Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
0T192 610
Crown copyright material is produced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and Queen's Printer for Scotland.
THERMAL RESPONSE OF
VESSELS AND PIPEWORK
EXPOSED TO FIRE
Dr J N Davenport
for
The Steel Construction Institute
Silwood Park
Ascot
Berkshire SL5 7QN
This document
London: HMSO
Lc0t5
pages
HMSO
FOREWORD
This report is one oftwenty six workpackage reports writtenas part ofthe Joint Industry Project on Blast
andFire Engineering forTopsideStructures. TheProjectPhase 1 startedin May 1990 to collate, appraise
anddisseminate informationonblastandfireloads,andontheresistance ofstructures andfacilities tothese
loads. The titles and numbers ofthe reports generated bythis projectare as follows.
List of Reports
01192597 Behaviour
ofoil and gas fires'inthe
(FL2)
presence ofconfinementandobstacles.
General
01192585 Genericfoundationdata to be used in
theassessment ofblast and fire sce(01(a))
narios.
(FL3)
(02 includedTypicalstructuraldetailsforprimary,
inthe above secondary, andsupporting structures/
report)
components.
scenarios.
Theeffectsofsimplification ofthe
(BR1)
explosionpressure-time history.
(BR2)
release rates.
miningstructural response.
OTT 92599
resources.
Blast Resistance
theoreticalandpredictivemodelling
subjected to blastloading.
certification requirements.
(BRS)
(BR4)
Fire Resistance
fire resistantstructures.
Blast Loading
elevated temperatures.
structures.
01192592 Confmedventedexplosions.
atelevatedtemperatures.
(BL2)
volumes.
sion.
(FR5)
Fire Loading
01192596 Oil and gas fires - characteristics and
(FL1)
material properties.
steelwork.
impact.
pipeworkexposedto fire.
AEA Technology(SafetyandReliabilityDirectorate)
Agip(UK) Limited
AmeradaHess Limited
Amoco (UK)ExplorationCompany
Aico BritishLimited
BritishGasPlc
BP International Limited
Chevron(UK)Limited
Conoco(UK) Limited
DenNoiske Stats OljeselskapAS
TheUKDepartmentofEneiy
Elf(UK) Plc
EnterpriseOilPie
ESSO Exploration& Production(UK)Limited
HamiltonBrothersOil& (lasLimited
Kerr-McGeeOil(UK) Plc
MarathonOil (UK) Limited
MobilNorth SeaLimited
NorskHydro AS
OccidentalPetroleum(Caledonia) Limited
Petro-CanadaResources
PhillipsPetroleumCo (UK) Limited
Ranger Oil(UK) Limited
SagaPetroleumAS
ShellUKExplorationandProduction
TexacoBritainLimited
Total OilMarinePlc
UltramarExplorationLimited
Unocal (UK)Limited
CONTENTS
Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.
DEFINITIONS
2:
INTRODUCTION
2.1
ON OFFSHORE PLATFORMS
12
Platform layout
Pipes and vessels
The hydrocarbon inventory
Fire scenarios
Fire loading of vessels and pipes
Mitigatory factors
PHYSICAL PROCESSES
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
5.
10
10
FIRES
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
4.
Background
Scope
5.2
12
12
13
13
14
14
17
9
9
9
18
18
18
19
20
20
22
23
24
26
28
28
30
31
32
33
34
35
37
37
37
38
40
5.3
6.
OUTSTANDING REQUIREMENTS
6.1
6.2
6.3
40
41
41
43
43
Physical processes
Predictive modelling
6.3.1
Non uniform heat fluxes
6.3.2
Models for pipework
6.3.3
Fire protection
6.3.4
Multicomponent fluids
6.3.5
Venting
6.3.6
Thermodynamic treatment
6.3.7
Vessel failure
6.3.8
Validation
6.3.9
Interconnected vessels
6.3.10 Partial damage
6,3.11 Heat transfer to the sea
43
44
45
46
46
46
47
47
48
48
48
49
49
7.
CURRENT POSITION
50
8.
AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY
54
REFERENCES
57
TABLES
FIGURES
APPENDICES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Fire attack of vessels and pipework containing hydrocarbon on
offshor platforms can lead to escalation if loss of
containment occurs.
The
appropriate emergency
response
on
a
firm
depends
understanding of the vulnerability of
vessels and pipes to different fire types, a ranking of the
equipment most at risk, predictions of the time available for
countermeasures, and the hazard posed by rupture.
Knowledge of these factors is essential for the safe operation
and shutdown of existing facilities, and should influence the
design of new platforms.
This report examines the extent of knowledge of the physical
processes which take place during fire attack, and compares
the predictive capabilities of available models with the
requirements. It gives a "snapshot" of the current position,
concentrating on information which is within the public
domain, and models which have been validated in large fires.
The relevance and applicability of the relationships used to
describe physical processes is discussed, and reference is
made to sources where the appropriate equations can be found.
This report includes summaries of the current position and
areas of uncertainty, but the reader is encouraged to study it
as a whole. Where possible the report is self contained, but
it draws on findings of other Work Packages, to which
reference should be made as appropriate.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
SECTION 1
DEFINITIONS
1.
DEFINITIONS
API
ASTM
BAM
Federal
HMSO
HSE
BLEVE
results
from the sudden failure of a vessel containing a
pressurised saturated liquid/vapour at a temperature well
above its normal (atmospheric) boiling point.
BLOWDOWN
film boiling
CRITICAL PRESSURE
The pressure below which a substance may exist as
in equilibrium with the liquid.
can
a gas
FIREBALL
A fireball is the rapid turbulent combustion of fuel as
an expanding, usually rising ball of flame.
DEFINITIONS
SECTION
HYDROCARBON (fire)
A hydrocarbon is a molecule comprised exclusively of
carbon and hydrogen. There are an enormous number of
such species; the petroleum industry commonly deals with
hydrocarbons ranging from one carbon atom (methane,
natural gas) through to waxy and bituminous mixtures with
several tens of carbon atoms.
From the fire point of
there
is
also
a
wide
view,
spectrum of other organic
chemicals, solvents, treatment agents etc., with similar
combustion characteristics producing a rapid temperature
rise and sustained high heat flux density.
See Work
Package FL1 Section 7.
JET FIRE
pipe
from
exceeding
an
allowed
limiting
TOPSIDE
of
legs
below
the
waterline
are
also
INTRODUCTION
SECTION
2.
INTRODUCTION
2.1
FR2
FR3
Passive
fire
protection
requirements and test methods
performance
(Shell Research
Ltd).
2.2
FR4
and
FR5
FR6
Fire
of
performance
explosion-damaged
structural and containment steelwork (SCI)
FR7
Thermal
and
response of vessels
exposed to fire (Shell Research Ltd)
secondary,
pipework
Objectives of FR7
2.3
Background
SECTION 2
INTRODUCTION
2.4
Scope
This study is based on the assumption that a platform fire has
triggered the alarm system, and initiated an emergency
shutdown sequence involving isolation and blowdown of the
process trains, and activation of the water deluge system.
For vessels and pipework containing hydrocarbon, this is
probably a more severe scenario than one in which the process
plant is still in operation, as it precludes removal of heat
by the flowing fluid.
2.5
10
INTRODUCTION
SECTION
be eliminated (Section
6).
(Appendix B).
present
the
11
such modelling,
current position
and
areas
is
of
3.
SECTION
All
3.1
Platform layout
The space available on the topsides of offshore oil or gas
platforms is very restricted, typically some tens of metres
long, wide and high. Almost without exception this means that
the processing vessels and pipework are packed very closely.
Thus the layout is very different from that in a comparable
onshore process plant, and the type and degree of reliance on
fire protective measures is not the same.
At a location such as a refinery, fire escalation can be
minimised through well-defined hazardous and non hazardous
areas and large safety distances, but for the offshore
platform, far more reliance has to be placed on containment of
the fire by barriers and water deluge systems.
3.2
12
SECTION
3.3
Thus the inventory of the pipes and vessels can be all vapour,
all liquid or vapour plus liquid and can comprise hydrocarbons
There may also be
ranging from Cl to C30 and beyond.
of
water, nitrogen, carbon dioxide and
significant quantities
hydrogen sulphide.
