Social and Political Recognition

Acts of recognition infuse many aspects of our lives such as receiving a round of applause
from a rapt audience, being spotted in a crowded street by a long-forgotten friend, having an
application for a job rejected because of your criminal record, enjoying some words of praise
by a respected philosophy professor, getting pulled over by the police because you are a black
man driving an expensive car, and fighting to have your same-sex marriage officially
sanctioned in order to enjoy the same benefits as hetero-sexual marriages. Evidently the
various ways we are recognised (and recognise others) play an important role in shaping our
quality of life. Recognition theorists go further than this, arguing that recognition can help
form, or even determine, our sense of who we are and the value accorded to us as individuals.
Political theories of recognition, which attempt to reconfigure the concept of justice in terms
of due or withheld recognition, can be contrasted with (but set alongside) the rise of
multiculturalism, which has produced an array of literature focused on recognising,
accommodating and respecting difference. Although these two trajectories overlap, there are
important differences between them. Multicultural politics is rooted in the identity politics
underlying various social movements that gained prominence during the 1960s, such as the
civil rights movement and radical/cultural feminism. These movements tend to emphasise the
distinctness and value of their cultural identity and demand group-specific rights to protect
this uniqueness. Without depreciating identity politics and multiculturalism, this article is
primarily concerned with political theories of recognition, particularly those formulated by
Charles Taylor (who is also a prominent figure in multicultural politics), Nancy Fraser and
Axel Honneth. These focus on the role played by recognition in individual identity formation
and the normative foundation this can provide to theories of justice.
Despite its brief history as an explicitly political concept, philosophical interest in the idea of
recognition can be traced to the work of Hegel, who first coined the phrase struggle for
recognition (kampf um anerkennung). This article begins by clarifying the specific
political and philosophical meaning of recognition. It will provides an overview of Hegels
remarks on recognition before proceeding to identify the contemporary advocates of
recognition. It presents the main similarities and differences between these authors before
examining some important criticisms levelled at concept of recognition. The conclusion is a
reflection upon the increasing influence of recognition and how it may develop in the future.

Table of Contents

1. Defining Recognition
2. The Hegelian Legacy
3. Contemporary Theories of Recognition
1.
Charles Taylor
2.
Axel Honneth
3.
Nancy Fraser
b. Redistribution or Recognition? The Fraser-Honneth Debate
c. Criticisms of Recognition
1.
The Reification of Identity
2.
The Accusation of Essentialism
3.
The Danger of Subjectivism
4.
The Problem of the Other
5.
The Post-Structural Challenge
b. The Future of Recognition
c. References and Further Reading

1. Defining Recognition

The term recognition has several distinct meanings: (1) an act of intellectual apprehension,
such as when we recognise we have made a mistake or we recognise the influence of religion
on American politics; (2) a form of identification, such as when we recognise a friend in the
street; and (3) the act of acknowledging or respecting another being, such as when we
recognise someones status, achievements or rights (upon the different meanings of
recognition, see Inwood, 1992: 245-47; Margalit, 2001: 128-129). The philosophical and
political notion of recognition predominantly refers to (3), and is often taken to mean that not
only is recognition an important means of valuing or respecting another person, it is also
fundamental to understanding ourselves.
Various attempts have been made to clarify precisely what is, and is not, to count as an act of
recognition (perhaps most comprehensively by Ikheimo and Laitinen, 2007). Ikheimo
(2002: 450) defines recognition as always a case of A taking B as C in the dimension of
D, and B taking A as a relevant judge. Here A and B indicate two individual persons,
specifically A is the recogniser and B the recognisee. C designates the attribute recognised in
A, and D is the dimension of Bs personhood at stake. For example, I may recognise you as a
person possessing certain rights and responsibilities in light of your being an autonomous,
rational human being (for more on defining the structure of recognition, see Laitinen, 2002).
A key feature of Ikheimos definition is that it requires not only that someone be recognised
by another, but that the person being recognised judges that the recogniser is capable of
conferring recognition. This means that we must place sufficient value in the recogniser in

order for their attitude towards us to count as recognitive. Brandom (2009) approaches this
idea through the idea of authority, arguing that a genuine instance of recognition requires that
we authorise someone to confer recognition. Similarly, one can gain authority and
responsibility by petitioning others for recognition. Consequently, one has authority only
insofar as one is recognised as authoritative.
We may not consider being valued by a wilful criminal as any sort of recognition in the sense
being defined here. We do not judge them capable of conferring value on us, as we do not
accord any value or respect to them. Similarly, someone who is coerced into recognising us
may also fail to count as a relevant judge. A king who demands recognition of his superiority
from all his subjects, simply in virtue of his being king, and threatens to punish them if they
disobey, does not receive any meaningful kind of recognition for the subjects do not genuinely
choose to confer value on him. Thus, in recognising another, we must also be recognised as a
subject capable of giving recognition. This indicates that reciprocity or mutuality is likely to be
a necessary condition of appropriate recognition (for a discussion of this point, see Laden,
2007).
A further issue in defining recognition is whether it is generative or responsive (Laitinen,
2002; Markell, 2007). A generation-model of recognition focuses on the ways in which
recognition produces or generates reasons for actions or self-understandings. This is to say
that someone ought to act in a certain way in virtue of being recognised as, for example,
recognising someone as a rational being will generate certain duties and responsibilities for
both the person being recognised and those who interact with him. A response-model of
recognition focuses on the ways in which recognition acknowledges pre-existing features of a
person. Here, to recognise someone is to acknowledge them as they already really are (Appiah,
1994: 149). This means that there are reasons why one ought to give recognition to someone
prior to the act of recognition itself. Thus, for example, we ought to recognise someones
ability to self-determination because they possess certain features, such as rational autonomy.
The demand for recognition in a response-model is produced and justified through preexisting characteristics of a person, whilst in the generation-model it is the act of recognition
itself which confers those characteristics onto a person through their being recognised as
such. The former is a case of person knowing, whilst the latter is a case of person making
(see Markell, 2002).
A third issue is whether groups or collectives can count as recognisers and recognisees. For
example, when speaking of recognising a particular cultural group, do we mean we recognise
that group qua a group, or as a collection of individuals? Similarly, does the granting of
certain rights or respect apply to the group itself or the individual members belonging to that

group? (For a detailed discussion and defence of group-differentiated minority rights, see
Kymlicka, 1995). These questions revolve, at least in part, around the ontological status
afforded to groups or collectives. Advocates of a politics of recognition are not always clear
regarding whether or not groups can be granted recognition. Debates over the legitimacy or
sovereignty of a state may depend upon the extent to which we recognise it as legitimate or
sovereign. Important discussions of groups as entities include Tuomela (2007), Jones (2009)
and List and Pettit (2011). However, as yet there has been little analysis of the connection
between recognition and the ontology of groups. Charles Taylor (1994) argues for the
importance of collective rights, but gives little consideration to whether collectives are
genuine subjects over-and-above the individuals that constitute them. In his more recent
work, Axel Honneth (Fraser and Honneth 2003: 159ff.) appears to give consideration to the
possibility of groups as the object of recognition, but his general emphasis is on individual
rights and recognition.
Common to all social and political notions of recognition is the shift from an atomistic to an
intersubjective, dialogical understanding of the individual. Because our identity is shaped
precisely through our relations to others, our being recognised by them, feelings of self-worth,
self-respect and self-esteem are possible only if we are positively recognised for who we are.
To this extent, theories of political recognition, which were first formulated in the 1990s,
developed out of political movements centred upon such concepts as gender, sexuality, race,
ethnicity and culture. Recognition, according to Taylor (1994), is an indispensible means of
understanding and justifying the demands of these identity movements, which have had a
major impact on society, particularly from the 1960s onwards. Consequently, for many
political theorists, recognition is an integral component of any satisfactory modern theory of
justice as well as the means by which both historical and contemporary political struggles can
be understood and justified. In order to understand how such theories developed, it is
necessary to examine their genesis within Hegels philosophy.

