Outline: Rule 15 Motions

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Lesson for September 16, 2014,

Motions
Motions in general - Rule 15
a) Definition of a motion - Sec. 1
b) Motions versus pleadings - Rule 15; Rule 6
c) Contents and forms of motions - Secs. 2, 3 & 10
d) Notice of hearing and hearing of motions Secs. 4, 5, 6 & 7
-

Aneco Realty v. Landex Development, G.R. No. 165952, July 28, 2008

KKK Foundation v. Bargas, G.R. No. 163785, December 27, 2007

Cledera v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-32450-51, June 10, 1971

Cruz v. CA, G.R. No. 123340, August 29, 2002

e) Omnibus motion rule - Sec. 8

f)

Anunciacion v. Bocanegra, G.R. No. 152496, July 30, 2009

Litigated and ex parte motions

Sec. 4, Rule 15 - e.g. Rule 16, 34, 35;
Sec. 2, Rule 15 - e.g. extension

g) Pro-forma motions
-

Marikina Valley Development Corp. v. Flojo, G.R. No. 110801, December 8, 1995

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Case Digest: Rule 15 Motions

Notice of hearing and hearing of motions
Secs. 4, 5, 6 & 7
ANECO REALTY vs LANDEX DEVELOPMENT
G.R. No. 165952, July 28, 2008
Facts:
FHDI was the original owner of the land located
in Quezon City. The land was subdivided. Thereafter, 22
lots was then sold to the petitioner and the 7 lots was sold
the respondent.
The dispute arose from the construction of wall
by the respondent in one of its lot. To refrain the
construction, the petitioner now filed a complaint for
injunction and subsequently filed 2 supplemental
complaint seeking to demolish newly-constructed wall
plus 2 million for damages.
The respondent filed its answer, alleging, among
others, that Aneco was not deprived access to its lots due
to the construction of the concrete wall. Landex claimed
that Aneco has its own entrance to its property along
Miller Street, Resthaven Street, and San Francisco del
Monte Street. The Resthaven access, however, was
rendered inaccessible when Aneco constructed a building
on said street. Landex also claimed that FHDI sold
ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, to Aneco based on the
express stipulation in the deed of sale that FHDI was not
interested in pursuing its own subdivision project.
RTC granted the injunction. Landex filed a motion
for reconsideration. Records reveal that Landex failed to
include a notice of hearing in its motion for
reconsideration as required under Section 5, Rule 15 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Realizing the defect,
Landex later filed a motion setting a hearing for its motion
for reconsideration. Aneco countered with a motion for
execution claiming that the RTC decision is already final
and executory.
Acting on the motion of Landex, the RTC set a
hearing on the motion for reconsideration on August 28,
1996. Aneco failed to attend the slated hearing. The RTC
gave Aneco additional time to file a comment on the
motion for reconsideration. The RTC now ruled in favor of
Landex.
Then petitioner appealed before the CA. The CA
affirmed the order of the RTC. Aneco moved for
reconsideration but was denied.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Held:
No. Section 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure requires a notice of hearing for a contested
motion filed in court. Records disclose that the motion for
reconsideration filed by Landex of the RTC decision did
not contain a notice of hearing. There is no dispute that
the motion for reconsideration is defective. The RTC and
the CA ignored the procedural defect and ruled on the
substantive issues raised by Landex in its motion for
reconsideration. The issue before Us is whether or not the
RTC and the CA correctly exercised its discretion in
ignoring the procedural defect. Simply put, the issue is
whether or not the requirement of notice of hearing
should be strictly or liberally applied under the
circumstances.
Aneco bats for strict construction. It cites a litany
of cases which held that notice of hearing is mandatory. A
motion without the required notice of hearing is a mere
scrap of paper. It does not toll the running of the period
to file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration. It is
argued that the original RTC decision is already final and
executory because of the defective motion.
Landex counters for liberal construction. It
similarly cites a catena of cases which held that
procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of
substantial justice. Landex asserts that the procedural
defect was cured when it filed a motion setting a hearing
for its motion for reconsideration. It is claimed that Aneco
was properly informed of the pending motion for
reconsideration and it was not deprived of an opportunity
to be heard.
Here, We find that the RTC and the CA soundly
exercised their discretion in opting for a liberal rather
than a strict application of the rules on notice of hearing.
It must be stressed that there are no vested right to
technicalities. It is within the courts sound discretion to
relax procedural rules in order to fully adjudicate the
merits of a case. This Court will not interfere with the
exercise of that discretion absent grave abuse or palpable
error. Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure even mandates a liberal construction of the
rules to promote their objectives of securing a just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in
liberally applying the rule on notice of hearing under
Section 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