3.4
Fire scenarios
type, physical
state and source of the fuel involved, the ventilation
conditions, the intensity with which the fire burns, and its
duration. The principal fire conditions to be considered on
the basis of severity and in relation to the response of
vessels and pipework relate to hydrocarbon pool fires and jet
fires.
Work Packages FL1 and FL2 provide a comprehensive
review and appraisal of heat flux data relating to these
fires.
13
3.5
SECTION
A PSV
vessel or pipe
be protected against such failure by
depressurising
the heat input
and/or
The value of these mitigatory factors are considered in the
next section.
limiting
3.6
Mitigatory factors
Controlled depressurising of a vessel (blowdown) reduces the
internal pressure, and hence the stress in the vessel walls.
It also reduces the potential addition of fuel to the fire
should the vessel rupture.
Industry practice for the blowdown of process facilities has
criteria given in API Recommended
Practice documents 520 and 521 [1,2]. This generally involves
reducing the pressure from initial conditions to 50 % of the
vessel's design pressure or 7 barg, whichever is the lower,
within approximately 15 minutes.
the
quantity
of
liquid
may
is
vessel,
and
that
blowdown
14
sequence
which
gives
net
SECTION
For example:
15
SECTION
the seawater mains, and the pumps and associated power supply
survive the fire.
Removal of contents tends to work only when the incident heat
flux is relatively small, since the contents have to be
removed sufficiently quickly and safely.
16
SECTION 4
4.
Vessel or pipe
vapour contents
Fire
heat
mass
flux
heat flux
heat flux
flux
><
mass flux
Vent
including insulation
momentum flux
heat
heat flux
flux
mass
flux
4r
Surroundings
Vessel or pipe
liquid contents
The
of the vessel
or
or
line,
in particular
the manner
in which
it
might
fail
(Section 4.5).
17
4.1
SECTION 4
The external flux balance comprises the fire loading, the heat
which is transferred to the pipework or vessel, heat losses to
the surroundings, and heat transferred to the water deluge if
present. These are illustrated in Figure 4.1.
4.1.1
fire
The principal external heat flux is from the fire to the wall
of the vessel or pipe. The magnitude of the flux is dependent
on the type of fire and relative positions of the flame and
the object.
If
the vessel
or pipe
is
partially
or
fully
on
this
area
is
presented
in
Work
difficult to
18
SECTIOI'T
is
often
in
4.1.3
are equipped
system, and additional water may be
emergency firefighting response. Heat
may take place from the external heat
vessel wall.
with
a water deluge
part of the
transfer to the water
flux or from the hot
used as
19
4.1.4
SECTION 4
Of course, if a vessel
the
pipe
or
vessel
to
20
the
fluid
contents
requires
SECTION 4
The data needed are the dimensions, specific heat and thermal
conductivity of each part (steel, insulation and so on) of the
The thermal properties can vary significantly with
wall.
temperature, and point values are probably not sufficiently
accurate.
Because the numerical
solution can involve significant
of
quantities
computer time, approximations can sometimes be
made which reduce the dimensionality of the problem.
The
basic geometry is essentially cylindrical, and it is tempting
to suppose that a full three-dimensional analysis of heat
transfer through the wall is not needed.
To examine the validity
consider two scenarios:
of
such
approximations,
1.
vertical vessel in
2.
horizontal pipe in
let
us
fire.
fire.
21
SECTION 4
the
are
low
the
on
the
4.3
the contents
of
the vessel
or
pipework
will
(The
case when there are two liquid regions, for example in primary
separators, where there is a liquid hydrocarbon region above a
water layer, will be ignored here). Heat transfer from the
fire through the wall to the liquid causes it to heat up and
then boil; heat transfer to the vapour causes it to heat up
and increase in pressure. As the wall heats up, its strength
decreases, perhaps to the point of failure.
will
22
4.3.1
SECTION 4
and
23
SECTION 4
4.3.2
shown
nucleate
wall.
In
24
SECTION
25
SECTION 4
4.3.3
Heat, mass
26
traverse the
SECTION
then
liquid-vapour boundary
(see
1),
obliquely
Figure
based
for
on
cubic
equations
straightforward methods,
example
of state (such as Soave-Redlich'-Kwong),
can be used - see
references [19] and [20].
Appendix B, ff B6)
It should also be noted that there can be problems with
multicomponent systems when using empirical correlations,
which have usually been developed for single component
systems. A particular example of this is in heat transfer
during boiling, which generally involves the latent heat of
the fluid. For multicomponent systems, the concept of latent
heat is undefined, so it is not immediately obvious what to
do.
This problem may, however, be more apparent than real.
Provided the energy change on evaporation/condensation does
not vary too much with changes in composition then the latent
heat can be identified with the energy change. When this is
not the case, the penalty incurred by incorrect specification
of a latent heat sometimes manifests itself only in a small
error in temperature difference.
through vent
27
SECTION 4
net
and condensation
4.4
Venting
4.4.1
will
Sufficient
28
SECTION 4
choke.
is
rate.
29
SECTION 4
from the boiling liquid is impossible. It can be treated albeit crudely - by modification of standard two-phase flow
correlations. The third of these, though perhaps unlikely
unless venting is from the bottom of the vessel or line, is
perhaps the least predictable and merits special discussion.
4.4.2
30
SECTION
4.5
of
flashing
liquid
see
Failure mechanisms
The discussions of the previous sections are devoted to the
determination of the temperature distribution over the surface
of the pressurised equipment as a function of time. It might
also lead to a knowledge of the temperature distribution
through the wall of the vessel or pipe, but this is usually of
secondary importance.
The pressurised equipment will fail, ie rupture, when it is
subjected to a stress in excess of the strength of the
material from which it is fabricated (for a thin-walled vessel
or pipeline under normal conditions, this is usually taken as
the ultimate tensile strength).
This simple statement is,
difficult
to
into
however,
put
practice with a vessel subject
to a non-uniform temperature distribution, because this
creates thermal stresses, in addition to the stresses caused
by the internal pressure, and also results in material of
variable strength over the surface of the vessel.
failure
is
reached
will
make
this
31
SECTION 4
4.5.1
is
This
significant temperature variation across the surface.
latter case is expected to be the norm where the temperature
gradient is caused by flame impingement or by a pool fire
under a large vessel. Solution of these cases is possible by
finite element techniques, often using the same computer
program as is used for the pressure stress calculations.
The relative magnitude of thermal stresses and pressure
stresses varies enormously.
For thin-wall vessels, the
thermal stress caused by a temperature difference through the
wall is relatively small, but temperature differences over the
surface of the wall can lead to significant stresses.
[31]
The large thermal stresses arose because the lower part of the
vessel was held at essentially constant temperature (through a
high heat transfer coefficient to the boiling liquid), while
the temperature of the upper part of the vessel increased
32
SECTION 4
4.5.2
Stress at failure
Pressurised equipment exposed to fire will experience a steady
increase in temperature. This may result in a time-varying
stress (see Section 4.5.1), and we expect that once this
time-dependent maximum stress equals the material strength,
the equipment fails. However, the material strength is itself
decreasing in time as the material weakens with increasing
temperature.
to 600
C.
33
stress.
SECTION 4
This method
4.6
Summary
In the scenario chosen for this study, fire attack occurs
directly or indirectly on a vessel or pipework which may or
may not be undergoing blowdown. The physical processes which
take place are heat transfer to the exterior of the vessel,
through any insulation to the interior wall and from there to
the vessel contents. The temperature of any unwetted wall
rises very rapidly, the wetted wall less so, the fluid
temperatures increase, and fluid boiling occurs, resulting in
an increase in the internal vessel pressure.
34
SECTION 4
4.7
Sources of equations
There are four main references in which most of the equations
needed for modelling the physical processes described here can
be found. The most complete is reference [35]; two others
which are less complete are reference [l8J and [36].
The
fourth, which applies to blowdown as opposed to fire loading,
is reference [37].
35
SECTION 4
Reference
good for:
[35]
and
[36]
Reference
is
References
[18]
[37 is useful
for:
36
or
5.
SECTION
of
the
of
complexity
the
physical
processes
(see
Itis
The LPG models were never intended for use in predicting the
response of a vessel on an offshore platform, and as might be
expected, their predictive ability falls short of the
requirements for that application. However, the models are a
good starting point, and we first need to assess how well they
perform in their intended role.