2. The Hegelian Legacy

Descartes dualistic philosophy of consciousness created an influential legacy in which the

mind was characterised as a private theatre and knowledge of the self was achieved through
introspection. This atomistic conception of self, encapsulated in Descartes cogito, filtered
into the transcendental idealism of Kant (despite his objections to Descartes philosophy) and
the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl, as well as being present in the contract
theories of Hobbes and Locke. Against this trend there emerged a strongly intersubjective
conception of selfhood that found expression through the concept of recognition, the founder
of which is typically identified as Hegel. Although Hegel has undoubtedly influenced the
contemporary understanding of recognition more than any other philosopher, Hegel was
himself inspired by the work of Johann Fichte (see Williams, 1992). In his Foundations of

Natural Right (1796/7), Fichte argues that the I (the ego or pure consciousness) must posit
itself as an individual to be able to understand itself as a free self. In order for such selfpositing to occur, the individual must recognise itself as summoned by another individual.
This is to say, the individual must acknowledge the claims of other free individuals in order to
understand itself as a being capable of action and possessing freedom. Hence, ones freedom
is both rendered possible and yet limited by the demands made on us by others. A key feature
of this idea is that the same applies in reverse the other can only comprehend itself as free
by being recognised as such. Hence, mutual recognition is necessary for human beings to
understand themselves as free individuals (as beings capable of I-hood). Through this
analysis, Fichte produced a thoroughly intersubjective ontology of humans and demonstrated
that freedom and self-understanding are dependent upon mutual recognition.
These ideas were developed in greater detail by Hegel. In his Phenomenology of
Spirit Hegel (1807: 229) writes, Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and
by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being
acknowledged or recognized. Self-knowledge, including ones sense of freedom and sense of
self, is never a matter of simple introspection. Rather, understanding ourselves as an
independent self-consciousness requires the recognition of another. One must recognise
oneself as mediated through the other. As Sartre, who was heavily influenced by Hegel, wrote,
The road of interiority passes through the Other (Sartre, 1943: 236-7). The idea of
recognition is developed further in Hegels mature works, particularly Elements of the
Philosophy of Right (1821), where it becomes an essential factor in the development of
ethical life (sittlichkeit). According to Hegel, it is through the intersubjective recognition of
our freedom that right is actualised. Rights are not instrumental to freedom; rather they are
the concrete expression of it. Without recognition we could not come to realise freedom,
which in turn gives rise to right. The work of Hegel consciously echoes the Aristotelian
conception of humans as essentially social beings. For Hegel, recognition is the mechanism by
which our existence as social beings is generated. Therefore, our successful integration as
ethical and political subjects within a particular community is dependent upon receiving (and
conferring) appropriate forms of recognition.
The part of Hegels work to lay bare certain fundamental dynamics involved in recognition is
the oft-discussed master-slave dialectic which appears in the Phenomenology (see Pinkard,
1996: 46ff; Stern, 2002: 83ff.). Hegel introduces the idea of a struggle for recognition,
describing an encounter between two self-consciousnesses which both seek to affirm the
certainty of their being for themselves (Hegel, 1807: 232ff.). Such a conflict is described as a
life-and-death struggle, insofar as each consciousness desires to confirm its self-existence and
independence through a negation or objectification of the other. That is, it seeks to
incorporate the other within its field of consciousness as an object of negation, as something

which this consciousness is not, thus affirming its own unfettered existence. Of course, the
other also tries to negate this consciousness, thus generating the struggle which results in
affirmation of one self-consciousness at the cost of the negation or annihilation of the other.
Only in this way, Hegel observes, only by risking life, can freedom be obtained. However,
there is a key moment with this struggle. Namely, consciousness realises that it cannot simply
destroy the other through incorporating it within itself, for it requires the other as a definite
other in order to gain recognition. Thus, it must resist collapsing the other into itself, for to do
so would also be to annihilate itself. It would be starving itself of the recognition it requires in
order to be a determinate self-consciousness.
Within Hegels radical reworking of how the individual subject is understood, autonomy
becomes a contingent, social and practical accomplishment; it is an intersubjectivelymediated achievement which is never simply given or guaranteed but always dependent upon
our relations with others. This co-dependency results in mutual relations of recognition which
are the condition for understanding oneself as a genuinely free being, albeit a free being which
acknowledges, and thus adjusts itself, to the freedom of others. Discussing the process of
recognition, Hegel (1807: 230) notes that it is absolutely the double process of both selfconsciousnesses... Action from one side only would be useless, because what is to happen can
only be brought about by means of both. As a result, these two self-consciousnesses recognize
themselves as mutually recognizing one another (ibid: 231). Hegel characterises this
mutuality, which cannot be coerced but be freely given and received, as being at home in the
other. Such a relation with another is the condition for the phenomenological experience of
freedom and right. Consequently, our interactions with others are not a limitation on
freedom, but rather the enhancement and concrete actualization of freedom (Williams, 1997:
59).
We see now how the master-slave dialectic of recognition is inherently unstable and
unsatisfying. The master has dominion over the slave, reducing the latter to the status of a
mere thing through refusing to recognise it as a free and equal self-consciousness. The slave,
realising that life as a slave is better than no life at all, accepts this relation of dominance and
subservience. Whilst the slave receives no recognition from the master, the master has
earned the recognition of a slave which it considers as less-than-human. Such recognition is
not real recognition at all and yet, within this Hegels dialectic of recognition, the master
requires the recognition of the slave in order to gain some modicum of self-understanding and
freedom. The recognition of the slave is ultimately worthless, for it is not the recognition of a
free self-consciousness, which alone can grant the recognition on another required for selfcertainty of existence and freedom. Trapped in this fruitless relation, the slave becomes the
truth of the master, and so the master, paradoxically, becomes enslaved to the slave. For

Hegel, relations of domination provide a vicious spiral of recognition. They lead nowhere but
to their own destruction. Hence recognition must always take place between equals, mediated
through social institutions which can guarantee that equality and thus produce the necessary
mutual relations of recognition necessary for the attainment of freedom. It is precisely this
last point that recent recognition theorists have seized upon and elaborated into
comprehensive discussions of justice.

