1. Samalio v.

Court of Appeals
454

SCRA 462

Topic: Applicability of Rules of Evidence

Facts: Weng Sai Qin, a Chinese with Uruguayan passport, was taken to Augusto R. Samalio,
Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), because her passport
was suspected to be fake. Qin paid Samalio $500 in exchange of her passport but
Samalio returned Qins passport without an immigration arrival stamp. Thereafter, a criminal
case
for robbery and violation of the Immigration Law was filed against Samalio in
the
Sandiganbayan, as well as an administrative case for dishonesty, oppression and
misconduct. Samalio was found guilty of the charges in both proceedings and was ordered
dismissed from service by the BID Commissioner, and such decision was affirmed
by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Secretary of Justice and the Court of Appeals.
The CSC and the Secretary of Justice took cognizance of the testimony of Wen Sai Qin in the
Sandiganbayan case, applying Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Rules on Evidence applies in the administrative case.
Ruling: Yes. The CSC and the Secretary of Justice did not err in applying Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule on
former
testimony,
in
deciding
petitioners
administrative
case.
The
provisions of the Rules of Court may be applied
suppletorily to the rules of procedure of administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers,
unless
otherwise provided by law or the rules of procedure of the administrative
agency
concerned. The Rules of Court, which are meant to secure to every litigant the adjective
phase
of
due
process
of
law,
may
be
applied
to
proceedings before an
administrative body with quasi-judicial powers in the
absence
of
different
and
valid
statutory or administrative provisions prescribing the ground rules for the investigation,
hearing and adjudication of cases before it. For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following
requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his
testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case
involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of
action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in
the present case and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in
the former case. In this case, Weng Sai Qin was unable to testify in
the administrative
proceedings before the BID because she left the country
even before the administrative
complaint against petitioner was instituted. Petitioner does not deny that the testimony of Weng
Sai Qin was given in Sandiganbayan case, the very basis for filing the administrative complaint.
Hence, the issue testified to by Weng Sai Qin in such case was the same
issue in the
administrative case, that is, whether petitioner extorted money from Weng Sai Qin. Petitioner
also had the opportunity to face and cross- examine his accuser Weng Sai Qin, and to defend
and vindicate his cause before the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, all the requisites for the
proper application of the rule on former testimony were satisfied. Furthermore, the proper
foundation was laid because in the early stages of the proceedings
before the Board of
Discipline of the BID, Weng Sai Qins departure from the country and consequent inability to
testify in the proceedings had already been disclosed to the parties.

2. Ong Chia v. Republic

328

SCRA 749

Topic: Applicability of Rules of Evidence

Facts: Ong Chia was born in China but he came to the country when he was a boy and stayed
here since then. When he was 66 years old, he filed a petition to be admitted as a
Filipino
citizen.
He
testified
as
to
his
qualifications and presented witnesses to
corroborate the facts which will admit him Filipino citizenship and the trial court
granted such petition. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial courts decision
when the State appea led to it, annexing in its appellant's brief the pertinent
documents for naturalization which contends that petitioner failed to suppo rt his petition
with the appropriate documentary evidence. Ong Chia now contends that the
appellate court erred in considerin
g the documents which had merely been
annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and that such documents, not having been
presented and formally offered as evidence, are mere scraps of paper.
Issue: Whether or not the documents annexed to the States appellant briefs
considered as evidence even if they were not formally introduced as evidence.

should be

Ruling: Yes. The documents should be considered as evidence.

In this case, the Supreme
Court held that the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Court)
now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving
a petition for naturalization. Rule 143 of the Rules of Court states, These rules shall not
apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for, except by
analogy
or
in
a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient . The only instance
when said rules may be applied by
analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." In the case at bar, petitioner claims that as a result of the failure
of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the
trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively
depriving him of his fundamental
right to procedural
due process. However, the
Supreme
Court
is
not
persuaded, ruling that the reason for the rule prohibiting the
admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the
chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right
to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He
could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of
Appeals.

3. Bantolino v. Coca Cola Bottlers, Inc.

403

SCRA 699

Topic: Applicability of Rules of Evidence

Facts:
Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero et al., who are former employees
Coca Cola, filed a case against the latter for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled
favor
of
the
employees,
and
ordered
their
reinstatement and the payment
backwages. The Labor Arbiter also ruled that despite the negative declarations of Coca Cola

of
in
of
as

to its relationship with the complainants, the complainants testimonies are more credible to
prove the existence of employer-employee relationship. The NLRC affirmed such decision but
the Court of Appeals modified such ruling because the complainants affidavits should
not be given probative value since they were not subjected to cross- examination, they were
not affirmed and therefore, they are hearsay evidence.
Issue: Whether or not administrative bodies like the NLRC should be strictly
of evidence.

bound by the rules

Ruling: No. The argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented
for cross examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly
observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC, where decisions may
be reached on the basis of position papers only. It is not necessary for the affiants to appear
and testify and be cross-examined by counsel of the adverse party. To require
otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of
the proceedings in the NLRC. The rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control
proceedings before the labor arbiter and the NLRC. They are authorized to adopt reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively without regard
to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of due process.

4. People v. Galleno
291

SCRA 761

Topic: Expert Testimony as Evidence; Evidence in Criminal Cases

Facts: Joeral Galleno was charged with statutory rape committed against Evelyn Obligar, a five
year old girl. The prosecution presented three expert witnesses namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco,
Dr. Ma. Lourdes Laada, and Dr. Machael Toledo, whose testimonies convinced the trial court
that rape was committed against Obligar. Galleno contended that he should be acquitted since
the expert testimonies were not impeccable considerin
g that the doctors found
that there was no presence of spermatozoa, and that they were not sure as to what caused the
laceration in the victim's vagina.
Issue: Whether or not the lacking testimonies of the expert witnesses as to
carnal knowledge should result to the acquittal of the accused.

the occurrence of

Ruling: As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or
give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions
upon the facts proved. However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many
cases, and are not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of
the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject
matter under observation, or for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a
judgment. In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of
the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's
laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witness, especially the victim herself.
In other words, the trial
court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses.
Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its judgment on the facts.
Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various possible causes of the victim's laceration

does not mean the trial court's interference

is wrong. The absence of spermatozoa in the
victim's vagina does not negate the conclusion that it was his penis which was inserted in the
victim's vagina.
In rape, the important consideration is not the emission of semen but the
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ.

5. People v. Calumpan
454 SCRA 719
Topic: Alibi
Facts: Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang were charged with two counts
of
murder,
committed against the spouses Alicia Catipay and Santiago Catipay. The trial court
dismissed the defense of alibi interposed by the defendants because it was weak and then
convicted the defendants, relying on the testimony of Magno Gomez who allegedly eye
witnessed the killing of
the two victims. The defendants appealed, contending that the
testimony of Magno is unreliable and inconsistent, and that the trial court erred in
dismissing their defense of alibi.
Issue: Whether or not the defense of alibi is sufficient to cast doubt as to the
accused.

guilt of the

Ruling: Yes. Appellants defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were corroborated
only by their relatives and friends, and it was not shown that it was impossible for them to be at
the place of the incident. However, the rule that an accused must satisfactorily prove
his alibi was never intended to change or shift the burden of proof in criminal cases. It is
basic that the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the defense. Unless the prosecution overturns the
constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused by competent and credible
evidence provin
g his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption remains.
There being no sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime, appellants presumed innocence stands. The Supreme Court found
that the testimony of the lone witness Magno is full of inconsistencies. While Magno claimed to
have witnessed the gruesome killings, the records show that serious discrepancies
attended Magnos testimony in court and his sworn statement executed during the preliminary
examination. Well settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itselfsuch as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances stand. Magnos
testimony failed to satisfy such rule, hence, the presumed innocence of the accused must be
upheld.

6. Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa

G.R. No. 152807

Topic: Admissibility of Evidence
Facts: The heirs of Lourdes Sabanpan filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
with damages
against respondents Alberto Comorposa, et al. The MTC ruled in favor of the heirs, but the RTC
reversed such decision. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC judgment, ruling that
respondents had the better right to possess the subject land; and it disregarded the affidavits of
the petitioners witnesses for being self-serving. Hence, the heirs filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court, contending that
the Rules on Summary Procedure
authorizes the use of affidavits and that the failure of respondents to file their position papers
and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an admission by silence.
Issue: Whether or not the affidavits in issue should have been considered by
Appeals.

the Court of

Ruling: No. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence
proves an issue. Thus, a
particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary
weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.
While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses'
respective
testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set
forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of action,
because they are the ones assertin
an affirmative relief.

7. People v. Negosa
G.R. No.

142856-57

Topic: Testimonial Evidence

Facts: Roberto Negosa was charged with two counts of rape, committed
against Gretchen
Castao. As to the second count of rape, Gretchen testified on direct examination that the penis
of the appellant was able to penetrate her vagina. However, on cross examination, she testified
that she and the appellant were wearing short pants and underwear, hence, it was physically
impossible for his penis to penetrate her vagina. The RTC convicted Negosa for statutory rape
and for acts of lasciviousness in lieu of the second count for rape. Negosa appealed, contending
that the trial court should have not believed the inconsistent testimony of the victim.
Issue: Whether or not the inconsistent testimony of the victim is sufficient to acquit the accused.
Ruling: No. The trial court disbelieved Gretchens testimony on the second count of rape that
the appellant managed to insert a small portion of his penis through the side of his short pants
and the side of the victims loose
short pants and convicted the appellant only of acts of
lasciviousness. This, however, does not impair Gretchens credibility and the probative weight
of her testimony that she was raped by the appellant. In People vs. Lucena, we ruled that the
testimony of a witness may be partly believed or disbelieved,
depending
on
the
corroborative evidence and intent on the part of the witness to pervert the truth. The
principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction. The maxim

falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule
of law; the rule is not an inflexible one of universal application. Modern trend in jurisprudence
favors more flexibility when the testimony of a witness may be partly believed and partly
disbelieved dependin
g on the corroborative evidence presented at the trial. Thus,
where the challenged testimony is sufficiently corroborated in its material points, or where the
mistakes arise from innocent lapses and not from an apparent desire to pervert the truth, the
rule may be relaxed. It is a rule that is neither absolute nor mandatory and binding upon the
court, which may accept or reject portions of the
witness testimony based on its inherent
credibility or on the corroborative evidence in the case.