5.1
5.1.1
37
SECTION
There is
of vessels;
There is
is
There
a common tendency to
use
semi-rigorous
and
for
the
vessel contents
thermodynamics
phase equilibria
with perfect gas behaviour for venting vapour, which is
thermodynamically inconsistent (and can lead to large errors);
No models
identified.
5.1.2
for
the
fire
response
of
pipes
have
been
Research Ltd;
Queen's University Ontario;
University of New Brunswick.
38
SECTION
B.
Their principal
in
turn.
The UK Health & Safety Executive and Shell Research Ltd have
used the HSE facilities at Buxton to validate both ENGULF II
(AEA Safety & Reliability Directorate) and HEATUP (Shell
Research Ltd).
Experiments have been conducted on 0.25, 1.0
and 5.0 tonne tanks containing propane in totally engulfing
pooi fires.
Queen's University Ontario have validated their program TCTCM
using experimental data from full scale and one fifth scale
tests on tanks apparently containing propane. The tests were
conducted
by the Transportation Development Centre of
Transport Canada, for whom TCTCM was developed initially.
The University of New Brunswick have conducted a series of
experimental tests on a 37.4 litre horizontal cylindrical
vessel partially filled with refrigerant Rll to validate their
program PLGS-I.
Multiple heater elements were used to
simulate the effect of an external heat load and it is
claimed that totally and partially engulfing pool fires and
jet fires can be simulated by appropriate use of the heater
elements.
It is not clear, however, whether the spatially
non-uniform heat fluxes occurring in partially engulfing pool
fires and jet fires can indeed be simulated in this way,
either in terms of heat flux density or the flux distribution.
It emerges from these sets of experimental tests that:
The flow through the valve and hence the response of the
vessel and its contents after the valve has lifted cannot
always be predicted accurately, and there is often no attempt
to predict the time to failure.
39
SECTION
There are
tests
on
loading.
5.2
Blowdown models
5.2.1
40
5.2.2
SECTION
5.3
41
SECTION
42
be of
OUTSTANDING REQUIREMENTS
6.
SECTION
OUTSTANDING REQUIREMENTS
Sections 4.6 and 5.3 indicate the state of knowledge of
physical processes which occur when a vessel or pipe
exposed to a fire loading, and the current capability
models to predict the response.
It is now necessary
examine once again the situation which is to be modelled,
to assess whether the current capabilities are sufficient.
6.1
the
is
of
to
and
Wall temperatures
Failure time
6.2
and
using
tests
Physical processes
While the physical processes taking place are relatively well
understood, there are two main areas which are likely to cause
Both are connected with the fact that the fluids
problems.
involved are multicomponent.
43
OUTSTANDING REQUIREMENTS
SECTION
6.3
Predictive modelling
2.
3.
response
to
spatially
limited.
4.
5.
6.
multicomponent
hydrocarbon
7.
8.
44
SECTION
OUTSTANDING REQUIREMENTS
9.
10.
6.3.1
6.3.2
45
OUTSTANDING REQUIREMENTS
SECTION
The LPG models carry with them the assumption that the
containment is a vessel rather than a pipe.
It might be
that
a
is
a
thin
line
vessel, in which
argued
simply
very long
case a pipe could indeed be modelled, particularly in a
uniform heat flux. However, it is not reasonable to expect
the whole of a pipe to be exposed in this way, and the
problems of modelling partial engulfment (see Section 6.3.1)
would apply even more.
The question of pipes raises the topic of end effects, which
is another unknown area, and applies particularly to vessels
with a small length to diameter ratio.
6.3.3
Fire protection
The ability of a model to deal with a variety of protection
methods is important because this would allow comparison of
the different systems under varying types of fire attack, and
could improve the emergency response and aid selection of the
most appropriate protection methods during the design phase of
a new platform.
Different fire protection methods will have a significant
effect on the behaviour of vessels and pipes in fire loading.
For example, a cementitious coating will greatly increase the
heat capacity of the vessel.
The capabilities and degree of validation of existing models
in this respect vary considerably. At the simplest level, a
fire protective system can be modelled as
a thermal
but
in
is
far
more
the
behaviour
resistance,
practice
complex.
6.3.4
Multicomponent fluids
As discussed in Section 3.3, most of the fluids to be found
offshore are multicomponent, for example condensates and
crudes.
The response of a multicomponent fluid to the
incoming heat flux and the blowdown process will be
significantly different from that of a single component. For
example, if blowdown results in vapour being removed, there
46
OUTSTANDING REQUIREMENTS
SECTION 6
6.3.5
Venting
Depending on the vessel contents, geometry and blowdown
method, the material passing through the vent line may be
mostly gas, mostly liquid, or mixtures, as described in
Section 3.4. The precise nature has a profound effect on the
venting behaviour, and can affect the behaviour of the vessel
considerably.
3lowdown of a vessel or pipework is in itself a very complex
area, and it is probably not necessary to include a full
description of it as part of the fire response. Nevertheless,.
some aspects are highly relevant. One example is the likely
distillation of the fluid leading to a lower rate of pressure
rise, as mentioned above. Another is the increased risk of
failure through reducing the level of the liquid in a vessel.
There are other cases where a rigorous description of blowdown
may be far less important. For example, with vapour venting,
the relative amounts of liquid and gas change only slowly, and
changes in the headspace composition are largely irrelevant to
the shell or liquid temperatures. The main effect is on the
overall pressure change with time, and this might be modelled
effectively by treating it as a simple leak.
6.3.6
Thermodynamic treatment
Simplifications to the thermodynamics are often used to give
acceptable runtimes to the codes. In some cases the errors
introduced are negligible, for example if the perfect gas
assumption is made about venting, but there is actually a
small quantity of entrained liquid droplets. Increasing the
47
OUTSTANDING REQUIREMENTS
SECTION
serious
errors.
6.3.7
Vessel failure
6.3.8
Validation
hardly needs to be stated that the validation of any
Validation is particularly
predictive model is essential.
in
the
case
of
fire
response because it is a complex
necessary
with
a
number
of
interconnected
factors.
topic
large
It
6.3.9
Interconnected vessels
48
OUTSTANDING REQUIREMENTS
SECTION 6
6.3.10
Partial damage
Partial damage of vessels and pipework may be an important
area, but it is probably less urgent. Again, no general guide
can be given.
6.3.11
49
CURRENT POSITION
7.
SUARY OF THE
SECTION
CURRENT POSITION
50
CURRENT POSITION
SECTION
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
hydrocarbon
8.
appropriate,
and because
51
CURRENT POSITION
9.
SECTION
10.
11.
to
The
current
models
have
considerable
as
shortcomings
tools
for
use
offshore.
In
there
is
a
predictive
particular,
52
CURRENT POSITION
SECTION
53
AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY
8.
SECTION
AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY
The areas of uncertainty fall into two categories - those
where there is
insufficient knowledge of the physical
situation - and those where there are gaps between the
the
of
models
and
capabilities
existing
predictive
requirements.
Modelling capabilities
The LPG fire response models fulfil their aim well, and their
deficiencies when compared with the requirements of simulating
a vessel or pipe on an offshore platform are largely a result
of the far greater complexity of the latter situation,
There is no doubt that a considerable amount of work would be
needed to develop a model (or models) which could simulate all
the possible scenarios for fire attack offshore.
Equally,
this is probably not necessary.
and time.
54
AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY
SECTION
in
As
be
is
of
on
program,
with
55
AREAS
OF UNCERTAINTY
SECTION
56
REFERENCES
REFERENCES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
R H
6.
7.
and depressuring
(editors):
Chemical
Engineers'
of Chemical
(1979)
8.
H J Ivey & D
9.
(1962)
10.
mt
11.
12.
13.
G
Hetsroni
(editor):
Hemisphere (1982)
14.
Handbook
57
of
multiphase
systems,
REFERENCES
15.
16.
M T
17.
18.
NU
19.
20.
21.
23,
22.
of
Thermodynamics
md
for
(1984)
182-186
(1987)
23.
24.
N Abuaf, 0
25.
C B Wallis,
26.
mt
J Multiphase Flow
97 (1980)
6,
E
80,
A van den
Akker,
Snoey
& H Spoelstra:
E23 (1983)
28.
