Deloso vs Sandiganbayan

This petition seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan which
preventively suspended petitioner Amor D. Deloso(accused in the criminal cases) from
his position as provincial governor of Zambales and from any office that he may be
holding. Deloso was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local elections
of November 1971. While he occupied the position of mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva
filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing him of having committed acts
in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act3019) for issuing to certain Daniel Ferrer
a tractor purchased by the Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land
Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without any
agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of tractor by the latter,
thereby, causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan.
Deloso was, then, elected governor of the Province of Zambales in the January 18,
1988 local elections
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner be suspended indefinitely
HELD: It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to
the highest provincial office in their command if they are deprived of his services for an
indefinite period with the termination of his case possibly extending beyond his entire
term. The Court rules that a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under
Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90) days under Section
42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which period also appears
reasonable and appropriate under thec ircumstances of this case. The petitioner may
still be suspended but for specifically expressed reasons and not from an automatic
application of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

BINAY V SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. Nos. 120681-83)

FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate
informations against petitioner, Mayor Jejomar Binay, one for violation of
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code (Illegal Use of Public Funds), and two
for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (giving undue favor to private
parties). The informations alleged that the acts constituting these crimes
were committed in 1987 during petitioners incumbency as Mayor of Makati,
then a municipality of Metro Manila. Petitioner argued that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the cases filed against him.
MAGSAYSAY v SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. 128136
FACTS:
Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual,
Batangas. Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysays
co-petitioners are officials of the same municipality. Two complaints were
raised against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No.
3019 for overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR Construction for the
landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School which informations
were filed before the RTC of Batangas City. While another complaint on the
same matter was eventually filed before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner
moved to quash the Criminal Case filed before the Sandiganbayan on the
grounds that the same complaints has already been filed with the RTC. The
proceedings of both cases were suspended by the Sandiganbayan and the
RTC pending resolution of the Binay case as to the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
--------------------------------------------ISSUES:
I.

Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject case

II.
In GR No. 128136, whether the filing of information with the RTC
effectively ousted the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the case and
estopped the respondents from filing an information before the latter; and
whether the filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes
double jeopardy.

RULING:
I. The court ruled that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the
subject cases. R.A. No. 7975 (took effect on May 16, 1995) as amended by
RA. 8249 (took effect on February 8, 1997) specified that the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over cases involving violations of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code when the principal accused includes officials of
the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) with enumeration
as to officials specifically included. Even if the municipal mayor is not
specifically included in the list and despite the fact that the actual salary
received is not equivalent to grade 27, the court ruled that the classification
of salary grades should not be based on the actual amount of salary received
but on the nature of the functions performed by the official concerned - the
level of difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof -relative to that of another position. It is the officials Grade that determines
his or her salary, not the other way around.
In the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades
prepared by the DBM lists the municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27.
Petitioners, therefore, fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code also settles the matter as it
provides that municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly
compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as
prescribed under R.A. No. 6758.
II. The court ruled that the Sandiganbayan was not ousted of its jurisdiction
even if the information was first filed in the RTC since the latter did not have
jurisdiction in the first place as provided in R.A. 7975. Estoppel could not also
be invoked because jurisdiction is determined by law and not by the consent
or agreement of the parties. The court has previously ruled that a filing of a
complaint with one court does not prevent the plaintiff from filing the same
with the competent court. This does not amount to forum shopping since the
only authority of the first court was to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction. By estoppel, it means that the party estopped consistently

invoked the jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the

proceedings, impugning such jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse
decision. Also, the filing of another complaint with the Sandiganbayan does
not also amount to double jeopardy because there can be no double
jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had no
jurisdiction. The remedy should have been for the petitioner to move the
quashal of information for lack of jurisdiction.
The consolidated petitions were DISMISSED.