8. People v. Matito
G.R. No.

144405

Topic: Circumstantial Evidence

Facts: Ferdinand Matito was charged with murder, committed against Mariano
Raymundo, Jr. The prosecution presented the following during the trial: (1) testimony of the
widow that her husband, prior to his death, declared that it was appellant who had
gunned him down; (2) the presence of nitrate powder on the cast taken from the right hand of
appellant; (3) the bitter quarrel that ensued between Matito and the victim after the latter had
cut off the formers water supply; (4) the denial by Matito of the request of
his neighbors
(including the victim) to widen the right of way along the premises of his house; and (5)
hours before the victim was killed, the threatening remarks of appellant to the formers
daughter. The Regional Trial Court convicted Matito.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution is sufficient to convict the accused.
Ruling: Yes. Circumstantial evidence, when demonstrated with clarity and forcefulness, may be
the sole basis of a criminal conviction. It cannot be overturned by bare denials or hackneyed
alibis. Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that "indirectly proves a fact in
issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established.
Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon free."
It is not a weaker form of evidence vis--vis direct evidence. Cases have recognized that in its
effect upon the courts, the former may surpass the latter in weight and probative force. To
warrant a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The totality of the evidence must constitute an unbroken
chain showing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
On the strength of the
circumstantial evidence proven in the current case, we hold that the court a quo did not err in
convicting appellant of the crime charged. The combination of the circumstances comprising
such evidence forms an unbroken chain that points to appellant, to the exclusion of all others,
as the perpetrator of the crime.

9. People v. Sevilleno
G.R. No.

152954

Topic: Circumstantial Evidence

Facts: Appellant Paulino Sevilleno was charged for rape with homicide, committed
against Virginia Bakia. The RTC convicted appellant based on the
following circumstances
presented by the prosecution: (1) appellant invited the victim to watch a "beta-show"; (2) victim
and the appellant proceed to a sugarcane field in Hacienda San Antonio, the place where the
corpse of the victim was found; (3) the appellant emerge from the sugarcane field alone and
without the victim, with fresh scratches on his face, neck and both arms;
(4) the multiple
scratches suffered by the appellant on the right side of his face and ears were all caused by
human fingernails; and (5) the victim suffered hymenal laceration, contusions, abrasions
and hematoma on different parts of her body and was strangled resulting to her death which
indicated that there was a struggle and the victim vigorously put up a fight against her attacker.
Sevilleno appealed, contending that the scratches on
his face do not prove that they were
inflicted by Virginia, much less that he committed the crime.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution evidence is sufficient to convict the accused.
Ruling: Yes. The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction
of an accused
through circumstantial evidence require the presence of the followin g requisites: (1) there
are more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and
(3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the
guilt of the accused. To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to
the criminal liability of the appellant. Jurisprudence requires that the circumstances must be
established to form an unbroken chain of
events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion
pointing to the appellant, to
the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. The
prosecution were able to establish all of these. While it is established that nothing less than
proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a conviction, this exacting standard does not
preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available.
Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort
to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in
secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted
on under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in
secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.

10. People v. Darilay

421

SCRA 45

Topic: Direct Evidence, Circumstantial Evidence

Facts: Appellant Noel Darilay, who was then 15 years old, was found guilty for the rape and
murder of minor Marilyn Arganda, and the attempted murder of Ailyn Arganda. Ailyn
testified that she and Marilyn were on their way home when they met appellant who suddenly
struck them with a piece of wood which left them unconscious. Appellant left Ailyn under such
state but he carried Marilyn to a grassy place where he repeatedly raped and eventually killed
her. The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that he raped and killed the
victim because only Ailyns testimony was
relied upon and there was no direct evidence
presented.
Issue: Whether or not the absence of direct evidence to prove the guilt of
his acquittal thereof.

the accused warrants

Ruling: No. The Court agrees with the appellant that the prosecution failed to adduce direct
evidence to prove that he raped and killed Marilyn on the occasion or by reason of the said
crime. However, direct evidence is not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused for the
crime charged; it may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Based on the evidence on record
and as declared by the trial court in its decision, the prosecution adduced
circumstantial evidence to prove beyond cavil that it was the appellant who raped and killed
Marilyn on the occasion or by reason of the rape. Hence, he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of rape with homicide, a special complex crime. First. The appellant alone waylaid Ailyn and
Marilyn while the two were walking home after buying tinapa. The appellant hit Ailyn twice with
a piece of wood on her back and boxed the left side of her face, rendering her unconscious.
The appellant also struck Marilyn with a piece of wood on the back. After dra
ing Ailyn to a
grassy area, he left her there. Second. When Ailyn regained consciousness, Marilyn and the
appellant were nowhere to be found. Third. The torn dress, the pair of panties, and a slipper
were found
about 15 meters away from where the two young girls were waylaid by the
appellant. Fourth. The appellant testified that he himself accompanied the policemen and
pointed to the place where Marilyns body was dumped, completely naked, with blood
oozing from her nose and vagina. Considerin
all of these, the court is convinced that the
appellant raped Marilyn about 15 meters from where he had earlier waylaid Ailyn. He then
carried Marilyn
across the river where he killed her to prevent her from revealing to the
authorities that she was raped. The appellant hid her body under the bushes and trees to
prevent police authorities from discoverin g that he killed Marilyn.

11. Ayala de Roxas v. Case

8

Phil. 197

Topic: Vested Right in a Rule of Evidence

Facts: Appellant Edwin Case filed a petition claiming a right of way through a passage along the
westerly side of the property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas. Case owns the two adjoinin
g
properties lyin g in the rear of appellees premises, and bein
g the dominant
tenement, he claims the benefit of easement. Appellant claims that the right of way
exists not by necessity but simply that it arises by prescription, founded not on any written
instrument but on immemorial use alone. The appellant makes the additional point that since
the passage of the Code of Civil Procedure, an immemorial prescription does not call for the

same proof as under the Spanish procedure. The third

Partida says that discontinuous
servitudes have no fixed periods, but must be proved by usage or a term so lon g
that men cannot remember its commencement.
Issue: Whether or not immemorial use or vested right over a servitude can be established by
mere evidence like the testimony of witnesses over 60 years of age who were acquainted with
the servitude during their lives and who also had heard it spoken of in the same way by their
elders, as required under the Spanish Code.
Ruling: No. The Court held that there is no vested right in a mere rule of evidence. (Aldeguer
vs. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. Rep., 500) But the point would be whether this requirement of the Spanish
law is not substantive rather than
evidential in its nature, so as to survive the repeal. If
substantive, then the appellant has failed to comply with it; if not substantive, but merely a
matter of procedure, then it must be taken to be replaced by the correspondin
provisions of
our new code. We find therein no equivalent provision, other than subsection 11 of section 334,
establishing as a disputable presumption
that a person is the owner of property from
exercising acts of ownership over it or from common reputation of his ownership. The use of
the passage proved in this case cannot be held to constitute acts of ownership for the reason
that it is quite consistent with a mere license to pass, informal in its origin and revocable in its
nature. It seems, however, that under the clause quoted, common reputation of ownership of
the right of way was open to proof and on this theory of the case such testimony, if available,
should have
been offered. The Court is of the opinion that in order to establish a right or
prescription somethin
g more is required than the memory of livin
witnesses.
Whether this something should be the declaration of persons lon
dead, repeated by those who
testify, as executed by the Spanish law, or
should be the common reputation of ownership
recognized by the Code of Procedure, it is unnecessary for the court to decide.

12. Homeowners

Savings

&

Loan

Bank

v. Dailo

453 SCRA 283

Topic: Burden of Proof
Facts: Marcelino Dailo, Jr. obtained a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and
executed a mortgage as security. Marcelino eventually died and was survived by his wife
Miguela. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstandin
g and as a result,
petitioner foreclosed the mortgage and a certificate of sale was issued in its
favor as the highest bidder in the extrajudicial sale. After the lapse of one year without
the property bein
redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by executing an
affidavit and a Deed of Absolute Sale. Miguela claimed that she had no
knowledge of the
mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, so she
instituted a case to nullify the real estate mortgage and the certificate of sale.
Petitioner claims however that the property mortgaged is Marcelinos exclusive property.
Issue: Who
property?

has

the

burden

of

proving that

the

property

mortgaged

Ruling: The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claimin
as such. He

is

conjugal

the conjugal
who asserts,

not he who denies, must prove. Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained
by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt
redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade
the Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case
to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to
the benefit of his family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable
for the payment of the principal obligation. In addition, a perusal of the records of the
case reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject property was
the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial
court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even
on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan.
When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his
theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it
would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A party may
change his legal theory on appeal only
when the factual bases thereof would not require
presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet
the issue raised in the new theory.

13. Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Ayin

G.R. No.