29.
K E
30.
First
&J E
Huff:
J,
33,
524 (1987)
Plant/Operations Progress
8,
40 (1989)
M R
(1974)
58
REFERENCES
32.
33.
34.
35.
P K Ramskill: ENGULF
(1971)
on the creep
37.
MA
B6).
38.
59
TABLES
TABLES
5.1
5.2
5.3
I-i.
0
Ii
g-1
(I)
pi
CD
a5
a7
e7
d5
d7
e2
gi
Validation
e7
ei e3
1
d6
d4
d2
c2
c4
b2
a6
d5
d7
dl
bi
b3
a3?
a5
al
B9
TCTCM
Failure
gi
d6
di
d3?
Vessel
contents
Venting
d2
d4
c3
wail
Vessel
b2
a8
a3?
Vessel
geometry
a2
a4
al
External
B3
ENGULF II
heat flux
Page in
Appendix B
Program
gi
e2
dS
d7
a6
e8
d2
d4
d6
c2
c4
b2
dl
al
a3
a5
a7
B12
FIEATUP
c4
c2
b2
g2
e2
d5
d7
d6
d2
d4
a6
gi
el?
d7
dl
ci
d2
d4
d6
alO
a2
b2
al
B17
Bl4
dl
a5
al
TAC7
PLGS-l
d5
dl
gi
ei?
d6
d2
alO
c2
c4
hi
B29
PIA
fi
d3
dl
f2
d2
b2
a6
ci
c4
hi
al
a3?
B31
VT*VESSEL
TABLES
Program
BLOWDOWN
Page in
Appendix B
B6
External
heat flux
Vessel
geometry
a8
a9
b2
bl
ci
Vessel
wall
VENTFLO
SAFIRE
PROCESS
B20
B22
B27
a8
a8
alO
bl b2
hi b2
hi b2 b3
ci
ci
ci
dl d2 d3
dl d2 d3
Vessel
contents
dl d2 d3
d5 d6 d7 d8
di d2 d3
Venting
el
el e3? e4 el e3? e4
e5? e6?
e5? e6?
Experimental
validation
TABLE 5.2
e4
e3
e5
e6
d5
g3
e2
TABLES
(? implying doubt):
vessel geometry:
bi
b2
b3
vertical cylinder
horizontal cylinder
arbitrarily inclined cylinder
vessel wall:
cl
c2
c3
c4
vessel contents:
dl
d2
d3
d4
d5
d6
d7
d8
two-phase vapour-liquid
single component
multicomponent
radiative heat flux to vapour
convective heat flux to vapour
convective heat flux to liquid
boiling heat flux to liquid
rigorous vapour-liquid equilibrium
venting:
el
e2
e3
vapour venting
perfect gas venting
vapour plus suspended liquid droplet venting
e4
liquid venting
liquid plus vapour bubble venting
flashing liquid venting
on-off model of pressure relief valve operation
specific models of pressure relief valve operation
e5
e6
e7
e8
TABLE 5.3
TABLES
vessel failure:
assumed failure criterion
fi
f2
wall stress determination
experimental validation:
tank containing propane in totally engulfing pool
gl
fire
tank containing refrigerant in totally engulfing
g2
pool fire
blowdown of vessel containing various different
g3
fluids
FIGURES
FIGURES
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
4.9
4.10
FIGURES
WATER,,"
DELUCE/
VESSEL
WALL
NCtDENT FLUX
b
HEAT
Figure 4.1
LOSSES
FIGURES
.4
RADIAL
CONDUCTION
TO VAPOUR
>14
AXIAL
CONDUCTION
RADIAL
CONDUCTION
TO LIQUID
case
I,
CD
rt
rt
CD
H)
rt
RADIAL
CONDUCTION
TO LIQUID
TO VAPOUR
CONDUCTION
RADIAL
tt,t
AXIAL
CONDUCTION
'I,
CIRCUMFERENTIAL
CONDUCTION
_______
U)
t1
FIGURES
Convection to vapour
Radiation to vapour
Radiation to liquid
Figure 4.4
Reradiation at wall
Convection to liquid
a.
vessel or pipeline
FIGURES
Mass flux
-
Figure
4.5
70
FIGURES
2.5
(.4
4-
0
-c
1,5
0
0.5
1.5
2.5
Figure
4.6
'71
FIGURES
300
A
0
250 -
AA
c"J
Toluene [10]
Benzene [11]
Pressure = 0.3
200
MN m 2
A A
x150
100
.0
50
0
50
100
150
200
Figure 4.7
Experimental example
7.2.
of boiling curve
250
FIGURES
400
c'J
E 300
x
200
C
-c
C
C-)
00
C)
0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Reduced pressure
Figure
4.8
Variation
0.8
(F/Pc)
72
[12]
FIGURES
Liquid
Critical point
uJ
onoblique
(I)
Ui
uJ
Two p h a se
Gas
TEMPERATURE
Figure
4.9
FIGURES
U)
a)
U,
U,
a)
U)
aC
-o
C
U)
a)
Cl,
U,
a)
-e-J
(I)
00
0
U)
a)
U)
U)
I)
L
(I,
I
Figure 4.10
'16
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX A
PACKAGE
WP START DATE:
WP END DATE:
Month 1
Month 6
DURATION:
& Month
Months
OBJECTIVES:
To summarise knowledge on the thermal response of hydrocarbon
containing vessels and pipework to fire effects.
Further knowledge
requirements
will
be
INPUT TO ACTIVITY:
Information from fire loading studies.
Published research and information made available by research
organisations, cooperating organisations and participants.
Al
APPENDIX A
DELIVERABLES:
Rev No:
A2
Date:
November 89
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX B
METHODOLOGY
A list was
around 30
in total
OF THE INFORMATION
The information has been grouped into three categories organisations who have produced experimentally verified
mathematical models, those who have carried out either
mathematical modelling or experimental work, and those who use
current models, but have not carried out development work, or
those who gave a null response.
For the first two categories the information is presented in
report form, and where necessary comments have been added. It
was felt that work in progress should be limited to areas
B!
APPENDIX B
which
will become
public knowledge,
undertaken as part of large projects,
references have been restricted to those
in the open literature.
Information is
organisations in the third category.
for example
that
and similarly the
currently available
not presented for
&
Chemical
Page
B3
B6
B9
Rh
Bl3
Bi 6
& Associates
Page
B19
B21
Testing (BAM)
Health & Safety Executive (Major Hazards Assessment
Unit)
B25
SimSci International
B26
1328
VERITEC
1330
Organisation
Contact(s)
Background
Predictive modelling
Experimental validation
Additional comments
Reference(s)
B2
APPENDIX B
Organisation
Safety & Reliability Directorate
Wigshaw Lane
Culceth
Warrington
Cheshire WA3 4NE
(Tel: 0925 232000; Fax: 0925 766681)
[b]
Contact
Mr Philip M Ramskill
Fire & Explosion
[c]
Background
use the programs ENGULF and ENGULF II for
modelling the thermal response of vessels containing LPG
to fire loading.
AEA SRD
[d]
Predictive modelling
AEA SRD, under contract to HSE, developed a computer
model called ENGULF for simulation of the response of an
LPG tank partially filled with hydrocarbon and totally
ENGULF II is a more
engulfed in a kerosene poo1 fire.
recent version which also claims simulation of tanks
which are partially engulfed in a fire.
ENGULF II is written in standard Fortran 77 and
present available on an Apricot XI microcomputer.
times of 30 minutes are typical. It costs 1500.
is
at
Run
a distant
fire.
Heated liquid;
Unheated liquid;
Heated vapour;
Unheated vapour.
B3
APPENDIX B
[f]
Experimental validation
Validation of ENGULF II has been against experimental
and
tonne horizontal
results
on
1.0
5.0
0.25,
cylindrical propane tanks fully engulfed in kerosene poo1
fires (<100 kW m2) obtained by HSE and Shell Research
been
runs have
Ltd.
No
experimental verification
flame
for
or
for
conducted
partial engulfment
jet
impingement.
