NICOLAS VS.

DESIERTO
G.R. No. 154668, DEC. 16, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Nicolas was the Commissioner of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau. He was administratively before the Ombudsman for allegedly
releasing an apprehended cargo based on spurious documents. The Graft
Investigation Officer found him guilty of gross neglect of duty which was duly
approved by the Ombudsman. The motion for reconsideration was denied, and thus
he appealed to the CA. The CA upheld the decision. Petitioner went further to the SC
arguing that the CA erred in affirming the decision despite of lack of substantial
evidence to support his conviction of gross neglect of duty.
ISSUE:
What is the quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings?
HELD:
The quantum of proof necessary to prove a charge in an administrative case
is substantial evidence, which is defined as relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Such quantum was not met
here. Even though petitioner had not adduced evidence on his behalf, the facts on
record show that his act or omission does not constitute gross neglect of duty.

SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC. VS. ABAD

G.R. No. 85502, February 24, 1992
FACTS:
The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it
to cut, remove and utilize timber within the concession area in Zamboanga del Sur,
for a period of ten years. Private respondents Gilbolingo and Bugtai filed a petition
with the DENR for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious violations of
its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The same charges
were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a complaint for
injunction with damages against the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of
Pagadian City. The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1)
the court had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet
exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly
prohibited by section 1 of PD 605. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The
petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondent Court of Appeals, which
sustained the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies was not without exception and pointed to the several
instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent
court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need
for judicial intervention.

ISSUE:

What is the correct application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies?

HELD:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to
the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling
under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for
review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is
one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint.
The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the
objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with
the case as if the doctrine had been observed.
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers,
which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters
coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other
departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better
position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors
committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if
given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative
decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict
enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of
avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.
As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number
of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly
resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the question
raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the
act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial
intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will
be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8)
when strong public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the controversy is
private land; and 10) in quo warranto proceedings.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. VS. NTC

G.R. No. 151908, AUGUST 12, 2003
FACTS:
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services.
Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed
against the National Telecommunications Commission an action for declaration of

nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC
Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.
Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to
regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such
jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer
Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and
violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due
process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the
prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the
prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid
card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed
that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.
Soon thereafter, petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc.
filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-inIntervention. This was granted by the trial court.
On October 27, 2000, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the NTC from implementing Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and the
Memorandum dated October 6, 2000.
In the meantime, respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not exhaustion of administrative remedies apply to this case.
HELD:
NO. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers
and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rulemaking power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of
non-delegability and separability of powers.
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are
the product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that
the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. They must
conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for
such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions control
with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an
administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation
by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering

or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the
former must prevail.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an
administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This
is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy
is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which
is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in
such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the
executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a
judicial nature.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by
an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative
agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not
when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
In Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, it
was held:
The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party
may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of
respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was
issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legislative power. However,
only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of
their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.

VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC. VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESL. ASST. & PPA
G.R. No. 73705, AUGUST 27, 1987
FACTS:
The Iloilo Port Manager of respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA for
short) wrote petitioner Victorias Milling Co., requiring it to have its tugboats and
barges undergo harbor formalities and pay entrance/clearance fees as well as
berthing fees. PPA, likewise, requiring petitioner to secure a permit for cargo
handling operations at its Da-an Banua wharf and remit 10% of its gross income for
said operations as the government's share.
To these demands, petitioner sent two (2) letters, both dated June 2, 1981,
wherein it maintained that it is exempt from paying PPA any fee or charge because:
(1) the wharf and an its facilities were built and installed in its land; (2) repair and
maintenance thereof were and solely paid by it; (3) even the dredging and
maintenance of the Malijao River Channel from Guimaras Strait up to said private

