LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS.

COURT OF APPEALS
December 7, 1995
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA
No. 4850 in order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and
sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and balanced
growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies
have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to
check
the
same.
EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA
and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term
Laguna
de
Bay
Region.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the
municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing
privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides:
Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in
the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens &
fish
cages
to
the
consternation
of
the
LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen
operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore
municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the
current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages &
other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31,
1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to
demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal
Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged
with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally
constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising
them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be
effected.
Issues:
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the
Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery
privileges
is
concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?

Held:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD
813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any
projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA
7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges on municipal waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily
repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights
authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter
should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the
general statute.The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general
law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be
given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed,
amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue
purposes. On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for
fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of
effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and
for lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police
power which is the most pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all
state powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the
LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over
the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in
respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease and desist order
and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and
other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the
LLDA, RA 4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction
to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the
exclusion of municipalities situated thereinand the authority to exercise such
powers as are by its charter vested on it.

OPOSA V. FACTORAN
Facts:
A taxpayers class suit was initiated by the Philippine Ecological Network
Incorporated (PENI) together with the minors Oposa and their parents. All
were duly represented. They claimed that as taxpayers they have the right to
the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the countrys
rainforests. They prayed that a judgment be rendered ordering Honorable
Factoran Jr, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving
new
timber
license
agreements.
Issue:
Whether

or

not

petitioners

have

cause

of

action?

Held:
Yes, petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common
interest to all Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said
right implies the judicious management of the countrys forests. This right is
also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of
that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be
revoked
or
rescinded
by
executive
action.
Facts:
The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents, filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements
(TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. This
case is filed not only on the appellants right as taxpayers, but they are also
suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility in so far as the right to a balanced and
healthful
ecology
is
concerned.
Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners
presented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earths capacity
to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the greenhouse effect.
Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the
plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendants office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs. The defendant,
however,
fails
and
refuses
to
cancel
existing
TLAs.

Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case
Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can
render a valid judgement in accordance to the prayer of the complaints
Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing
that these cancellation of these TLAs are against the non-impairment clause
of
the
Constitution
Held:
The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers
(class) suit. The subject matter of complaint is of common and general
interest to all the citizens of the Philippines. The court found difficulty in ruling
that the appellants can, for themselves, and for others file a class suit.
The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has been
clearly stated. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a
cause of action. The granting of the TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done
with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology hence, the full protection thereof requires that no TLAs should be
renewed or granted. The appellants have also submitted a document with the
sub-header CAUSE OF ACTION which is adequate enough to show, prima
facie, the violation of their rights. On this basis, these actions must therefore
be
granted,
wholly
or
partially.
Despite the Constitutions non-impairment clause, TLAs are not contracts,
rather licenses; thus, the said clause cannot be invoked. Even if these are
protected by the said clause, these can be revoked if the public interest so
required as stated in Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705).
Furthermore, Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that: The State shall protect the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. The
right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the government. The said right is also clear as the
DENRs duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions
under Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to
protect and advance the said right.Needless to say, all licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded. It is not a contract, property or property right protected
by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Facts:
Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted
action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C.
Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The

complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' classsuit and alleges that the

plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of
said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before
the
Court."

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's nonimpairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this
case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs
may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they
may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
Issues:

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a

Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs
have no cause of action against him and, the issue raised by the plaintiffs is
a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable
cause of action, the motion is dilatory and the action presents a justiciable
question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was
thedefendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him
and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further
ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment
of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors
not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a
cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a
sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
(Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the
DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's
inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in
natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful
environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged
grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to
cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial
question.

(1) Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.

(2) Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit.
(3) Whether or not the TLAs can be out rightly cancelled.
(4) Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.
Held:
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the
same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued,
a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five
(25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor
cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to
have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately
cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements
of
due
process.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible,
to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests.
Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case
and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation
has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors' assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations
to
come.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's

constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.