Additional comments
Additional work needs to be done on ENGULF II to reduce
assumed flame temperature when
its
sensitivity to
flame
impingement.
simulating jet
Desirable modifications and additions to ENGULF II would
be:
B4
APPENDIX B
(The
capacity to
is
References
[Bl-B5]
B5
APPENDIX B
Organisation
Imperial College
Department of Chemical Engineering & Chemical Technology
London SW7 2BY
(Tel: 071-589 5111 x 4429/4455; Fax: 071-584 1170)
[b]
Contacts
Dr Stephen M Richardson
Senior Lecturer
Dr Graham Saville
Senior Lecturer
[c]
Background
Imperial College use a program called BLOWDOWN developed
since 1985 in conjunction with Shell UK Exploration and
Production, based on an extensive set of experiments
conducted partly by Imperial College on their own and
The application is
partly by Shell Research Ltd.
for
simulation
of
rapid depressurisation of
primarily
offshore installations,
and has been used by several
oil/gas companies; it has also been used by some onshore
companies.
[d]
Predictive modelling
Imperial College have developed a computer program called
BLOWDOWN for simulation of the temperature, pressure,
or
composition response of a high-pressure vessel
blown
whether
or
not.
down,
pipeline being
deliberately
B6
APPENDIX B
Experimental validation
B7
APPENDIX B
facilities
for
has experimental
College
Imperial
Further
small-scale
high-pressure testing.
relatively
large scale testing has been carried out by Shell
Research Ltd.
BLOWDOWN has been tested:
Additional comments
to
simulate
of
The
depressurisation
ability
pipelines.
[g]
References
[B6,B7]
B8
APPENDIX B
Organisation
Queen's University
Department of Mechanical Engineering
McLaughlin Hall
Kingston
Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada
[b]
Contact
Dr A Michael Birk
[c]
Background
Queen's University Ontario use a computer program called
TCTCM for simulation of the response of LPC rail tankers
to external fire loading. The program has been validated
using full scale and one fifth scale tests on rail
tankers.
[d]
Predictive modelling
Queen's have developed a computer program called TCTCM in
conjunction with the Transportation Development Centre of
Transport Canada for simulation of the response of rail
tankers to external fire loading.
B9
APPENDIX B
[e]
Experimental validation
TCTCM has been validated using experimental data obtained
from full scale and one fifth scale tests on tanks
(apparently) containing propane which were unprotected
and on tanks which were thermally protected (by an
internal layer which enhances heat transfer from the wall
to the contents).
These tests were conducted by the
Transportation Development Centre of Transport Canada and
by the American Association of Railroads.
Some discrepancies between observed and predicted vessel
failures are attributed to flaws in the tank walls, poor
welds or unpredicted hot spots.
Some discrepancies
between observed and predicted valve opening pressures,
particularly with liquid or two-phase venting, are
attributed to the simple valve model used. Otherwise,
there are minor discrepancies between
observed and
predicted temperatures.
[f]
Additional comments
No validatory experiments on the effects of jet fire
impingement have been conducted. The assumed mode of
vessel failure appears not to have been validated.
[g]
Reference
B8]
BlO
APPENDIX B
Organisation
Shell Research Ltd
Thornton Research Centre
P0 Box
Contact
Dr Leslie T Cowley
Discipline Leader, Fire Loading
[c]
Background
Shell TRC use a program called HEATUP which they have
developed themselves, based on an extensive set of
experiments conducted partly by the HSE on their own and
The application is
partly in joint work with Shell.
for
onshore
installations
and
primarily
storage
conditions are those for either propane or butane at
ambient temperature and at its saturated vapour pressure.
Vessels for such storage have somewhat lower pressure
ratings than most encountered offshore.
[d]
Predictive modelling
Shell TRC have developed a computer model called HEATUP
for simulation of the temperature/pressure response of an
LPG tank partially filled with hydrocarbon and totally
engulfed in a fire.
The principal features of HEATUP are as follows.
The
internal pressure is
[e]
There
their
is no attempt to predict vessel failure.
Experimental validation
Bil
APPENDIX B
[f]
[g]
Additional comments
Desirable modifications and additions to HEATUP would be:
B12
APPENDIX B
Organisation
University of New Brunswick
Fire Science Centre
Fredericton
New Brunswick E3B 5A3
Canada
[b]
Contact
Professor James
E S Venart
[c]
Background
University of New Brunswick use a program called PLCS-I
which they have developed themselves, based mainly on
conducted
that
experimental measurements
they have
themselves but also on published data, particularly those
obtained by HSE, Shell Research Ltd, and BAM.
[d]
Predictive modelling
University of New Brunswick have developed a computer
program called PLGS-I for simulation of the response of a
vessel containing LPC to fire.
PLGS-I is written in HP Basic 5.0 and runs on an HP 98220
Fortran PC and mainframe versions are also
computer.
The principal features of PLGS-I are as
available.
follows.
A vapour region;
B13
APPENDIX B
Experimental validation
University of New Brunswick have conducted an extended
set of experimental measurements on a small-scale (37.4
litre) windowed horizontal circular cylindrical vessel
partially filled with refrigerant Ru.
The effect of the incident heat flux from a fire is
simulated by the use of ten individually controlled
radiant heater elements located around the vessel.
By
altering the heater controls, it is claimed that pooi and
jet impingement (torching) fire loads can be simulated
(although no basis exists for the jet fire loads
employed).
A pressure relief valve is fitted to the vessel.
Its
position on the vessel can be altered, as can its open
and close pressures (which are usually set at 105% and
95% of the nominal set pressure, respectively).
The experiments have been analysed and revealed the
importance of thermal stratification in the liquid and
critical two-phase flow through the valve.
Further
in
which
the effects
of
experiments are planned
impurities, non-condensihie gases and non-uniform heating
are to he investigated.
[f}
Additional comments
PLGS-I has a definite strength inasmuch as the liquid
within the vessel is not assumed to he spatially
isothermal. It also has limitations, including:
A heavy reliance on the use of adjustable
fire and
constants, particularly in modelling
venting characteristics which limits its use as an a
priori predictor;
and:
An apparent limitation to one-component fluids
B14
APPENDIX B
References
[B12,Bl3]
B15
APPENDIX B
Organisation
Mechanical Engineering Department
University of Maryland
College Park
Maryland 20742
USA
(Tel: 0101 301
[b]
[c]
Contact
Professor Dr Dirse
Sallet
Background
for
the
Predictive modelling
University of Maryland have developed two computer models
called TACG and TAC7 for simulation of the response of a tank
partially filled with hydrocarbon and engulfed in a fire.
[d]
TAC6 and TAC7 are written in standard Basic, and can be run on
GW-Basic 3.20 and IBM Basic 2.0. Run times of 30 minutes are
typical.
TAC6 is in a sense a subsidiary version of TAC7, which is the
main program. The principal features of TAC7 are as follows:
The fire load can (apparently) be partial or total
The heat load can also be
engulfment in a pool fire.
internal, for example from a runaway exothermic thermal
reaction.
is
B16
APPENDIX 13
It is not clear
Thermal
stratification
in the
liquid,
particularly
Radiation from
the vessel
not
Experimental validation
pool fire.
Additional comments
B17
APPENDIX B
B18
APPENDIX B
Organisation
British Gas
Research & Technology Division
London Research Station
Michael Road
London SW6 2AD
(Tel: 071-736 3344)
[b]
Contact
Dr Trevor K Yerlett
Senior Scientist, Gas Properties
[c]
[d]
&
Measurement Group
Background
British Gas LRS use VENTFLO for simulation of
temperature/pressure response of a venting vessel.
the
Predictive modelling
British Gas have developed a computer program called
VENTFLO, which is a modified version of SAFIRE developed
by DIERS, for simulation of the depressurisation of a
vessel.
VENTFLO is written in Fortran 77 and is at present
available
in-house or
elsewhere
on
an
IBM/Amdahl
mainframe and also on a VAX. Run times of a few seconds
are typical of steady-state runs; dynamic runs take much
longer.
A vertical cylinder;
or:
A sphere.
bullet;
insulated);
or:
According to the NFPA method (originating from
the US National Fire Protection Agency).
B19
APPENDIX B
and phase
are
Physical properties
equilibria
determined using in-house and RKS equations of state,
together with the Wilhoit-Harmens ideal gas method for
heat capacity, the Hankinson & Thomson COSTALD method for
liquid density and the Ely & Hanley TRAP? method for
transport properties.
