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G.R.No.164763

TodayisFriday,June26,2015

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
THIRDDIVISION
G.R.No.164763February12,2008
ZENONR.PEREZ,petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINESandSANDIGANBAYAN,respondents.
DECISION
REYES,R.T.,J.:
PETITIONERZenonR.Perezseeksareview1ofhisconvictionbytheSandiganbayan2formalversationofpublic
funds3underArticle217oftheRevisedPenalCode.
ThisisnotabigcasebutitsimplicationsarewiderangingandtheissuesWeresolveincludetherightstospeedy
trial and speedy disposition of a criminal case, the balancing test, due process, and cruel and unusual
punishment.
TheFacts
OnDecember28,1988,anauditteamheadedbyAuditorIArleneR.Mandin,ProvincialAuditorsOffice,Bohol,4
conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was then the acting municipal treasurer of
Tubigon,Bohol.
PetitionerwasabsentonthefirstscheduledauditathisofficeonDecember28,1988.Aradiomessagewassent
to Loon, the town where he resided, to apprise him of the ongoing audit. The following day, the audit team
counted the cash contained in the safe of petitioner in his presence. In the course of the audit, the amount of
P21,331.79wasfoundinthesafeofpetitioner.
TheauditteamembodiedtheirfindingsintheReportofCashExamination,5whichalsocontainedaninventoryof
cashitems.Basedonthesaidaudit,petitionerwassupposedtohaveonhandthetotalamountofP94,116.36,
insteadoftheP21,331.79,incurringashortageofP72,784.57.6
The report also contained the Cash Production Notice7 dated January 4, 1989, where petitioner was informed
and required to produce the amount of P72,784.57, and the cash count sheet signed and acknowledged by
petitionerindicatingthecorrectnessoftheamountofP21,331.79foundinhissafeandcountedinhispresence.A
separate demand letter8 dated January 4, 1989 requiring the production of the missing funds was sent and
receivedbypetitioneronJanuary5,1989.
Whenaskedbytheauditingteamastothelocationofthemissingfunds,petitionerverballyexplainedthatpartof
themoneywasusedtopayfortheloanofhislatebrother,anotherportionwasspentforthefoodofhisfamily,
andtherestforhismedicine.9
Asaresultoftheaudit,ArleneR.Mandinpreparedamemorandum10datedJanuary13,1989addressedtothe
ProvincialAuditorofBoholrecommendingthefilingoftheappropriatecriminalcaseagainstpetitioner.
On January 16, 1989, petitioner remitted to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol the amounts of
P10,000.00 and P15,000.00, respectively. On February 14, 1989, petitioner again remitted to the Provincial
Treasurer an additional amount of P35,000.00, followed by remittances made on February 16, 1989 in the
amountsofP2,000.00andP2,784.00.
AnadministrativecasewasfiledagainstpetitioneronFebruary13,1989.HefiledanAnswer11 dated February
22,1989reiteratinghisearlierverbaladmissionbeforetheauditteam.
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On April 17, 1989, petitioner again remitted the amount of P8,000.00 to the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol.
Petitioner had then fully restituted his shortage in the amount of P72,784.57. The full restitution of the missing
moneywasconfirmedandshownbythefollowingreceipts:12
OfficialReceipt
No.