wharf are being done by petitioner's equipment and personnel; and (4) at no time
has the government ever spent a single centavo for such activities. Petitioner
further added that the wharf was being used mainly to handle sugar purchased from
district planters pursuant to existing milling agreements.
In reply, on November 3, 1981, PPA Iloilo sent petitioner a memorandum of
PPA's Executive Officer, Maximo Dumlao, which justified the PPA's demands. Further
request for reconsideration was denied on January 14, 1982.
On March 29, 1982, petitioner served notice to PPA that it is appealing the
case to the Court of Tax Appeals; and accordingly, on March 31, 1982, petitioner
filed a Petition for Review with the said Court, entitled "Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v.
Philippine Ports Authority," On January 10, 1984, the CTA dismissed petitioner's
action on the ground that it has no jurisdiction. It recommended that the appeal be
addressed to the Office of the President.
On April 2, 1984, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President,
but the same was denied on the sole ground that it was filed beyond the
reglementary period. A motion for Reconsideration was filed, but the same was
denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the period of appeal under Sec. 131 of PPA AO No. 13-77 was
tolled by the pendency of the petitions filed first with CTA, and then with the SC.

HELD:
The instant petition is devoid of merit. Petitioner, in holding that the recourse
first to the Court of Tax Appeals and then to this Court tolled the period to appeal,
submits that it was guided, in good faith, by considerations which lead to the
assumption that procedural rules of appeal then enforced still hold true. It contends
that when Republic Act No. 1125 (creating the Court of Tax Appeals) was passed in
1955, PPA was not yet in existence; and under the said law, the Court of Tax Appeals
had exclusive appellate jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs regarding, among others, customs duties, fees and other
money charges imposed by the Bureau under the Tariff and Customs Code. On the
other hand, neither in Presidential Decree No. 505, creating the PPA on July 11, 1974
nor in Presidential Decree No. 857, revising its charter (said decrees, among others,
merely transferred to the PPA the powers of the Bureau of Customs to impose and
collect customs duties, fees and other money charges concerning the use of ports
and facilities thereat) is there any provision governing appeals from decisions of the
PPA on such matters, so that it is but reasonable to seek recourse with the Court of
Tax Appeals. Petitioner, likewise, contends that an analysis of Presidential Decree
No. 857, shows that the PPA is vested merely with corporate powers and duties
(Sec. 6), which do not and can not include the power to legislate on procedural
matters, much less to effectively take away from the Court of Tax Appeals the
latter's appellate jurisdiction.

These contentions are untenable for while it is true that neither Presidential Decree
No. 505 nor Presidential Decree No. 857 provides for the remedy of appeal to the
Office of the President, nevertheless, Presidential Decree No. 857 empowers the PPA
to promulgate such rules as would aid it in accomplishing its purpose.

UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS. CA

G.R. No. 134625, AUGUST 31, 1999
FACTS:
Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India
and holder of a Philippine visitors visa. Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the
doctoral program in Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of
Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City. After she was
conferred the Doctorate Degree, the UP Board of Regents stripped her of that
Degree on the ground of plagiarism. She argued that her right to due process was
violated because she was not accorded opportunity to cross examine the witnesses
against her.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to meet or confront the witnesses is demandable as
a matter of right in the administrative proceedings.

HELD:

Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the

opportunity to explain ones side of a controversy or a chance to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the
opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due
process.
In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against
her
and afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her
written explanation, which she forwarded on September 25, 1993. Private
[29]

respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla
committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P.
authorities explaining her position.
It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an
audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context
does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is
noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose
cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.
Nor indeed was private respondent entitled to be furnished a copy of the report
of the Zafaralla committee as part of her right to due process. In Ateneo de Manila
University v. Capulong, we held:
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded
the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis
of petitioners February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due
process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be
said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving
students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An
administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students participation in a
hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding.

VAR-ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. VS. ACHACOSO

G.R. No. 81805, MAY 31, 1988
FACTS:
The petitioners filed a complaint with the Workers' Assistance and
Adjudication Office, POEA against the private respondents for having allegedly
violated their Contracts of Employment with the petitioners which supposedly
resulted in damages arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the International
Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986.
On the basis of the pleadings and memoranda the public respondent
rendered a decision. Petitioner argued that they were denied due process of law
because the respondent Administrator resolved the case without any formal
hearing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a formal type of hearing is required in the administrative
proceedings.
HELD:
NO. Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners 'allegation that they were
denied due process because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard (Bermejo vs.
Banjos, 31 SCRA 764), or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain one's side (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438; Gas Corporation of the