3. Contemporary Theories of Recognition

a. Charles Taylor
Much contemporary interest in recognition was undoubtedly fuelled by Charles Taylors essay
Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (1994), first published in 1992. Taylors
lucid and concise article is often treated as the classic expression of a theory of recognition.
However, it would be more accurate to say that Taylor awoke a general interest in the idea of
recognition. His short essay provides a series of reflections and conjectures which, whilst
insightful, do not constitute a full-blown theory of recognition. However, its exploratory
nature and non-technical language has helped install it as the common reference point for
discussions of recognition.
Taylor begins with the assertion that a number of strands in contemporary politics turn on
the need, sometimes the demand, for recognition (Taylor, 1994: 25). He identifies such a
demand as present in the political activities of feminism, race movements and
multiculturalists (for a critical discussion of this point, see Nicholson, 1996). The specific
importance of recognition lies in its relationship to identity, which he defines as a persons
understanding of who they are, of their fundamental characteristics as a human being
(Taylor, 1994: 25). Because identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, then
Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning
someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being (ibid.). Underlying Taylors model is
the Hegelian belief that individuals are formed intersubjectively (see Section II). Our
individual identity is not constructed from within and generated by each of us alone. Rather, it
is through dialogue with others that we negotiate our identity. Taylor refers to these others as
significant others, meaning those people who have an important role in our lives (that is,
family, friends, teachers, colleagues, and so forth.). The idea that our sense of who we are is
determined through our interaction with others initiates a shift from a monologic to a dialogic
model of the self.
Taylor is keen to stress just how important recognition is, referring to it as a vital human
need (ibid: 26) and stating that misrecognition can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its
victims with a crippling self-hatred (ibid: 26). Deploying a brief historical narrative, Taylor

argues that the collapse of social hierarchies, which had provided the basis for bestowing
honour on certain individuals (that is, those high up on the social ladder), led to the modern
day notion of dignity, which rests upon universalist and egalitarian principles regarding the
equal worth of all human beings. This notion of dignity lies at the core of contemporary
democratic ideals, unlike the notion of honour which is, he claims, clearly incompatible with
democratic culture. This picture is complicated by the fact that alongside this development of
dignity there emerged also a new understanding of individualised identity, one in which the
emphasis was on each persons uniqueness, which Taylor defines as being true to myself and
my own particular way of being (ibid: 28). Taylor refers to this idea of uniqueness as the ideal
of authenticity, writing Being true to myself means being true to my own originality, which is
something only I can articulate and discover. In articulating it, I am also defining myself
(ibid: 31).
Taylor has been accused of adopting an essentialist view of the self, on the basis that there is
some inner me waiting to be uncovered and displayed to (recognised by) the world (see
section V. b). However, he is quick to point out that the discovery of our authenticity is not
simply a matter of introspection. Rather, it is through our interactions with others that we
define who we are. Nor is there an end point to this dialogue. It continues throughout our
entire lives and does not even depend upon the physical presence of a specific other for that
person to influence us. Consider, for example, the way an imaginary conversation with a
deceased partner might influence how we act or view ourselves. The importance of recognition
lies precisely in the fact that how others see (might) us is a necessary step in forming an
understanding of who we are. To be recognised negatively, or misrecognised, is to be thwarted
in our desire for authenticity and self-esteem.
Taylors uses these insights to construct a politics of equal recognition. He identifies two
different ways in which the idea of equal recognition has been understood. The first is a
politics of equal dignity, or a politics of universalism, which aims at the equalisation of all
rights and entitlements. In this instance, all individuals are to be treated as universally the
same through recognition of their common citizenship or humanity. The second formulation
is the politics of difference, in which the uniqueness of each individual or group is recognised.
Rousseau bitterly noted that man, having shifted from a state of self-sufficiency and simplicity
to one of competition and domination that characterises modern society, has come to crave
the recognition of their difference (Rousseau, 1754). In this detrimental situation, man is
rendered dependent upon the views of others, craving what Rousseau termed amour
propre through the admiration of those around him, leading to an endless competition for
greater achievements and respect and thus robbing man of his independence. For Rousseau,

this desire for individual distinction, achievement and recognition conflicts with a principle of
equal respect
Returning to Taylor, he notes that there is also a universal basis to this second political model
insofar as all people are entitled to have their identity recognised: we give due
acknowledgement only to what is universally present everyone has an identity through
recognizing what is peculiar to each. The universal demand powers an acknowledgement of
specificity (Taylor, 1994: 39). One consequence of this politics of difference is that certain
rights will be assigned to specific groups but not others. The two approaches can be summed
as follows. The politics of equal dignity is difference-blind, whereas the politics of difference
is, as the name suggests, difference-friendly (this does not mean that a politics of equal dignity
is not also friendly towards difference, but rather that differences between individuals cannot
be the normative foundation for the assignment of certain rights or entitlement to some
individuals or groups but not others).
Taylor defends a politics of difference, arguing that the concept of equal dignity often (if not
always) derives its idea of what rights and entitlement are worth having from the perspective
of the hegemonic culture, thus enforcing minority groups to conform to the expectations of
dominant culture and hence relinquish their particularity. Failure to conform will result in the
minority culture being derided and ostracised by the dominant culture. As Taylor (ibid: 66)
notes, dominant groups tend to entrench their hegemony by inculcating an image of
inferiority in the subjugated. A clear instance of this can be seen in de Beauvoirs claim that
woman is always defined as mans other or shadow (de Beauvoir, 1949). Woman exists as a
lack; characterised through what she does not possess or exhibit (namely, male and masculine
traits). Similarly, civil rights movements have frequently protested that the image of the
human was inevitably white, Western, educated, middle-class and wealthy. An example of
how this plays out in everyday life is the recent, though now generally discarded, practice of
labelling pink crayons flesh coloured. Both feminist and race theorists have tried to convey
the idea that the white male is simply another particular instance of humanity, rather than its
default image or constitutive, universal norm. This point was strongly made by Fanon (1952),
who detailed how racism infiltrates the consciousness of the oppressed, preventing
psychological health through the internalisation of subjection and otherness. This in turn
alienates the black person from both their society and their own body, owing to the fact that
the world is defined in terms of whiteness and thus as something essentially irretrievably
different (alien) to them.