DateIssuedand
Received

Amount

8266659

January16,1989

P10,000.00

8266660

January16,1989

P15,000.00

8266662

February14,1989

P35,000.00

8266667

February16,1989

P2,000.00

8266668

February16,1989

P2,784.00

8266675

April17,1989

P8,000.00

TOTAL P72,784.57
Later,petitionerwaschargedbeforetheSandiganbayanwithmalversationofpublicfunds,definedandpenalized
byArticle217oftheRevisedPenalCodeinanInformationthatread:
ThatonorabouttheperiodcoveringfromDecember28,1988toJanuary5,1989,andforsometimeprior
thereto, in the Municipality of Tubigon, Province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
HonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccusedZenonR.Perez,apublicofficerbeingthenActingMunicipal
Treasury of the said Municipality, by reason of the duties of his official position was accountable for the
public funds collected and received by him, with grave abuse of confidence did then and there willfully,
unlawfullyandfeloniouslymisappropriate,misapply,embezzleandtakeawayfromthesaidfundsthetotal
amount of SEVENTYTWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTYFOUR PESOS and 57/100
(P72,784.57), which said fund was appropriated and converted by the said accused to his own personal
useandbenefittothedamageandprejudiceofthegovernmentintheaforementionedamount.
CONTRARYTOLAW.13(Underscoringsupplied)
OnMarch1,1990,petitioner,dulyassistedbycounseldeparte,enteredapleaof"notguilty."14
Pretrial was initially set on June 45, 1990 but petitioners counsel moved for postponement. The
Sandiganbayan, however, proceeded to hear the case on June 5, 1990, as previously scheduled, due to the
presenceofprosecutionwitnessArleneR.Mandin,whocameallthewayfromBohol.
On said date, the Sandiganbayan dispensed with pretrial and allowed the prosecution to present its witness.
ArleneR.Mandintestifiedasnarratedabove.
The defense presented evidence through petitioner Zenon R. Perez himself. He denied the contents of his first
Answer15totheadministrativecasefiledagainsthimbytheauditteam.Heclaimeditwaspreparedwithoutthe
assistance of counsel and that at the time of its preparation and submission, he was not in peak mental and
physicalcondition,havingbeenstrickenwithdiabetesmellitus.16
HethenrevokedhisAnswerdatedFebruary22,1989andfiledhissecondAnswerdatedMarch2,1989.17Inthe
latter,hevehementlydeniedthatheincurredacashshortageP72,784.57.
Accordingtopetitioner,theallegedshortagewasinthepossessionandcustodyofhisaccountablepersonnelat
thetimeoftheauditexamination.SeveralamountstotallingP64,784.00wereremittedtohimonseparatedates
byhisaccountableofficer,startingJanuary16,1989toFebruary16,1989.Thesamewereturnedoverbyhimto
the Office of the Provincial Treasurer, leaving an unremitted sum of P8,000.00 as of February 16, 1989.18 He
remittedtheP8,000.00onApril17,1989totheProvincialTreasurerofBohol,fullyrestoringthecashshortage.
Petitioner further testified that on July 30, 1989, he submitted his Position Paper19 before the Office of the
Ombudsman, Cebu City and maintained that the alleged cash shortage was only due to oversight. Petitioner
arguedthatthegovernmentdidnotsufferanydamageorprejudicesincetheallegedcashshortagewasactually
depositedwiththeOfficeoftheProvincialTreasurerasevidencedbyofficialreceipts.20
PetitionercompletedhistestimonyonSeptember20,1990.HerestedhiscaseonOctober20,1990.21
SandiganbayanDisposition
OnSeptember24,2003,theSandiganbayanrenderedajudgmentofconvictionwithafalloreading:
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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ZENON R. PEREZ, GUILTY beyond
reasonabledoubtofthecrimeofMalversationofPublicFundsasdefinedinandpenalizedbyArticle217of
the Revised Penal Code and, there being one mitigating circumstance without any aggravating
circumstancetooffsetthesame,isherebysentencedtosufferanindeterminatepenaltyoffromTEN(10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8)
MONTHS of reclusion temporal as the maximum and to suffer perpetual special disqualification. The
accused Zenon R. Perez is likewise ordered to pay a FINE equal to the total amount of the funds
malversed,whichisSeventyTwoThousandSevenHundredEightyFourPesosandFiftySevenCentavos
(P72,784.57).
SOORDERED.22(Emphasisintheoriginal)
OnJanuary13,2004,petitionerfiledamotionforreconsideration23whichtheprosecutionopposedonJanuary
28,2004.24Petitionerreplied25totheopposition.OnAugust6,2004,petitionersmotionwasdeniedwithfinality.
OnSeptember23,2004,petitionerresortedtotheinstantappeal26raisingthefollowingissues,towit:
I.THEHON.SANDIGANBAYANBYUNDULYANDUNREASONABLYDELAYINGTHEDECISIONOFTHE
CASE FOR OVER THIRTEEN (13) YEARS VIOLATED THE PETITIONERS RIGHT TO SPEEDY
DISPOSITIONOFHISCASEANDDUEPROCESS.
II. THE LAW RELIED UPON IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER AND THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IS
CRUEL AND THEREFORE VIOLATES SECTION 19 OF ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) OF THE
CONSTITUTION.27(Underscoringsupplied)
OurRuling
Beforeaddressingpetitionerstwinassignmentoferrors,Wefirsttackletheproprietyofpetitionersconvictionfor
malversationofpublicfunds.
I.Petitionerwascorrectlyconvictedofmalversation.
Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The acts punished as
malversation are: (1) appropriating public funds or property, (2) taking or misappropriating the same, (3)
consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, permitting any other person to take such public funds or
property,and(4)beingotherwiseguiltyofthemisappropriationormalversationofsuchfundsorproperty.28
Therearefourelementsthatmustconcurinorderthatonemaybefoundguiltyofthecrime.Theyare:
(a)Thattheoffenderbeapublicofficer
(b)Thathehadthecustodyorcontroloffundsorpropertybyreasonofthedutiesofhisoffice
(c)Thatthosefundsorpropertyinvolvedwerepublicfundsorpropertyforwhichheisaccountableand
(d) That he has appropriated, took or misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or
negligence,permittedanotherpersontotakethem.29
Evidently, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. At the time of the commission of the crime
charged,petitionerwasapublicofficer,beingthentheactingmunicipaltreasurerofTubigon,Bohol.Byreasonof
hispublicoffice,hewasaccountableforthepublicfundsunderhiscustodyorcontrol.
Thequestiontheniswhetherornotpetitionerhasappropriated,tookormisappropriated,orconsentedorthrough
abandonmentornegligence,permittedanotherpersontotakesuchfunds.
Weruleintheaffirmative.
Inmalversation,allthatisnecessarytoproveisthatthedefendantreceivedinhispossessionpublicfundsthat
hecouldnotaccountforthemanddidnothavetheminhispossessionandthathecouldnotgiveareasonable
excuseforitsdisappearance.Anaccountablepublicofficermaybeconvictedofmalversationevenifthereisno
directevidenceofmisappropriationandtheonlyevidenceisshortageinhisaccountswhichhehasnotbeenable
toexplainsatisfactorily.30
Verily, an accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of
malversation because the law establishes a presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce
publicfundswhichhavecomeintohishandsondemandbyanofficerdulyauthorizedtoexaminehisaccountsis
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primafaciecaseofconversion.31
Because of the prima facie presumption in Article 217, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to
adequately explain the location of the funds or property under his custody or control in order to rebut the