Venting can be one-phase or two-phase, with
in short vents
and
non-equilibrium
two-phase flow
and
flow
in
or
slip
longvents
pipes.
homogeneous
[e]
Experimental validation
Additional comments
VENTFLO clearly needs further experimental validation and
British
Gas
LRS
would
welcome
appropriate
data,
particularly for large-scale fire exposure and blow down
of vessels containing multi-component fluids (such as gas
condensates).
It is not clear that VENTFLO models heat transfer
The assumption of spatially uniform heat
correctly.
transfer over the whole of the vessel wall, whether it
contains one or two phases, is rather drastic.
It is
also not clear that VENTFLO handles venting correctly.
Thus it is not clear that the venting is modelled in a
thermodynamical1y consistent way, nor is it clear that
flashing discharge is dealt with properly.
[g]
References
None available.
B20
APPENDIX B
Fauske
.5c
Associates
[a]
Organisation
Fauske & Associates
16W070 West 83rd Street
Burr Ridge
Illinois 60521 USA
[b]
Contact
Dr Hans KFauske
[c]
Background
Fauske & Associates have an extensive record of work in
the field of vessel venting, much in association with the
DIERS project and the SAFIRE program.
[d]
Predictive modelling
Fauske have made a significant contribution to the
computer program called SAFIRE, which was developed as
part of the DIERS project. This is a program for the
simulation of the response of a batch reactor or vessel
with an emergency relief system to actuation of the
relief system.
SAFIRE is written in ANSI standard Fortran 77
in
consistent SI units. It is a multi-purpose program:
[e]
Experimental validation
Additional comments
B21
APPENDIX B
References
[B15-Bl7]
B22
APPENDIX B
Organisation
Federal Institute for Materials Research & Testing (BAN)
tJnter
den Eichen 87
D-l000 Berlin 45
Germany
[b]
Contact
B. Dro.st
[c]
Background
Predictive modelling
None.
[e]
Experimental validation
BAN have conducted two series of tests on 4.85 cubic
metre horizontal circular cylindrical storage vessels.
The vessels contained propane and were in pool fires of
burning fuel oil with:
B23
APPENDIX B
increase
significant
vessels.
in
the
fire
resistance
of
the
and
hour were used. The cage system was found to improve the
fire resistance of the vessels considerably.
[f]
Additional
comments
References
[Bl8 ,Bl9]
B24
APPENDIX B
Organisation
Contact
Mr David A Jones
Head, Flammables
[c]
Risk Group
Background
SRD.
[d]
Predictive modelling
None.
[e]
Experimental validation
The Research and Laboratory Services Division of HSE has
experimental facilities at Buxton. The contact there is:
D K Pritchard, Head of Investigation Section, Research &
Laboratory Services Division, Harpur Hill, Buxton SK17
9JN.
Additional comments
A review paper on modelling and validation of the fire
response of vessels by K Moodie of HSE comprises Appendix
2 of this report.
[g]
References
[BlO,Bll,B20,B21]
B25
APPENDIX B
SimSci International
[a]
Organisation
SimSci International
Highbank House
Exchange Street
Stockport
Cheshire SK3 OET
(Tel: 061-429 6744; Fax: 061-480 9063)
[b]
Contact
Mr Michael M Orbach
Technical Manager
[c]
Background
SimSci are a software company responsible for the PROCESS
A new version, PRO/lI is
(chemical) plant simulator.
scheduled for the end of 1990.
[d]
Predictive modelling
SimSci have developed a very large computer program
called PROCESS for the simulation of process plant. The
program is modular; one of the modules is for simulation
of depressurisation of vessels.
The principal features of the PROCESS depressurisation
module are as follows:
B26
APPENDIX B
five adjustable
Purely
empirically, using
constants;
Isothermally;
or:
Using a natural convection correlation for
blowdown
of
with
an
alone,
gas
adjustable
multiplicative constant incorporated.
[e]
Experimental validation
None.
{f]
Additional comments
SimSci present a
'Fire Depressuring
Example' which
illustrates the use of the PROCESS module.
This is
somewhat misleading inasmuch as no heat flux is imposed
Reference
[B22]
B27
APPENDIX B
Organisation
SINTEF
Applied Thermodynamics Division
Norwegian Institute of Technology
N-7034 Trondheim
Norway
(Tel: 010-47-7-59 3920; Fax: 010-47-7-59 2480)
[b]
Contact
Professor Bjorn
F Magnussen
[c]
Background
SINTEF ATD have experience of modelling fire loads on
depressurising vessels using a program called PIA.
[d]
Predictive modelling
SINTEF ATD have developed (in conjunction with Statoil) a
computer program called PIA (based on a finite-difference
code called KAMELEON, with pre-and post-processing) for
the analysis of the behaviour of process equipment being
blown down in hazardous conditions such as fires.
B28
APPENDIX B
{e]
Experimental validation
There has been no validation
of
PIA.
[f]
Additional comments
PIA has several limitations, including:
{g]
Reference
[B23]
B29
APPENDIX B
VERITEC
[a]
[b]
Organisation
VERITEC
Veritas Offshore Technology
Det Norske Veritas
P0 Box 300
N-1322 Hovik (Oslo)
Norway
&
Services A/S
Contact
Mr Erik Skramstad
[c]
Background
VERITEC model fire loads on depressurising vessels using
a program called VT*VESSEL and on structural members
using a program called NV613.
[dl
Predictive modelling
VERITEC have developed
[e]
Experimental validation
B30
APPENDIX B
Additional comments
VT*VESSEL has several limitations, including:
References
[B24,B25]
B31
APPENDIX B
REFERENCES
31.
I
B2.
B3.
fire
M
-
of
ENGULF
II
to
model
P K Ramskill: ENGULF
B5.
HMSO (1989)
36.
37.
depressurisation of
Process Industries,
of state
Chemical
Chamberlain: Rapid
pressure vessels, 3 Loss Prevention
3, 4-7 (1990) (see also: Appendix B, ff
36).
B8.
A M
response
of
B9.
810.
K Moodie, K
Bli,.
&
exposed to
20, 197-225
Williams: Fire
predictive model, 3
I
Moodie, L T Cowley,
engulfment tests on a
20,
Bl2.
tankers
3 Hazardous Materials,
3 E
55-71 (1988)
Venart,
B32
APPENDIX B
313.
NU
B14.
D Dancer and D W
315.
M A Crolmes & J
relief
(1985)
316.
Bl7.
B18.
Bl9.
320.
K Moodie &
dispersion of
215-245 (1987)
B2l.
B22.
K Moodie:
Depressuring
calculations,
PROCESS
Technical
Bulletin 38 (1987)
Fagertun, T E Hals & B F Magnussen: PIA - a
computer program system for simulation of blowdown of process
equipment under hazardous conditions, Eurotherm Seminar 14,
Louvain-la-Neuve (1990)
J A
323.
T Evanger,
B24.
B25.
B33
APPENDIX B
Table Bi
Organisations contacted
BP Exploration
BP Research Ltd
British Gas (Engineering Research Station)
British Gas (London Research Station)
Brown & Root Vickers
CHAM
Norske Stats OljeselskapA/S (Statoil)
Fauske & Associates
Federal Institute for Materials Research & Testing (BAN)
H&G Engineering
Health & Safety Executive (Major Hazards Assessment Unit)
Imperial College (Chemical Engineering & Chemical Technology
Department)
John Brown Engineers and Constructors
MW Kellogg
Matthew Hall Engineering
Queen's University Ontario (Mechanical Engineering Department)
Shell UK Exploration and Production
Shell Research (Thornton Research Centre)
SimSci International
SINTEF (Applied Thermodynamics Division)
SINTEF (NBL)
Technica
Det
UKOOA
University of Maryland (Mechanical Engineering Department)
University of New Brunswick (Fire Science Centre)
VERITEC
WS Atkins Engineering Sciences
B34
APPENDIX C
Cl
APPENDIX C
EERfl4ETS
K.