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Notice of hearing and hearing of motions
Secs. 4, 5, 6 & 7
KKK FOUNDATION vs BARGAS
G.R. No. 163785, December 27, 2007
Facts:
The petitioner KKK Foundation, Inc. filed a
complaint for Annulment of Extra-judicial Foreclosure of
Real Estate Mortgage and/or Nullification of Sheriffs
Auction Sale and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and writ of preliminary
injunction.
Petitioner
alleged
that:
(1) the auction sale was made with fraud and/or bad faith
since there was no public bidding;
(2) the sheriff did not post the requisite Notice of Sheriffs
Sale;
(3) the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure was fatally
defective since it sought to foreclose properties of two
different entities;
(4) the foreclosed properties were awarded and sold to
Imelda A. Angeles for an inadequate bid of only
P4,181,450; and
(5) the auction sale involved eight parcels of land covered
by individual titles but the same were sold en masse.
Judge Adelina Calderon-Bargas issued a
temporary restraining order preventing Angeles from
consolidating her ownership to the foreclosed properties.
On even date, petitioner and Angeles executed a
Compromise Agreement wherein petitioner agreed to pay
Angeles the bid price of the eight parcels of land within 20
days. The parties then filed a Motion to Approve
Compromise Agreement.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Recall Compromise Agreement. It was denied on the
ground that it failed to comply with sec 4 and 5 of rules in
civil procedures.
The RTC approved the compromise agreement.
Angeles moved for writ of execution. It was granted .
Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner appealed on the ground that the judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess jurisdiction.
The CA ruled in favor of the respondent.
Issue:

CIVIL PROCEDURE
of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15of the Rules of Court is
considered a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of
Court has no right to receive and the trial court has no
authority to act upon.
Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice
of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a
mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to
comply with these requirements renders their motions
fatally defective. However, there are exceptions to the
strict application of this rule.
These exceptions are: (1) where a rigid
application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage
of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the
alleged defect in the questioned final and executory
judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals
contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial
justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the
motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious
discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the
adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.
A notice of hearing is an integral component of
procedural due process to afford the adverse parties a
chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the
court. Through such notice, the adverse party is given
time to study and answer the arguments in the motion.
Records show that while Angeless Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution contained a notice of hearing, it did not
particularly state the date and time of the hearing.
However, we still find that petitioner was not denied
procedural due process. Upon receiving the Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution, the trial court issued an
Order dated September 9, 2002 giving petitioner ten (10)
days to file its comment. The trial court ruled on the
motion only after the reglementary period to file
comment lapsed. Clearly, petitioner was given time to
study and comment on the motion for which reason, the
very purpose of a notice of hearing had been achieved.
The notice requirement is not a ritual to be
followed blindly. Procedural due process is not based
solely on a mechanical and literal application that renders
any deviation inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural rules
are liberally construed to promote their objective and to
assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of any action and proceeding.

Whether the trial court erred in in granting the

Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution although it
lacked the requisite notice of hearing.
Held:
No. Anent the second issue, we have consistently
held that a motion which does not meet the requirements