presumption that he has appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to do so, the
accusedmaybeconvictedunderthesaidprovision.
However,thepresumptionismerelyprimafacieandarebuttableone.Theaccountableofficermayovercomethe
presumptionbyprooftothecontrary.Ifheadducesevidenceshowingthat,infact,hehasnotputsaidfundsor
propertytopersonaluse,thenthatpresumptionisatendandtheprimafaciecaseisdestroyed.32
In the case at bar, petitioner was not able to present any credible evidence to rebut the presumption that he
malversed the missing funds in his custody or control. What is extant in the records is that the prosecution,
throughwitnessArleneR.Mandin,wasabletoprovethatpetitionermalversedthefundsunderhiscustodyand
control.AstestifiedbyMandin:
Atty.Caballero:
Q:WasMr.ZenonPerezactuallyandphysicallypresentduringthetimeofyourcashexamination?
Witness:
A.Yes,Sir.
Q:FromDecember28,toJanuary5,1989?
A:HewaspresentonDecember28,1988andJanuary4and5,1989,Sir.
Q:DidhenotmakeanyverbalexplanationasthereasonwhyhewasshortofaboutP72,000.00,
afteryouconductedthecashcountonJanuary5,1989?
A:Yes,Sir,hedid.
Q:Whatdidhetellyou?
A:Hetoldusthatheusedsomeofthemoneytopayfortheloanofhisbrotherandtheother
portionwasspentforfoodofhisfamilyandtherestforhismedicine.33(Emphasissupplied)
Petitioner gave himself away with his first Answer filed at the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol in the
administrativecasefiledagainsthim.
InthatAnswer,petitionernarratedhowhedisposedofthemissingfundsunderhiscustodyandcontrol,towit:(1)
about P30,000.00 was used to pay the commercial loan of his late brother (2) he spent P10,000.00 for the
treatment of his toxic goiter and (3) about P32,000.00 was spent for food and clothing of his family, and the
educationofhischildren.Hetherestated:
1. That the circumstances surrounding the cash shortage in the total amount of P72,784.57 during the
examinationoftherespondentscashaccountsbytheCommissiononAuditonDecember2829,1988and
January45,1989areasfollows,towit:
(a) That respondent paid the amount of about P30,000.00 to the Philippine National Bank,
Tagbilaran Branch as interests of the commercial loan of his late brother Carino R. Perez
using respondents house and lot as collateral thereof. If the interests would not be paid, the loan
would be foreclosed to respondents great prejudice and disadvantage considering that he and his
familyareresidinginsaidhouseusedascollateral
(b)ThatrespondentspenttheamountofP10,000.00inconnectionwiththetreatmentofhis
toxicgoiter
(c) That the rest of the amount amounting to about P32,000.00 was spent by him for his
familysfoods,clothings(sic),andeducationofhischildrenbecausehismonthlysalaryisnot
enoughfortheneedsofhisfamily.34
Bytheexplicitadmissionofpetitioner,coupledwiththetestimonyofArleneR.Mandin,thefourthelementofthe
crimeofmalversationwasdulyestablished.Hisconvictionthusstandsinterrafirma.
True it is that petitioner filed another Answer on March 2, 1989 with the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of
Bohol, substantially changing the contents of his earlier answer of February 22, 1989. His second Answer
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averred:
3. That the truth of the matter is that the alleged total cash shortage of P72,784.57 were still in the
possessionandcustodyofhisaccountablepersonnelatthetimeoftheexaminationheldbytheauditorof
theCommissiononAudit
4.ThatoutoftheallegedcashshortageofP72,784.57,almostallofsaidamountwerealreadyremittedto
him by his accountable personnel after January 5, 1989, and only the remaining amount of P8,000.00
remainstoberemittedtohimbyhisaccountablepersonnel.35
The sudden turnaround of petitioner fails to convince Us. To Our mind, petitioner only changed his story to
exoneratehimself,afterrealizingthathisfirstAnswerputhiminahole,sotospeak.
It is contended that petitioners first Answer of February 22, 1989 should not have been given probative weight
becauseitwasexecutedwithouttheassistanceofcounsel.36
There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee should be assisted by counsel in an
administrative case. On the contrary, jurisprudence is in unison in saying that assistance of counsel is not
indispensableinadministrativeproceedings.
Walang batas, hurisprudensiya, o tuntunin na nagsasabi na ang isang kawani ay dapat may tulong ng
abogado sa isang kasong administratibo. Sa katunayan, ang hurisprudensiya ay iisa ang sinasabi na
angpagtulongngisangabogadoayhindikailangangkailangansakasongadministratibo.
Therighttocounsel,whichcannotbewaivedunlessthewaiverisinwritingandinthepresenceofcounsel,isa
rightaffordedasuspectoraccusedduringcustodialinvestigation.Itisnotanabsoluterightandmaybeinvoked
orrejectedinacriminalproceedingand,withmorereason,inanadministrativeinquiry.37
Angkarapatangmagkaroonngabogado,nahindimaaaringtalikdanmalibangangwaiveraynakasulatat
saharapngabogado,aykarapatangibinibigaysasuspekonasasakdalsaisangcustodialinvestigation.
Itoayhindilubosnakarapatanatmaaringhinginotanggihansaisangprosesongkriminal,atlalonasa
isangadministratibongpagsisiyasat.
Whileinvestigationsconductedbyanadministrativebodymayattimesbeakintoacriminalproceeding,thefact
remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespectiveofthenatureofthechargesandofrespondentscapacitytorepresenthimself,andnodutyrestson
suchbodytofurnishthepersonbeinginvestigatedwithcounsel.38
Thus,therighttocounselisnotimperativeinadministrativeinvestigationsbecausesuchinquiriesareconducted
merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and
employees,withthepurposeofmaintainingthedignityofgovernmentservice.39
Kung gayon, ang karapatang magkaroon ng abogado ay hindi sapilitan sa isang administratibong
imbestigasyon sapagkat ito ay ginagawa lamang upang malaman kung may sapat na batayan na
patawan ng disiplina ang nagkasalang opisyal o empleyado, para mapanatili ang dignidad ng
paglilingkodsapamahalaan.
There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a nonlitigation proceeding is entitled to be
representedbycounselandthat,withoutsuchrepresentation,heshallnotbeboundbysuchproceedings.The
assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due
processclausesuchthatwithouttheparticipationofitsmembers,thesafeguardisdeemedignoredorviolated.
Theordinarycitizenisnotthathelplessthathecannotvalidlyactatallexceptonlywithalawyerathisside.40
More than that, petitioners first Answer may be taken against him, as he executed it in the course of the
administrativeproceedingsbelow.ThisispursuanttoRule130,Section26oftheRulesofCourtwhichprovides
that the "act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given against him." In People v.
Lising,41theCourtheld:
Extrajudicial statements are as a rule, admissible as against their respective declarants, pursuant to the
rulethattheact,declarationoromissionofapartyastoarelevantfactmaybegivenagainsthim.Thisis
baseduponthepresumptionthatnomanwoulddeclareanythingagainsthimself,unlesssuchdeclarations
were true. A mans act, conduct and declarations wherever made, provided they be voluntary, are
admissibleagainsthim,forthereasonthatitisfairtopresumethattheycorrespondwiththetruthanditis
hisfaultiftheyarenot.
ThereisalsonomeritinthecontentionthatpetitionerssicknessaffectedthepreparationofhisfirstAnswer.He
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presentednoconvincingevidencethathisdiseaseatthetimeheformulatedthatanswerdiminishedhiscapacity