b. Axel Honneth
Axel Honneth has produced arguably the most extensive discussion of recognition to date. He
is in agreement with Taylor that recognition is essential to self-realisation. However, he draws

more explicitly on Hegelian intersubjectivity in order to identify the mechanics of how this is
achieved, as well as establishing the motivational and normative role recognition can play in
understanding and justifying social movements. Following Hegel (1807; 1821) and Mead
(1934), Honneth identifies three spheres of interaction which are connected to the three
patterns of recognition necessary for an individuals development of a positive relation-toself. These are love, rights, and solidarity (Honneth, 1995: 92ff; also Honneth 2007, 129-142).
The mode of recognition termed love refers to our physical needs and emotions being met by
others and takes the form of our primary relationships (that is, close friends, family and
lovers). It provides a basic self-confidence, which can be shattered through physical abuse.
The mode of recognition termed rights refers to the development of moral responsibility,
developed through our moral relations with others. It is a mutual mode of recognition in
which the individual learns to see himself from the perspective of his [or her] partner in
interaction as a bearer of equal rights (Honneth, 1992: 194). The denial of rights through
social and legal exclusion can threaten ones sense of being a fully active, equal and respected
member of society. Finally, the mode of recognition termed solidarity relates to recognition
of our traits and abilities. It is essential for developing our self-esteem and for how we become
individualised, for it is precisely our personal traits and abilities that define our personal
difference (Honneth, 1995: 122). Consequently, unlike the relations of love and rights, which
express universal features of human subjects, esteem demands a social medium that must be
able to express the characteristic differences between human subjects in a universal, and more
specifically, intersubjectively obligatory way (ibid.). All three spheres of recognition are
crucial to developing a positive attitude towards oneself:
For it is only due to the cumulative acquisition of basic self-confidence, of self-respect, and of
self-esteem... that a person can come to see himself or herself, unconditionally, as both an
autonomous and an individuated being and to identify with his or her goals and desires (ibid:
169).
According to Honneth, the denial of recognition provides the motivational and justificatory
basis for social struggles. Specifically, it is through the emotional experiences generated by
certain attitudes and actions of others towards us that we can come to feel we are being
illegitimately denied social recognition. This argument makes use of Deweys theory of
emotion as intentionally orientated. Certain emotional states, such as shame, anger and
frustration, are generated by the failure of our actions. Conversely, more positive emotional
states are generated through successful action. The experience of negative emotional states
can, in theory, reveal to us that an injustice is taking place (namely, that we are not being

given due and appropriate recognition). However, as Honneth points out, feelings of shame or
anger need not (indeed, do not) necessarily disclose relations of disrespect (ibid: 138). What
they provide is the potential for identifying the occurrence of an injustice which one is
justified in opposing. The experience of disrespect is the raw material from which normatively
justified social struggles can be formulated. Furthermore, it is only within certain social
contexts, those in which the means of articulation of a social movement are available (ibid:
139), that experiences of disrespect provide the motivational basis for political struggles (see
Honneth, 2007). Presumably, disrespect in other contexts would lead to individual acts of
retaliation or undirected violence, rather than coordinated resistance.
This phenomenological approach to recognition thus locates the source and justification of
social struggles in the experiences and expectations of recognition. Of course, as noted, it
requires the further steps of (a) locating these experiences within a socially-generated
framework of emancipatory discourse; and (b) the establishment of common experiences
amongst individuals for these individual frustrations to develop into social struggles.
Therefore, it would be nave to think that Honneth is blind to the importance of, say, ensuring
the means and rights to collective political action within societies. But the fundamental
component of any attempt to identify injustice and vindicate the necessary remedies must be
located in the individuals experiences of disrespect (Honneth, 2007) (for a potential problem
with this position, see Rogers, 2009).
In order to justify these claims, Honneth ascribes an inherent expectation of recognition to
humans, referring to demands generated from such an expectation as the quasitranscendental interests of the human race (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 174). It is only
through the failure of such expectations that recognition can be a motivational source, arising
via negative emotional experiences. This assumption allows Honneth to assess societal change
as a developmental process driven by moral claims arising from experiences of disrespect.
Honneth (1995: 168) summarises his somewhat teleological account (a product of Honneths
Hegelian and Aristotelian tendencies) as follows: Every unique, historical struggle or conflict
only reveals its position within the development of society once its role in the establishment of
moral progress, in terms of recognition, has been grasped.
The positing of an approximate and ideal end-state, presumably one in which full recognition
reigns supreme, allows a distinction between progressive, emancipatory struggles and those
which are reactionary and / or oppressive. Therefore, from this general position of enabling
the self-realisation of ones desires, characteristics and abilities, we can assess current sociopolitical struggles and analyse their future directions so as to ensure their promoting of the
conditions for self-realisation. Honneth is careful to specify that he is not advocating a single,

substantive set of universal values and social arrangements. Rather, his concept of the good
is concerned with the structural elements of ethical life which enable personal integrity (ibid:
172). Therefore, the posited end-point from which normative claims can be made must
emanate from structural relations outlined in the three distinct patterns of recognition which
foster a positive relation-to-self (for a discussion of Honneths conception of the good / ethical
life, see Zurn, 2000). Here, Honneth is trying to retain a Kantian notion of respect and
autonomy through identifying the necessary conditions for self-realisation and selfdetermination, akin to a Kantian kingdom of ends in which all individuals receive and confer
recognition on one another. Simultaneously, in stressing the minimal or bare conditions
necessary for this, he aims to avoid committing himself to a singular, substantial conception
of the good life and thus resists the dangers of reproducing an exclusivist and exclusionary
conception of what constitutes the good life.

c. Nancy Fraser
Whereas there are broad areas of agreement between Honneth and Taylor, Nancy Fraser is
keen to differentiate her theory of recognition from both of their respective positions. Frasers
overarching theme throughout her works on recognition is the dissolving of the assumed
antithesis between redistribution and recognition (arguably this assumption is a consequence
of critical theorys Marxist roots, within which framework Frasers work undoubtedly emerges
from). Thus far, the presentation of recognition and redistribution has been presented (at
least implicitly) as an either/or decision. Fraser believes that this binary opposition derives
from the fact that, whereas recognition seems to promote differentiation, redistribution
supposedly works to eliminate it. The recognition paradigm seems to target cultural injustice,
which is rooted in the way peoples identities are positively or negatively valued. Individuals
exist as members of a community based upon a shared horizon of meanings, norms and
values. Conversely, the distribution paradigm targets economic injustice, which is rooted in
ones relation to the market or the means of production (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 14).
Here, individuals exist in a hierarchically-differentiated collective class system which, from
the perspective of the majority class who are constituted by a lack of resources, needs
abolishing.
According to Fraser, both these forms of injustice are primary and co-original, meaning that
economic inequality cannot be reduced to cultural misrecognition, and vice-versa. Many
social movements face this dilemma of having to balance the demand for (economic) equality
with the insistence that their (cultural) specificity be met. Fraser (1997: 19) gives the example
of the feminist movement by posing the question, How can feminists fight simultaneously to
abolish gender differentiation [through economic redistribution] and to valorize gender