144773

Topic: Burden of Proof

Facts: Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over
said parcel of land. After her death in 1930, the Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing the
issuance of a decree in the name of Crisanta Maloloy-ons eight children. The certificate of title
was, however, lost during the war. All the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an Extra- Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the
subject parcel of land to
herein petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Company. Aznar, claiming to be the rightful owner of the
subject property, sent out
notices to vacate, addressed to persons occupying the property.
Unheeded, petitioner then filed a complaint for ejectment against the occupants before the
Metropolitan Trial Court.
Issue: Who has the burden of proof?
Ruling: The only evidence on record as to when such prescriptive period commenced as to
each of the respondents are Wenceslao Sumalinogs (heir
of Roberta Aying) testimony that
about three years after 1964, they already
learned of the existence of the Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale; and Laurencio Ayings (heir of
Emiliano Aying) admission that he found out about the sale of the land in dispute a long time
ago and can only estimate that it must be after martial law. Paulino Ayin
(heir of Simeon
Aying) gave no testimony whatsoever as to when the children of Simeon Aying
actually learned of the existence of the document of sale. On the other hand, petitioner did not
present any other evidence to
prove the date when respondents were notified of the
execution of the subject document. In view of the lack of unambiguous evidence of when the
heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying discovered the existence of the document of sale, it
must be determined which party had the burden of proof to establish such fact. The test for
determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to an action or suit will fail if he

offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to
obtain. Moreover, one alleging a fact that is denied has the burden of proving it and unless the
party asserting the affirmative of an issue sustains the burden of proof of that issue by a
preponderance of the evidence, his cause will not succeed. Thus, the defendant bears
the burden of proof as to all affirmative defenses which he sets up in answer to the plaintiffs
claim or cause of action; he being the party who asserts the truth of the matter he has alleged,
the burden is upon him to establish the facts on which that matter is predicated
and if he fails to do so, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict or decision in his favor.

14. Bautista v. Sarmiento

138

SCRA 587

Topic: Quantum of Proof in Criminal Cases

Facts: Complainant Dr. Leticia C. Yap filed a case of estafa against Dr. Fe Bautista, Milagros
Corpus and Teresita Vergere. The case was heard before
the sala of Judge Malcolm G.
Sarmiento. The accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
against them but it was denied. They were later found guilty for said crime.
Issue: Whether or not conviction can be had in a criminal case only upon
reasonable doubt and not on a mere prima facie case.

proof beyond

Ruling: There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of the accused is established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal. But when the trial court denied
petitioners' motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that
the prosecution had established a prima facie case against them, they assumed a
definite burden. It became incumbent upon petitioners to adduce evidence to meet and nullify,
if not overthrow, the prima facie case against them. This is due to the shift in the burden of
evidence, and not of the burden of proof as petitioners would seem to believe. When a
prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar, the
burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party
upon whom it is imposedthe prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party
to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial. This burden of
goin g forward with the evidence is met by evidence which balances that introduced
by the prosecution. Then the burden shifts back. A prima facie case need not be countered by a
preponderance of evidence or
by evidence of greater weight. Defendant's evidence which
equalizes the
weight of plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in equipoise is sufficient. As a
result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof. Should it happen that at the trial the
weight of evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and presumptions operate against
plaintiff who has the burden of proof, he cannot prevail.

15. Rivera v. Court of Appeals

284

SCRA 673

Topic: Burden of Proof

Facts: Esmundo Rivera filed an ejectment case against Peregrino and Merlinda
Mirambel alleging that they constructed their house in his land as indicated by a private survey.
He presented the following evidence: private survey commissioned by Rivera which was not
properly authenticated by the Bureau of Lands, a letter of the district land officer to Rivera
informing him that his application cannot be given due course because of a prior
application. MTC ruled in favor of Rivera because he was able to establish his cause of action
through preponderance of evidence. The RTC reversed MTCs decision because the houses of
the Mirambels were built outside the land of
Rivera and located in a public land. Rivera
appealed to the CA saying that RTC's findings lack evidentiary support. The CA found that both
decisions are not supported by substantial evidence. According to the CA, there should be a
field survey directed by the court or ocular inspection of the subject premises,
and not just the sole survey conducted by Rivera which is self- serving if without thorough
verification.
Issue: Whether or not Rivera was able to prove the fact that Mirambels are within his property.
Ruling: No. Basic is the rule in civil cases that the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence
simply means evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is
offered in opposition to it. In the present ejectment case, petitioner (as plaintiff) has the burden
of proving that the houses of private respondents were located within his titled land. To justify
a judgment in his favor, petitioner must therefore establish a preponderance of
evidence on this essential fact. The extant records of this case support the finding of the Court
of Appeals
that the a
regate of evidence submitted by both parties was insufficient to
determine with certainty whether the private respondents houses were inside the
petitioners titled property. As noted by Respondent Court, private respondents claim that
their houses were built on public land is not convincing because petitioner has a
transfer certificate of title over the same parcel of land. Likewise unconvincing is the private
survey commissioned by the petitioner himself to prove that the houses of private
respondents
encroached on his property. The reliability of the survey would have been
indubitable had it been properly authenticated by the Bureau of Lands or by officials thereof.
Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof fails upon that issue. Therefore,
as neither party was able to make out a case, neither side could establish its cause of action
and prevail with the evidence it had. They are thus no better off than before they proceeded to
litigate, and, as a consequence thereof, the courts can only leave them as they are.
In such
cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss the complaints/petitions.

16. Benares v. Pancho

457

SCRA 652

Topic: Quantum of Proof/Evidence, Probative Value

Facts: Complainants Jaime Pancho, Rodolfo Pancho Jr., et al. worked at Hacienda Maasin II, a
sugar cane plantation owned and managed by Josefina Benares. Complainants alleged to have
been terminated without being paid termination benefits by Benares in retaliation to what they
have done in reporting to the Department of Labor and Employment their workin
conditions. The complainants filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money
claims before the labor arbiter. The labor arbiter dismissed the case for
failure of the
complainants to discuss the facts and circumstances surroundin
g their dismissal
and to prove their entitlement of monetary awards. The NLRC reversed such decision,
ruling that complainants were illegally dismissed for failure of Benares to prove that there was
just or authorized cause in their dismissal. On appeal, Benares questioned NLRC's general
statement to the effect that the payroll she submitted is not convincing, she
asserts that she submitted 235 sets of payroll, not just one, and that the NLRC did not even
bother to explain why it found the payroll unconvincing. She also said that NLRC should have
remanded the case to the labor arbiter since there are gray areas in the facts.
Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in not
petitioners evidence.

considering the

Ruling: No. The probative value of petitioners evidence has been passed upon by the labor
arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. Although the labor arbiter dismissed respondents
complaint because their position paper
is completely devoid of any discussion about their
alleged dismissal, much less of the probative facts thereof, the ground for the dismissal of the
complaint implies a findin
g that respondents are regular employees. According to
petitioner, however, the NLRCs conclusion is highly suspect
considerin
g its
own
admission that there are gray areas which require clarification. She alleges that
despite these gray areas, the NLRC chose not to remand the case to the Labor Arbiter as this
would unduly prolong the agony of the complainants in particular. Petitioner perhaps wittingly
omitted mention that the NLRC opted to appreciate the merits of the instant case based on
available documents/pleadings. That the NLRC chose not to remand the case to the
labor arbiter for clarificatory proceedings and instead
decided the case on the basis of the
evidence then available to it is a judgment call this Court shall not interfere with in
the absence of any showing that the NLRC abused its discretion in so doing. It is well to note
at this point that in quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of evidence required to
support the findings of the NLRC is only substantial evidence or
that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

17. Duduaco v. Laquindanum

A.M. MTJ- 05-1601

Topic: Quantum of Proof

Facts: Mercedes Duduaco charged Judge Lily Laquindanum with grave misconduct,
abuse of discretion, and gross ignorance of the law. Mercedes is the manager of Toyota Service
Center where respondent brought her vehicle for repairs and replacement of parts due to a
vehicular mishap. The service advisor told respondent that her vehicle will be released upon
payment of
deductible franchise, respondent refused saying that it should be paid by the
insurance company. She asked to speak with the manager Mercedes but the latter was in a
meeting. It was explained to respondent that the payment of the deductible franchise was upon
instruction of the insurance company but
the respondent got angry. Upon being told that
Mercedes was in a meeting,
respondent said that she was a judge and she should have a
preferential treatment. She was referred to Saragoza and Yez but when no agreement was
reached, she suggested that they put in writing the demand for the deductible franchise before
she would pay. Upon presentation, she paid the amount under protest but refused to sign a
blank form which is release of claim with subrogation. They told her that she cannot get the car
unless she signs the form. She did not sign it so she left without her car. She filed a case for
replevin, damages, and atty. fees against the service center. The Investigating
Justice of CA recommended the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of merit insufficiency of
evidence and reasonable doubt. OCA adopted such decision.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner must prove beyond reasonable doubt
defendant.

her case against

Ruling: No. In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of provin

g by
substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints. Administrative proceedings
against judges are by nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules
applicable to criminal cases.
The quantum of proof required to support the administrative
charges should thus be more substantial and they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
However, petitioner also failed to present substantial evidence. To constitute gross ignorance of
the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but
were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption. On the other hand, misconduct
is any unlawful
conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice
prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. In this case,
respondents refusal to pay the deductible franchise was justified. Her insistence that
the demand to pay be in writing, together with her refusal to affix her signature in the blank
form, did not amount to grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office or gross ignorance of the law.
She was only exercising her legal right. Had respondent signed the blank form, she would be
deemed to have waived her earlier protest and would have lost the right to claim for refund.

18. State Prosecutors v. Muro

236

SCRA 505

Topic: Judicial Notice

Facts: The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in
violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960.
Judge Manuel Muro dismissed all 11 cases
solely on the basis of the report published on 2
newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres.
of the
Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The respondents decision
was
founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive
Department in the
newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to
further hear the pending case. He further contends that the announcement of the President as
published in the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the
judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.
Issue: Whether or not the judge may take judicial notice of a statute before
effective.

it becomes

Ruling: No. Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one
of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well
and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court. Judicial notice is not equivalent to judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of
the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his
action. Judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. A law not yet in
force and hence still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of unquestionable
demonstration.

19. Fule v. Court of Appeals

162 SCRA 446
Topic: Stipulation of Facts as Evidence
Facts: Petitioner Manolo Fule was convicted of violation of B.P. 22, the Bouncing
on the basis of a stipulation of facts entered into between the prosecution and
during pre-trial which was not signed by the petitioner or by his counsel.
the respondent appellate court upheld the stipulation of facts and affirmed the
conviction.
Issue: Whether the conviction, based solely on a stipulation of facts which
either the petitioner or his counsel, was proper.