to formulate a true, clear and coherent response to any query. In fact, its contents merely reiterated his verbal
explanationtotheauditingteamonJanuary5,1989onhowhedisposedofthemissingfunds.
II.Thereisnoviolationoftherightstoaspeedydispositionofthecaseandtodueprocessoflaw.
Wenowdiscusstherighttoaspeedytrialanddisposition,thebalancingtest,dueprocess,andcruelandunusual
punishment.
Petitionerassertsthathisrighttodueprocessoflawandtospeedydispositionofhiscasewasviolatedbecause
thedecisionoftheSandiganbayanwashandeddownafterthelapseofmorethantwelveyears.Theyearsthat
hehadtowaitfortheoutcomeofhiscasewereallegedlyspentinlimbo,painandagony.42
Wearenotpersuaded.
Dueprocessoflawasappliedtojudicialproceedingshasbeeninterpretedtomean"alawwhichhearsbeforeit
condemns, which proceeds on inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial."43 Petitioner cannot complain that
hisrighttodueprocesshasbeenviolated.Hewasgivenallthechancesintheworldtopresenthiscase,andthe
Sandiganbayanrendereditsdecisiononlyafterconsideringallthepiecesofevidencepresentedbeforeit.
Petitionersclaimofviolationofhisrighttoaspeedydispositionofhiscasemustalsofail.
The1987Constitution44guaranteestherightofanaccusedtospeedytrial.Boththe1973ConstitutioninSection
16ofArticleIVandthe1987ConstitutioninSection16ofArticleIII,BillofRights,arealsoexplicitingrantingto
theaccusedtherighttospeedydispositionofhiscase.45
In Barker v. Wingo,46 the United States Supreme Court was confronted for the first time with two "rigid
approaches"onspeedytrialas"waysofeliminatingsomeoftheuncertaintywhichcourtsexperienceprotecting
theright."47
The first approach is the "fixedtime period" which holds the view that "the Constitution requires a criminal
defendant to be offered a trial within a specified time period."48 The second approach is the "demandwaiver
rule"whichprovidesthat"adefendantwaivesanyconsiderationofhisrighttospeedytrialforanyperiodpriorto
which he has not demanded trial. Under this rigid approach, a prior demand is a necessary condition to the
considerationofthespeedytrialright."49
Thefixedtimeperiodwasrejectedbecausethereis"noconstitutionalbasisforholdingthatthespeedytrialcan
bequantifiedintoaspecificnumberofdaysormonths."50Thedemandwaiverrulewaslikewiserejectedbecause
asidefromthefactthatitis"inconsistentwiththisCourtspronouncementsonwaiverofconstitutionalrights,"51"it
isinsensitivetoarightwhichwehavedeemedfundamental."52
TheCourtwentontoadoptamiddleground:the"balancingtest,"inwhich"theconductofboththeprosecution
anddefendantareweighed."53Mr.JusticePowell,ponente,explainedtheconcept,thus:
A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an adhoc basis.
Wecandolittlemorethanidentifysomeofthefactorswhichcourtsshouldassessindeterminingwhethera
particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might express them in different
ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendants
assertionofhisright,andprejudicetothedefendant.
The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is
presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.
Nevertheless,becauseoftheimprecisionoftherighttospeedytrial,thelengthofdelaythatwill
provokesuchaninquiryisnecessarilydependentuponthepeculiarcircumstancesofthecase.To
takebutoneexample,thedelaythatcanbetoleratedforanordinarystreetcrimeisconsiderablylessthan
foraserious,complexconspiracycharge.
Closelyrelatedtolengthofdelayisthereasonthegovernmentassignstojustifythedelay.Here,
too,differentweightsshouldbeassignedtodifferentreasons.Adeliberateattempttodelaythetrialinorder
tohamperthedefenseshouldbeweightedheavilyagainstthegovernment.Amoreneutralreasonsuchas
negligenceorovercrowdedcourtsshouldbeweightedlessheavilybutneverthelessshouldbeconsidered
sincetheultimateresponsibilityforsuchcircumstancesmustrestwiththegovernmentratherthanwiththe
defendant.Finally,avalidreason,suchasamissingwitness,shouldservetojustifyappropriatedelay.We
havealreadydiscussedthethirdfactor,thedefendantsresponsibilitytoasserthisright.Whether
and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other factors we have mentioned. The
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strengthofhiseffortswillbeaffectedbythelengthofthedelay,tosomeextentbythereasonfor
thedelay,andmostparticularlybythepersonalprejudice,whichisnotalwaysreadilyidentifiable,
that he experiences. The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain. The
defendants assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining
whetherthedefendantisbeingdeprivedoftheright.Weemphasizethatfailuretoasserttherightwill
makeitdifficultforadefendanttoprovethathewasdeniedaspeedytrial.
Afourthfactorisprejudicetothedefendant.Prejudice,ofcourse,shouldbeassessedinthelight
oftheinterestsofdefendantswhichthespeedytrialrightwasdesignedtoprotect.ThisCourthas
identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration (ii) to minimize
anxiety and concern of the accused and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
impaired.Ofthese,themostseriousisthelast,becausetheinabilityofadefendantadequatelytoprepare
hiscaseskewsthefairnessoftheentiresystem.Ifwitnessesdieordisappearduringadelay,theprejudice
isobvious.Thereisalsoprejudiceifdefensewitnessesareunabletorecallaccuratelyeventsofthedistant
past.Lossofmemory,however,isnotalwaysreflectedintherecordbecausewhathasbeenforgottencan
rarelybeshown.54(Emphasissupplied)
Philippinejurisprudencehas,onseveraloccasions,adoptedthebalancingtest.
In1991,inGonzalesv.Sandiganbayan,55thisCourtruled:
Itmustbehereemphasizedthattherighttoaspeedydispositionofacase,liketherighttospeedytrial,is
deemedviolatedonlywhentheproceedingisattendedbyvexatious,capricious,andoppressivedelaysor
whenunjustifiedpostponementsofthetrialareaskedforandsecured,orwhenwithoutcauseorjustifiable
motivealongperiodoftimeisallowedtoelapsewithoutthepartyhavinghiscasetried.Equallyapplicable
isthebalancingtestusedtodeterminewhetheradefendanthasbeendeniedhisrighttoaspeedytrial,or
a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendants
assertion or nonassertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are
considered.(Underscoringsupplied)
Subsequently, in Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan,56 this Court again enumerated the factors that should be
consideredandbalanced,namely:(1)lengthofdelay(2)reasonsforthedelay(3)assertionorfailuretoassert
suchrightbytheaccusedand(4)prejudicecausedbythedelay.57
Once more, in MendozaOng v. Sandiganbayan,58 this Court reiterated that the right to speedy disposition of
cases,liketherighttospeedytrial,isviolatedonlywhentheproceedingsareattendedbyvexatious,capricious
andoppressivedelays.59Inthedeterminationofwhethersaidrighthasbeenviolated,particularregardmustbe
taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.60 The conduct of both the prosecution and
defendant, the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by
accused,andtheprejudicecausedbythedelayarethefactorstoconsiderandbalance.61
Moreover,thedeterminationofwhetherthedelaysareofsaidnatureisrelativeandcannotbebasedonamere
mathematicalreckoningoftime.62
Measuredbytheforegoingyardstick,Werulethatpetitionerwasnotdeprivedofhisrighttoaspeedydisposition
ofhiscase.
Moreimportantthantheabsenceofseriousprejudice,petitionerhimselfdidnotwantaspeedydispositionofhis
case.63 Petitioner was duly represented by counsel de parte in all stages of the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan. From the moment his case was deemed submitted for decision up to the time he was found
