Villanueva v.

castaneda
There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along
Mercado Street, a strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a
conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what is commonly known as a
talipapa. This is the subject of the herein petition.
The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this
area by virtue of a previous authorization granted to them by the municipal
government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as
illegal constructions on public property. At the petitioners behest, court have issued
a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo between the parties
pending the decision.
This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961, when the municipal council of San
Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the
Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls
and sell in the above-mentioned place. The action was protested on November 10,
1961, in Civil Case No. 2040, where the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch
2, issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the defendants from
constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy. On January 18,
1964, while this case was pending, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted
Resolution No. 29, which declared the subject area as the parking place and as the
public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218,
series of 1961. Four years later, on November 2, 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar
decided the aforesaid case and held that the land occupied by the petitioners, being
public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the
subject of private occupancy. The writ of preliminary injunction was made
permanent.
The basic contention of the petitioners is that the disputed area is under lease to
them by virtue of contracts they had entered into with the municipal government,
first in 1961 insofar as the original occupants were concerned, and later with them
and the other petitioners by virtue of the space allocations made in their favor in
1971 for which they saw they are paying daily fees. 21 The municipal government
has denied making such agreements. In any case, they argue, since the fees were
collected daily, the leases, assuming their validity, could be terminated at will, or
any day, as the claimed rentals indicated that the period of the leases was from day
to day.
Issue: Whether or not the property in question can be the subject of contractual
undertaking.
HELD

A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of
lease or any other contractual undertaking. This is elementary. Indeed, this point
was settled as early as in Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 23decided in 1915, where
the Court declared as null and void the lease of a public plaza of the said
municipality in favor of a private person.
As was decided by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of February 12, 1895,
which says: "communal things that cannot be sold because they are by their very
nature outside of commerce are those for public use, such as the plazas, streets,
common lands, rivers, fountains, etc."
Court held that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petition for prohibition. On the contrary, he acted correctly in sustaining
the right and responsibility of the mayor to evict the petitioners from the disputed
area and clear it of all the structures illegally constructed therein.
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15 maneclang vs. IAC
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for the quieting of Title over a certain fishpond located
within the parcels of land belonging to them and for the annulment of Resolutions
Nos. 38 (ordering an ocular inspection) and 95(authorizing public bidding for the
lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries, including the fishpond under
consideration) of the Municipal Council of Bugallon Pangasinan.
The lower and appellate courts found that the property in question was originally a
creek forming a tributary of the Agno River.
However, before the parties could file their comments on the matter, a compromise
agreement was made which partakes the nature of an adjudication of ownership in
favor of the petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the subject property, originally a creek, can be acquired by
the petitioner.
Held:
In one case decided by SC, creek was defined as a recess or arm extending from a
river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the
public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription, and as a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens
System in the name of any individual.
Considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the
National Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out

of the subject fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the
nature of the creek as a property of the public domain, the Court finds the
Compromise Agreement null and void and of no legal effect, the same being
contrary to law and public policy.
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Dir. Of Lands Vs. Meralco
Manila Electric Company filed an amended application for registration of a parcel of
land. Applicant acquired the land applied for registration by purchase from Ricardo
Natividad who in turn acquired the same from his father Gregorio Natividad.
Applicant's predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property under the concept
of an owner for more than 30 years.
Respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the registration of the property in
the name of the private respondent. The Director of Lands interposed this petition
raising the issue of whether or not a corporation may apply for registration of title to
land.
Issue: whether or not a corporation may apply for registration of title.
Held:
In earlier decisions, the Court upheld the doctrine that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period
ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land
and becomes private property. Registration thereafter would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested.
Coming to the case at bar, if the land was already private at the time Meralco
bought it from Natividad, then the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against
corporations holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease (1973
Const., Art. XIV, See. 11) does not apply.
Petitioner, however, contends that a corporation is not among those that may apply
for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Public
Land Act.
As ruled in the Acme case, the fact that the confirmation proceedings were
instituted by a corporation is simply another accidental circumstance.
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17. Ignacio vs. dir. Of lands