Checks Law,
the defense
On appeal,
judgment of

was not signed by

Ruling: No. The omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as
mandatorily
required by the Rules, renders the stipulation of facts inadmissible in evidence. The
fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the stipulation of facts does
not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires the signature of both the accused
and his counsel. What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering the lack of the
required signatures, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of
relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused. Without said evidence independent of
the admission, the guilt of
the accused cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable
doubt.

20. Service Wide Specialists, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 117728
Topic: Admission of Liability
Facts: Servicewide filed a complaint for replevin and/or sum of money with damages against
spouses Eduardo and Felisa Tolosa, allegin
g that the spouses failed to pay
the installments due on the purchase price of a jeepney despite several demands.
Later on, Servicewide amended its complaint and included Eduardo Garcia as defendant
alleging that the Tolosa
spouses,
without
Servicewide's
knowledge
and
consent,
executed and delivered to Garcia a "Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage" over the
jeepney sought to be recovered. Lourdes Bartina filed a complaint-in- intervention
claiming that the vehicle subject of the complaint was sold to her by Binan Motors owned
by Garcia and that the vehicle was in her possession when it was seized by the sheriff
and thereafter turned over to Servicewide. Later, Bartina and Garcia and Binan Motors, with the
assistance of their respective counsels, moved to dismiss the complaint-in-intervention. They
alleged that they had arrived at an amicable settlement of their claims.
The decision was
rendered by the trial court and included Garcia in the payment of liability to Servicewide.
Issue: Whether or not an offer to compromise is considered an admission of
cases.

liability in civil

Ruling: No. The compromise between Bartina and Garcia and Binan Motors cannot be taken as
an admission of Garcia's liability. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission
of any liability. With more reason, a compromise agreement should not be treated as an
admission of liability on
the part of the parties vis-a-vis a third person. The compromise
settlement of a claim or cause of action is not an admission that the claim is valid, but merely
admits that there is a dispute, and that an amount is paid to be rid of the controversy, nor is a
compromise with one person an admission of any liability to someone else. The policy of
the law should be, and is, to encourage compromises. When they are made, the rights
of third parties are not in any way affected thereby.

21. Dalandan v. Julio

10

SCRA 400

Topic: Admission
Facts: Clemente Dalandan filed a civil case against Victoria Julio alleging in their complaint
that what transpired between the former and Victorina Dalandan is not a facto de retro
sale but an equitable sale. Victoria Julio filed a motion to dismiss which was granted by the
court. Clemente Dalandan went to the SC saying that upon filing of the motion to dismiss of the
other party it is deemed that they admitted that the transaction was really an equitable sale.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of motion to dismiss was in effect admitting the allegation that it
was an equitable sale.
Ruling: No. As the trial court correctly
mortgage' in the complaint is a mere

pointed out, "such allegation of

'equitable
conclusion of plaintiffs (appellants) and not

a
material
allegation,
so
that
the
same
cannot
be
deemed
admitted
by
defendants (appellees) who filed the motion to dismiss". As a rule, the complaint should
contain allegation of ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. Neither is it
proper to allege in a pleading inferences of fact from facts not stated, or incorrect inferences
from facts stated, for they are not the ultimate facts required by law to be
pleaded. Legal conclusions need not be pleaded, because so far as they are correct they are
useless, and when erroneous, worse than useless. And to determine the sufficiency of the cause
of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint and no other should be considered. The
allegation of nullity of a
judgment in a complaint, being a conclusion and not a material
allegation, is not deemed admitted by the party who files a motion to dismiss.

22.

Northwest

Orient

Airlines

v.

Court

of

Appeals

241 SCRA 192

Topic: Foreign Judgment as Evidence
Facts: Plaintiff Northwest Orient Airlines authorized defendant C.F. Sharp & Co. through its Japan
branch, to sell the former's airlines tickets. Sharp failed to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales
it made on behalf of Northwest
which led the latter to sue in Tokyo for collection of the
unremitted amount
with claim for damages. The Tokyo District Court of Japan rendered
judgment ordering Sharp to pay Northwest and Sharp failed to appeal making the judgment
final. However, Northwest failed to execute the decision in Japan,
hence, it filed a suit for
enforcement of the judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Sharp filed its answer
averring that the judgment of the Japanese court is null and void and unenforceable in this
jurisdiction havin
been rendered without due and proper notice to Sharp.
The trial court granted the demurrer to evidence motion of Sharp, holding that the foreign
judgment in the Japanese court sought to be enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant.
Issue: Whether or not foreign judgment in the Japanese court need to be
the Philippine courts.

proved as evidence in

Ruling: A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to
presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction
to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment
may, however, be assailed by
evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere,
enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction
and
has
regularly performed its official duty. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign
judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption
of its validity. Being the party
challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, Sharp had the duty to demonstrate
the invalidity of such judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the
extraterritorial service of summons effected as its home office in the Philippines
was not only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did
not, therefore, acquire
jurisdiction over it. It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to

the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the
forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that
determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on Sharp. As to what this
law is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded
and proved like any other fact. It was then incumbent upon Sharp to present evidence as to
what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial
service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the
presumption of validity and regularity of the
service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand.
23. City of Manila v. Garcia
19

SCRA 413

Topic: Judicial Notice

Facts: The City of Manila owns parcels of land occupied by illegal settlers,
who were later
ordered to vacate the area for the expansion of the Epifanio
delos
Santos
Elementary
School. The defendants Gerardo Garcia et al., however, refused; hence the suit for
recovery of possession. At the trial, the City presented the certification of the Chairman
of the Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board, stating that the
amount of Php 100,000.00 had been set aside in an Ordinance for the construction of an
additional building of the said school. The court ruled out the admissibility of said document.
But then, the trial judge reversed his views, and ruled in
favor of the City by citing such
evidence.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court may alter its ruling as to evidence presented in a case.
Ruling: Yes. A court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make it
conformable to law and justice. Defendants' remedy was to bring to the attention of the court
its contradictory stance. Not having done so, this Court will not reopen the case solely for this
purpose.
Elimination of the certification as evidence would not profit defendants. For,
in
reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken, because he was duty bound to take,
judicial notice of the Ordinance appropriating an amount for the school. This is because the city
charter of Manila requires all courts sittin g therein to take judicial notice of all
ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. And the ordinance itself confirms the
certification
aforesaid that an appropriation of Php 100,000.00 was set aside for the
"construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.

24. Gallego v. People

8

SCRA 813

Topic: Judicial Notice

Facts: Florentino Gallego, in view of holding a religious meeting at the public market without the
required permit, was convicted of slight disobedience of an agent of a person in authority. He
however assailed the decision of the court by contending that there is no proof of the existence
of an ordinance in force requiring a permit for the holding of a meeting; and claims that it is

error for the Court of Appeals to take judicial notice of Ordinance No. 2,
series of 1957 of
Lambunao, Iloilo when the trial court itself allegedly did not take cognizance of the ordinance.
Issue: Whether or not the Court may be prohibited in taking judicial notice of an ordinance.
Ruling: No. There is nothing in the law that prohibits a court from taking cognizance of a
municipal ordinance. On the contrary, Section 5 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court enjoins courts
to take judicial notice of matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration. This is
exactly what the Court
of Appeals did in this case in holding that "contrary to petitioner's
contention, there was an existing municipal ordinance at the time (Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1957) providing for a previous permit for the holding of religious meeting in public places."
Besides, it is not true, that the trial court did not take notice of the ordinance in question. For
the lower court mentioned petitioner's "failure to secure the necessary permit" with obvious
reference to Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957. In People vs. Gebune, 87 Phil. 727, it was
held that courts of first instance should take judicial notice of municipal ordinances
within their respective jurisdictions. It must be in compliance with this ruling that the trial
court took notice of said Ordinance.

25. Republic v. Court of Appeals

277 SCRA 633
Topic: Judicial Notice
Facts: The Regional Trial Court, after hearing, adjudicated a parcel of land in favor of Josefa
Gacot. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), contending that the land
was previously declared to be the property of the Republic in a decision rendered by Judge
Lorenzo Garlitos following an order of general default. A rehearing of the case was conducted.
However, the Government failed to present the said order of Judge Garlitos in
evidence. Thus, the CA ruled in favor of Gacot because the order of Judge Garlitos not having
been offered as evidence, it cannot take judicial notice of such.
Issue: Whether or not the CA should take judicial notice of the order of Judge Garlitos.
Ruling: Yes. Firstly, that the rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of
evidentiary value in ordinary trials of evidence which is not formally offered, and secondly, that
adjective law is not to be taken lightly for without it, the enforcement of substantive law may
not remain assured. The Court must add, nevertheless, that technical rules of procedure are
not ends in themselves but primarily devised and designed to help in the proper and expedient
dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may have to be so construed
liberally as to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice. A court will take judicial
notice of its own acts and records in the same case facts established in prior proceedings in the
same case of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of
the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same court. In
addition judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another
court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of
another case between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be taken of
court personnel.