guilty by the Sandiganbayan, however, petitioner has not filed a single motion or manifestation which could be
construedevenremotelyasanindicationthathewantedhiscasetobedispatchedwithoutdelay.
Petitioner has clearly slept on his right. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those
twelveyears,petitionerhadshownsignsofassertinghisrighttoaspeedydispositionofhiscaseoratleastmade
someovertacts,likefilingamotionforearlyresolution,toshowthathewasnotwaivingthatright.64
Currittempuscontradecidesetsuijuriscontempores:Timerunsagainsttheslothfulandthosewhoneglecttheir
rights. Ang panahon ay hindi panig sa mga tamad at pabaya sa kanilang karapatan. Vigilantis sed non
dormientibusjurainresubveniunt.Thelawaidsthevigilantandnotthosewhoslumberintheirrights.Angbatas
aytumutulongsamgamapagbantayathindisamgahumihimbingsakanilangkarapatan.
Pending his conviction by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner may have truly lived in suspicion and anxiety for over
twelveyears.However,anyprejudicethatmayhavebeencausedtohiminallthoseyearswasonlyminimal.The
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supposedgravityofagonyexperiencedbypetitionerismoreimaginedthanreal.
ThiscaseisanalogoustoGuerrerov.CourtofAppeals.65 There, the Court ruled that there was no violation of
petitionersrighttospeedytrialanddispositionofhiscaseinasmuchashefailedseasonablytoasserthisrights:
Inthepresentcase,thereisnoquestionthatpetitionerraisedtheviolationagainsthisownrighttospeedy
disposition only when the respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he
would have just continued to sleep on his right a situation amounting to laches had the respondent
judgenottakentheinitiativeofdeterminingthenoncompletionoftherecordsandoforderingtheremedy
preciselysohecoulddisposeofthecase.Themattercouldhavetakenadifferentdimensionifduringall
those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989 when the case was re
raffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his right which was granted him in 1987 when the new
Constitutiontookeffect,oratleastmadesomeovertact(likeamotionforearlydispositionoramotionto
compel the stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence
wouldhavetobeinterpretedasawaiverofsuchright.
While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial,
and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays
not attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a partys individual rights should not
work against and preclude the peoples equally important right to public justice. In the instant case, three
people died as a result of the crash of the airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the
delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused but the people as well. Since the
accused has completely failed to assert his right seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge was
notinapositiontodisposeofthecaseonthemeritsduetotheabsenceoffactualbasis,weholditproper
andequitabletogivethepartiesfairopportunitytoobtain(andthecourttodispense)substantialjusticein
thepremises.
III.Thelawrelieduponinconvictingpetitionerisnotcruelandunusual.ItdoesnotviolateSection19,
ArticleIIIoftheBillofRights.
What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly defined.66 The Eighth Amendment of the
UnitedStatesConstitution,67thesourceofSection19,ArticleIIIoftheBillofRights68ofourownConstitution,has
yettobeputtothetesttofinallydeterminewhatconstitutescruelandinhumanpunishment.69
Casesthathavebeendecideddescribed,ratherthandefined,whatismeantbycruelandunusualpunishment.
ThisisexplainedbythepronouncementoftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtthat"[t]heclauseoftheConstitution,
in the opinion of the learned commentators, may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete,
butmayacquiremeaningaspublicopinionbecomesenlightenedbyahumanejustice."70
In Wilkerson v. Utah,71 Mr. Justice Clifford of the United States Supreme Court opined that "[d]ifficulty would
attendtheefforttodefinewithexactnesstheextentoftheconstitutionalprovisionwhichprovidesthatcrueland
unusualpunishmentsshallnotbeinflictedbutitissafetoaffirmthatpunishmentsoftorture,xxxandallothers
inthesamelineofunnecessarycruelty,areforbiddenbythatamendmenttotheconstitution."72
InInRe:Kemmler,73Mr.ChiefJusticeFullerofthatsameCourtstatedthat"[p]unishmentsarecruelwhenthey
involvetortureoralingeringdeathbutthepunishmentofdeathisnotcruelwithinthemeaningofthatwordas
usedintheconstitution.Itimpliesxxxsomethingmoreinhumanandbarbarous,somethingmorethanthemere
extinguishmentoflife."74
Again, in Weems v. U.S.,75 Mr. Justice McKenna held for the Court that cadena temporal and its accessory
penalties"hasnofellowinAmericanlegislation.Letusrememberthatithascometousfromagovernmentofa
different form and genus from ours. It is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and
follows imprisonment. It is unusual in character. Its punishments come under the condemnation of the Bill of
Rights, both on account of their degree and kind. And they would have those bad attributes even if they were
foundinaFederalenactment,andnottakenfromanaliensource."
InEchegaray v. Executive Secretary,76 this Court in a percuriam Decision held that Republic Act No. 8177,77
even if it does not provide in particular the details involved in the execution by lethal injection, is not cruel,
degrading or inhuman, and is thus constitutional. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in
carrying out the execution of the death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against
cruel,degradingorinhumanpunishment.78
The Court adopted the American view that what is cruel and unusual is not fastened to the obsolete but may
acquiremeaningaspublicopinionbecomesenlightenedbyhumanejusticeandmustdrawitsmeaningfromthe
evolvingstandardsofdecencythatmarktheprogressofamaturingsociety.79
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Inhislastditchefforttoexculpatehimself,petitionerarguesthatthepenaltymetedforthecrimeofmalversation
ofpublicfunds"thatha[ve]beenreplenished,remittedand/orreturned"tothegovernmentiscruelandtherefore
unconstitutional,"asgovernmenthasnotsufferedanydamage."80
Theargumentisspeciousontwogrounds.
First.Whatispunishedbythecrimeofmalversationistheactofapublicofficerwho,byreasonofthedutiesof
hisoffice,isaccountableforpublicfundsorproperty,shallappropriatethesame,orshalltakeandmisappropriate
orshallconsent,orthroughabandonmentornegligenceshallpermitanyotherpersontotakesuchpublicfunds
orproperty,whollyorpartially,orshallotherwisebeguiltyofthemisappropriationormalversationofsuchfunds
orproperty.81
Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation it may only be considered as a
mitigatingcircumstance.Thisisbecausedamageisnotanelementofmalversation.
Second.Thereisstrongpresumptionofconstitutionalityaccordedtostatutes.
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than in
violationof,theConstitution.82Thepresumptionisthatthelegislatureintendedtoenactavalid,sensibleandjust
lawandonewhichoperatesnofurtherthanmaybenecessarytoeffectuatethespecificpurposeofthelaw.83Itis
presumedthatthelegislaturehasactedwithinitsconstitutionalpowers.So,itisthegenerallyacceptedrulethat
everystatute,orregularlyacceptedact,is,orwillbe,orshouldbe,presumedtobevalidandconstitutional.84