Phil. vs. Hon. Inciong, 93 SCRA 653; Cebu Institute of Technology vs. Minister of
Labor, 113 SCRA 257), or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of (Dormitorio vs. Fernandez, 72 SCRA 388).
The fact is that at the hearing of the case on March 4,1987, it was agreed by
the parties that they would file their respective memoranda and thereafter consider
the case submitted for decision (Annex 7 of Bunyog's Comment). This procedure is
authorized by law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes. However, only the
private respondents submitted memoranda. The petitioners did not. On June 10,
1987, the respondents filed a motion to resolve (Annex 7, Bunyog's Comment). The
petitioners' counsel did not oppose either the "Motion to Resolve" or the
respondents "Motion for Execution of Decision" dated October 19, 1987 (Annex 10),
both of which were furnished them through counsel. If it were true, as they now
contend, that they had been denied due process in the form of a formal hearing,
they should have opposed both motions.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS VS. DELA ROSA

G.R. No. 95122-23, MAY 31, 1991
FACTS:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following
the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian. Before the Citizenship
Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has five (5) children with his
wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian,
Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in
Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed
Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by
the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature
of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as
Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son, respectively, of
Santiago Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision
dated July 6, 1961, admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino
citizens. As a consequence thereof, William Gatchalian was issued Identification
Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration authorities on August 16, 1961.
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9
setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of
Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of
Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to
review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a
Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William and others.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the Bureau of Immigration are appealable to
the CA.
HELD:
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of
Appeals is vested with
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, order, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, board or commission, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph
(1) of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals extends to all quasi-judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose
decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals are those which under
the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are specifically appealable to
the Court of Appeals. Thus, under Republic Act No. 5434, it is specifically provided
that the decisions of the Land Registration Commission (LRC), the Social Security
Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Patent Office and the
Agricultural Invention Board are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
ROSALES VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-47821, September 15, 1988
FACTS:
This case sprouted from the complaint filed by Rosales against Don Bosco
Technical Institute before the Bureau of Private School for alleged anomalous
ranking of honor pupils for the grade school. The Bureau of Private School rendered
a decision in favour of Rosales, and so the latter filed a complaint for damages.
However, the school insisted that it has filed a motion for reconsideration and the
case was reconsidered. Respondent school insisted that the complaint for damages
should be dismiss for failure of the petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies.
According to the school, the reconsidered decision should have been appealed by
petitioner to the Secretary of Education prior to filing of said complaint for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Rosales exhausted administrative remedies before
filing in court the complaint for damages.
HELD:
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse
through court action, as a general rule, cannot prosper until all the remedies have
been exhausted at the administrative level.
Thus, in Abe-Abe et al. v. Manta, we emphatically declared:
When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive
Department of the government, but nevertheless, a litigant fails or
refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to
interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on
convenience but likewise on respect; convenience of the party litigants
and respect for a co-equal office in the government. If a remedy is
available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted
to before resort can be made to (the) court.
Petitioners however, claim that they were denied due process, obviously to
show that their case falls within one of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies. Such contention is however untenable, because in the
first place, they were made to avail in the same administrative agency, the
opportunity or right to oppose, which in fact they did, when they filed a motion for
reconsideration and later when the motion was denied, they appealed to the
Secretary of Education and Culture. Precisely, a motion for reconsideration or appeal
is curative in character on the issue of alleged denial of due process.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 79684, February 19, 1991
FACTS:
The petitioners Director of Lands and the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources entered into a contract with the private respondent B.A. Gonzalez
Surveying Company for which the latter was bound to execute a public land
subdivision mapping (Plsm) of the alienable and disposable lands in the Municipality
of Valderama, Antique. The private respondent was likewise contracted by the
petitioners to do the photo-cadastral mapping of Project PCADM-493-D in Numancia,
Aklan. However, despite written demands from the Bureau of Lands to the private
respondent to commence the Numancia, Aklan Pcadm project, the latter failed to do
so; consequently, in an order dated February 7, 1977, the former cancelled the
contract with regard to the said project and declared the performance bond as
forfeited. On a motion for reconsideration filed by the private respondent, the
Director of Lands reinstated the said contract without however granting the
company's request for a price adjustment, which denial the private respondent
seasonably appealed to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. This
appeal is pending.
The Director of Lands likewise scrapped the Valderama Plsm contract because
of the non-completion of the project despite the grant of repeated extensions
totalling 1,200 days. Similarly, the private respondent appealed the cancellation of
the said contract to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, where the
appeal also still remains pending. Meanwhile, without both appeals being resolved,
the Director of Lands conducted a public bidding for the cadastral survey of several
municipalities including the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan and the Municipality of
Valderama, Antique. In the said bidding, Armando Villamayor and Cristina Matuod
were declared as the successful bidders for the Numancia and Valderama projects,
respectively. Thereupon, the private respondent filed a petition for prohibition
and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order with the Court of
Appeals, alleging that the Director of Lands acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
in awarding the said cadastral survey projects to other persons while the appeals of
the private respondent remain pending.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding the opinion of the Director of
Lands on a matter within its exclusive competence and technical expertise.