26. Tabuena v. Court of Appeals

196 SCRA 650
Topic: Formal Offer of Evidence
Facts: Juan Peralta Jr., the half-brother of petitioner Jose Tabuena, sold a
parcel of land to
Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines
and upon his request, the subject land was conveyed to him by Damasa, Peraltas mother. The
latter, however,
requested that she be allowed to stay in said property to which Tabernilla
agreed on the condition that she will pay all realty taxes. Damasa remained on the said land
until her death, following which the petitioner, her son, took possession thereof. The complaint
was filed upon Tabuena to surrender the property and the trial court ruled against petitioner.
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent court, for lack
of basis because the lower courts should not have taken into account evidence not submitted
by the private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court. Petitioner claimed that the
court, in arriving at its factual findings, took cognizance of pieces of evidence which
had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence.
Issue: Whether or not decisions/factual findings may be drawn from evidences which
are not formally offered.
Ruling: No. It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the
courts below and even to regard them as conclusive where there is no showing that they have
been reached arbitrarily. The exception is where such findings do not conform to the evidence
on record and appear indeed to have no valid basis to sustain their correctness, as in this
case. The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on exhibits of evidence, which had
not been formally offered as evidence and therefore should have
been totally disregarded,
conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it relied on the evidence
submitted in another civil case and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or
knowledge
of
the
petitioner, in violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual
findings here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and should not have been
sustained by the respondent court. The Supreme Court found that the private respondent, as
plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed property
with evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is substantial
evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that should have persuaded the trial
judge to rule in his favor and dismiss the complaint.
27. Estrada v. Desierto
356

SCRA 108

Topic: Hearsay Evidence

Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada denies he resigned as President or that he suffered from
a permanent disability and contends that the Office of
the President was not vacant when
respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo took
her oath as president. To overturn his claim, the
prosecution presented the
Angara Diary which contains direct statements of petitioner: his
proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his
statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his
statements that he would leave by Monday if the second
envelope would be opened by

Monday; and his statement that he is very tired and he just wants to clear his name then he will
go.
Issue: Whether
evidence rule.

or

not

the

Angara

diary

relied

upon

is

violative

of

the

hearsay

Ruling: No. The Angara Diary is not an out of court statement. It is part of the pleadings in the
case at bar. Petitioner cannot complain that he was not furnished a copy of the diary since the
same was frequently referred to by the parties and three parts thereof were published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Supplemental Reply
Memorandum both the 2nd and 3rd parts of the diary. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity
to contest the use of the diary but unfortunately failed to do so. Even assuming that it was an
out of court statement, still its use is not
covered by the Hearsay Rule. Evidence is called
hearsay when its probative face depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility
of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. There are three
reasons for excluding it: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence
of
demeanor
evidence, and (3) absence of the oath.
Not all hearsay evidence, however, is
inadmissible as evidence. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that "the act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him." It has long
been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. In the case at bar,
the diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a
party.

28. Ortiz v. De Guzman

A.M. No.

P-03-1708

Topic: Implied Admission

Facts: Atty. Jose Ortiz's initial investigation revealed that on various dates, respondent Larry de
Guzman demanded and received cash bond deposits in violation of standin g regulations
of this Court. After issuin g either fake receipts or unauthorized provisional receipts, he
then ordered jail officers to release the accused in different cases. Accordin
g to
Atty. Ortiz, the falsifications committed were apparent after comparing the fake receipts
with the original receipts duly issued by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). De Guzman
was also caught extorting money from a winning party
litigant for the implementation of a
certain court decision in an entrapment operation of the National Bureau of Investigation. De
Guzman was ordered to make a comment on the allegations against him but none was heard
nor received from him during the formal investigation.
Issue: Whether or not respondent's silence may be considered as an implied admission of guilt.
Ruling: Yes. Throughout the entire process, and despite the many opportunities
given to respondent, he refused to comment and present his side. The gravity of the charges
and the weight of the evidence against him would have prompted an innocent man to come out
and clear his name. However, he opted to maintain his silence. The respondent's refusal to face
the charges against him head-on is contrary to the principle in criminal law
that the first
impulse of an innocent man, when accused of wrongdoing, is to express his innocence at the
first opportune time, for his silence and inaction can easily be misinterpreted as a defiance to

the directives issued, or worse,

an admission of guilt. Therefore, the Supreme Court was
inclined to believe that the respondent is guilty of all the charges against him.

29. People v. Serrano

G.R.

No.

L-17937

Topic: Testimony of Co-conspirators

Facts: Eulogio Serrano, Cenon Serrano, Anastacio Reyes et al. were charged for killing Pablo
Navarro in conspiracy with each other. The accused denied
all allegations and presented
different alibis. During the trial of the case
before the lower courts, Anastacio Reyes was
discharged to testify as a
witness for the prosecution. Reyes narrated before the court the
events that took place from the time he and his co-conspirators plotted the killing up until the
body of the victim was hid.
Issue:
Whether or not the lone
prove the conspiracy between the parties.

testimony

of

Anastacio

Reyes

is

sufficient to

Ruling: Yes. The appellants contend that in order that the testimony of a conspirator may be
admissible in evidence against his co-conspirator, it must appear and be shown by evidence
other than the admission itself that the conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is
to be bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy; and as there is nothing but the
lone testimony of prosecution witness Anastacio Reyes, a co-conspirator, the trial court erred
in finding that conspiracy has been established and in convictin
the appellants based upon the
lone testimony of their co-conspirator. The
contention does not merit serious consideration
because the rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy
is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration," applies only to extra-judicial acts or
declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the
opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or
confederates in crime is always subject to grave suspicion, "comin g as it does
from a polluted source," and should be received with great caution and doubtingly examined,
it is nevertheless admissible and competent.

30. People v. Bulos

G.R. No.

123542

Topic: Admission
Facts: Both Nancy Cordero and Rogelio Bulos are stay-in-workers for spouses Mario
and Delia Fariolan. Nancy was the cook and general househelp while Rogelio worked
as a truck helper for the business of Mario. One day when the spouses were away, Rogelio
raped Nancy. During his trial,
Rogelio and the combined testimonies of Mario and Conrado
Perido, sought to establish that Rogelio was not at the Fariolans' house on the afternoon in
question but was vacationing in Cotabato where he stayed at Perido's house.
On rebuttal,
Merson Cordero, Nancys brother who also worked as helper at the rice mill of the Fariolans,

testified that Rogelio in fact left the Fariolans house after he had already raped his sister.
Cordero also said that the accused in fact offered marriage to Nancy, that the Fariolan spouses
actively persuaded Nancy to accept the offer of marriage, and that Nancy refused.
Issue: Whether or not the offer of marriage in rape cases is an admission of guilt.
Ruling: Yes. The Court takes into consideration the flight of Rogelio the day after the rape, and
his offer of marriage to the victim after the incident had been reported to the authorities.
As a rule in rape cases, an offer of marriage to the offended party is an admission of
guilt. In this case, it was proved that Rogelio did indeed offer marriage to the victim. Thus, he is
found guilty of the crime of rape.

31. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hantex

Trading Co., Inc.

454 SCRA 301

Topic: Best Evidence Rule
Facts: Hantex Trading Co. is a corporation engaged in the sale of plastic products. Lt. Vicente
Amoto, Acting Chief of Counter-Intelligence Division of
the
Economic
Intelligence
and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB), received confidential information that Hantex had imported
synthetic resin amountin
to P115,599,018.00 but only declared P45,538,694.57. An
investigation was conducted and the following were presented against Hantex: certified copies
of Hantexs Profit and Loss Statement on file with the SEC; machine copies of the Consumption
Entries submitted by the informer; and excerpts from the entries certified by the investigators.
Administrative hearings and Hantex wrote the BIR Commissioner, questioning the assessment
because of the failure to present the original, or authenticated, or duly certified copies of the
Consumption and Import Entry Accounts, or excerpts thereof if the original
copies were not
readily available.
Issue: Whether or not the final assessment of the petitioner against the respondent is based on
competent evidence.
Ruling: Yes. The best evidence envisaged in Section 16 of the 1977 NIRC, as amended, includes
the corporate and accounting records of the taxpayer who is the subject of the assessment
process, the accounting records of
other taxpayers engaged in the same line of business,
including their gross profit and net profit sales. Such evidence also includes data, record, paper,
document or any evidence gathered by internal revenue officers from other taxpayers who had
personal transactions or from whom the subject taxpayer received any income; and record,
data, document and information secured from government offices or agencies, such as the SEC,
the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Bureau of Customs, and the Tariff and
Customs Commission. The law allows the BIR access to all relevant or material records and
data in the person of the taxpayer. It places no limit or condition on the type or form of the
medium by which the record subject to the order of the BIR is kept. The purpose of the law is to
enable the BIR to get at the taxpayer's records
in whatever form they may be kept. Such
records include computer tapes of the said records prepared by the taxpayer in the course of
business. In this era of developing information-storage technology, there is no valid reason to
immunize companies with computer-based, record-keeping capabilities from BIR scrutiny. The

standard is not the form of the record but where it might

taxpayer's return.

shed light on the accuracy of the

32. Sy v. Court of Appeals

330

SCRA 550

Topic: Original Document

Facts: Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy are married and blessed with 2 children. Fernando left his
family later and never returned. Filipina filed a petition for legal separation but later amended it
to a petition for separation of property, which was granted by the court. She then later filed a
petition for legal separation on the grounds of abandonment and physical violence against her
husband, which was granted by the Court. Filipina then filed a petition for
declaration of
absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity citing
habitual alcoholism, refusal to live with her without just cause, and refusal to have sex with her.
The trial court denied her petition since her grounds do not constitute psychological incapacity.
This was uphold by the appellate court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she alleged lack of
marriage license as her new ground, attaching therein mere photocopies of a marriage license
and marriage certificate.
Issue: Whether or not a mere photocopy of a document is admissible in evidence.
Ruling: A marriage license is a formal requirement and its absence renders the marriage void ab
initio. It is clear on the evidence presented that the issuance of marriage license and marriage
certificate was on September 17, 1974 but the celebration of their marriage was on November
15, 1973 which also what was written on the birth certificates of their 2 children. Since the
documents presented were just photocopies of the original, the Court ruled that although the
marriage certificate and other pieces of documentary evidence were only photocopies,
the fact that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections
having been made as to their authenticity and due execution, means that these
documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.
Likewise,
no objection was interposed to petitioners testimony in open court when she affirmed that the
date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. Therefore, having
been admitted in evidence, with the
adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these
documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.

33. Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 117384
Topic: Original Document
Facts: Felomino and Gregorio Madrid allegedly sold 3 parcels of land to
Teodoro dela and
allegedly executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the latter. Dela Cruz and his heirs took possession
of the land but they found out that a Torrens Title in the name of the Madrid brothers were
issued on the subject
lands, so they filed a petition for reconveyance. The Madrid brothers
denied having executed the Deed of Sale and alleged it to be falsified. The original copy of the

Deed of Sale was said to be lost, thus only a photocopy was presented during trial. To prove due
execution of the Deed of Sale, the Notary Publics testimony that his signature in the Deed of
Sale was genuine was offered.
The Madrids did not object to the admissibility of
the photocopy. Despite this, the trial court ruled that the photocopy was
inadmissible because no proof was presented as to the loss or destruction of the retained copy
by the Notary public or the duplicate copy held by the Madrids. It was then held that there was
no valid sale and the case was
dismissed. On appeal to the CA, the photocopy was held
admissible but has no probative value, so still the trial courts decision was upheld. The CA held
that despite the Notary Publics testimony, the Deed of Sale is not trustworthy
since the alleged survivin
g witness was not presented to corroborate the Notary
Publics testimony.
Issue: Whether or not the photocopy of the Deed of Sale is inadmissible as
has probative value.

evidence and if it

Ruling: Yes. The photocopy of the Deed of Sale is admissible as evidence but has no probative
value. Nonetheless, the petitioners appeal was granted because their possession was never
questioned by the Madrids. Not even a written demand to vacate was issued. Despite being
owners of land covered by TCTs the Madrids were adjudged guilty of laches. All original copies
must be accounted for before secondary evidence may be introduced. The Notary Public who
signed in the Deed of Sale testified that there were five copies made. None among the five were
presented. Although the Dela Cruzs claim that the National Archives does not have among its
copies these documents, this claim was not supported by any certification from the
same office. However, despite the original not having been presented, the respondents failed
to object as to its admissibility. The Notary Public was not even cross-examined. Thus, the
photocopy has become primary evidence. However,
despite its admissibility, it holds no
probative value regarding the sale it was intended to prove. The photocopy which was alleged
to be have been copied from one of the Deeds carbon copies, was unsigned by the parties and
was not even dated. The Notary Public failed to verify the Deed from his own records. Taken
together, these casts serious doubt on the due execution of the Deed of Sale.

34. Dela Rama v. Ledesma

G.R.

No. 28608

Topic: Parol Evidence Rule

Facts: Salvador Dela Rama is one of Inocentes Dela Rama Inc.s incorporators and
Rafael Ledesma is his nephew. The corporation claimed from the Philippine War Commission
war damages and it was paid in two installments. After the first installment was paid, Dela
Rama sold 140 shares that he owns to Ledesma. There was an alleged understanding that De la
Rama reserved to himself his proportionate equity in the war damage benefits due
on his 140 shares which Ledesma promised to deliver to him upon payment by the Foreign
Claim Settlement Commission of the United States. Subsequently, new certificates of stocks

were issued in Ledesmas name. When the 2nd installment was paid to the corporation, Dela
Rama
demanded the return of his shares. Ledesma refused so Dela Rama filed a collection
case against the former. On his answer, Ledesma denied the existence of the
agreement accompanyin
g the sale of shares of stocks. Ledesma raised as defenses
that the indorsement by De la Rama of the Stock Certificate in question without qualification or
condition constituted the sole and exclusive contract between the parties and to allow De la
Rama to
prove any alleged simultaneous oral agreement would run counter to the
Parol
Evidence Rule and the Statute of Frauds. In reply, Dela Rama alleged that the agreement does
not express the true intent of the parties, does the Parol Evidence Rule does not apply. The trial
court did not allow Dela Rama
to introduce parol evidence to prove the existence of the
agreement upon which, the sale of his shares of stocks was conditioned upon.
Issue: Whether Parol Evidence is admissible to prove the existence of an
that accompanies a sale but not put into writing.

alleged agreement

Ruling: No. Dela Rama is not allowed to introduce Parol Evidence to prove
the alleged
agreement accompanying the sale of his shares of stocks to Ledesma. It is a well-accepted
principle of law that evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally
not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument. While
parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written
contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporatin into
the
contract
additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has
been fraud or mistake.
Indeed, the exceptions to the rule do not apply in the instant case,
there being no intrinsic ambiguity or fraud, mistake, or failure to express the true agreement
of the parties. If indeed the alleged reservation had been intended, businessmen like
the parties would have placed in writing such an important reservation.

35. Canuto v. Mariano

37

Phil. 840

Topic: Parol Evidence Rule

Facts: Espiridiona Canuto executed a Deed of Sale of land in favor of Juan Mariano reserving the
right to repurchase within one year from the date of sale. One year lapsed and Canuto failed to
exercise the right to repurchase.
When Mariano claimed absolute ownership over the land
subject of the sale, Canuto alleged that she be given an extension to repurchase. Canuto claims
that Mariano agreed but the latter failed to appear at the place and time agreed upon to receive
the money for the repurchase and for executing the necessary Deed of Repurchase. Canuto
then filed a case to compel Mariano to receive the purchase money and execute the necessary

documents. To prove the alleged oral extension of the period to repurchase, one witness who
was alleged to be present when Mariano agreed to extend the time was presented. The trial
court ruled that Canuto may exercise her right to repurchase. Mariano appealed
asking that parol evidence may not be introduced to prove the alleged extension of time.
Issue: Whether parol evidence may be introduced to prove the alleged extension of time.
Ruling: Yes, considering the circumstances. Refusal by the vendee of a valid tender or offer of
purchase price in the exercise of the vendors right to repurchase preserves the vendors
right to repurchase. The defendant having extended the time within which the plaintiff
could repurchase the land on condition that she would find the money and make repurchase
within the extended period, it is clear that he cannot be permitted to repudiate his promise, it
appearing that the plaintiff stood ready to make the payment within the extended period, and
was only prevented from doing so by the conduct of the defendant himself. The SC citing the
cases of Rosales vs. Reyes and Ordoveza (25 Phil. Rep., 495), ruled that that a bona fide offer or
tender of the price agreed upon for the repurchase is sufficient to preserve the rights of the
party making it,
without the necessity of making judicial deposit, if the offer or tender is
refused. The case of and in the case of Fructo vs. Fuentes (15 Phil. Rep., 362) was further cited
holding that in such cases when diligent effort is made by the vendor of the land to exercise the
right to repurchase reserved by him in his deed of sale "and fails by reason of circumstances
over which he has no control, we are of the opinion and so hold that he does not lose his right
to repurchase on the day of maturity."

36. Lechugas v. Court of Appeals

143

SCRA 335

Topic: Parol Evidence Rule

Facts: Petitioner Victoria Lechugas filed an unlawful entry case against private
respondents Marina Loza, Salvador Loza et al. Another case was filed
for recovery and
possession of the same property and both cases was tried jointly. Petitioner testified that she
bought the land from Leoncia Lasangue in 1950. Private respondents contended that the same
land in question was bought by their father from the father of petitioner in 1941.
Lasangue testified for the Lozas stating that she sold the south part of the land which is lot
5522 not lot 5456 which plaintiff claims.
Issue: Whether the court of appeals erred in considering parol evidence over
petitioner.

the objection of

Ruling: The appellate court acted correctly in upholding the trial courts action in admitting the
testimony of Leoncia. Petitioner alleges that lot 5522 was sold to her by Leonora, not
Leoncia, who was never presented as witness in any proceeding in the lower court. The
parol evidence rule does not apply and may not properly be involved by either party to litigation
against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party
to a written instrument in the question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a
right originating in the instrument
or the relation established thereby.
The rule is not
applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third
persons. Through the testimony of Leoncia, it was shown that what she really intended to

sell is lot 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her
cousin, petitioner, she just placed her thumb mark on a piece of paper.

37. People v. Francisco

78

Phil. 694

Topic: Marital Disqualification Rule

Facts: Juan Francisco, who had been
being held as detention prisoner. He was
family, Francisco allegedly wounded his
wife testified against him, which he later

previously arrested on charges of robbery, was

charged with the crime of parricide. On a visit to his
wife and caused the death of their child. Franciscos
questioned.

Issue: Whether or not testimony of the wife is admissible.

Ruling: Yes. The law states that neither a husband nor wife shall in any case
be a witness
against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against
the other have been. However, as all other general rules, this one has its own
exceptions, both in civil actions between
the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses
committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound
reasons which,
in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For
instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there
is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility of interests disappears and the consequent
danger of perjury based on that identity is
non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the
security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but
ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. As well-settled
as this rule of marital incompetency itself is the other that it may be waived. Objections to the
competency of a husband or wife to testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be
waived as in the case of the other witnesses generally. Thus, the accused waives his or her
privilege by calling the other spouse as a witness for him or her, thereby making the spouse
subject to cross-examination in the usual manner. It is well- established that where
an accused introduces his wife as a witness in his behalf, the state is entitled to question her as
to all matters germane and pertinent to her testimony on direct examination. It is also true that
objection to the spouses competency must be made when he or she is first offered as witness,
and that the incompetency may be waived by the failure of the accused to make timely
objection to the admission of the spouses testimony, although knowing of such
incompetency, and the testimony admitted, especially if the accused has assented to the
admission, either expressly or impliedly. Other courts have held that the witnesss testimony is
not admissible even with the other spouses consent. Clearly, if the statute provides that a
spouse shall in no case testify against the other except in a prosecution for an offense against
the other, the failure of the accused to object does not enable the state to use the spouse as a
witness.

38. Ordono v. Daquigan

2

SCRA 270

Topic: Marital Disqualification Rule

Facts: Avelino Ordoo was charged with rape having raped his daughter, Leonora. In support of
that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoo, the mother of Leonora, executed a sworn statement
wherein she disclosed that on that same date, Leonora had apprised her of the outrage but no
denunciation was filed because Avelino Ordoo threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina if they
reported the crime to the police. Catalina Ordoo in her sworn statement further revealed that
her husband had also raped their other daughter, Rosa. Avelino Ordoo, invoked the marital
disqualification rule found in Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. Counsel claimed that Avelino
Ordoo had not consented expressly or impliedly to his wife's testifying against him. The trial
court overruled the objection.
Issue: Whether or not the marital disqualification applies.
Ruling: No. Should the phrase "in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other" be restricted to crimes committed by one spouse against the other, such as physical
injuries, bigamy, adultery or concubinage,
or
should
it
be
given
a
latitudinarian
interpretation as referrin g to any offense causing marital discord? There is a dictum that
"where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be
preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such
harmony
and tranquility fails. In such a case identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in
such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting
will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy
home. That the rape of the daughter by the father, an undeniably abominable and revolting
crime with
incestuous
implications,
positively
undermines
the
connubial
relationship, is a proposition too obvious to require much elucidation.