He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onusprobandi to show why such law is repugnant to the
Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or
inhuman,likethestanceofpetitioner,mustfail.
IV.Onthepenalty
The Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prisionmayor,asminimum,tofourteen(14)yearsandeight(8)monthsofreclusiontemporal, as maximum. In
imposingthepenalty,itfoundthatpetitionerwasentitledtothemitigatingcircumstanceofpaymentwhichisakin
tovoluntarysurrender.
Article217penalizesmalversationinthefollowingtenor:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property. Presumption of malversation. Any public officer
who,byreasonofthedutiesofhisoffice,isaccountableforpublicfundsorproperty,shallappropriatethe
same, or shall take and misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence shall
permitanyotherpersontotakesuchpublicfundsorproperty,whollyorpartially,orshallotherwisebeguilty
ofthemisappropriationormalversationofsuchfundsorproperty.
xxxx
4.Thepenaltyofreclusiontemporalinitsmediumandmaximumperiods,iftheamountinvolvedis
morethan12,000butislessthan22,000pesos.Iftheamountexceedsthelatter,thepenaltyshall
bereclusiontemporalinitsmaximumperiodtoreclusionperpetua.
Inallcases,personsguiltyofmalversationshallalsosufferthepenaltyofperpetualspecialdisqualification
and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property
embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeableupondemandbyanydulyauthorizedofficer,shallbeprimafacieevidencethathehasputsuch
missingfundsorpropertytopersonaluses.(Underscoringsupplied)
TheamountmalversedtotalledP72,784.57.Theprescribedpenaltyisreclusiontemporalinitsmaximumperiod
toreclusionperpetua,whichhasarangeofseventeen(17)years,four(4)monthsandone(1)daytoforty(40)
years.
However,thecommissionofthecrimewasattendedbythemitigatingcircumstanceakintovoluntarysurrender.
As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner restituted the full amount even before the prosecution
couldpresentitsevidence.Thatisbornebytherecords.
Itbearsstressingthatthefullrestitutionoftheamountmalversedwillnotinanywayexonerateanaccused,as
payment is not one of the elements of extinction of criminal liability. Under the law, the refund of the sum
misappropriated,evenbeforethecommencementofthecriminalprosecution,doesnotexempttheguiltyperson
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from liability for the crime.85 At most, then, payment of the amount malversed will only serve as a mitigating
circumstance86akintovoluntarysurrender,asprovidedforinparagraph7ofArticle1387inrelationtoparagraph
1088ofthesameArticleoftheRevisedPenalCode.
ButtheCourtalsoholdsthatasidefromvoluntarysurrender,petitionerisentitledtothemitigatingcircumstanceof
nointentiontocommitsograveawrong,89againinrelationtoparagraph10ofArticle13.90
Therecordsbearoutthatpetitionermisappropriatedthemissingfundsunderhiscustodyandcontrolbecausehe
was impelled by the genuine love for his brother and his family. Per his admission, petitioner used part of the
fundstopayoffadebtowedbyhisbrother.Anotherportionofthemisappropriatedfundswenttohismedications
forhisdebilitatingdiabetes.
Further,asshownearlier,petitionerrestitutedallbutEightThousandPesos(P8,000.00)ofthefundsinlessthan
onemonthandahalfandsaidsmallbalanceinthree(3)monthsfromreceiptofdemandofCOAonJanuary5,
1999.Evidently,therewasnointentiontocommitsograveawrong.
Ofcourse,theenddoesnotjustifythemeans.Tocondonewhatpetitionerhasdonebecauseofthenobilityofhis
purposeorfinancialemergencieswillbecomeapotentexcuseformalefactorsandopenthefloodgatesformore
corruptioninthegovernment,evenfrom"smallfry"likehim.
The bottom line is a guilty person deserves the penalty given the attendant circumstances and commensurate
withthegravityoftheoffensecommitted.Thus,areductionintheimposablepenaltybyonedegreeisinorder.
Article64oftheRevisedPenalCodeisexplicit:
Art.64.Rulesfortheapplicationofpenaltieswhichcontainthreeperiods.Incasesinwhichthepenalties
prescribed by law contains three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three
differencepenalties,eachoneofwhichformsaperiodinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofArticles76and
77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty, the following rules, according to whether
therearenomitigatingoraggravatingcircumstances:
xxxx
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are
present,thecourtshallimposethepenaltynextlowertothatprescribedbylaw,intheperiodthatit
may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances. (Underscoring
supplied)
Consideringthattherearetwomitigatingcircumstances,theprescribedpenaltyisreducedtoprisionmayorinits
maximumperiodtoreclusiontemporalinitsmediumperiod,tobeimposedinanyofitsperiods.Thenewpenalty
has a range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law,91 the maximum term could be ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
maximum,whiletheminimumtermisagainonedegreelower92andcouldbefour(4)years,two(2)monthsand
one(1)dayofprisioncorreccionalmaximum.
In the 1910 case of U.S. v. Reyes,93 the trial judge entered a judgment of conviction against the accused and
metedtohimthepenaltyof"threeyearsimprisonment,topayafineofP1,500.00,andincaseofinsolvencyto
suffer subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one day for every P2.50 that he failed to pay, which subsidiary
imprisonment,however,shouldnotexceedonethirdoftheprincipalpenalty"andtobe"perpetuallydisqualified
forpublicofficeandtopaythecosts."ThiswaswellwithintheimposablepenaltythenunderSection1ofActNo.
1740,94whichis"imprisonmentfornotlessthantwomonthsnormorethantenyearsand,inthediscretionofthe
court,byafineofnotmorethantheamountofsuchfundsandthevalueofsuchproperty."
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the accuseds conviction was affirmed but his sentence was modified and
reducedtosixmonths.Thecourt,perMr.JusticeTorres,reasonedthus:
For the foregoing reasons the several unfounded errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have
beenfullyrefuted,sinceinconclusionitisfullyshownthattheaccusedunlawfullydisposedofaportionof
themunicipalfunds,puttingthesametohisownuse,andtothatofotherpersonsinviolationofAct.No.
1740, and consequently he has incurred the penalty therein established as principal of the crime of
misappropriationand even though in imposing it, it is not necessary to adhere to the rules of the Penal
Code, the court in using its discretional powers as authorized by law, believes that the circumstances
present in the commission of crimes should be taken into consideration, and in the present case the
amountmisappropriatedwasrefundedatthetimethefundswerecounted.95(Underscoringsupplied)
Weopttoexerciseananalogousdiscretion.
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WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 24, 2003 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONthatpetitionerisherebysentencedtosuffertheindeterminatepenaltyoffour(4)years,two(2)
months and one (1) day of prisioncorreccional, as minimum term, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum term, with perpetual special disqualification. He is likewise ORDERED to pay a fine of
P72,784.57,theamountequaltothefundsmalversed.
Costsagainstpetitioner.
SOORDERED.
RUBENT.REYES
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:
CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson
MA.ALICIAAUSTRIAMARTINEZ
AssociateJustice