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Notice of hearing and hearing of motions
Secs. 4, 5, 6 & 7
CLEDERA vs SARMIENTO
G.R. No. L-32450-51, June 10, 1971
Facts:
This case is about the order issued by the
respondent judge giving due course to and granting the
motion for reconsideration, allegedly defective for want
of notice of hearing filed by private respondents herein as
Petitioners.
The private respondents herein were employees
of the provincial government of Camarines Sur and paid
under the plantilla of personnel of the road and bridge
fund budget.
The provincial board of province of Camarines
Sur passed a resolution which approved the road and
bridge fund budget of the province for the fiscal year
1968-1969 and abolished the positions of herein private
residents, who as a consequence filed Civil Cases before
the respondent judge sitting at Naga for prohibition
and/or mandamus with damages seeking their
reinstatement and payment of back salaries as well as the
restoration of their respective positions previously
occupied by them in the plantilla of personnel of the road
and bridge fund budget.
After the pre-trial, the parties were given five (5)
days from July 14, 1969 or until July 19, 1969 to submit
their respective memoranda, after which the two cases
would be deemed submitted for decision
Private respondents filed a motion to re-open
the cases and to allow them to present additional
evidence consisting of the budget and plantilla of
personnel of the road and bridge fund for the fiscal year
1969-70 to which on July 25, 1969 herein petitioners filed
an opposition dated July 24 1969.
Respondent Judge denied the said motion of
herein private respondents seeking to reopen the two
cases.
Private respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order dated September
10, 1969, which motion does not contain any notice at all
setting the time, date and place of hearing.
Private respondents filed a request addressed to
the clerk of court to set for hearing on November 24,
1969, Respondent Judge issued an order requiring herein
petitioners to submit within five (5) days from receipt
their opposition to herein private respondents' motion for
reconsideration of the order dated September 10, 1969,
but Assistant Provincial Fiscal Enrique Amador did not file
any opposition to the aforesaid motion for
reconsideration.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Respondent judge issued its order, reopened the
two cases and allowed them to present their evidences.
The respondent judge rendered a decision in favor of the
respondents declaring the resolution null and void.
The Provincial Fiscal as counsel for herein
petitioners received a copy of the aforesaid decision of
April 27, 1970.
The petitioners, through Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Enrique A. Amador, filed a 15 page motion dated
June 6, 1970 for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision
together with a notice of hearing address to the clerk of
court.
Private respondents filed a motion for execution
on the ground that the decision had already become final
since no appeal therefrom had been interposed and
perfected by herein petitioners within thirty (30) days
from their receipt on May 12, 1970 of the aforesaid
decision.
Petitioner filed their opposition on the ground
that they had complied with Sec. 2 of Rule 37 in
connection with Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Respondent Judge granted herein private
respondents motion for execution, relying on the cases of
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Bath Construction,
Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Co.,Magno vs.
Ortiz, in Re Disciplinary Action vs. Atty. Vicente Raul
AImacen in L-27654, Cal ero vs. Yaptinchay, and Sebastian
vs. Cabal, et al., where this High Tribunal repeatedly
enunciated that the requirements of Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory in relation to
See. 2 of Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion for
reconsideration of the said order which granted the
motion for execution.
The branch clerk issued a writ of execution. The
petitioner filed a supplement to their urgent motion. The
respondent judge denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
contending that respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in considering the subject motion for
reconsideration a mere scrap of paper, and that "what the
law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the
absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be
heard" citing Borja vs. Tan, Duran Embate vs. Penolio and
Sun, Un Giok vs. Matusa.
Issue:
Whether the notice accompanying the motion
dated June 6, 1970 and filed on June 8, 1970 for the
reconsideration of the decision dated April 27, 1970,
complies with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 37 in
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relation to Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Held:
No. but the deficiency of the notice of hearing in
the case was cured when the clerk of court set the
motion for hearing and the court took cognizance of the
motion on the date set for hearing thereof by the clerk
of court.
In the 1960 Canonoy case, counsel for the
defendants received a copy of the order of dismissal on
October 7, 1955, and on October 31, they moved to
reconsider the said Order. The motion for reconsideration
did not contain a notice of hearing, but on December 6,
1956, a motion was presented asking the clerk of court to
set the motion for reconsideration for hearing on
December 22. The motion was opposed on the ground
that it contained no notice of hearing and therefore
should be considered as a mere scrap of paper, which did
not toll the running of the period for the judgment to
become final. Nevertheless, the court reconsidered and
set aside its order of dismissal.
It is patent in the Canonoy case that the failure
on the part of counsel to set the date of hearing of his
motion was not due to neglect or negligence on his part
but because he could not do so as he did not know the
date or the month when the next yearly section of the
court in Pagadlian would take place as there was no
showing that at the time he filed his motion the court had
already fixed the date for the next term.
It is evident therefore that the circumstances
which compelled the court to regard the notice of hearing
in the Matusa case; as having been remedied or which
justified the failure inability of the counsel in the Canonoy
case to fix a date for the hearing of his motion, dip not
obtain in the instant case. Here, the clerk of court did not
set the motion of herein petitioners for reconsideration of
the decision for hearing on a definite date, much less did
the respondent Judge take cognizance of the said motion
for reconsideration. And the respondent Judge holds
hearing every business day throughout the year in Naga
City, unlike the Judge in the Canonoy case.
Neither did herein private respondents file an
opposition to the aforementioned motion of herein
petitioners for the reconsideration of the decision, so as
to bring the case at bar within the purview of the doctrine
in the case of Macasero vs. Saguin; 23 much less were the
merits of the said motion for reconsideration of the
decision argued. The hearing and argument were limited
to the motion for the reconsideration of the order
granting the motion for execution.
Withal, the facts in the instant case do not justify
a liberal application of the rules.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
To emphasize once more, the directives in
Section 2 of Rule 37 and Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 5 of
the Revised Rules of Court are as mandatory as they are
clear and simple; and non compliance therewith is fatal to
the cause of the movant, because the mere filing of the
motion for reconsideration, without the requisite notice
of hearing, does not toll the running of the period for
appeal. Unless the movant has the time and place of
hearing in the notice and serves the adverse party with
the same, the court would have no way to determine
whether the party agrees to or objects to the motion, and
if he objects to hear him on his objection, since the rules
themselves do not fix any period within which to file his
reply or opposition. The rules commanding the movant to
serve of the adverse party a written notice of the motion
(Section 2, Rule 37) and that the notice of hearing "shall
be directed to the parties concerned, and shall estate the
time and place for the hearing of the motion" (Section 5,
Rule 15), do not provide for any qualifications, much less
exceptions. To deviate from the peremptory principle
thus uniformly reaffirmed in the cases aforecited in, and
to exempt from the rigor of the operation of said
principle, the case at bar would be one step in the
emasculation of the revised rules and would be
subversive of the stability of the rules and jurisprudence
thereon all to the consternation of the Bench and Bar
and other interested persons as well as the general public
who would thereby be subjected to such an irritating
uncertainty as to when to render obedience to the rule
and when their requirements may be ignored. We had to
draw a line where and did when we promulgated on
January 1, 1964 the Revised Rules of court wherein WE
delineated in a language matchless in simplicity and
clarity the essential requirements for a valid notice of
hearing on any motion, to eliminate all possibilities of
equivocation or misunderstanding.