specificity [through cultural recognition]?. There is a clear divergence here between the
monistic models of Taylor and Honneth, in which recognition is the foundational category of
social analysis and distribution is treated as derivative, and Frasers dualistic model. Whereas
Honneth thinks a sufficiently elaborated concept of recognition can do all the work needed for
a critical theory of justice, Fraser argues that recognition is but one dimension of justice,
albeit a vitally important one.
The disagreement over whether or not distribution can be made to supervene on recognition
arises from the differing interpretations of recognition. According to Fraser (Fraser and
Honneth 2003: 29), one can understand recognition as either (a) a matter of justice,
connected to with the concept of a universal right (Frasers position); or (b) a matter of selfrealisation, connected with historically-relative cultural conceptions of the good (Honneths
and Taylors position). In (b) Fraser draws out the Aristotelian idea
of eudaimonia (flourishing),
which
runs
throughout
Honneths
teleological
account. Contra Honneth and Taylor, Fraser does not look to situate the injustice of
misrecognition in the retardation of personal development. Rather, she identifies it with the
fact that some individuals and groups are denied the status of full partners in social
interaction simply as a consequence of institutionalized patterns of cultural value in whose
construction they have not equally participated and which disparage their distinctive
characteristics or the distinctive characteristics assigned to them (ibid). Addressing injustices
arising from misrecognition therefore means looking at the discursive representations of
identities in order to identity how certain individuals are assigned a relatively inferior social
standing. Hence, on Frasers model, misrecognition should not be construed as an
impediment to ethical self-realization (as it is for Taylor and Honneth). Instead, it should be
conceived as an institutionalised relation of subordination.
Owing to her identification of recognition with social status, the evaluative element in Frasers
account is the notion of parity of participation. According to this principle, justice requires
that social arrangements permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as
peer (ibid: 36). In effect, recognition is required in order to guarantee that all members of
society have an equal participation in social life. Crucially, participatory parity also requires
material / economic redistribution in order to guarantee that people are independent and
have a voice (ibid). Because Honneth equates recognition with self-realisation, the derivative
issues of redistribution are only generated to the extent that they inhibit this personal
development. For Fraser, injustice in the form of both misrecognition and maldistribution is
detrimental to the extent that it inhibits participatory parity.

Fraser considers two possible remedies for injustice, which transcend the redistributionrecognition divide by being applicable to both. The first is affirmation, which incorporates
any action which corrects inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the
underlying framework that generates them (ibid: 23). The second is transformation, which
refers to remedies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restricting the
underlying generative framework (ibid). Frasers concept of transformation highlights her
belief that certain forms of injustice are ingrained within institutionalized patterns of cultural
value (ibid: 46). Certain forms of inequality, including those of race and gender, derive from
the signifying effect of socio-cultural structures. These discursive frameworks, situated within
language and social arrangements, reproduce hierarchical binary oppositions such as
heterosexual/homosexual, white/black and man/woman. Thus, the solution is not simply a
matter of revaluing heterosexual, female or black identities. Rather, one must attempt to
deconstruct the binary logic which situates people as inherently inferior, creating a field of
multiple, debinarized, fluid, ever-shifting differences (Fraser, 1997: 24). One key aspect of
this transformative approach is that, unlike the affirmative approach which aims to alter only
one particular groups sense of worth or material situation, it would change everyones sense
of self. The proposal made by Fraser, then, is the radical restructuring of society, achieved
through transformative redistribution (that is, socialism) and recognition (cultural
deconstruction). It should be noted that in her more recent work on recognition (that is,
Fraser 2000; 2001), she resists offering any particular remedies, arguing instead that the
required response to injustice will be dictated by the specific context. Thus, she appears to
distance herself from the more deconstructive elements of her earlier work (see Zurn, 2003).

4. Redistribution
Honneth Debate

or

Recognition?

The

Fraser-

In a very important discussion, Fraser and Honneth (2003) defend their respective theories of
recognition (see also Honneth, 2001). Underlying the disagreements between them is their
respective positions regarding the distribution / recognition debate. As noted in Section III,
Fraser believes that recognition and distribution are two irreducible elements of a satisfactory
theory of justice. This is to say, they are of equal foundational importance the one cannot be
collapsed into the other. Honneth, on the other hand, contends that issues of distribution are
ultimately explained and justified through issues of recognition. As he writes, questions of
distributive justice are better understood in terms of normative categories that come from a
sufficiently differentiated theory of recognition (ibid: 126). He begins justifying this claim
through a historical survey of political movements and unrest amongst the lower classes
during the early stages of capitalism. What marked such activities was the commonly held
belief that the honour and dignity of the members of the lower classes were not being

adequately respected. Summarising these findings, Honneth (ibid: 132) proclaims that
subjects perceive institutional procedures as social injustice when they see aspects of their
personality being disrespected which they believe they have a right to recognition.
One important consequence of this view is that it undermines the received wisdom that
collective identity movements are a recent modern phenomenon. In actual fact, according to
Honneth, experiences of disrespect and denigration of an individuals or groups identity are
the constitutive feature of all instances of social discontent. Portraying recognition as the
sole preserve of cultural minorities struggling for social respect is therefore highly misleading
and obscures the fact that challenges to the existing social order are always driven by the
moral experience of failing to receive what is deemed to be sufficient recognition (ibid: 160).
Any dispute regarding redistribution of wealth or resources is reducible to a claim over the
social valorisation of specific group or individual traits. The feminist struggle over the
gendered division of labour is, according to Honneth, primarily a struggle regarding the
prevailing assessment of achievement and worth which has had important redistributive
effects, such as a trend towards greater access to, and equality within, the workplace and the
acknowledgement of female housework. The division that Fraser makes between economic
distribution and cultural recognition is, Honneth claims, an arbitrary and ultimately
misleading one that ignores the fundamental role played by recognition in economic
struggles, as well as implying that the cultural sphere of society can be understood as
functioning independently of the economic sphere.
Fraser (ibid: 30ff.) offers four advantages of her status model over Honneths monistic vision
of justice as due recognition (for a discussion of these, see Zurn, 2003). Arguably the most
important of these is that, in locating injustice in social relations governed by cultural patterns
of representations, she can move beyond both Taylors and Honneths reliance on psychology
as the normative force underlying struggles for recognition. Recalling that Honneth locates
the experiences of injustice in the emotional responses to frustrated expectations of due
recognition, Fraser argues that she is able to show that a society whose institutionalized
norms impede parity of participation is morally indefensible whether or not they distort
the subjectivity of the oppressed (ibid: 32). The ideal of participatory parity gives Fraser
her normative component, for it provides the basis on which different recognition claims can
be judged. Namely, a valid recognition claim is one in which subjects can show that
institutionalized patterns of cultural value deny them the necessary intersubjective conditions
[for participatory parity] (ibid: 38). Honneths invocation of pre-political suffering, generated
by the perceived withholding of recognition, as the motivating force behind social movements
is thus rejected by Fraser as seriously problematic. In particular, she says, the idea that all
social discontent has the same, single underlying motivation (misrecognition) is simply

implausible. Honneth rejects other motivational factors such as resentment of unearned