Section
16,
Article
II
of
the
1987
Constitution.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written
in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it
is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies
by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect
and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be
lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining
life.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the
Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the
country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated
on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including
those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as
well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be
provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference
to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977,
P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of the
petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's

duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O.
No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said
right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done
with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
should
be
renewed
or
granted.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground
that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; the question submitted to
the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth
of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or determination by the
executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue.
What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable
shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or
review.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts,
the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance
declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence,
the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting
further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the nonimpairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as
law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the
state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment
clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent
Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of
yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the
holder
is
not
entitled
to
it
as
a
matter
of
right.
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge
of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The
petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants
the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN CASE DIGEST

(G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
Facts:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their
parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch
66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital
Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they
are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and
asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and
disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his
agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question.

which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said

right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and
implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly
mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for
the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and
conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of
E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987
have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology
is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim
was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and
healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting
of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the
ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the
expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to
rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and
Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment
of contracts.
Ruling:
First Issue: Cause of Action.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which
the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of
the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable
rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a

specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is
provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on
one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of

contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the nonimpairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and
the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

TANO V SOCRATES
GR No. 110249
August 21, 1997
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted
Ordinance N o. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled:
"AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH
AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY
1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS,
PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF.
Issue:
Is the ordinance valid and constitutional?
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Section 2 of Article X I I reads: The State shall protect the nation' s
marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic z one, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens. The Congress may, by law , allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as w ell as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in
rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide: Sec. 2. The promotion of social
justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities
based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. x x x x x x x x x Sec. 7. The
State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing
resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such
fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate
financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The
State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The
protection shall ex tend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence
fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just
share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right:
SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve

public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (underscoring supplied).
Ruling:
YES. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution
enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to local government units
under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447
(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve
the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances
cannot be doubted.
Both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes:
(1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic animals
covered therein for a period of five years, and
(2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa
and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing
activities. It is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of
Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not approved by
the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be sought would
be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of
municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters. In
closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto
Princesa and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for
exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed legislation to
protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby sharing In the
herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that
other local government units shall now be roused from their lethargy and
adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy
to future generations. At this time, the repercussions of any further delay in
their response may prove disastrous, if not, irreversible.

Mead vs Argel PDF Case Digest p. 58

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD VS. CA ET AL.

G.R. No. 93891
Facts:
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching,
rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater being directly discharged into a
canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos River. Petitioner Board, an
agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the
effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate
applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions, have been
remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-avis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued
discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the river. Petitioner Board
issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist
from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations. Solar, however,
with preliminary injunction against the Board, went to the Regional Trial Court
on petition for certiorari, but it was dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that
appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as
the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's
subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's
petition moot and academic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court
of Appeals, which reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and
remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the
Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same
time, the CA said that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of
petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that
while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that
the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for
reconsideration, without success.
Arguing that that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution were issued in
accordance with law and were not violative of the requirements of due
process; and the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper
subjects of a petition for certiorari, Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L.
Borre for petitioner asked the Supreme Court to review the Decision and
Resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals entitled "Solar Textile
Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board," which reversed an
order of the Regional Trial Court. In addition, petitioner Board claims that
under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte
orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima
facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or
wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible
standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that
the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the River
provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982
Effluent Code. Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own
rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents
discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare,

or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the
inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater
discharged
posed
such
a
threat.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the
ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board.
Held:
The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the
lawful authority of petitioner Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders are
permitted by law and regulations in situations like here. The relevant pollution
control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated
in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety,
health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power.
It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power.
Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for
certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court
to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave due
course on the Petition for Review and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
and its Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the Writ
of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court were reinstated, without
prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the
Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.

TECHNOLOGY VS CA
193 scra 147
Facts:
Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and exporting
charcoal briquette. On February 16, 1989, they received a letter from
respondent Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the
operation of the petitioners plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter also
requested the company to show to the office of the mayor some documents,
including the Building permit, mayors permit, and Region III-Pollution of
Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.
Since the company failed to comply in bringing the required documents,
respondent Acting Mayor, without notice, caused the padlock of companys
plant premises, effectively causing stoppage of its operation.
Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohiition,
mandamus with preliminary injuction against respondents, alleging that the
closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The lower court ruled
against the company. The CA affirmed the lower courts ruling.
Issue:
Whether of not the mayor has authority to order the closure of the plant.
Whether or not the closure order was done with grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
YES. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of
determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires
control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially
addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry
of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized
that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants
from pollution, and by virture of his police power, he may deny the application
for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless
appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of
the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the
business.
The Acting Mayor, in the letter, called the attention of petitioner to the
pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only
pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the
area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders
and it was required to bring the following:
Building permit;
Mayor's permit; and

Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution

permit.
This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the
residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the
Provincial Governor through channels.
NO.The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an
investigation was made. It found that the fumes emitted by the plant of
petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air
pollution device has been installed.
Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta.
Maria, but instead presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati.
While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the
then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the
permit was good only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any
effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control
the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the
community.
Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment
in this dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed however, that concomitant
with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the
economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the
very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the
environment.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V CITY OF DAVAO

GR No. 148622
September 12, 2002
Facts:
On August 11, 2000, The City of Davao filed an application for a Certificate of
Non- Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports
Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI.
Issues:
(1) Is an LGU like Davao exempt from the coverage of PD 1586?
(2) Is the project entitled to a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC)?
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Section 15 of Republic Act 7160,[5] otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, defines a local government unit as a body politic and
corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law.
Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that no person, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally
critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative
Ruling:
(1) NO, IT IS WITHIN THE COVERAGE OF PD 1586. Found in Section 16
of the Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to promote the
people's right to a balanced ecology. Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City
of Davao, cannot claim exemption from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body
politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure
the quality of the environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586.
(2) YES. The Artica Sports Dome in Langub does not come close to any of
the projects or areas enumerated above. Neither is it analogous to any of
them. It is clear, therefore, that the said project is not classified as
environmentally critical, or within an environmentally critical area.
Consequently, the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of NonCoverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can be
compelled by writ of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in the
case at bar.

Bangus Fry Fisherfolk VS Lanzanas

G.R. No. 131442
July 10, 2003
Facts:
Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe ("RED Principe") of Region
IV, Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR"), issued an
Environmental Clearance Certificate ("ECC") in favor of respondent National
Power Corporation ("NAPOCOR"). The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to
construct a temporary mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay
San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of
Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and breeding
ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of
NAPOCOR's power barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its former
mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required relocation to a safer site
like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts power barge would provide the main
source of power for the entire province of Oriental Mindoro pending the
construction of a land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The
ECC for the mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its date of
issuance or until 30 June 1999. Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from
Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera, sought reconsideration of the ECC
issuance. Petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of a writ of
injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility.
Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to
exhaust administrative remedies. They argued that the issuance of the ECC
was in patent violation of Presidential Decree No. 1605, 8 Sections 26 and
27 of Republic Act No. 7160, and the provisions of DENR Department
Administrative Order No. 96-37 ("DAO 96-37") on the documentation of ECC
applications. Petitioners also claimed that the implementation of the ECC
was in patent violation of its terms. TC dismissed complaint.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of
cause action and lack of jurisdiction.
Held:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought.
A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners' principal
cause of action is the alleged illegality of the issuance of the ECC. The
violation of laws on environmental protection and on local government
participation in the implementation of environmentally critical projects is an
issue that involves the validity of NAPOCOR's ECC. If the ECC is void, then

as a necessary consequence, NAPOCOR or the provincial government of

Oriental Mindoro could not construct the mooring facility. The subsidiary
issue of non-compliance with pertinent local ordinances in the construction of
the mooring facility becomes immaterial for purposes of granting petitioners'
main prayer, which is the annulment of the ECC. Thus, if the court has
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, then it has
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioners' complaint.
Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
issuance of the ECC, although it could not issue an injunctive writ against the
DENR or NAPOCOR. However, since the construction of the mooring facility
could not proceed without a valid ECC, the validity of the ECC remains the
determinative issue in resolving petitioners' complaint.

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V CONCERNED

RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY
GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008
Facts:
The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the
Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law,
specifically Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine
Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly
and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to
restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other
forms of contact recreation.
Issues:
(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading
of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in
general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution
incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and
rehabilitate the Manila Bay.
APPLICABLE LAWS:
PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water
Quality. Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree
where it s state will adversely affect its best u sage, the government
agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary
to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water
quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the
responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean - up water
pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do
so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment,
removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operation
shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities responsible for such
pollution.

Held:
(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal,
and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the
contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a
specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a
degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. Section 17 &
20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only.
The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and
scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a
specific and a general pollution incident.
(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by
Mandamus. While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks
may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the
very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in
nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial
discipline describes as continuing mandamus , the Court may, under
extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of
ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative
inaction or indifference.
NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is
institutionalized in the rules of procedure for environmental cases.
20 days Temporary restraining order