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Case Digest: Rule 15 Motions

Notice of hearing and hearing of motions
Secs. 4, 5, 6 & 7
CRUZ vs CA
G.R. No. 123340, August 29, 2002
Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Manila charged petitioner
with the crime of "Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Document" before the Manila Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner executed before a Notary Public in the City of
Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land
stating that she was the sole surviving heir of the
registered owner when in fact she knew there were other
surviving heirs. Since the offended party did not reserve
the right to file a separate civil action arising from the
criminal offense, the civil action was deemed instituted in
the criminal case.
The trial court rendered its decision dated
January 17, 1994 acquitting petitioner on the ground of
reasonable doubt and also a decision rendering judgment
on the civil aspect of the case, ordering the return to the
surviving heirs of the parcel of land.
On January 28, 1994, petitioner received a copy
of the decision. On February 10, 1994, petitioner filed by
registered mail a motion for reconsideration dated
February 7, 1994, assailing the trial courts ruling on the
civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner furnished the
City Prosecutor a copy of the motion by registered mail.
On, April 18, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration
stating:
"Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February
7, 1994, filed by the accused through counsel and
considering that there is nothing to show that the Office
of the City Prosecutor was actually furnished or served
with a copy of the said Motion for Reconsideration within
the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from receipt
by the accused on January 28, 1994 of a copy of the
Courts decision dated January 17, 1994, so that the same
is already final and executory, let the Motion for
Reconsideration be Denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the
trial courts order of April 18, 1994 but was denied denied
the same in an order to wit: "Under the Interim Rules, no
party shall be allowed a second motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment (Sec. 4). The
motion of accused dated 22 April 1994 is a violation of
this rule. WHEREFORE, said motion is DENIED."
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the Court of Appeals to nullify the two
assailed orders of the trial court. Petitioner also asked the
Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to resolve her
motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied

CIVIL PROCEDURE
due course to the petition and dismissed the case for
being insufficient in substance.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts
order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial
courts order denying the subsequent motion for
reconsideration, as follows: ". . ., while there is merit in
petitioners submission that the motion for
reconsideration dated April 22, 1994 was not a second
motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment,
as contemplated in the Interim Rules because the motion
sought to impugn the order dated 18 April 1994 not on
the basis of the issues raised in the motion for
reconsideration dated 07 February 1994 but on the
erroneous legal conclusion of the order dated May 6,
1994, 8 this is already academic. The decision dated
January 7, 1994 had long become final when the second
motion for reconsideration was filed on 03 May 1994.
Hence, the pairing Judge who issued the order on 06 May
1994 had no more legal competence to promulgate the
same."
The Court of Appeals upheld the assailed
decision of the trial court on the civil aspect denying the
instant petition and dismissing the case.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners motion for
reconsideration dated February 7, 1994 complied with the
mandatory requirements of Section 6, Rule 15 on proof of
service. No!
Held:
Absence of Proof of Service
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals
erred in sustaining the trial courts finding that the City
Prosecutor was not duly and timely furnished with
petitioners motion for reconsideration of February 7,
1994.
Petitioner asserts that both copies of the motion
for reconsideration were sent to the trial court and the
City Prosecutor by registered mail on February 10, 1994.
Petitioner relies on jurisprudence that the date of mailing
is the date of filing, arguing that the date of mailing of
both motions was on February 10, 1994. Petitioner
maintains that the motion was properly filed within the
15-day period, citing the registry return card which shows
actual receipt on February 22, 1994 by the City Prosecutor
of a copy of the motion.
The Court of Appeals, noting that petitioner
received a copy of the decision on January 28, 1994,
stated that petitioner had until February 12, 1994 to
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Case Digest: Rule 15 Motions