39. Tan v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No.

125861

Topic: Parol Evidence Rule

Facts: Tan Kiat averred that he bought a parcel of land from Mr. Tan Keh where he built his
house, but was unable to effect immediate transfer of title in his favor in view of his
foreign nationality at the time of the sale. Nonetheless, as an assurance in good faith
of the sales agreement, Mr. Tan Keh turned over to Tan Kiat the owners duplicate copy of the
TCT and executed a lease contract in favor of private respondent for 40 years.
However, Mr. Tan Keh sold the subject properties to Remigio Tan, his brother
and father of
petitioners, with the understanding that the subject properties
are to be held in trust by
Remigio for the benefit of Tan Kiat and that Remigio would execute the proper documents of
transfer in favor of Tan Kiat
should the latter at anytime demand recovery of the subject
properties.
Another contract of lease was executed by Mr. Tan Keh and Remigio in favor of
private respondent to further safeguard the latters interest on the subject
properties, but
private respondent never paid any rental and no demand whatsoever for the payment thereof
had been made on him. Remigio was killed. At his wake, petitioners were reminded of Tan Kiats
ownership of the subject properties and they promised to transfer the subject properties to Tan
Kiat who by then had already acquired Filipino citizenship by naturalization.

Petitioners, however, never made good their promise to convey the subject properties
despite repeated demands by Tan Kiat.
In
fact, petitioners had the subject properties
fraudulently transferred to their names.
Issue: Whether evidence is admissible.
Ruling: Inadmissible. Petitioners are in possession of a TCT which evidences their ownership of
the subject properties. On the other hand, Tan Kiat relies simply on the allegation that he is
entitled to the properties by virtue of a sale between him and Alejandro Tan Keh who is
now dead. Obviously, private respondent will rely on parol evidence which, under
the circumstances obtaining, cannot be allowed without violatin
g the Dead
Mans Statute found in Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The object and purpose of
the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard of the transaction in
question on the part of the surviving party, and further to put the two parties to a suit upon
terms of equality in regard to the opportunity to giving testimony. If one party to the alleged
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other
party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained
account of the transaction.

40. Gonzales v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 17740
Topic: Best Evidence Rule
Facts: Petitioners Carolina, Dolores and Cesar Gonzales sought the settlement of
the intestate estate of their brother Ricardo Abad. They claimed that they were the
only heirs of the deceased as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leavin
g no legitimate
o
illegitimate
descendants
or
ascendants. As such, Cesar was then appointed as the
administrator of the estate. Sometime later, private respondents Honoraria, Cecilia and Marian
Empaynado filed a motion to set aside the special proceeding. In their motion,
they alleged that Honoraria, the widow of Jose Libunao, had been the
common-law wife of
Ricardo for 27 years and that during the said period their union had produced 2 children:
Cecilia and Marian. Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia and Marians filiation, presented the
joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos stating that to their knowledge Libunao
had died in 1971 and had been interred at the Loyola Memorial Park. With this, petitioners
claimed that Cecilia and Marian Abad, who were born in 1948 and 1954 respectively, are not
then the illegitimate children of Ricardo, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses
Libunao and Empaynado. They likewise submitted the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, Ricardo's
physician, declarin g that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo and found him to
be infected with gonorrhea, and that the latter had become sterile as a
consequence thereof thereby rendering him to incapable of fathering a child.
Issue: Whether or not the pieces of evidence presented and submitted by
admissible.

the petitioners are

Ruling: No. The Court ruled that the joint affidavit as to the supposed death of Libunao was not
competent evidence to prove the latter's death at that time, being merely secondary evidence
thereof. Libunao's death certificate would have been the best evidence as to when the latter

died. The Court ruled further that as to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was inadmissible and the
same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad as being
privileged communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The rule on
confidential communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which
the advice or treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of
physician and patient existed between the person claiming the
privilege or his legal
representative and the physician; c) the advice or treatment given by him or any information
was acquired by the physician while professionally attending the patient; d) the information was
necessary
for the performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the
information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient. On the fifth requisite, Ricardo
Abad's "sterility" arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most
assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact,
given that society holds virility at a premium,
sterility alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted
disease, would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient.

41. People v. Brioso

37

SCRA 336

Topic: Contradicting Evidence

Facts: Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza were found guilty for the murder Silvino Daria. The motive
for the killing appears to have been the disapproval by the spouses Silvino and Susana Daria of
Mariano Taeza's courtship of their daughter, Angelita. Angelita was even sent to Manila for her
to avoid Mariano Taeza. The courtship is admitted by Mariano Taeza. The two
accused
appealed the conviction alledging that the lower court erred in relying on the
uncorroborated and contradictory testimony and statement of the prosecution witness
Cecilia Bernal on the physical identity of the accused.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence is admissible.
Ruling: Yes. There is no discrepancy in the testimony of Cecilia Bernal on the material points.
She stated that she did not see Mariano Taeza carry a gun when both the accused passed by.
But this brief observation does not necessarily mean that he was not actually armed or carrying
a gun on his person. The fact that he did was proved when both the said accused were seen
pointing their respective gun at the victim and each subsequently fired once at him, Taeza using
a short weapon that could have been carried concealed in his person. Cecilia Bernal had no
motive to impute falsely this
heinous charge of murder against the above-said accused,
considering that Mariano Taeza is a nephew of the deceased by a first degree cousin. Even
Juan Brioso specifically said that he knew of no reason why she should testify against him.
Hence, her statement that she came to court only to tell the truth should be believed. The
witness also stated that she was hard of
hearing and could not understand some of the
questions; thus, the alleged inconsistencies in her testimony do not detract from the
"positive and straightforward" identification of the accused as the ones who were seen at the
scene of the crime and who actually shot Silvino Daria. Moreover, the testimony of Cecilia
Bernal finds corroboration in the declaration of the victim, who told his wife that it was
Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot
him.
This
statement
does
satisfy
the
requirements of an ante mortem statement. Judged by the nature and extent of his
wounds, Silvino Daria must have realized the seriousness of his condition, and it can be safely

inferred that he made the same under the consciousness

considering that he died only one hour after being shot.

of

impendin

death,

42. People v. De Gracia

18 SCRA 197
Topic: Dying Declarations
Facts: The Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte charged Alfredo Salva, Narciso de
Gracia, and Raymundo Sorima with the crime of murder for the killing of Ernesto Flores. After
being stabbed by respondents, Flores rushed
away in the direction of his father's house,
shouting for help. Kauswagan Vice-Mayor Nemesio Agawin, who was then reading a
newspaper in his house, was attracted by these shouts. He immediately got his rifle, went
down and followed Flores, finally overtaking him in the back stairs of his father's house, sitting
by the stairs but supported by his two brothers, and with his intestines protruding out of his
abdomen. Upon Agawin's inquiry as
to what happened, Flores spontaneously declared that
Alfredo Salva stabbed him while "Naring" (de Gracia) and "Mundo" Sorima were holding his
arms. Flores died afterwards. Agawin testified in court.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence is admissible.
Ruling: Yes. Accused contends that the testimony of Vice-Mayor Nemesio Agawin regarding
Ernesto Flores' dying declaration had not satisfied the
requirements of an ante mortem
statement since the declarant had not
made
it
under
the
consciousness
of
an
impending death, nor had the statement fulfilled the requirements of res gestae, because
said declaration
was neither natural nor spontaneous, or unreflective and instinctive, but
rather it was made in reply to a question asked from the declarant; and the prosecution not
having specified the purpose for which Agawin's testimony
was offered, the same is
inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. The trial court in admitting the testimony of ViceMayor Agawin regarding Flores' dyin g declaration, wherein he identified accused as
his assailants. It is believed that the circumstances under which the victim made
such identification have fulfilled the requirements of either an ante mortem
statement or as part of the res gestae. Judged by the nature and extent of the injury inflicted
(deep stab wound on the abdomen, causing his intestines o protrude), Flores could not ignore the
seriousness of his condition, and it is safe to infer that the deceased made the
declaration under the consciousness of impending death. The same identification may
also be
considered as part of the res gestae, since it was made immediately after
the
stabbing incident and appears to be natural and spontaneous, and made before the deceased,
who had no enmity toward appellants, could contrive or devise a plan to incriminate
them. There was no necessity for the prosecution to specify the purpose for which it
offered Agawin's testimony, for said purpose was self-evident. Besides, the defense failed to
object on time to its presentation in the trial court. Hence, the trial court correctly admitted
said testimony.

43. People v. Lara

54

Phil. 96

Topic: Dying Declarations

Facts: The deceased, Juan Advincula, was a resident of the barrio of Salitran, in the
municipality of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite. Crispo Lara was charged with his murder. Lara
shot Advincula, who sought help in the house of a neighbor, Felix Ramirez. Advincula found the
family of Ramirez sitting at the table eating their evening meal; and he told them that he had
been shot by the Lara at the same time exhibiting the bloody stain on his left side. Ramirez at
once called the barrio lieutenant, one Ciriaco Reyes; and upon the arrival of the latter,
Advincula repeated his account of the occurrence, adding that he was weak from the pain
resulting from his wound and that he would not survive. The next day the justice of the peace of
the
municipality, one Restituto Paman, took Advincula's affidavit, in which the
declarant
reiterated what he had told the lieutenant, but upon this occasion he said he felt better and he
indicated to the justice of the peace that he thought he would not die of the wound. On the next
day Advincula was taken
to the Philippine General Hospital in the City of Manila where he
remained for
three weeks, at the end of which time he was discharged. In a few days,
however, the bullet, which had never been extracted from the shoulder, begun to make trouble
again, and Advincula was taken back to the hospital, where blood poisoning from the internal
wound soon developed and later on, Advincula died.
Issue: Whether or not the statements of Advincula regarding Lara as
be admitted as dying declarations.

the one who shot him can

Ruling: The statement made to Ciriaco Reyes in the house of Felix Ramirez, was in our opinion
admissible as a dying declaration because when this declaration was made the deceased was
weak, complained of the pain which he was suffering from the wound and stated that he would
not survive. It is true that the deceased lived for nearly six weeks after that statement was
made, and in this interval recovered, to external appearances, almost completely
from the wound. Nevertheless it appears that in the end the deceased died from the same
wound; and the admissibility of the first declaration depends upon the state of
mind of the deceased when the declaration was made, and not upon the length of time
that elapsed between the infliction of the wound and the declarant's death. This statement
supplies ample proof that the accused was the author of Advincula's death. It was not a dying
declaration with regard to the affidavit given to the justice of the peace by the deceased on the
day after the fatal injury was inflicted, for the reason that when that declaration was made the
deceased indicated that he was under the impression that the injury would not be fatal.