AND
DELLING:
- AN
REFERENCE
TO FIRE
DIE
UK
rRODUCTION
The quantities
vapour
considerably over the last two decades. In most industrialised countries this
trend is likely to continue for m.any years yet, because liquefied gases are
used by the chnjcal and petrochamical industries in vast quantities, as the
raw materials for many products eg. feedstocks and fertilisers from chlorine,
aTmDor,ia etc or as hydrocarbon fuels (LNG,
.itane). The processes and
prcducts utilising liquefied gases in a typical industrialised country are
chtiical production (organic and inorganic), transportation (fuels), domestic
L,
Further
sub-
divisions are the relatively small inventories of acutely toxic and persistent
chemicals (carcinogens). The more camoonly used of the liquefied gases are
C2
APPENDIX C
TABLE 1
Paraffins
B.P 0C
StOrage
Olefins
Methane
164
Etharle
88.6
F.R.
Ethylene
B.P 0C
Storage
80b
103.7
propylene
47.4
Propane
810
1 Butene
Butane
6.3
36.].
34 b
2 Butene(cis) 1 Pentene
3.7
29.9
Pentane
0.5
42
chnicals
canalon
(piped)
Industrial Hydrogen
oxygen
B.P0C
Storage
Others
B.P 0C
Storage
F.R.
P
A
259.1
F.R.
(Vinyl
chloride
209.8
Nitrogen
F.R.
F.R.
Ethylene
chloride
13.4
83.5
A
218.4
Ethylene
oxide
13.5
12 b
fully refrigerated
C3
Chlorine
34.6
89 b
12 Butadiene
1isnonia
33.3
1012
Oenzene
Acetylene.
84
bcy1inders
A
Acrylo
nitrile
10.85
80.1
77
APPENDIX C
of
practice,
it
paper
are taken to
mean
systematic
C4
APPENDIX C
importance are, ease of use (the user may not be totally familiar with the
basis of the model), efficiency (in terms of computing requirements), the
user's confidence in its physical basis and in its predictions. Other
desirable features may to versatility, numerical stability, and the knowledge
that it has been checked against acceptable experimental data.
Models for assessing what may happen for a clearly defined set of circum
stances may differ considerably in their predictions. One reason being that
each model makes various assumptions about the nature of the complex physical
processes involved. Often the physics of the processes are not well understood and their description in the model involves a good deal of empirical
input. This input often comes from experiments carried out on a much smaller
scale than that of concern in the industrial context. Furthermore the
appropriate scaling laws may not be well understood or cannot be completely
satisfied on a different scale. In these circumstances one approach is to
carry out 'largescale' experiments in order to provide data to, 1) enable
predictive models to be validated, 2) further the understanding of the
tests.
user may also need to know that the model is 'valid', ie. that the
predictions of the values needed to assess a particular hazard agree with the
results of representative experiments to an extent which is consistent with
the uncertainty in the available data, and the accuracy required for the
hazard assessment. The situation is by no means clear cut, and it is to be
expected that competing models will differ in the degree of validity they
have, according to the parameter that is being considered. For instance, a
model may predict one property with acceptable accuracy but may not do so for
others, or it may in achieving acceptable results for one parameter require
unrealistic values to be used for others. Perfect agreement uld not of
course be a reasonable objective and acceptable tolerances or error bands need
to be imposed from the outset.
Moffat(2) asks the question, "theri a good theory and a good experiment
differ, how much difference can be overlOoked before one must conclude that a
disagreement exists?" He concludes that the question cannot be answered until
The
it
C5
APPENDIX C
2.2 Model
Validation
rm,
The
it
for understanding the scaling properties of models and the examination of the
validity of the modelling of the physical processes and process parameters.
Finally the optimisation of empirical constants within a model by comparison
with experimental data, although not
speaking model validation, can
strictly
shed
2.3
rimental Reouirements
C6
APPENDIX C
field
isolation.
Any test data not only needs to be as comprehensive as possible within
the constraint of a budget, but it must also provide core' data which can be
used for testing as wide a range of models as possible. The test conditions
must be clearly established and defined as precisly as is practical. The
results provided should include estimates of random and systematic errors for
individual sensors, combinations of sensors, the data collection system, and
the processed information.
LOSS OF CO'rAINMENT
it
it
3.1
Partial and
Total
Losses
consecuences
of
any
C7
APPENDIX C
breach itself.
3.1.1
A
Modelling
total losses
usually minimal, however tank or vessel fragments may be projected over large
distances because a relatively high proportion of the energy released is
to the fragments.
Upon catastrophic failure the vessel's contents are assumed to be
released in two stages. An initial rapid (adiabatic) depressurisation occurs
during which the pressureenergy causes a fraction of the liquid to flash to
vapour (flash fraction). A large cloud is thus formed ccmprised of both
imparted
not necessarily
energy
C8
APPENDIX
it
sUppxDrtive.
3.1.2
either
of the
breach.
both
is
ambient,
then
further
decay of
the
it
C9
APPENDIX C
phase
propane
jet momentum and air entrainment these have not proved sufficient to prevent
buoyancy effects fran dominating, and a large flnmable heavy gas cloud has
developed at ground level.
In contrast with single phase
it
3.2
rain
The direct risk to people and nearby plant structure from fire is burning
flame or by thermal radiation. The extent of any burning cloud
by direct
do
APPENDIX C
4'
0
0
0
0.
ci
0.
0.
a-
4'
0
0
9.
LL
APPENDIX C
may be potentially
eatley
)DELLING FIRE
Fire
ENGULFED SWRAGE
T7KS
C12
APPENDIX C
-'
pit
44
VJC)
a)
CW
-4
Cl)
-4
'S
U
U
a_)
0
r-4
U
U)
00U)0
a) --4 a)
.J
.4
't0
(C)
Q ,..4
4)
I(C)LIU)
(C)>i--4
<C
U)
.)Qt1.4
s
Qua)
W'-4a)
Q4-
'
.i
-'a)
-U
c:-2
0
'n
.&J
-vU
LI
.-4
U).
LI V 1-
'0 0
U),-4>,
U)
COtC)
C
C
-.4 U)
LI
CCO.
LI
C4)
j
-i
CC
CC
4-J
'
'S
'S
CO
.-4 U)
Ca)
.-s
..4 ..4
-.1
jj
UC
,-, ...i
'
0j.ICfl
CO(I)
C-4.-4
V C.
CC
CWCO'C)
.4 ..
.u
'C)
C)
C.-4
--.4
CCC
.'
''
>
U)
C))
C))
U)
U)
-----.n
iFI .11
P--L"
4
:!:: :::::
:I!::
(Y)
U)
"
Ca)
LI
Ca)
fl
LI
.8
4)
'S
C.
4)
(0
4J
LI
4-
(C)
Cl)
-4 -.4 4)
-wa
'
'0
C1
a) --4
0
4)
-U
a)
CU)X
-4
a)
4)4)
Oc3
4)
aj
LI
C)
Ca)
.1 ..-4
.c
-.
'C
4'-lO
-0
'C
cn.-i
...
%-'
4)
I1
t:t
APPENDIX
boiling
once
capacity.
currently available models known to the author, and which assess the
thermal response of both the vessel and its contents when subjected to fire
attack, are listed in Table 2. All of the models are presented as crmpoter
packages, some of which are 'menudriven'. iarw will operate on micro's as
The
well
as mini
and
of
are
contemplated.
2 cater
be modified
the
hot gases.
The
contents.
An enhancement
in the region of
C14
APPENDIX C
as the basis for sizing pressure relief valves to cope with a fire
attack (rio account being taken of nonuniform heating effects, nor of the
practice
maximum wall
ll
of the current models assess the heat conduction through and within
the vessel walls by solving the 2D heat conduction equations in the radial
and circumferential directions, using finite difference solution procedures.
Although an alternative lD solution procedure with single nodal points in the
liquid and vapour walls is used by Ramskill(14) for analysing total fire
Most
c1s
APPENDIX C
163
changes
Operation
of the
tank
influence the
boundary
etc., can
layer,
all create
wall conduction.
nucleate
forces
transfer.
utilise npirically
implied dependence.
Sane models allow for the
an
C16
APPENDIX C
sudden
PRV
sizing practice).
4.5 Mass and Energy Conservation
a quantity of mass is lost from the vapour space through the vent
system a similar anount is evaporated off from the liquid region. In all
models this is calculated from the conservation equations for mass and energy,
Different solution
which are coupled together and solved numerically.
of
the
sets
of equations to
procedures are used depending upon the complexity
be solved, saturation conditions are assumed to. exist throughout the liquid
region during boiloff, and an appropriate saturation curve defined to
facilitate the solution procedure. This avoids numerical instabilities and
gross errors particularly when coarse time steps are used. None of the
solution procedures can be solved graically or by hand calculations.