appeal the decision or file a motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner, by filing a
motion for reconsideration without any proof of service,
merely filed a scrap of paper and not a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the reglementary period of
petitioner to appeal continued to run and lapsed after the
15-day period, making the trial courts decision final and
executory.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of
Appeals that petitioner patently failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements on proof of service insofar as
the public prosecutor is concerned. The Court has
stressed time and again that non-compliance with
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 is a fatal defect. The wellsettled rule is that a motion which fails to comply with
Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 is a useless piece of paper.
If filed, such motion is not entitled to judicial cognizance
and does not stop the running of the reglementary period
for filing the requisite pleading.
Section 6 of Rule 15: "SEC. 6. Proof of service to be
filed with motions. No motion shall be acted upon by
the court, without proof of service of the notice thereof."
From the language of the rule, proof of service is
mandatory. Without such proof of service to the adverse
party, a motion is nothing but an empty formality
deserving no judicial cognizance.
Section 13 of Rule 13 further requires that: "SEC.
13. Proof of Service. . . . If service is made by registered
mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the
registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry
return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by
the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter
together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice
given by the postmaster to the addressee."
If service is by registered mail, proof of service
consists of the affidavit of the person mailing and the
registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the
motion. Absent one or the other, or worse both, there is
no proof of service.
In the instant case, an examination of the record
shows that petitioner received a copy of the trial courts
decision of January 17, 1994 on January 28, 1994. Within
the reglementary period to appeal, petitioner filed on
February 10, 1994, by registered mail, a motion for
reconsideration. However, petitioner failed to attach both
the affidavit and the registry receipt to the motion for
reconsideration as required by the Rules.
The defect of the motion is apparent on its face.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was a mere scrap
of paper as it did not contain the required proof of
service.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Omnibus motion rule - Sec. 8
ANUNCIACION vs BOCANEGRA
G.R. No. 152496, July 30, 2009
Facts:
Petitioners filed before the RTC, Manila, a
complaint for Quieting of Title and Cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Title. The complaint averred that
defendants (respondents) may be served with summons
and legal processes through Atty. Rogelio G. Pizarro, Jr.,
with office address at 2830 Juan Luna St., Tondo,
Manila. The summons, together with the copies of the
complaint, were then served on Atty. Pizarro. The record
shows that before the filing of the said complaint, Atty.
Pizarro wrote a demand letter on behalf of respondents
and addressed to petitioner German Anunciacion, among
others, demanding that they vacate the land owned by his
clients (respondents), who needed the same for their own
use.
Respondents, through their counsel, Atty. Norby
C. Caparas, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that the complaint stated no cause of action. Petitioners
filed their Comment on the Motion to Dismiss.
A Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Reply to
the Comment on the Motion to Dismiss was filed by
respondents, alleging an additional ground that
petitioners failed to pay the required filing fee. The
petitioners filed their Opposition to the Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss and Comment to the Reply to the
Comment on the Motion to Dismiss.
Respondents filed a Second Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss and Manifestation on the grounds (1)
that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party, (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the claim, and (3) that the pleading
asserting the claim states no cause of action.
Petitioners then filed their Additional Comment
on the Motion to Dismiss, Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss and Comment on the Second Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss.
In its order, the trial court sustained the
respondents and dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of respondents as
defendants.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari, seeking the nullification of the RTC
Orders on the ground that the said orders were issued
with grave abuse of discretion.
The CA dismissed the petition upon finding that
there was no waiver of the ground of lack of jurisdiction
on the part of respondents in the form of voluntary
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appearance. Applying Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the CA held that although the
grounds alleged in the two (2) earlier Motion to Dismiss
and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss were lack of cause of
action and failure to pay the required filing fee, the filing
of the said motions did not constitute a waiver of the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on their persons as
defendants. The CA then concluded that there was no
voluntary
appearance
on
the
part
of
respondents/defendants despite the filing of the
aforesaid motions. The CA also rejected petitioners'
contention that the service made to Atty. Rogelio Pizarro,
Jr. was deemed service upon respondents/defendants
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the
decision but was denied by the CA.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals
erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction when it considered that the
respondents three (3) motions are being treated as
omnibus motion and are covered by Section 20 Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Yes!
Held:
The Supreme Court found merit in the petition.
Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil: Sec. 20.
Voluntary Appearance The defendant's voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.
The filing of the above-mentioned Motion to
Dismiss, without invoking the lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the respondents, is deemed a voluntary
appearance on the part of the respondents under the
aforequoted provision of the Rules. The same conclusion
can be drawn from the filing of the Supplemental Motion
to Dismiss and Reply to the Comment on the Motion to
Dismiss which alleged, as an additional ground for the
dismissal of petitioners' complaint, the failure of plaintiffs
to pay the required filing fee again but failed to raise the
alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court over the person of
the respondents.
It was only in respondents' Second Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss dated November 27, 2000 that
respondents for the first time raised the court's lack of
jurisdiction over their person as defendants on the ground
that summons were allegedly not properly served upon
them. The filing of the said Second Supplemental Motion
to Dismiss did not divest the court of its jurisdiction over