44. U.S. v. Dela Cruz

12

Phil. 87

Topic: Dying Declarations

Facts: Timoteo Dizon, together with a band, had just committed robbery in two houses when
they were surprised by Constabulary forces which attacked them, resulting to the wounding of a
member and in the death of Dizon. The accused appellants were convicted of the crime
of robbery in an armed band. The accused appellants were convicted based on the antemortem statements of Dizon, for the purpose of identifying the appellants as members of the
band. The ante-mortem statements admitted by the trial court were an alleged extra- judicial
declaration made by Dizon a few hours before his death, wherein he confessed his guilt of the

robbery and stated that the appellants were members

of the band. The evidence further
discloses that this confession was made to the provincial fiscal and an officer of the
Constabulary, and that, although the appellants were there present, under arrest, charged
with the commission of the crime, and heard the dying man charge them with being members
of the band, they kept silent and did not attempt to deny the charge.
Issue: Whether or not the dying declarations of Dizon is admissible to prove membership of the
accused in the band which committed the robberies.
Ruling: No. The grounds for the admission of evidence of co-conspirators clearly
require that such acts or declarations must have been made during the
progress of the
conspiracy and in pursuance of the ends for which it had been formed, and not after the
transaction had ended; and further, before such evidence can be admitted it must
appear by competent evidence that the conspiracy actually existed and that the
accused were members of the conspiracy. The declaration under consideration was made
after the transaction to which it referred was at an end, was not made in
pursuance of the conspiracy, and was clearly inadmissible for the purpose of proving that the
defendants were co-conspirators with the defendant. It is suggested, however, that while the
statements in question were inadmissible as proof of the truth of their contents, they might
have been received for the purpose of showing that, when they were made in the presence of
the defendants, they made no attempt to deny them, and by their silence admitted their truth.
Though silence may sometimes mean admission of guilt, there must be a proper opportunity to
reply and the surroundings were not such as to render a denial expedient and proper; and the
right of a defendant in all criminal prosecutions "to be exempt from
testifyin g against
himself" clearly prohibits any inference of guilt from the silence of an accused person
who has been arrested and charged with crime. The statements in question were made after
defendants had been arrested, and in the course of an official investigation which was being
conducted by the provincial fiscal, and under these circumstances, proof of the fact
that the statements were made in the presence and hearing of the defendants, and that they
kept silence and failed there and then to deny their truth, could in no event
support the
inference that by thus keeping silence they implicity admitted the truth of the facts alleged by
the declarant.
45. U.S. v. Antipolo
37 Phil. 726
Topic: Dying Declarations, Marital Disqualification Rule
Facts:
Dalmaceo Antipolo was charged with the murder of Fortunato Dinal. The trial court
convicted him of homicide and from that decision he has appealed. One of the errors assigned
is based upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of Dinal, to
testify as a witness on behalf of the defense concerning certain alleged dyin
declarations. The witness was called to the stand and having stated that she is the widow of
Fortunato Dinal was asked: "On what occasion did your husband die?" To this question the fiscal
objected upon the following ground
that she is not competent to testify under the rules of
procedure in either civil or criminal cases, unless it be with the consent of her husband, and as
he is dead and cannot grant that permission, it follows that this witness is disqualified from
testifying in this case in which her husband is the injured party. Counsel for defendant
insisted that the witness was competent, arguin g that the disqualification which
the fiscal evidently had in mind relates only to cases in which a husband or wife of one of

the parties to a proceedin

g is called to testify; that the parties to the prosecution
of a criminal case are the Government and the accused; that, furthermore, the marriage of
Dinal to the witness having been dissolved by the death of her husband, she is no longer
his wife, and therefore not subject to any disqualification arising from the status of
marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the marital disqualification applies to a dying declarations made by
either spouse.
HELD:
No. On grounds of public policy the wife cannot testify against her husband as to
what came to her from him confidentially or by reason of the marriage relation, but this rule
does not apply to a dying communication made by the husband to the wife on the trial of the
one who killed him. The declaration of the deceased made in extremes in such cases is a thing
to be proven, and this proof may be made by any competent witness who heard the statement.
The wife may testify for the state in cases of this character as to any other fact known to her. It
cannot be contended that the dying declaration testified to by the witness was a confidential
communication
made to her; on the contrary, it was evidently made in the furtherance of
justice for the express purpose that it should be testified to in the prosecution of
the defendant. The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in excludin
g
the testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta, and that by reason of such
exclusion, the accused was deprived of one of his essential rights. That bein
the case, a new
trial must be granted.

46. Macasiray v. People

291

SCRA 154

Topic: Waiver to Admissibility of Evidence

Facts:
Petitioners Melecio Macasiray, Virgilio Gonzales and Benedicto
Gonzales were
charged with murder for the death of Johnny Villanueve. In the course of the trial, the
prosecution introduced in evidence the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant
Benedicto Gonzales and the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
investigation wherein he affirmed the contents of his confession. The defense objected thereto
on the ground of inadmissibility for having been executed without assistance of counsel. The
trial court sustained the objection of the defense
which, nonetheless, presented appellant
Gonzales for the sole purpose of denying the contents of the confession and the transcript of
stenographic notes. It did not mark the confession as one of its exhibits. A
rieved by
the ruling of the trial court, the prosecution elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals which

reversed the trial court. It ruled that failure of the defense to

the documents constitutes a waiver of their objection.

move

for

the

exclusion

of

Issue:
Whether or not the failure of the defense to move for the exclusion of
the documents constitutes a waiver of their objection.
Ruling: There is no waiver to admissibility of the documents where objections were
made during the stage of formal offer; that objection to the document durin
g their
identification and markin g is not equivalent to objection during their formal offer; and
that there is no need to impeach appellant where his extrajudicial confession and the
transcript of stenographic notes wherein he admitted liability had been excluded in
evidence.

47. Lopez v. Valdez

32 Phil. 644
Topic: Objection to Admissibility of Evidence
Facts: This is an action begun by Benito Lopez, the administrator of the estate of Marcela
Emradura, deceased, against Tomas Valdez for the recovery of possession of the land.
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant went to the Supreme Court
assigning as error the
procedure adopted by the court when objections were interposed by
counsel for defendant to questions designed to adduce evidence of the contents of written
documents when the destruction or the loss of the documents had
not been properly
established. It appears from the record that Lopez relied
on
certain
written
contracts
entered into between Valdez and Marcela Emradura during her lifetime to prove the
cause of action set out in the complaint. The documents themselves were not produced and
when counsel
for appellee sought to prove by certain witnesses the contents of these
documents, without presenting facts justifyin g secondary evidence with reference
thereto, counsel for appellant made the objection that the evidence was incompetent
and improper as the documents themselves were
the best evidence. A decision on these
objections was thus left in abeyance
and the trial terminated without a resolution of the
questions presented. In spite of that the trial court in its final decision took into consideration
the secondary evidence thus introduced and based its decision thereon.
ISSUE: Was the procedure valid?
RULING: No. A party who offers an objection to a question propounded to a witness testifying on
the trial of a civil action is entitled to a ruling at the time the objection is made, or as soon
thereafter as may be possible; in any event during the trial and as such time as will afford the
party against whom the ruling is made a reasonable opportunity to meet the situation created
by the ruling. It is error for a court to reserve decision on such a question until after the trial
is closed and the case submitted; and if such error is prejudicial, the judgment will
be vacated and the cause returned for a new trial.

48. People v. Singh

45 Phil.

676

Topic: Confession
Facts: Santa Singh, an East Indian, was found dead on the sidewalk in front of his tienda in
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija. There were three knife wounds on the body, one of them necessarily
mortal. Sometime the accused Buda Singh confessed to a friend of his, Ram Singh that he had
killed Santa Singh and related the details of the crime, implicating five other East Indians in its
commission. On a subsequent occasion Ram Singh thought that Buda Singh looked at him
with malos ojos. Suspecting that Buda Singh regretted havin
g made the
confession
and
contemplated
killing him,
Ram
Singh
reported the matter to the
authorities and the present action was instituted
against Buda Singh and his five alleged
companions. On motion of the fiscal
the case was dismissed against all of the defendants
except Buda Singh.
Upon trial, the court below found Buda Singh guilty of homicide. The
counsel of Buda moved that the confession made by Ram Singh be stricken from the record on
the ground that it had not been shown affirmatively by direct evidence that the confession had
been made freely and voluntarily.
Issue: Whether or not the confession made by Buda Singh to Ram Singh is admissible.
Ruling: Yes. There is no merit in this contention. The evidence was clearly admissible. Act No.
619, upon which the argument of counsel is evidently
based, has been repealed by the
Administrative Code and evidence of a
confession may now be received without direct
affirmative evidence that the confession was freely and voluntarily made. (U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil.
308.) The fact
that the court,
in its decision, takes the confession into
consideration must be regarded as a denial of the motion to strike it from the record and if the
defendant desired to introduce further evidence in rebuttal,
the matter should have been
brought to the attention of that court through the appropriate motion.