Facts:
Ignacio applied for the registration of a parcel of a mangrove land in Rizal. It was
stated in the application that he owned the parcel by right of accretion.
The director of land opposed the registration for the reason that the land to be
registered is an area of public domain and that the applicant nor his predecessor-ininterest possessed sufficient title for the land. The parcel of land applied was
acquired from the government by the virtue of permit granted by him by BF.
However, the land in question adjoins a parcel owned by the petitioner and was
formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the Manila bay.
The petition was denied by the lower court and decided that the land to be
registered are part of the public domain.
Petitioner filed a petition contending that the subject property belongs to him by law
of accretion, or by virtue of acquisitive prescription, the said land having ceased to
be of the public domain and became the private property of the state.
Issue:
*Whether or not the subject land is covered by the law of accretion.
*whether or not the property in question ceased to be a public domain for the
reason that it is no longer necessary for public use or purpose.
Rulings:
Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of accretion, having
been formed by gradual deposit by action of the Manila Bay, and he cites Article
457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which provides that:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits on
the banks of rivers, while the accretion in the present case was caused by action of
the Manila Bay.
++++
Then the applicant argues that granting that the land in question formed part of the
public domain, having been gained from the sea, the trial court should have
declared the same no longer necessary for any public use or purpose, and
therefore, became disposable and available for private ownership. Article 4 of the
Law of Waters of 1866.

Courts do not have the power to reclassify a land. The courts are primarily called
upon to determine whether a land is to be used for public purpose. However, it is
only limited there. A formal declaration of reclassification of land should come from
the government, specifically from the executive department or the legislature.
These bodies should declare that a land in question is no longer needed for public
use, some public use or for the improvement of national wealth.
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Tan toco vs. Iloilo
Petitioner owned two strips of land which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated
for widening said street. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo sentenced the said
municipality to pay the plaintiff the amount so claimed, plus the interest, and the
said judgment was on appeal affirmed by Supreme court.
On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable to pay the said
judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution issue against the property of
the said municipality, by virtue of which the sheriff attached two auto trucks used
for street sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, the police stations with the
corresponding lots, used as markets by Iloilo.
The attachment was declared by CFI as null and void as being illegal and violative of
the rights of the defendant municipality upon motion of the provincial fiscal.
Hence, petitioner filed this appeal.
Issue: whether or not the properties levied upon is exempt from execution.
Held:
The principle governing property of the public domain of the State is applicable to
property for public use of the municipalities as said municipal is similar in character.
The principle is that the property for public use of the State is not within the
commerce of man and, consequently, is inalienable and not subject to prescription.
Likewise, property for public of the municipality is not within the commerce of man
so long as it is used by the public and, consequently, said property is also
inalienable.
It is evident that the movable and immovable property of a municipality, necessary
for governmental purpose, may not be attached and sold for the payment of a
judgment against the municipality. The supreme reason for this rule is the character
of the public use to which such kind of property is devoted. The necessity for
government service justifies that the property of public of the municipality be
exempt from execution.
Mandamus is the proper remedy.

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Hilario vs. city of manila
Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land around 49
hectares in area upon his death, this property was inherited by his son, herein
plaintiff-appellant Jose Hilario, Jr., to whom a new certificate of title2 was issued.
The river destroyed the dike, left its original bed and meandered into the Hilario
estate, segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular place of land. The disputed
area is on the eastern side of this lenticular strip which now stands between the old
riverbed site and the new course.
In 1947, the plant (formerly owned by U.S army) was turned over to the defendantsappellants and appellee who took over its operations and continued the extractions
and excavations of gravel and sand from the strip of land along an area near the
River.
The parties filed their separate claims over the disputed property.
Defendants contended that the disputed area was part of the public domain, since it
was situated on the riverbanks.
Issue: whether or not the subject property, which is originally a private property, is
public domain considering that it is already a part of the river bank.
Held:
The court agreed with defendants that under the law, all riverbanks are of public
ownership including those formed when a river leaves its old bed and opens a
new course through a private estate. Art. 339 of the old Civil Code is very clear.
Without any qualifications, it provides:
Property of public ownership is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of
a similar character;