HELD:
We likewise take cognizance of the wealth of jurisprudence on this doctrine of
primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. The
Court has consistently held that "acts of an administrative agency must not casually
be over-turned by a court, and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment

for that of the administrative agency acting within the parameters of its own
competence," unless "there be a clear showing of arbitrary action or palpable and
serious error." In similar vein, we reiterated recently the rule that the findings of
fact of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, in the present case cadastral surveys and
mappings and land registration, are accorded not only respect but more often than
not even finality.

FORTICH VS. CORONA

G.R. No. 131457, APRIL 24, 1998
FACTS:
This case involves a land dispute between the Quisumbings and tenants. Said
parcel of land was supposed to be covered by the Agrarian Law, however, it was
exempted from coverage because the area upon said land lie was subsequently
declared by the provincial government and its coverage from the DAR was
exempted which exemption was upheld the Office of the President, said decision by
the OP has become final and executory. Aggrieve by said decision, the farmers and
other tenants march their way from Bukidnon until Manila to protest the land
exemption from the coverage of the DAR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the President may change its ruling after it has attain
finality.
HELD:
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of
the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof
provides:
Sec. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall,
except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after
the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such
period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be
allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.
(Emphasis ours).
It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a
suppletory character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997
declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has
seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its
jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its
jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the
second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second
motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court

mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from
the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration
was permitted to be filed in "exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the
second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been
entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably
filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the
act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying
its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in
gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 110571, MARCH 10. 1994
FACTS:

Brought to fore in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application
for preliminary injunction is the novel question of where and in what manner
appeals from decisions of the Board of Investments (BOI) should be filed. A thorough
scrutiny of the conflicting provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," Executive Order No. 226, also
known as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 and Supreme Court Circular No.
1-91 is, thus, called for.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an executive order can change an LOI

HELD:
The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies
found in the third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said
circular does not apply to appeals from final orders or decision of the BOI. The
second sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that " They shall also apply to
appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an
appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court."
E.O. 266 is one such statute. Besides, the enumeration is preceded by the words "

among these agencies are . . . ," strongly implying that there are other quasi-judicial
agencies which are covered by the Circular but which have not been expressly listed
therein. More importantly, BOI does not fall within the purview of the exclusions
listed in Section 2 of the circular. Only the following final decisions and interlocutory
orders are expressly excluded from the circular, namely, those of: (1) the National
Labor Relations Commission; (2) the Secretary of Labor and Employment; (3) the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals and (4) other quasi-judicial agencies from
which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or allowed by statute. Since in DBP
v. CA we upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the Court of
Tax Appeals despite the fact that the same is not among the agencies reorganized
by B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and comprehensive, there is no
reason why BOI should be excluded from Circular 1-91, which is but implementary of
said law.

EPZA VS. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 101476, APRIL 14, 1992
FACTS:
The CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP
Company and Governor Remulla and their subordinates to desist from committing
further acts of demolition, terrorism, and harassment until further orders from the
Commission and to appeal before the Commission. Two weeks later, the same group
accompanied by men of Governor Remulla, again bulldozed the area. They allegedly
handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other
respondents, and fired a shot in the air. On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary
Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her order of May 17,
1991 and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the
contractors, and their subordinates.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CHR can issue and injunction order.
HELD:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have
been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the
Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the
intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. It is never derived by
implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the
Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ
of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the
victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no
jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued
"by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by

the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action
pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A
writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending
principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a
party thereto, and for no other purpose