,
Prescription. Needless to say, acquisitive prescription is in itself a mode of
acquiring ownership over a parcel of land and does not require, as petitioners
asseverate, successional or inheritance rights, in order to ripen into ownership.

TOLENTINO vs. PARAS

FACTS:
On November 1, 1948, Amado Tolentino contracted a second marriage with
the petitioner, Maria Clemente at Paombong, Bulacan, while his marriage to the
petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino celebrated on July 31, 1943 was still subsisting.
The petitioner charged Amado with bigamy. Amado pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to suffer the corresponding penalty. After serving prison, Amado
continued to live with private respondent until his death on July 25, 1974. His death
certificate carried the name of his surviving spouse, Maria Clemente.
Petitioner sought to correct the name of surviving spouse to her name, where
the lower court dismissed the petition.

The petitioner filed a case against the private respondent and the Local Civil
Registrar. On October 21, 1976 the court dismissed the case.
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Is Serafia G. Tolentino the rightful surviving spouse of Amado Tolentino?
DECISION:
Yes, considering the Amado was convicted for bigamy, the sentence furnishes
the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and Amado. Under Article 35
of the Family Code, the second marriage that Amado contracted with private
respondent was null and void from the beginning and no force and effect.

BRITISH AIRWAYS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
On April 16, 1989, Mahtani decided to visit his relatives in Bombay, India. He
asked Mr. Gumar to prepare his travel plans. Mr. Gumar purchased a ticket from
British Airways (BA).Since BA had no direct flights from Manila to Bombay, Mahtani
had to take a flight to Hongkong via PAL, and upon arrival in Hongkong he had to
take a connecting flight to Bombay on board BA. Before departure, Mahtani checked
in at PAL counter his two pieces of luggage containing his clothing and personal
effects, confident that upon reaching Hongkong, the same would be transferred to
the BA flight bound for Bombay. When Mahtani arrived in Bombay he discovered
that his luggage was missing and that upon inquiry from the BA representatives, he
was told that the same might have been diverted to London. After waiting for 1
week, BA finally advised him to file a claim by accomplishing the "Property

Irregularity Report. In the Philippines, on June 11, 1990 Mahtani filed his complaint
for damages and attorney's fees against BA and Mr. Gumar before the RTC alleging
that the reason for the non-transfer of the luggage was due to the latter's late
arrival in Hongkong, thus leaving hardly any time for the proper transfer of
Mahtani's luggage to the BA aircraft bound for Bombay. The RTC rendered its
decision in favor of Mahtani.BA is ordered to pay Mahtani P7, 000 for the value of
the 2 suitcases$400 for the value of the contents of the luggageP50, 000 for moral
and exemplary damages and 20% for attorneys fees and cost of the action.
This decision was affirmed by Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of the damages was without basis since Mahtani
failed to declare a higher valuation with respect to his luggage.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The nature of an airline's contract
of carriage partakes of two types, namely: a contract to deliver a cargo or
merchandise to its destination and a contract to transport passengers to their
destination. A business intended to serve the traveling public primarily, it is imbued
with public interest, hence, the law governing common carriers imposes an exacting
standard.
Neglect or malfeasance by the carrier's employees could predictably furnish
bases for an action for damages.
Admittedly, in a contract of air carriage a declaration by the passenger of a
higher value is needed to recover a greater amount. Article 22(1) of the Warsaw
Convention However, , we have held that benefits of limited liability are subject to
waiver such as when the air carrier failed to raise timely objections during the trial
when questions and answers regarding the actual claims and damages sustained by
the passenger were asked.
Given the foregoing postulates, the inescapable conclusion is that BA had
waived the defense of limited liability when it allowed Mahtani to testify as to the
actual damages he incurred due to the misplacement of his luggage, without any
objection. Indeed, it is a well-settled doctrine that where the proponent offers
evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason,
the latter has the right to object. However, such right is a mere privilege which can
be waived. Necessarily, the objection must be made at the earliest opportunity, lest
silence when there is opportunity to speak may operate as a waiver of objections.

BA has precisely failed in this regard. To compound matters for BA, its counsel
failed, not only to interpose a timely objection, but even conducted his own crossexamination as well.

CENIZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
On June 14, 1967, the petitioners filed against private respondents, an action
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for recovery of their title to Lots Nos. 627-B
and 627-C, situated in Casuntingan, Mandaue, Cebu.

The respondents answered, alleged that the petitioners rights of action had
already prescribed. The petitioners replied that Vicente Dabon held the land in trust
for them, as co-owners, hence, their action for reconveyance was imprescriptible.
On August 31, 1970, the trial court rendered judgment for the petitioners,
ordering the private respondents to execute deeds of conveyance of the said lots in
favor of the plaintiff.
The defendants appealed on October 28, 1976, the court reversed the
decision of the trial court. It ruled that the petitioners right of action had prescribed
after the lapse of 20 years from the date of registration of the land on February 8,
1939 in Vicente Dabons name.
The petitioners have appealed to this Court by a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Does the registration of the title of the land in the name of one co-owner,
constituted a repudiation of the ownership for purposes of acquisitive prescription?
DECISION:
No, because a trust relation and co-ownership were proven to exist between
the predecessors-in-interest of both petitioners and private respondents. Except
when Dabons heirs repudiated the co-ownership and made the repudiation known
to the co-ownersll run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or coheirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Paragraph 5 of Article 494 of the Civil Code provides, no prescription sh
In this case, the registration of the Lot No. 627 in the name of Vicente Dabon
created a trust in favor of his co-owners Jose Ceniza and the latters heirs. Article
1452 of the Civil Code states, if two or more persons agree to purchase property
and common consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the
benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to
the interest of each.