privilege, abhorrence of cruelty, aversion of arbitrary power... antipathy to exploitation,
dislike of supervision that cannot not simply be reduced down to, or subsumed by, an
overarching expectation of appropriate recognition.
Another problem with Honneths psychological model of experiences of injustice is that, so
Fraser argues, it shifts the focus away from society and onto the self, thus implanting an
excessively personalized sense of injury (ibid: 204). This can lead to the victim of oppression
internalising the injustice or blaming themselves, rather than the discursive and material
conditions within which they are situated as oppressed or harmed. Indeed, Fraser proceeds to
point out that there can be no pure experience of moral indignation caused by withheld or
inappropriate recognition. There is no realm of personal experience that is not experienced
through a particular linguistic and historical horizon, which actively shapes the experience in
question (see section V. d). Thus to introduce a primordial sense of moral suffering is, Fraser
claims, simply incoherent (similar concerns are raised by McNay, 2008: 138ff.). Honneth
cannot invoke psychological experiences of disrespect as the normative foundation for his
theory of recognition as they cannot be treated as independent of the discursive conditions
within which the subject is constituted. To do so is to rely on an ultimately unjustifiable
transcendental account of the subjects access to their sense of moral worth grounded in the
right to recognition.
In his response to Fraser, Honneth points out that she can necessarily focus only on those
social movements that have already become visible. By analysing the ways in which
individuals and groups are socially-situated by institutionalised patterns of cultural value,
Fraser limits herself to only those expressions of social discontent that have already entered
the public sphere. The logic of this criticism seems to be that, if (in)justice is a matter of how
society signifies subjects abilities and characteristics, then it can only address those collective
subjectivities which are currently socially recognised. In other words, there could be a
plethora of individuals and groups who are struggling for recognition which have not yet
achieved public acknowledgement and thus have not been implicated within positive or
negative social structures of signification. There appears some weight to this criticism, for a
successful critical social theory should be able to not only critique thestatus quo, but identify
future patterns of social resistance. If, on Fraser's account, justice is a matter of addressing
how subjects are socially-situated by existing value structures, then it seems to lack the
conceptual apparatus to look beyond the present. The ability to identify social discontent
must, Honneth argues, be constructed independently of social recognition, and therefore
requires precisely the kind of moral-psychological considerations Fraser seeks to avoid (ibid:
125). In ignoring the individuals experiences of injustice as the disrespect of aspects of their

personality, a social theory can only address the present situation, rather than exploring the
normative directions of future social struggles. It is out of the frustration of individual
expectations of due recognition that new social movements will emanate, rather than the preexisting patterns of signification which currently hierarchically situate subjects.

5. Criticisms of Recognition

Despite its influence and popularity, there are a number of concerns regarding the concept of
recognition as a foundational element in a theory of justice. This article cannot hope to
present an exhaustive list, so instead offers a few of the most common critiques.

a. The Reification of Identity

Perhaps the one most frequently voiced criticism is that regarding the reification of group
identity. Put simply, the concern is that, in initiating an identity politics in which one
demands positive recognition for a groups specific characteristics, specific characteristics can
be seen as necessarily constitutive of this group and thus any group member who does not
display these characteristics risks being ostracised. Such claims are often cloaked in a
language of authenticity which leads to demands for conformity amongst individual
members of the group in order to gain acceptance and approval. This risks producing
intergroup coercion and enforcing conformity at the expense of individual specificity.
To give an example, discussed by Appiah (1994) in his response to Taylors essay on
recognition, the construction of a black politics in which black identity is celebrated can
provide a sense of self-worth and dignity amongst historically denigrated black communities.
However, it can also lead to a proper way of being black, one which all members of the black
community must demonstrate in order to partake in this positive self-image. Such
expectations of behaviour can lead, Appiah notes (ibid: 163), to one form of tyranny being
replaced by another. Specifically, individuals who fail to exemplify authentic black identity
can find themselves once again the victims of intolerance and social exclusion. Similar
dynamics of exclusion can be seen in the debate within certain feminist circles about whether
lesbians can be properly considered women. Extrapolating from these concerns, Markell
(2003) argues that Taylor conflates individual identity with group identity with the result that
agency is rendered a matter of adopting the identity one is assigned through membership of
one's community. Consequently, the critical tension between the individual and community is
dissolved, which leaves little (if any) space for critiquing or resisting the dominant norms and
values of one's community (see also Habermas, 1991: 271).
The reification of group identity can also lead to separatism through generating an us-andthem group mentality. By valorising a particular identity, those other identities which lack

certain characteristics particular to the group in question can be dismissed as inferior. This
isolationist policy runs counter to the ideal of social acceptability and respect for difference
that a politics of recognition is meant to initiate. Reifying group identity prevents critical
dialogue taking place either within or between groups. Internal group members who challenge
apparently authentic aspects of their culture or group identity can be labelled as traitors,
whilst non-group members are dismissed as unqualified to comment on the characteristics of
the group on the basis that they are outsiders. The result is a strong separatism and radical
relativism in which intergroup dialogue is eliminated. This can mask over the ways in which
various axes of identity overlap and thus ignores the commonalities between groups. For
example, the focus of black feminists on black culture and the oppression this has suffered
can lead to a failure to recognise their commonality with women in other cultures. Conversely,
the tendency among feminists to focus on the concept of woman can lead them to ignore the
potential alliances they might share with other oppressed groups that dont focus on gender
injustice. Underlying this critique is the idea that identity is always multilayered and that each
individual is always positioned at the intersection of multiple axes of oppression. Simply
reducing ones sense of oppression to a single feature of identity (such as race or gender) fails
to acknowledge the way that each feature of identity is inextricably bound up with other
features, so that, for example, race and gender cannot be treated as analytically distinct modes
of dominance.

b. The Accusation of Essentialism

Similar to the concerns over reification, there is a concern that recognition theories invoke an
essentialist account of identity. This has particularly been the case with regards Taylors
model of recognition (see McNay, 2008: 64ff). Critics accuse recognition theory of assuming
that there is a kernel of selfhood that awaits recognition (see, for example, Heyes, 2003). The
struggle for recognition thus becomes a struggle to be recognised as what one truly is. This
implies that certain features of a person lie dormant, awaiting discovery by the individual who
then presents this authentic self to the world and demands positive recognition for it.
Although Taylor is keen to stress that his model is not committed to such an essentialist
account of the self, certain remarks he makes do not help his cause. For example, in
describing the modern view of how we create a sense of full being, he notes that, rather than
connecting with some source outside of ourselves (such as God or the Platonic Good), the
source we have to connect with is deep within us. This fact is part of the massive subjective
turn of modern culture, a new form of inwardness, in which we come to think our ourselves as
beings with hidden depths (Taylor, 1994: 29). Taylor proceeds to note that Being true to
myself means being true to my own originality, which is something only I can articulate and
discover (ibid: 31) and that authenticity calls on me to discover my own original way of being.