Demaala vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 173523

FACTS:
Petitioner is the Municipal Mayor of Narra, Palawan, and is the accused in
criminal cases and for violations of Section 3(h) ofRA 3019, which cases are
pending before the Sandiganbayan.
On January 9, 2006, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed before the
Sandiganbayan a Motion to Suspend the Accused Pursuant to Section 13, RA
3019arguing that under such sectionpetitioners suspension from office was
mandatory. Petitioner opposed the motion claiming that there is no proof that
the evidence against her was strong; that her continuance in office does not
prejudice the cases against her nor pose a threat to the safety and integrity
of the evidence and records in her office; and that her re-election to office
justifies the denial of suspension.
On February 9, 2006, Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the
motion to suspend, thus, petitioner is suspended from her present position
for 90 days.
On March 23, 2006, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration. She
argued that the motion to suspend should have been filed earlier and not
when the prosecution is about to conclude the presentation of its evidence;
that the prosecution evidence indicates that petitioners acts are not covered
by Section 3(h) of RA 3019, and thus not punishable under said law; that the
evidence failed to show that petitioner was committing further acts of
malfeasance in office; and that suspension while mandatory is not
necessarily automatic. Petitioner scheduled the hearing of her Motion for
Reconsideration on April 26, 2006. However, the Ombudsman (prosecution)
opposed petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 19, 2006, the prosecution filed a Manifestation with Motion to Reset
the Trial Scheduled on April 26 and 27, 2006.It sought to reset the scheduled
April 26 and 27, 2006 hearing for the continuation of the presentation of the
prosecutions evidence to a later date.
Per the January 19, 2006 Order of the Honorable Court, trial of these cases
will continue on April 26 and 27, 2006, both at 1:30 in the afternoon.
On April 21, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order granting the
prosecutions motion to reset trial and scheduled the continuation thereof on
August 2 and 3, 2006.
On May 23, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying
petitioners March 23, 2006 Motion for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant Petition.
ISSUE: Whether Petitioner was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan
issued its May 23, 2006 Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration
even before the same could be heard on the scheduled August 2 and 3, 2006
hearings.
HELD: Petitioner was not denied due process. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW due
process
The April 21, 2006 Order of the Sandiganbayan indicates that what it referred
to were the two hearing dates of April 26 and 27, 2006 covering the
continuation of the trial proper the ongoing presentation of the prosecutions
evidence and not the single hearing date of April 26, 2006 for the
determination of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The prosecutions
manifestation and motion to reset trial itself unmistakably specified that
what was being reset was the trial proper which was scheduled on April 26
and 27, 2006 pursuant to the courts previous January 19, 2006 Order; it had
nothing at all to do with petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioners failure to attend the scheduled April 26, 2006 hearing of her own
Motion for Reconsideration is fatal to her cause. Her excuse that she no
longer bothered to go to court on April 26, 2006 since "she had no business
to be there" is unavailing. By being absent at the April 21, 2006 hearing,
petitioner did not consider the prosecutions manifestation and motion to
reset trial as related to her pending Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, it was
incumbent upon her to have attended the hearing of her own motion on April
26, 2006. Her absence at said hearing was inexcusable, and the

Sandiganbayan was therefore justified in considering the matter submitted

for resolution based on the pleadings submitted.
Consequently, there was nothing procedurally irregular in the issuance of the
assailed May 23, 2006 Resolution by the Sandiganbayan.
With the Courts ruling in Batul v. Bayron, later reiterated in De La Salle
University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 565 Phil. 330 (2007)thus Where a party
was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do
so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Notice and hearing is
the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the
primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or
defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of
due process.
"To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in
court - one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity
to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
DISMISSED.
Hadjim Hashim Abdul Vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 184496