CIVIL PROCEDURE
the person of the respondents who had earlier voluntarily
appeared before the trial court by filing their motion to
dismiss and the supplemental motion to dismiss.
The dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondents
after they had voluntarily appeared before the trial court
clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the RTC.
Quite apart from their voluntary appearance,
respondents' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Second
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss were clearly in violation
of Rule 15, Section 8 in relation to Rule 9, Section 1 of the
Rules.
Rule 15, Section 8 of the Rules provides: Sec. 8.
Omnibus motion. Subject to the provisions of Section 1
of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment,
or proceeding shall include all objections then available,
and all objections not so included shall be deemed
waived.
Rule 9, Section 1, in turn, states: Sec. 1. Defenses and
objections not pleaded. - Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same
cause, or that the action is barred by prior judgment or by
statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Applying the foregoing rules, respondents' failure
to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over their persons
in their very first motion to dismiss was fatal to their
cause. They are already deemed to have waived that
particular ground for dismissal of the complaint. The trial
court plainly abused its discretion when it dismissed the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendants. Under the Rules, the only
grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if not
pleaded in the motion to dismiss or answer, are: (a) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence of
another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of
limitations.
The Supreme Court likewise cannot approve the
trial court's act of entertaining supplemental motions to
dismiss which raise grounds that are already deemed
waived. To do so would encourage lawyers and litigants to
file piecemeal objections to a complaint in order to delay
or frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiff's cause of
action.
Although the Court of Appeals correctly observed
that Atty. Pizarro, as the lawyer of the respondents in the
demand letters, does not per se make him their
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Case Digest: Rule 15 Motions

representative for purposes of the present action, a
scrutiny of the record shows that the address of Atty.
Pizarro and Atty. Norby Caparas, Jr., (the counsel who
eventually entered his appearance for respondents) is the
same. This circumstance leads us to believe that
respondents' belated reliance on the purported improper
service of summons is a mere afterthought, if not a bad
faith ploy to avoid answering the complaint.
The petition was granted.

Pro-forma motions
MARIKINA VALLEY DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs FLOJO
G.R. No. 110801, December 8, 1995

Facts:
Jose Reyes Sytangco instituted a complaint for
reconveyance of a piece of land against petitioner
Marikina Valley Development Corporation (Marikina
Valley) and Milagros Liamzon. In his complaint, Jose Reyes
Sytangco alleged that he and his wife, Aurelia LiamzonSytangco, had entrusted some-funds to Milagros Liamzon,
sister-in-law of Aurelia, in order to purchase the property
from its former owners. The Sytangco spouses had years
ago built their house on that parcel of land then leased
from the original owners with whom they negotiated for
purchase of that land. Milagros Liamzon, however, in
alleged violation of the trust reposed upon her, purchased
the property in her own name and had title to the same
registered in her name. Thereafter, she transferred title
over that property to petitioner Marikina Valley, a closed
corporation owned by the Liamzon family.
In their answer, petitioner denied the allegations
of Jose Reyes Sytangco and claimed that Milagros Liamzon
had purchased the property by and for herself, with funds
coming from petitioner Marikina Valley. For her part,
Milagros Liamzon insisted, among other things, that the
Reyes Sytangco spouses had waived in her favor their
right to buy the property in question.
During the trial in the court below, Jose Reyes
Sytangco died and he was substituted by his heirs, who
are private respondents herein. The trial court ruled in
favor of private respondent heirs. The trial court directed
petitioners Marikina Valley to execute a Deed of
Conveyance covering the property involved in favor of
private respondents.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Marikina Valley and the other petitioners heirs
of Milagros Liamzon (Milagros having, in the meantime,
passed away) received a copy of the decision of the
trial court. Petitioners moved for reconsideration.
The Reyes Sytangco heirs opposed petitioners
motion for reconsideration upon the ground that it was a
proforma one. The heirs contended that the allegations of
insufficiency of evidence were couched in very general
terms, contrary to the requirements of Section 2, Rule 37
of the Rules of Court.
The trial court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioners received a
copy of trial courts order of denial.They filed a notice of
appeal with the trial court. Private respondent heirs
moved for execution of the decision. They insisted that
petitioners had failed to perfect an appeal within the
reglementary period.
The trial court dismissed the notice of appeal
filed by petitioners for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period to perfect an appeal. The trial judge
reasoned that petitioners motion for reconsideration was
proforma and hence did not stop the running of the
reglementary period. The trial judge granted private
respondents motions for execution.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals
on certiorari and injunction. They denied that their
motion for reconsideration was merely proforma and
claimed that they had filed their notice of appeal
seasonably. They also challenged the validity of
subsequent orders of the trial court directing execution.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition,
declaring that petitioners motion for reconsideration was
indeed proforma and, "therefore, clearly without merit."
The appellate court went on to say that: "[w]here a
motion for reconsideration merely submits, reiterates,
repleads, repeats, or reaffirms the same arguments that
had been previously considered and resolved in the
decision, it is pro forma."
The Court of Appeals concluded that petitioners
proforma motion for reconsideration had not stopped the
running of the period to perfect an appeal and that,
accordingly, the judgment had become final and private
respondents were entitled to execution as a matter of
right. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals decision, without success.
In their present Petition for Review on Certiorari,
petitioners aver once more that their motion for
reconsideration filed before the trial court was sufficient
in form and substance and was not proforma. They
reiterate that their motion had effectively suspended the
running of the reglementary period, and that their notice
of appeal filed three (3) days from receipt of the order