By definition, this way of being cannot be socially derived, but must be inwardly generated
(ibid: 32).
A more radical account of intersubjectivity can be found in Arendt (1958). Examining the
processes by which the subject reveals who they are, she shifts the focus away from a personal
revelation on the part of the agent and into the social realm: it is more than likely that the
who , which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from the person
itself, like the daimn in Greek religion which accompanies each man throughout his life,
always looking over his shoulder from behind and thus visible only to those he encounters
(Arendt, 1958: 179-80). One important consequence of this idea is that, in order to address
the question of who we are, we must be willing to relinquish control of any such answer. In so
doing, we place ourselves into the hands of others. As Arendt writes, This unpredictability of
outcome [of personal disclosure] is closely related to the revelatory character of action and
speech, in which one discloses ones self without ever either knowing himself or being able to
calculate beforehand whom he reveals (ibid: 192) (for an Arendt-inspired critique of
recognition, see Markell, 2003).

c. The Danger of Subjectivism

Taylor mitigates his position and, arguably, eschews any form of essentialism, by arguing that
we always work out our identity through dialogue with others. However, there is a possibility
that he slips towards a subjectivist position, for it seems that it is the individual who
ultimately decides what their true identity is. For example, Taylor (1994: 32-3) states that
this dialogue with others requires that we struggle with and sometimes struggle against the
things that others want to see in us. However, he does not state to what we appeal to in this
potential struggle with others. If it is ultimately our sense of who we are, then this would seem
to undermine the very conditions of intersubjectivity that Taylor wants to introduce into the
notion of personal identity. For, if one is the ultimate judge and jury on who one is, then those
around us will simply be agreeing or disagreeing with our pre-existent or inwardly-generated
sense of self, rather than playing an ineliminable role in its constitution.
Again, it is unlikely that Taylor would endorse any form of subjectivism. Indeed, his turn
towards intersubjective recognition is precisely meant to resist the idea that one simply
decides who one is and demands that others recognise oneself in such a way. Taylor would
certainly seem critical of the existential tradition, which emphasised the need for one to define
oneself and provide meaning to the world. Although Sartre deployed the language of
intersubjectivity (see V. d) and highlighted the importance of the other, his analysis of the initself and the for-itself, coupled with describing how we are each born alone and must carry
the weight of the world on our shoulders (with no-one able to lighten the burden), suggests an

ego which negates (and hence is radically separated from) the world. This split between I and
you renders any notion of dialogical identity construction impotent.
Recognition, contrasted with this existential picture, theories seem well equipped to resist any
accusation that they slide into subjectivism. However, they must provide a criterion from
which to judge whether individual and collective demands for recognition are legitimate. For
example, it cannot be the case that all demands for recognition are accepted, for we are
unlikely to want to recognise the claims of a racist or homophobic group for cultural
protection. There is a danger that Taylors model does not explicitly state the conditions by
which acceptable claims for recognition can be separated from unacceptable claims. His
politics of difference is premised on a universal respect for the human capacity to form ones
identity
(Taylor,
1994:
42).
Hence he
seems
committed
to
respecting
difference qua difference, regardless of the particular form this difference takes. There is a
sense that, as long as recourse is made to an authentic life, then the demand for recognition
should be met. But no matter how strongly the racist group insists upon their authenticity, we
would be likely to resist recognising the value and worth of their identity as racists.

d. The Problem of the Other

Certain theorists have tended to cast recognition in a far more negative, conflictual light.
Typically, they interpret Hegelian recognition as evolving an inescapable element of
domination between, or appropriation of, subjects. Perhaps the most notable of such thinkers
is Sartre (1943), whose account of intersubjectivity appears to preclude any possibility of
recognition functioning as a means of attaining political solidarity or emancipation. According
to Sartre, our relations with other people are always conflictual as each of us attempts to
negate the other in an intersubjective dual. The realisation of our own subjectivity is
dependent upon our turning the other into an object. In turn, we are made to feel like an
object within the gaze of the other. Sartres famous example is the shameful, objectifying
experience of suddenly feeling the look or gaze of another person upon us when carrying out
a contemptible act. In this moment of shame, I feel myself as an object and am thus denied
existence as a subject. My only hope is to make the other into an object. There are no equal or
stable relations between people; all interactions are processes of domination.
Whereas Sartre focuses on the problem of being recognised, Levinas (1961) turns to the ethical
issues attending how one recognises others. According to Levinas, Hegelian recognition
involves an unavoidable appropriation or assimilation of the other into ones own subjectivity.
By this he means that in recognising the other we render them knowable according to our
own terms, thus depriving him or her of their irreducible alterity or difference. Levinas
believes that the denying of such difference is the fundamental ethical sin as it fails to respect
the other in their absolute exteriority, their absolute difference to us. In effect, to recognise

someone is to render them the same as us; to eliminate their inescapable, unapprehendable
and absolute alterity (Yar, 2002).
An alternative perspective on the self-other relationship can be found in Merleau-Ponty who
argues that the other is always instigated within oneself, and vice-versa, through the potential
reversibility of the self-other dichotomy (that is, that the self is also a potential other; seeing
someone necessarily involves the possibility of being seen). Merleau-Ponty explicitly rejects
the Levinasian perspective that the other is an irreducible alterity. Rather, the self and other
are intertwined through their bodily imbrications in the world. He describes our respective
perspectives on the world as slipping into one another and thus being brought together: In
reality, the other is not shut up inside my perspective of the world, because this perspective
itself has no definite limits, because it slips spontaneously into the others (Merleau-Ponty,
1945: 411). Consequently, there is no problem of the other, for the other is already contained
within our being, as we are within theirs. This resonates with Heideggers characterisation of
Being (Dasein)as being-with-others. We are always already alongside others, bound up in
relations of mutuality that prevent any strict ontological distinction between self, other and
world.
The Levinasian and Sartrean accounts of the self-other relationship can be criticised from a
hermeneutic perspective for failing to acknowledge the fact that understanding is essentially a
conversation with another, and that a simple reduction of the other to a sameness with
oneself, or a pure objectification of the other, would preclude the possibility of a genuine
interaction from which mutual understanding could arise (Gadamer, 1960). Levinas presents
a monological account of understanding, ignoring the fundamentally dialogical nature of
intersubjectivity. As Taylor (1994: 67) approvingly noted, understanding according to
Gadamer is always a fusion of horizons, a coming-to-understanding between two individuals
who require the perspective of the other in order to make sense of their own (and vice-versa).
Neither the total incorporation of the other into the perspective of the recognisee, nor the
reduction of the other to pure object, is possible on a hermeneutic account of meaning and
understanding.

e. The Post-Structural Challenge

Concurrent with the rise of identity politics, there has been a trend towards deconstructive or
destabilising accounts of the individual subject. Rather than representing a single critical
perspective on recognition and identity politics, the post-structural challenge can be
understood as a broad term incorporating various attempts at showing how the subject is
always constructed through and within networks of power and discourse (e.g. Foucault, 1980;
Butler, 1990; Haraway 1991; Lloyd, 2005; McNay, 2008).