FACTS
Petitioner was first elected as municipal mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur ion
May 1998 election and re-elected for a second term in May 2001 election. It
was while serving his second term as mayor that Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao filed an Information charging petitioner, along with Abdul and
Domado, with falsification of public documents. During arraignment,
petitioner and his co-accused pleaded not guilty to offense charged. Before
the commencement of thge trial, Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
moved for suspension pendente lite of petitioner and co-accused as
mandated by law. OSP rendered suspension as mandatory. petitioner
asserted that he cannot be suspended pendent lite because the crime for
which he was charged is not among those enumerated under Section 13 of
RA 3019. Neither does fraud upon government or public funds or property

cover falsification of public document nor fraud per se, an ingredient of the
offense of falsification of public document.
Finding the charge as squarely falling within the ambit of the law, respondent
granted in its Resolution and ordered suspension pendente lite of petitioner
and accused from their positions and from any other office which they may
now or hereafter be holding for a period of 90 days from notice On March 10,
2004, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with TRO alleging
that suspension order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction .Court dismissed the petition, however, the suspension
order was no longer implemented because it was superseded by the
expiration of petitioner's second term as a municipal mayor and his
unsuccessful bid for reelection.
During 2007 election, petitioner emerged as winner. OSP once again moved
for his and his co-accused's suspension order. In his Comment and
Opposition, petitioner called attention to respondent's pronouncement in its
Resolution that his defeat in 2004 election has effectively rendered his
suspension moot and academic. Respondent still ordered suspension o0f
petitioner. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied in
a Resolution.
Petitioner filed this present petition
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in suspending him pendente lite from his
position as mayor of Lanao del Sur

HELD:
"We dismiss the Petition for being moot and academic. For a court to exercise
its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy.
Thus, in Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco, we have ruled that [w]here the issue has
become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an
adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit
to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest however
intellectually challenging. In the present case, the acquittal of herein
petitioner operates as a supervening event that mooted the present Petition.

Any resolution on the validity or invalidity of the issuance of the order of

suspension could no longer affect his rights as a ranking public officer, for
legally speaking he did not commit the offense charged. Notwithstanding
the mootness of the present Petition, petitioner nevertheless implores us to
make a clear and categorical resolution on whether the offense of
falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the RPC is included in
the term fraud as contemplated under Section 13 of RA 3019. As earlier
quoted, to warrant the suspension of a public officer under the said Section
13, he must be charged with an offense (1) under RA 3019, or (2) under Title
Seven, Book II of the RPC, or (3) involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property. Admittedly, petitioner in this case was not charged under
RA 3019. Neither was he charged under Title Seven,Book II of the RPC as the
crime of falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the RPC is
covered by Title Four, Book II thereof. The relevant question now is whether
falsification of public documents is considered as fraud upon government or
public funds or property. This issue is not of first impression. Close but not
exactly similar with the factual backdrop of this case is Bustillo v.
Sandiganbayan, Petitioner therein was charged with falsifying municipal
vouchers which, as used in government, are official documents.
He asserted the said offense does not involve fraud or property; hence, his
suspension finds no basis in Section 13 of RA 3019. In construing the term
fraud as used in Section 13 of RA 3019, the Court held in said case that the
same is understood in its general sense, that is, referring to an instance or
an act of trickery or deceit especially when involving misrepresentation. And
since vouchers are official documents signifying a cash outflow from
government coffers, falsification thereof invariably involves fraud upon public
funds. Again, in Bartolo v. Sandiganbayan, Second Division the Court citing
Bustillo underscored the fact that the term fraud as used in Section 13 of
[RA] 3019 is understood in its generic sense. In upholding the suspension of
therein petitioner, the Court held that the allegation of falsification of the
three public documents by making it appear that the flood control project
was 100% complete [when in fact it was not,] constitutes fraud upon public
funds.