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Case Digest: Rule 15 Motions

denying their motion for reconsideration had been filed
well within the remaining period to perfect an appeal.
The rule in our jurisdiction is that a party
aggrieved by a decision of a trial court may move to set
aside the decision and reconsideration thereof may be
granted when (a) the judgment had awarded "excessive
damages:" (b) there was "insufficiency of the evidence to
justify the decision;" or (c) "the decision was against the
law."
A motion for reconsideration based on ground
(b) or (c) above must "point out specifically the findings
and conclusions of the judgment which are not supported
by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making
express reference to the testimonial or documentary
evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary
to such findings and conclusions."
A motion for reconsideration, when sufficient in
form and substance that is, when it satisfies the
requirements of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court
interrupts the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
A motion for reconsideration that does not comply with
those requirements will, upon the other hand, be treated
as proforma intended merely to delay the proceedings
and as such, the motion will not stay or suspend the
reglementary period. The net result will be dismissal of
the appeal for having been unseasonably filed.
Issue:
Whether or not a motion for reconsideration is
properly regarded as having satisfied the requirements,
noted above, of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court and not a
proforma motion. Yes!
Held:
As already pointed out, the Court of Appeals took
the position that where a motion for reconsideration
merely "reiterates" or "repleads" the same arguments
which had been previously considered and resolved in the
decision sought to be reconsidered, the motion is a
proforma one.
It should, however, be noted that the
circumstance that a motion for reconsideration deals with
the same issues and arguments posed and resolved by the
trial court in its decisions does not necessarily mean that
the motion must be characterized as merely proforma.
More than two (2) decades ago, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
had occasion, in Guerra Enterprises Company, Inc. v.
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur, to point out that a
pleader preparing a motion for reconsideration must of
necessity address the arguments made or accepted by the
trial court in its decision: ". . . Among the ends to which a
motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely
to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and

CIVIL PROCEDURE
improper, contrary to the law or the evidence (Rule 37,
Section 1, subsection [c]); and in doing so the movant has
to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the
court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss
these issues, the consequence would be that after a
decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined
to filing only motions for reopening and new trial. We find
in the Rules of Court no warrant for ruling to that effect, a
ruling that would, in effect eliminate subsection (c) of
Section 1 of Rule 37."
The movant is very often confined to the
amplification or further discussion of the same issues
already passed upon by the trial court. Otherwise, his
remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision,
but a new trial or some other remedy.
The kinds of motions for reconsideration which
have been regarded as merely proforma are illustrated by
Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 10 where a one sentence
motion for reconsideration, which read thus:
COMES NOW the petitioners-appellants in the
above-entitled case and to this Honorable Court
respectfully move for reconsideration of the decision
promulgated on November 8, 1966, copy of which was
received by the undersigned on November 9, 1966, on the
ground that the same is contrary to law and evidence,"
was considered a proforma motion for total failure to
specify the findings or conclusions in the trial courts
decision which were supposedly not supported by
evidence or were contrary to law. Similarly, in Villarica v.
Court of Appeals, a motion for reconsideration which no
more than alleged the following: "1) that the order is
contrary to law; and 2) that the order is contrary to the
facts of the case,"
did not suspend the running of the period for
appeal, being a proforma motion merely. These kinds of
motion present no difficulty at all.
A motion for reconsideration which is not as
starkly bare as in Crisostomo and in Villarica, but which, as
it were, has some flesh on its bones, may nevertheless be
rendered proforma where the movant fails to make
reference to the testimonial and documentary evidence
on record or the provisions of law said to be contrary to
the trial courts conclusions. In other words, the movant is
also required to point out succinctly why reconsideration
is warranted. In Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Court of
Industrial Relations, the Supreme Court declared that: "it
is not enough that a motion for reconsideration should
state what part of the decision is contrary to law or the
evidence; it should also point out why it is so. Failure to
explain why will render the motion for reconsideration
proforma.
Where a substantial bonafide effort is made to
explain where and why the trial court should be regarded
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Case Digest: Rule 15 Motions