Perhaps the most notable theorist in this regard is Foucault, who develops a detailed account
of the way in which the subject is constituted through discursive relations of power. Within
Foucaults theory, the individual becomes the site where power is enacted (and, importantly,
resisted or reworked). Foucaults genealogical method was employed precisely in order to
explore the conditions under which we, as subjects, exist and what causes us to exist in the
way that we do. According to Foucault, not only are we controlled by truth and power, we are
created by it too. Concerning his genealogical method, Foucault (1980: 117) writes, One has to
dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, thats to say, to arrive at
an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical
framework. This leads to a far more problematic view of the subject than is generally found
within recognition theories. Specifically, issues of power, coercion and oppression are seen as
coeval with identity formation and intersubjective relations.
This suggests that there can be no instances of mutual recognition that do not simultaneously
transmit and reproduce relations of power. As Foucault (1988: 39) notes, If I tell the truth
about myself... it is in part that I am constituted as a subject across a number of power
relations which are exerted over me and which I exert over others. Critics of recognition
theorists argue that they ignore the fundamental relationship between power and identity
formation, assuming instead that intersubjective relations can be established which are not
mediated through power relations. McNay (2008) develops this critique through a discussion
of Bourdieus concept of habitus, arguing that Taylor assumes that language is an expressive
medium that functions independently of, and antecedent to, power and thus fails to analyse
how self-expression is constitutively shaped by power relations (ibid: 69).
Another important theorist in this regard is Judith Butler, whose account of gender identity
develops certain key themes of Foucauldian theory as well as insights offered up by Derrida on
the re-iteration of norms as fundamental to identity formation. Butler (1988: 519) begins
outlining this project by arguing that gender is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency
from which various acts proceed; rather it is an identity tenuously constituted in time an
identity instituted through astylized repetition of acts. Gender is created through acts
which are internally discontinuous. These acts produce the appearance of substance,
but this apparition is no more than a constructed identity, a performative accomplishment
which the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves, come to believe and to
perform in the mode of belief (ibid: 520; see also Butler 1990: 141). Essentially, we internalise
a set of discursive practices which enforce conformity to a set of idealised and constructed
accounts of gender identity that reinforce heterosexual, patriarchal assumptions about what a
man and woman is meant to be like.

Turning the commonsense view of gender on its head, Butler argues that the various acts,
thoughts and physical appearances which we take to arise from our gender are actually the
very things which produce our sense of gender. Gender is the consequence, rather than the
cause, of these individual, isolated, norm-governed acts. Because acts which constitute gender
are governed by institutional norms which enforce certain modes of behaviour, thought,
speech, and even shape our bodies, all positive constructions of gender categories will be
exclusionary. Consequently, not only does Butler deny any ontological justification for a
feminist identity politics, but she also rejects the possibility of a political justification. Identity
categories are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary
(1992: 16). As a result, Any effort to give universal content or specific content to the category
of women... will necessarily produce factionalization and so, identity as a point of
departure can never hold as the solidifying ground of a feminist political movement (ibid: 15).
Infusing issues of power into the recognition debate therefore presents problems for existent
models of recognition. Taken to its extreme, contemporary feminist accounts of gender and
identity may be seen as reason to decisively reject recognition politics. If, as Butler suggests,
gender identity is intrinsically connected to power, then to demand recognition for ones
identity could seen as becoming compliant with existing power structures. Such a position
would have no possibility of radically critiquing the status quo and would thus potentially
forfeit any emancipatory promise. Upon the relationship between the individual and power,
Foucault (1980: 98) writes: [Individuals] are not only its [powers] intent or consenting
target; they are always also the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the
vehicles of power, not its point of application. The concern is that there is no form of selfrealisation in recognition models that does not, in some way, reproduce patterns of
dominance or exclusion.

6. The Future of Recognition

Despite the above reservations regarding the concept of recognition and its political
application, there is a growing interest in the value of recognition as a normative sociopolitical principle. The increasingly multicultural nature of societies throughout the world
seems to call for a political theory which places respect for difference at its core. In this regard,
recognition theories seem likely to only increase in influence. It should also be noted that they
are very much in their infancy. It was only in the 1990s that theorists formulated a
comprehensive account of recognition as a foundational concept within theories of justice. To
this extent, they are still in the process of being fashioned and re-evaluated in the light of
critical assessment from various schools of thought.

For many thinkers, the concept of recognition captures a fundamental feature of human
subjectivity. It draws attention to the vital importance of our social interactions in formulating
our sense of identity and self-worth as well as revealing the underlying motivations for, and
justifications of, political action. It seems particularly useful in making sense of notions of
authenticity and the conditions for agency, as well as mapping out the conditions for rational
responsibility and authority (see Brandom, 2009). As a result, recognition can be seen as an
indispensible means for analysing social movements, assessing claims for justice, thinking
through issues of equality and difference, understanding our concrete relations to others, and
explicating the nature of personal identity. Although there remain concerns regarding various
aspects of recognition as a social and political concept, it is entirely possible that many of
these will be addressed and resolved through future research.

7. References and Further Reading

Alexander, Jeffrey C. and Lara, Maria P., Honneths New Critical Theory of
Recognition. New Left Review. 1/220 (1996): 126-136
Appiah, Kwame, A. Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social
Reproduction.Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Ed. Amy Gutmann.
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994: 149-163
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958
Brandom, Robert. Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard
University Press, 2009
Brandom, Robert. The Structure of Desire and Recognition: Self-consciousness and
Self-Constitution.Philosophy & Social Criticism. 33:1 (2007): 127-150
Butler, Judith. Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology
and Feminist Theory.Theatre Journal, 40:4 (1988): 519-531
Butler, Judith.Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York:
Routledge, 1990
Butler, Judith. Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of
Postmodernism. Feminists Theorize the Political. Ed. Butler, Judith and Joan W. Scott.
London: Routledge, 1992. 3-21
De Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972 [1949]
Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. London: Pluto, 1986 [1952]
Fichte, Johann G. Foundations in Natural Right: According to the Principles of the
Wissenschaftslehre. Cambridge: CUP, 2000 [1796/7]
Foucault, Michel. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. Brighton:
Harvester, 1980
Foucault, Michel. Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 19771984. Ed. Kritzman, L. D. London: Routledge, 1988
Fraser, Nancy. Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the Postsocialist Condition.
New York: Routledge, 1997
Fraser, Nancy. Rethinking Recognition. New Left Review. 3 (2000): 107-120
Fraser, Nancy. Recognition Without Ethics?. Theory Culture & Society. 18:2-3 (2001):
21-42
Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth. Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical
Exchange. London: Verso, 2003
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. London: Sheed and Ward, 1975 [1960]

Haraway, Donna. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. London:
Free Association Books, 1991
Hegel, Georg W. G. Phenomenology of the Spirit. Trans. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1977 [1807]
Hegel, Georg W. G. Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Trans. H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge:
CUP, 1991 [1821]
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Author Information
Paddy
Email: paddymcqueen@gmail.com
Queen's
Northern Ireland

McQueen
University