LAYUS V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:

Petitioner Celia T. Layus (hereafter LAYUS), the elected Mayor of the

Municipality of Claveria, Province of Cagayan, was charged with estafa
through falsification of public documents in an Information, filed on 19
February 1997 before public respondent Sandiganbayan and docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 23583. The Information stemmed from a
complaint for estafa through falsification of public documents and for
violation of Section 3(e) and (h), and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed against
LAYUS and Pedro V. Layus, Henjie C. Layus and Arnold V. Layus. After
preliminary investigation, Graft Investigation Officer II Jose D. Carlos of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in a Joint Resolution dated 21
November 1996, recommended the filing of an information against LAYUS for
the first charge and the dismissal of the charges against all of the original
respondents for the second. The resolution had the concurrence of Director
Ernesto Nocos and was approved by the Ombudsman.
On 24 March 1997, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied LAYUS
motion for reconsideration of the Joint Resolution of 21 November 1996. On 6
August 1997, the first day set by the Sandiganbayan for the trial of the case,
LAYUS informed the court of the prior filing of her motion for reinvestigation
dated 2 August 1997, which was allegedly sent by registered mail, but the
Sandiganbayan had not received any copy of it. On 7 August 1997, LAYUS
filed a motion to quash the Information.
In the meantime, with appropriate leave, LAYUS served and filed an Omnibus
Motion dated 25 September 1997, reiterating her right to reinvestigation.
This was, however, denied by the Sandiganbayan in its resolution of 1
December 1997. LAYUS motion to reconsider the denial likewise failed. In its
resolution of 9 October 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied LAYUS motion to
quash and ruled that the alleged irregularities in the preliminary
investigation were not proper grounds for quashing the Information.
On 19 November 1997, the prosecution filed with the Sandiganbayan a
Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite, which LAYUS opposed on 26
November 1997.
The resolution of said motion was held in abeyance in light of the May 1998
elections and the prohibition under Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, as amended,
which
provides thus:

(x) Suspension of elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay officer - the

provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding during the election period,
any public official who suspends, without prior approval of the Commission,
any elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay officer, unless said
suspension will be for purposes of applying the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act in relation to the suspension and removal of elective officials;
in which case the provisions of this section shall be inapplicable. On 26 June
1998, the Sandiganbayan eventually granted the motion to suspend LAYUS.
ISSUE:
WON the 90-day suspension pendente lite is valid.
HELD:
Having ruled that the information filed against LAYUS is valid, there can be
no impediment to the application of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, which
states: Sec. 13.
Suspension and loss of benefits -- Any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property, whether as a simple or
as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. This
provision makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public
officer who has been validly charged with a violation of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, or Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property. This is based on
the presumption that unless the public officer is suspended, he may frustrate
his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or both.
The imposition of the suspension, however, is not automatic or selfoperative. There must first be a valid information, determined at a presuspension hearing, where the court is furnished with the basis to suspend
the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or refuse
suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the
proceedings which impairs its validity. In the instant case, the records show
that LAYUS was given adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the
criminal proceedings against her. Since the required pre-suspension hearing
was complied with and the information was deemed valid, it then becomes
the ministerial duty of the Sandiganbayan to forthwith issue the order of

preventive suspension which, however, may not be for an indefinite duration

or an unreasonable length of time. Thus, in Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, we
ruled that preventive suspension may not exceed 90 days in consonance
with Presidential Decree No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree), now Section 52
of the Administrative Code of 1987. Considering that the imposed 90-day
suspension pendente lite of LAYUS does not exceed the maximum period
thus fixed, the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in granting the
prosecutions motion to suspend petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
JOSE MIRANDA V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then the mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, under
preventive suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to 25 January 1998 for alleged violations of
Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees. Subsequently, then Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a Complaint with
the Office of the Ombudsman. Vice Mayor Navarro contended that Mayor Miranda committed the
felony of usurpation of authority or official functions. Mayor Miranda asserted that he reassumed
office on the advice of his lawyer and in good faith. He also averred that, on the day he reassumed
office, he received a memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to
vacate his office and he immediately complied with the same. Notably, Mayor Mirandas counteraffidavit also stated that he left the mayoralty post after coercion by the Philippine National Police.
ISSUE:
Whether or not good faith may be invoked by the petitioner.
HELD:
The court is not a bit persuaded by the posture of the petitioner that he reassumed office under an
honest belief that he was no longer under preventive suspension. Petitioners pretense cannot stand
scrutiny. Petitioners own affidavit states.Petitioners excuse for violating the order of preventive
suspension is too flimsy to merit even a side-glance. He alleged that he merely followed the advice
of his lawyer. If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect for the rule of law, they should have
assailed the validity of the order of suspension in court instead of taking the law into their own
hands.