as having erred in its main decision, the fact that the trial
court thereafter found such argument unmeritorious or as
inadequate to warrant modification or reversal of the
main decision, does not, of course, mean that the motion
for reconsideration should have been regarded, or was
properly regarded, as merely proforma.
It is important to note that the above case law
rests upon the principle that a motion for reconsideration
which fails to comply with the requirements of Sections 1
(c) and 2 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, and is therefore
proforma merely, has no other purpose than to gain time.
It is intended to delay or impede the progress of
proceedings and the rule that such motion for
reconsideration does not stop the period of appeal from
"slipping away" reflects both poetic and substantial
justice. In Estrada, Et. Al. v. Sto. Domingo, Et Al., the Court
underlined "[T]he principle [previously] forged by this
Court that a motion for reconsideration which has no
other purpose than to gain time is proforma and does not
stop the period of appeal from slipping away. It is in
recognition of this doctrine that we hold that where a
motion for reconsideration in an election case is taken
advantage of for purposes of delay to the prejudice of the
adverse party or where such motion forms part of a
matrix of delay, that motion does not stop running of the
five-day period for appeal."
Where the circumstances of a case do not show
an intent on the part of the movant merely to delay the
proceedings, our Court has refused to characterize the
motion as simply proforma.
In paragraph (a) of their motion, petitioners
claimed that the evidence submitted was insufficient to
show that the downpayment for the purchase of the
property had in fact come from private respondents
predecessor-in-interest Jose Reyes Sytangco. In effect,
petitioners here aver that the presumption of regularity of
private transactions carried out in the ordinary course of
business had not been overturned by the testimony of
Jose Reyes Sytangco himself. This reflected petitioners
appraisal of the trial courts conclusion that Jose and
Aurelia Reyes Sytangco had handed over to Milagros
Liamzon the amount of P41,000.00 to complete the
downpayment of the Reyes Sytangco spouses on the
Espaa lot. The trial court had not discussed the
presumption of regularity of private transactions invoked
by petitioners.
In paragraph (b) of their motion, Petitioners,
building upon their paragraph (a), argued that since the
money used to pay the property did not belong to the
plaintiff, no constructive trust arose between Jose Reyes
Sytangco and Milagros Liamzon. Petitioners further argue
that assuming that the money for the downpayment had
really come from the Reyes Sytangco spouses, the rest of

CIVIL PROCEDURE
the payments on the Espaa property had been made by
Milagros Liamzon. Accordingly, they argue that the Reyes
Sytangco spouses would be entitled only to
reimbursement of the downpayment and not to
reconveyance of the property itself. The trial court had
not addressed this argument in its decision; the trial judge
had found Milagros Liamzons testimony concerning
whose money had been used in the purchase of the lot as
"filled with contradictions" which seriously impaired her
credibility.
The third argument of petitioners in their motion
assailed the reliance of the trial court upon the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil by asserting that that doctrine
was available only in cases where the corporation itself
had been created the purposes of fraud. Implicitly,
petitioners argue that no evidence had been submitted to
show that Marikina Valley had been created precisely "for
purposes of fraud." The trial court had not touched on
this argument. In paragraph (d) of their motion,
petitioners aver that the ejectment suit instituted by them
had been decided in their favor. The trial courts decision
had not mentioned such an ejectment suit.
The Supreme Court is, therefore, unable to
characterize the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners as simply proforma. That motion for
reconsideration, it may be noted, had been filed no more
than ten (10) days after receipt of the trial courts decision
by petitioner Marikina Valley.
It is scarcely necessary to add that our conclusion
that petitioners motion was not proforma, should not be
regarded as implying however indirectly that that motion
was meritorious.
The Supreme Court note finally that because the
doctrine relating to proforma motions for reconsideration
impacts upon the reality and substance of the statutory
right of appeal, that doctrine should be applied
reasonably, rather than literally. The right to appeal,
where it exists, is an important and valuable right. Public
policy would be better served by according the appellate
court an affective opportunity to review the decision of
the trial court on the merits, rather than by aborting the
right to appeal by a literal application of the procedural
rule relating to proforma motions for reconsideration.
The orders of the trial court and the decision of
the Court of Appeals were reversed and set aside. The
case was REMANDED to the trial court which was directed
to give due course to petitioners notice of appeal.

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