*RENATOC.CORONA

AssociateJustice

ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURA
AssociateJustice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.
CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitutionandtheDivisionChairpersonsAttestation,Icertifythatthe
conclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriterof
theopinionoftheCourtsDivision.
REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

Footnotes
*ViceAssociateJusticeMinitaV.ChicoNazario.JusticeNazarioisonofficialleaveperSpecialOrderNo.

484datedJanuary11,2008.
1UnderRule45oftheRulesofCourtperA.M.No.00503SC.
2PennedbyAssociateJusticeDiosdadoM.Peralta,withAssociateJusticesTeresitaLeonardoDeCastro

(nowamemberofthisCourt)andFranciscoH.Villaruz,Jr.,concurringrollo,pp.2538.
3CriminalCaseNo.14230.
4PursuanttoOfficeOrderNo.8855datedDecember22,1988issuedbyProvincialAuditorFaustoP.De

LaSerna.(Annex"B")
5Exhibit"C."
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6Exhibit"E."
7Exhibit"D."
8Exhibit"F."
9TSN,June25,1990,p.25.
10Exhibit"E."
11Exhibit"G."
12Exhibits"H"&"H1"to"H5."
13Rollo,pp.2526.
14Id.at26.
15Exhibit"G."
16Exhibits"1"to"3."
17Exhibit"5B."
18Exhibit"5."
19Exhibit"7."
20Exhibits"7a"to"7f."
21Rollo,p.26.
22Id.at37.
23Id.at3944.
24Id.at4548.
25Id.at4952.
26Id.at1124.
27Id.at17.
28Reyes,L.B.,TheRevisedPenalCode(BookII),15thed.,rev.2001,pp.393394.
29Id.at394.SeealsoNizurtadov.Sandiganbayan,G.R.No.107838,December7,1994,239SCRA33,

42Peanueva,Jr.v.Sandiganbayan,G.R.Nos.9800002,June30,1993,224SCRA86,92.
30DeGuzmanv.People,G.R.No.L54288,December15,1982,119SCRA337,347(emphasisours),

citingAquino,TheRevisedPenalCode,Vol.II,1976ed.,citingPeoplev.Mingoa,92Phil.856(1953)U.S.
v.Javier,6Phil.334(1906)U.S.v.Melencio,4Phil.331(1905).SeealsoQuizov.Sandiganbayan,G.R.
No.L77120,April6,1987,149SCRA108.
31Quizov.Sandiganbayan,supraat113,citingU.S.v.Catolico,18Phil.504(1911).
32Id.
33TSN,June5,1990,p.25.
34Exhibit"G."
35Exhibit"5."
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36TSN,September20,1990,pp.3739.
37Lumiquedv.Exevea,G.R.No.117565,November18,1997,282SCRA125,138139.
38Id.at140,citingBancroftv.BoardofGovernorsofRegisteredDentistsofOklahoma,210P.2d666

(1949).
39Id.at141.
40Nerav.TheAuditorGeneral,G.R.No.L24957,August3,1988,164SCRA1.
41G.R.Nos.10621011,January30,1998,285SCRA595,624,citingVicente,F.,Evidence,1990ed.,p.

305.
42Rollo,p.19.Petitionerclaimsthathehadtowaitformorethanthirteen(13)years.However,thisis

erroneous.TherecordswouldshowthatherestedhiscaseonOctober20,1990,whiletheSandiganbayan
handeddownitsquestionedDecisiononSeptember24,2003,orafterthelapseoftwelve(12)yearsand
eleven(11)months.
4316CC.J.S.ConstitutionalLaw,Sec.946.
44BillofRightsoftheConstitution(1987),Art.III,Sec.14provides:

(1)Nopersonshallbeheardtoanswerforacriminaloffensewithoutdueprocessoflaw.
(2)Inallcriminalprosecutions,theaccusedshallbepresumedinnocentuntilthecontraryisproved,
andshallenjoytherighttobeheardbyhimselfandcounsel,tobeinformedofthenatureandcause
oftheaccusationagainsthim,tohaveaspeedy,impartial,andpublictrial,tomeetthewitness
facetoface,andtohavecompulsoryprocesstosecuretheattendanceofwitnessesandthe
productionofevidenceinhisbehalf.However,afterarraignment,trialmayproceednotwithstanding
theabsenceoftheaccusedprovidedthathehasbeendulynotifiedandhisfailuretoappearis
unjustifiable.(Emphasissupplied)
45"Allpersonsshallhavetherighttoaspeedydispositionoftheircasesbeforealljudicial,quasijudicial,or

administrativebodies."
46407US514,33L.Ed.2d101,92S.Ct.2182(1972).
47Barkerv.Wingo,id.at112.
48Id.
49Id.at114.
50Id.at113.
51Id.at114.
52Id.at116.
53Id.
54Id.at116118.
55G.R.No.94750,July16,1991,199SCRA298,307.
56G.R.No.144542,June29,2001,360SCRA478.
57DelaPeav.Sandiganbayan,id.at485,citingBlancov.Sandiganbayan,G.R.Nos.13675758,

November272000,346SCRA108Dansalv.Fernandez,Sr.,G.R.No.126814,March2,2000,327SCRA
145,153Alvizov.Sandiganbayan,G.R.No.101689,March17,1993,220SCRA55,63.
58G.R.Nos.14636869,October18,2004,440SCRA423,425426.

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59MendozaOngv.Sandiganbayan,id.,citingDimayacyacv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.136264,May28,

2004,430SCRA121.
60Id.,citingRodriguezv.Sandiganbayan,G.R.No.141710,March3,2004,424SCRA236.
61Id.,citingTyDazov.Sandiganbayan,G.R.Nos.14388586,January21,2002,374SCRA200,203.
62Id.,citingBinayv.Sandiganbayan,G.R.Nos.12068183&128136,October1,1999,316SCRA65.
63SeeBarkerv.Wingo,supranote46.
64SeeDelaPeav.Sandiganbayan,supranote56,at488.
65G.R.No.107211,June28,1996,257SCRA703,715716.
66Weemsv.U.S.,217US349,30S.Ct.544,54L.Ed.793,19Am.Ann.Cas.705(1910).
67TheEighthAmendmentoftheUnitedStatesConstitutionprovides:

Excessivebailshallnotberequired,norexcessivefinesimposed,norcruelandunusual
punishmentsinflicted.(Emphasissupplied)
68BillofRightsoftheConstitution(1987),Art.III,Sec.19provides:

Sec.19.(1)Excessivefinesshallnotbeimposed,norcruel,degradingorinhumanpunishment
inflicted.Neithershalldeathpenaltybeimposed,unless,forcompellingreasonsinvolvingheinous
crimes,theCongresshereafterprovidesforit.Anydeathpenaltyalreadyimposedshallbereduced
toreclusionperpetua.
(2)Theemploymentofphysical,psychological,ordegradingpunishmentagainstanyprisoneror
detainee,ortheuseofsubstandardorinadequatepenalfacilitiesundersubhumanconditionshallbe
dealtwithbylaw.(Emphasissupplied)
69Seenote43.
70Weemsv.U.S.,supranote66,citingMackinv.U.S.,117US348,350,29L.Ed.909,910,6S.Ct.Rep.

777ExparteWilson,114US417,427,29L.Ed.89,92.
7199US130.
72Wilkersonv.Utah,id.at135.
73136US436,10S.Ct.930,34L.Ed.519.
74InRe:Kemmler,id.at524.
75Supranote66.
76G.R.No.132601,October12,1998,297SCRA754.
77AnActDesignatingDeathbyLethalInjectionastheMethodofCarryingOutCapitalPunishment,

AmendingForthePurposeArticle81oftheRevisedPenalCode,AsAmendedbySection24ofRepublic
ActNo.7659.Sections17and19oftheRulesandRegulationstoImplementRepublicActNo.8177were,
however,declaredINVALID:(a)Section17becauseit"contravenesArticle83oftheRevisedPenalCode,
asamendedbySection25ofRepublicActNo.7659"and(b)Section19becauseit"failstoprovidefor
reviewandapprovaloftheLethalInjectionManualbytheSecretaryofJustice,andunjustifiablymakesthe
manualconfidential,hence,unavailabletointerestedpartiesincludingtheaccused/convictandcounsel."
78Echegarayv.ExecutiveSecretary,supraat777.
79Id.at778779,citingExParteGranvel,561SW2d503,509(1978),citingTropv.Dulles,356US86,78

S.Ct.590,2L.Ed.2d630(1958)Estellav.Gamble,429US97,97S.Ct.285,290,50L.Ed.2d251,
258259(1976).
80Rollo,p.22.
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81SeeRevisedPenalCode,Art.217.
82Cruzv.SecretaryofEnvironmentandNaturalResources,G.R.No.135385,December6,2000,347

SCRA128,citingSanMiguelCorporationv.Avelino,G.R.No.L39699,March14,1979,89SCRA69Phil.
LongDistanceTelephoneCo.v.CollectorofInternalRevenue,90Phil.674(1952)Teehankeev.Rovira,
75Phil.634(1945).
83Id.,citingInreGuarina,24Phil.37(1913).
8416AC.J.S.ConstitutionalLaw,Sec.96(a).
85U.S.v.Reyes,14Phil.718(1910).SeealsoPeoplev.Livara,94Phil.771(1954).
86Estamosconel.Hon.ProcuradorGeneralenquehalugaraestimarladevolucinhechaporeapelante

delacantidaddefraudadacomocircumstanciaatenuanteespecialsinningunaagravantequela
compense.Estoas,procedecondenaralapelanteasufrirensugradominmolapenasealadaporla
ley.(Peoplev.Velasquez,72Phil.98,100[1941])(Italicssupplied)
87RevisedPenalCode,Art.13,Par.7.Thattheoffenderhadvoluntarilysurrenderedhimselftoapersonin

authorityorhisagents,orthathehadvoluntarilyconfessedhisguiltbeforethecourtpriortothe
presentationoftheevidencefortheprosecution.
88Id.,Sec.10.And,finally,anyothercircumstanceofasimilarnatureandanalogoustothoseabove

mentioned.
89RevisedPenalCode,Art.13,Par.3.Thattheoffenderhadnointentiontocommitsograveawrongas

thatcommitted.
90Supranote88.
91ActNo.4103,asamended,otherwiseknownastheIndeterminateSentenceLaw,provides:

Section1.Hereafter,inimposingaprisonsentenceforanoffensepunishedbytheRevisedPenal
Code,oritsamendments,thecourtshallsentencetheaccusedtoanindeterminatesentencethe
maximumtermofwhichshallbethatwhich,inviewoftheattendingcircumstances,couldbeproperly
imposedundertherulesofthesaidCode,andtheminimumofwhichshallbewithintherangeofthe
penaltynextlowertothatprescribedbytheCodefortheoffenseandiftheoffenseispunishedby
anyotherlaw,thecourtshallsentencetheaccusedtoanindeterminatesentence,themaximum
termofwhichshallnotexceedthemaximumfixedbysaidlawandshallnotbelessthanthe
minimumtermprescribedbythesame.(AsamendedbyAct.No.4225)
92Guevarrav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.41061,July16,1990,187SCRA484.
9314Phil.718,721(1910).
94EnactedonOctober3,1907.
95Id.at725726.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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