BERONA V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS

Petitioners were public officers and employees of the Provincial Health Office
in Abra. Petitioners were charged for violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. When arraigned, all accused
pleaded not guilty. The prosecution filed an Amended Motion to suspend the
accused pendente lite. The motion sought the suspension of petitioners from
any public office which they may be occupying pending trial.
After pre-suspension hearing, Sandiganbayan suspended the petitioners from
office for 90 days. The Sandiganbayan held that preventive suspension is
mandatory under Section 13 upon the courts finding that a valid information
charges the accused for violation of RA 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or any offense involving public funds or property or fraud on
government. The Sandiganbayan observed that a preliminary investigation
was duly conducted before the filing of the Information, which the
Sandiganbayan found sufficient in form and substance.
The Sandiganbayan held that preventive suspension is mandatory under
Section 13 upon the courts finding that a valid information charges the
accused for violation of RA 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
or any offense involving public funds or property or fraud on government.
The Sandiganbayan observed that a preliminary investigation was duly
conducted before the filing of the Information, which the Sandiganbayan
found sufficient in form and substance. The first Resolution ordered thus:
ISSUE:
Whether Sec 13, which qualifies the public officer as incumbent, applies to
petitioners since they are no longer occupying the positions they held when
they were charged under RA 3019.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
The Information charged petitioners under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for
causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence pursuant to
Section 13.
Section 13 is so clear and explicit that there is hardly room for any extended
court rationalization of the law. Section 13 unequivocally mandates the

suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution

under RA 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving public funds or property or fraud on government. This Court has
repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is mandatory, and there are
no ifs and buts about it.[6]
The purpose of a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the
information. The court can then have a basis to either suspend the accused
and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the
suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that
impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the
information by way of a motion to quash. In this case, the Sandiganbayan
had determined the validity of the information in a pre-suspension hearing
conducted for that purpose. Hence, petitioners suspension is unquestionably
mandatory.
Suspension pendente lite applies to any office the officer might be currently
holding
Petitioners contend that Sandiganbayan jhas no legal basis to suspend them
because they are presently occupting positions different from those under
which the Information charged them In Libanan v. Sandiganbayan,[8] the
petitioner similarly claimed that the order of suspension, based on his
indictment as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, could no longer attach
to him, as he was already the duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of
Eastern Samar. Rejecting his thesis, the Court explained: In Deloso v.
Sandiganbayan, this Court rejected a similar argument advanced by
Governor Deloso who, at the time of issuance of the suspension order, was
already occupying the office of governor and not the position of municipal
mayor that he held previously when charged with having violated the AntiGraft Law. Prior to Deloso, in Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, the suspension of then
Cavite Mayor Bayot was also sustained even as he was charged for acts
committed as government auditor of the Commission on Audit.
Suspension pendente lite prevents the accused from committing further acts
of malfeasance while in office
Petitioners other contention that there is no longer any danger that
petitioners would intimidate prosecution witnesses since two of the latters
witnesses had already completed their testimonies in court is also untenable.
Equally futile is their claim that Dr. Beroas suspension would deprive his
constituents in the Municipality of Pilar the services and leadership of their

highest elected municipal official to the greater detriment of public

service.These reasons cannot override the mandatory character of Section
13. The possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses or hamper
their prosecution is just one of the grounds for preventive suspension.
Another is to prevent the accused from committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office. Section 13 reinforces the principle that a public
office is a public trust. Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer
from hampering his prosecution by intimidating or influencing witnesses,
tampering with documentary evidence, or committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office. Petitioners last feeble argument that the
prosecution evidence is weak misses the point. They lose sight of the fact
that preventive suspension is not a penalty. The accused public officers
whose culpability remains to be proven are still entitled to the constitutional
presumption of innocence.