The computer programmes predict the thermal response of the vessel and
As
Cu
APPENDIX C
contents as
PRV
temperatures.
4.6 Tank Fret
tion
Systems
at around 100C.
evaporating layer of water upon the tank surface. A uniform coverage over the
whole of the tank is implied. This may be difficult to achieve in practice,
because of wind effects, the need to ensure that all the spray nozzles are
rking properly, and structural features unique to a particular installation.
Range of Applications
The utility of a computer model is enhanced
it can be used relatively
for
a
of
fluids.
This
is
in
most
cases as the physics
easily
range
possible
of the models are general, and apply to most fluids, hydrocarbon or otherwise.
4.7
if
A range of fluid
and
in
in some
codes(14)
is the
of
gases
is given by Nylund(20).
C18
TABLE
Responsjble
Body/Author
Date
Bray
1964
Tank Size/
Sca1e
5T
ContentsEnvirorent
Water
Outdoors
Measureiients
cwr (V/L)
BFT
AARRPI
1973
l/5 scale
AAR-RPI/ABR
1973
'Full
Anderson
Proparze
scale
Outdoors
Propane Outdoors
64T
Transport
1980
1/5th scale
Canada
Propane
Outdoors
HSE/Shell
Cutler
1980/81
Water
Outdoors
Propane,
l/4T
Williams
cwr
(V/L)
IWT (V/L]
Unprotected railcar.
Tested to destruction.
BET, P, WHF JP4
FHF, Fr, FD
cwr
(V/L)
GWT
l/4T &
1981/82
Droste
lT
2T
1983
Water
Propane
Outdoors
(V/L)
G?T (V/L)
Fr, p
cwr (V/L)
Propane1
FT
'DIERS
Fauske
1983
Venart
:198386
Lab
40
Unprotected and
protected
BET, P
BET,
fuel.
1985
Billinge
1985
Freon's Indoor
Laboratory
tests
1/4T
Propane
Outdoors
BET, P
fires.
I.C, WHF
{therrnal response of
cwr (V/L)
BFT,P
Water
Indoors
cWT (V/L)
3.Om Dia.
Gases
Outdoors
P,' FT
ST
Propane
Outdoors
cwr (V/L)
1/5th scale
0.5m3
1985
Nylund
HSE/Shell/
1985/86
'Moodie
'Cowley
Water spray
protected tanks.
Nm'erous tests.
ment
fills.
PD, Th, FT
tp
l1
alk fluid
BET
P.
IC
FT
s.11
Pressure
WHF
temp
temp
FHF
PD
cells
Wall
heat flux
Fire heat flux
Flare data
Thermal radiation
VVapour LLiquid
ciq
vessel
contents.
EWI' (V/L)
BET, P, ir
WHF, FHF,
to test
Tests
FT
Davis Eng
(Explosafe)
fire.
Protected tanks
Insulations.
Nurerous tests.
:and
HSE
pool
JP4
FT
HSE/Shell
Cutler
Moodie
BET, P
FT
Appleyard
Cmnents
APPENDIX
LPG STORAGE
FIRE
JLF
EypERIMETS
engulfed.
recorded,
Vessel wall temperatures for both inner and outer surfaces ware
together with the bulk liquid and vapour temperatures, and the
also made
ben reported by
Federal Institute for Material testing, Berlin(24). Three fire tests ware
for Lp(, stored in accordance with the appropriateDIN standard, and
again vessel skin temperature variations with time ware recorded. In all
these tests tank failures occurred within 7 to 12 minutes fran the beginning
of the fires, depending upon the initial temperature of the TIG.
Recent
studies by the same orgaruisation include fire tests on water spray protected
the
canpleted
undertaken
contained
used,
it was
fitted with
Freon 11
observation
by
Venart et
capacity cylindrical
windows
at both ends
that
C20
APPENDIX C
rk
realistic total fire engulfment. The tests were conducted at an open moorland
site. Uninsulated tanks of l/4t, it and 5t capacity were tested. l/4t tanks
were used to assess the effectiveness of various types of insulation materials
also obtained
5t tests
5t tests.
Engineering(29)
report an
indoor
C21
APPENDIX C
reported.
5.1 Comments on Test Data
Collectively the experimental results currently available provide a
comprehensive data set, ranging from laboratory simulations, through to
realistic pool fire engulfment trials on propane filled tanks from l/4t to 64t
capacity. ditional data is available from fire tests with insulated tanks,
flares, water spray protected tanks, and gas filled pressure vessels.
5.1.1
Flame and
wall tesperatures
liquid.
Wall temperature measurements for unprotected pool fire engulfed LEK
tanks, at the time of failure or when was thought imminent, showed that the
vapour region walls reached peak temperatures of around 600C. The actual
values are dependent upon the internal pressure and the strength of the
vessel. This is illustrated in Table 4, which
the maximum wall temperatures and the corresponding pressures. Also given in Table 4 are the times to
PRV opening, percentage fills, initial propane loadings, and the fire heat
fluxes. The interdependence between these parameters is complex, but
generally speaking for a given heat flux, the mnaller the vessel and the lower
the percentage
then the shorter the time to failure or potential
failure. The times to initial
opening appear to be both specific heat
flow rate and test dependent, although they are similar for all the reported
it
lists
fill,
C22
APPENDIX C
TABLE 4
Surtrnary
II
il
I
I
Originator(s)
HSE
l/4t,
It,
Nauinal
40%
20%
40%
it, 80%
5t, 20%
5t. 40%
5t, 60%
5t, 80%
185
308
789
1,635
2,250
3,676
5,900
7,644
600
570
620
680
635
657
610
572
35
7
8.8
6.3
II
10
ii
11
190(1)
297
262
226
373
415
401
312
64t, 95%
121,500
650
25
160
2,820
2,820
245
573
340
2,820
460
420
660
90
it,
(Anderson
Droste
2t,
50%
50%
2t, 50%
2t,
Davis
Engineering
500
I
.98m3
800
99
101
96
104
570
13
(Enigma)
(2)
(Bray
21.9m3, 90%
19,700
'
(2)
0.51m3
1
Appleyard
i3t
AAR
100
150
only
C23
120
APPENDIX C
usually
of
the tests
in
accordance with
pressures rose
pressure
a specified code of
relatively quickly
practice.
started.
The
internal
The initial
failure occurred.
levels can
be
C24
APPENDIX C
observed
in the
ilst
it
it
C25
APPENDIX C
extent and stability of the convective flows in the liquid region. precise
laboratory simulations of field tests may help to clarify some of these
influences, particularly the consequences of asynTnetric heating, and the most
appropriate averaging procedures to
opted. They may also help to verify
scaling criteria.
The nature of the flow patterns which exist within the vessel during
field tests have not been examined to anything like the extent that they have
in the laboratory. There are considerable practical difficulties viewing
inside a tank during a fire engulfment test, and of measuring velocities and
phase compositions. Nevertheless the problu needs to be dresscd in view of
the potential benefits to be gained from such information.
alys
CCNCLtJS IONS
C26
APPENDIX C
REFERENCES
.1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
No.2, 1980.
R Bettis et aJ. "Expansion and evolution of heavy gas and particulate
clouds", J.Haz.Mats. Vol.14, pp 213232, 1987.
R C Reid "Some theories on boiling liquid expanding vapour explosions".
10
UEIEA.
1984.
Series.
11
12
13
14
15
eat1ey
of
II) in a
to model the thermal response of a tank (partiallyor) totally engulfed in
fire. UKEA Repts Nos SRD/HSE/R 354, SRD/HSE/070/WPI, 1987.
W M Rosenhow "A method of correlating beat transfer data for surface
16 D
17
18
19
20
21
22
C27
APPENDIX C
175
23
24
25
of
-175th
tanks" 4th
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
K Moodje
mt. Loss Prey. Symp. I.Chem.E. Series 82, Harrogate, UK, 1983.
"The fire engulfment of
storage tanks" I.Clem.E. Syrap.
et al
et al
AM
3irk
flare froo a
C28