TEOTICO vs. DEL VAL

FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She
executed a will written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before

Notary Public by her and the witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was
the P20, 000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrixs niece, Josefina
Mortera. The usufruct of Marias interest in the Calvo Building were left to the said
spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her grandchildren, the
legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and
universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will.
Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana
del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister
of Maria) and an acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria),
that said will was not executed as required by law and that Maria as physically and
mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution and was executed
under duress, threat, or influence of fear.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding?
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will
or in the property to be affected by either as executor or as a claimant of the estate
and be benefited by such as an heir or one who has a claim against it as creditor.
Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right to intervene because she has no
such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator because it did
not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of
the estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the
deceased but she is not under the CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true,
the law does not give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased sister of
both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law
from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and that
relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and adopted
and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except only as
expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not
of the relatives of the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal
heir in the probate proceeding.

AGUILAR vs. CA

FACTS:
The petitioner and the respondent were brothers. On October 28, 1969, they
purchased a house and lot in Paranaque and agreed that Virgilio would have 2/3 in
the co-ownership while that of Senen was 1/3. They agreed on a written agreement
that their interests in the house and lot should be equal. After the death of their
father, petitioner demanded the respondent to vacate the house and the
respondent refused to give the petitioners demand.
On January 12, 1979, petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the
house and the respondent answered with counter claim, alleging that he had no
objection to the sale as long as the best selling price could obtain; the proceeds
should be divided equally and being a co-owner he was entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the property.
Upon the issues, on April 26, 1979 the case was set for pre-trial.
On April 20, 1979, the counsel for respondent he filed a motion to cancel pre-trial.
On April 23, 1979, the trial court denied the motion and directed that the pre-trial
should be continued as scheduled.
On the pre-trial date, plaintiff and his counsel appealed while the defendant
and his counsel did not appear. Consequently, the trial court declared defendant as
in default and ordered reception of plaintiffs evidence ex parte. On May 7, 1979,
the defendants counsel file an omnibus motion to reconsider the order of default
and the trial court denied the motion and plaintiff presented his evidence.
On July 26, 1979, rendering judgment default by the defendant, the trial court
found him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot in equal shares on the
basis of their written agreement. It ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of his
participation in the property by defendants continued enjoyment of the house and
lot, free of rent, despite demands of rentals and continued maneuvers of
defendants, to delay partition. The trial court also upheld the right of plaintiff as coowner to demand partition. The trial court held that this property should be sold to
third person and the proceeds divided equally between the parties. The trial court
likewise ordered defendant to vacate the property and pay plaintiff P1, 200.00 as
rentals from January 1975 up to the date of decision plus interest from the time the
action was filed.
Defendant sought relief from the Court of Appeals praying that the following
orders and decision of the trial court be set aside; (a) the order of 23 April 1970
denying defendants motion for postponement of the pre-trial set on 26 April 1979;
(b) the order of 26 April 1979 declaring him in default and authorizing plaintiff to
present his evidence ex-parte; (c) the default judgment of 26 July 1979; and (d) the
order dated 22 October 1979 denying his omnibus motion for new trial.
On 16 October 1986, the Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial
court of 26 April 1979 as well as the assailed judgment rendered by default.

ISSUE:
Does the trial court correctly rendered
the default judgment against
respondent founding him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot in equal
shares?
DECISION:
Yes. Under Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any
time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
Corollary to this rule, Article 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is
essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of
them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked
by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the property it cannot be
subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b)
the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or
assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. In one
case, this Court upheld the order of the trial court directing the holding of a public
sale of the properties owned in common pursuant to Article 498 of the Civil Code.
However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot
without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned
in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and
in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners. Each co-owner of
property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use
and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the
respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises,
together with his co-participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in
addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.

MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS vs. HONORABLE ADORACIO G. ANGELES

FACTS:
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, out of this
union was born in 1942 petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. However, Antonio and
Sofia subsequently parted ways. While separated de facto from Sofia, Antonio, in
1949, secured a divorce decree against her in Nevada, USA. He then married private
respondent Dr. Conchita Talag in Tokyo, Japan, in 1951. Antonio and Conchita had
eleven children who were all born between the years 1951 and 1967.
On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Gautemala. Thereafter, Antonio married
private respondent, for the second time, in Tagaytay City. Antonio then died on
March 8, 1981 at the Capitol Medical Center.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of
letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late
husbands estate. She alleged that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate
heirs, namely herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. There being no
opposition, her petition was granted.
After six years, petitioner decided to intervene. In a motion, she argued inter
alia that private respondents children were illegitimate. This was challenged by
private respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her
children were born prior to Sofias death in 1967.
On November 14, 1991, the court declared private respondents ten children
legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and
private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.
She filed the instant petition for certiorari, contending that since only natural
children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her
half brothers and sisters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not children of the private respondent can be legitimated?
DECISION:
Article 269 of the Civil Code states that only natural children can be
legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other were natural. In this case, the marriage under question is considered void

from the beginning because bigamous, contracted when a prior valid marriage was
still subsisting. It follows that the children begotten of such union cannot be
considered natural children proper for at the time of their conception, their parents
were disqualified from marrying each other due to the impediment of a prior
subsisting marriage. Subsequently, the term natural children by legal fiction was
invented, thus giving rise to another category of illegitimate children, clearly not to
be confused with natural children as defined under Article 269 but by fiction of law
to be equated with acknowledged natural children and, consequently, enjoying the
status, rights and obligations of the latter.
Natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimized in this fashion. Our
archaic law on family relations, patterned as it is after Spanish Civil Law, frowns
upon illegal relations such that the benefits of legitimation under Chapter 3 of Title
VII do not extend nor were they intended to extend, to natural children by legal
fiction. Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural children
as defined thereunder.
Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be
legitimized, and natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged
natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural
children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized.